CHAPTER 4

Enablers, Interpreters & Entrepreneurs: The Global City, 1980 onwards

Thank God, ‘Sushimania’ is finally receding in Istanbul.
I, too, was compelled to keep eating although I really did not enjoy it a bit, because I thought everyone else liked it.
It now seems everybody had felt just like me.
Now, fortunately, the ‘fusion cuisine’ is ‘in’ with full force”

Hürriyet, October 13, 2003.
In this chapter, I stretch my particular reading of the long history of leisure consumption and entertainment into its final destination, Istanbul of 2014. I will start first with the key and somewhat abrupt transformation that took place in early 1980s. Second, I will discuss the period since 2002. All in all, I cover from 1980 until the beginning of 2014 when the book writing up process was concluded.

To put the stage for the larger study, in my analysis of this recent period, since 1980, I need to note my observation that the major transformations could be seen as having developed as a result or under the institutional wings of two successive types of regulation that could be associated with two chronological periods:

1) **Pro-Market and Managerial Paternalism** that had been introduced by the deep economic reforms and violent coup d’état in 1980. This period spanned until 2002.

2) **Neo-Liberal and Conservative Paternalism** that was initiated slowly and in gradual phases since AK Party’s assumption of office in 2002. I conclude this period as I conclude this book in early 2014.

To clarify these terms as explanatory concepts to characterize those sub-periods, I borrow Engelen’s discussion of ‘market dimensions’ (2001). Building on and extending the work of Weber (1968) he points out to various market dimensions as follows: (1) the objects of trade (2) the subjects of trade (3) the structure of the market (4) its level of institutionalization (5) the locality of the market (6) its degree of social embeddedness and (7) the mode, level and object of regulation (Engelen, 2001; Rath, 2002). I employ those dimensions to animate my discussion in every one of the each sub-section, below.

In order to analytically animate above periodization, I will discuss below, the major socio-economic, political and cultural background and parameters of neo-liberal urban transformation in Istanbul since the last
three decades. In doing this, I analyze the roles of the governmental and nongovernmental regulation in contouring, shaping and promoting leisure consumption and entertainment.

My claim is that the changes in the way Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment was regulated have helped the emergence of a particular leisure consumption and entertainment opportunity structure—as discussed by Kloosterman & Rath (2001). This opportunity structure was in turn used by the producers or the laborscapes (in adaptation and inspiration from various -scapes of Appadurai 2000) in order to cater to the consumers who were swimming amidst a plethoric ‘sea’ of increasingly multiplying and diversifying choices. One certainly may remind him/herself of the shiny ‘sea’ of leisure and entertainment—providing personalities and scenes on İstiklal Avenue as described in the opening vignette in the prologue of Chapter I.

The city in these two successive periods was, first getting increasingly unshackled from the limitations set up by the regulations of the previous national developmental period; and later, was on the way to becoming an aspiring global city. In the first period, market liberalization helped further development of what Chatterton & Hollands call, ‘corporate institutionalization’ (2005) of the services sector in general and provoked the coming of a more diversified leisure consumption and entertainment setting in particular (Aytar, 2011).

The general pro-market orientations as well as the particular regulatory policies were behind the sprouting of a more entrepreneurial and initiative-taking stance amongst the laborscapes of leisure consumption and entertainment. Regulation is also not only important to help bring into flourishing of this new ethos of production, but also in molding the citizenry-as-consumers swimming amidst this new sea of diverse options provided by the producers.

**IV. 1. ENABLERS: CHANGING ACTORS IN REGULATION**

Based on my analysis the primary material amassed in the fieldwork (semi-structured interviews and participant observation), as well as the evaluation of the secondary material (legal documents, books and articles, media scanning etc), I argue that the Regulators could be classified and clustered as:
I should certainly note Rath’s important theoretical and fieldwork-based reminder that “regulation [should not] be confused with state regulation. A multitude of agents play a role in regulation processes, such as local, national or international governmental agents, unions, quangos, non-profit organizations, voluntary associations, and individual and their social networks. Regulation can be manifested in thick or thin ways or, in other words, can either be imposed or enforced or be a matter of voluntary action” (Rath, 2002). In this spirit, in the following sub sections, I will analyze the roles of above three categories of regulators while underlining the fact that all actors are entangled to one another, are in complex relations among each other and always exhibit diverse –and sometimes contradictory-sounding–ways of dealing with different situations.

IV.1.I. Derogators, Inspectors & Bulldozers: Pro-Market / Managerial and Neo-Liberal / Conservative Paternalism(s) by the Central Government

Since the beginning of 1980, a new era was opened up and I would like to underline as it pertains to my analytical discussion of regulation. Actually, this new era consisted of two successive sub-periods dominated by –what I suggested to term as above: (a) Pro-Market / Managerial Paternalism and (b) Neo-Liberal / Conservative Paternalism. The first one was introduced by the ‘Monetarist-New Rightist’ economic reform package (Eralp, Tünay and Yeşilada, 1993) and the authoritarian and violent military coup d’état in 1980. The second was launched with the coming to the office of the reformist yet authoritarian-conservative AK Parti in 2002 (İnsel, 2013).

The former period could be associated most certainly with Turgut Özal, the Cabinet Minister under the pre-coup government, the founder of ruling ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, Motherland Party), Prime Minister (1983-1989) and finally, the President of the Republic between 1989 and 1993, the year of his death. The period in the urban field of Istanbul, on the other hand, could be characterized by Özal’s metropolitan municipal associate, Bedrettin Dalan of the same party, who was the Metropolitan Mayor between 1984 and 1989.
The latter could directly be identified with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the Metropolitan Mayor (officially in office between 1994 and 1998), founder of AK Parti (in 2001) and Prime Minister (2002-onwards) and who, some claim is, ‘in the final instance’ the ultimate and prolonged ‘Mayor’ of Istanbul. Now let me discuss those two periods first in terms of the role of the central government and next, in municipal administration in the following sub-section, IV.1.2.

I claim that these two periods transformed the role of the state in consumption, radically altering the model under the national developmental/populist paternalist period between 1950 and 1980. During this previous period, ageing ideological orthodoxies of early republican Kemalism (1920-1950) had been relaxed. Between 1950 and 1980, the role of the state was one centered upon the economic and cultural necessities associated with policies of promoting mainstreaming and thus homogenizing forms of consumption. All in all, a policy that some scholars call Peripheral Fordism had become a supporting procedure to the International Keynesianism (Lipietz, 1987). ‘Import-substituting’ model of development in Turkey was in this sense, one among the many local implementations of International Keynesianist trend (Keyder, 1981).

After 1980, with Turkey’s pro-market (or economically liberal) turn, consumption policies too, started move away from a populist and allocative/state-led course, to a more market-oriented one where the regulation was mostly about letting the economy operate more freely, reduce rigid formalities. The role of the state changed after 1980 significantly to have a deep impact on the way regulation upon leisure consumption and entertainment was formulated and executed. On January 24th, 1980, the ruling center-right wing Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) of the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel announced a package of radical economic measures. Economic “decisions were announced in order to curb inflation, to fill in the foreign financing gap, and to attain a more outward-oriented and market-based economic system. Within the framework of these decisions, export subsidies were granted and exchange rates were allowed to depreciate in real terms to make Turkish exports more competitive, which would lead to the promotion of export-led growth” (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2002: 5). It was claimed that the new period has shown great ideological affinities with the ‘Monetarist New Right’ in general and ‘Reaganism’ and ‘Thatcherism’ in particular (Eralp, Tünay and Yeşilada, 1993). This new period opened up a whole new series of

---

1 A similar case was made for the Republican period’s urban tourism policies until the mid-1980s. Alipouraghtapeh noted that Turkey’s urban tourism policies were characterized by a heavy national developmentalist strand based on central planning and domination by the government (Alipouraghtapeh, 1991). Göynem (2000) illustrates this development in the sector of tourism by the marked shift in the government’s role away from a ‘pioneering state’ (pioneering stage) to the ‘state as the coordinator’ (liberal stage). He claims that in the first stage (1963-83) state was the main force behind investing in infrastructure, planning and promoting leisure consumption and was also running many establishments itself. In the liberal stage (1983 – onwards), state slowly and gradually moved away from the sector, promoting public-private partnership, with a projected aim of leaving the area to the private investors. “State investment in leisure consumption superstructure was stopped, and preparations to privatize existing establishments started. […] The practice of price-setting for facilities by the government was discontinued, allowing for market mechanisms to function” (Göynem, 2000:1033-4; for the shift towards entrepreneurialism especially with regards to changing legal, juridical structures, also see Var, 2001).
pro-market transformations that were in many ways similar to the global changes (Yalman, 2002 & 2013).

Only months later, on September 12th, 1980, Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) announced it took over the administration of the country after the ideological strife and violence claimed lives of numerous citizens on a daily basis (Mete, 1987). The coup d’etat ended the lame duck parliamentary democracy of the country, shut down all existing political parties, jailed their leaders and tens of thousands of left and right wing militants, activists, journalists and others. 1982 Constitution -which was formulated by the junta and which is still currently in effect- was a highly draconian one, severely restricting citizens’ rights and liberties and placing ‘indivisible integrity of the state with its land and nation’ and “preservation of Atatürk’s principles and revolutions [reforms]² as among the top priorities” (Oran, 1989).

With those two important events, since the beginning of 1980s, Turkey has undergone a shift from a developmental model based on import-substituting industrialization led by a protectionist state, to an export-promoting and market oriented growth strategy (Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 1990a, 1990b; Eralp, Tünay and Yeşilada, 1993; Erkip, 2000). Under the rule of Turgut Özal who was elected in the first general balloting in 1983, export-promoting and pro-market reforms continued on, while numerous state economic enterprises were started to be privatized (Sönmez, 2000). It is worthy to note that Özal was also the architect of the economic package of January 24th, 1980 as a state bureaucrat in charge of economics under AP’s rule.

Privatization and export promotion were designed as new priorities in resource allocation and this has changed and redefined the policy parameters regulating and shaping income distribution (Boratav, 1990 & 2013). Indeed in the post-1980 period, previous populist policies providing increasing real wages for some sections of the society (Keyder, 1987) were gradually shelved, and labor organizations were muted (Önder 1997 & Boratav 2013). There was a fall in public sector jobs, a major employment source for many. In the meantime, industrial jobs became more limited, especially for migrants (Ayata, 1997 & Aytar, 2007). It was also argued that January 24th and September 12th implied a new period of liberal economic reforms against labor rights (Boratav, 1990; 2004) which certainly has important implications for my discussions of the leisure and entertainment producers.

² The preferred and thus, highly favored and advantaged party of the junta, Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, MDP) of retired army general Turgut Sunalp became a distant third (and later, disbanded quickly) and Turgut Özal’s center-right wing Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) won an impressive victory in 1983 parliamentary balloting.
All in all, the massive transformation stamped the coming decades as well.

I don't distinguish 1990s particularly since the decade lacked distinguishing characteristics as it pertains to the general pro-market and managerial paternalism as well as the way it was experienced in leisure consumption and entertainment. 1990s was mostly determined by the shadow of the pro-market revolution which recorded a far more unstable course experienced under successive coalitions of fragile, short-lived and weak nature (Mahmut, 2003). AK Parti’s victory in 2002 balloting signaled the end to fragile coalitions and allegations of corruption during most of 1990s, but more importantly, added new dimensions on top of the legacy of Özal. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had already served as the highly popular metropolitan mayor of Istanbul with a conservative vision that still espoused ‘global city’ discourse to its heart. With the successive electoral victories both in general (2002; 2007; 2011) and local balloting (1994; 1998; 2004 & 2009) by Erdoğan embarked on a massive project of infrastructural investments, amelioration of public transport and branding Istanbul as the global city of its region.

AK Parti’s rule also continued on with the previous coalition government’s European Union accession and membership process. Those steps included formal/legal/administrative changes, as well as more mentality- and behavior-oriented ones. In the formal front, following the constitutional amendment of October 2001, eight “EU Harmonization Packages” were adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – TBMM) between February 2002 and May 2004 (Cizre, 2005; Aytar, 2006). Some of those packages included legislative changes that had a liberalizing impact on leisure consumption and entertainment sector and harmonized most practices with those standards in the European Union. However, some others were selectively implemented to restrict and seriously limit the practices of them.

