Soulmates: Reinvention of ethnic identification among higher educated second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch

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4. The Dutch integration landscape

What does the setting of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch immigrants and their children look like? What is the discursive landscape? What are their socioeconomic and sociocultural positions? How did these develop over time?

Like in many other countries, since the start of this millennium, Dutch integration politics has seen a significant turn from a relative tolerance of diversity to an ‘assimilationist’ or ‘culturalist’ intolerance of cultural diversity. This evolving political landscape forms the backdrop of the lives of the second generation that I studied. Their identifications are hard to apprehend without knowing about the culturalist turn and the change in the tone of voice that have affected the early second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch since early adulthood. I discuss the changing political landscape in the first section of this chapter (4.1). Additionally, to understand the second generation’s social relations and struggles, it is essential to know about their immigration background and their evolving socioeconomic and sociocultural positions in the Netherlands, which I describe in the second section (4.2). The chapter concludes with a summary (4.3).

4.1 The Dutch integration context: voices and policies over time

In this section, I will describe how a strongly exclusivist ‘culturalism’ has ascended, claiming that ‘the Dutch culture and identity’ – defined in terms of progressiveness – should be defended against immigrants and their presumed illiberal, intolerant, traditional and non-secular cultures and religions (Uitermark 2012, Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014). The Turkish and particularly the Moroccan Dutch, both with their Muslim backgrounds, have been the primary targets. In the Netherlands, this culturalism is accompanied by a new-realist discursive style, characterized by a bold ‘frankness’ and ‘the nerve to break taboos’ (Prins 2002). To elucidate the significance of the change, I describe this emerging discourse and its resonance in a relatively detailed way, including the changing themes that the integration politics center on, the shifting demands placed on immigrants and their offspring, and the monumental change in tone. Before discussing the figureheads of the emerging culturalist discourse, and the culturalist resonance with mainstream actors and integration policies, I first briefly describe the recent history of Dutch politics.
A history of pragmatism rather than multiculturalism (1970s and ’80s)

Roughly until the second half of the 1980s, the Netherlands was relatively tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity. As a result, the Netherlands was renowned for its multiculturalism, but this view predominantly misperceives the underlying reasons for this tolerance (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011, 2012). Rather than expressing a multicultural ideology, which values and nurtures cultural diversity, this tolerance was based on widespread pragmatism. This pragmatism was a legacy of the Dutch system of pillarization, in which various ideological segments were institutionally and socially separated (Uitermark 2012). Pillarization started to decline in the late 1960s, but the Dutch ‘poldermodel’ remained, characterized by compromise, consultation and accommodation, rather than confrontation. This ‘poldermodel’ had become ingrained in the Dutch civil sphere (2012). This model was reflected in an approach to integration that did not emerge from ideological bases but was driven by finding solutions that were practical and efficient (Scholten 2011; Uitermark 2012). When workers from Morocco and Turkey arrived in the Netherlands in the late sixties and seventies, and when their families arrived ten years later, it was generally assumed that their migration would be temporary, so immigrant policies were directed towards facilitating their return. In view of the prospected return to Morocco and Turkey, the retention of their cultural identities and group structures was promoted and supported.

When in the 1980s it appeared that many of the immigrants would stay permanently, the goal of the integration policy shifted from facilitating return to socioeconomic participation and the prevention of sociocultural segregation (Scholten 2011). This did not lead to an adaption of the integration instruments. Group-specific facilities were maintained or supported, as the cultivation of minority language skills and identities were seen as means for simultaneously preventing social insulation and promoting socioeconomic integration. The underlying idea was that knowledge of the ‘own’ language and culture would contribute to a positive self-image, facilitate acquisition of the Dutch language, and reduce the gap between children and their parents (Bouras 2012: 90). Combatting discrimination and inequality was seen as the mutual responsibility of both the minority and the majority; mutual adaptation was emphasized and combating discrimination was one of the policy aims (Scholten 2011).

Thus, the institutionalization of ethnic and religious differences were not engrained in a multiculturalist ideology, but were promoted for instrumental reasons. The accommodation of sociocultural differences does not express an appreciation of cultural diversity, but rather, it is the pragmatic consequence of the aim to facilitate return and socioeconomic integration. Yet, the Dutch pragmatic approach resembles multiculturalism in the view that (a certain level of) cultural and religious diversity is acceptable and does not necessarily threaten integration and national cohesion. It is a groupist way of thinking that is not
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necessarily exclusivist. This changed sharply in 2001, foreshadowed by developments in the integration debate in the preceding decennium.

Culturalism on the rise

In the early nineties, a more exclusivist way of thinking emerged, which, particularly after the turn of the millennium, severely challenged the tolerance for cultural diversity. Whereas cultural diversity was previously tolerated for pragmatic reasons, it became increasingly formulated as a social problem that needed to be resolved urgently, and those who were presented as cultural Others were increasingly regarded as outsiders. This move away from the accommodation of cultural diversity is observed in many other European countries (see e.g. Joppke 2004; see also the literature mentioned by Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens 2011: 233). As I describe in this section, in the Netherlands, a discourse of ‘culturalism’ ascended and gradually became one of the most dominant voices in the Dutch integration debate. It was voiced in a style of ‘new realism’ or even ‘hyperrealism’ (Prins 2002). Dutch culturalism can be described as ‘as discourse organized around the idea that the world is divided into cultures and that our enlightened, liberal culture should be defended against the claims of minorities committed to illiberal religions and ideologies’ (Uitermark 2012: 15). The ascent of the culturalist discourse strongly relied on particular discursive leaders, who left clear marks on the integration debate in the Netherlands in the last two decennia (ibid.). This description is largely based on the detailed analyses of Prins (2002, 2004) and Uitermark (2012) of the Dutch integration debate.

In 1991, culturalism was freed from its association with the extreme right by Bolkestein, the leader of the rightwing liberals and the appointed ‘Godfather’ of culturalism in the Netherlands (by Uitermark 2012: 85). Bolkestein argued that Islam is fundamentally different from the ‘Enlightened’ Western cultures, which need to be protected against Islamic influences (Bolkestein 1991). He presented himself as voicing the concerns of the ‘ordinary people’, the lower-class ethnic Dutch, whom he portrayed as the real victims of immigration. After 2000, the support for culturalist ideas also increased among more leftist people following an opinion article in which Scheffer, a member of the Labor Party, sketched Dutch society as a ‘multicultural drama’ (2000). Scheffer blamed the Dutch elites for being relativist and consensual, and holds them accountable for a large number of socioeconomic problems among ethnic minorities, such as unemployment, poverty, school drop-outs and criminality. Scheffer envisions a strong national identity that articulates what holds society together, as a sociocultural solution for these socioeconomic problems.

