Cape Verdeans in Cova da Moura, Portugal, an ethno-historical account of their destinies and legacies

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III. Review of the Literature

III.1 Conceptual Framework

My overall approach to analysis of how the three families (first and second generations) could adapt and cope in the host country, is illustrated in Figure 13.

![Conceptual Framework](image)

**Figure 13**: Conceptual Framework for analysis of the Literature

The factors identified for inclusion in this conceptual framework and the way they are organized into components rely on literature with a focus on: immigrants’ poverty, social networks, segmented assimilation, transnationalism and racism. It aims to explain the lives of Cape Verdean families in Portugal, more precisely in Cova de Moura, influenced by strong legalization issues and city constraints.

The framework suggests that the socio-economical characteristics of these families (informal work, low school attainment) combine with institutional factors (being undocumented) in predicting low mobility associated with poverty.
III.2 The Concept of ‘Culture of Poverty’

Poverty is largely the result of social and behavioural deficiencies in individuals that ostensibly make them less economically viable within conventional society (Jordan, 2004). However, due to persistence of poverty in certain areas, the behavioural perspective is reinforced by the ‘culture of poverty’ thesis, suggesting that individuals create, sustain, and transmit to future generations a culture that reinforces the various social and behavioural deficiencies (Rodgers, 2000).

The idea of the ‘subculture of poverty’ was introduced by Oscar Lewis in 1958, at the International Congress of Americanists in San Jose, Costa Rica (Harvey and Reed, 1996: 466). Later, Lewis mentioned it in his book *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty* (1959). Although admitting that he had meant a ‘sub-culture’, Lewis chose to use the term ‘culture’ for convenience, and the term became popular in this form. The fullest description of the developing concept was given in Lewis’ book *La Vida, A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty* (1965). Comparing his study of 171 families in Mexico City with data on slums collected by other social scientists, and with descriptions in other essays, Lewis “noted certain persistent pattern associations of traits among families with the lowest income level and the least education” (Lewis, 1970: x).

In anthropological circles Lewis is remembered for: 1) his ethnographic study of the above-mentioned community in Mexico, which came to different conclusions from those of an earlier study of the same community by Robert Redfield (1930); 2) the quality of his ethnographic texts, whether he was writing about rural or urban Mexico, about Puerto Ricans in San Juan, New York or in communities in India, and 3) his most important theoretical contribution to anthropology and social science, the concept of the ‘Culture of Poverty’.

But what are the problems and conditions favouring the development of a ‘culture of poverty’? Lewis argues that the concept is based on people's adaptation in urban areas to an

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28 Lewis’ research in Topoztlan took place in a village that became famous earlier through the study by Robert Redfield. The following work by Redfield, *Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village* (1930) and *Chan Kom: A Maya village* (1934) included anthropological studies of Mexican communities.
industrial capitalist society with its inherent inequalities: low wages, high unemployment, underemployment for unskilled labour, a failure to provide social, political and economic organization for the poor population, bilateral kinship system, the possibility of upward mobility, and thrift. All of these factors and blaming the poor for personal inadequacy make the poor develop certain patterns of behaviour to deal with their low status, in order to adjust to their marginal social and economic position in the wider society. This behaviour is characterized by low aspirations, political apathy, helplessness, disorganization, and pretending to adopt middle-class values (Lewis in Berndt, 1969: 190-192).

“The way of life which develops among some of the poor under these conditions is the culture of poverty. It […] can be described in terms of some seventy interrelated social, economic, and psychological traits,” writes Lewis (1965: xlv).

The ‘culture of poverty’, however, is not only an adaptation to a set of objective conditions of the wider society; it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effect on the children. This is due to the basic values and attitudes of their parents that accompany the children during their growing process. Fatalism and low level of aspiration are some of the main determining and conditioning factors in this process (Lewis, 1965: li). Consequently, they are not psychologically prepared for changing conditions or to grasp opportunities which may occur during their lives even if structural conditions change, as Lewis observes:

“Once it comes into existence, it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effect on children. By the time slum children are six or seven years old, they usually have absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime.” (Lewis, 1965: xlv)

The poor remain in poverty not only as a result of their economic condition, but also because of cultural values and practices they have developed from poverty (orientation towards the present and instant gratification, a preference for happiness over work, a tendency to value family ties over moral considerations of right and wrong, engaging in sex with multiple partners and others). Briefly, “the culture of poverty is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society”, defines Lewis (1965: xlv). But it is not just an adaptation. Therefore, overcoming a situation of poverty does not necessarily mean ending the culture of poverty. In other words, even if the situation of poverty changes, people do not automatically abandon behavioural
patterns adopted during their (long lasting) previous situation. The ‘culture of poverty’ as a way of life, is a combination of certain traits, passed on through generations. It is an adaptation to poverty, to ‘being at the bottom’ in an industrializing society, but perpetuating itself once started. It crosses national and ethnic boundaries, but has different characteristics in different circumstances.

The four main characteristics of the ‘culture of poverty’ can be summarized as:
1) the lack of effective participation and integration of the poor in the major institutions of the wider society; 2) poor housing, overcrowding and a minimum of organization beyond the level of the nuclear and extended family; 3) the absence of childhood as a specifically prolonged and protected stage in the life-cycle of some of the poor, as well as early initiation in sex, free unions or consensual marriages. There is also a trend towards the female-centred family; 4) strong feelings of marginality, helplessness, dependence and inferiority.

In recent times of global economic recession, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening - a reality that many societies in Europe are experiencing today. It can be assumed that those who are wealthy will do everything they can to remain in that category, but the poor do not have many possibilities to escape the dynamics of downward mobility.

For Lewis, a ‘culture of poverty’ develops when persistent poverty exists and when the poor are thrown back upon their own resources. In most of our parliamentary democracies, and especially in the U.S., there is no political consensus to support them.

In fact, they are liable to be blamed for their own condition, without consideration of their real resources, as they have no sufficient means to change their situation. In their efforts to adapt to these extreme situations, they often end up engaging in patterns of practice which can easily be psychologically and socially dysfunctional. But such patterns, which constitute a subculture of poverty, are the product rather than the cause of persistent impoverishment.

Once these patterns are established, they contribute to reproduction of poverty. The ‘culture of poverty’ does provide an adaptive strategy for low living conditions, excluding, however, many options that could lead to upward mobility. This may sound rather deterministic, but my fieldwork results corroborate this assumption in several cases.

In this context, I would like to emphasize two issues in Lewis’ delineation of the particular traits of the culture of poverty: 1) the part of Lewis’ discussion that involves empirical
description. The characteristics he describes are actually present in particular impoverished surroundings, as my research confirmed. After my readings, I realized that some anthropological works criticized Lewis’ writings for over-generalizing on the basis of information from a specific community, or sometimes even from a single family. This may be true (in the case of the Sanchez family), but does not invalidate the theoretical concept for the attention given to specific details of sub-cultural patterns associated with the ‘culture of poverty’; 2) the fact that Lewis transmitted an unpleasant image of poverty does not mean that he is blaming the poor for their condition. Instead, Lewis takes care to point out the circumstances in which a ‘culture of poverty’ is likely to develop. In La Vida (1965) he distinguishes a set of mechanisms to cope with precarious conditions, to change the circumstances in which the ‘poor’ are stigmatized by poverty.

The ‘culture of poverty’ theory has proven to be applicable in certain societies, but it is not consistent throughout different societies across time and space. Some scholars claim that the ‘culture of poverty’ does not exist, or at least that there is no evidence of it. Others hold that poverty can be explained through the situational theory, which concerns economic and social structures within societies. Still, and despite extensive criticism, the concept of ‘culture of poverty’ seems to continue its influence as a credible theory.

III.2.1 The Controversy of the Concept of ‘Culture of Poverty’

Already in the 1960s, several scholars contested the concept of ‘culture of poverty’, which started some controversy. For example, Charles Valentine (1968) one of the critics of the ‘culture of poverty’, suggested that one of the most serious defects in current studies of the poor is the lack of comparative analysis. A major task of research on the poor, he argues, should be “to discern what cultural features are shared by different but related subsystems” and “what culture traits or configurations are shared by the lower class with the middle class or with the system as a whole.” (Valentine, 1968: 114-115). He defined his concept as a distinct sub-culture characteristic for lower classes which is different from the dominant culture of the wider society. According to Valentine, the distinctive element of poverty sub-culture is a disorganized, pathological or incomplete version of the major aspects of the generally dominant culture. He claims that poverty sub-culture is self generating in two ways: 1) the cultural patterns of the group are perpetuated by socialization; 2) its socialized individuals acquire psychosocial inadequacies which block their entry into the dominant
culture. Valentine contrasts these two models used by social scientists to explain the persistence of poverty in advanced industrial societies.

Valentine also criticizes Lewis’ style of writing and the way his findings are presented: a short introduction by the author is followed by simple “transcriptions of testimony” of the informants, without the narrator commenting on them “The transitions, connections, and interrelations among the different levels of analysis are never entirely clear” (Valentine, 1968: 51). He also disapproves of Lewis’ methodology in *La Vida* (1965), pointing out that the collected data and his conclusions do not match: “Thus does Lewis attempt to move back and forth from individual to family to culture” (Valentine, 1968: 51). In Valentine’s opinion this approach is not altogether successful.

Also, O’Connor (2001) accused Lewis of not adequately contextualizing the life stories he presented, so that “any connection to political economy or broader social conditions was completely obscured” (2001: 120). In fact, some misunderstandings arose from Lewis’ generalizations. Both in *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies of the Culture of Poverty* (1959) and in *La Vida* (1965), not all the families described and not all family-members represent the ‘culture of poverty’.

This fact seemed self-evident to Lewis himself, but his descriptions can be confusing. Instead of trying to distinguish where the described people are placed in the continuum of ‘culture of poverty – working class – middle class’, there is the temptation to generalize the assumption that Lewis warned against: equating poverty with the ‘culture of poverty’.

