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Everyday autochthony: Difference, discontent and the politics of home in Amsterdam

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INTRODUCTION

As the entanglements of everybody with everybody else have grown in recent times, to the point where everyone is tripping over everyone's feet, and everyone is in everyone's face, its disruptive power, its capacity to induce doubts in those who think they have things figured out, taped, under control, rapidly increases. We live in a bazaar, not a cathedral; a whirl, not a diagram, and this makes it difficult for anyone anymore to be wholly at ease with his or her own ideas, no matter how official, no matter how cherished, no matter how plated with certainty.

Clifford Geertz (1995)

After local elections in March 2011 the Dutch prime-minister Mark Rutte, a member of the free-market liberal, rightist VVD that had won the elections and still today is the largest political force in the country, bore witness to the far-reaching transformation of Dutch political discourse in recent decades. In response to the electoral victory of his party, the prime-minister said, 'We are going to give this beautiful country back to the Dutch, because that is our project.' The premier's words echoed his earlier promise, made when he presented his first cabinet in October 2010, to 'give the country back to hard-working Dutchmen'.¹ This statement

¹ See the column of Anil Ramdas on this issue:
<https://www.groene.nl/artikel/hardwerkende-nederlanders>

exemplified the normalization of a peculiar political discourse in the Netherlands - an exclusionary politics that rests on the construction and imagination of a notion of 'the people', as in the rhetorical figure of the hardworking Dutchman for instance. The people called upon in these discourses, it must be emphasized, 'do not form a shapeless demos, but a particular *ethnos or natio*' (Farris, 2016): the people called into being are 'autochthonous' (cf. Geschiere, 2009a).

The figure of the hardworking, ordinary Dutch person also plays a central role in the rhetoric of the populist, rightwing Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV). The leader of this nationalist and anti-immigration political formation, Geert Wilders, for years has argued that he represents 'hardworking Dutch people' like 'Henk and Ingrid' (sometimes: 'Henk and Anja'). Wilders argues, 'We make a choice for the people who don't have it easy [*die het niet cadeau krijgen*]. Not for the elite, but for Henk and Ingrid.' Boundaries are drawn, in Wilders' discourse, between 'ordinary people' and allegedly pluralist elites, but also between 'white autochthones' and people of migrant background. 'Henk and Ingrid,' Wilders once famously said, 'have to pay for Ahmed and Fatima. They have 'a right' to a safer Netherlands that is *more Dutch*.'² Class and cultural boundaries submerge in a discourse giving form and shape to a rightwing populist political paradigm and social persona - the ordinary person, who is 'originally' Dutch and presumed to be and construed as white.

Important questions concerning the complex plurality characterizing contemporary societies emerge here - particularly considering Geertz' remark above. Who are these hardworking Dutchmen called into being in these discourses? How does this symbolic figure relate to the lived realities of subjects in the urban day-to-day life of mixed neighborhoods? How do these exclusionary

2 *De Telegraaf*, 'PVV doet het voor Henk en Ingrid'. April 23, 2010, my emphasis.

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discourses affect the possibilities for urban interculturalism and the development of new and plural, diverse collective narratives? This book takes as a starting point the emergence, in the extended aftermath of decolonization and the Cold War and amidst the withering of the Fordist-Keynesian compact in Europe, of what Nicholas de Genova has referred to as ‘the European question’, or the problem of Europeanness:

W.E.B. Du Bois famously articulated the ever-unasked question posed implicitly to African Americans -- ‘How does it feel to be a problem?’ While this dilemma persists also for people racialized as non-white in Europe, the question has also become pertinent for the presumptively ‘true’ or ‘real’ Europeans: each national identity -- Dutch-ness, or Danish-ness, or Spanish-ness, and so forth -- has become newly problematic. (De Genova, 2012: 2-3)

The reanimation of nationalism and the strong ascent and normalization of culturalist and nativist politics in Europe, which is expressed in the rise and growing social and political influence of rightwing populist³, deeply exclusionary formations and ideas, calls for an anthropology that turns attention to precisely those European populations construed as native. The rise to political influence of nativist populisms demands an analytic focus on the reconstruction of majoritarian identities in Europe, and the everyday discourses and politics emerging in this context.

³ The term populism is not without its problems. I engage with the debate concerning this notion in Chapter 2.

A culturalization of citizenship

The Netherlands' political landscape has changed fundamentally after the rise and murder of Pim Fortuyn. The ex-Marxist sociologist Fortuyn came into prominence on the political stage in 2001 as the leader of a new, populist anti-immigration, anti-Muslim political movement. His party won almost 35 percent of the vote in his hometown of Rotterdam in the March 2002 municipal elections, and 17 percent nationally in May of that year, in elections held only days after his assassination (see Buruma, 2006). Fortuyn had built his charismatic political persona around a radical attack on the 'established' political right for not heeding the widespread frustration with refugees and immigrants, while blaming the left - which he dubbed '*de linkse kerk*' (the left church) - for abandoning 'ordinary people' to the consequences of immigration and what he called 'Islamization' (Fortuyn, 2001). Fortuyn's discourse built on already existing public and political modes of identifying alterity and associating migrants and their offspring - metonymically but sometimes metaphorically - with social problems and feelings of discomfort and displacement (e.g. Van Reekum, 2014). Baukje Prins has theorized this 'prehistory' of the culturalization of citizenship as the ascent of 'new realism' - a genre of speaking about Dutch multicultural society that emerged in the early 1990s during the so-called national minorities debate (Prins, 2002). Especially the rightwing politician Frits Bolkestein - the 1990s leader of the free-market, conservative liberals already mentioned above (the VVD) - criticized an existing discourse surrounding 'ethnic minorities' as too lenient and permissive. Bolkestein presented himself as a politician who voiced unjustly marginalized popular discourses that could be encountered, he argued, in the churches and bars of the country. He said; 'A representative who ignores the people's concerns is worth nothing' (Bolkestein in Prins 2004). In his important assessment of the transformation of Dutch society and politics in the 2000s, the internationally renowned sociologist Ian

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Buruma quotes Bolkestein saying: ‘You should never underestimate how deeply Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are hated by the Dutch. My political success rests upon the fact that I have listened to these feelings’ (2006: 58).

Fortuyn thus radicalized and normalized an already existing and important new realist discourse, which culminated in a culturalization of citizenship that has deeply affected Dutch society since the early 2000s. Since the rise of Fortuyn, political constructions pitting ‘autochthonous’ Dutch citizens against allegedly devious (post-)migrants have become increasingly normalized in the political and social sphere. In this process, citizenship has become redefined in terms of cultural assimilation, ethnic loyalty and national identity. Ethnicized and racialized groups are now construed and defined as *cultural Others* and as such are asked to integrate into the fiction we call Dutch ‘culture’. At the same time, a communitarian definition of the good citizen has become dominant. As Mandy de Wilde has summarized: ‘The communitarian citizenship ideal implies a transformation in the way citizens are perceived by governments: no longer as rational, individual and calculative subjects but more prominently as affective subjects in search of attachments to something in common’ (2015: 22).

In this dissertation, I analyze this culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands from a critical and ethnographic perspective. The concept gives name to the rise of a discursive genre, an interpretive frame, that carves up Dutch society in distinct, internally homogeneous and delimited cultures, and that represents autochthonous ‘Dutch culture’ as a threatened entity that must be protected against the allegedly deviant cultures and moralities of minoritized and racialized outsiders. The culturalist discourse rests on the construction of a symbolic ‘front’ - a boundary - between autochthonous insiders and so-called newcomers, who - as I will flesh out in Chapter 4 - continue to be

represented as ‘space invaders’ (Puwar, 2004) or guests in a national home. The culturalist logic, which as we shall see, is intimately tied up with populist rhetoric, also sections the autochthonous social space in distinct camps - the ordinary, ‘hardworking Dutchman’ as underdog versus the establishment, while the latter is represented as alienated from authentic, autochthonous realities.