The discourse that took hold was not only culturalist, but can also be described as what Prins refers to as a ‘new realist’ (2002). According to Prins, a new realist ‘dares’ to say the ‘facts’ that have supposedly been covered up by the elites, thereby ‘unmasking’ a formerly hidden truth and ‘frankly’ addressing social
issues that should not be ‘smothered’ but ‘solved’. A new realist presents him or herself as a spokesperson of the ‘ordinary people’ (lower-class ethnic Dutch) and blames the (leftist) establishment, whose evasive ‘political correctness’ has caused the social ‘problems’ that we are now supposedly facing. In this new realist discourse, being frank, straightforward and realistic are presented as characteristic features of Dutch national identity. According to Tillie, the new-realistic ‘frankness’ led to violations of the basic principles of a democratic debate, which are non-violence, non-exclusion, and the respect of human dignity (Tillie 2008).

In the period after the September 11 attacks on the American World Trade Center, politician Fortuyn emerged in the political arena and dominated Dutch national politics prior to the national elections in May 2002. Fortuyn, who was very explicit with his homosexuality, outshone his political opponents with his controversial and flamboyant appearance. He caused ‘political correctness’ to become suspect and he passionately fulminated against what he called the ‘retarded’ Islam, the ‘imminent’ ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society, and the ‘paternalizing’ ‘left church’ (Prins 2002). He argued that the progressive Dutch achievements were under threat and that he did not feel like ‘doing the emancipation of women and homosexuals all over again’ (Fortuyn in Poorthuis and Wansink 2002). Prins explains that frankness is no longer a means for unmasking the truth, but that the unrestrained venting of one’s feelings is now valued for its own sake, and she calls this ‘hyperrealism’ (2002). Fortuyn was shot dead a week prior to the elections by an ethnic Dutch environmental activist. Many people blamed the Left, as the Left had (supposedly) demonized Fortuyn. Fortuyn’s political party (List Pim Fortuyn, Lijst Pim Fortuyn) became the second largest party in the successive elections and was a member of the cabinet, which fell after only 87 days in office (Prins 2002).

Hirsi Ali, a novice politician, also challenged both the Islam for its orthodoxy and the Dutch politicians for their inert politics. She was confident, eloquent, determined, and above all, she was raised as a Muslim in Somalia. She experienced genital mutilation and fled to the Netherlands to escape arranged marriage. This all contributed to her legitimacy as a culturalist spokesperson and even made her into an ‘icon that cultural elites, too, could support or even adore’ (Uitermark 2012: 148). In 2002, she was allotted a seat in Parliament for the right-wing Liberals, which led her to break with the Labor party. Hirsi Ali advocated a confrontational style, which she saw as the only way to achieve the social change that she deemed urgent. Numerous death threats against her meant that she had to live with constant security. In her fight for the emancipation of Muslim women, she called the prophet Mohammed a pervert and a pedophile. The short film Submission, which she made with the controversial columnist and filmmaker Van Gogh (who consistently referred to Muslims as ‘goatfuckers’, geitenneukers), embodied her confrontational style. Many Muslims found the film offensive (Van Tilborgh 2006). It portrayed Muslim women suffering abuse and
showed a naked woman with a semi-transparent veil and Quranic verses painted on her body that can be interpreted as justifications of the subjugation of women. Hirsi Ali not only had supporters among the ‘ordinary people’ like Fortuyn, but also among the cultural and political elite. Although her approach led many Muslims in the Netherlands, particularly women, to speak up, they primarily reacted in opposition to Hirsi Ali’s stereotypical presentation of Islam and Muslims (Van Tilborgh 2006). In November 2004, Van Gogh was publicly murdered by an extremist in the name of Islam. In those years, the theme of ‘Islamic’ extremism was prominent in the media. The media extensively covered an extremist Dutch network of young Muslims, de Hofstadgroep, the ‘Capital City group’, the ideological home of Van Gogh’s murderer. Several of the youth were arrested and sentenced for being members of a criminal and terrorist organization. Those were the years of the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the attacks in London in 2005, which were carried out in name of Islam. In 2005, Time Magazine ranked Hirsi Ali among the 100 world’s most influential people. In 2006, she moved to the United States.

Although the attention for ‘Islamic’ extremism in the media gradually subsided, the success of yet another culturalist figurehead cannot be ignored. In recent years, the politician Wilders has managed to draw a lot of media attention (although he was not included in Uitermark’s analysis, I assume he has high resonance). His success is also visible in political terms. Wilders broke away from the right-wing Liberals and participated in the 2006 elections with his newly founded Freedom Party (Partij Voor de Vrijheid). In the 2010 elections he managed to expand the presence of the PVV in Dutch parliament from 9 to 24 of the 150 seats, making PVV the third biggest party, giving them a strong say in the course of the new cabinet. Wilders fiercely opposes Islam and presents Islam as a totalitarian and fascist ideology, lacking any shades and nuances (PVV 2010a). In the 2010 election program, the PVV advocated a ‘combat against Islam’ (islambestrijding) and a stop to the current (presumed) ‘mass-migration’ (ibid.). Wilders explained:

The second choice the PVV makes is less immigration and less Islam in the Netherlands. Mass-immigration needs to be halted. (…). We need to rid ourselves from cultural relativism. Cultures are not equal, and our culture is better than the Islamic culture. (…) Islam is a violent, totalitarian ideology, which squarely opposes freedom, democracy and tolerance. The Netherlands should not further Islamize. (PVV 2010b: 3; translation MS)

In the short film he produced in 2006, Fitna, which led to international commotion even before its broadcast, he connected atrocities all over the world with Islam and sketched a looming future, in which Europe is overwhelmed by Muslim immigrants. Like others, such as Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali, he received many threats that have resulted in his necessity for continuous protection. His style is highly confrontational and not only serves to depreciate Islam but to dissociate
himself from the elites and to seek connections with the ‘ordinary people’. He employs crude sound bites, presents himself as the ultimate advocate of free speech and presents those who oppose him as threats to free speech. In 2010, he was charged with inciting hatred against Muslims but was cleared by the court, which Wilders celebrated as a ‘victory for free speech’. He proposed a tax for headscarves, which he referred to as a ‘head-rag tax’ (kopvoddentaks); he wanted to halt the ‘tsunami of islamization’; and recently, he introduced stickers, looking like the Saudi flag, with the virulent anti-Islam statements ‘Islam is a lie, Mohammed is a criminal, the Quran is poison’ (in Arabic). In the spring of 2014, he made a room of supporters chant that they wanted ‘less Moroccans’.