Other important arguments in the controversy referred to the values and behavioural patterns of the poor and to the author’s questionable assumptions: 1) Lewis assumes that individual practices were caused by their values, ignoring the fact that many people, from different social classes, act against their values; 2) he lists both values and behaviours, leading to a circular argument (excusing a certain behaviour based on cultural patterns); 3) he assumes that a single culture categorized very diverse people; 4) he assumes that people’s culture is static and does not change in their lifetime and that individuals play a comparatively minor role in creating their own culture and practices.

Although Lewis emphasized that the ‘culture of poverty’ is adaptive, just as helping the poor to survive in their circumstances, he was criticized for writing about it in largely negative terms. The concept itself had negative implications for poor people, despite Lewis’ view that
his notion of ‘culture’ should stress the dignity and worth of the poor. That was especially true when the concept gained popularity and even started to be used in public debates and political discussions in the U.S. and European countries.

Once again, Valentine disputes the whole “prehistory” of the idea that the poor should have certain self-perpetuating traits and that certain doctrines interpret their social position and deprivation as resulting from internal deficiencies. He criticizes conservative scholars, such as Franklin Frazier, Nathan Glazer, and even Daniel Moynihan30 for writing in this “pejorative tradition,” especially about “black” people (1968: 20).

In Valentine’s perspective Lewis is following, maybe unconsciously, this line of thought, especially when he mentions policy questions. Moreover, he interprets the ‘culture of poverty’ and ‘lower-class culture’ as “twin concepts” (Valentine, 1968: 76). As an answer to this criticism, Lewis wrote: “… I find Valentine’s book tendentious, self-righteous, pedestrian, and downright irresponsible in its distortion of the views of others” (in Berndt, 1969: 189).

Nevertheless, it was also noticed that the description of a ‘culture of poverty’ is not only consistently negative, but reflects middle-class values. Clearly, “the actual terms used to describe the attributes are value-laden” (Eames and Goode 1970: 481). The ‘culture of poverty’ model, being “grounded in what today is called ‘Marxist humanism’” (Lewis in Berndt, 1969: 485) was intended to argue against racial, national and regional discriminatory explanations. However, discrimination became one of the issues Lewis was criticized for later. It is crucial to realize that it was not his concept of the ‘culture of poverty’, but his development of new methods of family ethnography which Lewis considered his most important work.

The idea of ‘culture of poverty’ was proposed as “simply a challenging hypothesis which should be widely tested by empirical research” (Lewis in Berndt, 1969: 191). Although Lewis tried to point out positive, adaptive sides of the ‘culture of poverty’, for example that low aspiration helped to reduce frustration, he recognized that the ‘culture of poverty’ “is a thin,

30 Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report investigated poor families of urban blacks and concluded that the disintegration of many of these families could be traced to their matriarchal character, a situation that stood in contrast to the patriarchal character of the wider society. The cognitive dissonance this created for black males contributed to the dysfunctional behaviours that reinforced their own condition. Before the 1960s, scholars argued that poverty was primarily caused by economic conditions. The ‘Moynihan Report’, which called for policies to improve the condition of the black family, contributed to a gradual resurgence of behavioural arguments. However, Washington at the time was dominated by the liberals and Moynihan’s recommendations were effectively ignored.
relatively superficial culture” (Lewis, 1970: 78). It also seems that some of Lewis’ critics use definitions of culture that differ from the definition Lewis provided. For instance, Valentine was criticized for understanding culture merely as “a system of strongly held values passed on by formal instruction” (Hannerz in Berndt, 1969: 186), which is much narrower than the system of traits and way of life, as understood by Lewis.

Likewise, some authors applauded the concept of culture as a mechanism for adaptation, because it implies the approach of cultural ecology (Eames and Goode, 1970: 479). Others were sceptical about the appropriateness of the concept of culture in the circumstances of poverty for the same reason, arguing that the “way of life” starts as an adaptation to very oppressive circumstances (Valentine, 1968: 114). This point was probably most exactly summed up by Peter Townsend, who claimed “it would be not consistent to call it culture, when the members of it do not accept its supposed values” (Townsend, 1979: 69). Defining subculture as a system of values, beliefs and institutions, “positively established and upheld”, and at variance with the majority in the society, he concludes that disorganization, instability, fatalism and inferiority are neither approved nor self-perpetuated. Despite its limitations, the ‘culture of poverty’ theory still has its reason to exist as a heuristic tool in explaining poverty.

III.3 The Concept and ramifications of the ‘Underclass’

One particular aspect of the ‘culture of poverty’ thesis, the idea that the adaptive behaviour of the poor contributes to their continued poverty, developed into the theory of ‘underclass’. The debate waged over the notion of the ‘culture of poverty’ in the 1960s and 1970s; the emergence of ‘underclass’ as a widely used concept in the U S. and in Britain occurred more recently. In many ways the two concepts appear to refer to the same population and set of dynamics, an observation that has been made by several scholars (Auletta, 1982, Wilson, 1985, Lemann, 1986, Murray, 2001).

The term ‘underclass’ appeared in the U S. and was used by Gunnar Myrdall (1962) referring to unemployed, unemployable and underemployed persons and families at the bottom of society. Other scholars used the term referring to diverse subjects: Herbert Gans (1965) connected the ‘underclass’ to public housing. Andrew Brimmer (1971) linked the ‘underclass’
to welfare dependency. Ken Auletta (1982) attributed certain behavioural patterns and values to those seemingly belonging to the ‘underclass’: 1) synonymous with the black residents of urban slums 2) implied poverty was a permanent condition 3) connected to an end to black progress.

Generally, the term designates people without means or opportunity for effective legal participation in society. The ‘underclass’ is thus situated below the working class, which, although exploited, is able to participate in economic reproduction, rather than subsisting on government subsidies (although sometimes it may be necessary), charity and crime.

The emerging ‘underclass’ of structurally unemployed individuals is often concentrated in minority groups. Nearly all definitions underline the lack of employment opportunities. This has to do not only with a job shortage, but with a mismatch of skills to opportunities through rising demands for formal education and declining demands for manual labour in industrialized countries.

One key part of contemporary sociological debates about the ‘underclass’ involves the cultural reproduction of structural features of poverty and dependency (single motherhood, devaluation of education) over the relative absence of steady employment.

Wilson defined ‘underclass’ as “that heterogeneous grouping of families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system. Included […] are individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or are not members of the labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency” (Wilson, 1987:8). Later he subscribed to another definition developed by Martha Van Haitsma (1989) in which the ‘underclass’ are “those persons who are weakly connected to the formal labor force and whose social context tends to maintain or further weaken this attachment’ so that structural factors are either reinforced or counteracted by the cultural factors of social context” (Haitsma, 1989:28). According to Wilson, the urban poor, especially blacks, belong to the ‘underclass’. His criteria are the structural labour market position rather than the behaviour of the ‘underclass’. Being against race-specific policies to address the problems of ‘underclass’, he uses the ‘underclass’ theory in the context of the persistent urban poverty which is the result of the combined interacting effects of joblessness, deteriorating neighbourhoods, and the oppositional culture. These forces generate: 1) disappearing job opportunities, 2) moving out of stable working-class families, 3)
disintegrating employment networks, 4) disappearing role models, 5) declining number of two-parent families and 6) declining number or disappearance of communities and institutions that depend on resources provided by middle-class families. Also the young poor become socially isolated from mainstream social networks that facilitate social and economic advancement. They become more vulnerable to gangs, drugs, dropping out of school and teenage pregnancies. Obviously, these behavioural factors impede their economic and social mobility.

In his study *What is the Underclass and is it Growing?*, Jenks (1989) distinguishes three types of failure in people belonging to the ‘underclass’: the moral (deviant behaviour), the economic (unable to get paid work) and the educational (lack of skills and qualifications) (Jenks, 1989: 14). Also in *Beyond Poverty*, O’Brien (1997) makes a distinction between two groups of the poor: the deserving poor, those who find themselves in poverty but struggle to exist (for example ‘working poor’ for low wages) and the undeserving poor, those who live on the margins of society (the ones that live on state benefits).

Even if there is still no terminological agreement about ‘underclass’, its different definitions tend to reflect whether the definer subscribes to a structural or behavioural/cultural explanation of its causes. Thus, the ‘underclass’ is defined purely and simply in terms of relationship to the labour market’s social relationships. Even if the relationship to the labour market forms the basis of the structural definition of ‘underclass’ used by Wilson, he also points to behavioural characteristics. From his point of view, the long term unemployed, whether forced or voluntary (living on state subsidies) and marginals belonged to the ‘underclass’.

The next section identifies the case of the British underclass as an example of a post-colonialist stance similar to the Cape Verdean families studied in Portugal.

**III.3.1 Relationship of British ‘underclass’ with the Portuguese Case**

The concept of ‘underclass’ had different formulations across the Atlantic. In Britain, earlier usage of the term in the 1970s tended to focus on the racial dimension as a way of demonstrating the impact of discriminatory employment and housing policies on minority
ethnic groups (Murray, 1996: 2). Dahrendorf (1959) had already emphasized that it was a phenomenon of race in Britain, as well as in the U. S.

Both Field (1989, 1995) and Murray (1996) explicitly dispute this racial connotation in the British context, where the ‘black population’ is much smaller than in the U. S.

In his books *The Emergence of Britain’s Underclass* (1989) and *Making Welfare Work* (1995), Field argues that the very poor constitute a “class apart” from mainstream society. According to this argument, this class not only exists at the bottom of the society, but is also socially excluded in terms of income, life chances and political aspiration.

In 1998, Field’s own portrayal of the emergence of a British ‘underclass’, in his book *Losing Out*, identifies four main “forces of expulsion” (unemployment, widening class differences, the exclusion of the very poor from rapidly rising living standards, and a hardening of public attitudes) as having created an ‘underclass’, separated from the rest of society “in terms of income, life chances and political aspirations” (Field, 1998: 196). For Field, this process of exclusion is closely connected with “the loss of a comprehensive approach to citizenship” (Field, 1998: 153). This concept was previously developed and explained by Horowitz in his work *On the Dole in United Kingdom* (1995).