My study is concerned with the *ethnography* of this ‘culturalist’ common-sense in the Netherlands.⁴ Rather than focusing only on the national, discursive frame, I ask how the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ has played out in people’s everyday life-worlds. I approach the culturalization of citizenship as a process of formation in which ‘situated subjectivities’ take shape: a ‘sense of who one is, of one’s social location, and how (given the first two) one is prepared to act’ (Brubaker, 2005: 44). Culturalism is thus conceptualized as productive of categories, frames and schemas through which people perceive the world and act upon it; it is a process in which forms of ‘self-understanding’ (Ibid.) take shape

4 Other notions for more or less the same discourses used in the context of the Netherlands include ‘culturism’, which Willem Schinkel conceptualizes as the functional equivalent of racism (2007). Schinkel prefers the term above ‘culturalism’, used by Uitermark and now by me in this book, because it can be easily confused with the culturalist traditions in ‘American’ anthropology and sociology. These traditions are indeed also grounded in notions that ‘traditional’ cultures exist and can to a certain extent be isolated analytically, although American culturalism is grounded in an intense belief in the equality of cultures, whereas contemporary culturalist ideologies emphasize hierarchies. Other terms used to describe articulations of ‘cultural racism’ include Etienne Balibar’s ‘neoracism’ (1991). My own view is that analyses that make a strong distinction between racism and culturalism are highly problematic. Such distinctions between the old and the new racism in my view cannot be made: racism was always a cultural phenomenon. As Ann Stoler for instance, has pointed out, biological racism was always only one aspect of colonial racism, which was always also about distinction, behavior, and ‘civility’. Racism - in other words - has always been cultural. When it comes to contemporary ‘cultural’ racism, it is clear that the ‘biological’ constantly surfaces within these discourses (e.g. Balkenhol, 2013; Mcharek, 2013). I am therefore opposed to making a clear-cut distinction between racism and culturalism.

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and a sense of location, commonality, and alterity is construed and negotiated. It denotes a transformation in the realm of what Pierre Bourdieu called a *sens pratique* (1990) - the practical sense, at once affective, habitual, emotional and cognitive, that persons have of the social world and their location in it (see Brubaker, 2005: 44; 75).

This focus on categories, frames, and social location leads to a critical exploration of the terms 'autochthonous' and 'allochthonous', which together name an operative taxonomy that carves up Dutch society along ethnic lines, 'nominating into existence' (Goldberg, 1997: 29-30) a majority population of 'white' Dutch citizens classified as 'autochthonous' on the basis of kinship and people's alleged cultural and genealogical attachment to the Dutch soil (Duyvendak, 2011; Geschiere, 2009a; 2009b; Schinkel, 2007; Yanow and Van der Haar, 2011). In other words, the notions of autochthony and allochthony denote a process of majoritization and minoritization (Rath, 1991). As a social anthropologist, my interest is in the enactment of autochthony in everyday life, in the ways in which daily life and people's self-understanding are structured by the discourse of autochthony. During my field work in Amsterdam New West I have studied how autochthony is negotiated and appropriated in everyday life; and what role it plays in the ways people act upon the world. I thus analyze the extent to which autochthony takes shape as a cultural model for the guiding of perception and the organization of social action, and how it does so. I look at the complex relationship between autochthony as a symbolically powerful discourse and imaginary, institutionalized in practices of governance and in political rhetorics, and the things people do with these frames and categories. Conceptualizing the autochthony / allochthony taxonomy, I follow Brubaker's approach of ethnicity as relational and processual and as 'happening every day' (Brubaker et al., 2006: 6-7):

This means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation [...] in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization [...] as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes. (Brubaker, 2005: 11)

Summarizing, autochthony must not be thought of in terms of a cultural substance of an ethnic or national 'group' that we can confidently take as our fundamental unit of inquiry, but in terms of practical categories, situated actions and symbolic frames. The culturalization of citizenship has been studied mostly 'from above' - in and through the analysis of political developments and public discourse. This study, on the other hand, will focus on the politics of everyday life. This is what ethnography has to offer: a focus on symbolic behavior and everyday action, on the subtle ways people and social formations employ, contest, and transform the various 'identities' ascribed to them (Verkaaik, 2010: 70).

A reification of culture

Central to the process of culturalization is the mobilization of a notion of culture as an integral whole - a static totality - and the symbolic equation of social groups with a particular *ethnos* and a reified culture. The culturalist common sense is based on the idea that Dutch culture should be dominant on Dutch soil, and should be defended against the cultures of deviant outsiders. A dominant Dutch culture is to assimilate minorities into the fictive body we call society, which is conceived of as an integral totality with a discrete, monolithic cultural substance (Ibid.). In Jan Willem Duyvendak's terms, the culturalist ideal is a '*homogeneous national home*' (2011, my emphasis).

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The notion of culture as a distinct totality - or a home - constitutes a conception of culture that is troubling from an anthropological perspective. Reified cultural frameworks ignore the relational, processual, and conflictual character of human world-making. It simplifies reality by creating an illusion of cultural unity, reducing the opponent to a knowable and perceivable essence. Culturalism constitutes a discourse that 'equates ethnic categories with social groups under the name of 'community' and [...] identifies each community with a reified culture' (Baumann, 1996: 188). Moreover, the culture ascribed to minorities has increasingly become framed as explanatory of social problems of persons in minoritized social groups, including persistent socio-economic marginalization and deviant attitudes and behavior. This in turn points to a naturalization of culture: those defined as ethnic minorities are seen to 'form a community based on their reified culture; and their culture must appear in reified form, because they are, after all, identified as a community' (1996: 17). Culturalization almost always denotes some form of naturalization. The late Gerd Baumann's critique of essentialist and totalizing conceptions of culture, and the alternative he formulates, is illuminating and deserves attention here. Baumann advocates an understanding of culture as a 'triple helix in perpetual motion' (2007). Cultures, he argues, always have to 'strike new balances among three factors: changing material circumstances ('survival'), changing motivations and cognitive structures ('sense-making'), and changing patterns of action and behaviour ('agency')' (Ibid: 112). The three elements of this triple helix constantly act upon the other: change is the key word here and culture is always in motion. It is not an essence but a process. This understanding of culture as a 'perpetuum mobile' (Ibid.), as dynamic, processual, and historical is at odds with the substantialist, organicist and nativist use of culture in common-sense, culturalist discourse.

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From the perspective of a critical analysis of culture and ethnicity⁵, the carving up of the social world in bounded groups and along ethnic, racial, and cultural lines - and the reification of cultural systems as discrete, coherent entities - cannot be sustained. The reification of culture as an analytic concept is precisely the object of anthropological understanding and critique. In other words, a relational, ethnographically informed analysis of culturalization necessarily constitutes an 'unfreezing' of the 'static, substantialist categories that deny the fluidity - hence, the mutability, of figurational patternings' (Emirbayer, 1997: 308). Such an approach cannot take the dominant discourse for granted: its effects and workings are precisely what are under investigation. Relational social scientists, ethnographers, and others, must find ways of taking vernacular categories, common-sense understandings, and everyday narratives seriously, without falling into the trap of becoming 'analytic naturalizers' (Gil-White 1999, quoted in Brubaker, 2005: 9), replicating essentialist and reifying conceptions.

Social research in the fields of ethnicity and integration in the Netherlands has sometimes suffered from a lack of reflexive analysis and therefore from a form of analytic naturalization. As scholars of race in the United States have argued, racial principles are 'deeply inscribed in the objective structures of racial domination, which some race analysts take for granted because they are deeply formed within them' (Emirbayer and Desmond, 2012: 6). The location of scholars in any racialized order 'deeply affects their presuppositions with respect to it' (Ibid., 5). One of the consequences of this has been that whiteness, conceptualized not in the first place on the

5 See e.g.: Appadurai, 1996; Barth, 1969; Baumann, 1996; 1999; Cohen, 1985; 1999; Eriksen, 1993; Geschiere, 2009a; 2009b; Verkaaik, 2009; Wolf, 1997; 2001; and see Kuper, 2000; Brubaker, 2005; Brubaker et al., 2006; Desmond and Emirbayer, 2009a; Emirbayer and Desmond, 2011; Gilroy, 2005; Schinkel, 2007.