Culturalism gained ground

The ascent of these loud, culturalist voices does not mean that a uniform ‘Dutch discourse’ or a uniform ‘Dutch climate’ exists. Uitermark shows, based on an analysis of the Dutch integration politics between 1980 and 2006, that multiple voices and discourses resound in the integration debate. He identifies three alternative discourses: pragmatism, civil Islam and anti-racism. Pragmatism has always been the discourse with the most followers (2012: 57). An example of a well-known pragmatist is former Amsterdam major Cohen, who was committed to ‘keeping things together’ (de boel bij elkaar houden). Another discourse is the emerging ‘Civil Islam’. In reaction to culturalist thinking, people such as the Rotterdam major Aboutaleb, who has a Moroccan background, assert the compatibility of Islam and civic virtues (p. 138). This discourse shares with the culturalists the idea of norm-enforcement and adaptation to civic norms. The third alternative discourse, anti-racism, highlights the dangers of racism, discrimination and prejudice. As also described by Vasta (2007), anti-racism has been weak in the Netherlands, particularly compared to countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States and has become only weaker over time (Uitermark 2012: 123). Anti-racists are accused of smothering criticism of cultures and religion (p. 127). Uitermark shows that anti-racism is more often identified as a problem than racism itself (p. 126). He concludes that the denial of racism is commonplace among the Dutch elite (p. 129). Anti-racism is a marginalized discourse, which encounters strong opposition and has great difficulty accessing the central stages in the public sphere.¹

Despite the variety of existing discourses, the culturalist discourse has come to dominate the public sphere. Although Uitermark does not use this exact qualification, he describes other discourses, including the pragmatist discourse, as discursively subordinate to that of the culturalists (2012: 137). Pragmatists are highly fragmented, while culturalists band together around discursive leaders and gripping icons (p.113). The culturalists have the most power to attract attention and to stir debate (p.117), and, more than their discursive opponents, they have agenda-setting power (p.148).
The influence of the ascended discourse stretches beyond the culturalist discursive leaders. Culturalist thinking and new-realist rhetoric also has gained ground with more mainstream politicians and parties, both in their discourses as well as in (proposed) policies and measures. Views on integration as projected by the various political parties clearly show culturalist influences, as Sleegers demonstrates based on an analysis of election programs (2007). She shows that, since 2000, most political parties have adopted the language of ‘multicultural drama’ and have increasingly formulated immigration in terms of problems, which the parties attribute to cultural differences and which supposedly can be solved though clarity about the Dutch identity and the broad adoption of ‘our’ (presumably undisputed) norms and values. ii They argue that immigrants should be loyal to ‘western key norms’ of the ‘modern society’, such as gender equality, freedom of speech and individual autonomy, which are inherent aspects of the national identity (Spijkerboer 2007: 24 in Sleegers 2007: 49, translation MS). There was a telling case in which a parliamentary investigation committee, led by politician Blok, concluded that immigrants had advanced relatively well in socioeconomic terms, and the assessment of a ‘failed’ integration process was unjust (Blok 2004). The fact that this report did not support the impressions of the members of the parliament did not lead to an adjustment of their opinions but to a broad rejection of the committee’s results (Dutch Parliament 2004). In 2007, at the presentation of the report ‘Identification with the Netherlands’ by the Dutch Scientific Council, the speech of then Crown Princess Máxima Zorreguieta, who immigrated to the Netherlands from Argentina seven years earlier, led to commotion. She prided the Netherlands for its rich diversity and explained that in her introduction to Dutch society, she had not encountered ‘the’ Dutch identity and ‘the’ Dutchman. iii She was severely criticized for this statement.

The fact that cultural differences were increasingly formulated as problematic cultural distances (Scholten 2011: 79), lead the integration policy to shift from the ‘cultivation of one’s own cultural identities’ to a one-sided bridging of differences. Whereas ethnic minority group formation previously was tolerated to facilitation the expected return and for emancipatory purposes, group formation was increasingly regarded as undesirable, as it supposedly hampered integration and social cohesion (Koopmans et al. 2005; Veldboer, Duyvendak and Bouw 2007). This led, for example in Amsterdam, to abolishment of structural subsidies for organizations with minority signatures, in favor of the support of incidental, small-scale initiatives (Uitermark and Steenbergen 2006: 268). That higher educated are not exempted, is illustrated by the fact that many feel the need to counter the idea that ethnic minority student associations are examples of self-segregation and reflect estrangement (see for example Van Riel 2006; Algemeen Dagblad 2007; Trouw 2007; Brouwer 2010). In reference to the policy shift, Scholten describes: ‘[c]ommon citizenship means that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to basic Dutch norms’ (2011: 78). The aim of the current integration policy is that those ‘who choose to build their future in the
Netherlands, should be oriented towards Dutch society. Newcomers are in the first instance responsible for their own successful integration’ (Asscher 2013). In terms of measures, this led to the implementation of compulsory ‘civic integration programs’ for permanent immigrants from outside the European Union, including those who have lived in the Netherlands for decennia. This also led to another measure: the Participation Declaration, which attempts to morally bind new immigrants to Dutch society, which is in its pilot-phase in 2014. Immigrants are requested to sign a declaration to affirm their intention to be self-sustaining, embrace the existing values and actively participate in society (Asscher 2013). Although signing the declaration is presented as a moral obligation, it is formally voluntary. It is hard to say whether immigrants feel pressured to sign.

Also the new-realist tone of voice has affected the public arena. Politicians and media refer to the overrepresentation of citizens with Moroccan backgrounds in problem areas such as school dropout rates, public nuisance and criminality, using the terms ‘Moroccan issue’ (Marokkanenprobleem) and ‘Moroccan drama’ (Marokkanendrama). Another term that became a slur with broad resonance was ‘kut-Marokkanen’, which literally translates as ‘cunt-Moroccans’. This term was accidentally introduced in 2002 by Amsterdam alderman Oudkerk at (what he thought was) an unguarded moment (Uitermark 2010: 175). In 2011, then Deputy Prime Minister Verhagen emphasized that concerns about ‘foreigners’ (buitenlanders) changing society and threatening people’s positions are ‘understandable’ and ‘justified’ (begrijpelijk and terecht). This did not escape the attention of many, including Golden Calf winner Nasrdin Dchar.