I will now concentrate on market dimensions of Engelen (2001), further discussed and animated by Rath (2002). ‘Structure of the market’, (dimension 3, above) according to Engelen, refers to the number of actors on respective sides of supply and demand. It also concerns the way power is distributed within the market among them (2001, also see Rath, 2002). The first sequence of the post-1980 period can be termed Pro / Market Managerial Paternalism in this particular sense, that is, in its formative molding of the leisure consumption and entertainment ‘market’. Özal’s
policies opened up the path to a new way of ‘coupling’ the producers to the consumers who were on two sides of the supply and demand mechanism (Yalman, 2012).

‘The mode, level and object of regulation’ (dimension 7) as discussed by Engelen (2001) and Rath (2002) helps understand that regulation is not only about legislation. Rath notes “There are ‘sticks’, which Engelen refers to as 'legislation per se', and ‘carrots’ (financial incentives and disincentives) or ‘sermons’ (persuasion), all different forms in complex packages that define what is possible in a market” (Rath, 2002). This more comprehensive approach is also very useful so to understand that regulation should not be equated only with state regulation: “A multitude of agents play a role in regulation processes, such as local, national or international governmental agents, unions, quangos, non-profit organizations, voluntary associations, and individual and their social networks. Regulation can be manifested in thick or thin ways or, in other words, can either be imposed or enforced or be a matter of voluntary action” (Rath, 2002).

While the consumers were into developing new habits of consumption in the sudden availability of different choices, producers were involved in fetching up some of those. Both pro-market managerialism of Özal and neo-liberal / conservative paternalism of Erdoğan deployed ‘sticks’ legislation per se; carrots (dis)incentives, and as sermons (persuasion) (Engelen, 2001) that is, “all different forms in complex packages that define what is ‘possible’ in a market” (Rath, 2002). Here, I propose to underline and focus on ‘complex packages’ and ‘what is [made] possible’.

Indeed the pro-market managerialism by the ‘Özal revolution’ (Özkök, 1987; Uluengin, 1993) and Erdoğan’s neo-liberal conservatism involved a whole array of instruments that were loosely connected to one another and even at times contradicting with one another, thus connoting the ‘complexity’ involved. Setting the market relatively more free and helping remove previous étatiste barriers the regulatory packages were making what is ‘possible’ to be situated on a significantly larger palette. Larger palette refers to the extended array of alternatives that could be found in the leisure consumption and entertainment sectors. In these two periods, formerly homogenized forms supported by the state and promoted by the mediators were complemented with new and hybrid forms.

What some termed arabesk capitalism (Sönmez, 1995; Bali, 2002) seems
to aptly describe the characteristics of Özalizm in its market-promotion, liberalizing and informality-encouraging, ‘everybody for themselves’ (her koyun kendi bacağından asılır) kind of an attitude. Özal was well known with his popular statements such as “nothing will happen if we drill [contradict] the Constitution once” and “my state servant knows well his business” (Çölaşan, 1987). Notorious and celebrated depending on how one viewed him and his revolution Özal’s statements alluded to a practical mindset that does not see formal rules (even the constitution) as binding and limiting, as well as to an encouraging message to state bureaucrats and employees that (relatively minor) forms of corruption would be blinked at.

When the central government and the Prime Minister / President of the Republic were acting on the basis of such flexibilities and derogations, all actors in the leisure consumption and entertainment sectors were informed to some extent or the other that the new regulations were far more relaxed and exceptions would also be permitted to those who wanted to get around them. What was initiated in the first sub-period, and what certainly continued on through the second, thus could be characterized by the notion of derogation.

I am using the term derogation to characterize to curtailment the application of a particular law or regulation in specific cases. I take it to point out to the occasional or longitudinal applications of exceptionality that are either engrained and codified in law, or mobilized occasionally in order to accommodate the flexibility demanded by the regulators themselves or the subjects of legislation. Such derogations became commonplace under both pro-market managerialism and neo-liberal conservatism.

The central government as the regulator, in this sense, liberalized formerly strict rules and let exceptions and derogations develop if those would help vitalize the market even further. The different than earlier (post-1980) period’s ‘relaxed regulation’ that let informalities sprout mainly for personal reasons, this period saw informalities also as a way to stir up entrepreneurship and revitalize the economy. This is certainly reminiscent of Rath’s discussion on the voluntary silence of regulators: “there is a fundamental difference between rules and the enforcement of rules. The Dutch practice of gedogen […] that means looking the other way when you must […] is a case in point” (Rath, 2002). Turkish authorities similarly looked the other way when their self-interest or the vitality of the market.

---

3 ‘Casino capitalism’ was also used to describe Özalizm (Sönmez, 1995) to signify the economic policies during the office of Özal proper as well as through his continued impact over the economy (H. Kozanoğlu, 1999). I believe the metaphor is being stretched out unnecessarily, without explaining much. It was more of a speculatively pumped up and syncretic assemblage of economic measures developed on a case by case basis rather than a risky, very large and uncontrollable environment created by the international financial economy (Strange, 1986).

4 See URL: http://tr.wikiquote.org/wiki/Turgut_%C3%B6zal

5 For various linguistic examinations and analytical discussions, see URLs such as: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/derogation & http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derogation.
required them to do so. Let me illustrate how that worked out in written law and in practice, by also incorporating material from the fieldwork.

In the ‘sticks’ department, central government promulgated new legislation that administered leisure consumption and entertainment sectors in general but also left ways of relaxing some of those rules in practice. Some of the main pieces of legislation (laws proper) incorporated broad contours of a pro-market orientation but included statements that day-to-day operations would be decided on by specific directives (yönerge) or statuses and by-laws (yönetmelik). The central authority was given the power to introduce or alter such directives, statutes and by-laws as it saw fit (Yılmaz 2004). Particular implementation of formal regulations always depended upon such vague notions as; “necessities required by the actual situation” and “as administration sees [them] required” (idarece gerekli görülen şekilde) (Interview with Regulator 3).

More immediately of interest for the sector was the Free Trade Legislation that freed the import of foreign brand alcoholic drinks, technical / decorative equipment or other infrastructural items that were previously banned due to policies protective of national production (or what is usually referred to literally as ‘native-product/ native-made’ (yerli malı) and enforced through strict tariffs, border enforcements measures as well criminal prosecution of offenders (Interview with Regulator 2, 2011).

“This move certainly opened up the path for the producers to be able to bring into the sectors, items which were previously ‘watched in awe’ during the visits at ‘foreign countries’ (yabancı ülkeler)” (Interview with Regulator 1, 2011 & Interview with Mediator, 2012). Actually [in numerous interviews] it was even mentioned that there was a sense of “national pride being caressed” (milli gururumuz okşanıyordu) when foreign bands and brands were far more easily invited, sponsored and hosted by [our] ‘national’ establishments” (Interview with Regulator 3).

This administrative attitude was part and parcel of what was termed as the ‘structure of the market’ and ‘the mode, level and object of regulation’ (Engelen, 2001; Rath, 2002). What I believe made this pro market period also managerial as well as paternalistic, can be illustrated as follows:

“The central government re-situated its role away from “a slow,
lumpish (*bantal*) bureaucratic, red-tape ridden administrator” (Altan, 2004) or even a “superior (*amir*) of sorts” (Çınar, 2013) towards a ‘facilitator,’ (*kolaylaştırıcı*) similar to the role of a private factory owner (*fabrikatör*) who only lightly coordinates various units from a distance” (Interview with Legislator 2) by setting each free and take initiative if necessary. This managerial part was also polished by the notion of ‘getting things done’ (*işbitiricilik*). However, paternalism walks back in when central government still remained unwilling to let go of the “excessively centralist” (*aşırı merkeziyetçi*) and unitarian (*uniter*) role (Interview with Regulator 1). I will discuss this point further below.

What AK Parti added to the mix of centralism and pro-market liberalism was its Neo-Liberal / Conservative Paternalism. Neo-Liberalism took the previous pro-Market / Managerial regulation to a more advanced level, as it aimed to connect Istanbul into the global economy and finance. Under their rule, Istanbul became a huge construction field (*şantiye*) (Birikim, 2013) when bulldozers razed numerous old neighborhoods and buildings to make way to new financial centers and service complexes (*Express*, 2014), commercial and leisure consumption spaces or luxurious as well as middle/lower income residences (Kuyucu, 2008; Çavdar, 2014). As such, central government’s regulators were basing their authority on the ‘creative destructivity’ of their hurried agenda of reform, executed with bulldozers with the support of pro-government mediators (TVs, radios, newspapers and their columnists, public intellectuals and other mediators). Doing so, they espoused two seemingly contradictory takes on regulation, both in terms of actual legislation and attitudinal stances:

(a) an exceptions-accepting and flexibility-oriented liberalizing attitude (derogatory permissiveness and largesse). One regulator noted that he always try to “help out” (yardımcı olmak) even when the formal books stipulate execution of stricter rules. He said that “I take initiative if I see that arkadaş (friend, meaning the entrepreneur looking for a permit and also an exception on the side) looks like a nice fella who’d contribute positively to the local economy (yerel ekonomiye katkıda bulunacaksa)”. Another interesting illustration of the local regulators’ powerful status vis-à-vis the entrepreneurs was deployed when one of the interviewed regulators confessed that they were being “profuse with money that isn’t even their own” (2011) (noting the largesse I had mentioned above) “by spilling a lot of dough when trying to attract that tourist, that man [sic] who visits Istanbul and hailing from [our] İzmir, Adana, Diyarbakır or Trabzon” […]
We are certainly far more reserved when it comes to funding our more routine tasks and we become stationery item counters” (Regulator 3).

(b) combined with their insistence to continue clinging on the practices of paternalism executed through unbending fiat. This inspector [denetçi] can be seen as a typologically diversified splinter from the republican memur (civilian/military officer) with his well displayed\(^7\) innuendo of power. But that person is at once armed with technological gadgets, ‘softer’ ways of approaching the society\(^8\) and a go-and-getter type of personality. So the inspectors’ uniforms are complemented by either walkie-talkies, cell phones or both.

As part and parcel of above agenda and practices –or even \textit{zeitgeist} / \textit{zamanın ruhu} as uttered by some mediators of the lifestyle liberal streak– AK Parti followed an agenda of standardization, investment-promotion, deregulatory and re-regulatory and harmonization with those of international standards and especially EU-wide regulations on leisure consumption and entertainment establishments. However, what made its policies Conservative and Paternalistic was their selective and punitive application. I will discuss these under the below sections in more detail, as they are concretized in the municipal level in Istanbul as well as they pertain to the corporate, civil societal and sectoral actors in leisure consumption and entertainment.

\section*{IV.1.II. Alterations, Suits & Permits}
\textbf{Renovation & Branding by the Local Government}

A key dimension of the changes entailed in the post-1980s era was the transformation of the nature and role of the local government. Although ridden with setbacks and ebbs and flows, the hitherto heavily asymmetrical power balance between the central and city governments became relatively more leveled. ANAP and AK Parti governments adopted measures that critically altered previous municipal structure, granting local governments greater autonomy (Heper, 1986; 1987 & 1989; Tekeli, 2012) allowing them to seek for their own financial sources at jungles of the competitive global urban market. In this sense, there is a clear continuity between the urban policies initiated by the Özal revolution and Erdoğan’s later policies to promote cities as self-interest seeking economic actors.

Within the cities, on the other hand, government spending was
dramatically decreased and previous urban policies that were in harmony with the Monetarist régimes faced with a hostile and alien world of ‘cut-throat’ capitalism. Cities, deprived of their previous advantages and comfort sustained by a protective Nation-State, had to become lonely homo-economicus of sorts, searching for eliminating rivals and doing their own way. They were at a far more competitive world, which, both altered their ground and opened new ways leading to risky but rich alternatives (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990). This new character of the period drew the boundaries of a new realm of operation for the cities, favoring some functions, while complicating some others.

These aspirations were certainly inspired by the discussions around the world as well. Urban entrepreneurialism is thus connected to make your city a new ‘global city’ or ‘world city’ as it is seen also elsewhere. This may be seen as an urban reflection of a “new Weltanschauung” based on “individualism, self-help, private property and respect for law and order” (Martin, cf. Philo & Kearns, 1993). Especially the self-help component is connected to the idea of ‘letting’ cities become more self-sufficient, more ‘dynamic’in paving their way into a more globalized capitalist world.

