International migration and multilevel governance in Europe

Penninx, R.

Published in:
10 observations on the future of migration: costs, benefits and policy responses

Citation for published version (APA):
OBSERVATIONS on the Future of Migration

Costs, Benefits and Policy Responses

Veronika Bilger, Sabine Klinglmair and Martin Hofmann (Editor)
Rainer Münz, August Gächter, Eleonore Kofman, Mariyana Radeva Berket, Rinus Penninx, Didier Ruedin, Gianni D’Amato, Marco Martiniello, Bernhard Perchinig, Andrew Geddes, Oliver Bakewell
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>Peter Widermann</td>
<td><em>Foreword</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>Veronika Bilger</td>
<td><em>Introduction</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Executive Summary</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Migration in the 21st Century</td>
<td>Rainer Münz</td>
<td><em>Migration in the 21st Century</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Impact of Future Economic and Demographic Disparities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Grappling with supply and demand</td>
<td>August Gächter</td>
<td><em>Grappling with supply and demand</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Present and future labour market needs, and labour and skills demands in specific countries, sectors and occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Gender Structures in International Migration Processes</td>
<td>Eleonore Kofman</td>
<td><em>Gender Structures in International Migration Processes</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Labour Exploitation and Trafficking for Labour Exploitation</td>
<td>Mariyana Radeva Berket</td>
<td><em>Labour Exploitation and Trafficking for Labour Exploitation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trends and Challenges for Policy Making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Migration and Multilevel Governance in Europe
Rinus Penninx

Immigrant integration, public acceptance and social cohesion
Didier Ruedin & Gianni D’Amato

Migration and citizenship in Europe
Political participation, mobilisation and representation
Marco Martiniello

Migration and the Welfare State
Trends, Challenges and Contradictions
Bernhard Perchinig

Climate change, conflict and displacement
Consequences for international protection
Andrew Geddes

Maximizing the benefits of migration for countries of origin, destination and migrants alike
Oliver Bakewell
While Europe used to be predominantly an emigration continent until and including the 1950s, it has become an immigration continent since then. The number of foreign-born residents rose from an estimated 23 million in 1985 (United Nations 1998: 1) to more than 56 million, or 7.7 per cent of the total European population, in 2000. When we look specifically at the European Union (at present 28 members), these figures are higher: according to Eurostat, in 2011 nearly 49 million of the total of 504 million inhabitants of the EU (some 10%) were born outside the country where they presently live (Eurostat 2012: 1). These figures include only the legally residing foreign-born persons.

Historically, immigration started in the countries of North-Western Europe. Other countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland, which used to be emigration countries until the 1980s, started to experience significant immigration in the 1990s and 2000s. Still other countries, among them most of the new EU Member States that acceded in 2004 or after, are experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time. Europe has de facto become an immigration continent.
The pattern of origin of migrants in Europe has changed in the course of time. Up to the 1980s, migrants could conveniently be grouped under three headings: a) migration with a colonial background that connected certain European countries to their former colonies; b) labour migration that connected a number of `recruiting countries' to a limited number of `sending countries', and c) refugee migration that was strongly dominated by migration from Eastern to Western Europe. In terms of the origins of immigrants this led to geographical patterns of migration that embraced Europe and the Mediterranean countries, plus a limited number of (former) colonies. That picture has changed completely since the 1980s. The new geography of migration shows immigrants coming to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: (posted) expatriates working for multinational companies and international organisations, skilled workers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum seekers from African, Near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, students from China, and undocumented workers from African countries, just to single out some of the major immigrant categories.

Another recent characteristic is the feminization of labour migration. The gender patterns of labour migration have changed significantly: higher rates of women are migrating independently for labour purposes, and not as dependants for family reunification. This corresponds to a significant extent with the development of specific labour market niches, such as domestic services, care and nursing, and the sex industry.