Culturalized thinking not only permeated the political and governmental arena but is also present among the population, which increasingly tends to fear the political influence of Islam (EUMC 2002; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello 2002; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008). Among ethnic Dutch as well as among Moroccan and Turkish Dutch youth, have the impression that cultural differences have increased over time (Entzinger 2009). Ethnic Dutch do not have warm feelings towards the immigrant Other. On a temperature scale between 0 and 100 degrees, they evaluate Turkish, Moroccan and Muslim citizens with scores of 57, 38 and 47, whereas they rate their feelings towards ethnic Dutch with a score of 68 (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 104). A large majority of the ethnic Dutch do not subscribe to the opinion that most Muslims in the Netherlands respect Dutch culture (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012: 45). This might explain why support for the cultural assimilation of immigrants among ethnic Dutch has increased between 1999 and 2006 (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 101). Various ethnic minority groups share the negative evaluation, particularly of the Moroccan Dutch, as they nearly all rate the Moroccan Dutch with lower temperatures than the Turkish, Surinamese, Antillean and ethnic Dutch (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012: 50).
The culturalist demands
Although the Dutch political integration arena includes diverse players and discourses, it is clear that culturalist voices have become louder, and other voices have become more culturalist. As I explain here, this means that very intrinsic demands are currently placed on immigrants and their offspring. Following Duyvendak, I argue that there are also emotive and nativist demands. Not only are immigrants required to adapt to highly progressive norms, they are also required to feel at home in the Netherlands in emotional terms. Furthermore, even if they comply with these demands, their belonging is not self-evident because of ‘nativist’ conceptions of citizenship.

Along culturalist lines, successful integration and good citizenship are increasingly defined as adherence to norms and values that are considered inherently and undisputedly Dutch. The discussion of the culturalist voices clearly showed that progressive values such as secularism, sexual freedom and gender equality are presented as the core values of ‘Dutch culture’, which is supposedly under threat by non-western, Muslim immigrants (see also Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014). In the Netherlands, a broad progressive consensus has formed among the Dutch since the 1960s. More than among other Europeans, let alone Americans, they adhere to progressive norms (see SCP 1998; Uitterhoeve 2000; Arts, Haginaars, and Halman 2003; Duyvendak 2004; Halman, Luijkkx and Van Zundert 2005). However, the idea of an all-encompassing, undisputed consensus ignores the recent homophobic past in the Netherlands and the continuous moral diversity in Dutch society, also among ethnic Dutch (Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014). These progressive standards are used by politicians of various backgrounds to demand cultural assimilation, particularly of Muslim immigrants and their offspring, who are portrayed as outsiders because of their presumed moral distance (ibid.). As Ghorashi formulates: the right to be different is under threat (2010). Clearly, the demands placed on immigrants go beyond the procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles outlined by Joppke. In describing the European move away from multiculturalism, he states: ‘With the exception of language, the only explicit impositions on newcomers are liberal impositions, most notably a procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles’ (2004: 254). In the Netherlands however, immigrants – more so than non-immigrants – are not only expected to respect liberty and equality, but also to have internalized progressive norms as their own personal principles.

The demands placed on immigrants and their offspring go even further: citizens are increasingly expected to be ‘loyal’ and to ‘feel at home’ in the Netherlands, as Duyvendak argues (2007, 2011) (see also Duyvendak and Slootman 2011). The Dutch Scientific Council concludes that ‘integration has increasingly become an issue of identification and loyalty’ (Meurs 2007: 28). This is illustrated by the quotes of the Dutch politicians Verhagen and Marijnissen. ‘People must feel connected to our society if they want to be naturalized, they have to feel at home
in it. It is necessary to feel Dutch’ (Dutch Parliament 2000: 363 in Duyvendak 2011: 93). ‘If one is not prepared to conform to our values and obey our laws, the pressing advice is: seek a country where you feel at home’ (Marijnissen 2004 in Duyvendak 2011: 92). Clearly, cultural assimilation in the Netherlands includes emotional and identificational aspects. Feeling at home and feeling Dutch have become central requirements for citizenship. Because these feelings cannot easily be observed, certain actions become their symbolic stand-ins (Verkaaik 2010 in Duyvendak 2011: 92). For example, in the eyes of various Dutch politicians, having dual nationality expresses a lack of loyalty to Dutch culture (Meurs 2007; Driouichi 2007). Belonging and identification is regarded as zero-sum, as singular in nature, which is why loyalty to other countries and cultures are regarded as threats to an emotional attachment to the Netherlands. This explains the demand that immigrants who want to stay in the Netherlands adapt to ‘Dutch’ norms, values and emotions, which supposedly requires the abandonment of any other norms, values and attachments. Having positive emotional bonds with Dutch society is not articulated as a national aspiration but rather as a demand that is placed on individuals (on immigrants) and that is formulated as a condition for belonging. In other words: the personal, intimate side of belonging (feeling at home) is set as a condition for the political side of belonging (being accepted as an insider); see Antonsich (2010) for a reflection on these two dimensions of belonging). This demand ignores how personal feelings of belonging are influenced by the politics of inclusion and exclusion. It ignores the responsibility of society in processes of belonging. After all, it is hard to feel at home when one feels rejected or unwelcome, as Jayaweera and Choudhury note (2008 in Antonsich 2010: 649).

However, even when immigrant citizens have adapted to the progressive norms and meet the demands to ‘feel at home’ in the Netherlands and to ‘feel Dutch’, this does not guarantee their belonging as accepted citizens. The discourse contains yet another exclusivist layer; it is also nativist (Duyvendak 2011, Duyvendak and Slootman 2011). The nativist discourse argues that ‘original’ inhabitants own the place, the nation, because they were there first. This nativist conception is reflected in the consistent and persistent use of the terms ‘autochthonous’ and ‘allochthonous’ to refer to ethnic Dutch respectively non-western immigrants (and their children and even sometimes their grandchildren vi). These are originally geological terms, meaning respectively: originating and not originating from the soil where it is found (Geschiere 2009). Using this terminology renders the distinction between those who belong and those who do not belong immutable and creates a ‘common-sense’ justification for asking newcomers to adapt and also creates a hierarchy of belonging. Fortuyn used this argument when he stated that ‘Christian inhabitants, like those living in the Veluwe [a relatively religious and conservative area in the Netherlands], morally have more rights than Islamic newcomers, as Christians have contributed to the construction of our country for decennia’.vii
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The shift from integration politics that were relatively tolerant of cultural and identificational diversity to politics that are relatively intolerant of diversity and contain culturalist, emotive and nativist layers is characterized by Entzinger (2006) as a ‘change of the rules while the game is on’.