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basis of phenotype, but as a field of power that is defined by means of skin color, accent and language, habitus, normative behavior, aesthetic disposition, cultural preference, and taste, has long been ignored as an object of study and analysis. Whiteness has not been understood as a social construct but as ‘the standard against which all other categories are (implicitly) compared’ (Emirbayer and Desmond, 2012: 6).

This assessment, articulated by Emirbayer and Desmond here but emerging - more broadly - from the field of critical race studies, is highly relevant for the research on autochthony in the Netherlands. Like whiteness, ‘autochthony’ has implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) functioned as the unreflexive norm, a neutral category, a natural fact without a history or relational context. Thus it functions, like whiteness, as a ‘reference category’ (see Emirbayer and Desmond, 2012; Hartigan, 1997) against which deviant cultures can be measured, or a cultural ‘whole’ into which minoritized and racialized Others can be reasonably expected to ‘integrate’. Willem Schinkel has pointed out that, unlike the supposed ‘cultures’ of Others, autochthony is not understood as an *ethnos*, denoting the sense that everything that is not autochthonous is automatically ‘ethnic’, while the notion of ‘autochthony’ itself is exempt from ethnicity and as a result from social scientific scrutiny (Schinkel, 2007: 172-174). As Schinkel (2007) points out, much ‘integration’ research, which plays an important role in the social-sciences in the Netherlands and in Europe more generally, has a tendency to reproduce this ‘differentiation mechanism’, in which society is divided up in allochthonous (ethnic/cultural, outside) and autochthonous (neutral/inside) parts (see Geschiere, 2009a: 130-168).

Autochthony on the one hand is politicized as the normative background against which Others can be seen, known and counted, while on the other hand it is mobilized as a neutral entity, which itself is exempted from scientific scrutiny and reflexivity. This

lack of reflexive analysis can be found in the fields of criminology, economics, and political science, but also in the sociology of integration, ethnicity, and religion, as Daan Beekers has recently shown (2015). Some scholarly representations have the tendency to reproduce precisely the substantialist categories that should be the objects of social analysis. As Duyvendak (2011: 84-105) has argued, the problem with the analysis of 'the social and political crisis around the 'integration' of immigrants in the Netherlands' is that it often begins with the implicit - and sometimes explicit - premise that Dutch autochthonous culture has always been there. It takes autochthony as a neutral, sociologically unproblematic category, a distinct totality that has been disrupted as a result of the forces of globalization and immigration.⁶ Hence, in contrast to the understanding of culture as a 'triple helix in perpetual motion' that Gerd Baumann (2007) defends, some scholars posit an a priori incompatibility of cultural wholes, beginning with the assumption that migrant 'cultures' disrupt an autochthonous sense of home and wholeness. Migrant cultures are thus framed as '*wezensvreemd*', alien/strange, to use the notion the well-known, neoconservative philosopher Ad Verbrugge employs (2004).

This culturalism is explicit for instance, in the work of Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2006), who argue that the discontent of autochthonous Dutch citizens with multi-ethnic realities can and must be understood as the result of a multiculturalism

⁶ Willem Schinkel offers illuminating examples: Van den Brink (2006) begins his work on cultural contrast in the Netherlands with the unreflexive premise that there is a 'tension' between 'the cultural heritage of migrants' and 'the demands of the Dutch environment' (303), as if 'migrant cultural heritage' and 'the Dutch environment' can operate as explanatory variables, as discrete and static substances that are not themselves the product of social composition (see Schinkel, 2007: 149-150). Similarly, Paul Schnabel (1999) posits a fundamental contradiction between a 'modern-secular, universally oriented culture of the Western world', which he describes as accommodating (*inschikkelijk*) to minorities, and the allegedly unaccommodating cultures of minorities themselves (Schnabel, 1999: 10; cf. Schinkel, 2007: 325-326).

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from above. 'Dutch multicultural policies created feelings of homelessness and alienation among native Dutch' (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2006). These authors, not unlike Koopmans (2005), suggest that allegedly pluralist policies of the past not only gave (too much) leeway to (post-)migrants cultures, but also disrupted a once homogeneous national home, an ethnically undisturbed past, a national sense of emplacement and security (cf. Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011).

From a social-scientific point of view, this approach is problematic because it is grounded in a number of false premises (cf. Schinkel, 2007). First of these is the premise that Dutch policies can indeed be labeled as multiculturalist and pluralist. Other researchers have demonstrated sufficiently that this cannot be empirically sustained.⁷ Second, the approach is grounded in 'the local hierarchization of cultures' that Schinkel discusses, the double reification - cultural and spatial - that there is such a thing as 'Dutch culture' *and* that this alleged 'culture' should be dominant on 'Dutch soil'. This very notion linking a reified culture to a particular place is in need of deconstruction. Indeed, the analysis of Dutch autochthony must begin with an understanding of autochthony as a symbolic category - an imagined community - that needs deconstruction, not reproduction. As Francio Guadeloupe (2015) notes, there has always been movement of people, cultural expression, and things within Europe and as part of the colonial 'encounter': multiplicity and diversity are nothing new. Once understood as a 'fiction' - in the Geertzian sense (1973), hence as 'something made', 'something fashioned' - the task becomes to explore the performative power and persuasiveness of the fiction of autochthony, and the ways in which it is materialized in people's everyday life-worlds as common sense and 'really real' (cf. Meyer, 2009; Van de Port, 2004).

⁷ See e.g. Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011; Scholten, 2011; Uitermark, 2010; Uitermark et al., 2014b; Van Reekum and Duyvendak, 2013; Van Reekum, 2014.

Ordinary people

In his book on the politics of home, Duyvendak argues that his analysis of parliamentary debates shows:

that, over time, the crisis in ‘feeling at home’ has indeed become primarily a problem for the native-born. In the 1990s, and around 2000, ‘not feeling at home’ was still mostly discussed as a problem for immigrants [...]. After 2002 (the murder of Pim Fortuyn), and even more after 2004 (the murder of Theo van Gogh), discussions about the loss of home feelings have almost invariably concerned the native Dutch, whom politicians increasingly paint as ‘foreigners’ in their own country. (2011: 95)

In short, the rhetorical figure of the native-born, ordinary autochthon whose sense of home and emplacement has been undermined as a result of immigration and multiculturalist, pluralist policies has come to take an increasingly central role in Dutch politics (Duyvendak, 2011). This is a quite ‘old’ rhetorical figure that has played a pivotal role in far right imaginaries in the 1970s and 1980s, in different ways has also been mobilized by the leftist Socialist Party in the 1980s and after (SP, 1982; cf. Duyvendak, 2011), and by way of the ascent of contemporary culturalist populism has moved from the margins to the center of Dutch political and public discourse.⁸

There is a complex dynamic of cultural hierarchization at work here. In the dominant discourse, white Dutch citizens are equated with the category of ‘autochthony’. People thus categorized

⁸ It has also come to play a central role in social analysis and popular scientific scholarship (e.g. Ellian, 2002; Fennema, 2010; Fortuyn, 2002; Koopmans, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2005; Scheffer, 2000; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2006; Van den Brink, 2006).

