European Cities and their Migrant Integration Policies
A State of the Art Study for the Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING) Project

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KING Project – Social Science Unit
Overview Paper n.5/July 2014
KING - Knowledge for INtegration Governance

The KING project is co-funded by the European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, under the Action HOME/2012-2013/EIFX/CA/CFP/4000004268. Start date: 15 September 2013; end date: 15 March 2015.

The KING project’s objective is to elaborate a report on the state of play of migrant integration in Europe through an interdisciplinary approach and to provide decision- and policy-makers with evidence-based recommendations on the design of migrant integration-related policies and on the way they should be articulated between different policy-making levels of governance.

Migrant integration is a truly multi-faceted process. The contribution of the insights offered by different disciplines is thus essential in order better to grasp the various aspects of the presence of migrants in European societies. This is why multidisciplinarity is at the core of the KING research project, whose Advisory Board comprises experts of seven different disciplines:

- EU Policy – Yves Pascouau
- Political Science - Alberto Martinelli
- Public Administration – Walter Kindermann
- Social Science – Rinus Penninx
- Applied Social Studies – Jenny Phillimore
- Economics – Martin Kahanec & Alessandra Venturini
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The project consists in the conduct of preliminary Desk Research to be followed by an empirical in-depth analysis of specific key topics identified within the desk research. To carry out these two tasks, each Advisory Board member chose and coordinated a team of two to five researchers, who have been assigned a range of topics to cover.

The present paper belongs to the series of contributions produced by the researchers of the “Social Science” team directed by Professor Rinus Penninx:

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- “Immigrants’ equal access and equal use: A review of local policies in the domains of health care, housing, education and the labour market” by Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
- “Local policies as cultural integration and social cohesion policies” by Patrycja Matusz-Protasiewicz
- “The legal and political dimension of local integration policies” by Tiziana Caponio
- A Bibliography of Scientific Literature on Integration Policies of European Cities by Hannah Schwarz
The project is coordinated by the ISMU Foundation, based in Milan (Italy).

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This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
European Cities and Their Migrant Integration Policies

1. INTRODUCTION

The KING project’s objective is to elaborate a report regarding immigrant integration issues in Europe through a multidisciplinary approach. The purpose is to offer a state of play of migrant integration in order to better consider future options for policy making supported by evidence based analysis.

Within the Social Science team, the team leader took the initiative to develop a strategy for a systematic review of the literature – the State of the Art report. This strategy and the tools to be used are developed in the next section of this report (chapter 2): an analytical definition of the concept of integration (in par. 2.1), the approach to the study of policies relating to migrant integration (in par. 2.2.).

In section 3 an outline of the historical context of the development of local migrant integration policies is given: the emergence of such policies in West European cities, their different relation with national integration policies and since the turn of the century their new relations with European Union integration policies. The increasingly multi-level governance of migrant integration is a context that should be analyzed to understand recent orientations of European cities (in 3.3.).

The state-of-the-Art of local integration policies itself is painted in three consecutive sections. Each of these sections focuses on one of the three dimensions of integration policies as the main focus of local policies: section 4 looks at the legal/political dimension of integration policies of cities with a specific view on immigrant organizations. Section 5 looks at local policies as structural integration policies in the hard socioeconomic domains of work and income, of housing, of education and of health. And section 6 focuses on local policies as cultural integration and social cohesion policies.

2. HOW TO STUDY INTEGRATION PROCESSES AND POLICIES THAT WANT TO STEER SUCH PROCESSES?

The scientific study of the process of settlement of newcomers in a society has a long history and has been using different concepts such as adaptation, acculturation, assimilation, accommodation, incorporation, absorption. These concepts differ in a number of aspects:

• in the perspective from which they look and the object of study: do they study primarily or solely the newcomers and (changes in) their ideas and behaviour (adaptation, acculturation, assimilation), or is the receiving society and its reactions to newcomers central in the analysis (accommodation, incorporation, absorption as forms of inclusion, or the negative counterpart: exclusion).
• in the dimensions of the process of settlement: is the legal and political dimension of becoming a part of the new society central (Are residents legal? Are immigrants citizens or aliens? Etc.) Or is the socio-
economic dimension of participation in the hard domains of work/income, housing, education and health the most important? Or is the ethnic/cultural/religious dimension central in the concept (is the process of settlement primarily perceived in terms of difference and sameness of immigrants and natives?). The adaptation, acculturation and assimilation concepts refer predominantly to the latter dimension, while accommodation, incorporation, absorption refers primarily to the former two dimensions.

- in the level of analysis: if the perspective is predominantly focusing on the newcomers, this may be done by studying primarily the process of settlement at the level of individual newcomers, their attitudes, behaviour adaptation and the individual level of natives and their perceptions of, and attitudes and behaviour towards newcomers. It may also be studied at the collective level: groups of newcomers that share a background and migration history may have organized themselves in the new society; and civil society of the receiving society and its organization react to organizations of newcomer. And it may be studied at the institutional level, asking the question whether immigrant collectives have established their specific institutions in the new society (such as for their religion). And conversely, a crucial question is how important institutions of the receiving society react to newcomers, including or excluding them, and if they include them, is this done on the basis of equality or not?

In the scientific literature integration as a key concept in the study of the process of settlement is relatively new. It has been introduced in continental Europe since the 1970s as an alternative for the terms mentioned above. An important reason to introduce this new term was to avoid the negative political connotations of earlier terms, particularly assimilation. Key authors who have used and defined integration as a broad concept to study the process of settlement of newcomers in Europe are: Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Novotny (1973; Hoffmann-Novotny & Neuwirth 1986), Hartmut Esser (1980), Friedrich Heckmann (1981; 2003), Michael Bommes (see: Boswell & D’Amato 2012) and Rinus Penninx (1989; 2005). These authors do have different definitions, accentuating different dimensions, domains, levels, but they also have quite some common ground.

It is worthwhile – using these different versions of the concept - to construct a definition of what integration as an analytical scientific concept is. We will use such a definition is a heuristic tool to describe and analyze integration processes, and as an instrument to analyse and characterize policies in the field (for which we need an instrument that is independent of the normative definitions of integration in policies itself).