The new migration to Europe is not only much more diverse in origin, the type of mobility has also changed significantly in the globalised context: increased short-term stays like those for seasonal work in agriculture or tourism, for study, and sunbelt migration of pensioners, but also longer stays by employees of international organisations, multinational enterprises and highly-skilled people in general. One could bring these migrants together under the category of the "wanted" travellers and movers. Their mobility is facilitated, if not promoted. But there are also unsolicited others who independently decide to look for an economically better and/or politically safer new destination to move to. Paradoxically, for this category of migrants national borders and the sovereign right of states to decide on admission of non-nationals have gained importance. For the non-invited migrants, new and higher barriers have been erected.
UNWILLING IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES:
NATIONAL REACTIONS TO IMMIGRATION

A predominant characteristic of European states is that they have consistently defined themselves as non-immigration countries in the very period when Europe has de facto become a continent of immigration. Any rhetoric about being a ‘nation of immigrants’, as is usual in classic immigration countries like Canada, Australia and the United States, has been completely absent in Europe. On the contrary, consistent and explicitly anti-immigration rhetoric has been a constant factor in Europe, despite the fact that quite a few European countries in recent decades have had higher immigration rates than, for example, the United States of America.

This particular framing has had pervasive consequences, above all with regard to how the de facto immigration has been perceived and labelled. Many newcomers received special labels that legitimised their arrival, but they were not called immigrants. In the Netherlands, for example, the sizeable group of immigrants from the former Dutch Indies following the independence of Indonesia in 1949 came to the Netherlands under the label of ‘repatriates’, the workers from the Mediterranean area were defined as ‘guest workers’, expressing the intended temporary nature of their stay, and the migrants from Surinam (Dutch Guyana) and the Dutch Antillean islands in the West were (until 1975) ‘Overzeese Rijksgenoten’ (fellow overseas citizens, part of the Dutch Kingdom). In Germany, the inflows from the East in the decades after WWII were received under the labels Übersiedler (from the GDR to the FRG) or Aussiedler (in principle Germans who had settled elsewhere in the past) ‘coming home’ or refugees; and there was the significant category of Gastarbeiter whose label indicated the expectation that their stay would only be temporary.

A consequence of countries defining themselves as a non-immigration country was that after the first oil crisis of 1973 increasingly restrictive admission

---

1 Jeroen Doomernik & Michael Jandl (eds) (2008), Modes of Migration Regulation and Control in Europe. IMISCOE Reports. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
2 In 2011, eight of the 27 EU countries had a higher percentage of foreign-born residents than the USA had in 2010. See: Eurostat (2012), Population and social conditions. Statistics in focus 31/2012 for statistics on foreign and foreign-born population in EU and EFTA countries). The latest figure for the foreign-born population in the USA, based on the 2010 Census, amounted to 12.9 % (‘The Foreign-Born Population in the United States 2010’. American Community Reports, May 2012).
3 Some 300,000 came from the former Dutch Indies between 1945 and 1962; most of them had never been ‘in patria’ before.
policies were introduced, to start with mainly for ‘economic migrants’ (i.e. the guest workers). This was justified initially by the decrease in demand for migrants, particularly lower-skilled ones. But the de facto closure to new migrant workers also caused an increase in supply-driven migration. This supply-driven migration presented itself firstly (in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s) in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and France, particularly under the policy category of ‘family reunion’ (and ‘family formation’) of the temporary workers, whose supposedly temporary stay was taking on the characteristics of more permanent settlement. Return to their home country was not an attractive option, notwithstanding the sticks and carrots that were offered, particularly in Germany under the Return Promotion Programmes of the late 1970s and 1980s.