Murray (1990, 1994) discusses the concept of an ‘underclass’ relating it to issues of illegitimacy and the state of the British family, crime and unemployment. He claims that “‘underclass’ does not refer to degree of poverty, but to a type of poverty” (Murray, 1996: 24). His interpretation of the concept refers to those excluded because of their anti-social, or even criminal behaviour, including drug-taking, unwillingness to work steadily, absenteeism from school and violence.

Murray considers ‘illegitimacy’ the best indicator for an ‘underclass’. The crime rate was increasing in the 1990s when his articles were written, and he cited statistics that pointed to more property crime in England than in the U.S. Murray’s special concern, however, was crimes of violence particularly committed in problematic neighbourhoods where it became difficult for parents to raise their children. According to his findings, also the education and labour sectors determined acquisition and preservation of both self-esteem and the respect of others. The increasing numbers of drop-outs from school and the decrease in labour force participation in the 1980s led Murray to the conclusion “that Britain has an ‘underclass’ and that it is growing” (Murray, 1996: 19).
While Field set out to investigate the structural causes of an ‘underclass’, Murray’s analysis focuses on behaviour as both its cause and defining characteristic. It is this association between an ‘underclass’ and the behaviour of its members which has contributed much to the controversy surrounding the work of Murray (1996) and others who subscribe to his ‘underclass’ thesis. This association with long historical antecedents and the debate about the role of behaviour in causing poverty has been an issue over the years.

During this debate, the anthropological concept of ‘culture’ had gradually changed due to the influence of the sociological/ economic terminology of ‘class’/ ‘underclass’. Morris (1989) discusses this shift, claiming there is an ideological basis for preferences in use of some concepts rather than others. According to Morris, “the underclass represents a segment of the poor who are not only economically deprived, but who manifest a distinctive set of values, attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behaviors as well” (Morris, 1989: 125).

On the other hand, Runciman (1972) argues that the class analysis relies on economic assumptions (benefit receipt), determining the definition of ‘underclass’ as those among the working classes “whose roles place them more or less permanently at the economic level where benefits are paid by the state to those unable to participate in the labor market at all” (1972: 27). However, it is not simply benefit receipt which defines the ‘underclass’ but also their exclusion from the labour market on a more or less permanent basis. Moore (1975) suggested that, despite its possible inadequacies, a collective term such as ‘underclass’ may be needed to refer to the group of marginalized migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers, inner city ethnic minority populations and the very poor who “typically have little or no control over goods and skills either within or outside a given economic order” (Moore, 1975: 60).

However, in his work on the history of the ‘underclass’ theory, Macnicol (1987) summarizes it as “the way that ‘underclass’ has been used to signify and denote the alleged cultural differences of the poor, whether these are seen as behavioral inadequacies, such as an alleged inability to plan for the future, or as an adaptive response to the structural challenges under which these people live” (Macnicol, 1987: 293). The idea of social exclusion is emphasized by Welshman (2002) in his book *The Cycle of Deprivation and the Concept of Underclass* based on a “cycle of deprivation” in terms of “material deprivation” factors such as low
family income having cumulative cultural effects such as “culture deprivation”, dropping out from school leading to educational failure and to low-paid, low-skilled work (2002: 3).

The interpretation of this section requires moving between the very different cultures of Britain and the US, raising the question of how ideas were transmitted between the two countries and whether a parallel process was going on in other countries, such as Portugal. I argue that the answer can be found in their economic structures, histories and collective identities. The persistence of the ‘underclass’ and related concepts suggest the importance of behavioural and structural factors in the causes of poverty and deprivation.

The term ‘underclass’ is often employed by Portuguese scholars, such as Mendes (1997), Baganha (1999), Pires (2009) and can be found even in Government publications about different ethnic groups31. At a cultural level, Fado32 might be considered the expressive voice of the Portuguese ‘underclass’. Also the Portuguese media mention the idea (not the term) of a growing intergenerational ‘underclass’ and connect it directly with the economic crises that affected the most vulnerable part of the population, including many immigrants33. In fact, this rise of the ‘underclass’ coincides with periods of economic reforms or changes, accompanied by high levels of poverty, unemployment and social dislocation.

My research points to a historically-specific emergence of what may be considered an ‘underclass’ formation in Portugal and I argue that ‘underclass’ does apply to certain segments of the wider Lisbon communities. Moreover, this ‘underclass’ is usually spatially separated from mainstream society. And unlike the poor, their members are often regarded as a category of persons who live on social resources. Although this ‘social problem group’ exists in Portugal it appears not to have influenced government policy directly, as concerted official measures were hardly introduced. Their members remain unemployable, unemployed and spatially segregated. Being ‘unemployable’ due to their lack of professional and educational skills led inevitably to precarious social and economic situations. The continuing acceleration of technological change, globalisation and economic uncertainty originated

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32 Fado is an urban popular song-genre of Portugal originating from the Alfama area in Lisbon. Historians believe that Fado is a multicultural blending of songs of Portuguese homesick sailors, musical traditions from rural areas of the country brought by successive waves of internal immigration, African slave songs and ancient Moorish ballads. In 2011 it was awarded the World’s Intangible Cultural Heritage by UNESCO. According to UNESCO, ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage’ includes traditions and skills passed on within cultures.
33 On 21 March the Census of 2011 founded 394,496 foreign citizens living in Portugal, which represented 3,7% of total residents in the country.
groups perceived as ‘left behind’ and ‘cut off’ from the mainstream. Furthermore, residential segregation near urban centres, such as Cova da Moura, provokes a concentration of economically vulnerable groups in poor housing neighbourhoods. The study of Sparkbrook by Rex and Moore (1967), a comparable example, focuses on the notion of ‘housing class’ and shows how the type and location of housing is a crucial aspect of stratification at both subjective and objective levels. The groups in question were restricted in their choice of housing location due to their low incomes, prejudice and the hostility of landlords. Mostly, they were not entitled to council houses, a situation experienced by many African immigrants when they arrived in Portugal.

However, there is another Lisbon that offers economic opportunities and is upwardly mobile. It is this dynamic of increasing socio-economic exclusion, on one hand, and socio-economic improvement, on the other, which allows us to speak of ‘underclass’ formation and its tendency to grow.

These facts and the attempt to explain them are likely to ensure that the term ‘underclass’ and related concepts continue to be debated in the future.

III.3.2 Discussion of ‘Culture of Poverty’ versus ‘Underclass’

Can the two concepts, ‘culture of poverty’ and ‘underclass’ be compared? One of the meanings of ‘underclass’ presented by Morris (1989) is that “the underclass represents a segment of the poor who are not only economically deprived, but who manifest a distinctive set of values, attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behaviors as well” (Morris, 1989: 125). Since then, the concept has become more popular; Morris discusses this shift and finds there is an ideological basis for preferring to use some concepts rather than others. The anthropological concept of culture was changed by the sociological and economic language of class. Morris gives four reasons for that: first, ‘underclass’ is a more neutral term. It is less demeaning to poor people than the ‘culture of poverty’. Second, it does not depict the poor in general, but only one subgroup. Third, the ‘underclass’ concept fits better the sociological frameworks focused on class-based stratification systems. This also means it fits the structural explanation of poverty better.
Finally, the understanding that just a small segment of the lower class has some problems is considered acceptable, meaning there is no need for large scale restructuring of society in order to change the economic redistribution system (Morris, 1989: 128-131).

Finding remedies for the constraints of the ‘underclass’ in a competitive environment, based on economic values, is a difficult task. Auletta (1982) maintains that some are "passive victims of government support" (1982: 49), which is a relatively new phenomenon. However, in times of crisis the ‘underclass’ tends to become a larger segment of society, contrary to the assumption of Morris (1989). Wilson’s notion of cultural pathologies with structural origins has met with scepticism. The poor with little education and low wage employment become vulnerable due to their precariousness. As Anderson (1978) puts it: “When jobs are not available, living up to rules of conduct based on the values of ’decency’ becomes difficult, and those rules based on residual values become a more viable alternative for maintaining self-esteem” (1978: 210).

But the real advance in the ‘underclass’ debate is the acceptance that the poor are neither homogeneous nor a monolithic segment. The dilemma of the poor is connected to a global economy and attached to international economic processes. In a speech, Emília Ferreira (2012) concluded, “It is not possible to invent new policies to solve everyone’s problems; the fundamental questions are about the basis of community, the conditions of citizenship, and the achievement of human dignity. They are about our definition of a fair Portuguese society and how much we are willing to do to achieve it”.

III.4 Social Networks in a Migration Context

A social network is, in itself, a theoretical abstraction which allows us to trace and reveal relational links between individuals. In the case of migration, the identified variables are the actors themselves, migrants, groups of migrants, communities of migrants and the relationships among them (Gois, 2002: 260). Several migration studies emphasize the role of the migrant's family and friends, in the place of origin and elsewhere. They documented the impact of social networks on migrants’ lives and the different functions they fulfil. These

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social networks are important factors in facilitating migration. They have positive or negative impacts on migrants’ residence strategies, and they partly explain transnational behaviours (Banton, 1955; Massey et al.; Jerrome, 1978; Granovetter, 1983; Courade, 1997; Marques et al., 2001; Mazzucato, 2003 and Riccio, 2003). Some research results reveal the implications of the maintenance of emotional and financial links among members of the family across national borders (Mahler, 2001, Sorensen, 2005 and Landolt and Da, 2005). Others emphasize the dual role of social networks in the process of migrants’ integration (Bourdieu, 1986; Marques et al., 2001; Portes et al., 2002 and Guarnizo et al., 2003) and the importance of kinship for social relationships in transnational space (Bryceson and Vourela, 2002, Faist, 2004; Eastmond and Akesson, 2007).