2.1 What is integration? An analytic definition for the empirical study of integration and exclusion processes

Many of the definitions of integration do have normative elements that relate to a wished for outcome of such processes. That is by definition the case with definitions that stem from policy debates and documents. That makes such concepts problematic in empirical analytical studies. For the empirical study of processes of integration we need an open, non-normative, analytical definition. For that reason the following definition is developed.
The process of integration: an analytical definition

From the moment an immigrant arrives, he/she has to secure a place in the new society. Such finding a place has to be taken literally: he/she has to find a home, a job and income, schools for him/herself and his/her children and access to health facilities. But the newcomer also has to find a place in the social and cultural sense: establishing cooperation and interaction with other individuals and groups, and getting to know and use institutions of the new society to satisfy material and non-material needs. If newcomers see themselves as different, and are also perceived by the receiving society as (physically, culturally and/or religiously) ‘different’, they may aspire to gain a recognised place in the new society and be accepted in that society on the basis of being different.

From these observations, a basic, but also comprehensive, definition of integration is deduced: integration is the process of becoming an accepted part of society. This elementary definition is intentionally open in two ways. First, it emphasises the process character of integration rather than defining an end situation. Second, it does not specify beforehand the degree of or even the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society (in contradistinction to the normative models developed by political theorists whether these go under the labels of assimilation, integration, multiculturalism or pluralism). This makes the definition highly useful for the empirical study of these processes: measuring the degree of becoming an accepted part of society allows to capture empirically the diversity (of stages of) the process. What needs to be specified within this basic definition is what should be measured: what are the indicators of integration and where do we find these?

Figure 1: A heuristic model for the empirical study of integration processes

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1 This section is an elaboration of Penninx 2005 and 2007.
Three dimensions of the process of integration

The basic definition of integration encompasses three analytically distinct dimensions in which people may (or may not) become accepted parts of society: the legal-political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious dimension. These dimensions can be operationalised in indicators that measure the position of individual migrants or migrant groups.

The first dimension - the legal-political one - refers to residence and political rights and statuses. The basic question is here whether and to what degree immigrants are regarded as fully-fledged members of the political community. The position of an immigrant or the 'degree of integration' has two extreme poles: on the one hand there is the position of the illegal foreign resident who is not a part of society in the legal-political sense (but is part of it in the other two dimensions, as becomes clear from research and policies in cities!). At the other extreme there is the position of an immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. In between there is an enormous variation, in recent decades increased as a consequence of attempts of European states to 'regulate' international migration and integration, and as a consequence of new statuses and rights of the European Union migration regimes (among others EU-nationals versus Third Country Nationals).

It is important to realise that the legal-political dimension conditions the socio-economic and the cultural/religious dimension in two ways (symbolised by the arrows in Figure 1). Firstly, from the perspective of individual immigrant, factors such as illegal residence, extended uncertainty about future residence rights (and, in the case of asylum seekers, long-term dependence on charity or the state), and lack of access to local and/or national political systems and decision-making processes, obviously have negative implications for migrants' opportunities and preparedness to participate. From the perspective of the receiving society, such exclusionary policies are an expression of basic perceptions that classify immigrants as outsiders – a mindset not conducive to acceptance on different levels of society or to development of proactive policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domains. Exclusionary policies are thus the expression of refusal of the receiving society to accept newcomers at the institutional level, and that will have adverse effects on integration. Turning this reasoning around, empirical studies indicate that where inclusion of immigrants in formal and informal channels of political participation does occur, this may lead to (admittedly varied) forms of proactive policies in the socio-economic domain and often also in the cultural-religious domains.

The socio-economic dimension refers to the social and economic position of residents, irrespective of national citizenship. Under this dimension, positions of immigrants can be measured by access to and participation in domains that are crucial for any resident: do immigrants have (equal) access to institutional facilities to find work, housing, education and health facilities, and do they use these facilities? What is the outcome of this participation as compared to natives (with the same or comparable qualifications)? What can be measured and monitored under this dimension is quite extensive in each of the classic 'hard domains' of work and income, housing, education and health. Since needs and aspirations in these domains are relatively universal (i.e. basic needs not dependent on cultural factors) access to, participation of immigrants and natives in these areas can be measured comparatively. Such measures (particularly unequal outcomes) can be used as input for policies.

2 In the theoretical literature one can find dimensions that are defined differently from the ones presented here. One can find, for example, the social dimension as a separate one (that covers all aspects of contacts between people) and the identificational dimension (that focuses on the question of identity and choice of belonging). These specific dimensions are subsumed in the ones mentioned here: the social one is subsumed under the political, the socio-economic and cultural/religious dimension as their behavioural component; the identificational dimension is the attitudinal component of the cultural/religious dimension. In some theoretical approaches the three elements of categorisation of individuals on the basis of ethnic belonging, shared culture or world view are presented as separate dimensions. However, these elements are not relevant for their substantive meaning, but only as far as they are used in reciprocal perceptions as instruments of categorising, distinction and 'othering'.
As we have seen above, the socio-economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political dimension: access to and rights in these hard domains may be limited or even denied to newcomers, particularly aliens. In liberal democracies, legislation is the highest form of institutional regulation of inclusion and exclusion. The existence and substance of legal discrimination is determined by such laws. Such laws precede the anti-discrimination policies that states may have, since such policies can only declare acts discriminatory if these go against legal rules (of equality) (See Penninx 2001).

Potentially, the results of immigrant in this dimension may also be influenced by the cultural/religious dimension (symbolized by another arrow in Figure 1): for example, if negative perceptions relating to certain immigrants lead to prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the receiving society. That leads – even if access is legally guaranteed - to less opportunities and lower scores for immigrants in these hard domains.

The third dimension pertains to the domain of cultural/religious perceptions and practices of immigrants and the receiving society and their reciprocal reactions to such differences and diversity. Particularly if newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally or religiously different, the newcomers may aspire to acquire also in these respects a recognized place in that new society. The receiving society may or may not accept that cultural or religious new diversity: on the one extreme such new diversity may be rejected (and adaptation/assimilation demanded from immigrants) in mono-cultural/religious societies; on the other extreme there may be a practice of accepting ethnic identities, cultures and world views on an equal level in a pluralistic societal system. In the middle part of this continuum there are many in-between-positions, such as accepting certain forms of new diversity in the private realm, but not, or only partly in the public realm.