4.2. The Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and their offspring

The Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have occupied central positions in the debates on integration over the last two decennia of the culturalist turn, but this is not the only reason why they offer interesting focal points for research. Numerically, they comprise the largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and have second generations that are currently coming of age. Around five percent (4.5%) of the 16.7 million Dutch citizens are Moroccan and Turkish Dutch (636,000 respectively 696,000), of which roughly half belong to the second generation (CBS 2012). The eldest of the second generation are now reaching their forties. The share of first and second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch is much higher in the larger cities. In some Amsterdam and Rotterdam neighborhoods Moroccan and Turkish Dutch comprise between forty and fifty percent of the population, viii making them the largest and often most established groups in these neighborhoods, particularly among the younger cohorts (Crul and Schneider 2010). In this section, I describe the current situation of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch in the Netherlands in socioeconomic and sociocultural terms. I show that both in structural as well as in sociocultural respects, on average, the situation of both Moroccan and Turkish Dutch is characterized by a distance from the average ethnic Dutch; and, in many respects, this distance decreases over time. But first, I sketch the immigration background, which helps us further understand how the positions have developed.

Background: the first generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants

In the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, many Turkish and Moroccan migrants arrived in the Netherlands as labor migrants to fill shortages of low-skilled labor. These were mainly men. Many were married and left their wives and children behind. Although the Dutch government had recruitment agreements with Turkey and Morocco, as well as with other Southern European countries, many of the immigrants migrated via informal channels (Bouras 2012). The large majority of the Moroccan immigrants came from the rural areas of the Rif region in northern Morocco (Nelissen and Buijs 2000; Bouras 2012). In Morocco, the interests of the Amazigh, or Berber, peoples in the Rif were put behind those of the rest of the country (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum 2007), and to alleviate economic suffering and reduce political pressures, the Moroccan government directed the recruitment to the Rif (Bouras 2012: 55). The Moroccan men who arrived generally had extremely low formal educational levels, partly due to the inadequacy of the Moroccan education system at that time (Nelissen and Buijs 2000). Around a quarter had (slightly) more than primary school
education and over a third had not attended any school at all (CBS 1986 in Nelissen and Buijs 2000: 179). The background of most of the Turkish laborers is largely comparable. The majority came from villages and provincial cities and had low formal education levels (Böcker 2000). Three quarters had only attended primary school. The first oil crisis halted the immigration of workers. Although most workers arrived with the intention of returning to Morocco and Turkey (hence the label ‘guest workers’), in the second half of the seventies they had their families come to the Netherlands.

The Moroccan and Turkish Dutch present an interesting comparison, as these ethnic groups are roughly similar in many respects, while they differ in others. Both groups are predominantly Muslim and originally came to the Netherlands around the same period as temporary labor migrants to work in low-skilled jobs. As we have seen in the previous section, this temporary stay was one of the main reasons that both the Dutch government and the individual immigrants themselves cultivated their Moroccan and Turkish identities. This was also strongly stimulated by (governmental) institutions in Morocco and Turkey, which did not want to lose control over their citizens abroad (Bouras 2012; Sunier 1996). In the end, many immigrants stayed in the Netherlands longer than they originally intended and had their families join them. Later, the economic crisis and the fact that their children attended Dutch schools prevented many of them from returning to Morocco and Turkey. Most of these immigrants from both groups came from rural areas and had low levels of formal education. Most of the first generation remained in the lower socioeconomic strata. Furthermore, what is generally seen as typically Moroccan or Turkish cultural elements is described in very similar terms.

Although many individual differences exist, and it is disputed if ‘the Moroccan culture’ exists (De Jong 2012: 88), the broad literature study of Pels and De Haan on socialization practices among Moroccans and Moroccan Dutch (2003) reveals dispositions and trends that are shared by many Moroccan Dutch. This concerns family structures and gender roles in particular. The literature reviewed by De Jong in her description of cultural patterns among Moroccan families in the Netherlands reveals a similar picture (2012: 88-90). Pels and De Haan describe norms and practices that were common among families in Morocco and formed the background of many Moroccan families that migrated to the Netherlands. They also describe patterns of socialization practices as observed among Moroccan families after migration. In the more traditional Moroccan family life, age and gender were important social markers and expressed hierarchical relations (p. 24). The adult members represented authority, and there was a strict division between the sexes. Women were primarily confined to the private sphere and the home, while men dominated the public sphere (p. 25). Core values were based on conformity with Islamic law and living in accordance with the community, although actual social practices often had ‘agonistic and individualistic’ aspects (p. 16, 28). The control of passion and desire was
important, and impulsive, thoughtless, irresponsible behavior was to be avoided, especially with regards to matters of sexuality, and this was particularly applicable to women (p. 28-30). De Jong also points to the value attached to honor, which refers to the importance of upholding an impeccable public image (Van de Meer 1984 in De Jong 2012: 88-89). Particularly the Moroccan families that came from rural areas and had no formal schooling were relatively traditional and experienced a large gap with the Dutch context in which they arrived (Pels and De Haan 2003: 51). However, these traditions were already under change before the moment of migration, only to change more since then. Tensions between Moroccan communities that originated from different regions fragmented social networks and weakened social control (p. 48). The number of children per family sharply decreased (p. 49). The father’s authority declined, partly due to ‘role reversal’, as children became mediators between their parents and outside institutions (p. 53). Girls have obtained an increasing amount of freedom to study and enter the labor market, provided that they uphold the key values of respect, chastity and family honor (p. 52). However, the shift in balance between the young and the old and between women and men that took place in practice has not been accompanied by a parallel shift in ideology (p. 54). Contrary to many ethnic Dutch parents, most Moroccan parents do not value the idea of a ‘hedonist’ youth phase, and they fear the ‘permissiveness’ of the Dutch (p. 61).

Often, in literature on sociocultural positions of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch, these groups are taken together (see for example Douwes, De Koning and Boender 2005; Nabben, Yeşilgös and Korf 2006; Pels and De Gruijter 2006). Although Turkey is a more modern and secular society than Morocco (Van Amersfoort 1986), the cultural characteristics of the Turkish immigrants, particularly those with rural backgrounds, are described in roughly similar terms (see Böcker 2000; De Vries 1995). Like among the Moroccan Dutch, many Turkish Dutch hold relatively traditional views on gender roles and family structures. Turkish family structures are often characterized by a great interdependency between the generations. Women in general have limited freedom and are subjected to high social control. Chastity and modesty are considered highly important, and many dislike the Dutch liberal attitude towards the interaction between the sexes.