A new model of metropolitan governance was entailed first in the 1984 Law on Municipalities, which implied a total politico-administrative overhaul of the previous system based on centralism. The law created a two-tiered system of local government. It was designed first to ‘locally centralize’ major metropolis-wide functions and place them under direct control and authority of the metropolitan (or, greater city) mayor who now had greater independence and autonomy. Smaller district municipalities were technically independent yet in actuality were dependent upon the decisions taken by the central and municipal levels of government. District mayors were given the duty of actual day to day operation of municipal services which are rather routine tasks.

Under the new system, the political prominence of the office was coupled with scope of administrative action, as well as new resources to render the mayor of Istanbul a very important political figure. Indeed, Ekinci claimed that with such rise in power, especially the Metropolitan of Mayor of Istanbul was now becoming the Efendi (Master) of the city (Ekinci, 2005). Decentralization of detailed land use planning, building control and building permits allowed metropolitan mayors to ‘get things done’ quickly à la Özal. This was later coupled by Erdoğan’s “hyperactive zeal
to provide ‘services (hizmet) [to the people]’ fast, without being limited or slowed down by formal regulations” (İnsel, 2013) and in order to bypass the red-tape ridden bureaucratic structures of the past. Erdoğan’s attitude certainly added to his popularity as his administration has certainly speeded up delivery and improved effectiveness of numerous sets of urban services to citizens.⁹

Keyder and Öncü argue that “during a period of major reductions in state subsidies and financial austerity, with its attendant consequences of worsening income distribution and social polarization, […] Istanbul received a major influx of state funding –for the first time in Republican history (Keyder & Öncü, 1993: 19). Municipalities got a hold of a larger and increasing share of the financial resources through increases in taxes and other fees. New legal provisions allowed metropolitan governments to levy and/or increase local taxes, permit fees and charges on a variety of activities ranging from sports and entertainment to advertising (Keleş, 2006). ANAP and AK Parti progressively increased the proportion of total tax revenues allocated to the municipal administrations. This proportion that was 6.4 percent in 1983 rose to 13.3 percent by 1990, and 17.8 percent in 2008 (TUİK, 2010). By early 2014, another legislative change was in the works in the parliament to further increase the tax share of the municipalities (Erdem, 2014).

Increase in national funding also allowed the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, İBB) to tap into foreign credits in order to undertake major infrastructural investments or grand projects to improve the city’s appearance for a global audience and promote it as a global city. Increasing the accumulation potential of the city through investment-inviting projects designed to enhance the global image of Istanbul. Indeed, within this environment, the Greater Municipality of Istanbul in particular (at times cooperating with the government, international institutions such as the World Bank, corporate and business groups and other actors) undertook major projects to transform the infrastructure and appearance of the city in order to make it more ‘attractive’ for a global audience, be them international tourists or foreign investors (Aytar, 2007). This infrastructural, spatial and technological leap helped leisure consumption and entertainment being embroidered back onto the urban map. Major developments in economy and culture of the city at once witnessed the development of new groups of consumers interested in and catered by an upgraded and diversified leisure consumption and entertainment scene.

⁹ Erdoğan’s populist stance coupled with his conservatism certainly facilitated his interaction with the electorate. Here, it is worth noting Erdoğan’s image as ‘someone coming from among people’, as illustrated by his youth days; he was from Kasımpaşa, a poor neighborhood at the ‘periphery’ of (and in contradistinction with) ‘opulent’ Beyoğlu (Pera). He was an amateur soccer player, a delikanlı (literally, a ‘fool-blooded’) connoting a ‘youngster from the neighborhood, most of the time taking care of the control and security of the same neighborhood’. This delikanlıness purports symbolic meanings pertaining to ‘peripheral urban values’, as suggested by Bora; he presents Erdoğan as a member of the volk-Istanbul, the ‘eclipsed’ part of the city which was ‘peripheralized’ by the century-long modernization (2000).
Double-edged strategy of promoting and branding the city as a ‘global metropolis’ with its simultaneously available ‘local’ and ‘exotic’ characteristics (Babalık, 2011) seems to constitute the main axis that shaped the Urban Transformation (Kentsel Dönüşüm, KD) efforts since 1990s (Aytar & Kırca-Schroeder, 2012). KD in its formulation and implementation falls more aptly within the bounds of a mix of urban regeneration and/or renewal with an eye on (selective) historical preservation and restoration. Istanbul’s attempts to attract global attention almost constantly went hand in hand with efforts to ‘sanitize’ the city\textsuperscript{10}. Areas considered being dangerous for middle class Istanbulites and international visitors increasingly became targets for new KD schemes. With their proximity to the centre and historical and tourism, such areas also became more attractive as loci for potential “urban rent” (kentsel rant) (Kuyucu, 2008; Bezmez, 2009).

In this context, at the urban governance level, beyond previous ‘cosmetic’ and clumsy attempts, more programmatic KD efforts were initiated since 2000. As a new approach to ‘historic preservation and restoration,’ KD was among the main urban policies of selling the city in its new image (that aimed to create synergies between the aforementioned ‘global’ and ‘local’ characteristics of Istanbul). In 2005, on the request of the AK Parti government, the parliament passed the Urban Transformation Law\textsuperscript{11} which allowed significant ‘short cuts’ to go around bureaucratic regulations. The legislation significantly arms the local governments with powers to force the owners to evacuate and renovate their historic buildings either on their own or with the help of the Public Housing Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi, TOKİ) or the municipalities (Aytar & Kırca-Schroeder, 2012).

KD policies also need to be underlined especially as they pertain to leisure consumption and entertainment. They are part and parcel of local level municipal regulation in terms of their impact on what Engelen calls “the locality of the market” (Engelen, 2001). Going beyond selective renovation of entire neighborhoods KD in this sense implied an effective re-zoning of the whole city map. Rath notes: “[t]he locality of the market denotes aspects of spatiality in two different but connected ways, one being the location as such and, the other the spatial market scale. The location involves the factors that shape the business” (Rath, 2002).

Conditioned by above policies to promote globality and locality of Istanbul, upgrading the infrastructure for finance and service industries, housing stock and amassing immense urban rent (Kuyucu, 2007), both Özal/Dalan...
and Erdoğan/Topbaş were involved in radical re-spatizalization of the “locality of the market” (Engelen, 2001). Following through with Özal and Bedrettin Dalan’s “tourism-promotion schemes” that effectively instituted a new map of spatial transformations of the city, Erdoğan’s (bulldozer-raged) urban policies also helped classify and thus earmark certain districts and neighborhoods as residential, commercial, financial and consumption/tourism-oriented zones. In this sense, municipal-level regulations helped initiate a spatial clustering based on such variety of functions. Policies of pro-market / managerial and neo-liberal / conservative paternalism periods, then, effectively carved out new foci of leisure consumption and entertainment in the city (Yırtıcı, 2005 & Pérouse, 2011):

Under the 1980s period of Özal and Dalan, Istanbul’s heavy and light industries had been relocated towards the outskirts of the metropolitan city. The Golden Horn (Haliç) was one of the most important sites of such a de-industrialization and promotion as a residential as well as leisure consumption/tourism oriented section of the city. This move was also certainly helped by the physical cleaning up of the formerly polluted horn-shaped bay. The spatial dislocation promoted at Karaköy-Perşembe Pazarı strip lying on the north-western shores of the Golden Horn and housing numerous artisanal workshops and small stores, however, did not proceed as successfully, at least initially. Most small entrepreneurs of Perşembe Pazarı – literally meaning Thursday Market or Bazaar whose history goes back to late Byzantine period— peacefully declined to be relocated to the newly built, architecturally controversial industrial-complex dubbed PerPa (an ostensibly painted acronym as a playful combination of syllables in Perşembe Pazarı) and situated towards the north, near Okmeydanı. This latter is also characterized by a medical clustering -where an archipelago of hospitals and related services dot and intensify the territory (Güvenç, 2010). Under Dalan’s failed plan, Perşembe Pazarı was set to be evacuated, functionally re-defined and cast anew as a tourist-attraction zone and entertainment (Istanbul Life, 2007), socializing and dining hangout (Hürriyet, 2000) for the elite, educated and well-to-do citizens of Turkey (Time Out Istanbul, 2010).

However, Karaköy-Perşembe Pazarı was not able to resist gentrification past late 2000s and early 2010s. The revalorized and renovated [Galata] Kuleåbî (Tower-Foot) neighborhood’s newly sprouting residences and small to mid-sized creative industries have trickled down and dripped over the neighborhood and turned Karaköy into a hot spot of newly flourishing
leisure consumption and entertainment establishments (Gürgen & Aytar, 2013). Karaköy’s ‘upgrading’ and touristification were aided by a number of spatial / functional changes directly initiated and implemented by the municipal regulators helped with the powerful tools of administrative fiat (Danış, 2009).

The ‘cleaning up’ and ‘branding’ of the cluster connecting Sultanahmet (environs of the Blue Mosque) to Kapalıçarşı (Grand Bazaar) up to the seashore tip Sirkeci / Eminönü. Old town or the Tarihi Yarımada (Historic Peninsula) in general was redesigned as the tourist Mecca of Istanbul and was connected to Karaköy as well Beyoğlu/Pera. The nineteenth century-originated short (a single stop-long) ‘metro’ dubbed as the Tünel bridging Karaköy to İstiklal Caddesi allowed tourists as well as residents to get to the entertainment heartland, as well as to the nearby gentrified neighborhood of Cihangir more quickly, safely and effectively.

Redevelopment of the nearby and internationally well-connected Salı Pazarı port and maritime strip that at once started housing a new constellation of museums (İstanbul Modern, Tophane-i Âmire and Siemens Gallery). Thus, the serpentine line connecting Salı Pazarı, Tophane, Karaköy, Perşembe Pazarı and Kuledibi developed quickly, dotted with a whole array of hotels, hostels, expensive bars, bistros, as well as small creative industry businesses, civil societal initiatives and artists’ galleries, workshops. I will elaborate on this particular clustering in the coming sub-sections.

Opening up of the new tram line (Zeytinburnu-Kabataş) connecting Sultanahmet to Karaköy, physical cleaning up and amelioration of the Bosporus-Shore between Kabataş-Fındıklı and redesigning of Kabataş as a public transportation hub where major bus, ferry, tram and subway lines meet and take transporters from elsewhere in the European Side or the facing Asian / Anatolian side to Taksim square for shopping, entertainment and leisure consumption purposes (Aytar & Gürgen, 2013).

Kabataş hub was also connected to Teşvikiye-Maçka, Beşiktaş and Şişli-Etiler-1 Levent line and beyond towards Maslak slope and Ortaköy, Kuruçeşme, Arnavutköy, Bebek, Tarabya and the entire Bosphorus’ European coast towards northernmost Sarıyer, each with significant clustering of various types of leisure consumption and entertainment establishments.

Aksaray in this period lost much of its former splendor as a gazino and
and Erdoğan/Topbaş were involved in radical re-spatialization of the “locality of the market” (Engelen, 2001). Following through with Özal and Bedrettin Dalan’s “tourism-promotion schemes” that effectively instituted a new map of spatial transformations of the city, Erdoğan’s (bulldozer-raged) urban policies also helped classify and thus earmark certain districts and neighborhoods as residential, commercial, financial and consumption/tourism-oriented zones. In this sense, municipal-level regulations helped initiate a spatial clustering based on such variety of functions. Policies of pro-market / managerial and neo-liberal / conservative paternalism periods, then, effectively carved out new foci of leisure consumption and entertainment in the city (Yırtıcı, 2005 & Pérouse, 2011):

Under the 1980s period of Özal and Dalan, Istanbul’s heavy and light industries had been relocated towards the outskirts of the metropolitan city. The Golden Horn (Haliç) was one of the most important sites of such a de-industrialization and promotion as a residential as well as leisure consumption/tourism oriented section of the city. This move was also certainly helped by the physical cleaning up of the formerly polluted horn-shaped bay. The spatial dislocation promoted at Karaköy-Perşembe Pazarı strip lying on the north-western shores of the Golden Horn and housing numerous artisanal workshops and small stores, however, did not proceed as successfully, at least initially. Most small entrepreneurs of Perşembe Pazarı – literally meaning Thursday Market or Bazaar whose history goes back to late Byzantine period— peacefully declined to be relocated to the newly built, architecturally controversial industrial-complex dubbed PerPa (an ostensibly painted acronym as a playful combination of syllables in Perşembe Pazarı) and situated towards the north, near Okmeydanı. This latter is also characterized by a medical clustering -where an archipelago of hospitals and related services dot and intensify the territory (Güvenç, 2010). Under Dalan’s failed plan, Perşembe Pazarı was set to be evacuated, functionally re-defined and cast anew as a tourist-attraction zone and entertainment (İstanbul Life, 2007), socializing and dining hangout (Hürriyet, 2000) for the elite, educated and well-to-do citizens of Turkey (Time Out Istanbul, 2010).