This third dimension, and the specific positions of immigrant and immigrant groups is more difficult to measure, basically for two reasons: the first is that it is not about objective (ethnic, cultural and religious) differences and diversity, but about the perceptions and reciprocal normative evaluations of what is defined as different and the consequences of such categorisations. Such categorisation and giving normative meaning to them takes place in different intensity: a neutral category may be become stereotyped; if negative connotations are added to stereotypes, they become prejudices; ultimately these prejudices may in turn become part of immutable racist ideologies. Measuring such perceptions is all the more complicated, since the basis of categorisation may change in the course of time: for example, in the guest worker period (1960-1975) the fact that an increasing part of these workers were Muslims was not seen as relevant; it was only from the 1990s on that such migrants and their families were categorised prominently and sometimes primarily as coming from Muslim countries and being Muslims.

The second reason why measuring this third dimension is difficult, is because such categorisations and reciprocal perceptions do manifest themselves differently at different levels (individual, collective, institutional) with different consequences. If contacts between individuals are coloured by prejudice, this may be uncomfortable, but also have a limited impact. If organisations, for example work organisations, base their recruitment of workers on stereotyped or prejudiced perceptions and procedures, the consequences for individual immigrants may be quite disastrous. The workings of institutions (and policies) may also be influenced systematically by categorisations - inadvertently or on purpose – possibly with systemic consequences for migrants (indirect and direct institutional discrimination in terms of anti-discrimination policies).

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3 A stereotype is a set of images, opinions and expectations vis-à-vis another group that represent a drastically simplified picture of reality. The basic feature here is a lack of information. A prejudice contains rigid opinions and expectations that are not susceptible to reasoning or adequate information; essential is that prejudice is based on emotions. Racism is a systematic set of ideas and prejudices that imply inferiority and superiority based on racial characteristics of groups.
Two actors in integration processes

Having defined the dimensions of the process of integration of newcomers in a (for them) new society and how to measure these dimensions, the next question is: Who are the relevant actors involved? There are two main parties in integration processes: the immigrants themselves, with their varying characteristics, efforts and degrees of adaptation (the left part of Figure 1), and the receiving society with its characteristics and its reactions to the newcomers (the right part of Figure 1). It is the interaction between the two that determines the direction and the temporal outcomes of the integration process. However, these two ‘partners’ are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources. The receiving society, the measure of inclusiveness of its institutional structure and its reaction to newcomers are far more decisive for the outcome of the integration process than the characteristics and efforts of the immigrants themselves.

Integration policies are part of the institutional arrangements in a society, particularly since we should define such policies broadly as including both general institutional arrangements and policies and their effects for immigrants, and policies that carry the explicit flag of integration of immigrants. Such policies being defined politically by (majorities of) the receiving society there is the inherent danger of representing expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than being based on participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups themselves.

Three levels relevant for (measuring) integration

The section above indicates that processes of integration of immigrants do take place and can be measured at different levels. The first level is that of individuals: migrants and natives of the receiving society. The former – the individual immigrant – is subject to a lot of measuring in integration research. At this level his integration can be measured in terms of the migrant’s political (non-)participation; his socio-economic integration can be measured in the hard domains of housing, work, education and health. When it comes to the third dimension, his social and cultural adaptation to the new society, his identification with a specific group and the receiving society or city, his religious identification and practice can be measured. In our conceptual definition of integration we should also measure here attitudes and behaviour of native individuals towards newcomers and its consequences.

Integration also takes place at a second level: the collective level of organisations. Firstly, there are the organisations of immigrants that we should study and measure as the expression of mobilised resources and ambitions of a group. These organisations may be strong or weak. They may orient themselves primarily to (certain aspects of participation in) the receiving society, or to specific cultural and religious needs of the group, or both. They may become an accepted part of the native civil society (and a potential partner for integration policies), or they may isolate themselves or they may be excluded by the society of settlement.

Secondly, there is also the collective level of organisations of the receiving society. The extent of openness for newcomers, their perceptions of and behaviour towards individual immigrants and their organisations can be of crucial importance for processes of integration (becoming an accepted part of society). Research has shown, for example, that in the absence of a governmental integration policy in Germany until 2002, non-governmental organisations, particularly trade unions and churches, have been crucial for integration processes of guest workers and their families (Penninx & Roosblad 2000).
Thirdly, integration also takes place at the level of institutions\textsuperscript{4}. Two kinds of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are general public institutions of receiving societies (national or local), such as the educational system, institutional arrangements in the labour market, for housing or for public health. Also the institutional arrangements of the political system, and institutional arrangements for cultural and religious needs are relevant. Such general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens, and equally so. Laws, regulations and executive organisations, but also unwritten rules and practices are part of these institutions.

General institutions may impede access or equitable outcomes for immigrants in two ways. First, they may formally exclude them, either completely (as does the political system in most countries and cities in the case of alien immigrants) or partially (as when social security and welfare systems offer only limited services to aliens). Second, even if access for all residents including immigrants is guaranteed in principle, such institutions may hamper access or equitable outcomes by virtue of their (historically and culturally determined) ways of operating – for example by failing to take into account specific characteristics of the migrants’ situation that are attributable to their migration history, their cultural and religious background, or their language abilities. The adequate functioning of these general public institutions – and their potential to adapt to growing diversity by immigration – is therefore of paramount importance\textsuperscript{5}. At this level especially, integration and exclusion are ‘mirror concepts’ (see Penninx 2001).

The second type of institutions that are of particular relevance for integration are institutions specifically ‘of and for’ immigrant groups, such as certain religious or cultural institutions. The value and validity of group-specific institutions in society, in contrast to general institutions, is confined to those who voluntarily choose for and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, group-specific institutions may also manifest themselves in the public realm as important actors of civil society – as the history of churches, trade unions, cultural, leisure and professional institutions in European cities and states has shown. In measuring integration on this point, we may see that some migrant-specific institutions become accepted parts of society at an equal level to comparable institutions of native groups, but others may either isolate themselves or remain unrecognised and excluded.

The mechanisms operating at individual, organisational and institutional levels are different, but the outcomes on each of these levels are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements determine to a strong degree the opportunities and scope for action of organisations, and they may also exert significant influence on how immigrant organisations develop and orient themselves, as Fennema and Tillie (2004) have shown. Institutions and organisations together, in their turn, create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. Conversely, individuals may mobilise to change the landscape of organisations, and may potentially contribute to significant alterations in general institutional arrangements. In view of the uneven distribution of power and resources noted above, such examples are scarce, but they do occur\textsuperscript{6}.