Beyond these similarities, there are significant differences. Since their arrival in the Netherlands, the Turkish Dutch in general have been more strongly oriented towards their ethnic group – or rather: ethnic subgroups. Despite differences of opinion among the Turks, and despite rigid ethnic, political and religious dividing lines (Böcker 2000), for the Turkish immigrants, their country of origin and national identity have been stronger sources of bonding and pride than for their Moroccan counterparts (Nelissen and Buijs 2000). Most Moroccan immigrants had a troubled history with the Moroccan state because as Amazigh from the Rif area they were second-class citizens. Furthermore, the Moroccan immigrants were a more fragmented group than the Turkish Dutch, as Moroccan immigrants
often reconstructed the social units that existed before migration, which were based on patrilineal and regional lines, and tensions between these social units frequently occurred (Van den Berg-Eldering 1978 in Pels and De Haan 2003: 48). Whereas most Turkish immigrants shared the same Turkish language, Moroccan immigrants with different sub-ethnicities spoke different languages. This difference in cohesion is also reflected in the level of organization. The Turkish immigrants maintained cohesive communities, strong organizations that were organized along ethnic, political and religious divides, which were closely connected to the Turkish state (Böcker 2000). In the Netherlands, twice as many organizations and mosques with Turkish signatures exist as with Moroccan signatures (Van Heelsum, Fennema and Tillie 2004: 3). Furthermore, the Turkish organizations form a much more cohesive network than the Moroccan organizations (Fennema et al 2000: 17). The landscape of Turkish organizations in the Netherlands largely reflects the organizational and ideological landscape in Turkey, and many Turkish organizations are closely affiliated with the Turkish state (Sunier 1996; Yükleyen 2009), while for the organizations of Moroccans in the Netherlands, this is much less the case (Van Heelsum, Fennema and Tillie 2004; Bouras 2012). This weaker co-ethnic cohesion among the Moroccan Dutch is often seen as an explanation for a stronger orientation towards the Netherlands. This weaker cohesion is also seen as one of the causes for the relatively high rates of criminality among Moroccan Dutch (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000: 219).

**Socioeconomic position of the second generation**

While most of the first generation remained in the lower socioeconomic strata, the second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch show considerable advancement, although their averages still lag behind the averages of the ethnic Dutch. When the entire Moroccan and Turkish Dutch population are compared with the entire ethnic Dutch populations (which, as I explained in chapter 2, does not do justice to differences in class background), they show considerable arrear (see figure 4.1). For example, Turkish and Moroccan Dutch between 18 and 25 lack a ‘starter qualification’ (a diploma of middle to higher education levels; levels that are considered to have good employment perspectives) nearly twice as often as ethnic Dutch, and men nearly twice as often as women. 23% of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch young men that left school lack a starter qualification; compared with 12% of the ethnic Dutch young men. For the women these percentages are 14% and 7%) (CBS 2012: 82).

Yet, many of the younger generations of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch show strong upward mobility and are closing the gap with the ethnic Dutch. Besides those who lack a starter qualification, there is a sharp increase in the number of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch that enter higher education, which leads Crul and Doomernik to speak of a ‘polarization’ among the second generation (2003). In 2011, nearly four out of ten young adult Moroccan and Turkish Dutch men and nearly five out of ten women entered higher education (HBO or university) (see table 4.1). Only eight years earlier, in 2003/2004, among this was still roughly
three out of ten men and women (CBS 2012: 85). Roughly ten percent start at university. Although the percentages lag behind those of the ethnic Dutch, among whom nearly six out of ten enter higher education, and two out of then enter university, it is still an amount (and an increase) that cannot be ignored in assessments of ‘integration’. The idea that the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch second generation has unambiguously ‘failed’ is unjust when we look at their educational achievements at the high end of the spectrum. These figures furthermore nuance the idea of the lesser position of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch women, as in all groups, women achieve higher education levels more than men.

**Figure 4.1 Education levels**

![Education Levels Graph](image)

**Table 4.1 Inflow into higher education (in average percentages of population groups at the age of entering higher education)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moroccan Dutch</th>
<th>Turkish Dutch</th>
<th>Ethnic Dutch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entering HBO or university</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/'04</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/'12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entering university</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/'12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, Jaarrapport Integratie 2012: 85

The position of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch in the job-market is precarious, which has become particularly apparent in the current economic crisis, both for
Chapter 4

the higher and lower educated (Huijnk, Gijsberts and Dagevos 2014: 43; see also Vasta 2007). Around 10% of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch with an HBO or university diploma are unemployed, versus the 5% of the higher educated ethnic Dutch. Among the lower educated the difference is even larger. Unemployment among the lower educated Moroccan and Turkish Dutch is over 20% and 15%, respectively, while only over 5% of the lower educated ethnic Dutch are unemployed.

**Sociocultural dimensions among the second generation**

As the incorporation of immigrants is not only assessed in socioeconomic terms, but also – and as we saw, even more so – in sociocultural terms, I discuss various aspects of the sociocultural position of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch, focusing on social interactions, language and specific practices, as well as aspects that are central to the culturalist discourse and relate to normative demands placed on immigrants: religiosity and progressive norms. I compare the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch and consider developments over time. I also analyze if the higher educated differ from the lower educated. The description is partly based on the TIES data, which focuses specifically on the second generation and enables me to compare the lower and higher educated second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch. The description is furthermore based on data from the national research body SCP (Netherlands Institute for Social Research), as published in the report written by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012). This data contain longitudinal information about the first and second generations combined and some information about the differences between the first and second generations. The data of TIES and the SCP are partly complementary and partly overlapping and reveal rather similar pictures.