The long history of the Cape Verdean Diaspora in three continents shows the complex social ties between Cape Verdeans living in different countries. Members of one household in Cape Verde may maintain relations with other migrants in Lisbon, Rotterdam or Boston. In another household people receive remittances from their relatives living in Paris. Even those living in the same household may maintain different transnational contacts or be part of ‘Transnational Social Fields’. However, it seems more appropriate to speak of networks rather than ‘Social Fields’, since network analysis sees each individual as “… a ‘node’ linked with others to form a network.” (Vertovec, 2001: 6).

The term ‘social network’ was already mentioned by Portes (1995), who suggests that migration in itself can be conceptualized as a network structure, which depends on, and in turn, strengthens social relationships across space. Consequently, social networks allow an understanding of migration as a social result, rather than just an individual decision. Transnational networks are essentially based on kinship ties. Belonging to the same família, (family) is regarded as a natural and obvious basis for both local and global ties. According to Vertovec, “social networks are crucial for finding jobs and accommodation, circulating goods and services, as well as psychological support and continuous social and economic information” (Vertovec 2001: 13). They transmit information about destinations, and supply help for the migrant’s settlement in the new place.

Certainly, relationships based on friendship and neighbourly support are important for Cape Verdeans in Portugal. Ethically, migrants’ neighbours and friends can claim support from the migrants, but such requests do not have the same social weight as demands directed towards relatives, and are consequently less effective. There is a strong ideal that relatives, and
especially close relatives, should keep together and help each other. It is common to hear that “the word ingröt (ungrateful) does not exist between Cape Verdeans' relatives”.

According to Boyd (1989), the process of chain migration and the role of relatives and friends in it are of crucial importance. These networks can provide migrants with direct or indirect support. They supply important resources (money, information on work, housing), contacts and information. The quality of contacts in a migrant network can open doors and create opportunities for the new arrivals. If migrants are confined to a very limited network with few hopes of improving their situation, there is a greater risk that they will never get access to the conditions and skills needed for a prolonged stay in the host country.

Particularly in the settlement phase, familial and extra-familial networks are vital. All the immigrant pioneers of the target families obtained shelter on arrival, either from their family or from friends, mainly originating from their Cape Verdean island. Each family member received different types of support from different groups at different stages of their migration, but according to their testimony, the most important help came from their kin.

Being regularly in touch with each-other allowed the formation of a network of strong ties which grants support by those already settled in a certain destination to those who have just arrived. According to Douglas Massey (1990), migrant networks generate a group of social bonds that link communities, regions, cities or original locations to specific destinations in the host societies. Important characteristics of these social networks in terms of social structures are their formation and maintenance, which have only been possible due to the development and decreasing costs of communication systems (telephone, internet) and the emergence of low cost air companies. These technological factors have led to an easier maintenance of bonds between the migrant Diaspora and their families in the place of origin. They form social and economic structures for the individual, family and community. These networks are not static units; they develop through time and space, as migrants depend on their support to pursue their migratory projects. They are the result of the union of small family networks, based on a concept of enlarged family, on the union of networks of individual, group and regional social capital; as well as on ethnic identity sharing a common language, the Crioulo. These social networks need to be stimulated by new migrants; otherwise they will lose their defining characteristics, closely linked to different geographical spaces.
III.5 The Theory of Segmented Assimilation

The two major theories of the ‘underclass’, straight-line assimilation and segmented assimilation, point to different processes underlying second-generation immigrants’ outcomes.

Straight-line assimilation was associated with the founders of the Chicago School of Sociology, who studied the integration of first and second-generation European immigrants in the early twentieth century (Park and Burgess, 1925). This process was investigated by several researchers who found little evidence of second generation decline or downward assimilation.\(^{35}\)

The model of straight-line assimilation demonstrates that assimilation processes will enable each succeeding generation to show upward social mobility in education and occupation. It points towards more integration into American society and less ethnic distinctiveness in language use, residential concentration and intermarriage patterns (Warner and Srole, 1945). Alba and Nee (2003) formulated a new version of straight-line assimilation for post-1965 immigrants. Retaining the thoughts of earlier theorists, they predict that most members of the contemporary second generation will experience gradually increasing social integration and upward mobility.

The theory of segmented assimilation emerged as an alternative to this model in the 1990s and has been very influential. It was formulated by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators, elaborated and empirically tested by Portes and Rumbaut (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) and further developed in a recent article by Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller, 2009). This approach claims there is no homogeneous path of adaptation for the second generation of immigrants as was maintained by the traditional assimilation theories\(^ {36}\). As the adaptation process is segmented, different socio-cultural and socio-economic outcomes are possible, depending on the challenges faced and the resources available. “They can ascend to the ranks of the middle class or join in large numbers the ranks of a racialized, permanently

\(^{35}\) Cf.: Hirschman (2001); Boyd (2002); Farley and Alba (2002); Kasinitz, Mollenkopf and Waters (2002, 2004); Smith (2003); Waldinger and Feliciano (2004); Waldinger (2007); Kasinitz et al. (2008).

\(^{36}\) The traditional assimilation theory claims that second generation immigrants experience complete assimilation to the main culture and upward socio-economic mobility.
impoverished population at the bottom of society” (Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller, 2005: 1004).

As Waldinger (2004) observed, some second generation immigrants tried to share the American (lower-class) way of life by adopting their values, which may have negative consequences, whereas holding on to immigrant distinctiveness can turn out to be an advantage.

According to Crul and Vermeulen (2003), there are also two different individual acculturation modes for the children of immigrants. The first is adaptation to the host society, called ‘classical acculturation’ (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003: 972). The second applies when children adapt to the new society, but at the same time remain partly adapted to the parental culture and the strong co-ethnic community called ‘selective acculturation’. However, the assimilation outcome for children of immigrants cannot be explained by their individual acculturation processes, but by the acculturation processes in relation to their parents (intergenerational acculturation patterns), which are partially determined by the human capital of each family. The result could lead to upward assimilation, downward assimilation and upward mobility combined with persistent biculturalism. The three intergenerational acculturation patterns are: 1) consonant acculturation: when children and parents acculturate to the culture and language of the host country, which mainly occurs in high-human-capital families and can lead to upward acculturation 2) selective acculturation: when children selectively adapt to the values of the host country and selectively stay connected to the parents’ culture and co-ethnic community which can lead to upward assimilation, because the children have access to family and community capital; 3) dissonant acculturation: when children reject their parents’ culture, values and language which happens mostly in immigrant families with low human capital (including parents’ education and income), modes of incorporation (state definition of immigrant groups, eligibility for welfare, and discrimination towards immigrant groups) and family structure (single families vs. married couple, multigenerational vs. nuclear family) and is likely to lead to stagnation or downward assimilation, because of a lack of access to family and community capital. This situation is characterized by a rupture of family communications and an increasing cleavage between parents and children (Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller, 2009: 1082).

Portes and colleagues also identify several challenges that create vulnerability to downward assimilation: 1) discrimination within the host society; 2) an economic structure with a
widening gap between the lower and higher status jobs, with less possibility for upward mobility; 3) concentration of immigrant households in poor areas where children of immigrants are exposed to the adversarial subcultures of marginalized native youths. Adversarial youth subculture is considered one of the greatest risks of stagnation or downward mobility. Also Gans (1992) identifies another factor that causes stagnation. He argues that “many children of immigrants have developed ‘Americanized’ ambitions and expectations, and reject ‘immigrant jobs’, which mean low-wage and low-status” (1992: 182). Due to the changed economic structure, there are few alternatives for their skill level, which is likely to lead to unemployment and marginalization. This situation is similar to the Portuguese case where immigrants are confined to live in segregated areas that influence their educational evolution and necessarily affect their chances of employment.

III.5.1 Analysis of the Segmented Assimilation Theory

The segmented assimilation theory is based on two assumptions. The first is that a specific intergenerational way of acculturation leads to a specific assimilation outcome and the second that intergenerational acculturation patterns are determined by the level of human capital in the family. As shown previously, in low human capital situations the second generation immigrant could possibly assimilate in selected acculturation (Thomson and Crul, 2007, Stepick and Stepick, 2010).

This is the case of the second generation of this research’s target families, which forms a cohesive ethnic group with low family capital, but shows a small socio-economic advancement in relation to their parents who began at the very bottom of the occupational ladder, which makes upward (and not downward) mobility the possible outcome (cf. Farley and Alba, 2002, Alba and Nee, 2003). The same can be said about educational attainment in the second generation, whose school performance represents a significant advance compared to their parents. Although this generation may be considered downwardly mobile because of having badly paid, insecure jobs, they are slightly better off than their parents. Therefore, the use of the term downward assimilation may not be applied in this case.

Classifying an immigrant group in terms of trajectory typologies should also consider variations over time in adaptation processes. As Crul and Vermeulen (2003) argue, the second
generation could be wrongly classified, because over time the adaptation process can change. Challenges and resources are in the first place treated as group characteristics, as are intergenerational acculturation patterns. Thus, both the challenges and resources and the intergenerational acculturation patterns are regarded as being determined by the context of the ethnic groups.

As a result of the focus on ethnic groups in the analysis of segmented assimilation theory, the great differences that exist in ethnic groups are largely neglected. By focusing on the explanation of differences between ethnic groups there is no recognition of other factors that could play a role in socio-cultural identification processes and socio-economic advancement, such as gender, class (which might differ from average human capital within an ethnic group), profession, origin and local context. Crul and Vermeulen (2003) explained that “different segments of the same group may follow different paths” (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003: 975). This appears to be true, because of the polarization within ethnic groups, such as Angolans, Mozambicans or Guineans in Portugal. And it is even possible that for one individual the acculturation mode varies depending on the context and on the life phase (Crul and Scheider, 2003). If dissonant acculturation was the mode of adaptation in somebody’s youth, his/her adaptation in adulthood, for example in accessing the low middle class, with changed relationships with family and friends, may have a different outcome.

It is certainly justified to be concerned with the prospects of the children of immigrants, the majority of whom were born in Portugal and are more assimilated (schooling, language acquisition). For low-skilled immigrants, moving to Portugal meant entering an economy that provided little reward for workers with modest schooling.