\textsuperscript{4} I use here the sociological concept of institution: a standardized, structured and common way of acting within a socio-cultural setting.

\textsuperscript{5} A basic thesis on policies, namely that ‘non-policy’ - i.e. not having an explicit integration policy for immigrants – is also to be analysed as a policy, follows from these observations. See also Alexander 2007.

\textsuperscript{6} Penninx (2000) has demonstrated the interconnectedness of integration processes at different levels by comparing how the situation of Turkish Muslims has evolved in the Netherlands and Germany. Although these immigrants migrated in the same period and for the same reasons, and had roughly the same characteristics, the policy reactions both to Islam and to the Turkish minority have differed markedly in the two countries. An interesting outcome of contrasting policies regarding Islamic organisations and specific institutional arrangements for Islam is that individual-level attitudes towards the receiving country and towards integration, particularly as gauged among young and second-generation Turks, appear to differ significantly between the Netherlands and Germany (Heitmeyer et al. 1997; Karakaşoğlu & Koray 1996; Karakaşoğlu 1996; Sunier 1999)
Integration processes, time and generations

The heuristic model that we have developed and explained above may be used as a tool to describe and analyse the position of (a group of) immigrants at a certain point in time. It is not able to cover a very important element in the logic of integration processes: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long-term by their very nature (under the condition that their stay is prolonged). This becomes clear immediately, if we look through the lens of a newcomer. If he is an adult immigrant, he may adapt significantly in the cognitive dimension of his behaviour when he takes a pragmatic attitude of learning how things are done, by whom, and so on. This part is a relatively easy form of adaptation and it pays off quickly. However, the adaptation of the same adult in the aesthetic (relating to the five senses) and normative dimensions of his behaviour is generally more difficult. Feelings, likes, dislikes, and perceptions of good and evil remain rather persistent across a lifetime. That adaptation of adults in these dimensions is more difficult, is a general pattern for the human race; it only becomes more manifest in those who change their basic environments through migration.

The situation of the descendants of migrants generally differs in this respect. Although they do become familiarised with the immigrant community, and possibly its pre-migration background, through their primary relations in family and immigrant community networks, they simultaneously become thoroughly acquainted with the culture and language of the society of settlement, not only through informal neighbourhood contacts starting in early childhood, but especially through their participation in mainstream institutions, the education system in particular. If such a double process of socialisation takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies can play an important role), these second-generation young people develop a way of life and a lifestyle that combines or integrates the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Because the ways of doing this are manifold, more and more differentiation develops within the original immigrant group. At the group level, this means that the litmus test for integration as an end result (being an accepted part of society) – and hence for the success or failure of policies in this field – lies in the situation of the second generation in the host society.

In principle we can handle this important time factor by making descriptive analyses of individuals and groups of immigrants at different points in time and compare these. In doing this, we should again be open for any outcomes of such historical comparative analyses. Research indicates that integration processes are not be definition linear nor unidirectional. Although we have indicated before that the situation of the first generation of migrants differs significantly from that of their children and grandchildren, this does not imply that integration is the inevitable eventual outcome, as is often assumed or wished for. On the contrary, the literature has shown that significant setbacks may occur. The third generation is not necessarily better integrated than the second and the second than the first.

Comparative empirical studies as a tool

If the immigrant integration process is propelled by the interaction of two parties at different levels, as has been posited so far, and if we also allow for the differentiating effects of interaction between the three dimensions, and a different impact of time and generations, how can we best make sense of outcomes?

Comparative empirical studies do provide clear answers that hint at great diversity of outcomes. There are basically two kind of comparisons that each measure different elements from the heuristic scheme. The first category of studies compares the integration processes of different immigrant groups in the same institutional and policy context of a nation or city. Such studies reveal that different immigrant groups may follow different patterns of integration or incorporation. In the Dutch case, for example, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) have shown that Moluccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Southern European, Turkish and
Moroccan immigrants differ in their speed of integration and in the pathways they tend to follow. Some groups are quick in using the educational system as a route for social mobility (Chinese, Portuguese), while other groups are strongly involved in entrepreneurship (Turks in the Netherlands) for example. The consequence of this type of comparative design, however, is that the explanations found for such differences lie primarily in characteristics of the various immigrant groups, simply because the national or city context into which they are being integrated is identical. The European Commission has funded important cross-national research projects funded through its TSER Programme (see overviews by Blaschke (2006) and Singleton (2009)).

Exactly the opposite happens in a second category of cross-national and cross-city studies that examine the integration of (the same) immigrant groups in different national or city immigration contexts. These studies find significant differences in states and cities into which immigrant groups integrate. An early example of such a study is the comparison of the institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK in the post-war period, largely before the politicisation of the issue of Islam and Muslims in Europe (Rath et al. 2001): how Islam was recognised (or not) as a world view on an equal footing as other religions, how public manifestations of Islam are regulated, like mosque building, the call for prayer, *helal* slaughtering, Islamic religious education in schools, religious counselling in prison, the army and hospitals, etc. There are significant differences in timing, content and direction of this institutionalisation in the three countries, and even between the two cities in the Netherlands that are studied in detail.

Another comparative study of this kind was a comparative analysis of attitudes and actions of trade unions with respect to immigration and the societal status of immigrants in seven European countries in the period 1960 – 1990 (Penninx & Roosblad 2000). Again, striking differences are found between countries: on the one hand, German trade unions which – in the absence of a governmental integration policy – have practised a very inclusive strategy, much more than trade unions in the Netherlands or in Austria did. As a result of such an inclusive strategy, trade unions in Germany have become an important route for social mobility of immigrants.

A third example refers to the study of the position of the children of Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslavian immigrants in 15 cities in 8 European countries in the TIES-project (Crul et al. 2012a). How can we explain that on the one hand the educational attainment of the second generation Turks is much higher in Sweden (Stockholm) and France (Paris and Strasbourg) than in Germany (Berlin and Frankfurt) and Austria (Linz and Vienna)? And, given that, why are attainments different when it comes to access to and integration of this same second generation into the labour market of the countries/cities mentioned? Obviously, the interaction in these two institutional fields works differently in different countries and cities. “Context matters in integration. Institutional arrangements in the ‘receiving society’ actually create the very capacity of an immigrant group to find a productive place and position” (Crul et al. 2012b). Another interesting conclusion for our study is that “the second generation identifies strongly with the city they live in. Claiming a national identity is more difficult” (Crul et al. 2012b: 2).