From the mid-1980s onwards, a new supply-driven migration announced itself in Western European countries in the form of asylum seekers. This increasing inflow of unsolicited newcomers culminated in the early 1990s in the ‘asylum crisis’\(^4\) and provoked new restrictive measures and controls on entrance and admission. These restrictions in turn led to a spiralling rise of ‘innovative’ new forms of entrance, like smuggling and trafficking, which in turn generated new control-oriented requirements and procedures (for asylum and family migration). New dynamics thus developed, and new actors were brought into play\(^5\). Immigration was increasingly criminalised, as the tougher regulations by definition led to more illegality and irregularity. International political terrorism, furthermore, brought migrants into focus from a security perspective\(^6\). Migration thus became associated first and foremost with problems and threats and as such has risen to the top of the political agenda in many EU countries in recent times.

The ideology of not being an immigration country also had consequences for settlement and integration policies. North-West European countries ‘solved’ the contradiction – of not being countries of immigration, while simultaneously receiving significant inflows – by defining these migrants either as a priori members of society, as in the case of the ‘repatriates’ in the Netherlands and

---

\(^4\) In the four years from 1990 to 1993 the number of new asylum applications surpassed an annual level of 400,000 in the European Union.

\(^5\) See, for example, Ilse van Liempt (2007), Navigating Borders: Inside Perspectives on the Process of Human Smuggling into the Netherlands. IMISCOE Dissertations. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

\(^6\) For an analysis of parliamentary debates on increasing controls on immigration in the UK and the FRG, see Bastian Vollmer (2010), Policy Discourses on Irregular Migration in Germany and the United Kingdom, 1973-1999. PhD dissertation. Amsterdam: Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam.
Übersiedler or Aussiedler in Germany, or defining them as ‘temporary guests’. In the former case, full citizenship was offered (in the Dutch case, it was even a condition for admission) and a fully-fledged reception programme aiming at speedy re-integrative assimilation was put in place. In the latter case of the guest workers, however, it meant limited facilities for accommodation in anticipation of their eventual return. For this sizeable group of ‘guests’, time increasingly created a contradiction of expectations: many guest workers actually stayed for good and formed communities that grew by using their right to bring in their families and spouses. Most governments in Europe that had recruited guest workers, however, maintained the illusion of return until the turn of the century and confined themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures, leaving the responsibility of integration in practice to organisations in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations.

The picture of migration and related policies that I have outlined here is strongly based on developments in the Western European countries. South European states have a much more recent experience of immigration and integration. For most of the twelve new members of the European Union that acceded in 2004 or later, the topic of migration and integration is relatively new and takes multiple forms: emigration, immigration and transit migration co-exist in most of these countries.

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S MIGRATION PARADOX

The preceding general description of the development of migration and migration policies in Europe is based on (nation-)states as basic units of analysis. But there have also been significant supranational forces in Europe that have influenced international migration in a unique way. They stem from a 60-year process of gradual economic and political integration in Europe that started as

---


8 See for example Richard Black, Godfried Engbersen, Marek Okolski & Christina Pantiru (eds) (2010), A Continent Moving West? EU Enlargement and Labour Migration from Central and Eastern Europe. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, and Marek Okolski (ed.) (2012), European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Interestingly, such a situation has also developed in so-called ‘sending states’ like Morocco and Turkey. For Turkey see Ahmet İçduyu & Kemal Kirisci (eds) (2009), Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press.
early as 1951, when the Treaty of Paris instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)\(^9\), which developed into the European Economic Community (EEC) by means of the 1968 Treaty of Rome and to the European Community (EC) established by the Single European Act of 1985. What was crucial in these developments from our point of view was that the free circulation of (initially) workers and (later all) citizens of (the growing number of) Member States became an essential element of an internal market. The Single European Act foresaw the removal of all physical, technical and fiscal barriers to be implemented by 31 December 1992 between by then 12 Member States. Such an opening up (de facto abolition) of internal borders, however, meant that the Community would henceforth share a common external border. That in turn meant that visa policies, admission of third-country nationals and asylum policy should be coordinated. The decision to abolish internal borders necessitated common policies towards third-country nationals: however, Member States were hesitant to give up their sovereignty in this domain, although the upcoming “asylum crisis” and the pressures of supply-driven migration in general pushed some states towards common (restrictive) policies\(^10\).