Therefore, it remains doubtful whether their children will benefit from any upward mobility. Although the majority of the second generation is moving slightly ahead in terms of educational achievement and employment compared with their predecessors, there are still some left behind. This group corresponds closely to predictions based on immigrant parents’ human capital, family type and socio-economic status and could face ‘downward assimilation’37.

The segmented assimilation theory also takes into account the advantages and disadvantages of deliberately limiting assimilation and maintaining strong ethnic social ties. Such limited assimilation will have a protective effect for the immigrants, allowing them to achieve better outcomes than if they were fully assimilated.

**III.6 Transnational Migration and Households**

Towards the end of the 1980s, several scholars focused on immigrants’ close relations with their country of origin, even from geographically distant places and on their lives across national borders (cf. Boyd, 1989). Originally, the term transnationalism referred to multinational corporations and other organizations simultaneously operating in several countries (Duany, 2002: 1).

Conventional migration theories, in which push and pull factors were used to explain the choices of migrants and the causes of migration received more attention than the effects of migration, have been replaced by theories that put more emphasis on migration as a social or cultural act, on the relationships between migrants and their relatives at home, and on mobility instead of on destination.

The term transnational migration was introduced in the 1990s by the social anthropologists Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Christina Blanc-Szanton (1992). They show the need for new concepts which make it possible to understand the ‘in-between’ life of migrants. They defined the term ‘transnationalism’ as:

“We have defined transnationalism as the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated ‘transmigrants’ when they establish and maintain several familial, economic, social, organizational, religious and political relations that enlarge the frontiers and interconnect the global and the local” (Schiller et al 1992: 1).

Nevertheless, social scientists avoided using the concept ‘transnational’ to include individuals and groups who move across national boundaries, but remain tied to their home communities. Also, political economists preferred to write about ‘transnational’ instead of ‘multicultural’ or ‘international’ companies, because these conglomerates are often controlled by capital from various centres, usually located in the industrialized world in North America, Western Europe.
or Japan (Schiller et al., 1995). The main focus in transnational studies was on the movement of commodities and capital, on communication and transport of people, and on people’s movements across national borders, whereas family dynamics received little attention (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 4).

The studies of Schiller and Basch (1995); Kearney (1995); Smith and Guarnizo (1998); Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999) and Vertovec (1999) were grouped as ‘transnational’. This definition refers to a set of relations and ties that are established across borders (in one or many nations). Through transnational practices migrants can live abroad, but at the same time ‘be’ in their country of origin. These spaces cannot be considered a ‘national’ space, as “they regenerate their border-crossing nation” (Akesson, 2004: 52). Two years later Schiller defined ‘transnational migration’ as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlements” (Schiller et al, 1994: 7). However, Portes (1997) and Smith and Guarnizo (1998) came to the conclusion that transnationalism in the field of migration studies is best characterized as ‘transnationalism from below’. This refers to people who adapt to the influence of global capital by means of transnational practices. Migratory networks that shape transnational communities developed, for example, by Cape Verdeans, are part of a process of globalisation that expands the concept of globalised localism described by Santos (2001). Since these processes are driven by “below”, they can be understood as counter-hegemonic to dominant, state and business led neoliberal processes of globalisation (Portes 1999: 143).

As a concept of research, ‘transnationalism’ has a diversity of descriptions, focusing on the idea that it entails bonds and interactions, connecting people across the borders of a nation state (Vertovec, 1999: 447). At the same time, Portes et al. (1999) and Levitt (2001) defined it as a sphere in which people live dual lives, meaning that they have a ‘home’ in two different countries or regions. Their lives are engaged in activities that need constant contacts across national borders. Portes and colleagues (Portes et al., 1999) name two conditions for the appearance of transnationalism: technical advancement and the emergence of migration networks across national boundaries. According to Portes:

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38 Many scholars critically examined the complex phenomena associated with this international movement (circulation of capital, goods, people and commodities) (Cohen (1997); Vertovec (1999); Urry (2000); Koser (2003).
“The ready availability of air transports, long-distance telephone, facsimile communications, and electronic mail provides the technological basis for the emergence of transnationalism on a mass scale.” (Portes et al., 1999: 223)

Social networks of migrants extend their distant home regions to the host countries, which leads to the phenomenon of transnationalism. The analysis of the social processes that result from the interaction of specific groups of migrants in different nation states enables us to study the emergence of a new social space, a transnational social space (Pries, 1999; 2001), in which the members of a nation may live anywhere in the world and, in a sense, still not live outside their state (Basch et al. 1994, 269). The case of the Cape Verdean Diaspora in the 1960s and 1970s drew attention to the existence of transnational families who spread their members in several countries. These transnational practices, referring to relations and ties established across borders, are an important part of life for many Cape Verdeans. Therefore, supporting the consolidation of transnationality developed into a vital function of the family. The majority of families are involved directly or indirectly in this migration process. Furthermore, the intensity of emigration from the Cape Verdean islands to Portugal facilitated networks and exchanges.

Analyzing these migratory networks reveals the importance of the theories of social networks, of transnational communities and transnationalism. They help explain the development and continuation of migratory flows that have become an intrinsic feature of the Cape Verdean community.

**III.6.1 Transnational Households**

Research in the areas of migration and development has demonstrated that individual migration-related choices are usually related to his/her family members’ needs and that migration affects the migrant’s countries of origin. This area of research largely focuses on the economic effects of remittances on households as a whole. However, studies from this field do not consider non-economic effects such as the impact of migration on the well-being of family members who live apart. In this section, I analyze the fields of both family and migration studies by examining the effects that migration has on the well-being (defined as psychological, educational outcomes) of children who are left in the host country when the mother emigrates to a third country.
Several studies on transnational families have emerged, in which scholars from different disciplines have engaged with the topic of families with members who live across national borders, and the effects of such transnational living arrangements on children (cf. Dreby, 2007; Parrenas, 2005). These studies have shown that children benefit from remittances sent by their emigrated parents, while suffering emotionally from prolonged separation (cf. Dreby, 2007, Heymann et al., 2009). Sometimes the cause of migration of one of the parents for the well-being of the child has defined motives and reasons (educational, health). The role of the caregiver of the child in the country of origin suggests the great importance attributed to the child's well-being. According to a study by Dreby (2007), children felt abandoned by their parents and in some cases responded by detaching themselves from the one who left. Such feelings might lead to marginal behaviour (dropping-out of school, leaving home). Thus, for migrants who left to ensure better opportunities for their children, the unintended consequences of their migration could have negative implications for the relationship and their children's educational outcomes. Moreover, these psychological and economic processes are gendered. Abrego (2009), for example, found that families in which the mother migrated are more likely to thrive economically than father-migrant families because of the greater sacrifices mothers tend to make to send remittances home. On the other hand, Parrenas (2005) claims that children experience more emotional problems when their mother migrates (compared to when their father migrates), because of traditional gender norms related to care.

III.6.2 Transnational Families

Transnational theories established that ‘family processes and relations between people defined as kin constitute the initial foundation for all other types of transnational social relations’ (Basch et al, 1994: 238). ‘Families’ are often considered homogeneous entities in which individual members share the same long-term objective. It is a term that generally suggests notions of ‘nuclear’ or ‘extended’, which include the diverse forms of family structures in different cultures. As a result of migration, ideas about who belongs to the family and who does not may change. Through ‘delocalization’ their composition can assume different forms, not only in the place of origin as some members may be absent for a long time (Escrivá, 2003). In the new place of residence in the host country, the closeness to family members who used to be part of a household, may decline in favour of other forms of proximity, by
including other immigrants from the same country or island or even other foreigners, as long as the original family unit is not reunified or the migrant does not form a new family.

In the 1990s, Basch and her colleagues (1994) argued that “only recently some attention has been paid to family dynamics in transnational migration” (Basch et al. 1994: 6). Meanwhile, scholars in migration studies stated that families take deliberate decisions to migrate with the aim to improve their income or their members' educational standards. Due to international migration, “the family structures easily become exposed to traumas of deterritorialization as family members pool and negotiate their mutual understanding and aspirations in spatially fractured arrangements” (Appadurai, 2003: 42), but not all lead to disorganized families and may be part of a strategy of social mobility for all members (Olwig, 2002). These results contradict Sorensen’s (2005) findings and confirm what is described in the following chapters.

The formation of transnational households is no novelty for Cape Verdeans and other labour migrants who have experienced it for centuries. Early transnational theory established that “family processes and relations between people defined as kin constitute the initial foundation for all other types of transnational social relations” (Basch et al., 1994: 238). In early periods, family members were left behind in the country of origin and later followed the migrants to their country of destination or eventually reunited with the returned migrant in the country of origin (Hsu, 2003, Gardner, 2005).

An investigation by Sorensen and Olwig (1995), concerning immigrants from America, the Caribbean and Africa, showed that livelihood practices quite commonly engage people in extensive movements at local, regional, national and transnational levels. Such mobile livelihoods evolve not just in order to explore economic opportunities unavailable within local communities, but also in order to pursue particular types of culturally and socially desirable livelihoods. This suggests that movement is an integral aspect of the life trajectories of many individuals and groups of people preserving at the same time their transnational behaviours. Therefore, a transnational perspective changes the focus from place of origin and place of destination to the movements involved in sustaining cross-border livelihoods (Sorensen and Olwig, 2002). Sorensen (2005) distinguishes between different transnational family members,

analyzing the power relations served and sustained through transnational family ties. Moving temporarily or permanently elsewhere does not necessarily mean that women and men are cut off from social relationships with those left behind\textsuperscript{40}.

Sorensen’s argument is based on the assumption that most gender constructions give prominence to notions of masculinity and femininity, where women's roles are dependent on men. Men are usually the ‘pioneers’ in a migration trajectory (cf. Pumares \textit{et al.}, 2006; Solana \textit{et al.}, 2009)\textsuperscript{41}. This certainly applies to Cape Verdean migration to Portugal. Obviously, it is important who in the family engages in transnational migration for the form and conditions under which their migration is evaluated.