### Comparing cities’ integration processes and policies

A specially interesting strand of research – for the purposes of our study – is the analysis of integration processes and policies at the local level of cities in Europe. An inventory of the international literature reveals that such studies appeared already well before the turn of the century. Early studies focused predominantly on the political dimension of integration and policies related to civic and political participation, as in the case of Patrick Ireland’s study of four cities in France and Switzerland (Ireland 1994);

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7 This type of studies are to be located in the left part of the heuristic scheme in Figure 1
8 The European Commission has funded important cross-national research projects funded through its TSER Programme (see overviews by Blaschke (2006) and Singleton (2009)).
9 This study can be located in the lower part of Figure 1 (the cultural/religious dimension) at the institutional level at both sides.
Rex & Samad (1996) on Birmingham and Bradford; Blommaert & Martiniello (1996) on Antwerp and Liège; Garbaye (2000) on Birmingham and Lille; Bousseta (2001) on Antwerp, Liège, Lille and Utrecht, and Fennema & Tillie (2004) on Amsterdam, Liège and Zürich. Other studies focused on specific aspects of local policies such as housing and segregation patterns in nine cities (Musterd et al. 1998), policing in Paris, Marseille and Lyon as compared to New York and Chicago (Body-Gendrot 2000), local policies relating to Islam and Muslim institutions in European cities (Rath et al. 2001; Maussen 2009) or the management of diversity in the implementation of local policies in Manchester and Marseille (Moore 2001 and 2004). More recently we also saw examples of attempts to compare the making of local integration policies (Caponio & Borkert 2010; Gesemann & Roth 2009; Uitermark 2012).

An early large scale comparative analysis of integration policies at the local level of cities has been done in the MPMC-project (Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities). The MPMC-project ran from 1996 till 2004. It focused in its empirical research particularly on the political participation of immigrants, but that specific focus was framed in a more general comparison of cities, their immigrants and local governmental policies. Systematic descriptions were made of 16 major European cities and Tel Aviv10. In two book publications (Rogers & Tillie 2001 and Penninx et al. 2004) general comparisons of policies and cities were supplemented by in-depth comparisons on selected topics. Alexander (2004) used this material not only to construct a first typology of local policies, but also to devise a new in-depth comparison of policies in Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv (Alexander 2003 and 2007).

In section 3.5. we will outline further a number of comparative city studies that have been done in the last decade. It is particularly the material from these more recent comparative projects that will be the basis of the substantive descriptions of local integration policies in the sections 4 – 6.

### 2.2 How to study Policies that aim to steer Integration Processes?

The heuristic approach that we have developed in section 2.1. relates to (the study of) processes of integration. The study of policies, its making, its content and its outcomes is a different ball game altogether. Let us specify these differences (and the specificity of studying policies) in order to avoid common misunderstandings about the meaning of the concept of integration and how to apply it.

#### 2.2.1 The specific of study of politics, integration policymaking and implementation

Firstly, the study of policies is fundamentally different from studying and understanding the processes that such policies aim at. The essence of policies is that they intend to guide and steer processes in society: in our case integration processes of immigrants. Explicit policies are part of a political process of normative nature in which the topic of integration is formulated as a problem, the problem is given a normative framing (what do we want to be the outcome of the integration process?) and concrete actions are designed and developed to reach an explicit desired outcome. Therefore, the systematic study of policies should study its framing and normative elements11 and its practice and what relation these have (or do not have) to the process of integration as measured empirically. Such a systematic analysis of policies should be

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10 The city templates are available on the UNESCO website: [www.unesco.org/most](http://www.unesco.org/most).
11 One of the best examples for Dutch integration policies is Scholten 2011.
done in a terminology that is independent from policy concepts. (That is why we did go at great length to develop such an independent analytical concept in section 2.1.).

Secondly, in democratic societies, policies are part of political systems in which majorities decide on such policies. In the case of immigrant policies, there is the inherent danger that these policies represent expectations and demands of the majority rather than that they would be based on negotiation and agreement with immigrants themselves. (This relates directly to the observation made in section 2.1. that “the two actors involved in integration processes are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources”. This may lead to the outright exclusion of segments of immigrant populations (as aliens = non-citizens) from the formal political system. Or it may, in cases where they are partially or fully included in politics, marginalise their voices. The way immigrants are perceived turns out to be a significant factor in such processes – indeed often stronger than the facts. This is even more the case, if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants have become politicised questions. In principle, this holds for the different levels of policymaking, although exclusionist mechanisms may work differently at the national and local level. This mechanism may result either in a virtual absence of (explicit) integration policies and an avoidance of issues related to immigrants, or in one-sided, patronising policies that largely reflect majority interests and disregard the needs and voices of immigrants.

Thirdly, as integration policies are adopted and implemented in practice, another aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges. In contrast to the long-term nature of integration processes (that normally takes at least a generation), the political process in democratic societies requires that policies bear fruit within much shorter time frames: the spaces between elections. Such a policymaking logic may lead to unrealistic promises to voters, to demands from immigrants that cannot be fulfilled, etc. In turn, such ‘democratic impatience’ often produces disappointment and backlash effects (Vermeulen & Penninx 1994). The debate on the alleged failure of Dutch integration policies (and of immigrants to integrate) that takes place in the Netherlands since 2000 is a good example of this (Prins & Saharso 2010). Even more difficult than such democratic impatience, are situations in which anti-immigrant sentiments are translated into political movements and lead to a strong politicisation of the topics of immigration and integration.

Fourthly, what we need in studying policies is a broad concept of policies. As we have explained in the preceding section, integration policies are part of the total system of institutional arrangements in a society. This has two important consequences for what we study under the heading of policies. The first is that explicit integration policies should always be studied as part of the total system of such institutional arrangements. The second is that also not having an explicit integration policy should be studied as a policy. In the latter case we actually study the functioning of general institutional arrangements and their effects for immigrants.

