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8 Guest Worker Migration in Post-War Europe (1946-1974): An Analytical Appraisal

Ahmet Akgündüz

Introduction

This chapter examines the migration of labourers in post-war Europe, both officially recruited labourers and those who arrived on their own. Following the Second World War, Western European countries began the reconstruction of their economies. For sectors where labour was in short supply, they recruited foreign workers from Southern Europe, primarily Italians. However, what began as recruitment on a small scale soon burgeoned into a new international labour migration that would last more than a quarter of a century. With some shrinkage in times of recession, this movement grew consistently in volume and came to include labourers from North Africa and, for the first time, Turkey as well. By the time recruitment ended in 1973-1974, more than 5.7 million migrant workers were employed in seven countries alone: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland (Lohmann 1976: 230-232; Böhning 1979: 401; Werner 1986: 544). Estimates suggest that between 1945 and 1974, the number of foreign workers and their dependants who entered Western Europe was ‘something like 30 million’ (Castles 1984: 1), returnees included. This was one of the largest movements of its kind in modern history, contributing to irrevocable changes in the ethnic, cultural and religious composition of Western European populations.

This chapter first considers the historical background of guest worker migration in Europe and the context within which it was resumed in the aftermath of the Second World War. It then looks at receiving countries’ policies for the recruitment of foreign labour. Why and how did the labour supply from Southern Europe become insufficient in relation to demand from the North? Why was recruitment extended to Turkey and to North African countries such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia? The chapter also addresses the major components of the guest worker system and its limits. Finally, it examines demand-supply relations in the labour market of each of the receiving countries and sectors of employment for migrant workers, critically evaluating some assessments of prior studies.
Historical background and the period up to 1960

The Western European practice of recruiting large numbers of foreign workers did not begin with post-war guest worker migrations. From the 1880s, the core countries, especially England, France, Germany (from the 1890s onwards) and Switzerland, employed foreign labourers in substantial numbers, particularly from their immediate peripheries, such as colonial Ireland and Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (Hoeder 1996, 2000; Olsson 1996). For example, as early as 1886 in France, the number of foreign residents was more than 1.1 million, reflecting mainly migrant workers and their family members (Cross 1977: 10, 22, 24). Germany hosted some 1.3 million foreigners in 1910 (Herbert 1990: 20-23), and a considerable proportion of them were Poles recruited in the eastern parts of the German domain, Russian Poland and Austria-Hungary. In Switzerland, migrants made up 14.7 per cent of the population by the same year (Power 1979: 12).

In the early twentieth century, the major receiving countries such as France and Germany became dependent on the import of labour, as well as Austria-Hungary, to a varying extent; Denmark, Russia, the Netherlands and Sweden needed to recruit migrant workers, particularly seasonal ones. Other buyers of labour on the European labour market included the newly emerged industrial cities in labour-exporting areas, like Budapest and Lodz (Hoeder 2000), as well as European companies in the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia (Quataert 1983: 72-93; Adanır 1994: 31; Akgündüz 2008: 13). Furthermore, in the early twentieth century, the Americas – particularly the United States – attracted migrants mainly from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, because the number of arrivals from Northern and Western Europe had diminished considerably (Flourwich 1912; Hoeder 1985, 1996, 2000; Moch 1992; Olsson 1996; Bade 1997). As a result, the leading European labour importers were in competition with each other for migrant labour (Cross 1977: 28-31; Herbert 1990: 93; Olsson 1996). Olsson argues that bilateral and multilateral relations among major European states during the years preceding the First World War were heavily affected by their need for foreign labour. Accordingly, the emergence of international competition for migrant labour is a crucial factor in understanding France’s conflict with Germany, the rising tension between Germans and Poles and Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Olsson suggests that in the war, ‘Germany sought to fortify its position in Europe [...] primarily as a buyer of labour on the international labour market’ (Olsson 1996: 897).

Having been heavily disrupted, labour migration from the periphery to the core countries of Western Europe recommenced following the end of the First World War. However, there was perceptible variation
in the volume of each country’s demand for labour. For example, due to economic stagnation, Germany employed relatively few foreign workers until the Nazis took power: 174,000 in 1924 and a mere 108,000 in 1932 (Herbert 1990: 121, 126). During the Nazi regime, the number of foreigners brought to work – often forcibly – soared quickly and dramatically; there were over 7.6 million foreign workers in August 1944. Of that total, 5.7 million were ‘registered foreign civilian workers’ and more than 1.9 million were prisoners of war (Herbert 1990: 127-181, 1997: 296-299).  

France, meanwhile, needed large numbers of foreign workers just after the First World War, and put a prime example of a guest worker system into practice. It signed bilateral labour recruitment agreements with several Southern, Central and Eastern European countries between 1919 and 1930, and brought nearly two million migrants to work through official channels. In principle, nationals of the frontier countries were exempt from official recruitment procedures, and their migrations remained largely spontaneous. Labourers from Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland did not even need passports to enter France (Cross 1977: 222). However, when the economic crisis of the early 1930s made guest workers redundant, France sent them back.  

Between the two world wars, other relatively small Western European countries, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, in addition to attracting workers from neighbouring countries, continued to admit workers in varying numbers from the countries of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.  

After the Second World War, Western Europe not only resumed the admission of guest workers, but also saw at least two new migration movements that supplied labour. First was the recruitment of prisoners of war and displaced persons as labourers with the option of permanent settlement, which began with the cessation of hostilities in 1945. Britain, for example, by offering both a work contract and the right to permanent settlement, received approximately 217,000 people by December 1950, representing the largest admission in this regard. To specify, some 25,000 prisoners of war who had primarily been employed in agriculture and approximately 115,000 Poles and their dependants, many of whom had been members of the disbanded Polish armed forces, accepted work contracts and settlement offered by the British government at the end of the Second World War. When it became apparent that these admissions were insufficient in relation to labour demand, Britain recruited some 77,000 displaced persons, or ‘European volunteer workers as they came to be known’, living in refugee camps in the British occupied zones of Germany and Austria between October 1946 and December 1950 (Kay and Miles 1992: 33-35, 42-94).
In varying but significant numbers, Belgium, France and the Netherlands all admitted prisoners of war and displaced persons. Belgium first employed approximately 50,000 German prisoners of war in its coalmines from the end of the war until their release (Groenendijk and Hampsink 1995: 9), and recruited more than 22,000 displaced persons living in refugee camps in Germany (Kay and Miles 1992: 62). France recruited 27,000 displaced persons from its own zone of Germany and some 31,000 Germans (McDonald 1969: 119). The Netherlands recruited some 10,000 displaced persons, of whom 2,000 were former Polish soldiers (Lucassen 2001; Lange 2007: 23).