**Social interactions**

Moroccan and Turkish Dutch appear to have a strong social orientation towards both co-ethnics and people with other ethnic minority backgrounds, such as ethnic Dutch. This refutes the idea that a strong co-ethnic orientation precludes a strong orientation towards ethnic Dutch. When asked about the ethnicity of their three best friends, over half of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch second generation TIES respondents indicate that the majority of these three best friends are co-ethnic: 63% of the Turkish Dutch and 55% of the Moroccan Dutch respondents have two or even three best friends who are co-ethnic. 92% of the Turkish Dutch and 85% of the Moroccan Dutch who are in a relationship have a partner with a co-ethnic background. When we zoom in on their broader networks of friends, the picture is more diverse. For both categories, only 18% indicate that ‘most’ of their current friends are co-ethnic. The SCP data are rather similar. They reveal a co-ethnic focus for people who are close, such as best friends and partners (p. 60, 62), but at the same time, 74% of the second generation Moroccan Dutch and 82% of the Turkish Dutch indicate that they have a lot of contact with ethnic Dutch in their leisure time (p. 59). The majority of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch respondents indicate that they also have leisure
time contacts with people from other ethnic minority backgrounds (p. 61). The ethnic Dutch appear to lead the most segregated lives; 38% of the ethnic Dutch SCP respondents in the four largest cities (where most ethnic minorities live) hardly ever have contact with ethnic minorities (p. 63).

The Turkish Dutch second generation TIES respondents are slightly more oriented towards co-ethnic others than the Moroccan Dutch, although this difference is only significant with regards to their best friends (see values for gamma and levels of probability in Appendix B). Education level significantly influences the ethnic composition of the social network. Lower educated Moroccan and Turkish Dutch TIES respondents more often have co-ethnic friendships and a co-ethnic partner than higher educated respondents. Whereas 43% of the lower educated Moroccan and Turkish Dutch (taken together) have three best friends who are all co-ethnic, this percentage is 27% among those who attended or graduated from higher vocational education (HBO) or university. Regarding their broader network of friends, 22% of the lower educated have friends who are ‘mostly’ co-ethnic, against 10% of the higher educated. Offering an explanation, Entzinger and Doureljin point to the different compositions of the student populations at higher education levels (with relatively few ethnic minority students) and lower education levels (with relatively many ethnic minority students). The SCP data show that social contact with ethnic Dutch has not increased over the years, contrary to what we would have expected based on straight-line ideas of incorporation. The various indicators reveal that this has remained roughly the same or has (slightly) decreased (p. 53, 54, 56).

**Language**

Regarding language, we observe a development towards adaptation. The SCP data shows that the use of the Dutch language at home has steadily increased among the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch since the end of the nineties, and that their language proficiency has improved (p. 65-72). This is the case both among Moroccan and Turkish Dutch, although the Moroccan Dutch speak Dutch at home more often and report a higher proficiency (ibid.). The TIES data confirms this difference between the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch. Whereas two thirds of the Moroccan Dutch second generation respondents mostly speak Dutch with their friends (68%) and siblings (66%), this is the case for only one third of the Turkish Dutch (33% and 29%). Consequently, this difference in language use is reflected in a significant difference in proficiency: more Moroccan Dutch respondents than Turkish Dutch respondents report that they speak Dutch excellently (57% and 45% respectively). Turkish Dutch are more fluent in their parents’ language than the Moroccan Dutch; 47% of the Turkish Dutch indicate they speak their parents’ language very good or excellent, compared to 37% of the Moroccan Dutch respondents who feel this way.

Higher educated second generation TIES respondents speak Dutch more often with their friends than those who are lower educated, which is not surprising
considering the composition of their social networks. With their friends, 63% of the higher educated speak mostly Dutch, whereas among the lower educated, this percentage is 42%. This is also the case for their communication with siblings. This difference in language use is reflected in their proficiency. Higher educated respondents more positively report about their Dutch language skills than lower educated, whereas the lower educated report slightly higher proficiency in their parents’ language than the higher educated.

Other practices
When we look at other aspects, again we see that the Turkish Dutch second generation have a stronger co-ethnic orientation than the Moroccan Dutch. Second generation Turkish Dutch TIES respondents watch co-ethnic television channels more often than Moroccan Dutch respondents, they go out to places where second generation youth gathers more often, they visit the country of their parents more often, and they participate in organizations with a co-ethnic signature more often. Differences between the lower and higher educated are less pronounced. The lower educated watch co-ethnic television channels significantly more often and also participate in organizations with a co-ethnic signature significantly more.

Religiosity
Over the last decennia, the Netherlands changed from one of the worlds’ most religious societies to one of the most secular (Van Rooden 2004 in Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014: 246). In such a secular society, the religiosity of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch stands out. While, according to the SCP data, less than half of the ethnic Dutch (45%) see themselves as belonging to a religion (nearly all are Christian), among the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch, 98% and 95% respectively see themselves as religious, nearly all Islamic (p. 78). The TIES data reveal that the difference between the ethnic categories is even larger among the younger generation. 90% of the Moroccan and 88% of the Turkish Dutch TIES respondents have a religion, whereas this is only 20% among the ethnic Dutch TIES respondents. Nearly all religious second generation TIES respondents are Muslim (98% and 97%), while most of the religious ethnic Dutch respondents are Christian (82%; 11% choose the category ‘Other’). Although equal shares of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch respondents call themselves religious, the level of religiosity appears higher among the Moroccan than the Turkish Dutch. More often, Moroccan Dutch respondents totally agree with the statement that they see their religion as an important part of themselves (56% versus 48%); more often, they indicate that they pray more than once a day more often (49% versus 13%); and (slightly) more often, they agree with the view that religion should be represented in politics and society (28% versus 24%). Moroccan Dutch respondents do not visit the mosque more often. Slightly more Moroccan women wear a headscarf (42% versus 37%), but this difference is not significant. In short, on average, Moroccan Dutch and Turkish Dutch are much more religious than ethnic Dutch, and Moroccan Dutch even more so than Turkish Dutch. This is
supported by the SCP data (p. 78-81). There is no evidence that religiosity among Moroccan and Turkish Dutch is decreasing; religious attendance has even increased in the last decennium for both ethnic categories (ibid: 80).

The higher educated hardly differ from the lower educated in their religiosity. 93% of the higher educated Moroccan and Turkish Dutch second generation TIES respondents have a religion versus 89% of the lower educated. They do not significantly differ from the lower educated in the personal significance they attach to their religion, how often they pray or how often they visit the mosque. However, the lower educated want religion to be represented in politics and society more often than the higher educated, and the lower educated second generation women wear headscarves (46%) more often than the higher educated (29%).

**Progressive norms**

Moroccan and Turkish Dutch are not only more religious, but they are also more traditional than the ethnic Dutch, specifically in their attitudes regarding gender roles, homosexuality, ethical issues such as abortion and euthanasia, and ‘traditional’ values such as respect for parents, obedience, courtesy, and conservatism. The SCP data show that around a quarter of both ethnic categories agree with traditional gender statements, compared with around 10% of the ethnic Dutch (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012: 72). 28% of both ethnic minority categories approve of same-sex marriage, whereas among the ethnic Dutch respondents this is 80% (p. 76). Regarding abortion and euthanasia, Moroccan and Turkish Dutch are also more traditional than ethnic Dutch (p. 74). Another study shows that Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have much more appreciation for traditional values such as respect and obedience than ethnic Dutch (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 47).