In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU) as the successor of the EC. The EU created a European Union citizenship and granted full freedom of movement to all citizens of Member States. It completed the earlier developments towards free movement between Member States in the sense that all obstacles to such movements were taken away and equal access to facilities was guaranteed. Moving between Member States within the borders of the EU, which used to be defined as international migration, had effectively become internal migration. Under this new regime the EU expanded further to 15 states in 1995.

However, the complete freedom of movement and the de facto abolition of borders within the EU had also made it necessary to coordinate Member States’ policies relating to the admission of third-country nationals. The Amsterdam

---

\(^9\) Goedings made a detailed historical analysis of the origins of the free circulation of workers in the early period of economic cooperation in Europe from the 1951 Treaty of Paris until the 1968 Treaty of Rome, showing that it has been Italy in particular that has consistently pressured negotiations to include the free circulation of workers: see Simone Goedings (2005), Labor Migration in an Integrating Europe. National Migration Policies and the Free Movement of Workers, 1950-1968. The Hague: SDU.

\(^10\) Five countries (France, the FRG and the Benelux countries) were moving quickly towards open borders and already in July 1985 signed the Schengen Treaty, which envisaged a system of international border controls and checks, a common asylum procedure and information exchanges on asylum and unwanted migrants, to be implemented by 1 January, 1990. The Schengen model later became the standard for the EU.
Treaty of 1997 specifically stipulated that five years after its ratification (i.e. by May 2004) asylum and migration should have become communitarian policy (thus being moved from the third pillar of intergovernmental collaboration to the first pillar of communitarian EU governance) and that existing policies and practices would have been harmonised. This goal was reaffirmed at the Tampere Summit of ministers responsible for such policies in 1999, which also formulated the explicit ambition that third-country nationals who are long-term residents should be granted rights that come as close as possible to those of EU citizens.

Indeed, by May 2004 agreements of two kinds had been reached\textsuperscript{11}. The first amounted to a synchronization of restrictive policies aimed at combating illegal immigration and keeping potential asylum seekers at bay, together with the harmonization of asylum policies. The Schengen Agreement and Dublin Convention had at that stage been made part of Community law. These new policies – represented by the great majority of Directives developed between 1999 and 2004 – focused on the perceived problematic nature of (unsolicited) immigration by third-country nationals and tended to develop restrictive immigration policies reflecting the lowest common denominator of the member states. The second kind – represented by a small set of EU directives – served to improve the position of third-country immigrants. They included a directive on the immigrants’ right to family reunification\textsuperscript{12} and on their free movement between Member States (after five years of legal residence)\textsuperscript{13}. On balance, as observers have remarked, the interests of the member states have been served much better in the harmonization process than those of the immigrant EU residents\textsuperscript{14}.

In summary, the European Union has become a significant new political and policy unit at the supranational level, which has created completely new regimes for international mobility and migration in Europe. On the one hand, the early (Western European) EU members have transposed their national policies into common restrictive admission policies in relation to potential immigrants

\textsuperscript{14} See Van Selm & Tsolakis op. cit. According to Groenendijk & Minderhoud (2004, 139 ff) some 50 proposals for Directives were made during the first four years after the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999. Of these 50, only 23 became binding regulations. These 23 relate to borders and visa (11), illegal immigration and expulsion (6), asylum (5), and only one to legal migration. The topics on this list reflect the dominant preoccupation with control-oriented migration regulation at the EU level.
(economic migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers) from non-EU countries. Furthermore, they have made these policies the 'standard' for new members of the Union: the acquis requires the new members to build legislation and institutions in conformity with established EU policies in this domain. This strand of EU policies has been characterized by critics as the 'Fortress Europe policies'.