The work of Sorensen on Latin Americans in various European countries addresses similar issues to those analyzed by Montero-Sieburth and Melendez (2007) for Latinos in the U.S. \textit{Latinos in a Changing Society} focuses specifically on issues, related to Dominicans, Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans in the United States. Through extensive analytical data, provided in tables and charts, the authors examine the disparity of poverty, the difficulty of health care and services, labour practices, interaction with communities and education.

Theoretically, a household includes people living together under the same roof who share resources and the responsibility of securing survival and welfare. However, these transnational households have been defined by Bryceson and Vuereda (2002), as groups that live separated most of the time, but remain united and create a collective feeling of well-being and unity. This implies the maintenance of emotional and financial links among family members across different nations. The basis for keeping these transnational households intact is built on communication, remittances and periodic visits.

Any attempt to define transnational families must be aware of differences between various migrant groups and of social, cultural and economic differences within the various groups. At the same time, state regulation in host societies through immigration policy (citizenship, integration), labour market regulations and social welfare policies are related to forms of exclusion and inclusion and must inevitably have consequences for the lives of these

\textsuperscript{40} “Apart from family reunification, asylum and work contracts most European countries have been legally closed to migration since the early 1970s” (Sorensen, 2002: 4). This could be the explanation why in Europe, females outnumber men. They are concentrated in the domestic service with low paid jobs. They have strong transnational family links and responsibilities for providing for families back in their home country.

\textsuperscript{41} Once men get a certain labour and residential stability, and in most cases the appropriate documentation, the process of family reunification is activated. The wife and other relatives will therefore come to the host country, when the situation is more stable.
‘transnational family members’. Therefore, transnationalism is conditioned and affected by complex and interconnected social, political and economic processes.

III.7 The Influence of Racism and Lusotropicalism on Post Colonial Families

Racism implies the conviction that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial difference produces an inherent superiority of a particular race.

There are various conceptualizations of racism, for example, in the Portuguese literature (Vala, 1999; Sobral, 2008; Peixoto, 2011; Gomes, 2011) and also in the American literature (Wodak and Reisigl, 1999; Winant, 2000; Taguieff, 2001). Some scholars claim that this term is limited to analytic value (Mason, 1994; Wacquant, 1997), whereas others consider the concept essentially an ideological and/or subjective issue (Bonilla-Silva, 1996).

However, there is a debate associating racism with modernity42, explaining its emergence in the context of European expansion and the consequent enslavement of Africans. This debate links racism to colonialism and imperialism. Wade (1997) suggests that physical differences are the main reasons for contemporary racial distinctions. His line of thought could be described as social perceptions built of phenotypic variations, which correspond to the “geographic encounters of Europeans in their colonial histories” (Wade, 1997: 15). It is interesting to observe the changing and historical contingency of the meaning of these perceptions and distinctions. English, French and Dutch travellers portrayed Pacific Islanders differently at various points in time depending on prevailing global and regional agendas. Gailey (1996) noted that their willingness to reduce judgment to skin colour was associated with the rise of slavery in West Africa and colonization in other areas.

Portugal was noted as the first European country to keep large numbers of black slaves. As one of the major maritime powers of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Portugal also shipped and sold many African slaves to other parts of the world. Unsurprisingly, the issue of slavery has shaped racial tensions between Portugal and Africa. It dominated Portuguese colonialist practices and prompted Africans to have hostile attitudes

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42 Scholars such as Abramovitz (1996); Goode and Maskovsky (2001) and Morgen and Maskovsky (2003) focused on contemporary anthropological studies of the structural dynamics of poverty and its racialization. They analyzed the national and transnational processes that reproduce racial inequalities.
toward the Portuguese. Even in 1960, Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar emphasized in a speech delivered before the National Assembly in Lisbon that the autonomy of colonies may not extinguish “racial conflicts”. He feared “… violent explosions of racial hate against the white man, to whom the progress achieved is due and who is supposed to be no longer necessary to the economic and social development of the lands concerned. Facts exist to gainsay these forecasts…” (Salazar, 1961: 27).

Following this argument, the alleged superiority of the ‘white men’ that brings progress to the African colonies should be reason enough to justify and continue an ideology of racial distinction. However, Malik (1996) observes that “Racial difference and inequality can only have meaning in a world which has accepted the possibility of social equality and a common humanity” (Malik, 1996: 39). I agree with the underlying idea of Malik’s assertion that the basis for any objection to the concept of inferior or superior races is the consensus on the egalitarian principles introduced by the French Revolution of 1789.

Mignolo (2009) states that during “the period of heavy slave trade lives made dispensable for economic reasons implied that the people involved in slave trade or benefiting directly or indirectly from it, did not subjectively care. And if they did not care it was because either they accepted that Africans were not quite human …” (Mignolo, 2009: 78). This colonial past complicated race relations between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde and even in Portugal.

The term ‘racism’ has evolved from both biological and cultural explanations. Often the biological aspect has been connected to poverty accompanied by implications of genetic inferiority. One reason for this connotation was the social development after the abolition of slavery (1751 in Portugal and 1850 in the U.S.). Mignolo blames the oppression of the so-called ‘savages’ by Europeans, who marked them for economic and capitalist reasons. He

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43 Session held on 30 November 1960 in Lisbon.
44 As for the epistemic racism of the modern world, he refers to the coloniality of knowledge: “decolonial projects have to start from the decoloniality of knowledge and of being, in order to de-colonize the economy and authority”. (Mignolo, 2009: 82).
enquires why “the cosmology in question constructed enslaved Africans as undesirable, dispensable or unvalued human lives” (Mignolo, 1999: 74).

Over the past centuries Portugal has developed separate and distinct cultures within its social class system. Some of them became the target of ‘cultural racism’. Cultural racism refers to devaluation of the cultures of minority groups which are considered inferior. There was a dominant ‘white’ culture, divided into various ‘sub-cultures’ and an African culture with its subdivisions. Each culture had distinctive characteristics and a limited permeability; racial barriers were particularly hard to overcome. A behavioural codex and strict rules required each racial group to have a separate identity and existence. Nevertheless, some changes were bridging the gaps at the end of the twentieth century. For example, schools became increasingly multiracial after the Revolution of 1974 and the teachers’ approach multicultural as the curricula began to take into account the different cultures of the pupils ten years ago.

Research investigating the history of racism confirmed that racism: 1) is inextricably bound with the historical emergence of nation states, 2) is frequently built on earlier conflicts, and 3) emerges amid contestation (Mullings, 2005: 667). However, there are basically two distinct perspectives concerning the source of racism. The ‘natural racism thesis’ generally perceives racism as a set of psychosocial orientations, prejudices, and beliefs, linked to in-group/out-group phenomena, the source of which is human nature, considered to be innate, natural, or primordial (Allen, 2002). The more persuasive perspective links racism to structures of power that emerge through processes of accumulation and dispossession within local and transnational contexts (Mullings, 2005: 668). Unsurprisingly, not only the ‘black’ groups are targets, but also social classes. Rath (1999), for example, suggests that “there is a tendency to localize racism exclusively in colonial and post-colonial relationships. The occurrence of racism in European centres is then directly related to the migration of black people from the colonial territories.” (Rath, 1999: 1). However, Rath does not ignore the observations of Miles (1993) that students of racism deal with the concept in a unidimensional and monocausal sense and often start with the assumption that the only or the most important racism has “black” people as its object (Rath, 1999: 2). Quite rightly, Rath dismisses these affirmations, as the use of such a concept “excludes to a greater or lesser extent that any non-black population can be the object of racism” (Rath, 1999: 2). In fact, not only the ‘black’

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The population is the target of racist behaviour, but also the lowest social classes and other minorities.

Racism is a relational concept. It is a set of practices, structures, beliefs and representations that transforms certain forms of perceived differences, generally regarded as indelible and unchangeable, into inequality. It works through modes of dispossesion, which have included subordination, stigmatization, exploitation, exclusion, various forms of physical violence, and sometimes genocide. There are different conceptualizations of racism and it is distinguished from other forms of discrimination, such as xenophobia and cultural, ethnic, and class prejudice.

It is both overt and covert, and it takes three closely related forms: individual, systemic and institutional. Individual racism consists of overt acts by individuals that cause death, injury, destruction of property, or denial of services and opportunities.

Systemic racism is the basis of individual and institutional racism as it provides the value system rooted in a society that supports and allows discrimination.

Institutional racism is more subtle but no less destructive. It involves policies, practices and procedures of institutions that have a disproportionately negative effect on racial minorities’ access to quality of goods, services and opportunities. To understand institutional racism, it is important to observe the interaction between prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice is an attitude based on limited information or stereotypes; it is usually negative, but can also be positive. Both positive\(^{47}\) and negative prejudices are damaging, because they deny the individuality of the person. Anybody can become the victim of prejudice, although in Portugal there are some minority groups, mainly of African origin, that are more often targeted. The same applies to a discriminatory attitude which is an intentional behavioural pattern, disqualifying a person or a group of people, very often based on their racial origins.

Institutional racism and discriminative practices are often denounced by ethnic groups. In Portugal, 11% of immigrants declared they had been victims of institutional discrimination (EUMC, 2006)\(^{48}\). According to this report the ‘overt racist’ institutions in question showed clear signs of prejudice and discriminative behaviour. It depends on the possibility to give or withhold social benefits, facilities, services or opportunities from someone who is entitled to

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\(^{47}\) Cf. Racism of low expectation.

\(^{48}\) EUMC (European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia) (2006), ‘Migrants’ Experience of Racism and Xenophobia in 12 EU Members States.
them but is denied them on the basis of race, colour or national origin. Overt racism involves actively and intentionally expressing unfairness, discrimination or prejudice against others as members of the three target families testified.