However, Karaköy-Perşembe Pazarı was not able to resist gentrification past late 2000s and early 2010s. The revalorized and renovated [Galata] Kuledibi (Tower-Foot) neighborhood’s newly sprouting residences and small to mid-sized creative industries have trickled down and dripped over the neighborhood and turned Karaköy into a hot spot of newly flourishing
leisure consumption and entertainment establishments (Gürgen & Aytar, 2013). Karaköy’s ‘upgrading’ and touristification were aided by a number of spatial / functional changes directly initiated and implemented by the municipal regulators helped with the powerful tools of administrative fiat (Danış, 2009).

The ‘cleaning up’ and ‘branding’ of the cluster connecting Sultanahmet (environs of the Blue Mosque) to Kapalıçarşı (Grand Bazaar) up to the seashore tip Sirkeci / Eminönü. Old town or the Tarihi Yarımada (Historic Peninsula) in general was redesigned as the tourist Mecca of Istanbul and was connected to Karaköy as well Beyoğlu / Pera. The nineteenth century-originated short (a single stop-long) ‘metro’ dubbed as the Tünel bridging Karaköy to İstiklâl Caddesi allowed tourists as well as residents to get to the entertainment heartland, as well as to the nearby gentrified neighborhood of Cihangir more quickly, safely and effectively.

Redevelopment of the nearby and internationally well-connected Salı Pazarı port and maritime strip that at once started housing a new constellation of museums (İstanbul Modern, Tophane-i Âmire and Siemens Gallery). Thus, the serpentine line connecting Salı Pazarı, Tophane, Karaköy, Perşembe Pazarı and Kuledibi developed quickly, dotted with a whole array of hotels, hostels, expensive bars, bistros, as well as small creative industry businesses, civil societal initiatives and artists’ galleries, workshops. I will elaborate on this particular clustering in the coming sub-sections.

Opening up of the new tram line (Zeytinburnu-Kabataş) connecting Sultanahmet to Karaköy, physical cleaning up and amelioration of the Bosporus-Shore between Kabataş-Fındıklı and redesigning of Kabataş as a public transportation hub where major bus, ferry, tram and subway lines meet and take transporters from elsewhere in the European Side or the facing Asian / Anatolian side to Taksim square for shopping, entertainment and leisure consumption purposes (Aytar & Gürgen, 2013).

Kabataş hub was also connected to Teşvikiye-Maçka, Beşiktaş and Şişli-Etiler-1 Levent line and beyond towards Maslak slope and Ortaköy, Kuruçeşme, Arnavutköy, Bebek, Tarabya and the entire Bosphorus’ European coast towards northernmost Sarıyer, each with significant clustering of various types of leisure consumption and entertainment establishments.

Aksaray in this period lost much of its former splendor as a gazino and
Indeed, the interest by global actors was also clear in the post-1980s period. Keyder and Öncü argue “foreign companies, which had shunned Turkey during the national developmentalist period, were persuaded by the liberal rhetoric of the government to invest and to open offices in Turkey” (Keyder & Öncü, 1993: 19). Istanbul in this context was transformed from a major base for large-scale, manufacturing firms into Turkey’s globalizing center for finance and banking (Keyder and Öncü, 1994), has increased its hold over the Turkish economy (Pérouse, 1998), and has become the preferred location for multinational corporations attempting to make roadways into the Turkish market (Pérouse, 1999 and 2000). A remarkable drop in manufacturing investment was observed (Sönmez, 1986; Aksoy, 1996; TUIK, 2010; Cihan Veri Servisi, 2013).

In the meantime, the number of branches of multinational companies increased dramatically, and most of those in producer services preferred Istanbul as their location of choice to base their operations: “[...] 95 percent of the producer service firms in Turkey receiving foreign capital were established after 1984 and almost 75 percent of them were located in Istanbul” (Tokatlı and Erkip, 1998; Erkip, 2000). By 2010, this percentage had increased to 81 percent (TUIK, 2012). In this new environment, “foreign investors preferred to invest in non-manufacturing areas” such as tourism, leisure and producer services “such as consultancy, banking and insurance)” Erkip, 2000. Overall, the share of service sector multiplied considerably between 1980 and 2010 (DİE, 1989; TUIK, 2012).

Keyder argues that in Istanbul “there is a flourishing service sector in marketing, accounting and management, telecommunications, banking and finance, transport, insurance, computers and data processing, legal services, auditing, accounting, consulting, advertising, design and engineering” (1999:19). In the same period, in Turkey in general there also was an associated increase in foreign investment to services. By 1996, 81 percent of foreign investments were in services (Foreign Investment Directorate, 1996) in Turkey. In terms of employment, within services itself, the share of finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) services employment increased from 10.3 percent in 1980 to 13.9 percent in 1990. This was an increase from 5.3 % to 7.1 % in Istanbul’s overall employment (Aksoy, 1996). Between 1990 and 2010, those ratios increased to 17.8 percent and 12.4 percent, respectively (TUIK, 2012).

All these developments were connected to the recent transformation of
Istanbul into a ‘globalizing city’, increasingly subject to global flows of capital, goods, as well as culture (Keyder and Öncü, 1994; Öncü, 1997; Keyder, 1993; 1999) Keyder and Öncü claim that Istanbul cannot be described as a ‘global’ (or ‘world’) city as usually conceptualized in the literature (1994, also see, Öncü, 1997; Keyder, 1993 and 1999). However, alternative readings of the global/world city could challenge this argument, such as the ones promised by Grosfoguel (1994, 1995) and Soysal (2011) among others. I also subscribe to the attempt to enlarging the concept accordingly to be able to accommodate new urban and global developments as well as new symbolic economy around leisure consumption and entertainment.

In this sense, the fourth of the market dimensions, ‘institutionalization’ (Engelen, 2001) is helpful in comprehending the scene of non-governmental actors in regulation. Engelen’s notion of institutionalization “refers to the more or less standardized patterns of actions and ideas with a normative validity in the context where they are rooted. The process of institutionalization is thus conceived in terms of transaction standardization rather than regulation per se, and is actually related to the culture of doing business” (Rath, 2002, emphasis added). Central and local government has also extended the subjects of trade (market dimension number 2) referring to the “legal entities that are allowed to enter the market. They can be individuals, households, families, professionals, co-operatives, incorporated firms, NGOs, quangos or public agencies” (Rath, 2002)

Central governmental regulation, especially the technical steps of the EU harmonization (AB Uyum) process, those legislative changes and administrative transformations have allowed for a larger array of legal entities who could become entrepreneurial actors in leisure consumption and entertainment. A case in point would be the second EU Harmonization Package dated March 2002 that was prepared in line with previous amendment in the Turkish constitution (in October 2001) and which incorporated alterations in the Law on Associations (Dernekler Kanunu – DK). The package did not only provide room for relatively more permissive administrative measures pertaining to the freedoms of the press, association and assembly (although some serious limitations remained in place) but also allowed associations, chambers and the like to launch and operate leisure consumption and entertainment lounges or other types of commercial enterprises both as part of their ‘social role’ and as mechanisms to bring in more funds to carry on their work. 14

14 See, for example, URL: http://www.havadis16.com/serbest-piyasa-kanunu-tasarisi-11345.html#.UxAtcPl_tW6
Lokal technically meaning Club House are such civil societal ‘branches’ operating within the commercial market. Lokal also means the district level headquarters by trade unions or vocational organizations. Most such lokal are in fact meyhâne or içkili lokanta catering to more professional, sector-populating technicians, practitioners or intellectuals. By fulfilling the need for lower-priced locations and vocational socialization, local should be noted among the civil societal field of institutional regulation.

Municipal food and leisure consumption establishments are certainly regulator-launched [publicly funded] corporate actors within this regulatory environment. Beltur had also conquered and transformed previously elite strongholds operated by [Automotive] Turing Club, where alcohol was available, into popular and affordable leisure consumption localities for the middle and lower classes. Ottoman-era Kiosks such as Sarı Köşk, Hidiv Kasrı, Küçük Çamlıca Köşkü were renovated, improved start servicing a far different and demographically large clientele. In this sense, Erdoğan in fact democratized access to such locations. However, his ‘moralizing’ agenda was behind his decision to forbid sale of alcohol on the basis that [primarily] ‘families’ with çoluk çocuk [kids/homefolks] would be catered to at municipal tesis (leisure facility).

Corporately institutionalized actors who were positively impacted by above regulatory changes were a number of previously established foundations. Mostly part of their decades-long ‘corporate responsibility’ projects and certainly in synergistic –even at times, symbiotic– interconnections with the consulates and cultural centers of foreign countries, they had a more permissive environment since the regulatory changes in mid-to-late 1990s. Major actors in this field are AkSanat funded by Akbank one of the most sizeable and important private banks controlled by Sabancı conglomerate (Holding known for its cult logo, SA); İKSV, İstanbul Culture and Arts Foundation that was initiated and funded by the Eczacıbaşı pharmaceutical corporation as well as SALT (formerly Garanti Platform) established by private Garanti Bank under the automotive-media magnate Doğuş Group.

Yardımcı claims that all in all, they are the strongest and most visible actors in the ‘civil societal field’ of regulation and argue that their work could be classified as Festivalism (2009). She suggests that those corporate institutions are mostly ‘flirting’ with central governmental and municipal branding of the city and commodification of difference. However, such criticisms aside, they certainly are also vital in helping carve alternative,
even at times subversive spaces of leisure consumption and allowing to get familiarized with the works of global artists, musicians and entertainment professionals.

I should also note that corporate-induced cultural centers also created a secondary -and thus, dependent- circle of employment as more entrepreneurs moved in to fulfill diversifying demands of increasingly larger masses pouring into Beyoğlu. These activities were the fertile soil of the development of new middle classes’ cultural and symbolic habitus (Öğün, 2014) and got them connected to the expats living in Istanbul thus ‘internationalizing’ their lifestyle vocabulary (Behar, 2008). In a more celebratory take, Aksoy & Enlil connected such corporate institutions to the spaces and communities that they helped establish. They claim these are centrally connected to what they call “Istanbul’s cultural economy” (2011). However they fail to develop a particular perspective to analyze leisure consumption and entertainment.

Festivalism (Yardımcı, 2009) certainly is an ingenious concept that could certainly be connected to “mega-projects craze” (Özkan, 2008; 2009) of both Özal and Erdoğan as well as their shared attempts to make the city a “brand” (MarkaŞehir) on its own, combining global economic and cultural reach with local yet impressively “civilizational” log. Özal and Dalan had promoted Istanbul as a brand from within a more underlined ‘free’ market oriented phraseology, presenting it almost as a non-ideological necessity required by the [spirit of the] ‘times’ (zamanın ruhu), part of the city’s manifest destiny of sorts. In this vision Istanbul could “no longer settle for less”; as “a global metropolis” needs to “break the barriers of excessively centralist policies by the ‘lumpy’ bureaucrats15 of Ankara” (Özkök, 1990). In this new path, “Istanbul is already a star, shining not only with its world-class financial centers, business plazas and high-tech centers, but also with its huge events, such as concerts, congresses, conventions and sports tournaments” (Özkök, 1992). Özal and Dalan’s competitive new Istanbul does not seem to mind the sprouting of luxurious entertainment establishments. In some senses, central and local governmental regulation encouraged and took pride in this multiplication.