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are linked with the soil historically and genealogically⁹, and framed as having an historical right to the soil (Duyvendak, 2011). This nativist logic is replicated in the kind of social analyses that treat autochthony as a norm, not as something to be explained, but as something with which to explain social phenomena - 'Others', deviants, outsiders. One of the critical objectives of my study is precisely to denaturalize autochthony, to understand autochthonous culture not as neutral but as part and parcel of processes of making sense of and giving meaning to the world. I thus seek to observe what notions, idioms, frames, stories, and self-understandings are produced within the discourse of autochthony - and how these are 'staged on and between bodies' (Linke, 2006). What is crucial, therefore, is to pay attention to the affective and emotional dimensions of autochthony, to autochthony as an 'aesthetic formation' (Meyer, 2009) that is grounded in memories, sensibilities, affects, and habits that have historically developed, and that are produced, circulated, maintained, and shared among people, informing their everyday dispositions in multiple ways. The politics of home are a matter of aesthetic formation (Meyer, 2009; cf. Tamimi Arab, 2013). Autochthony is about people, but it is also about material things and features, about buildings, events, and emotions. Autochthony constructs continuity between the different levels of Dutch 'whiteness'. A focus on habits, emotions, and things shifts attention to the marshaling and organizing of white audiences through affect, and to the structures of feeling within which white, autochthonous people shape their everyday emotive and perceptive life-worlds.

9 See for instance, the 2009 Labor Party white paper on migration and integration: 'Neighborhoods built for workers and the middle class have become migrant districts. Well-known social customs have disappeared. Shared codes of conduct are no longer self-evident. [...] [P]eople have experienced feelings of unease. Their country is changing and they feel alienated. They feel the changes have been foisted upon them - and that is a nasty feeling when it comes to the country where you were born and raised, which you, your parents and their parents built up' (PvdA, 2009, quoted in Duyvendak, 2011: 96-97).

Commonplace diversity?

Knowing the city, argues the anthropologist James Holston, is always experimental (1999, 155).

Cities are full of stories in time [...] Their narratives are epic and everyday; they tell of migration and production, law and laughter, revolution and art. Yet [...] each foray into the palimpsest of city surfaces reveals only traces of these relations. Once lived as irreducible to one another, they are registered as part of the multiplicity and simultaneity of processes that turn the city into an infinite geometry of superimpositions. (Holston 1999, 155)

I certainly cannot put it better than that. When I began coming to terms with Amsterdam ethnographically, back in 2009, the complexity and multiplicity of the city - looked at not (only) with a bird eye's view, but (also) from the microscopic perspective of everyday life - impressed upon me the difficulty of what I had set out to do. Amsterdam is not a metropolis or mega-city, but a medium-sized European city that is nonetheless a node in several transnational networks of global flow: it is a globalized city that exemplifies and incorporates 'the excesses, in various forms, of late capitalism and political conflict. Large metropolitan cities produce a heterogeneous quantity of signs and impulses that are to an unprecedented degree open to interpretation' (2008: 66). The problem was how to do justice to this multiplicity, and how also to do justice to the fact that the urban environment 'seems to make its own involuntary demands' (Gandhi and Hoek, 2012: 3; cf. Hansen and Verkaaik, 2009). Fully aware of the limits of 'writing culture' (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) and of the impossibility of giving an unambiguous account, the complexity of the city first of all produced bafflement and headaches.

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One of the new and important concepts that has emerged in recent years to describe the 'urban condition' in the era of late-capitalist globalization, political conflict, and mass-immigration - a concept that holds the promise of making sense of the dramatic heterogeneity of urban experience today - is the notion of 'super-diversity' (Vertovec, 2007). This concept names, according to its proponents, a diversification of diversity characterizing the lived reality of an increasing number of people in urban areas across the world. The concept, it is argued, provides 'a lens to describe an exceptional demographic situation characterized by the multiplication of social categories within specific localities' (Wessendorf, 2014: 1). Scholars have argued that this 'new' urban condition has gone hand in hand, in many areas, with the normalization of difference. Susanne Wessendorf, in her study of diversity in Hackney, argues that in that part of London where she lives and works, diversity has become 'commonplace' (2014). 'Diversity has become habitual and part of the everyday human landscape' (Wessendorf, 2014: 3).

By focusing on what I call the culturalization of everyday life in an Amsterdam neighborhood in New West, where I worked from 2009 to 2011, in this book I stress the other side of super-diversity. Another side that Wessendorf already alludes to when she argues that, even in Hackney, in the private realm, cultural particularity and boundary construction remain the dominant modes of negotiating diversity. Rather than understanding super-diversity in terms of an increasing normalization of alterity, I argue that the contemporary global city is characterized by what Birgit Meyer and Peter Geschiere have called a 'dialectics of flow and closure' (1999): increasing heterogeneity, while sometimes becoming commonplace, also sometimes provokes an ever more powerful focus on locality, belonging, and identity fixture. In a world characterized by flux, a great deal of energy is invested in fixing, controlling, and freezing identities (Meyer and Geschiere,

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1999: 5). As I see it, Dutch culturalism - understood by me as the dominant mode of regulating diversity in the Netherlands today - is a discourse of controlling and fixing identity in times of urban transformation and global flux. The culturalist common sense that has now been firmly constituted in this country produces an increasing focus on and awareness of the alterity of neighbors. As a result, it brings into being a *commonplace culturalism*, signifying a process of boundary making between those who are ethnicized as *autochthonous* - and thus entitled to soil and nation regardless of their cultural choices - and those who are construed as guests or strangers because they are associated with ethnic, cultural and / or religious alterity. It is for this reason - a pressing reason, it seems to me - that my dissertation focuses on the construction, negotiation, and appropriation of the discourse of autochthony in 'super-diverse' times (cf. Geschiere, 2009).

One aspect of Amsterdam New West that struck me was that so few people that I spoke with exhibited any *indifference to difference*. The powerful emergence of autochthony in the Netherlands stands in contrast, it seems to me, with Wessendorf's notion that in Hackney 'almost everybody comes from elsewhere' (2014, 2). Autochthony precisely denotes a clear and powerful boundary between those who come from elsewhere and those who can claim to have been 'born from the soil' and thus to be home in the nation (cf. Geschiere, 2009; Duyvendak, 2011). This boundary between so-called 'autochthonous' and 'allochthonous' residents plays a key role in everyday discourse, especially among people ethnicized as autochthonous, in New West. This, I shall argue, indicates a particular 'distribution of the sensible' (Rancière, 2004a). That is to say, the way people negotiate self-understanding and alterity in everyday life is intimately entwined with political and public discourse, which imposes meaning upon everyday life, on the perception and experience of alterity and therefore on the construction of self-understanding.

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In this book I make use of my ethnographic explorations in New West to shed light on the politics of autochthony - part and parcel, in my view, of a culturalist distribution of the sensible, a 'regime' of making (common) sense, of putting things and people in their place and role, while ideologically legitimizing this particular distribution. I show that the construction of autochthony is always already contingent upon alterity - and upon the images and emotions that 'adhere' to culturalized and ethnicized Others (cf. Ahmed, 2000). Autochthony is dependent upon the ways in which the Other is produced as a knowable object. This is a pivotal dimension of Dutch culturalism. Indeed, the culturalization of citizenship can be described as a process in which 'allochthonous' people come into being as cultural Others, never fully at home among those who are seen to belong to the soil. The alterity of Others can be achieved precisely because the culturalist framework rests on collective representations of reified and culturalized 'groups' the members of which are thought and seen to be defined by social stereotypes that are understood and framed as inherent to their groups' collective life and culture. Indeed, before the Other can be known - and can be distinguished from ordinary neighbors - a particular discourse already has to be in place - a field of knowledge that enables people to distinguish between neighbors and Others. I will focus on various ways in which this field of knowledge, this 'common sense', is produced and maintained in everyday discourses by zooming in on discussions surrounding the tangible, material future of the neighborhood and what I have called the discourse of displacement; on the anthropology of disorder, respectability and what I refer to as a nostalgia for the state; on the everyday politics of loss, alterity, and race; and on the sexual politics of culturalism.