III.7.1 Global Conditions of Racism

With increased immigration to Europe, racism is both local and global. Although modern racism is a global system significantly influenced by Western conquest and racialized labour, it can take local forms. In migratory processes, new manifestations of racism in various areas of the world are recurrent. During the past five decades, three major events have interacted to bring about substantive transformations in racism: the national liberation struggles in the third world, the ‘black’ liberation movement in the U.S., and the antiapartheid offensive in South Africa all effectively challenged ‘white’ supremacy, overturning the old racial orders, and bringing about powerful changes in how race is lived (Mullings, 2005: 668).

Nevertheless, the consolidation of global capitalism has resulted in new racialized consequences. In this century, globalization, which is driven by the deployment of capital for production around the globe, has been accompanied by continuing crises within industrialized countries. The relocation of industrial production to Asian countries, for example, has raised unemployment in Portugal and influenced the decline in state benefits for the most vulnerable part of the population, especially migrants.

Racialized labour forces continue to be central to old and new forms of accumulation. As much of the world’s population tried to find work wherever it existed, ‘transmigratory racism’ was and still is noticeable in Europe. Immigrants face various forms of discrimination and right wing anti-immigration movements have appeared all over Europe. Ethnic groups faced intensification of racialized inequalities but also new forms of racialization, as Justino points out: “The unregulated job market which feeds on the unprecedented and insatiable offer of ill-paid and mostly illegal jobs has become a catalyst of a social reality which stands out by the novelty and discrimination/exclusion it has originated” (Justino, 2007: 154-155) In Portugal, construction and manufacturing workers with flexible labour and precarious working situations, experience massive exclusion from the formal economy. In situations of limited opportunities, emigration becomes a viable option for employment. Only in the first semester
of 2012, 65,000 Portuguese nationals, aged from 24 to 35, immigrated to African and other European countries.

Nationality, race and class intertwine in complex ways. Entire nationalities may be racialized according to the dominant class position of their members. Recently, new forms of frightening physical violence have been documented and perceived as a racial problem on a large scale, for example neo-Nazi attacks on refugees in Germany, riots in the suburbs of Paris and other French towns in 2010, and the massacre in Norway in 2011. In Portugal, for instance, racial discourse linking Cape Verdean immigrants to crime is directed to the inhabitants of segregated neighbourhoods (Machado, 2004); African migrants in Spain also face xenophobic campaigns as the country experiences recession and high unemployment. These contexts influenced by the fear of social decline of the lower classes, create great tensions between native and migrant workers. Although racism is frequently associated with working class populations, a recent ethnographic study of racial attitudes toward African and Asian immigrants revealed ambivalent positions among the mainstream society (Cole, 1997). It suggests that the upper classes tend to adhere to Universalist ideologies, while in reality they are the greatest beneficiaries of race, class and gender segmentation.

III.7.2 Concealing Racism within Segregated Spaces

Although direct racism has diminished in many countries, racial inequality continues and has in some instances worsened. Perhaps the most significant is the transformation of practices and ideologies of racism to a configuration that takes place without the official support of legal and civic institutions. For example, the ‘unmarked racism’ (Harrison, 2000) that has been registered mainly in former colonial powers. Machado (2004) describes the post-racial view that emerged in the 1970s in Portugal concerning the Cape Verdean who was considered “unmannered, uncultured ‘black’ and someone to be mocked” (2004: 135). According to Machado, this racial inequality is the result of cultural limitations; a consequence of the history of conquest, enslavement and continuous discrimination.

There are important variations among regional and national racisms, but they all emphasize cultural and individual explanations for inequality. In Brazil, for example, the ideologies of ‘racial democracy’ and ‘lusotropicalism’, which will be discussed below, have facilitated discrimination as well as their absorption into a culture of poverty for ‘black’ people.
In the twenty-first century residential segregation and spatial segregation are almost as intense as they were in the past. In Portuguese neighbourhoods, residential segregation was the cause of discrimination and isolation mainly for the first and second generations of immigrants. Inhabitants of Cova da Moura experienced residential segregation when they mentioned their address to people from outside the neighbourhood and when applying for jobs. Exclusionary practices by landlords and political decisions keep neighbourhoods segregated and their residents the target of discriminatory acts. In the contemporary context, discriminative neighbourhoods are no longer only segregated communities but enclose their inhabitants in ‘ghettos’ where interaction with the mainstream is difficult. Cova da Moura is an example of such an enclosure with a wall (height ca. 1.5 m) and a fence on top (ca. 1 m), all along the street which divides the neighbourhood from the surrounding buildings. The majority of this community, mainly of African origin, is low class and faces discrimination and segregation.

In Portugal, where immigrants find themselves inserted in a racial context, class may mediate the ways in which immigrants are racialized. However, the general discourse tends to use entire nationalities that can be racialized, according to the position of the dominant class. For example, descendents of Cape Verdean immigrants who are pupils in Lisbon schools assume that rich Cape Verdeans from Praia (the Cape Verdean capital) have a ‘brighter’ complexion than those from other small islands, who are ‘poorer and darker’ (Casimiro, 2006: 241). At school, children of immigrants are sometimes assessed differently according to the status of their national homeland, which may, to some extent, mediate phenotype.

Although these previously mentioned analyses provided a basis for understanding how complex variables of inequality interact in particular circumstances and places, the challenge remains to build on ethnographic work in order to move beyond understanding these forms of inequality and to develop new theoretical concepts of their causes and effects.

Globalization and new technologies create new possibilities for transnational antiracist organization through coalitions and networking. With the growth of an international labour force and the unwillingness and inability of nation states to implement equal redistribution, there is awareness among antiracist movements that they must interact globally. Their objective is to make concealed racism visible and to promote the implementation of legislation to combat its diverse forms. The variety of antiracist strategies and interventions derive, in part, from the local specificity of conditions but also from differing ideological
perspectives among antiracist activists about the cause, nature, and the most effective means of confronting it.

The next section addresses one particular aspect of racism which directly influences Portuguese policy. Since the 1950s, ‘Lusotropicalism’ has affected the relationship with the European Community and the former African colonies such as Cape Verde and the term is still in use and positively conotated. This myth still persists and has been internalized by generations of scholars and politicians.

**III.7.3 Lusotropicalism within the Discourse of Racism**

The idea of Lusotropicalism is based on the hypothetical existence of a specific Portuguese cultural trait: the natural capacity and ability of the Portuguese to relate to people who are considered different. This alleged quality would explain the unique character of colonial relationships and would nowadays have a positive impact on the relationship between the Portuguese and immigrants (Vala and Lopes, 2008). Its concept had its origins in the early 1920s, when Brazil struggled with issues of identity, facing hegemonic European values that propagated material wealth, industrialization, and the supremacy of the ‘white’ race.

In 1922, the city of São Paulo witnessed the appearance of a ‘Modernist Movement’ and the Week of Modern Art, during which a new generation of artists and intellectuals questioned the official ‘white’ culture. This movement produced a new anthropological and sociological Brazilian literature that embraced local traditions and rejected European measures of cultural value. The most influential academic in this new way of thinking was the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre (influenced by the anthropologist Franz Boas), who published the book *Casa Grande e Senzala* (1933 / English title: *The Masters and the Slaves*).

He claimed that miscegenation had been a positive force in Brazil, and this argument encouraged scholars to develop a new way of thinking and arguing: art, literature and music created by Afro-Brazilian culture and miscegenation were suddenly held in great esteem (Fine, 2007).
Racial mixing had become an issue at a time when ethic purity was claimed by the Nazi movement in Germany (cf. Nürnberger Rassengesetze, 1935). Freyre credited the Portuguese tendency for miscegenation among colonized peoples for the uniqueness of Brazilian culture. He praised the ideal of a racial paradise, defending Portuguese colonialism and its aspects of cultural integration:

“... by valuing in men, to the greatest extent possible, authentic qualities independent of colour, social position, economic success; through equality – as much as possible – of social opportunities and of culture for men of different origins, regions moulded by the Portuguese ...” (Freyre, 1938: 18).

Freyre claimed that “wherever this type of colonization prevailed (the humanizing colonization), racial prejudice becomes insignificant...” (1940: 45). Despite his assumption “that after Christ nobody has contributed as much as the Portuguese to the fraternity of men” (1940: 58), his writings received positive contemporary reviews. Murias (1938) confirmed the absence of “any kind of racial mysticism” in Portugal (1938: 469). Smith (1938) comments: “Of all the colonizing European nations, Freyre asserts, Portugal has been the most successful in conveying the essential spirit of the homeland to the conquered territories and in maintaining in both colonists and natives a common racial fuling [feeling]” (1938: 140-143).

However, only in the 1950s did Freyre use the term Lusotropicalismo (Lusotropicalism). According to him, the specificities of Portuguese history, with its long periods of contact with Jewish and ‘Moorish’ cultures, created in the Portuguese people an aptitude for developing racially harmonious societies. He argued that Portuguese multi-racialism resulted in a more egalitarian colonialism than the exploitative colonialism of other European countries. Using again the example of the Portuguese propensity for miscegenation, Freyre reiterated that Portuguese contact with natives was marked by integration, rather than by domination and subjugation:

“Once the expressions ‘integration,’ ‘assimilation,’ ‘subjugation’ have thus been qualified, we see that in the Portuguese system of relations with non-European groups and non-European cultures, in spite of rare cases of crude subjection of the non-

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Europeans by the Portuguese […] the most characteristic tendency of the system has been towards ‘integration.” (Freyre, 1953: 24)

III.7.4 Lusotropicalism in Portugal

In the 1930s, when Freyre’s *The Masters and the Slaves* was published, Portugal was living under Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar’s dictatorship. He had come to power in 1926 after a military coup against the First Republic. Only in 1910 The First Republic, a progressive, anticlerical regime, replaced the Portuguese monarchy which had lasted for 800 years.

One of the major reasons for the loss of prestige of the monarchy was its inability to respond to the British Ultimatum of 1890. In the late 19th century many European nations were engaged in occupying Africa, while Portugal had no economic, military or demographic power to compete. After the demise of the first and second empires, respectively in India and the East in the 16th and 17th centuries, and in Brazil in the 17th and 18th centuries it was impossible to effectively occupy and maintain its territories in Africa.