Erdoğan’s vision is similar in some senses but very different in some others. Istanbul as the Brand City mostly shares the pro-market zeal and actually was far more successful in delivering the concrete infrastructural bases for the development of Global Cityness of the city by speedily improving

15 Note the similarity of this vision voiced in this example by influential liberal columnists such as Ertuğrul Özkök to the “anti-federal, anti-Washington D.C.” anger expressed by neo-liberal and neo-conservative pundits in the U.S. such as Pat Buchanan, Newt Gingrich, Dinesh D’Souza and George F. Will.
transportation and erecting the emblematic cornerstones of neo-liberal urban entrepreneurialism, such as the high-tech financial centers (new building of the stock market **Borsa Istanbul** and the new financial center in **Ataköy**), large shopping centers (**Alış Veriş Merkezi**, AVM) and the like.

Neo-Ottomanist (**Yeni Neo-Osmanlıcı**) rhetoric of Erdoğan's “New Turkey” (**Yeni Türkiye**) however, constantly stresses the role of Istanbul (**Marka Şehir**) as being the successor seat of the millenarian Islamic tradition and centuries-old Ottoman heritage who had “tolerated” the members of “all other faiths” (actually meaning only the two other Abrahamic cousins, Christianity and Judaism). Combining elements of neo-liberal competitive rhetoric housing all of the Özalian items above, Erdoğan's rhetoric of global brand city of Istanbul also reaches out to an almost colonial tone of voice by stressing Istanbul being the leader of a new regional (or even civilizational) encapsulation of Pax Ottomana. Certainly, this pax ottoman coloniality is being used in the sense introduced by Quijano (1993).

Corporate, sectoral and civil societal actors in leisure consumption noted that while regulatory policies of standardization and harmonization may have been ‘technically’ in line with EU standards, the central government’s and municipality’s policy-formulation and policy-implementation stages lacked the necessary participatory mechanisms whereby non-governmental stakeholders could be added into the decision-making process (Interview with non-governmental actors 2 & 3). One of the most important deficiencies according to them was at once the formal rigidities and lack of transparency and accountability:

In our land, there isn't even the letter [g] of [governance] as a word. You'd only be able to utter your take if they'd even condescend to consider calling you up for 'consultation' (istişare). Even then, whatever you tell them, they keep flattering themselves by listing their unrelated 'services' (hizmetler) of theirs. It is almost as if they ask us to quickly agree with them on the basis of their certified past success. So that they could proceed with their own plans... They dance to their own tunes. They come up with decisions and use us up as decor... No Sire, they don’t want partners or stakeholders, they just want ‘yes men’ who'd nod their heads” (**evet efendimciler**) (Interview with NGO professional)

In the period of 1980s, “market, now freed from statist regulation, seemed to promise quick riches to the few who were lucky, and legalized speculative
gains to a broader segment” (Keyder & Öncü, 1993: 20, emphases added). Indeed, Özal’s anti-bureaucratic, anti-red tape and practical-minded attitudes as well as his notion of ‘getting things done’ (işitirililik) struck a chord with wider segments of the society, especially considering citizenry’s already informality-oriented and self-interest seeking relationships with the state as discussed in the previous chapter. This attitude was certainly crucial in the formation of a new “culture of doing business” (Rath, 2002) in the sense that previous, lower key mentalities were transformed to accommodate far more opportunistic, daring and calculating ways by the entrepreneurs.

The ruling party’s custom of allocating lucrative deals to politically favored businesspeople was certainly criticized and led to its eventual downfall. However, the “Özal revolution” as lauded by numerous liberal columnists (Özkök, 1987; 1993; 1998 & Bali, 2002) was very powerful in terms of changing the role of the state from a populist and administrative actor towards a managerial and entrepreneurial one. It also transformed the popular attitudes by promoting a new citizen as a profit-maximizing- and interest-seeking individual highly reminiscent of the ‘individual actor’ who seems to orient him/herself towards ‘possessive individualism’ of the liberal thinking (MacPherson, 1962) and the neoclassical economics. In the case of Turkey, this individual was also trying to what was popularly termed as ‘making it’ (köşeyi dönmek\textsuperscript{16}) by avoiding, ignoring or going around formal rules and regulations in the jungles of the pro-market, new economy. In the next quotation from the fieldwork semi structured interview, we witness the rise of the entertainment entrepreneur as such a touch, rugged individual on the lookout and fighting for his interests, a pioneer in the jungles of Istanbul’s entertainment heartland of the shady kind at that period:

One regulator argued that “serving the country also means making money for the country”. He said that the “real patriots are those entertainment establishment owners, who risked their lives by opening up the first non-mainstream bistros and clubs deep inside the dark part of Beyoğlu”. A noted case was PeriPeti Bistro, a street level establishment at Afrika Han (Africa Inn or more aptly, Africa Arcade) connecting three axial sub-streets near İstiklal (Ayhan Işık, Büyük Parmakkapı and Küçük Parmakkapı streets) which was for a long time reportedly dominated by Mafioso-controlled gazino and pavyon, older pre-1980s originated forms. The regulator, after this rather elongated eulogy of the entertainment pioneer as a daring conquistador amidst

\textsuperscript{16} Which could also be translated literally as ‘turning the corner’.
Parallel to decreasing state regulation of the economy, pro-market managerial paternalism and the neo-liberal / conservative paternalism since the 1980s witnessed the growing ascendancy of market forces in the organization of the consumption sphere. As I have discussed above, the state eased its role in the sphere of the consumption. However this does not mean it no longer had a presence in the consumption sphere. On the one hand, it promoted market forces through the deregulation of the economy. On the other hand, consumerism as a way of life was promoted by political and social elites. In that sense, the public notoriety of, and conspicuous consumption by, politicians including Prime Minister Turgut Özal and his family during the 1980s stand out. “The depoliticization of the public sphere after the military coup of 1980 and the dismantling of the developmentalist project left an arena ready to be exploited by new social forces” (Yenal, 2000).

Into this field left out by the state, market institutions moved in to create new types of consumerism, introduce novel products and promote these as the symbols of cosmopolitan life styles to be adopted by urban middle classes. Thus in this period, we observe the increasing commodification of cultural practices, in contrast to the previous period when modern ways were promoted through education, that is, they were “learned” rather
then bought (Yenal, 2000). As a result, the role of cultural specialists and intermediaries “who have the capacity to ransack various traditions and cultures in order to produce new symbolic goods, and in addition provide the necessary interpretations on their use” (Featherstone, 1991: 19) grew considerably in the consumption sphere.

The globalizing orientation of Istanbul was also mirrored in the changing population configuration, and the transformation of the urban space. Increasing deterioration of the income distribution in Istanbul provoked social polarization. Istanbul’s urban space became increasingly fragmented and was divided along new fault lines. Koksal argues that Istanbul is divided between formal and informal settlements occupied by diverse economic, social and cultural groups (1993). Residential patterning according to income groups, as well as in some cases according to ethnic and confessional background has become more underlined, and processes similar to suburbanization (Oncu, 1997) and gentrification (Uzun, 2001; Islam, 2002) started to surface and gain force.

A new globalizing stratum of the population emerged in Istanbul (Aksoy, 1996). Those employed in the globalizing sectors of the economy were moving towards “world class incomes” (Kandiyoti, 2002), while the poorest strata were increasingly marginalized, and left out of the process of articulation into the world economy (Ercan, 1996). Additionally, within the middle classes there occurred a growing fragmentation and polarization, with those employed in the public sector increasingly losing out (Kandiyoti, 2002).

Due to political-economic changes that came with the adoption of neo-liberal reforms, the migrants of the 1980s and 1990s found themselves in a different environment in urban areas in general, and in Istanbul in particular. Rural to urban migration continued during those two decades, and migrants were faced with decreasing employment opportunities, especially in the industrial sector (Ayata, 1997). With the continued increase in population, especially the share of the younger population (Tokatli and Boyaci, 1997), this translated into growing problems of unemployment, and magnified effects of worsening income distribution (Ozmucur, 1995; Senses, 1990).

I have already discussed in the previous sub-sections of the chapter, market-oriented shift was also behind the emergence of a new type of entrepreneurialism in the business sector in general and in the leisure

---

18 Quoted from the ‘Lifestyle’ column in daily Hürriyet, October 13, 2003.
19 The city had the worse distribution of income as of mid-1990s, with the richest 20% controlling 64% of the income, while the poorest 20% receiving a mere 4.2% (Sonmez, 1996).
20 Those migrants themselves were different than those migrating prior to 1980s as well. As opposed to earlier voluntary migrants who had left their provinces mainly due to economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, many new migrants were internally displaced people fleeing the environment of insecurity in Southeastern Anatolia due to the protracted fighting between the Turkish security forces and the separatist Kurdish rebels of the Marxist-Leninist PKK (Partiya Karkéren Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers’ Party) since 1984 (Kirisçi, 1998; Celik, 2002; for other aspects of out-migration in the southeast see, Akshit, et al 1996).
consumption and entertainment laborscapes in particular. While in the sphere of the producers, initiative-taking entrepreneurialism was the result, in the sphere of the consumers, this pro-market ‘atmosphere’—that some later called zamanın ruhu (spirit of the times or zeitgeist, see Özkök, 1987; 1994; 2001; 2009; 2013) yielded into a new ethos of consumerism. Especially when the purchasing power for the bulk of the consumers increased (Güresel, 2005), this new ethos was quite critical.

This was certainly formative of the new individualistic, personal entrepreneurial stances that many citizens espoused in the new period of market-oriented growth, beyond the richer groups who were certainly the more direct and immediate beneficiaries of the new economy. While some continuities and commonalities certainly existed between the two, the older forms of ‘usurping state property’ (devletin mali deniz) by the citizenry was remarkably different from this new attitude of ‘making it’.

As discussed in the previous chapter III, the ‘old school’ opportunistic mentality was centered on seeking somewhat ‘low key’ clientelistic favors
ranging from trying to secure guaranteed yet modestly paid state jobs to having formal regulations (such as building codes, zoning or licensing rules) ignored for their private aims. State, in this case, implied a protective shield or a higher authority out of which action, or—in the case of the expectation of turning a blind eye to formal rules—inaction was sought.

The newer type of mentality was going far beyond that. In this, the citizens no longer sought state jobs or such ‘petty’ favors, but instead, were aiming to become ‘micro-businesspeople’ or aspirant entrepreneurs on the lookout for grey zones or blind spots of regulatory mechanisms to allow them to make a bigger step in social ladder. The new pro-market rhetoric injected into the public a more grandiose aim of ‘jumping [to the upper] class’ (*sınıf atlamak*). Indeed Gürbilek claims that in this new period, “the old culture of saving money and postponing one’s desires in line with Puritan take of Kemalism was quickly yielding into a new culture of seeking to fulfill one’s desires and dreams here and now” (Gürbilek, 2001: 16).

I need to mention here the emergence of social strata that led the sprouting of a new group of mediators or what I call ‘Lifestyle Liberals’. The growth of such a segment of consumers is very much related to processes of globalization. Elites and new middle classes employed in transnationally-connected business sectors develop tastes, lifestyles and practices that are similar across the world for similar social groups (Castells, 1996: 415). International travel, communications technologies and services (from five-star hotels to publications) that cater to this transnational stratum of managers and elites forge the formation of transnational cultures based on elite lifestyles, etc. (Yenal, 2000: 147).

More generally, the transnational connections of elite communities are expressed in cosmopolitanism. This involves “a willingness to engage with the Other, […] an intellectual and esthetic openness towards divergent cultural experiences” (Hannerz, 1996: 103, see also Appadurai, 1996). But cosmopolitanism is also reflexive. “Cosmopolitanism often had a narcissistic streak, the self is constructed in the space where cultures mirror one another” (Hannerz, 1996: 103). “During the past 20 years, a layer of consumers have come into being in Turkish metropolises among the middle classes who work in the globalized sectors of the urban economy. Lifestyle marketing and the growing ‘culinary press [media]’ target the cosmopolitan sensibilities of this stratum” (Yenal, 2000: 166).
The alternative, ‘informal’ globalization of Istanbul as discussed by Keyder and Öncü (1994), not only had important repercussions for the changes in lifestyles, consumption patterns, and for urban/spatial transformation, but also provoked a mix-and-match kind of heterogeneity and diversity. I claim that this heterogeneity and diversity shaped the new Turkish urban consumerism, which helped highly upgrade the leisure consumption and entertainment sector in Istanbul. Although set in a socio-historical context different from the postindustrial turn as experienced in the west, Istanbul’s mainly upper and higher middle classes and class fractions increasingly socially and culturally position themselves vis-à-vis others through the media of consumption and appreciation.