New West: a very short history

This book is about the dialectic of autochthony and alterity in the Netherlands, but it is also an urban ethnography of Amsterdam New West. This district can be seen as a 'plural time-space,' 'into which are folded layers and fragments of personal and public histories' (Weszkalnys, 2010, 16). It is impossible to give one, coherent account of the district - and I will not attempt this. Rather, I follow particular narratives and representations as I have encountered them in this part of town, without doing justice to the full complexity of views and discourses in the everyday life of the district. I do so in the conviction that this particular anthropological study of New West sheds light on Dutch social history and cultural (trans)formation in more general terms. I argue that in giving shape to an ethnography of New West, I am able to 'extend out' from the field, 'to extract the general from the unique, to move from the 'micro' to the 'macro,' and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory' (Burawoy, 1998: 5).

The area in which my research has taken place is the neighborhood of Sloterveer, part of the district referred to as the Western Garden Cities (*Westelijke Tuinsteden*), or Amsterdam New West. New West was built on the basis of the *Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan* (General Expansion Plan, AUP) of 1934. Its genealogy can be traced to the socio-spatial ideologies of modernist urban design, planning and architecture - the social utopianism of the movement for the Garden City of Ebenezer Howard on the one hand and the organicism and functionalism of the *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM) on the other. As the anthropologist James Holston has argued in his study of Brasília, the quintessential modernist city, architectural modernism can be looked at as a 'discourse on the good government of society which proposes architecture and city planning as instruments of social change and management' (1989,

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12). The emergence of modern planning, presupposing the city as an object of knowledge and intervention, can be traced to the birth of the nation state and the industrial working class (cf. Holston 1989; Scott 1998). Industrialization went hand in hand with a crisis of agricultural, rural life, an escalation of urban growth, the rise of an urban proletariat (and a extremely poor and marginalized sub-proletariat), and the concomitant need to develop instruments to control and contain the city and its populations.

The British movement for the Garden City around Ebenezer Howard and his *International Federation for Housing and Town Planning* came into being in the late 19th century as a response to the abominable housing situation of the British working class (e.g. Engels, 1845). The Garden City was to become an alternative to the poverty and chaos of the modern industrial city, which was seen as a threat to the security and stability of the state. Howard's ideas were to have a tremendous impact world-wide because they contained a 'plea for integrated urban planning' as an alternative to 'the haphazard and spontaneous development of cities by private developers, which had been the norm until the end of the 19th century' (Oudenampsen, 2010: 2). The concept of the garden city combined a number of existing ideas on (alternative) urban development, including (utopian) socialist and anarchist thought, but stood out for its combination of such radical utopian notions with pragmatic applicability. '[T]he Garden City as proposed by Howard was one part political utopia, one part feasibility study' (Ibid.: 3). Moreover, the concept embodied industrial modernity's paradoxical character: on the one hand the belief in the 'makeability' of the future, in modernization, on the other a distaste and political dissatisfaction with the chaos, flux, and despair of modern urban life. This paradox was reflected in the garden-city ideal of combining the best aspects of urban and rural life, of tradition and modernity, of nature and culture (cf. Scheffer 2006, 7). Pleading for the demolition of the 'wretched' working class slums of London

and replacing them with 'parks, recreation grounds and allotment gardens', Howard wrote: 'Elsewhere the town is invading the country, here the country must invade the town' (Howard, 1902; quoted in Oudenampsen, 2010).

A similar 'modern paradox' characterized the other modernist movement in urban planning and architecture, more sober than the 'Romantic' garden-city movement (cf. Scheffer, 2006): the *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM). CIAM was founded on the premise that modern architecture and planning were the means to create new forms of 'collective association, personal habit, and daily life' (Holston 1989, 31). The 'guiding hand' (Ibid.) of CIAM was Le Corbusier, whose Charter of Athens led the way. The Dutch architect and urbanist Cornelis van Eesteren played a central role in the movement (cf. Scheffer, 2006; Heijdra, 2010; Van Rossem, 2010). CIAM advanced and prescribed a functionalist, rationalist, and organicist view of the city and urban design.

Modernist planning and architecture were based on the compartmentalization of urban spaces, the separation and specialization of functions as an alternative to the unplanned, market-driven urban chaos of earlier epochs (cf. Abrahamse et al., 2007). Modernism expressed, in other words, the modern quest to master ambivalence, to restrain and contain 'raw existence, the existence free of intervention, the unordered existence' (Bauman, 1991; 7) through planning and rationalization. Zygmunt Bauman argues that this desire to contain ambivalence, to organize and rationalize, in fact is a defining element of modernity: 'We can say that existence is modern in as far as it is effected and sustained by design, manipulation, management, engineering' (1991, 7). The paradoxes of modernity - and its cultural and aesthetic expression, modernism - are evident here. Modernity is characterized by a tension between fragmentation and constant change on the one hand, and the desire to control and contain on the other.

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The same paradox is found in modernist architecture and urban design, which were grounded in both the acceptance of, and even enthusiasm for, the inevitability of technological progress and modernization - in what had become thinkable, imaginable in modern industrial capitalism - and on a Romantic hostility to and fear of the transformations associated with these developments. The ideologues and architects in CIAM and the garden-city movement were driven, simultaneously - and dialectically - by love of modern life and by anti-urban sentiments. The ideals of modern urban design combined the wish to emancipate and elevate the working classes with the equally important wish to control and regulate. For Howard, the Garden City was a form of common-sense socialism; he was less concerned with the outward form of the city than with the process that would produce new forms of democratic urban organization, common ownership and administration, and self-government.

The AUP - the General Expansion Plan - was approved and presented in 1934; but building activities started only after the war. The construction of the garden cities in the 1950s offered Dutch modernist architects the chance to bring their convictions about urban organization and design to life in material form. They wanted to employ industrial design to build a new city as a means of reconstructing the social order and giving shape to a new, truly modern, kind of person. Working class people were to be liberated from the cramped and chaotic circumstances of life in the old popular neighborhoods, from the lack of space and hygiene in the inner city. Light, air, and space were the new principles guiding urban design, and building activities started only after extensive scientific studies on typology and building techniques, hygiene, urban functions, and the use of public and private space (cf. Hellinga, 1983; 2005; Van Rossem, 2008).

The decision to build a neighborhood for mostly working and middle class people on the west side of Amsterdam was linked partly

to the development of the Amsterdam port and its industrial areas, which were projected to extend westward. The new neighborhoods of New West were to become a 'labor reservoir' for these industries (cf. Hellinga, 2005). After the war however, the plans to create a socially homogeneous district of industrial laborers and their families were modified: mounting costs of construction had led to higher rents than anticipated, which most working class people could not yet afford. The target group was therefore extended to other socio-economic categories, including teachers, civil servants, and other members of the emergent middle-class. Moreover, at different places in New West comfortable, more expensive homes arose on what were called 'golden borders' [*gouden randjes*], to attract more affluent and even wealthy people, while returnees from Indonesia (a former Dutch colony), and 'migrants' from rural districts in the north of the country also came to live in the area (and were perceived and treated as outsiders) (Hellinga, 2005). Although in the early years the population of the new neighborhoods consisted mostly of young couples raising children, New West has always been a socially and culturally heterogeneous district (Ibid.) - contrary to popular ideas that construe the past, retrospectively, as homogeneous.

The new suburbs offered only very few possibilities for the enormous social mobility that characterized the decades after WW2. Due to the pressure to build massive numbers of housing units as cheaply and quickly as possible, most houses were too small to accommodate family growth, and the capacity to facilitate the demands of socially mobile, 'upper working class' people was limited. Between the late 1960s and early 1980s a rising number of upwardly mobile people started leaving New West for (white, 'middle class') towns in the vicinity of Amsterdam. (Post-)migrant families slowly took their place. In 1981 less than five percent of the residents of Amsterdam New West were categorized as of Surinam, Turkish or Moroccan origin (cf. Hellinga, 2005: 62). The

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number of (post-)migrants rose to twelve percent in 1987, and 38 percent in 2002. In 2010, while I was doing fieldwork, the total of '*niet-westerse allochtonen*', the taxonomic category now employed for residents with a (partly) 'non-Western' genealogy, was 49 percent. In Slotermeer, where my research was concentrated, around sixty percent of residents was categorized as non-Western 'Amsterdammers'; thirty-two percent of the population was qualified as autochthonous. My research has focused on residents ethnicized as autochthonous. Some of these people can be seen as the 'original urbanites' [*oorspronkelijke stedelingen*] that Nio et al. refer to - white autochthones above the age of fifty who have spent decades living in New West - although some of the people the reader will encounter in this book have moved to New West more recently. Most of the people discussed in this dissertation are white residents over the age of fifty. Although New West is changing quickly - a new category of 'new urbanites' is now contributing to a process of gentrification in New West - this social group still makes up a large part of the white 'autochthones' in Slotermeer (Nio et al., 2009).