On the other hand, the EU created a fundamental right to move and settle within the EU area for EU citizens and long-term third-country residents of its Member States. The total area of free movement in the EU now covers 28 countries with a total population of more than half a billion inhabitants, about 10% of whom were born outside their country of residence. An increasing share of these immigrants are “internal EU migrants”. This increase is due on the one hand to the fact that citizens from new accessor states resident in other EU states change status at accession: from TCN to citizen of a Member State. On the other hand, we see that in the last decade immigration of TCNs in the EU has decreased, while immigration of citizens of Member States has increased (Eurostat 2011: 16-18; Urso & Schuster 2011). The financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s has reinforced the dominance of intra-EU migration. Germany is a strong case in this respect (Sachverständigenrat 2013: 54 ff): while in 2004 the number of new immigrants in the FRG was divided approximately 50/50 among those coming from the 26 EU partners and TCNs, this percentage shifted gradually to 63.4% from EU countries and 36.6% TCNs in 2011. Recent immigration figures of other Member States also indicate such a trend towards stronger internal EU migration. The sharp increase in unemployment in the Southern EU countries and Ireland may further contribute to this in the near future.

THE LABYRINTH OF EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION POLICIES

We have seen above that in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s there was a growing contradiction between the facts of immigration and the norm of not being an immigration country. In some cases this tension led to early, strongly rights-based integration policies, covering not only the socio-economic but also the political and cultural spheres of life, such as those of Sweden (since the mid-1970s) and the Netherlands (since the early 1980s). Most national governments in Europe

15 Urso & Schuster 2011, p. 17: “Another trend (...) is the increasing percentage of EU nationals among migrants. In absolute terms, they have registered the highest increase, namely 470,000 (+ 3.8%), which is in line with the continuous growth in previous years (= 13.3% from 2008 to 2011)”. 
that had recruited guest workers, however, maintained the illusion of return till after 2000 and confined themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures, leaving the responsibility for integration in practice to the local level of cities and to organisations in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations.

When, in the increasingly politicised climate of the late 1990s and 2000s, integration policies at the national level were finally introduced in those countries, the term integration started to take on a different, specific meaning. Where earlier policy conceptions, such as those used in Sweden and the Netherlands, had been rights-based and aimed at structural integration, the new conception focused increasingly on cultural integration as an obligation for immigrants: cultural and value-based commonalities were thought to be essential for social cohesion. Acquisition of citizenship – which had been seen earlier in Swedish and Dutch policies as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration – was now increasing redefined as the crowning element of a finalised process of cultural adaptation. This new cultural conception of integration for migrants also led to questions of how the society into which newcomers (should) ‘integrate’ essentially defined itself. The claims and outcomes of such discussions about the ‘identity’ of receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, secular, equal, enlightened, etc.) were translated into civic integration requirements and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. The latest developments – compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as those developed in the Netherlands – extend this logic even further: under the pretext of integration, such courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective.

These developments in national contexts, plus the double-edged migration policy described before, form the backdrop and at the same time the determinants of EU integration policies: a set of policy initiatives that is different from both national and local integration policies in several respects. I will characterise these EU integration policies on the basis of six points: the genesis of their formal definition, their target group, the status of their policy making and implementation, their strategies and funds and their organisational setting.

---


17 See, for example, Elspeth Guild, Kees Groenendijk & Sergio Carrera (eds) (2009), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU. Farnham: Ashgate.

First of all, integration was defined in a rather limited manner in the early phase. In fact, until 2003 EU policies started out from the implicit assumption that if the legal position of immigrants were equal (as far as possible, as the Tampere programme stipulated) to that of national citizens and if adequate instruments were in place to combat discrimination, integration processes could be left to societal forces. Thus, legal integration (= equality) was to be ensured by means of the directives on family reunification and free movement after five years on the one hand, and by comprehensive anti-discrimination directives on the other.