The more important movement was colonial migration. Before the Second World War, the labour-receiving countries of Western Europe, including colonial ones, had avoided recruiting non-European workers on principle, colonial labourers being brought to work temporarily and only for exceptional cases. For example, when France mobilised more than seven million citizens during the First World War (20 per cent of the total population) (Cross 1977: 42) – further exacerbating pre-war labour shortages – the French government recruited labourers in the colonies of North Africa and Indochina, and Chinese labourers by using commercial labour contractors. However, when the war ended and the situation improved in the labour market, France deported the vast majority of them – by force if necessary – as was the case with North Africans. In 1919, the French authorities ‘rejected any further experimentation with non-European labour’, and racialised the recruitment of foreign workers by making a list of the nationals they preferred. Nevertheless, during the economic expansion of 1922-1924, ‘when French and European immigrants could not be found for the worst jobs’, ‘the North Africans were hired’; but the bulk of them were again repatriated by 1931 (Cross 1983: 124-125). Similarly, Britain recruited ‘several thousand coloured labourers from the colonies’ during the First World War due to the acute shortage of labour, and after the war repatriated nearly all of them (Castles and Kosack 1973: 22).

However, after 1945, as a by-product of the decolonisation process, colonial migrations were not only in full swing but also mainly permanent in nature. In Britain, for example, there were 924,200 ‘coloured immigrants’ in 1966 (Freeman 1979: 21). France provided Algerians with free entry until their country became independent in 1962. The ‘net balance of admission in France of Algerian migrant workers’ was 400,200 between 1947 and 1963 (International Migration Digest 1965: 101), not to mention the number of immigrants who came from the former French protectorates (e.g. Morocco and Tunisia), ex-colonies in Africa (e.g. Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) and other colonies. The Netherlands admitted 501,736 people from the former
colony of Indonesia (and partly from other colonies) between 1946 and 1960 (Nederlandse Emigratiedienst 1965: 120-121). In Germany there was no colonial immigration since the country had no colonies; immigrants were refugees and/or expellees from Eastern Europe and what was then East Germany. Accordingly, Germany received 7.9 million ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union by 1950 (Münz and Ulrich 1998: 27) and some 3.8 million Germans from East Germany before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961 (Fassmann and Münz 1994: 529).

Another new development that Western Europe saw after the Second World War was the gradual steps being taken in the direction of the free circulation of labourers through bilateral and multilateral agreements. International organisations like the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe guided and encouraged this direction from very early on, thus stimulating intra-European migration. More importantly, as part of and parallel to an economic, social and political integration process, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which was the founding treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC, the forerunner of the EU), gave nationals of the member countries the right to take up employment in any other member state. This right was to develop into complete freedom of movement in 1968, allowing the economies of the member countries to absorb available reserve labourers within the boundaries of the Community more easily than ever.

Belgium, Britain and France were the first to recommence the employment of migrant workers in post-war Europe; each signed a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Italy in 1946, followed by the Netherlands and Switzerland in 1948. France renewed its earlier agreement in 1951, and Germany concluded a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955. However, until roughly 1960 – except in the case of France, Switzerland and, to a certain extent, Belgium – the demand for migrant labour, and thus the number of recruited workers, was remarkably modest, if not negligible, in the receiving countries. Italy was the main, if not the only, supply country. Only Belgium signed additional bilateral agreements with Greece and Spain, and France only with Greece.

Apart from France, before 1960, the receiving countries’ intention in signing a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Italy and some other countries, in so far as agreements were made, was both to initiate the entry of a limited number of workers while also restricting them to clearly specified sectors; thus, protecting the domestic labour market against a possible influx of migrants. For example, the Dutch-Italian agreement was a sector-tied one, indicating that a particular
number of Italians would be recruited to work only in the coal industry. Similarly, the Belgian-Italian agreement aimed at recruiting workers only for the coalmines, and ‘any occupational mobility’ outside the ‘sector was legally prohibited’ (Martiniello 2010: 247). Even France, in the first agreement, insisted that Italians should move to specific regions and occupations (Kubat 1993: 165).

As compared to both colonial immigration and overseas emigration, guest-worker migration was a relatively small movement in post-war Europe until approximately 1960. It was also smaller than intra-Western European labour migration, which was facilitated by the new regulations and political climate. For example, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands each employed a much higher number of workers from other Western European countries, especially from their adjacent ones, than workers from Southern Europe.

The management of recruitment in years of high labour demand

With the completion of the absorption of prisoners of war, displaced persons and colonial immigrants into employment by the late 1950s, Western European economies entered into a trend of remarkably high and stable growth until late 1973 and early 1974 that was called ‘Europe’s amazing economic performance’, notwithstanding a slight contraction during the recession years of 1967 and 1968. From 1960 on, not only larger economies like Germany and France and relatively smaller countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland demanded labour in ever-increasing numbers, but also some new buyers, such as Austria, Sweden and Denmark, queued up to recruit workers from the same sources. As early as 1961, the number of migrant workers, including seasonal ones admitted by six countries (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Britain) was 980,500; the following year the figure rose to about 1.1 million (International Migration Digest 1964: 223). Except for the recession years, the annual number of workers entering Western Europe remained remarkably high throughout the period, though migration was not a one-way movement; the annual return rate was also high.

In connection with a sharp increase in the demand for labour, the implementation of the guest worker system showed significant changes after 1960. During this period, the policy began to attract workers as rapidly and in as large numbers as possible from more easily accepted Southern European countries, in terms of both cultural characteristics and political position in relation to the Cold War; that is, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The demand countries, France and Germany being primary, were in a hurry to continue signing agreements with the
Southern European countries with which they had not yet signed. The countries that already had a restrictive recruitment agreement with Italy replaced the earlier agreements with new ones.\(^{17}\)

Furthermore, Italian, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and Yugoslav labourers were also given free access to sectors that were in need of labour.\(^{18}\) After entering France and other labour-demanding countries on tourist passports, Southern European workers could work and simultaneously or subsequently regularise their status. For example, in 1961, 32 per cent of Italians and 57 per cent of Greeks and Spaniards entered Germany in ways other than through official recruitment (Bendix 1990: 35). Spontaneous migration of workers became an accepted form of recruitment and thus a part of the European guest worker system.\(^{19}\) By and large, this applied to workers from the second group of official supply countries (Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia and Algeria) until at least the 1967-1968 recession years or even the end of the recruitment period, notwithstanding the existence to a varying degree of curbs on their free entry, especially in the later years. However, due to data limitation, it is difficult to establish whether or not and to what extent spontaneous migrants from the second group of countries received the same treatment as Southern Europeans in the regularisation of their status. For example, unlike the other receiving countries, Germany was against the regularisation of spontaneous Turkish migrants, which was documented in the 1964 German-Turkish protocol (Akgündüz 2008: 120-121).