Regarding these various norms, Moroccan Dutch are not clearly more traditional than Turkish Dutch or vice versa. It is only with regard to traditional values such as respect and obedience that the Turkish Dutch are more traditional than the Moroccan Dutch (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 47). According to the SCP data, there is no notable difference in progressiveness between the first and second generations except regarding euthanasia and abortion (ibid.: 73, 75, 76). This does not mean, however, that there are no developments over time. Measured between 1998 and 2011, the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have become (slightly) more progressive (ibid.: 73). Entzinger and Dourleijn’s data also indicate that Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have become (slightly) more progressive over time, with regards to partner choice and ‘traditional’ values such as respect and obedience. Furthermore, the data of the Integration Report 2009 (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2009) show that (children of) Turkish and Moroccan immigrants had more progressive values in 2006 than in 1998, for example with regard to ‘modern values’ such as individualization, emancipation and secularization.
Zooming in on the second generation, the TIES data show that the Moroccan and Turkish second generation respondents are more traditional than the ethnic Dutch, but the gap varies for different norms. The differences are smaller regarding gender roles than abortion and female sex before marriage (see table 4.2). It is possible that their religious interpretations leave more room for emancipation for women than for issues like abortion and sexuality. Furthermore, in all ethnic groups, the higher educated are more progressive than the lower educated. For the norms regarding gender roles, it appears that the higher educated second generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch are at least as progressive as the lower educated ethnic Dutch, sometimes even as progressive as the higher educated ethnic Dutch. This is also the case among the SCP respondents (p. 73).

Table 4.2 Answers to normative progressive statements (in % of the category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Mor Total</th>
<th>Tur Total</th>
<th>CG Total</th>
<th>Mor &amp; Tur Total</th>
<th>CG Total</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Higher</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women having sex before marriage (‘always acceptable’)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion for medical reasons (‘always acceptable’)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women with small children can work outside the house (‘(totally) agree’)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is okay if women in leading positions have authority over men (‘(totally agree)’)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study and higher education are equally important for women and men (‘(totally) agree’)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIES data for the Netherlands, 2007, NIDI and IMES

### 4.3 Summary

The Netherlands has experienced a turnaround in integration politics in the last two decennia. The Dutch landscape has become increasingly culturalist. This means that integration and citizenship – not in juridical terms but in defining who belongs and who does not – are framed in terms of the incompatibility of cultures and the defense of a ‘Dutch culture’. Increasingly, assimilative demands are placed on non-western immigrants and have become conditions for belonging. Immigrants (and their offspring) are not only required to internalize progressive cultural norms, but also to express an emotional and identificational attachment to Dutch society. The demand for moral and emotional assimilation coincides with an essentialized view that presents Islam as intrinsically incompatible with being a Dutch citizen and equates ‘Moroccan’ with being Muslim. (Although Turkish Dutch are also predominantly Muslim, they are less explicitly targeted in the political debates.) The culturalist demands have been accompanied by an increasingly exclusivist language and with a nativist conception of citizenship,
which reduces immigrants and their (grand-) children to second-class citizens. Remembering the reflections in Chapter 2 on national identities and the creation of the ethnic Other as part of the politics of the nation-state, we see that the Dutch culturalist discourse fits these political mechanisms. The national identity takes shape through defining who does not belong to the nation, the cultural Other. In the Dutch case, the divide is formulated in terms of progressiveness, contrasted with ‘the cultures’ of ethnic and religious Others, who are portrayed as backwards and intolerant and hence incompatible with European secular modernity. In other countries, similar framings have emerged, which center on the supposed incongruity of national citizenship with Islam; as Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak show based on a range of international literature (2014: 236).

The changing landscape of integration politics formed the backdrop of the lives of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and their children in the Netherlands. How are they faring in terms of their structural and sociocultural positions? In the structural domain, we see that considerable numbers of second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch overcome their lower-class backgrounds and reach high levels of education. However, due to a large percentage that remains in the lower strata, the second generation still lags behind the average of the ethnic Dutch.

Also in the sociocultural domain, the picture is characterized by variation. In some respects, we see that the differences between the ethnic Dutch and the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have slowly decreased over time. The use of the Dutch language and the levels of proficiency among the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have increased in the last decennium. Furthermore, the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch have become slightly more progressive over time, although they are still substantially less progressive than the average ethnic Dutch. This is also the case when we focus solely on the second generation. With regard to religiosity and social relations, the figures show no developments. Religion plays an important role in the lives of the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch, also for the second generation. This strongly contrasts with the ethnic Dutch, who are relatively secular. The Moroccan and Turkish Dutch combine a strong social orientation towards co-ethnics with friendships and frequent leisure time contact with people from other ethnic backgrounds, such as ethnic Dutch.

We should be careful with generalizations. Despite the commonalities between the Moroccan and Turkish Dutch, Turkish Dutch on average show a stronger co-ethnic sociocultural orientation than the Moroccan Dutch. On the other hand, Moroccan Dutch appear to be more religious; however, they are not notably more or less progressive. These pictures also apply when we solely focus on the second generation. Next to ethnic background, education level also makes a difference. For example, the higher educated have more friendships with ethnic Dutch, report a higher usage of the Dutch language and better Dutch language skills. In all ethnic groups, including the ethnic Dutch, the higher educated are more
progressive than the lower educated. Among the second generation, this particularly applies to gender roles and traditional values such as respect and obedience. The higher educated second generation sometimes even equals (or surpasses) the average levels of progressiveness among the ethnic Dutch.

In my view, the assumption that a country really needs attitudinal uniformity among all its citizens needs serious reconsideration. Nevertheless, those who propagate cultural assimilation out of fear that an incongruence of different cultures impedes the incorporation of people with Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds, can feel somewhat reassured. Conceptions of ‘the’ Moroccan and Turkish cultures as static and incongruent are contradicted by the differences between the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch (the latter are more negatively portrayed but actually show a smaller sociocultural distance), the shifts over time, and the differences between the lower and higher educated. These observations refute the idea that a ‘cultural distance’ is an inherent reality for all Muslims, and that ‘Muslims’ form a homogeneously traditional group. In the next chapters, I further explore the affiliations and orientations of the higher educated second generation Moroccan and Turkish Dutch.