It was only in 2003 that the European Commission came up with a more comprehensive view on integration policies in its Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (EC COM (2003) 336 final). This Communication defined integration as follows: “it is a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-countries nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant’s full participation”. Integration is conceived as a “balance of rights and obligations”. The holistic approach of policies targets all dimensions of integration (economic, social and political rights, cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and participation). In November 2004, the Council of Ministers responsible for integration agreed on the Common Basic Principles (CBP) for integration as a first step towards a common framework for a European approach to immigrant integration and a point of reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies.

Secondly, however, this shift from a narrow initial conception to – in principle and on paper – a very broad conception of integration goes together with a continuation of the limited definition of the target group that comes directly from migration policies: integration policies are supposed to be for third-country nationals only. Immigrants (or long-term residents) who are citizens of EU Member States do not belong to the target group. They are supposed to be integrated by definition (an assumption that has been criticised recently by local authorities in regions that received many new immigrants from accessor states after the enlargements of 2004 (Poland) and 2007 (Rumania and Bulgaria)).

Thirdly, the foregoing two points raise the question of what the status of EU policies is: while migration policies are communitarian policies (first pillar), integration policies are intergovernmental policies (third pillar). This means that policies have to be decided upon by consensus of Member States and that there is no binding legislation and directives. On many aspects of the broad
concept of integration, like social security, education, housing and health, national governments vehemently defend their sovereignty. Integration policies at the EU level are thus clearly `soft' policies and bound/limited to what national governments allow them to be.

Fourthly, this means that the mechanisms of policy making and implementation are quite different from those for migration policies. A special method, called the “open method of co-ordination” (OMC) has been adopted in the field of integration policies since 2003. National strategy reports are an important tool within the OMC strategy in which each Member State reports on priorities for and achievements of national policies. The Common Basic Principles mentioned above are another (paper) tool of the OMC strategy. Furthermore, specific internal and external monitoring instruments, such as the European Migration Network and MIPEX, have been developed together with mechanisms for the exchange of policy expertise (handbooks, integration website).

Fifthly, apart from the paperwork related to the framing and formulation of EU policies, the European Commission has managed to get agreement on some practical tools for concrete action. From 2004-2006 the INTI programme (Integration of Third-Country Nationals) financed action and research, followed by the much more substantial funding earmarked from 2007 till 2013: the European Integration Fund (EIF) and – especially to compensate states for their efforts regarding the reception and integration of refugees – the European Refugee Fund (ERF). These funds are important for the European Commission as a policy maker, since they create direct relations between the EU and local and regional authorities (and their policies) on the one hand, and non-governmental civil society partners on all levels on the other.

Sixthly, there is the very specific internal organisational setting of EU integration policies: on the one hand, there is DG Freedom, Security and Justice (also responsible for migration policies) which particularly targets the early reception and integration of recent newcomers, refugees and accepted asylum seekers, but also third-country nationals until they have become long-term residents. It is in this particular part of EU policies that Western European countries have increasingly `uploaded' their cultural integration requirements for new third-country immigrants into EU integration policies. What started in

---

19 Hannelore Goeman uses this term in her analysis of the constitution of integration policies at the EU level: Goeman, 2012. See also Guild et al. 2009.
the Netherlands as a voluntary programme in the 1990s and soon thereafter became mandatory in Denmark has rapidly gained currency in other EU Member States: mandatory integration courses and subsequent testing for those third-country nationals who wish to settle. Sanctions to enforce the mandatory character can be found in the withholding of residence rights and administrative fines. The broad concept of integration set forth in the 2003 Communication and the Common Basic Principles is interpreted in a very specific and narrow manner in this part of EU policies.

On the other hand, there is a second setting from which integration is promoted: the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Its programmes aim to promote social inclusion and cohesion and its sizeable funding is – again – used quite extensively by local and regional authorities (and their policies) on the one hand, and non-governmental civil society partners on all levels on the other. Equality and anti-discrimination are key concepts (and one reason why the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and its successor the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) were related to this DG). Target groups include immigrants but equally ethnic minorities and the disabled. The priority domains are (equal access to and long-term integration into) employment, education, housing and health.

**LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICIES:**
**CITIES AND THEIR NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONNECTIONS**

Local integration policies have always been in the shadow of national integration policies, or overshadowed by the absence of the latter. This basically has to do with the fact that migration policies (decisions on who is allowed to enter and stay) are national policies. If immigration policy is followed by a national integration policy, as happened in an early phase in Sweden and the Netherlands, then local integration policies are stimulated and facilitated by such national policies. That is why Dutch and Swedish cities do have a longer history of local integration policies.

But – as we have seen – de facto immigration is not necessarily followed by an integration policy at the national level: most Western European countries did have sizeable immigration but no national integration policies till the turn of the century. Nevertheless, immigrants do settle somewhere in cities and municipalities and these might have developed integration policies, even in the
absence of national policies, as is evidenced by Birmingham and Bradford in the UK, Berlin and Frankfurt in the FRG, Vienna in Austria or the cities of Zurich, Bern and Basel in Switzerland, to give just a few examples (Penninx 2009).

Whatever the history of local integration policies, a common characteristic during the last decade is that tensions have developed between cities and national governments on issues on which national and local policies clash. Such clashes may relate to different views on how to implement (restrictive) immigration policies: how to handle illegal migrants in practice? How to implement restrictions on access to facilities and services in the domains of employment, housing, education and health to combat illegal residence? Clashes may also relate to the new early reception, the civic integration courses, and the increased cultural requirements for continued residence and for naturalisation: where national policies may be quite ideological on such matters, local policy practitioners tend to look for feasible practical solutions that are acceptable to immigrant communities. Tensions also arise when the financing of integration facilities is at stake, particularly when national policies prescribe new action, but do not deliver the financial and other resources needed to implement it.

Cities do not always win such battles, but at the same time, city governments may use their discretionary power – avoiding national public debate when possible – to gain more room to manoeuvre and they may use their own resources. What such tensions make clear is that the interests at stake in integration policies and their implementation may differ substantially, or be perceived as different, at the local and national level. At the city level, the confrontation with the day-to-day consequences of immigration is far more direct, and the implications of policies are more immediately felt, especially by immigrants. Any serious attempts by local government to cope with integration of immigrants, or – in more positive terms used increasingly by cities – to maximise the opportunities inherent in immigration, are sure to bring pressure to bear at the national level. A significant proportion of the European metropolitan areas and cities are increasingly aware that they need long-term, consistent integration policies in order to preserve their viability as community entities and their liveability for all their residents.

During the last decade, cities that are active in integration policies have developed significant new relations outside their national context, particularly in the form of networks of cities that exchange knowledge and practical experiences regarding local integration policies. Interestingly, apart from being primarily
cross-national horizontal forms of cooperation between cities, they all have a strong connection with the European Commission. The three most important are:

› The CLIP Network (Cities for Local Integration Policies). Set up in 2006, it consists of some 30 European cities that systematically exchange knowledge and practice on local integration policies at regular conferences. Research material on the policies of all the cities is collected by a consortium of research institutes. It was funded from 2006 to 2012 by the European Foundation (http://www.europfound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip.htm).

› Integrating Cities: This project (also set up in 2006) is run by the Working Group on Migration and Integration of EUROCITIES, a large network of some 140 major European cities. Integrating Cities is seen as a policy dialogue between EUROCITIES and the European Commission through the INTEGRATING CITIES Conference series, the EUROCITIES Charter on Integrating Cities, the EU-funded projects INTI-CITIES, DIVE, MIXITIES as well as initiatives by EUROCITIES' Working Group on Migration and Integration (www.integratingcities.eu/).

› Intercultural Cities: this is a joint initiative by the Council of Europe and the European Commission, started in 2008. It emerged from the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue which the Council of Europe contributed to the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in that same year. The Intercultural Cities strategy based on that research is a management strategy that publicly advocates respect for diversity and a pluralistic city identity. The Intercultural Cities Programme was developed and first applied in 11 European pilot cities and has evolved further since then. The Programme develops tools such as the Intercultural Cities Index for cities to evaluate and develop their policies, and organises international conferences for cities to exchange experience (http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/Cities/).