After 1960, the rationale behind bilateral labour recruitment also changed; that is, agreements were made if the dimension of labour demand was substantial. As long as the number of spontaneously available migrants from one country was seen as adequate in relation to labour demand, the receiving side, in general, refrained from entering into a labour recruitment agreement with the supply country. For instance, because spontaneous entry of workers from the countries in the Mediterranean basin was sufficient in relation to labour demand, Britain did not make any recruitment agreements with the supply countries. This was the case with the other demand countries as well. Sweden, for example, after receiving limited numbers of Turkish workers through spontaneous entry from the early 1960s on, signed a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Turkey in 1967, but realising that the volume of labour demand from Turkey would not be large, Sweden did not put the agreement into practice. Thus, just as in the pre-agreement years, Turkish migration to Sweden continued to consist of only those who organised their migration on their own, usually due to personal links with earlier migrants.

Unlike the previous period, after 1960, bilateral recruitment agreements aimed at accelerating and regularising the migration movements
already established. This was vividly evident in the case of France’s agreement with Spain, Portugal and North African countries, as well as most of Germany’s agreements (e.g. with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia). Germany had already recruited workers from Yugoslavia through unofficial channels in modestly increasing numbers since the late 1950s, and the number of Yugoslav workers employed in 1967 was approximately 91,000. Following the 1968 German-Yugoslav labour recruitment agreement, Germany admitted 508,000 workers through the official channels in just three years’ time (1969-1971) (BIA 1974: 114).

A rather unexpected development that each of the industrialised Western European states experienced in the early 1960s was the inadequacy of the volume of supply from Southern Europe that required them to look beyond Southern Europe for labourers (McDonald 1969: 117; Castles 1984: 13; Miles 1987: 142-152). For example, France, unlike other Western European states, explicitly recognised immigration as being vital to secure economic and demographic recovery at the end of the war and set up an administrative structure in 1945, the Office National d’Immigration (ONI), to plan and organise the inflow of foreign people (Mayer 1975; Freeman 1979; Miles 1986; Ogden 1991).

Government advisors put the minimum number of immigrants required at over 5 million (Freeman 1979: 69-71; Cohen 1987: 125). In the beginning, the intention was to recruit ‘assimilable groups’ (i.e. so-called ‘culturally compatible’ Catholic Southern European nationals) for permanent settlement, particularly Italians (McDonald 1969; Ogden 1991; Seifert 1997). Nevertheless, the number of Italians entering France began to decrease drastically from the late 1950s onwards.22 With the signing of a recruitment agreement with Spain in 1961, the entry of Spanish workers first increased but soon declined, partly due to the emergence of Germany as another strong buyer on the labour market. The total number of Greek workers admitted did not even reach a mentionable figure, in spite of the fact that the French-Greek labour recruitment agreement was signed in the mid-1950s. When immigration from the preferred countries proceeded more slowly than planned during the period from 1945 to the late 1950s, the French authorities put aside the idea of having permanent settlers and placed emphasis on temporary labour recruitment, and implemented laissez-faire principles with regard to labour migration until 1968 (Castles 1986; Freeman 1989; Husbands 1991; Ogden 1991). Government spokespersons defended this policy by pointing to the shortage of workers (Freeman 1989: 165).

Germany had the upper hand in the competition with its European contenders and was able to attract quite a high proportion of Italian, Spanish and Greek labourers,23 notwithstanding the fact that
Switzerland was usually the largest recipient of Italians. Nevertheless, the numbers received were still not sufficient, particularly in view of the trend of a constant increase in labour demand. In the early 1960s, German employers and the Ministry of Labour were concerned with finding proper sources of labour (Bendix 1990: 31-33; Herbert 1990: 210-214), as well as the difficulty of retaining recruited guest workers. In 1963, for instance, 40 per cent of all foreign workers stayed less than a year (Bendix 1990: 31). The situation not only caused additional recruitment costs for employers, but also concern about finding workers. Because Germany experienced no self-initiated colonial labour inflows, and the erection of the Berlin Wall effectively stopped entry from East Germany, the country had to make active and vigorous efforts to recruit foreign workers. Germany put 400 recruitment offices into operation throughout the Mediterranean basin (i.e. in all the countries with which recruitment agreements had been signed) (Bauer et al. 2005: 206) to attract workers, and showed its appreciation for their inflow with ostentatious ceremonies from time to time (Akgündüz 2008: 102-103).

The Netherlands turned to Spanish workers when it became evident that Italians were not coming in sufficient numbers. The initial plan was to exclusively admit unmarried skilled migrants. However, because finding workers with the required characteristics was rather difficult, this plan was soon put aside, and even the first cohort of Spaniards consisted mostly of married unskilled workers; to find skilled workers was exceptional (Tinnemans 1994: 33; Schuster 1999: 170; Akgündüz 2008). As an official document from 1964 reveals, the Netherlands acknowledged the supremacy of strong buyers, particularly Germany, on the labour market of Southern Europe and Turkey, and arranged its recruitment policy accordingly. Belgium had difficulty finding and retaining Southern European labour in the 1960s. When the representatives of the Belgian coal industry approached Turkey to sign a labour recruitment agreement, they honestly told their counterparts that Southern Europeans, namely Italians and Spaniards, were no longer available, and they were ready to accept any able-bodied person who could work in the pits (Akgündüz 2008: 107).

The insufficiency of the labour inflow from Southern Europe was not simply due to an increase in the volume of labour demand. Two other important factors have to be taken into account as well. First, Western European countries had to compete for Southern European workers not only with each other but also with overseas countries. When Western European countries re-entered the international labour market as buyers after the war, overseas countries – especially the USA, Australia and Canada – had already been gravitational centres for Southern Europeans, and were still in need of immigrants. For
example, due to the shortage of labour, Canada developed a contract-based migrant worker scheme with the Caribbean region for its fruit and vegetable industry in the mid-1960s (Satzewich 1997: 38). Australia experienced difficulty attracting ‘Southern European workers, and many were returning to their homelands. The result was a series of measures to attract and retain migrants’, including recruitment in Latin America and ‘some relaxation of the White Australia Policy’ (Castles 1992: 551). Overseas countries were successful in taking a considerable proportion of the Southern European emigration during the 1960s and 1970s, thanks to the beckoning opportunities they offered and the dynamics of the previously established migration, particularly the role of social networks.