The local as a microcosm of the nation

Amsterdam New West can be understood historically only in relation to urban politics and urban developments in a broader sense. The making of New West after WW2 was an expression of the Keynesian consensus, marked by a belief in progress, modernization, and make-ability (cf. Duyvendak, 1999). Developments within the district since then are also closely tied up with historical developments in a broader sense: a slow but definitive diversification of diversity, increasing prosperity and social mobility of the working classes, and - starting in the 1990s - the growing influence of neoliberal conceptions of urban development. By placing my data in this historical and discursive context, the relevance of this dissertation extends the confines of

the everyday in the district. In short, the anthropology of New West has something to say about the historical anthropology of post-war Dutch society in general.

In his autobiographical novel *Badal*, the Dutch author Anil Ramdas - who dramatically committed suicide in 2012 - places the figure of Badal, like the author a Hindustani-Surinamese Dutch journalist and public intellectual (and alcoholic), in a house by the sea, in Zandvoort. In the book, Badal, whose career has come to a dead end and who is frustrated about current political developments, mounting to racism, in his country, intends to write a 'brilliant' come-back essay on what he calls 'white trash' - the electorate of the right wing populist Geert Wilders and his far-right PVV, but actually working and middle class whites more generally. Anil Ramdas presents Badal digging through the comments on news items on the websites of Dutch broad sheets, counting the number of times people in their comments refer to either 'time' or 'space'. They do so constantly, Badal finds, by referring to 'the nation' and 'the past'.

Time and space are of pivotal importance to Dutch autochthony. Space and time submerge in the nation, which, as Benedict Anderson has shown, is grounded first of all in a sense of geographical boundedness. 'The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations' (Anderson, 1991: 7).¹⁰ Moreover, the nation, imagined as a community, 'conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Ibid.), is grounded in a fundamentally modern mode of apprehending the world, a modern conception of time that has made 'thinking' the national community possible.

¹⁰ It is of importance here that in the early 1990s Anil Ramdas interviewed Benedict Anderson about his book, 'Imagined Communities, for Dutch television. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNJuL-Ewp-A>

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Borrowing from Walter Benjamin, Anderson argues that the nation is grounded in the emergence of an idea of 'homogeneous, empty time' (Anderson, 1991: 22-36), 'in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar' (Anderson, 1991: 24). Anderson demonstrates that this is an historically novel idea of time and goes as far as to argue that 'every essential modern conception is based on a conception of 'meanwhile'' (Ibid.): 'The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history' (Ibid.: 26). The nation is thinkable as a 'substance', a bounded and solid community, because we have a conception of time - a conception that we can call 'modern' - that gives us complete confidence in the 'steady, anonymous, simultaneous' activity of strangers (Ibid., 26), to whom we are connected, even though they are strangers. This knowledge of temporal homogeneity and simultaneity, reproduced by mass media, literature, film, blogs, reassures us that the imagined world of the nation is rooted in mundane, everyday activities (getting up in the morning, reading the newspaper, going to school or work, taking the train at set times, etcetera).

Modern nationalism thus necessarily rests on a sense of homogeneity, simultaneity, cohesion, and boundedness. This focus on the national community as a cohesive and bounded whole in the Netherlands is replicated and made tangible in what I have called 'a culturalist conception of locality'. That is to say, the neighborhood community emerges in the public imagination as a microcosm of the nation. Indeed, modern nationalism everywhere goes hand in hand with the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991; Appadurai, 1996). More precisely, it relies heavily on urban planning and organization. In fact, architecture and city planning have become instrumental to the social regulation of citizens and

the organization of social order. Lack of cohesion and order at the neighborhood level has a dramatic symbolic significance at the level of the nation. I will elaborate on this in chapters 2 and 3.

Urban planning, including large scale public housing projects, has played a key role in the making of reliable and emancipated Dutch national citizens and the regulation of the Dutch nation-state since the late 19th century. The paradoxical character of post-war Dutch society, as reflected in the urban/anti-urban dialectic of modernism, was articulated in the *wijkgedachte*, a neighborhood cohesion ideology that was rooted in the British garden-city movement and older community based ideologies originating in the United States, Australia, and Germany and that gained currency after World War 2. In this community ideology the fear of the loss of social cohesion in modern society was combined with the modern optimism that cohesion could be organized at the level of the neighborhood. After the war the concept was popularized because intellectuals and politicians were eager to find ways to preserve and secure the cohesion that was imagined to have existed during the war years. Indeed, in 1946 a book was published on the neighborhood as community entitled *De stad der toekomst, de toekomst der stad* ('The city of the future, the future of the city'). It outlined what the post-war city should look like if based on the *wijkgedachte*. An individualizing society, it was argued, needed a tight, hierarchically organized neighborhood community as a bridge between the nuclear family and society. Such a neighborhood community was to protect people from metropolitan anonymity and alienation, and was seen as an answer to the atomization and de-socialization of individuals in modern society.

The *wijkgedachte* was criticized by Dutch sociologists, most importantly by J.A.A. Van Doorn, who argued that it was not based on an 'analytical reality' but rooted in an ideological and emotional distaste for urban life (Hellings 2005, 40; cf. Diemer-

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Lindeboom 1955). The sociologist Diemer-Lindeboom (1955) criticized it as authoritarian, anti-modern, and anachronistic. These critiques of the concept notwithstanding, the neighborhood idea was influential in the post-war Netherlands and also took root in social-democratically dominated Amsterdam. Dutch social democracy embodied the very contradictions and paradoxes of post-war modernism and articulated the 'co-occurrence' of a modern optimism about the 'make-ability' of society and the possibilities for social change, with the equally modern fear of disorder and lack of cohesion in the city. 'In the large city, man has become an atom surrounded by an unknown mass of other atoms', argued a special study group of the Amsterdam social-democratic Labor Party in 1953 (PvdA, 1953; cf. Heijdra, 2010: 75, my translation). The neighborhood idea was to bridge this modernist and social-democratic paradox. The modernist fear of the loss of social cohesion in post-war society was combined with an equally modernist optimism that cohesion could be organized at the level of the neighborhood. Such a community was seen as an answer to the perceived de-socialization of individuals: it was to make strangers into neighbors, as well as loyal citizens.

The *wijkgedachte* was deeply influential in the post-war Netherlands and the sense that the neighborhood can and must function as a locus for the organization of social cohesion and integration remains influential today (e.g. Uitermark, 2003; Duyvendak, 2006; Schinkel, 2009). This becomes rather conspicuous in the projection of culturalist fears of disorder onto the neighborhood (see Schinkel, 2009; 2012).

Tropes of autochthony: displacement, nostalgia, and respectability

The culturalist common sense in the Netherlands relies heavily on the idea of the crisis of the purified community (Sennett, 1996; Ahmed, 2000), which is discursively located in pluri-ethnic, so-

called 'concentration neighborhoods' (see Uitermark, 2003). These spaces figure in public representation as the sites of a multicultural drama (Scheffer, 2000). In Sara Ahmed's words, the disadvantaged neighborhood 'enters public discourse as a site of crisis' (2000: 26). It figures as a constitutive outside of the ideal space of culturalist ideology - the homogeneous and orderly national home (cf. Duyvendak, 2011). The construction of the image of the 'good citizen' happens in connection with an imaginary of *failed* citizenship - the multicultural, disadvantaged neighborhood as the space of disorder, populist discontent and struggles over belonging and emplacement (Mepschen, 2012, cf. Balkenhol, 2014). The neighborhood constitutes, in this symbolic discourse, the space where an autochthonous sense of displacement - supposedly the result of increasing cultural diversity - can be localized.