More specific horizontal cooperation initiatives are also in place, such as EC-CAR (the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism), established in 2004 at the initiative of UNESCO. The aim of this coalition of cities is to share experiences in order to improve policies to fight racism, discrimination and xenophobia. 104 municipalities from 22 European countries have joined the network and adopted the "Ten Point Plan of Action".
THE MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION: CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

The foregoing analysis has shown, first of all, that mobility of people across national boundaries has become a prominent feature in Europe and that, as a consequence, the population of European societies, and particularly of its cities, has become more diverse.

Secondly, it has shown that these two phenomena have become significant issues for governmental agencies at several levels: where initially national governments had a monopoly on the politics of international migration, the European Union has become a significant actor, introducing new notions of migration (TCN-international and EU-internal) with different regimes and statuses. When it comes to integration, the picture is even more complex: where initially there were few examples of explicit national integration policies and thus it was primarily local governments which had to deal with the presence of immigrants, national governments and EU agents have now launched integration policies, each with their own specific definition of the concept of integration, of target groups and the aims of such policies. Local governments are now revising (or being forced to revise) their position in relation to these new policy actors: new oppositions – between national and local governments – and new coalitions – between local and EU agents – are being introduced. In the descriptive sense, the multilevel character of policies has clearly expanded, simply because more levels have involved themselves in these policies. If one were to have a more normative definition of multilevel governance – in the sense that policy action should be coordinated, complementary and mutually supporting between levels – than the multilevel character is presently quite problematic. The foregoing descriptive analysis demonstrated, for example, that in integration policies the European Commission circumvents national governments by working directly with cities, while national governments have uploaded their new cultural integration policies to the EU level and prescribe it to the local level.

What can we say about the future on the basis of this analysis? Firstly, what is likely to be the future of cross-national mobility and international migration? In my view there is no reason to expect a decrease in mobility in the short and medium term: the fundamental, long-term causes of migration to Europe – the demographic profile of an aging and soon decreasing population combined with a relatively prosperous and economically viable society – will remain with
us in the coming decades. Europe will need immigrants and Europe will remain an attractive destination in the coming decades.

Secondly, I also expect that the (rhetorical) resistance to immigration that has been characteristic of Europe from the beginning and which has recently manifested itself in greater demands for cultural integration of immigrants will continue to exist in the near future. Nowadays it is part of relatively strong nationalistic and anti-EU sentiments, fed by the financial and economic crisis. However, as in the past, such rhetorical resistance will be not be able to stop or even decrease international migration. It may lead to a ‘re-labelling’ or redefinition of parts of the migration flows (as happened in the enlarging EU) or mobility flows may temporarily shift to more internal EU migration than immigrants from non-EU countries (as is happening now).

What policy responses are to be expected then? If one accepts the conclusions I made above on the multilevel governance of migration and integration on the descriptive level (yes, more levels involved, more complex) and on the normative level (not having the same definitions, target groups, tools, resources; not necessarily coordinated, complementary and mutually supporting), it is difficult to see how that would change in the short term. What governments do at different levels is bound to a certain extent to how migration and integration manifest themselves on these levels and the political pressures that work on these respective levels. The best one can do is work on the principle of consistency and complementarity of action at different levels (or, negatively formulated, the absence of conflicting policy aims and instruments). Defining the common interests for all levels is the best starting point for concerted action.

---

**AUTHOR**

Rinus Penninx has been Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam since 1993, where he founded the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES). From 1999–2009, he was the European co-chair of International Metropolis. In 2004 he coordinated the Network of Excellence IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe) and in 2009 he founded its independent successor, the IMISCOE Research Network, for which he continues to work. Most of his present research work is on immigrant organisations, migration and integration policies at the EU level, and local integration policies.