The second important factor was the relatively high economic performance and gradual dissipation of labour reserves in Southern European countries. Although several earlier studies in the description of push factors on guest worker migration in post-war Europe characterised the sending countries as having ‘widespread unemployment and slow economic growth’ (Salt 1976: 83); ‘unemployment’, ‘slow pace of economic development’, ‘the disparity between population and economic growth’ (Salt and Clout 1976: 127-128); and ‘unemployment, poverty, and underdevelopment’ (Castles and Kosack 1973: 28), the actual situation was rather different, as OECD data indicates. With the exception of Yugoslavia, most Southern European countries were in fact in the process of impressive economic growth (notwithstanding the existence of unemployment, underemployment and various economic hardships for the labouring population as well as the rural and urban lower middle classes). This growth was particularly visible in the case of Italy. In the late 1950s, the Italian economy was beginning to boom, ‘and it was not unknown for a trainload of southern emigrants, bound for France or Germany, to be “stolen” at Milan by labour-short Piedmontese industries’ (McDonald 1969: 120).

Also, Southern European countries experienced such remarkably high emigration rates, both in absolute and proportional terms, that from the late 1960s, on their capacities to release labour became limited, and some of them even began to suffer labour shortages. Mayer (1965: 13), in referring to the Italian Statistical Institute, states that the number of Italians who went abroad was more than 4.6 million during the 1946-1961 period alone. He adds that these statistics underestimate the number of persons migrating to European countries. However, according to Del Boca and Venturini (2003), the number of people who emigrated from Italy between 1946 and 1965 was 3.6 million. Greece observed the emigration of some 1.2 million people from 1955 to 1973 (Lianos 1975: 120), and the number of Spaniards who moved to Western Europe between 1956 and 1971 was estimated at
about 1,500,000; this did not include the seasonal migrant workers who were mostly under 21 or over 40, of peasant origin and who travelled to France each year to work in the grape and beet harvests (Del Campo 1979: 158-159). The actual figure was likely to be even higher, since the official Spanish data for emigration 'are widely agreed to underrepresent the level of migration' (Bover and Velilla 2005: 391). Given that in 1970 Spain had an economically active population of 12.7 million (Paine 1974: 59), this rate of migration was quite significant. Portugal saw the departure of more than two million people between 1945 and 1974, constituting nearly a quarter of the total population, excluding its colonies in Africa (Cohen 1987: 114). In the period 1965-1974 alone, 1,218,000 people went abroad; of these, 63 per cent headed to France (Baganha et al. 2005: 420). Yugoslavia, following the government's legalisation of labour migration abroad, acquired the second highest emigration rate in Europe, after Portugal (Schierup 1990: 106-109).

Due to its high level of emigration, by 1973 Greece had imported 20,000 foreign workers, mostly from North Africa (Paine 1974: 59), and tried to recall some of its workers from Germany. Yugoslavia lost more than 10 per cent of its population of 20- to 30-year-olds and as much as 34 per cent of its skilled and highly skilled metalworkers by the beginning of 1971 (Schierup 1990: 106-109). The emigration of skilled workers became such a great problem for the Yugoslav economy (Baucic 1972; Kayser 1972; Schierup 1990) that in 1972, the government introduced legislation to restrict emigration of the highly trained (Booth 1992: 118).

Where could the countries in need of labour go to recruit more workers? A drastic shrinkage in the geography of labour supply in Europe following the end of the Second World War began to be felt by the late 1950s. Central and Eastern European countries – which had been important sources of labour supply to Western Europe, especially to Germany and France, as well as to the USA – were now under socialist regimes that effectively banned labour migration to the West due to the political-ideological significance of their being what they called ‘a regime of proletariat and labouring population’. The only exception was a small trickle of refugees, particularly after the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary and the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. With the exception of Yugoslavia, the socialist countries of the Balkans also banned emigration. (The former Soviet Union had already started to do the same in the early 1920s, when the Bolsheviks consolidated their grip on power.) Likewise, China, which had been another major supply country of international labour migration from the mid-nineteenth century onward (Zolberg 1997), stopped releasing labour as a result of the 1949 revolution.

**alternative sources of labour supply**
This new situation in post-war Europe, and the fact that the management of the guest worker system necessarily required a relative geographical proximity to sources of labour supply, caused those countries realising that the inflow of Southern European labour was insufficient to turn to a second group of countries: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. There were no other alternatives within the same geographical range.\footnote{Werner 1986; \*no figure is given; \*\* for 1973}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
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<td>1,092.7</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>94.5</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>246.7</td>
<td>1,870.1</td>
<td>1,268.3</td>
<td>134.3</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>657.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>218.0</td>
<td>278.0</td>
<td>2,340.0</td>
<td>1,900.0**</td>
<td>193.4</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>593.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yugoslav labourers

Yugoslavia was in the second group of sending countries only due to the timing of its official recruitment agreements, and for political-ideological reasons. Yugoslav labourers had already been employed in Western Europe from the late nineteenth century onward, but between the end of the Second World War and the early 1960s their presence was not in as high numbers as it may have been and not under the coverage of bilateral agreements. An important reason for this was that for a long time Yugoslavia, as a socialist country, found it difficult to approve and regulate the economic migration of labourers to capitalist countries, since it could be viewed as a failure of its responsibilities towards its people. However, in 1961, the Yugoslav government eased its restrictions on migrants working abroad’ (Shonick 2009) by liberalising its policy of issuing passports, and became more open to signing labour recruitment agreements. On the other hand, the receiving countries could have their own reasons for being hesitant to make an official agreement with Yugoslavia. For example, West Germany long saw Yugoslavia’s official relations with East Germany as an obstacle to concluding a bilateral recruitment agreement (Shonick 2009). The change in West Germany’s stance made an agreement between the two countries possible in 1968.

North African (Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian) labourers had been a permanent part of the French labour force even before the Second World War ended; however, the labour markets of the other demand countries were not yet familiar with them. Turkey, among all the labour-sending countries of the post-war period, was the only one that would be participating in migration to Western Europe for the first time.
With the necessary extension of bilateral labour recruitment agreements to the second group of countries, the admission policy of Western Europe transformed from ‘Southern Europeans only’ into ‘Southern Europeans first’. For the most part, the recruitment of workers from the second group of countries took place to the extent that the first group (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) failed to meet demand. Following the removal of restrictions on Yugoslav labour migration, Yugoslavia also became a part of the first group.