Finally, an important aspect of policy studies relates to the question which actors are involved in policies, on which levels – the local, national or supra-national level – and how actors and levels relate to each other. In recent years the term ‘the multi-level governance of migration and integration’ has been introduced to study the often complicated interrelations of influence and interdependence between these levels (see Caponio & Borkert 2010; Zincone et al. 2011; Penninx forthcoming). In section 3 we will outline the historical development of this context of multi-level and multi-actor integration policies.

### 2.2.2 Main elements of comparative policy analysis

So what is it that we actually focus on, if we study local integration policies comparatively? We study basically two elements: the first refers to the substance of policies: the sections on frames, aims and target
groups below. The second refers to what is sometimes called governance: strategy, organisation, actors and the multi-level context and influence.

Policy frames and frame shifts

A frame is (a reconstruction of) the problem definition of a policy issue, including the underlying assumptions of its causes and the remedies for it. A descriptive-analytic approach of frames identifies first the key questions or themes at stake in policy making. In the case of migrant integration the key questions are:

1. How (desirable) is immigration perceived (for the country)? Who has the (moral and/or legal) right to be/become an immigrant? Who is the preferred type of immigrant (to be encouraged to come) and who is not (i.e. to be discouraged/prohibited to come)?

2. For immigrants who are actually present (in the society or the city) the basic question is how their future is envisaged? Are they perceived as “foreigners” or as “temporary guests” whose future is in principal somewhere else, or are they seen as (potential and probable) permanent members of the society for whom the state or city accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaranteeing the same rights and providing the same facilities (inclusion versus exclusion dilemma).

3. If inclusion is in principle chosen as a solution, a new dilemma manifests itself: when immigrants start to settle and participate in society, they are confronted on a daily basis with real or alleged differences between natives and immigrants. Some of these differences relate to their specific position as migrants (legal status, having their kin and history elsewhere, relation with country of origin, etc.), others to speaking a different language, or having a different cultural, religious, ethnic or racial background. These differences relate directly to specific problems for these newcomers to participate and function within the existing social and institutional structures of society. The dilemma of the state or city polices is: should these policies exclusively regard to and act on the common interests of individual natives and immigrants, and thus treat them all the same within the given institutional structures (general policies that can implicate injustice, when not making a distinction in the treatment of cases that are not equal), or should they cater for the specific interests and needs of immigrants and devise specific policies in order to attain material (and not just formal) equality for immigrants?

4. Recognition of differences and choosing in principle for inclusion and equality of outcomes is one thing, the question that follows is a fourth (strategic) dilemma: can the problem of difference be solved by a strategy that involves both (inevitable) adaptation and learning of immigrants, but also significant changes in access to and the working of institutional structures of society that should be able to cope with more diversity keeping the standard of equality/equity. Or are societal rules and structures, including underlying norms and values, taken (and even defended) as a given and is the burden of adaptation and fitting into the system completely put on the immigrants’ shoulders, as a voluntary or even as a mandatory task?

The answers to these questions actually define the policy problem of integration; they tell us whether a process of becoming a full accepted part of society is envisaged, and how, what the process entails, how long it may take, what the requirements for a successful integration are, and whose efforts it involves.

However, we often do not find answers to these frame questions directly, but we have to reconstruct these answers from policy documents, from political debates around these documents, from implementation
practices, etc. In practice, in our comparative analyses of (local) policies we focus on the following elements:

**Problem definition and aims**

When a policy is started, there is generally an explicit formulation of a perceived problem and of the desired outcome of the specific efforts that are taken by policies. Such verbal, politically debated statements in and about policy documents can be analysed to reconstruct the basic frame of a policy. The most important elements to be studied and compared are:

- General *assumptions and orientations* on causes of the problem and remedies;
- *Basic concepts* used (or explicitly rejected);
- General *aims* of policies and the specific targets to be attained;
- Which (of the three) *dimensions of integration* are addressed (primarily);
- What are the most important *domains of action*?

**Target groups**

The formulation of groups or categories (and the political debates around these formulations) for which the policies are meant, often gives valuable information on the frame of policies.

Migrant integration policies that formulate specific groups of immigrants as target groups are different from policies that focus on all immigrants, and they are even more different from policies that also target at natives, at established civil society and at general institutions of society.

**Integration Strategy**

Another important indicator of frames is the question how the implementation of policy is foreseen. Do integration policies consist of a series of specific activities that are organised for specific groups in a specific policy context, or should migrant integration aspects ideally be part of general policies meant for all residents? The possibly intended shift from the former to the latter is often discussed under the concept of mainstreaming.

**Organisation of policymaking and implementation**

The integration strategy may be related to the question how migrant integration policies are organised. There are two aspects relevant here: the first is whether the implementation of policies by the civil servants and others is directly steered and controlled by politics or that there is a relatively big gap between politics and policy. The second aspects relates to the location of the initiating and coordinating force for migrant integration: is it centrally located, near to the Mayor, with a powerful influence on all departments that are relevant for integration policies? Or is the coordination in a specific department and decentrally located.
**Actors**

Answers to the question who is supposed to be a relevant actor in policies do give quite important hints at the underlying frames. A first question is whether individual immigrants are seen as primary actors, or that also their organisations and other collective and institutional resources are regarded as relevant actors. Secondly, in how far is the receiving society at all levels (individuals, organisations and institutions) perceived as a relevant actor involved in policy action?

**Local policies in relation to regional, national and EU - policies**

General institutional and specific integration policy competences are located at different levels: the local level of municipalities or cities, the regional level (in some federal states), the national level and since a decade or so also the EU-level. What cities can do, is to a certain extent dependent on what they are allowed to do, or for what domains they get resources to act. Integration policies at different levels have developed into a quite complex constellation: new tensions have come to the fore, but also new alliances and forms of cooperation. Local policies will be analysed in this context of multi-level interdependence. In section 3 we will describe and analyse the genesis of multi-level integration policies as a context for local policies.