It was not until Salazar’s regime that a revival of colonial projects in Africa began. In the 1930s discussions about the colonies were still revolving around racist and racialist issues. But this discourse was slowly replaced by an already existing one about the merits of discoveries and expansion as a feat of humanist ‘globalization’, of evangelization, of expansion of the Catholic faith. Discourses about the inferiority of ‘blacks’ could be proffered at the same time as discourses on the different way in which the Portuguese had encountered and colonized other peoples with supposedly less violence and with more miscegenation (cf. Vale de Almeida, 2008: 6).

Soon, the Portuguese government began to rework some of its colonial legislation by ceasing to refer to its colonies as such. Indeed, before the Acto Colonial (Colonial Act) of 1930, Portuguese colonies were called provinces. The Acto Colonial had made these ‘provinces’ colonies law, but in 1951, the Portuguese government released a new constitution, renaming these territories Overseas Provinces of Portugal and turning the Ministry of Colonies into the Overseas Ministry (Frye and McGowan Pinheiro, 1961: 161). However, the African colonies continued to be an obstacle to joining the UN. Nevertheless, in 1955 Portugal succeeded and was admitted into the UN.
Immediately, the overseas territories were called into question. The Portuguese government responded that its overseas provinces were non-contiguous extensions of the mother country and labelled them ‘Non-Self-Governing Territories’. Still the only possible solution for the UN would be the controlled territories’ autonomy. Portugal argued its case before the international community, reaffirming its commitment to the African colonies and demonstrated the help and development which, in fact, mainly brought benefits for the Portuguese settlers (cf. the National Development Plans from 1953-1958 and 1959-1964 provided infrastructures, such as roads, bridges, railways, irrigation projects, ports and factories).

Furthermore, the administration of the African colonies had worked out different measures and rules. Some territories were classified as ‘different’, as in the case of Cape Verde, because of on-going miscegenation. The Cape Verdean population was the outcome of a mix between Portuguese colonials and slaves from the African mainland who had been brought to the deserted islands. Their culture was classified ‘regional’, not ‘colonial’, and its population (the elites) had special rights, one of which was their recruitment as colonial middlemen on the African mainland.

**III.7.5 Lusotropicalism in the Salazar Regime**

The African colonies became ‘real’, important factors for the Portuguese economy and self-representation precisely at the moment when anti-colonial protest started. At that juncture, in the 1950s, Freyre was invited by the Overseas Minister to visit and write on the colonies. After these journeys Freyre published *Um brasileiro em terras portuguesas* (1953), in which he confirmed that the unique colonizing abilities of the Portuguese, as evidenced in Brazil, could also be witnessed and experienced in their contemporary overseas provinces.

In his speeches Salazar also claimed that the Portuguese were uniquely capable settlers who created multi-racial societies free of the oppression, racial hierarchies and economic exploitation of other colonial powers. Consequently, Article 135 of the Constitution of 1933 stated: “all provinces are integral parts of the Portuguese State. We became the kind of people we are by the strength of spirit, not by the force of arms – one people only, dispersed
throughout four continents, but united by the same national faith” (Diário da República, nº 43, 1ª Série, Suplemento of 22 February). Despite Portugal’s desire to join the UN and growing international criticism of its colonial empire, Salazar insisted that anti-colonialist accusations and decolonization efforts were not relevant in Portugal’s case. Soon, the theory of Lusotropicalism had been adopted by politicians of the ‘Estado Novo’ and effectively transcribed into state propaganda and speeches, justifying Portugal’s colonial possessions.

In his speech before the National Assembly on 30 November 1960 Salazar emphasized the benefits that the ‘white’ man had brought to the colonies, and warned that their autonomy may not extinguish “racial conflicts, even among coloured people themselves” (1960: 6).

Indeed, the arguments Portugal presented to the national and international community were both unorthodox and rhetorically effective and resisted demands to decolonize.

By examining the theory of Lusotropicalism, it becomes clear that maintenance of the colonies served several important functions beyond the economic benefits Portugal accumulated: 1) during its long history of exploration and colonialism, continued colonial possession became an integral part of Portuguese national identity, and the loss of colonial territories was perceived as politically disastrous for Portugal in the world of politics; 2) the articulation of Portuguese anti-racialism allowed the country to claim a moral superiority and colonizing reward, and to be recognized as an economic and political power by other nations; 3) Portugal’s claim of a superior colonizing method and continued presence in Africa was considered proof enough of the nation’s ability to ‘compete’ with stronger political powers; 4) by emphasizing threats to Portugal’s empire from abroad, the Salazar and Caetano regimes were able to silence internal dispute about colonial policy and create support for the New State dictatorship; 5) lastly, by defying the UN and the ideological conventions of the time, Portugal felt it was defending its national autonomy.

All these arguments imply the refusal to decolonize at a national and international level.

III.7.6 Criticism of Lusotropicalism

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From its appearance, the scientific character of Lusotropicalism was questioned by African liberation activists and European scholars. Mário Pinto de Andrade, the founder of MPLA (Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was the first to openly denounce the generalizations and the lack of political and economic aspects of Portuguese colonialism. He points out the difference between the theory of Lusotropicalism and practice in the colonized African countries:

“C’est justement le refus d’envisager le fonctionnement de l’appareil colonial comme étant au premier chef une emprise d’exploitation économique dirigée par un pouvoir politique, c’est ce refus-là, qui détermine la faiblesse de sa sociologie” (Fele, 1955: 34).

Pinto de Andrade affirmed that the cultural system of Lusotropicalism was based on a relation of dominant cultures upon submitted cultures. But criticism was not restricted to the theoretical approach, and extended to the historical domain. The historical research published by Charles Boxer (1963), for example, demonstrated with ample documental material that the racial relationships in the Portuguese Colonial Empire were not as harmonious as might be insinuated by Lusotropicalism. He presented a complex vision of racial relations in the colonized territories. His study ranges from the XV to the XIX centuries and revealed various aspects of Portuguese racism. Prejudice and racial inequalities were noticeable in all the colonies, even in Brazil, where mobility was denied to free ‘blacks’ and dark ‘mulatos’, who suffered legal and social discrimination.

Although the colonial project was abandoned in 1975, the media still insist on continuing the Portuguese ideal of Lusotropicalism in several areas, be they educational or political. This is documented by the research results presented at a Conference in 2006, exploring the concept of Lusotropicalism and its impact on education:

“… Lusotropicalism has survived to present days. The myth that the Portuguese are not racist by nature and are actually more tolerant than other peoples is occasionally present in official discourses…. The media has also preserved the myth: ‘Portugal is the most tolerant country in Europe’ still makes newspapers’ headlines. All these discourses have been helping to promote the idea that the Portuguese are less racist than other peoples. This is particularly significant as a large number of teachers in Portugal were socialized into this idea…. When talking about the usefulness of

intercultural education, a teacher told me that he felt no need for it, because “…integration is easy…We…And we have that advantage and I tell them that, so they can see… Which were the countries that integrated Black people like Portugal did?” (Araujo, 2006: 5-6)

Indeed, as can be concluded from the statement above, the ideal of Lusotropicalism would have lost its usefulness long ago, if it were used only as the premise for economic exploitation. But the theory’s continued prevalence implies that Lusotropicalism served to create a shared sense of Portuguese identity. Salazar’s emphasis on Portuguese multi-racialism must be considered a truly effective rhetoric which perpetuated a long-lasting ideal.

The topic of Lusotropicalism continues to this century, in the discourse of former politicians (from the right and left spectrum), such as Adriano Moreira, former Minister of Ultramar (Overseas) in Salazar’s government, now a university lecturer, Mário Soares, former President of Portugal and Cavaco Silva, presently President of Portugal. According to Hélia Santos (2006), Moreira published articles in which “he does not hide his Lusotropicalism”. In a television debate about ‘Identidade Portuguesa’ (‘Portuguese Identity’) Moreira reaffirmed his Lusotropicalist vision, claiming the “necessity of Portugal to maintain its secular and almost ontological connection with Africa” (Santos, 2006: 44). Similarly, Thais Cabral (2010) emphasized in her MA thesis Mario Soares’ belief in the Lusotropicalism theory, expressed in the Brazilian newspaper Jornal de Brasília during a state visit to Brazil in 2000: “… what he [Gilberto Freire] said about Luso-Tropicalism is true. It is a culture of its own and we have to develop it in the future” (Cabral, 2010: 118). In an extensive research, Lloyd-Jones and Pinto (2003) reported Cavaco Silva’s affinity with the Lusotropicalist ideal in an interview given in 1988, in which he emphasized the good relations between Portugal and the former ‘colonial empire’: “Portuguese ties with its former colonies, Brazil and other areas of the world are indeed trump cards which increase our relative weight in the Community.”

This conviction still haunts widespread perceptions within Portuguese society and has also been internalized by many who were colonized, as a ‘positive’ aspect of their colonizers. Undoubtedly, Lusotropicalism was ultimately instrumentalized by Salazar and Estado Novo to justify and prolong the Portuguese Colonial Empire. Indeed, the Portuguese insistence on its anti-racial attitudes has long outlived its political suitability. However, many Portuguese, some of them with political and economic influence, continue to defend a historical anti-

53 Jornal de Brasília, 30 January 2000, Brazil.
racism. This theory resonates even in the first decade of this century, long after it served as a justification for colonialism and economic exploitation.

The literature cited in this chapter provides the conceptual framework necessary to describe the ways in which ‘poor’ immigrant Cape Verdean families conducted their lives in a former colonial power where they were still considered as ‘Cape Verdean blacks’. Of great importance was the existence of networks that provided direct or indirect support and the regular contact with siblings dispersed all around the world. Furthermore, ethnic groups are disproportionately more likely to become an at-risk-of-poverty population. Contrary to the Lusotropicalism myth, discrimination seems to affect different generations for decades and separates low-income families from the mainstream.