The treatment of Turkey as a member of the second group was not what the rulers of Turkey wanted, as the country wished to be seen as having the same economic system, defence system and political values as the West. One of the arguments that Turkey employed to justify sending workers to Western Europe in the early 1960s was to advance the integration of the country into the European political and economic community. What is more, the founders of the Republic of Turkey ideologically represented the West as the model and ideal to aim for in development. Turkey was a founding member of the Council of Europe, a member of NATO, the IMF and the OECD, and in 1963 an associate of the EEC.

France had the highest number of North African workers; however, Algerians were only the third largest foreign group there in the 1962 and 1968 censuses, after Italians and Spaniards. In 1968, the number of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians in France combined was less than half that of Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese combined (Brenner 1979: 47). The number of Algerian workers in other labour-receiving countries, including Belgium (which, except France, was the only country that had signed a recruitment agreement with Algeria), was very small, if not negligible. In the early 1970s, Italians were in first place by a large margin as being the largest foreign labour contingent in Belgium, followed by Spaniards and Moroccans. Moroccans were in third place in the Netherlands as well by the end of 1972, after Spaniards and Turks. In Germany, the number of workers from Morocco and Tunisia combined constituted only a small fraction of the foreign labour contingent, despite earlier recruitment agreements with these countries.

Turkish workers’ migration to Germany and their eventual presence there as the largest foreign labour contingent were often ascribed in the relevant literature to Germany’s preferential treatment of Turks due to foreign policy reasons and historical ties between the two countries. Portes, for example, places the Turkish labour migration to Germany in the same category as the post-war colonial migration to the former colonial or dominant countries, claiming that between Germany and Turkey ‘there is a history of client relations and geopolitical collaboration dating at least to World War I’. In this case, ‘the
dominant power not only finds it easier to recruit labour within its sphere of influence, but also acquires certain obligations toward this dependent population' (Portes 2000: 160-161). However, this characterisation of the labour migration from Turkey to Germany may not be entirely accurate. As available evidence indicates, neither did Germany give Turks preferential treatment for foreign policy reasons, nor is there ‘a history of client relations’ between the two countries (Akgündüz 2008: 117-126). Germany first refused Turkey’s request to sign a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with the argument that ‘Turkey is only partly a European country’ and that there were several African and Asian countries willing to sign recruitment agreements with Germany. If Germany said ‘yes’ to Turkey then ‘it would be very difficult to say no to these countries. Otherwise they could harm German foreign policy interests by recognising the German Democratic Republic’ (Jamin 1998).

However, following the signing of the German-Greek labour recruitment agreement, the Turkish diplomatic mission in Bonn gave a note to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 December 1960, stating that if Germany still refused to sign a bilateral agreement with Turkey, Turkey would consider it to be neglecting a NATO member in favour of Greece. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the Turkish Embassy in Bonn by indicating that Germany was also willing to sign a labour recruitment agreement with Turkey. The recruitment agreement between the two countries in October 1961 was, at least in terms of the social rights of migrant workers, a ‘second class’ agreement as contrasted with the kind made with Southern European countries (Akgündüz 2008: 117-123). Although Germany began attracting Turkish labour before the bilateral labour recruitment agreement, and the percentage of skilled Turkish migrants was higher than that of guest workers among other nationals, the volume of Turkish migration to Germany remained limited, and smaller than Greek, Italian or Spanish migration until the end of 1967. The attraction of Turkish workers gained pace just after 1969, when Southern European labour sources largely dried up and Germany’s demand for labour enlarged significantly. Between 1969 and 1973, Germany recruited more than 4.4 million workers, though in these years the volume of return migration was also high, at more than 2.3 million workers (Bauer et al. 2005: 201). In addition, according to the German Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, BfA), Germany officially recruited more skilled workers from Turkey than it did from Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain combined. In the last two years of the recruitment period (1972-1973), Turkish workers became the largest foreign labour contingent by a rather small margin, in which a higher return rate among Southern European workers was a factor.
By the end of 1972, Turkish workers were the second largest foreign labour contingent in the Netherlands, after Spaniards, and the fourth largest group in Belgium. Although the Turkish-French labour recruitment agreement was signed in 1965, France only started to actively recruit workers in 1970, coinciding with a relatively rapid rise in registered job vacancies (Table 8.2), though the total number of workers recruited from Turkey by July 1974 constituted only a small fraction of the number of post-war migrants in France. In the other labour-receiving countries (e.g. Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland) the number of Turkish workers was also rather small.

**Limits of the guest worker system**

The main components of the recruitment agreements were identical. When a demand country wanted to recruit migrants through its recruitment bureau or representative office in a supply country, it had to submit an application to the supply side. The application had to contain information about the characteristics of the workers requested, their wage, type of work, the place of work, working hours, the place of boarding and boarding expenses, and how much would be paid toward the cost of their return home. The receiving side usually signed a one-year contract with selected candidates before their departure. The contract wages depended upon whether they were recruited, as skilled or unskilled. Migrant workers’ wages, as a rule, were to be identical to those for native workers doing the same work. The receiving country handled the transportation of workers to the destination country, and the costs incurred. From the perspective of workers’ interests, entering Western Europe through official channels was much better, both in terms of the financial and physical costs of migration.

However, even in this most formal form of recruitment migrants could be confronted with a breach of the basic principles right from the start. As some cases suggest (Castles and Kosack 1973: 152-175; Eryilmaz 1998; Akgündüz 2008: 64), the contract wage might be lower than that of native workers; employers could put the contracts of skilled workers aside and ask them to sign contracts for unskilled work instead; or the conditions of job and accommodation might be lower than promised. In Germany, for example, the proportion of skilled migrant workers at work was less than that specified during the recruitment by the receiving country itself.30

Employers quite often used nominative requests (i.e. demanding specific names given by migrant workers already working) as a form of official recruitment. For migrant workers to be able to organise a nominative request for a family member or a friend at home, the
existence of vacancies in their workplace was not enough; they had to at the same time win the confidence of their employers. In this practice, the violation of the rules relating to wages, accommodation and jobs might perhaps be less visible but more frequent. The situation might be the same in the practice of large factories directly recruiting workers on their own. Needless to say, for undocumented migrant workers the likelihood was greater of facing lower wages than that of native workers doing the same work, in addition to enduring substandard working and living conditions.