**2.2.3 Three basic orientations of city policies**

The elements mentioned above can be studied separately and independently, but if we use them for the comparative study of policies these elements do not combine arbitrarily, but they turn out to form patterns, or specific forms of policies. The most basic element that forms such patterns is the specific dimension of the process of integration that policies want to influence: the legal/political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious dimension. They are most basic, because they refer to quite different mechanisms that determine the position of newcomers in a society, as we have explained in the observations on our analytical definition of integration. In this study (under the sections 4, 5, and 6) we have taken these three dimensions as distinct perspectives of policies. We should realise, however, that this is an analytic distinction. I.e. we ask the question, what kind of policies do we see, if one of the three dimensions is taken as the central perspective? To what kind of policy actions does it lead (What frames, assumptions, aims, target groups, strategies, organisation, actors?). We will see later that most cities have elements that refer to all dimensions, even if the cities themselves do not refer to these explicitly.

**The legal/political dimension as central element**

Section 4 of this paper will investigate the policies and practices of European cities that deal with issues of legal inclusion and participation in the public sphere, considering also the role assigned (or not) to immigrant associations in the decision making and implementation of local integration policies.

The main competence over the legal and political dimension of integration lies indeed at the national level and to a certain extent at the EU-level (such as the distinction between EU-migrants and TCNs). Framings behind such different level definitions may cause on the one hand tensions or may be disputed at the local level (such as the EU-definition of integration policies not being applicable to intra-EU-migrants; or national policies in relation to illegal migrants). Local authorities may develop alternative solutions for concrete problems at the local level that are a consequence of different framings, regulations and actions on other levels.
On the other hand, local authorities may use the margin of manoeuvre in implementing national policies and/or can promote specific initiatives to facilitate immigrants’ access to secure legal status (e.g. a dedicate office providing information on how to prepare the naturalisation procedure) or to favour their political participation (e.g. through consultative committees).

In section 4 we will explore these initiatives and policies by considering three specific issues:
1) legal inclusion, i.e. access to the residence permit and/or naturalisation;
2) local voting rights and participation in political organisations at a local level (direct political inclusion);
3) indirect political inclusion through consultative committees and role assigned to immigrant associations

The socio – economic dimension in focus: structural integration policies in the hard domains

A newcomer has to find a place to live (the domain of housing), a job and an income (the domain of labour and income); he has to have access to education for himself or his children and have his attained education recognised (domain of education), and he has to be able to get access to health provisions (domain of health). Integration (finding an accepted place) in these hard domains is dependent on the accessibility (equal access/ equal outcomes) of the institutions in these fields for newcomers and of the efforts and qualifications of newcomers.

Section 5 will focus on this structural dimension of local policies by considering how different European cities have responded in these four domains: housing, income, education and health. Given that most of these domains are a matter of national policies, particular attention will be given to the tensions between the local and national levels both in terms of policy definition and policy implementation. Taking a European comparative perspective will allow us to consider whether the structural dimension of local policies varies depending on the different models of welfare state (following Esping-Andersen categorisation).

The cultural/religious dimension in local policies: cultural integration and social cohesion

When the cultural/religious dimension is in focus, then the mutual perceptions of immigrants and natives, categorizations of difference, attitudes and behaviour are the central policy issues: are newcomers recognized, accepted and treated like other social/ cultural/ religious groups? Do they organize and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups and do they have the right and opportunity to do so? Or do they adapt themselves predominantly to the new society? Do they integrate socially? Policies may direct themselves to different elements of this dimension and may do so in different ways. They may focus on adaptation of newcomers (civic integration courses) or on their rights to be different. They may focus on (developing) social contacts, positive relations and cooperation between groups at the local level (intergroup relations; social cohesion). They may also use cultural diversity as a strategy of the city to position itself economically and culturally. The review of the literature will include the recent studies on cities policies towards Islamic communities (such as the OSI 2010- study).

A specific question in this paper will be how local policies relate to this dimension in integration policies on the national level: how is the present tendency of national policies to see cultural integration as a condition for inclusion perceived and implemented at the local level?
3. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICIES

Historically, immigration in Europe started in the Northwest-European countries. Other countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland, that used to be emigration countries until the 1980s, started to experience significant immigration in the 1990s and 2000s. Still other countries, among them most of the new EU-Member States that accessed in 2004 or after are experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time.

This historical development is also traceable in the policies that have been developed. In all cases such a development started as immigration policies at the national level of countries. Integration policies at the national level did follow, but sometimes with significant delays. Local policies, have by definition been integration policies (cities do not have competences in immigration policies) and their development is often in reaction to (the absence or presence) of national policies.

European Union level immigration policies, and integration policies even more, are latecomers, but they have complicated the multilevel governance constellation significantly and have given rise recently to remarkable new coalitions. In this section we will draw an historical analysis of how this new constellation (including the tensions involved) emerged, starting with the national level of policymaking and from there outlining the EU- and local level policymaking.

3.1 Unwilling immigration countries: national reactions to immigration

A predominant characteristic of European states is that they consistently have defined themselves as non-immigration countries, exactly in the period – the second half of the 20th century - that Europe has factually become a continent of immigration. A rhetoric about being a ‘nation of immigrants’, as is usual in classic immigration countries like Canada, Australia and the United States, has been completely absent in Europe. On the contrary, consistent and explicitly anti-immigration rhetoric (Doomernik & Jandl 2008) has been a constant factor in Europe, despite the fact that quite a few European countries in recent decades have had higher immigration rates than for example the United States of America12 (see Eurostat 2012).

This particular framing has had pervasive consequences, first of all for how the factual immigration was perceived and labelled. Many newcomers received special labels that legitimised their arrival, but they were not called immigrants. In the Netherlands, for example, the sizeable group of immigrants of the former Dutch Indies after independence of Indonesia in 1949 came to the Netherlands under the label of ‘repatriates’13, the workers from the Mediterranean area were defined as ‘guest workers’, expressing the intended temporary nature of their stay, and the migrants from Surinam (Dutch Guyana) and the Dutch Antillean islands in the West were (until 1975) ‘Overzeese Rijksgenoten’ (fellow overseas citizens, part of the Dutch Kingdom). In Germany, the inflows in the decades after WWII from the East were received under the labels of Übersiedler (persons moving from the GDR to the FRG) or Aussiedler (in principle Germans

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12 In 2011 eight of the 27 EU-countries had a higher percentage of foreign born residents than the USA had in 2010. The latest percentage of the foreign-born population in the USA, based on the Census 2010, amounted to 12,9 % (‘The Foreign-Born Population in the United States 2010’. American Community Reports, May 2012).
13 Some 300.000 came from the former Dutch Indies between 1945 and 1962; most of them had never been ‘in patria’ before.
who had settled elsewhere in the past) ‘coming home’; and there was the significant category of Gastarbeiter (guest workers) whose label indicated the expectation that they would stay only temporary.