Since the mid-1980s New West has transformed from a white working and middle class area to a heterogeneous district in which over fifty percent of residents now have differentiated, transnational, diasporic backgrounds. The neighborhood exhibits, in short, the traces of fifty years of labor and postcolonial migration, resulting in what Vertovec has called a transformative 'diversification of diversity' (Vertovec, 2007). Concomitantly, the district has been confronted with a potent set of territorial stigmas (cf. Wacquant, 2008). One of the neighborhoods on an infamous list of forty top-priority 'attention neighborhoods' (*aandachtswijken*) issued by the Dutch minister of Integration and Housing in 2007, it has since long been stigmatized not only as peripheral and depraved, but also as 'lacking liveability' (see Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008) and sometimes as perilous. Its inhabitants have increasingly become marked as troubled, marginal, poor, and disruptive. The small, sober homes people live in have come to be seen as anachronistic, out of sync with contemporary middle class demands, while the functionalist, modernist forms, structure, and architecture that characterize this part of Amsterdam have come to be perceived,

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increasingly, as the disheartening determinants of petty crime, deterioration, alienation, and feelings of insecurity.

The affects of displacement and nostalgia are central here. These affects - part and parcel of the alleged crisis of the national community - play key roles in the marshaling and organizing of culturalist and populist audiences. Popular urban neighborhoods have become important sources and objects of culturalist passions and anxieties. Neighborhoods like those in New West therefore constitute a formidable location for ethnographic research into the workings of everyday autochthony, while at the same time making a good starting point for an ontogenetic understanding of autochthony as the outcome of a specific social history, a social history in which the 'white' working and middle classes in the Netherlands have 'become autochthonous'. As I will argue in Chapter 3, the dialectic of territorial stigmatization and respectability plays a key role here: local residents cannot identify with the stigmatized representation of their district and mobilize a discourse of respectability to defend their locality and their sense of self-worth. As we shall see, this dynamic is tied up with post-colonial and labor migration - with the construction of culturalized and ethnicized Others as agents of decreasing respectability.

If space, place, and displacement are central, so is time - or rather, temporality. Take for instance this response to the publication of a popular history of New West in 2010. A man who grew up in New West, contributing to the website '*Het Geheugen van West*', stated:

What a feeling of melancholy emanates from such a photo of the Sloterpark baths [...]! It makes me rather mournful! We [...] lived in a house with a through lounge [...] furnished with austere modern furniture, from Gispen, among others...The morning sun on the marble patterned vinyl. The sound of the number 13

tram [...] of scooters, amplified in the bathroom [...] Yet it had the bright smell/taste of progress...something perhaps many people yearn to have back.¹¹

The smell and taste of progress is also what New West was celebrating in festivities around the sixty year anniversary of the district, with the slogan: *60 jaar toekomst* (60 years of future) in 2012. The paradoxical mobilization of a discourse of progress and futurity as nostalgic praxis in New West I argue, must be understood in relation to a broader dynamic in which this part of the Dutch capital, to the great dismay of many New West residents, has become framed as an anachronistic space - a part of the city that is out of sync with the times. As the saying goes about New West: '*Het is niet meer van deze tijd...*' It is no longer 'of this time' - 'it is not part of now'; or as one developer, connected to the housing corporation *Stadgenoot*, told me in the course of my field work, reflecting on New West: 'It is now in the past...' [*Het behoort nu tot het verleden*].

In recent decades many people have argued that New West and its modernist forms should be dismantled, demolished and replaced by a denser, chaotic, creative, or spontaneous city, and residents who depend on public housing should for a large part be replaced by residents with spending power in larger and more expensive apartments. Indeed, since the 1990s New West has been one of the largest building sites of Europe. However, the representation of New West as 'in the past' has not remained unchallenged. In the course of my fieldwork from October 2009 to

11 Hoe melancholiek stemt zo'n foto van het Sloterparkbad [...]! Het stemt me wel een beetje weemoedig! Wij [...] bewoonden een doorzonwoning [...] ingericht met die strakke, moderne, meubels van o.a. Gispen... Het zonlicht 's ochtends op het marmoleum. Het geluid van tram 13 [...] brommers versterkt in de badkamer [...]. Het had toch de opgeruimde geur/ smaak van de vooruitgang... waar velen misschien wel naar terug zullen verlangen. (Huub Derkson, 29 August 2010)

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June 2011, I have taken part in numerous cycling tours and walks through Amsterdam New West, organized by residents, architects, landscape specialists, local historians, etcetera. Moreover, while I was working in New West, the *Van Eesterenmuseum*, celebrating the neighborhood's modernism while building on a nostalgic sense of a past belief in progress, was launched - a local initiative that relies on the work of many volunteers and has been highly successful.¹² These activities contributed not only to the construction of a particular spatial identity in New West, but grounded this spatial identity in an imaginary of optimism, progress, and futurity that is understood to have characterized this district in the past.

The current historical moment is often theorized in temporal terms as 'post' something, as a historical moment following a time now passed. This moment has been variously named late-capitalist and postmodern, new capitalist, fast-capitalist and millennial capitalist, post-Fordist, postindustrial and postcolonial.¹³ When it comes to the Netherlands, Jan Willem Duyvendak evokes a comparable temporal imaginary when he argues that 'home feelings of the majority' must be understood in relation to the 'two major revolutions of our times: the gender revolution and globalization' (2011: 3). I think there is ample reason for such temporal conceptualization and, moreover, for an understanding of the contemporary historical moment in Europe in terms of historical shift, but I agree with Andrea Muehlebach and Nitzan Shoshan (2012) when they argue that we have to move beyond sweeping analyses of temporal rupture and 'towards ethnographic considerations of the present as fundamentally entwined with the past'. This focus on the everyday meaning of social temporality shifts my attention - especially in Chapters 3 and 4 - to nostalgia: 'a

12 See URL: <http://vaneesterenmuseum.nl>

13 See, for instance, Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; 2006; Gilroy, 2004; Harvey, 1990; Holmes, 2000; Jameson, 1991; Muehlebach, 2011; Sennett, 1998; 2006)

consuming feeling born of the realization that human temporality is irreversible' (Angé and Berliner, 2015: 6). A cultural practice that mediates collective identities, I understand nostalgia as a transformative politics in and through which temporal discontinuity is negotiated and discourses of self and Other emerge in relation to (a sense of) temporal rupture. Understood as a discourse of spatial and temporal rootedness, a defense against the 'terror' of both time and deterritorialization, I propose that autochthony can be understood as a nostalgic cultural practice in and through which people shape a sense of self, place, and belonging. This connection of nostalgia and autochthony alludes also to a specific articulation of nostalgia in the contemporary Netherlands with secularism and sexual freedom. Nostalgia denotes, I will attempt to demonstrate in Chapters 4 and 5, a longing for a homogeneously Judeo-Christian 'home' (Van den Hemel, 2014) and a discomfort with those who are seen to trespass on this sense of emplacement and enjoyment.

Post-Fordist affect

The transformations of urban politics in the Netherlands, and the ways in which it is contested and negotiated, offer a good angle and starting point for the ethnographic exploration of these cultural practices. This dissertation is grounded in a 'Marxian' understanding of late-capitalist development - the analysis that contemporary urban transformations signal a process of development from a Fordist to a post-Fordist society, associating post-Fordism with the 'condition of postmodernity' (Harvey, 1990; Jameson, 1990; see also Storm and Naastepad, 2003) and with globalization. The period of the large scale modernist projects of the post-war Netherlands, characterized by a strong belief in social 'makeability' and half- and wholehearted efforts to enfold the popular classes into middle class morality, order, and affluence, has slowly but surely come to an end. As in other European countries, we have seen the emergence of quite another form of organizing society - a shift to post-Fordism.