The guest worker system included a tacit approval of the employment of undocumented workers. Spontaneous migrants, in principle, could regularise their status after finding a job; however, there were always significant numbers of irregular (also called ‘undocumented’ or, in the popular term of the early 1970s, ‘tourist’) workers, though it is difficult to document their exact number per year. This was also valid for France, where an easy and almost free access to the regularisation process for spontaneous migrants existed (Kubat 1993). Germany exhibited quite an interesting example in relation to undocumented Turkish migrant workers. At Turkey’s request, during the official visit of the Turkish president to Germany in 1972, the regularisation of undocumented Turkish workers was discussed at the highest level. Although the solution found was rather bureaucratic, and from the perspective of ‘tourist’ workers risky, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only two länder – Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz – abided by the agreement, and some 8,000 ‘tourist’ workers regularised their status, with the consent of their employers. The rest of the länder ignored the agreement and refused to do the same (see Akgündüz 2008: 81, 121).

In terms of basic legal rights on the labour market, migrant workers were separated from native workers and placed in an inferior position. Migrants were not able to sell their labour to the highest bidder. For example, during the initial contract period, employers could fire migrants at any time, but the migrants could not quit without the consent of their employers. Employers enjoyed the freedom of easily hiring and firing migrants. Furthermore, migrant workers were permitted to change occupation only after working some years at their initial jobs (see Castles and Kosack 1973: 98-112, 125-132). These restrictions were underpinned by the regulation of residence and work permits, and the fact that migrants were often unaware of their rights and feared deportation. A similar separation of migrant workers from native ones existed in the area of trade union rights. Migrants were eligible to be members of trade unions, but were not eligible to be candidates for the election of works council or staff representatives, or to take administrative or executive posts in a trade union. In the course
of time, however, this situation was modified, as it was in 1972 in France (Brenner 1979: 19). In Germany, some trade unions ignored the law and permitted their migrant members to participate in works council elections much earlier.

Labour market and sectors of employment

Despite a constant inflow of migrant workers and open door policies, for Southern Europeans at least, the situation in the Western European labour market that emerged in the years post-1960 was previously unknown and unique. OECD data permit us to comparatively view demand-supply relations in the labour market of each of the receiving countries (Table 8.2). Somehow a largely ignored fact is that, with the exception of recession years, the number of job vacancies was either higher (e.g. in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands until 1972 and Austria from 1971 on), or just slightly lower than that of the registered unemployed (e.g. in Belgium, France and Austria before 1971). In the latter case, the number of unemployed was negligible even in absolute terms, putting aside the question of whether or not and to what extent their qualifications met the requirements of demand (Table 8.2).

As OECD data reveal, migrant workers were attracted not simply to take ‘jobs that the native labour force refuses to accept’ – as widely held belief or Piore’s dual labour market thesis suggests33 – but as a response to labour shortages. Furthermore, the jobs for which labour shortages existed and thus guest workers were recruited were not only in the secondary sector or in ‘agriculture, construction, and mining’, as Moch believes.34 It is true that in the initial years, with the exception of France, in the receiving countries (e.g. Britain, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland), guest workers were recruited to work mainly in agriculture, mining, construction, and some other jobs (including seasonal ones) that were unattractive to native labourers. However, from roughly 1963 onward the situation was significantly changed. Not only did the demand for migrant workers rise very quickly but also, especially in the leading receiving countries, industry became their main field of employment; agriculture, construction and mining, which were likely to be the most unattractive sectors for the native labour force, embraced only a small proportion of migrants.

It is apparent from the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BfA) statistics that more than half of migrant workers35 were recruited to fill jobs in the country’s two most important sectors: iron and metal production and processing (Eisen- und Metallerzeugung und -verarbeitung); and the
Table 8.2  Number of registered unemployed and job vacancies in migrant-labour recruiting countries, 1960-1974 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>246</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a: registered unemployed; b: jobs vacant; *no figure given

processing industry, iron and metal excluded (Verarbeitende Gewerbe, ohne Eisen- und Metallverarbeitung) (BfA 1972, 1974a). Thus, more than half of the foreign workers were, in fact, a vital part of the labour force in key industries. Böhning indicates that the employment of foreign workers by economic sector in Switzerland was similar to that in Germany. In France, too, foreign workers [were] heavily concentrated in the industrial sector’ (Brenner 1979: 38). According to Dutch statistics, the vast majority of workers from all the recruitment countries who entered the Netherlands per year were employed in ‘factories and workshops’ (arbeiders fabriek, werkplaats). The metal production and processing industry took the highest share of migrant workers, while agriculture-horticulture, mining and construction embraced only a small fraction. However, in Belgium, the situation remained somewhat unchanged; mining continued to be an important sector of employment for migrants.

Relevant studies usually defined the jobs migrant workers took up in post-war Western Europe as either ‘unskilled’ or ‘unskilled and semi-skilled’ (see Piore 1979: 1-26; Satzewich 1991: 16; Kay and Miles 1992: 189; Moch 1992: 188). It is a fact that migrants were mainly employed as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Workplaces showed a clear segmentation between native workers who usually occupied high-status and better-paying jobs, and migrants who usually occupied low-status, low-paying ones, and were faced with various forms of
discrimination and difficulty in promotion. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that especially in the largest labour-receiving countries (i.e. Germany and France), a mentionable proportion of male guest workers occupied skilled positions; this was despite the fact that the receiving countries could and did employ skilled migrants as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. For example, in Germany in 1966, 28 per cent of all foreign males were employed as skilled labourers (Herbert and Hunn 2001: 199). The BfA’s survey in 1968 indicated that 55 per cent of male Yugoslav workers occupied skilled positions (including master and foreman); this percentage was 16 for Turks, 15 for Spaniards, 13 for Italians, 12 for Portuguese and 7 for Greeks. The 1972 survey of the same institution yielded almost the same results for male migrants, except for Yugoslavia, whose level of skilled workers dropped to 41 per cent. However, both surveys indicated that female migrant workers were employed only as unskilled and semi-skilled workers (BfA 1973: 67). A comprehensive Dutch survey conducted in 1970, which covered 261 mostly industrial firms, showed that 17 per cent of Italians, 13 per cent of Turks, 11 per cent of Spaniards and 4 per cent of Moroccans were skilled workers (Akgündüz 2008: 161).