Therefore in the post-1980 period we see the increasing number of magazines, radio and TV shows and books on fashion, food, leisure consumption, arts, etc. which are devoted to consumption and cultivation of certain lifestyles. “Parallel to this, the role of marketing and advertising in the organization of the consumption sphere has grown in an unprecedented fashion. In other words, the gradual withdrawal of the state from the cultural regulation of consumption went hand in hand with the increasing capacity of cultural intermediaries in these fields” (Yenal, 2000: 160). In my analysis of the fieldwork, mediators of post-1980 could be categorized under the media, both in conventional and new senses of the term, public intellectuals and opinion makers (İnce, 2000).
In one of the very few analyses of mediators of this sort, Şimşek (2006) employed a critical perspective which was occasionally crude but potentially interesting analyses. Accurately learning from Gramsci’s cultural hegemony (1971) as well as Althusser’s notions of ideological apparatus and interpellation (1971, also see, Sawyer, 2002). Paying homage Bourdieu (1977 & 1984) but hardly fulfilling his promise, Şimşek resorts to an explanation of the new intermediaries as ‘cynical’(kinik, in his usage) translators of trends into popular attitudes on and psychologies of consumption (2006). This seems to be a rather facile way of explaining their changing role especially as it pertains to leisure consumption and entertainment.

Instead, in a process somewhat reminiscent of Bauman’s discussion of the transformation of intellectuals from ‘legislators’ to ‘interpreters,’ the role of cultural intermediaries in Turkey have also changed: The previous era’s modernization-oriented or politically engaged intellectuals have either evolved into interpreters or promoters of various lifestyle choices or were dethroned by a new style of cultural mediation. Indeed numerous left wing or Kemalist intellectuals of the pre-1980 coup period, who were ousted from state offices or universities for political reasons, took up jobs in the newly flourishing advertising sector. These intellectuals reportedly tapped into their creative and writing abilities to formulate attractive advertising campaigns, catchy slogans and branding strategies.

Bali argues that this new language of advertising was mainly geared towards the upper income social groups who got rich or richer after the September 12, 1980 military coup. He claims those new groups were urbanized, well educated and had distinctively ‘elite’ lifestyle choices (Bali, 2002: 22). In the same period, consumer market research have become increasingly important for advertising sector and sub-groupings among the consumers were identified and such research was used to promote ‘elite’ and ‘distinctive’ products for the upper sections of the consumers (Interview with Advertising Executive, 2009; also see, Pir, 1985). As seen in Picture IV.1, the media has simultaneously espoused a celebratory attitude of the advent of ‘branding’ of lifestyles.

Daily newspapers’ lifestyle columnists, as well as weekly and monthly publications such as Time Out Istanbul, Istanbul Life, Taksimania, as well as websites such as <istanbul.com>, and e-mail list-serves such as <lecool.com/cities/istanbul/> have been important in shaping leisure consumption

---

21 Interview with Advertising Executive #3, 2009.
22 Interview with Advertising Executive #1, 2009.
and entertainment choices of mainly upper middle and upper classes. In line with the advent of consumerism and lifestyle-based advertising, leisure consumption and entertainment patterns in Istanbul, the importance of the mediation has also increased.

Since at least mid-1990s, 'lifestyle' and 'gusto' columnists at daily newspapers, weekly and monthly magazines and other publications, cultural leisure consumption experts, advertisement and culture industry professionals and others have taken on a bigger role in shaping the consumption choices of mainly middle and upper middle class citizens. They have been highly instrumental in defining what is—and what no longer is—“trendy,” “hip,” “exciting,” and “exotic”. Numerous periodicals have published “in” and “out” lists for various leisurely consumption and entertainment venues and establishments.

Seen in Picture IV.2, above, the lifestyle columnist of liberal daily Radikal, Ezgi Başaran claims she has “decoded the secret of Lucca,” which is one of the high class café-restaurant-bar complexes in the upper income Bosphorus neighborhood of Bebek. She describes Lucca as well as her position within it: “I read on sociologist Gustave LeBon’s Psychology of the Masses and smirk to the ‘shaky’ position I am in, at Lucca […] The customers remind me of LeBon’s characters who are in search of a small ‘masses’ of sorts who
share their own opinion as well their choices in life” (Başaran, 2010). As an opinion maker or in Bauman’s terms ‘interpreter’ Başaran claims to provide an intellectual analysis on Lucca.

IV. 3. ENTREPRENEURS, ET AL

In the case of Istanbul, my argument is that above changes have created interesting constellations in terms of leisure consumption and entertainment employment, that would somewhat mirror, and also differ from patterns observed elsewhere. In order to study this, I have conducted participant observation at fifty leisure consumption and entertainment establishments at Beyoğlu, Beşiktaş, Fatih, Eyüp, Şişli, Gaziosmanpaşa, Zeytinburnu, Üsküdar, Kadıköy and Adalar (Prince’s Islands) districts. At the same fifty establishments in ten districts a total of ninety-six semi-structured interviews were conducted during three temporally separate research sequences.

The first one was conducted between 2002 and 2006, the second one was conducted between 2008 and 2010 and the final one between 2011 and 2013. I have interviewed producers (entrepreneurs, employers and employees) and consumers as they will be discussed under sub-section IV.4. Since a great majority of respondents chose to remain anonymous out of fear of negative repercussions or retributions, or in order to more comfortably share their insights, no actual places or names were identified in the text. Those clearly identified at above introductory prologue are used only as ‘colorful’ examples of ‘typical’ forms of leisure consumption and entertainment and the use of their names does not necessarily mean any fieldwork was or was not conducted there.

During my fieldwork, I have asked the producers a set of questions about their socio-cultural background, political stances, and their personal history of their experience within the leisure consumption and/or consumption sectors. This way I was able to identify the main parameters of their position as producers (employees and / or entrepreneurs) and as consumers in those two sectors. I have also inquired about their relationship with the regulators and the mediators.

In the interviews with the producers, the longitudinal historical demarcation placed to distinguish alaylı from mektepli was confirmed in the leisure consumption and entertainment. This separation was quite useful
to help differentiate among persons of varying levels of human capital and vocational itineraries: The epithet of *alaylı* literally means a ‘ranker’ or ‘legionary’ in the sense of those belonging to a ‘legion’ (*alay*). It is attached to those persons who undergo the slow process of vocational socialization and professionalization as well as rank-climbing within a trade.

Those persons usually enter the trade in their young ages, starting from the lowest rank of *çırak* (apprentice), and passing through the intermediary stage of *kalfa* (assistant master or journeyman usually in charge of a particular detachment of employees) eventually to climb up onto the highest place: *usta* (master). *Mektepli*, in turn, literally means the ‘pupil’ or the ‘educated one’ and is an epithet ascribed to those persons who have gone through the processes of formal education and vocational training of the trade. While the categorizations of *çırak*, *kalfa* and *usta* are sometimes used for the ranks that *mektepli* pass through, they are most immediately and closely associated with *alaylı* who slowly climb all those steps in time.

Since a great majority of respondents chose to remain anonymous out of fear of negative repercussions or retributions, or in order to more comfortably share their insights and provide standardization through the text, no actual places or names were identified. Those leisure consumption or entertainment establishments that were identified with their brand names in the vignette section of the prologue in Chapter I are used only as ‘colorful’ examples of ‘typical’ forms of...
leisure consumption and entertainment. The use of their names does not necessarily mean any fieldwork was—or was not—conducted there. The relative locations of the districts where the interviews and participant observation fieldwork was conducted could be seen at below map:

In this context, based on my research discussed above, I would claim that Istanbul’s new leisure consumption and entertainment setting created a new laborscape in the leisurely service sector. Here, I borrow from and extend Appadurai’s notion of various ‘-scapes’ (1996) to discuss the shifting and fluid laborscapes of leisure consumption and entertainment in Istanbul. In the construction and configuration of this new laborscape, a bifurcating stratification of ‘ethnicization’ is important and functional. In this new setting, Istanbul’s urban tourist-entertainment-leisure industry employs or incorporates increasingly diverse groups, many long-time or recent migrants, immigrants, expatriates, minorities, as well as ‘natives’. But in Istanbul, particular demographic conditions and the unstructured nature of the leisure consumption and entertainment setting prevent one-to-one correspondence with the general pattern discussed in the literature.

The concept of the ‘opportunity structure’ (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001:190) may be employed here to clarify the situation. The general shift towards market-oriented growth, the relaxation of state regulations on property ownership, licensing rules for establishments, and employment, the increasing share of consumer markets fueled by a rise of the well-to-do, ‘globalizing’ urbanites, and the general cultural shift to globalization, diversification and hybridization, all add up to a time- and space-specific ‘opportunity structure’ for entrepreneurs and employees in Istanbul.

This section aims to analyze the opportunity structure as it led to what I term bifurcation and ethnicization of the laborscape in Istanbul’s increasingly ‘globalizing’ leisure consumption and entertainment setting. Learning at once from the literature on ‘leisure migration’ defined as “the type in which the consumer travels to the commodity, resulting in geographical movements of people for the purposes of consumption” (Böröcz, 1996: 24), I mainly attempt to understand the ‘other’ side of that migration. Instead of focusing on the experience of the international tourists visiting Istanbul, I try to learn from leisure migration to shed light on the complex interplay between leisure consumption and human mobility from the perspective of those employed in, and incorporated into the leisure consumption and entertainment.
In the fieldwork, I observed that leisure is part and parcel of a larger amalgamation of tourism-entertainment-leisure setting. In this larger context, I have identified a bifurcating stratification of “ethnicization” in Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment laborscape. I claim that these phenomena are linked to the turn towards increasingly diversified consumerism in Turkish society, as well as to the transformation of Istanbul towards becoming a city of urban consumption, a ‘globalizing’ tourist / entertainment city catering both to tourists and residents as discussed above.

Here, different groups perceive and experience this opportunity structure differently. They mobilize their financial, human and cultural capital in myriad ways, and thus, diverse strategies of ethnicization are employed. In Istanbul, different groups of migrants, immigrants and local ‘ethnics’ are employed in different segments of leisure consumption and entertainment settings, because they adapt to the ‘diverse human capital requirements’ (Szivas, Riley and Airey, 2003) in different ways, in accordance with their social, educational and regional backgrounds, as well as their self-perception of their ‘worth’ in the setting. Put differently, I argue that different groups, due to their backgrounds, steer themselves towards particular segments of the setting they see most befitting to them, not necessarily the segments for which they would best qualify. Let me discuss each group below:

IV. 3. 1. Chic Ethnique: Accents à la Mode

In this sense, the search for new distinctions and diversities were to be launched after the 1980s. I will also discuss this under the impacts on the consumer, at the sub-section IV.4. below.

In line with Istanbul’s transformation towards becoming a ‘globalized’ city as mentioned above, world and/or ethnic cuisines, as well as world fashions, music and dances have become very much ‘in’. As noted before, this cultural shift to globalization is among major parameters of the ‘opportunity structure’ for the employees and
entrepreneurs of the leisure consumption and entertainment laborscape in Istanbul.

In terms of the bifurcating stratification of ‘ethnicization,’ I would claim that those on the top of the bifurcated laborscape of leisure consumption and entertainment compose of a stratum of what I would call ‘chic ethnics,’ who are in the ‘front’ of the top ‘slice’ of the leisure consumption and entertainment laborscape in Istanbul. To comprehend this, I borrow Goffman (1995) typology of the front and the back. Chic ethnics are highly visible, and are consciously deployed there to form the façade of the enterprises by the entrepreneurs and owners. This is certainly in line of what Jones & Ram discuss for the case of eating out: “It is all about interactive theatre with diners as well as waiters, chef and maître d’ all active members of the cast and the kitchen porters presumably the stage hands who receive no curtain call and not that much” (Jones & Ram, 2007). So the employees’ position and their level of ethnic visibility is a matter of there they stand in this ‘interactive theater’.