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The post-World War 2 Fordist-Keynesian compact, and the kind of social constitution that emerged from it, was characterized by a belief in progress and a fair amount of societal optimism; it was a mode of organizing society that Tony Judt has recently somewhat nostalgically referred to as ‘the time of collective purpose’ (Judt, 2010). From a Marxist perspective, David Harvey discusses post-war Fordism as ‘less a system of mass production than [...] a total way of life’ (Harvey, 1989). Harvey understands Fordism as mode of thinking, living, and feeling life - a psycho-social nexus that produced subjectivities and social relations that were intimately tied up with the building of the welfare state - the Keynesian consensus, biographic, social mobility, the regulation of market capitalism, collective planning, the emphasis on social make-ability, and a particular organization and understanding of time, exemplified by the 8-hour work day. In other words, what is curiously called ‘Fordism’ in the academic literature - a term of which the meaning goes far beyond the actual ideas of the person for whom it was named, the industrialist Henry Ford - has constituted an infrastructure of social relations and subject-positions that belonged to a particular historical period in capitalist development - and that with the ascent of neoliberal relations and temporalities have slowly but definitely disappeared (cf. Comaroff en Comaroff, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Harvey, 1990; Muehlebach, 2011).

The use of the term Fordism, it has been made clear to me, can lead to confusion: what does Henry Ford have to do with it? I follow David Harvey, who argues he broadly accepts:

the view that the long postwar boom, from 1945 to 1973, was built upon a certain set of labour control practices, technological mixes, consumption habits, and configuration of political-economic power, and that this configuration can reasonably be called Fordist-Keynesian. (Harvey, 1990, 124)

EVERYDAY AUTOCHTHONY

While the figure of Henry Ford has played a central role in the shaping of modern capitalism, the term Fordism refers less to him than to what Antonio Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks describes as ‘the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a new type of worker and a new type of man’ (In: Harvey, 1990: 126). In these analyses, Fordism is understood as a distinctive, modernist regime of accumulation - a particular moment in the history of modern industrial capitalism - that was brought to maturity after 1945 and remained intact until 1973. Harvey points out:

During that period, capitalism in the advanced countries achieved strong but relatively stable rates of economic growth. Living standards rose, crisis tendencies were contained, mass democracy was preserved and the threat of inter-capitalist wars kept remote [...] Fordism became firmly connected with Keynesianism. (1990: 129-131)

The development of Amsterdam as a city is exemplary of the ascent of post-Fordism, as is demonstrated by the focus on Amsterdam as a ‘creative capital’ (Oudenampsen, 2008; Peck, 2011). If Amsterdam New West was once the flagship of the modernist avant-garde, it has increasingly become framed and discussed as ‘no longer of this time’, a modernist anachronism, so to speak, in post-modern times. Inhabitants of New West take this imaginary very personally. ‘What is meant,’ I have heard many times in the course of my field work there, ‘is that *we* are no longer of this time.’

I have already argued that autochthony can be understood as a defense against the terror of time - as a nostalgic discourse in which, paradoxically, futurity and progress play key roles. As David Harvey (1990) has argued, the transformation of Fordism to post-Fordism signals the transition to a new temporal regime and

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a transformation in 'the structure of feeling' (Williams, 1973). The shifts in how we live, work, dwell, experience, perceive, and feel lead to new forms of political struggle, new affective relations and antagonisms. Echoing the analysis of post-socialist nostalgia (e.g. Berdahl, 1999; Mandel and Humphrey, 2002), Andrea Muehlebach points out that post-war 'Fordism' must not be understood only as a time now passed but as a period with an 'affective afterlife' - a period that has great influence in the present. A Fordist 'structure of feeling' is mobilized, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, in people's perspectives on the present. A longing for certain welfare state arrangements, including public housing arrangements, is one aspect of this. Another is the longing for a tangible state, for a particular form of social order and authority.

To fully understand autochthony, I propose that it must be studied in a context in which a post-Fordist 'structure of feeling' is defined and construed over and against the structures, rhythms, lifestyles, and forms of belonging and community that can be seen as part of an historically different period - that of the Keynesian consensus, the 'secular truce' (Achterberg et al., 2009), and the welfare state (Naastepad and Storm, 2003). It is this historical period that has now become framed as anachronistic, old-fashioned, 'from another time'. The sense of loss and longing that emerges in this context can be studied by tracking 'the discursively articulated tropes of memorialization', but such feelings often 'appear in the form of a more diffused sensitivity that, while palpably felt and expressed in everyday practice, is not - or not fully - available for discursive elaboration' (Muehlebach and Shoshan, 2012). I shall try to shed light and make sense of these diffused sensitivities by fleshing out ethnographic case studies concerning the transformation of everyday life in New West.

Structure of the book

I have structured the book around these major themes: (1) the complex question of the discourse of autochthonous displacement, (2) the issues of stigmatization and respectability, (3) the relationship between culturalism, alterity, and race, and (4) debates surrounding sexuality, 'gayness', and locality.

In chapter 2, I zoom in on the perspectives of 'autochthonous' residents in New West, demonstrating how the plans for the demolition and restructuring of the neighborhood opened up a space for the articulation of a discourse of displacement in antagonistic relations with 'Others' - elites and sometimes (post-) migrants. The analysis offers insight, I hope, into the conjuncture of the culturalization of citizenship, the crisis of representation, and the transformation of the affective relationship between citizens and the state in a post-Fordist and postcolonial Netherlands, and therefore into the deeper structures of Dutch 'populism', while developing a critical perspective on the notion of populism.

In chapter 3, I continue thinking through the role of the state by focusing, ethnographically, on respectability, order, and what I have called a 'longing for the state' in the making of autochthony. I explore the complex set of issues connected to respectability and dis/order in the affective formation of home, place, and self-understanding. As I shall demonstrate, 'autochthonous' residents define and defend their 'home' in the face of what they perceive as a growing threat to their way of life and their hard-won respectability. This perceived threat is posed by the physical proximity of cultural 'Others', but especially by the changing face of the state and civil authorities, who are distrusted and seen as agents of stigmatization and decreasing respectability. The defense of respectability and the negotiation of stigma is part and parcel of the performance of a symbolic and moral boundary work. In order to be able to counter stigmatization and defend respectability, residents must 'externalize' the responsibility for neighborhood decline by means

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of the performance of boundaries. They do this first of all through classification, by mobilizing particular politics of *bringing order to disorder* by naming the agents of decreasing respectability and symbolic defamation - the state and other authorities - who are accused of deliberate neglect - and sometimes certain groups of post-migrants as well as other outsiders, who are viewed as culturally or socially incapable of respectable behavior.

If in the chapters 2 and 3, I have already dealt with the question of nostalgia, chapter 4 offers an analysis of the relationship between nostalgia and alterity. Focusing on the enactment of autochthony, I show that the making and doing of autochthony is always dependent on alterity. Indeed, autochthony can only come into being when a particular self-evidence concerning the alterity of Others is already in place. Before the Other can be known, a particular discourse has to be accepted, a field of knowledge that enables people to distinguish between ordinary neighbors and cultural Others. Moreover, this field of knowledge structures perception: it construes how people perceive and encounter the Other, in both a discursive and a corporeal way.

Finally, in chapter 5 I zoom in on sexuality, alterity, and gay rights in the dynamics of culturalization - issues that loom large in the Netherlands today. Taking an ethnographic approach, I foreground the complex interplay of religion, secularism and sexuality in the 'making' and 'doing' of autochthony in an everyday, local context, a complexity that is lost in much of the existing analyses of Dutch multiculturalism.