Conclusion

Guest worker migration in post-war Europe was not a new phenomenon in 1945. Rather, it was the resumption of a well-established pattern starting from as early as the 1880s. After the Second World War up to the 1960s, guest worker migratory movements to Western Europe were comparatively smaller than emigration, colonial immigration and even intra-Western European labour migration. Afterwards, however, guest worker migration increased remarkably. In Germany, for example, migrant workers came to constitute more than 10 per cent of the total labour force in 1973.

With the exception of France, in every receiving country migrant workers were initially recruited mainly to work in agriculture, mining, construction and other jobs that were unattractive to native labourers (including seasonal jobs). From the early 1960s, however, migrants came in response to labour shortages principally in industry. Particularly in the leading labour-recruiting countries (e.g. Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands), the vast majority of migrant workers were employed in manufacturing. It was rather unusual that despite a constant inflow of migrants and open door policies, at least for Southern Europeans, including Yugoslavs, demand-supply relations in the labour market of each receiving country remained
spectacularly in favour of labour. The number of unfilled vacancies was either higher or only slightly lower (mainly in Belgium and France) than that of the unemployed until recruitment was officially halted in 1973-1974. Thus, Western Europe was very successful at tightly regulating the admission of foreign labour according to demand.

Though the admission policy was initially 'Southern Europeans only', when the demand for foreign labour further increased and the volume of supply from Southern Europe became insufficient, the admission policy was transformed into 'Southern Europeans first'. The recruitment of workers from the second group of supply countries was limited to cases where the first group failed to meet demand.

From the perspective of official migrants, the guest worker system represented ease and security in reaching the country of work. It offered regulated wages and working conditions, accommodation and certain social rights. This aspect of the system was a clear improvement over the situation of 'undocumented' migrant workers. Yet in the host countries, the guest worker system created a hierarchy within the working class along ethno-cultural lines. Not only were migrants usually unskilled and semi-skilled workers mainly employed in low-status, low-paying jobs, their position was also inferior to that of native labourers in legal, political and social domains and housing. Although they paid taxes and premiums, they demanded little, if anything, of the social expenditures of the state (e.g. in terms of subsidised housing, education and welfare). Furthermore, they left their paid premiums behind when they returned home, especially in the early years. Perpetuated longer than a quarter of a century, this exclusionary system was justified, sometimes only ideologically, as was the case in Germany, where the authorities long claimed that 'Germany is not an immigration country'. The legacy of the guest worker system was the creation of a range of difficulties for the acceptance and inclusion of especially ethnically and culturally more distinct segments of the migrant worker population, who went on to become permanent settlers.
MAIN IDEAS

Guest worker migration in post-war Europe was not a new phenomenon, but a resumption of an established pattern.

Before 1960, apart from France, the receiving countries’ intention in signing a bilateral labour recruitment agreement was to initiate the entry of a limited number of workers while also restricting them to clearly specified sectors.

In connection with a sharp increase in the demand for labour, the policy became to attract workers as rapidly and in as large numbers as possible from Southern European countries; that is, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and later Yugoslavia.

Unlike the previous period, after 1960, bilateral recruitment agreements aimed at accelerating and regularising the migration movements already established. Agreements were made if the dimension of labour demand was substantial.

The recruitment of workers from Turkey and North African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) took place to the extent that Southern Europe failed to meet demand.

The number of unfilled vacancies was either higher or only slightly lower than that of the numbers of unemployed until recruitment was officially halted in 1973-1974. The volume of migration was determined by the demand for labour; this was despite the acceptance or easiness of spontaneous migration of labourers.

Particularly in the leading labour-recruiting countries, such as Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands, the vast majority of migrant workers were employed in manufacturing after the early 1960s. Especially in the first three countries, migrant workers constituted a considerable proportion of the labour force, even in key industries.

Migrants were mainly employed as unskilled and semi-skilled workers in low-status, low-paying jobs; they also held inferior positions in legal, political and social domains.

Employment of undocumented workers was tacitly approved or tolerated.
Notes

1. Hoelder (2000: 45) suggests that these intra-European labour migrations were ‘part of two larger migration systems of intercontinental dimension, a North Atlantic system reaching from the small towns of the Jewish Pale of Settlement in Russia to North America, and a Russo-Siberian system extending from the Russian ethnic territories to the Pacific’. Lucassen and Lucassen (2009) provide a useful and comparative analysis of migrations in Europe from 1500 to 1900.

2. Although somehow largely unnoticed, Hourwich’s book presents a comprehensive analysis of how the main source of immigration to the US shifted from Northern and Western Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe, and relations between the US labour market and immigration (including return migration).

3. Herbert (1957) gives a detailed account of the living and working conditions of foreign workers – including prisoners of war – their sectors of employment and the racist hierarchy in which they were placed under the Nazi regime.

4. France established labour recruitment agreements with the following countries: Poland (1919), Italy (1919), Czechoslovakia (1920), Hungary (1924) and Yugoslavia, Romania and Austria (1929 and 1930) (Cross 1977: 89-90, 119, 123, 318).

5. In the Netherlands, there were some 44,000 foreign labourers with work permits in 1936 (Eiel 2005), the majority of whom were Germans and Belgians. The remaining workers were largely Italians, Poles, Czechs and Yugoslavs (Ellenmers, 1987; Langeweg 2008). For the case of Belgium, see Caestecker (2008); Delbroek (2008).

6. For the numbers, wages and the sector of employment of these colonial and Chinese workers, see Cross 1977: 43-49.

7. Cross (1977: 224) states that ‘the Colonial Ministry imported 132,421 North Africans throughout the war’. After the war the police ‘summarily deported North Africans through periodic raids on their neighborhoods in Paris and Marseilles, probably only about 6,000 remained by the end of 1920’.

8. Preferences by nationality were as follows: 1) Italians, 2) Poles, 3) Czech, 4) Portuguese, 5) Spanish, 6) Greeks, 7) Russian, 8) Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Bulgarians’ (Cross 1977: 85-6).


10. Such as the agreement between France and the Netherlands in 1948, and the agreement between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1953 (Lange 2007).

11. For example, the recommendation of the ILO in 1949, the recommendation of the OECD in 1955 (Lange 2007: 29-33) and the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Establishment in 1955 (Grootendijk 2006).

12. France admitted 315,000 Italian workers between 1946 and 1958 (McDonald 1969: 120). In Switzerland the number of Italian nationals with Swiss work permits was 242,806 in 1959 (Mayer 1965: 7-8), and Belgium employed 57,626 Italian workers in 1947 (Desle 1995: 543).