Catering mainly to the upper and upper middle class Istanbul residents, as well as those foreign citizens employed in Istanbul’s globalized sectors; upscale entertainment establishments now increasingly employ highly paid, high-skilled foreigners. Most of them are citizens of the advanced economies of the West. Given especially Turkish middle and upper classes’ deeply rooted disdain for the ‘Middle Easterners,’ (expressed most clearly in occasional anti-Arab sentiments and utterances, which should be seen as symptomatic of a strange sort of Turkish Orientalism, or even cultural schizophrenia) ‘Westernized,’ ‘modernized’ consumptive ethic, and lack of knowledge of the Asian countries, ‘Western’ ethnics seem to be the preferred group among the ‘chic ethnics’ in Istanbul’s entertainment industry.

Istanbul’s five star hotels employ international chefs, as well business executives and ‘image consultants’. Larger leisure consumption companies employ foreign employees working to coordinate activities with Western-based offices and other companies. Some upscale entertainment establishments employ occasional or part time foreign DJs, dance instructors and bartenders as well as design and image consultants. In some cases, those employed become attractive for the customers chiefly for the sake of them being foreigners. Indeed, an entertainment establishment owner interviewed said that he attracted more customers after he hired an English bartender: ‘Customers enjoy being served by someone speaking English
with an English accent. Well, who would have a more genuine English accent than an Englishman?"

Istanbul’s ‘night-out,’ ‘high-society,’ and lifestyle magazines frequently feature stories about African-American blues and jazz musicians, American, Asian, European DJs, Latin dance instructors, British bartenders, international chefs, diet advisors and personal trainers working in that sector. Located on the top of the sector, they form the crème de la crème of Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment establishments. What we could draw from is that Istanbul’s upper middle and upper classes increasingly value ‘chic ethnics’ in their consumption patterns especially when they consume the city’s urban, privatized spaces of entertainment.

This attitude is also in line with Istanbul customers’ increasing acceptance of, and even preference for foreign language brand names, creating interesting constellations of heterogeneity, diversity and hybridity. Apart from the rising popularity of American and European fast food, restaurant and café chains such as McDonald’s, Arby’s, Starbucks, Waffle House and Schlotzky’s Deli, some linguistically ‘hybrid’ food establishments, such as Emmim (My Uncle) Chicken & Kitchen, and Dilim (Slice) Sandwiches and Café proliferated in the recent years. One of the most expensive and upscale club in Istanbul was called Laila (which is the English transliteration of an Arab female first name, while a Turkish version, Leyla is a widely adopted first name).

Perhaps two of the most creative and humoristic cases deserve to be mentioned here: A Bagdat Avenue clothing store adopting the name, Nursace based on a twist on famous Versace, by substituting Nur- (Light) for Ver-, and a textile entrepreneur from Rize, a Black Sea coast town, launching a new line of clothing, Rizelli with an expressed aim of making his brand ‘Italian sounding’ (Eren, 2003). Note that Rizeli means ‘from Rize,’ while the addition of another letter ‘l’ apparently makes the brand ‘almost’ Italian!

In line with the rise of the ‘chic ethnics’ as employees, one also observes the emergence of foreign entrepreneurs increasingly peopling the entertainment (and to some extent, leisure consumption) sector. The valuing of ‘anything foreign’ seems to have led some British, Russian, Spanish, Latin American and Asian citizens to settle in this city to launch restaurants, cafés, and other entertainment establishments. What is also interesting to note in this
regard is the fact that a considerable number of those entrepreneurs had first arrived to Turkey as tourists, and had decided to stay or to come back after observing the suitability of the market for their prospective business ventures.

Less than half of the foreign entrepreneurs had any prior training in or professional experience in the food or entertainment industries. In those cases, the national origin of the entrepreneur (them being ‘chic ethnics’) seem to be the main factor shadowing their educational background and professional skills. This seems to be in line with Hall and Williams’ argument that some immigrant entrepreneurs set up medium scale businesses catering to niche markets, and/or shaped by ‘lifestyle’ considerations (2002).

Apart from the socio-cultural parameters making the ‘opportunity structure’ increasingly suitable (such as Istanbul middle and upper classes’ increasing preference for ‘lifestyle’-based consumption patterns), we should note that the recent changes in Turkish legal code have provided an additional motivation for the ‘chic ethnic’ employees and entrepreneurs. Changing regulatory structures, such as the relaxation of legal barriers on property and employment rights for non-citizens (that are further being eased in preparation for Turkey’s European Union membership bid), as well as official ‘attitudes’ towards immigrant entrepreneurs and workers (within the context of marketization and privatization as briefly discussed above) seem to have an important positive impact.

In some cases, more ‘micro’ decisions by other, non-government actors provoke perceptions of new opportunities for businesses. After the United States Consulate was moved from Beyoğlu to Kaplıcalar Mevki, near İstinye for ‘security reasons,’ a new leisurely and functional ‘periphery’ seems to have emerged in this low-income, migrant-dominated, and informally settled neighborhood as illustrated by the emergence of small businesses such as office supplies stores, visa advisors, one hour photo shops, cafés, a Pakistani restaurant, as well as a local Dunkin Donuts franchise. However, because of the ‘isolated self sustainability of the Consulate,’ and the unwillingness of the Consulate employees to leave the premises, many of the newly formed businesses had to close down, and the Pakistani restaurateur had to leave the neighborhood reportedly ‘without even paying his rent’ (Soykan, 2003).

Apart from the socio-cultural parameters making the ‘opportunity structure’ increasingly suitable (such as Istanbul middle and upper classes’ increasing
preference for ‘lifestyle’-based consumption patterns), we should note that the recent changes in Turkish legal code have provided an additional motivation for the ‘chic ethnic’ employees and entrepreneurs. Changing regulatory structures, such as the relaxation of legal barriers on property and employment rights for non-citizens (that are further being eased in preparation for Turkey’s European Union membership bid), as well as official ‘attitudes’ towards immigrant entrepreneurs and workers (within the context of marketization and privatization as briefly discussed above) seem to have an important positive impact.

IV.3.2. Cool Visionaries: Suitable Repertoires riding on the friendly waves

Concurrently with the emergence and rise of ‘chic ethnics,’ ‘local’ individuals who are highly-educated, high-skilled, and/or of high social standing increasingly take part in Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment laborscapes both as ‘front’ employees and entrepreneurs. Among those, Turkish citizens with some experience with living abroad constitute an important section. Many leisure consumption and entertainment establishments hire local ‘knowledge workers’ with necessary ‘vision’ and ‘background’ to be successful. Also, many Turkish citizens of similar backgrounds launch businesses in leisure consumption and entertainment sectors.
Few having educational backgrounds immediately relevant for leisure consumption and entertainment industries, new Turkish entrepreneurs increasingly shape the vision for their business ventures while living abroad, by forming a cultural repertoire of what is ‘trendy’ abroad and seek to adapt those after they come back to Istanbul. They also capitalize on their experience of having lived abroad. Among those entrepreneurs interviewed, some had come up with some interesting new ‘themes’ while living/studying abroad, and consequently launched businesses catering to new ‘lifestyle’ considerations.

Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment industries now increasingly face new businesses such as Bagel Cafés, ‘finger food’ and ‘fusion cuisine’ restaurants, cultural /historic neighborhood tours led by archeologists and anthropologists, tourism companies, and others. It was increasing to note how frequently the notion of konsept (a Turkified version of the English word concept), was used by entrepreneurs interviewed when characterizing their businesses, while a Turkish language equivalent -and actually more appropriate- kavram was readily available but was not used at all.

Those individuals somewhat fit into the category of what some analysts call the ‘White Turks’ (Beyaz Türklər) denoting their supposed proclivity for an entrepreneurial, individualistic, neo-liberal, self-reflexive and consumerist ethic, as well as their more ‘privileged,’ upper class and urban social backgrounds. This implies a classification based on a social and cultural construction, rather than ‘biological’ difference (although ‘lighter skin’ seems to be preferred by some, and has been used as a further tool of stratification).

In the popular iconography, as well as in the language of print and TV commercials, White Turks are usually pitted against the ‘uneducated,’ ‘crude,’ and ‘darker’ Turks. Initially used in a pejorative sense by their critics, the notion of ‘White Turks’ has more recently been incorporated into a more celebratory discourse by some neo-liberal, western-oriented analysts and newspaper columnists. Note that some of the entrepreneurs interviewed also unapologetically and self-reflexively used the label to define themselves, and the ‘target audience,’ or ‘niche consumers’ for their businesses.
This picture seems to conform to the general pattern of high qualification-high pay correlation. What distinguishes Istanbul in this respect is that this correlation is observed between high social class background and high pay, as well as between high qualification and high pay. In other words, individuals from high social backgrounds, who may not be necessarily professionally qualified, occupy many of the high pay jobs. They most chiefly deploy their cultural / social capital to become and remain successful on the top echelons of the leisure consumption and entertainment setting in Istanbul.

**IV.3.3. Eleman: Informalization & Ethnicization at the bottom**

The other tier of the bifurcating stratification has to do with real, imagined and / or constructed ‘ethnicization’ of the lower stratum of Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment laborscape. *Eleman (staff)* is a widely used nomenclature that bring together all migrants, legal and illegal immigrants, ‘locals’ as well as longer-time ‘minority’ residents who are employed mainly in low-paid jobs within leisure consumption and entertainment. For instance, Turks, Kurds, those recently coming from former Socialist bloc, as well as the Roma (who historically were making up an informal entertainment labor force) are employed in establishments as caterers, entertainers, and as support staff. Although those jobs mostly require low qualification and human capital, this is not necessarily the case for all jobs concerned.
In terms of the ‘other’ side of the bifurcating stratification, one needs to identify three additional, more ‘micro’ sub-stratification strategies. The first has to do with the steering of individuals with lower-skills and lower education levels towards low-paying jobs. Mainly migrants from Anatolia, including ethnic Kurds people this sub-stratum. Those support staff members usually remain invisible and mutable, and are concentrated on the ‘back’ of the bottom ‘slice’ of Istanbul’s leisure consumption and entertainment laborscape. As dishwashers, somewhat ‘replaceable’ cooks, and cleaners, they constitute the silent labor force behind the visible scene.

In this sense, ‘ethnicity’ is ‘functional’ as much as it facilitates them being steered to the bottom (especially in terms of their ‘shakier’ social roots), ‘back’ regions of the laborscape, and is not mainly ‘for display’.

Although the ‘replaceability’ is very real, an interesting clustering and concentration seem to occur, especially in the case of cooks. Most cooks interviewed were recent migrants from Mengen, a small town near the city of Bolu, well known for the ‘culinary talents’ of its male population. Migrants from Mengen seem to almost universally dominate the ‘kitchen scene,’ and when a Mengen cook is fired, or resign, informal networking practices quickly help find another Mengen cook to replace him. Although Mengen’s cooks are known for their ‘skills’ in ‘local,’ Anatolian cuisine, some ‘international cuisine’ restaurants as well as Bagel cafés employ them. In those cases, the Mengen roots of their cooks are, unsurprisingly, not underlined in promotional literature. However, I need to note the fact that not all Mengen cooks are located on the bottom ‘slice,’ as many renowned and highly skilled Mengen ‘chefs’ (as opposed to, say, ‘mere’ cooks) earn high incomes at more established, expensive restaurants, and hotels.

Secondly, especially in leisure consumption, some employees are consciously ‘ethnicized’ for the purposes of ‘display’. As highly displayed (thus, located in the ‘front’) ‘folkloric’ musicians and dancers, and as kebab restaurant employees wearing ‘traditional’ outfits, an image of the ‘exotic Other’ as service provider is constructed for the consumption by the tourists. Most Sultanahmet-based hotels and tour companies provide routine ‘visits’ to ‘authentic’ restaurants and music and dance shows where the employees are required to wear ‘representatively authentic’ clothing items, including those seriously outdated, or even legally banned such as the fez and turban. Here, an almost generic and retroactive ‘ethnicity’ has been constructed, whereby local differences are further erased, and a blanket ‘Turkishness’ is displayed by muting especially problematic ethnic differences in Turkey. Note that
any reference to Kurds is carefully avoided, as well as the non-Turkish roots of the *fes* (fez).

**Turn Up Your Ethnicity**

Thirdly, again in the ‘front,’ the ‘ethnic backgrounds’ of some employees are further emphasized. This is especially the case for the Roma, and those immigrants from the former Socialist bloc. Historically forming an ‘informal’ labor force in entertainment and leisure consumption, and employed as full time or occasional music performers and dancers, the Roma’s ‘ethnic’ roots have recently been more emphasized. Located near the bottom ‘slice’ of the stratum in the ‘front,’ Roma laborers are highly skilled, but earn low pay, mainly due to their prolonged ‘informal’ employment status, and ‘shaky’ legal state.