13. The number of Italian workers who arrived in Britain between 1947 and 1948 was only 460, despite the fact that the 1945 agreement aimed to recruit 2,800 workers (Kay and Miles 1992: 38). In the Netherlands, the number of Italian workers was 1,984 by the end of 1959 (Wentoft 1967: 213), and the number of Italians working in Germany was just 9,691 in 1938 (BFA 1962: 26-27).

14. Belgium made a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Spain in 1936 and with Greece in 1937 (Martiniello and Jamin 2009); though in 1961, the number of
Spanish workers was about ten times smaller (7,191), and that of Greek workers was over 19 times smaller (3,573), than the number of Italian workers (Desle 1995: 545).

15 France signed a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Greece in 1954 (Freeman 1989: 74), but Greek labour migration to France remained negligible until the end of the official recruitment period (Lianos 1973).

16 Europe experienced mass emigration to overseas regions in the decade after the war ended. In the Netherlands, for example, emigration remained larger than immigration until 1960 (Nederlandse Emigratiedienst 1961: 120-123), and Britain’s situation was the same until 1958. Total European (including Southern and Eastern European) emigration to overseas countries for the period 1946-1973 is estimated at more than 12.6 million (Lohrmann 1976: 229).

17 Belgium lifted the limitation on the sector of employment of Italian workers as early as 1938. This took place following ‘the accident at the Marcinelle mine when 136 Italian miners lost their lives’ (Martinelli 2010: 247). The 1948 Dutch-Italian recruitment agreement was replaced with a new one in 1960. In 1964, with the initiative of the Italian government, which took advantage of the competition for migrant labour, a new labour recruitment agreement was made between Switzerland and Italy, giving more rights to Italians living in Switzerland (Liebig 2004: 163-164).

18 It became a legal right in 1968 for Italian nationals to take a job in the other member countries of the EEC.

19 For example, in a report dated 14 January 1970 and presented to the Dutch parliament, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health stated that the phenomenon of spontaneous migration was a veiled form of recruitment, and quite attractive due to the situation in the labour market, notwithstanding the existence of certain risks like the spread of infectious diseases and the oversupply of labour (Brief van de Minister van Sociale zaken en Volksgezondheid 1970: 4).

20 The number of Italian workers coming to France dropped to around 13,000 per year in 1961 and dropped a further four to six thousand per year from 1969 onwards (BFA 1974b: 101).

21 Germany recruited more than 177,000 workers from Italy in 1961 through its recruitment agencies (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1963: 11), which was almost five times higher than that the number admitted by France in the same year. Likewise, Germany got the lion’s share of total annual Greek emigration: approximately 53 per cent in 1961 and 69 per cent in 1965 (Lianos 1973).

22 In 1960, Chinese refugees encamped in Hong Kong were considered for recruitment; however, due to the high transportation costs, racial reasons and discomfort with the possibility of permanent settlers, the plan was not implemented (Bendix 1990: 33).

23 The report of an official Dutch delegation’s visit to Greece, Turkey, Italy and Malta, dated 10–31 January 1964 (Archive of the Dutch Recruitment Bureau in Ankara, in the archive titled ‘Human Rights and Oppositional Movements in Turkey’ at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam).

24 Between 21 per cent and 61 per cent of Greeks migrated annually to Australia, Canada and the USA during the period 1955-1973 (Lianos 1975: 120-21). The total share of overseas regions in the Italian migration from 1960 to 1969 was similar (International Migration 1967, 1970). More than 80 per cent of Portuguese migrants went to the Americas, with Brazil accounting for the majority, until 1960; this percentage was 25 between 1960 and 1974 (Bagnana 2003). Some 25 per cent of Yugoslav migration was directed to Canada, the USA, New Zealand and Australia after 1960 (Bucic 1972: 1–3).
For the annual real growth rate of GDP (gross domestic product) in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey from 1960 to the mid-1970s, see OECD 1977: 124. Though Turkey was less developed than the other Southern European countries, it still had a high economic and industrial growth rate in the 1950s and during the migration years.

Aside from the insufficiency of labour from Southern Europe, there was another factor in finding additional supply countries. The receiving countries needed to diversify the composition of the labour force to avoid becoming dependent on particular groups of workers in order to ease the management of labour and to reduce the risk of industrial disputes.

The only exception was that the socialist regime in Bulgaria allowed emigration of large numbers of Turkish minorities to Turkey.

Germany, after the agreement with Italy, made recruitment agreements with Spain and Greece (1961), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and the former Yugoslavia (1968) (Bauer et al. 2005). Following the first agreement with Italy, France concluded bilateral recruitment agreements with Spain (1961), Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal (1963), Yugoslavia and Turkey (1965). After independence in 1962, France signed three consecutive agreements with Algeria in 1964, 1968 and 1971 in order to regulate Algerian migration according to labour demand, and similar agreements were made with Mali, Mauritania (1963) and Senegal (1964) (Brenner 1979: 22-3). Belgium’s bilateral agreement with Italy was followed by agreements with Spain (1956), Greece (1957), Turkey, Morocco (1964), Tunisia (1969), Algeria and Yugoslavia (1970). The Netherlands’ agreements, after that with Italy, were with Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia and Tunisia (1970).

For a detailed study of the case, see Akgündüz 2008: 115-126.

For instance, on average 33 per cent to 34 per cent of the workers annually recruited from Turkey by Germany were skilled according to the standard of the recruiter, but this percentage was at least halved when workers took up work in Germany. For more on this issue, see Dohse 1982.

Piore (1979: 1-49; 1980: 13-21) suggests that the hypothesis of seeing labour migration as a response to labour shortages does not provide an adequate explanation. Instead, he offers his dual-labour market hypothesis. Accordingly, the market is divided into a primary and a secondary sector, and migrants come ‘to take a distinct set of jobs, jobs that the native labour force refuse to accept’.

Moch (1997: 54) writes: ‘Foreign workers and their families arrived in unprecedented numbers in the 1960s [...] In terms of their occupations and home conditions, these foreign labourers resembled historical migrants. Like nineteenth-century immigrants, they worked in agriculture, construction, and mining’.

From 1965 onward, this meant more than 60 per cent of Turkish migrants.

Böhnning (1972: 47) states, ‘the proportion of foreigners employed in low-productivity, low-paying jobs in Switzerland has been halved over the last 15 years, while a larger and larger share of immigrant labour has found employment in the metal and machinery industry, for example’. For more information on the sectors of employment of foreign workers in Switzerland, see Böhnning and Maillat 1974: 124-165.

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