Popularly labeled as *çingene* (gypsy), or *çingen* (an even more pejorative use of the word, *çingene*), Roma have not only been popularly disdained and ridiculed, their Islamic self-identification highly doubted, but also since the Ottoman period had to endure a quite ‘shaky’ status as *esmer vatandaş* (swarthy citizens). In 1934, in line with global anti-’gypsy’ legal codes limiting Roma’s mobility, çingene were banned from entering the Turkish territory. Even a recent –and avowedly ‘liberal,’ pro-European Union accession- law on naturalization of foreigners as Turkish citizens lists ‘unethical behavior’ as well as ‘working as *çingene*’ as factors ‘making applicants ineligible’.

The reasons for the increasing visibility of their otherwise ridiculed and disdained ‘ethnicity’ has to do not only with the longitudinal struggle by Roma human and civil rights activists, but also with the recently increasing interest in ‘fusion’ as an ‘in,’ ‘trendy’ musical and cultural form. Roma musicians, who were not previously ‘taken seriously’ by the music and entertainment establishments beyond their role as occasional ‘informal’ performers mainly dependent on customers’ tips, were ‘rediscovered’. A new ‘respectability’ was assigned to Roma musicians.

Nowadays, it is quite customary to come across with albums or concerts bringing together *Amsterdam Klezmer Band* with the *Galata Gypsy Band*, or *Brooklyn Funk Essentials* with *Laço Tayfa*, especially in the city’s cutting edge, pioneering and experimental new clubs such as the *Babylon*. Some larger hotels in Sultanahmet helped release albums by *Ahirkapi Roman*.
Orkestrası and launch the orchestra as a ‘signature item’ during the hotel’s entertainment shows. A new ‘gaze’ towards Istanbul’s ‘own ethnicities’ as musical subjects may be said to have developed in this city’s new spaces of music and entertainment. Within this new atmosphere and gaze, Roma ‘ethnicity’ is highly commodified while social and legal exclusionary practices as well as residential and occupational segregations of the Roma linger on.

Indeed, an important question remains as to whether these experimental, fusion-oriented musical efforts and the spaces of music they create substantively bridge the social distance between the entertainment economies of Beyoğlu and Maslak (where many crossover-promoting establishments are housed); and Tarlabası, or Ahırkapı (lower-income neighborhoods from out of many Roma musicians are recruited to play with western bands) or not. For example, Tarlabası is just a block off Beyoğlu and its mainly Roma and Kurdish residents are vitally yet quite informally connected to Beyoğlu’s entertainment economy as street sellers, street musicians, and fortune tellers. On the other hand, media descriptions and popular attitudes continue to blame both groups for constituting Beyoğlu’s criminal economy, such as drug dealing, car parking ‘mafia’ and street theft networks. Living under the shadow of criminalization, many Tarlabası residents may not be enjoying the fruits of the new musicscapes unlike their friends or relatives who were recruited to play at Babylon (Aytar and Keskin, 2003).

**Eroticized ‘Others’**

A final group, members of which effectively ‘ethnicized,’ constitute of those mostly illegal immigrants from the former Socialist bloc. Flooding to Turkey prior and since the break-up of the Soviet Union and other Socialist regimes, many immigrants deal with informal ‘suitcase’ trading whereby they bought consumer goods from local merchants and sold them with higher profits back home, opened up street bazaars in Turkish cities to sell Socialist-era paraphernalia, and other
cheap, ‘interesting’ and hard-to-find items. Peopling the lively transnational informal trading networks, and helping Istanbul’s Laleli neighborhood become a major ‘node’ of that trade, some illegal immigrants also were caught in the web of ‘sex trade’ (Yükseker, 2000).

Numerous Eastern and Central European, and Central Asian women constitute of illegal immigrants residing in Istanbul as informal sex workers as well as ‘female escorts’ at entertainment establishments such as the pavyon and taverna. Many of them may be highly qualified for other, more formal employment, highly educated with college, even post graduate degrees, and may indeed occupy higher positions as caterers and entertainers, but may not opt for high paid employment due to their legal status. They are effectively ‘ethnicized,’ (as well as criminalized, and become subject to patriarchal and ‘semi-official’ violence) because their ‘exotic’ and eroticized ‘Otherness’ is the main reason for their employment. Labeled under the pejoratively used blanket terms as the Rus (Russian) or Nataşa (Natasha), they constitute another ‘slice,’ (one that is in the ‘front,’ but not necessarily on the ‘top’) of the entertainment and leisure consumption laborscape in Istanbul.

III. 3. Conclusions:
“From where to where?” (nereden nereye)

This chapter discussed the last three decades of Istanbul’s major transformations. I argued that they could be seen as having developed as a result or under the institutional wings of two successive types of regulation that I suggested to term: 1) Pro-Market and Managerial Paternalism launched in 1980 by two radical breaks; pro-market reform and coup d’état. This period continued until 2002. 2) Neo-Liberal and Conservative Paternalism that was initiated by AK Parti since 2002. In the first period, market liberalization helped further development of what Chatterton & Hollands call, ‘corporate institutionalization’ (2005) of the services sector in general and provoked the coming of a more diversified leisure consumption and entertainment setting in particular (Aytar, 2011). In the second, this scene became more cosmopolitan yet more authoritatively regulated.

The general pro-market orientations as well as the particular regulatory policies were behind the sprouting of a more entrepreneurial and initiative-taking stance amongst the laborscapes of leisure consumption and entertainment. Regulation is also not only important to help bring into flourishing of this new ethos of production, but also in molding the
citizenry-as-consumers swimming amidst this new sea of diverse options provided by the producers:

(a) Consumers & Producers:

In the period of 1980-2014, Istanbul has grown considerably in space and population. Increasingly more diverse groups from myriad geographical backgrounds poured into the city. The city map became a patchwork with numerous ethno-confessional, socio-economic and cultural concentrations of clustering with demographic and commercial functions, each scattered around this metropolis housing 29 districts scratched by thousands of streets whose total length is around a whopping 48,000 kilometers (Şengör, 2014). All other 80 provinces have resident populations in Istanbul and over 100 different nationalities and/or ethnic and religious groups are present. Two of the most important transformations have been: (a) the Kurdish migration from the conflict-ravaged Southeast Anatolia, and (b) the increasing globalization/trans-nationalization of the demographic stock.

In this diversity-laced environment, economic income levels, social status, cultural and economic capital, lifestyle considerations all play out in the diverse shaping up of consumers groupings and, in turn, providers who run to fulfill those demands. Infrastructural and transportation work by the central and municipal regulators and their global city branding policies have also radically transformed the map of leisure consumption and entertainment in Istanbul.

Some historically anchored entertainment neighborhoods (such as Sulukule, for example) were liquidated and some others (like Aksaray) lost most of their past prominence due to spatial transformations. New foci of entertainment were established such as those around the Maslak-Büyükdere line, or on the Anatolian side’s Marmara seaboard. Most new focal points for leisure consumption and entertainment were designed to cater to the middle or higher income citizens with relatively more education and social capital. Some other but rather sporadic foci also appeared on more peripheral neighborhoods, catering to the lower income clientele. In this sense, consumers and producers lined up along spatial and income level divisions.

(b) Regulation & Mediation:

The two sub-periods, 1980-2002 and 2002-2014 were marked by Pro-
Market and Managerial Paternalism and Neo-Liberal and Conservative Paternalism respectively. Both sub-periods transformed the role of the state in consumption, radically altering the model under the national developmental / populist paternalist period between 1950 and 1980. The transformation was in some senses a continuation of 1950-1980, in the sense that the ageing ideological orthodoxies of early republican Kemalism (1920-1950) were further relaxed. However, 1980-2002 was also a break in terms of the regulation, in the sense that Fordist, Keynesian and populist consumption policies were dethroned by the pro-market, managerial, neo-liberal and conservative policies. Central and municipal regulatory policies critically re-shaped what Engelen calls the ‘structure of the market’, ‘locality of the market’ and ‘the mode, level and object of regulation’ (2001).

Pro-market, managerial and neoliberal policies –as well as efforts to brand the city and promote it as a global city– opened up a new path. On this path, a new ‘coupling’ of the producers to the consumers emerged, who were on two sides of the supply and demand mechanism (Yalman, 2012). The globalizing stratum of consumers and the peripheralized, lower income consumers were pitted against one another and producers lined up accordingly, also in a spatially and socially dissipated manner.

Conditioned by policies to promote globality and ‘authentic’ locality of Istanbul, to upgrade the infrastructure for finance and service industries, both Özal/Dalan and Erdoğan/Topbaş were involved in such a radical re-spatialisatization of the “locality of the market” (Engelen, 2001). ‘The mode, level and object of regulation’ also were altered in this period. Unchaining the market from past étatiste rigidities, the regulatory packages were making what is ‘possible in the market’ to be situated on a considerably larger palette, with a far more extended array of alternatives that could be found in the leisure consumption and entertainment sectors.

In these two periods, formerly homogenized forms supported by the state and promoted by the mediators were complemented with new and hybrid forms. Into this field left out by the state, market institutions moved in to create new types of consumerism, introduce novel products and promote these as the symbols of cosmopolitan life styles to be adopted by urban middle classes. Thus in this period, we observe the increasing commodification of cultural practices and the changing role of the mediators. post-1980 period we see the increasing number of magazines, radio and TV shows and books on fashion, food, leisure consumption, arts, etc. which are devoted
to consumption and cultivation of certain lifestyles. Different than in the previous period of 1950-1980, whereby various stripes of mediators were situated along political or ideological divisions but who all still agreed on “preaching” what the society “should be doing”, the new mediators were promoters of new “trends” and did quickly launch new ones one after the other. Lifestyle liberals, reflexive progressives and engagé nostalgics as main groups of mediators were not so much split on the basis of ideologies, but on the basis of lifestyles and associated ethics of leisure and entertainment consumption.

(c) Dynamics of Diversity:
Processes of diversity and ethnicity at play were largely underwritten by two key societal dynamics that had jointly stamped the period between 1980 and 1980 were; the increasing share in Istanbul of Kurds who were displaced from out of Southeastern Anatolia, fleeing the conflict between the state and PKK; and the rising globalization and transnationalization of the population in the city. These two major transformations shaped new diversities –including ethnic diversity– which contoured the scenes of leisure consumption and entertainment to a considerable extent.

Kurds and other provincial newcomers colored both the consumer base and the laborscape of leisure consumption and entertainment in the city. They most constituted the ‘invisible’ workforce and those consumers whose voices were not so much heard of or uttered at mainstream media or by other mediators. While their ethnicity was mostly ‘functional’ in terms of their steering to the ‘back’ and ‘bottom’ of the laborscapes, a new type of ethnicization was at play at the ‘front’ and ‘top’ parts. In terms of the bifurcating stratification of ‘ethnicization,’ I would claim that those on the top of the bifurcated laborscape of leisure consumption and entertainment compose of a stratum of what I would call ‘chic ethnics,’ who are in the ‘front’ of the top ‘slice’ of the leisure consumption and entertainment laborscape in Istanbul. Chic ethnics are highly visible, and are consciously deployed there to form the façade of the enterprises by the entrepreneurs and owners.

Roma, as an ethnicized group depended on their historically longitudinal role as key producers of leisure consumption and entertainment. However, escapist and alternative spaces they had created on the face of social conservativism and republican fiat that were quite functional in the previous period, 1920-1950, were demolished due to neo-liberal urban policies. Lacking such a pivotal spatial fix, Roma are in this new period, mostly
informally employed and spatially dissipated along the leisure consumption and entertainment map of Istanbul.

A final group, members of which are ‘ethnicized,’ constitute of those mostly illegal immigrants from the former Socialist bloc. Numerous Eastern and Central European, and Central Asian women are part of illegal immigrants residing in Istanbul as informal sex workers as well as ‘female escorts’ at entertainment establishments such as the pavyon and taverna. They are effectively ‘ethnicized,’ and criminalized and their ‘exotic’ and eroticized ‘Otherness’ is significantly usurped by the formal and informal entrepreneurs.