A consequence of defining one-self as a non-immigration country was that after the first oil crisis of 1973 increasingly restrictive admission policies were introduced, in the beginning mainly for ‘economic migrants’ (i.e. the guest workers). This was justified initially by the decrease in demand for migrants, particularly for lower skilled ones. But the factual closure for new migrant workers also caused an increase in supply-driven migration. This supply driven migration presented itself firstly (in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s) in Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and France particularly under the policy category of ‘family reunion’ (and ‘family formation’) of the temporary workers. Their supposedly temporary stay was gaining the characteristics of more permanent settlement. Return to their home country was not an attractive option, notwithstanding the sticks and carrots that were offered particularly in Germany in the Return Promotion Programmes of the late 1970s and the 1980s.

From the mid-1980s on, a new migration announced itself in West-European countries in the form of asylum seekers. This increasing inflow of unsolicited newcomers culminated in the early 1990s in the ‘asylum crisis’ and provoked new measures of restriction and control of entrance and admission. These restrictions in its turn led to a spiralling rise of ‘innovative’ new forms of entrance, like smuggling and trafficking, which in turn generated new control-orientated requirements and procedures (for asylum and family migration). New dynamics thus developed, and new actors were brought into play. Tougher regulations led by definition to more illegality and irregularity and criminalisation of certain types of migration.

International political terrorism, furthermore, brought migrants into focus from a security perspective. Migration thus became associated first and foremost with problems and threats and as such has risen to the top of the political agenda in many EU-countries in recent times.

The ideology of not being an immigration country also had consequences for settlement and integration policies. North-West-European countries ‘solved’ the contradiction - of not being countries of immigration, while receiving significant inflows at the same time - by defining these migrants either as a priori members of society, as in the case of the ‘repatriates’ in the Netherlands and Übersiedler or Aussiedler in Germany, or defining them as ‘temporary guests’. In the former case, full citizenship was offered (in the Dutch case, was even a condition for admission) and a full-fledged reception programme aiming at a speedy re-integrative assimilation was put in place. In the latter case of the guest workers, however, it meant limited facilities for accommodation in anticipation of their eventual return. For this sizeable group of ‘guests’ time created increasingly a contradiction of expectations: in the course of time many guest workers factually stayed for good and formed communities that grew by using their right to bring their families and spouses. Most governments in Europe that had recruited guest workers, however, maintained the illusion of return until the turn of the century and confined themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures, leaving the integration responsibility in practice to parties in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations (Penninx 2005).

The picture of migration and related policies that I have outlined here is strongly based on developments in the West European countries. South European states have a much more recent experience in immigration and integration. For most of the twelve new members of the European Union that accessed in 2004 or later, the topic of migration and integration is relatively new and takes multiple forms: emigration, immigration and transit migration co-exist in most of these countries (Black et al. 2010; Okolski 2012; Içduygu & Kıriş 2009).

14 In the four years of 1990 to 1993 the number of new asylum applications surpassed the annual level of 400.000 in the European Union.
3.2 The European Union’s migration paradox

The preceding general description of the development of migration and migration policies in Europe is based on (nation-) states as basic units of analysis. But there have also been significant supra-national forces in Europe that have influenced international migration in an unique way. They stem from a 60 year long process of gradual economic and political integration in Europe that started as early as 1951, when the Treaty of Paris instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)\textsuperscript{15}, which developed into the European Economic Community (EEC) by the 1968-Treaty of Rome and to the European Community (EC) established by the Single European Act of 1985. What was crucial in these developments from our point of view was that the free circulation of (initially) workers and (later all) citizens of (the growing number of) member states became an essential element of an internal market. The Single European Act foresaw removing all physical, technical and fiscal barriers to be implemented by December 31st, 1992 between by then 12 member states. Such an opening up (actually abolishment) of internal borders, however, meant that the Community would share henceforth a common external border. That in turn meant that visa policies, admission of Third Country Nationals and asylum policy should be coordinated. The decision to abolish internal borders made common policies for Third Country Nationals necessary. However, Member States were hesitant to give up their sovereignty in this domain, although the upcoming “asylum crisis” and the pressures of supply driven migration in general pushed some states towards common (restrictive) policies\textsuperscript{16}.

In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU) as the successor of the EC. The EU created a European Union citizenship and granted full freedom of movement to all citizens of Member States. It completed the earlier developments towards free movement between Member States in the sense that all obstacles for such movements were taken away and equal access to facilities was guaranteed. Moving between Member States within the borders of the EU that used to be defined as international migration had virtually become internal migration. Under this new regime the EU expanded further to 15 states in 1995.

However, the complete freedom of movement and the factual abolition of borders within the EU had also made it necessary to coordinate Member States’ policies relating to the admission of Third Country Nationals. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 concretely stipulated that five years after its ratification (i.e. by May 2004) asylum and migration should have become communitarian policy (being thus moved from the third pillar of intergovernmental collaboration to the first pillar of communitarian EU-governance) and that existing policies and practices should have been harmonised. This goal was reaffirmed at the Tampere Summit of ministers responsible for such policies in 1999 where also the explicit ambition was formulated that third country nationals who are long-term residents, should be granted rights that come as closely as possible to those of EU-citizens.

Indeed, by May 2004 agreements had been reached of two kinds (Van Selm &Tsolakis 2004). The first amounted to a synchronization of restrictive policies aimed to combat illegal immigration and keeping at bay potential asylum seekers, and the harmonization of asylum policies. The Schengen Agreement and

\textsuperscript{15} Goedings (2005) made a detailed historical analysis of the origins of the free circulation of workers in the early period of economic cooperation in Europe from the 1951-Treaty of Paris until the 1968- Treaty of Rome showing that it has particularly been Italy that has consistently pressured negotiations to include the free circulation of workers.

\textsuperscript{16}Five countries (France, the FRG and the Benelux-countries) were moving quickly towards open borders and signed already in July 1985 the Schengen Treaty that envisaged a system of international border controls and checks, a common asylum procedure and information exchanges on asylum and unwanted migrants, to be implemented by January 1st, 1990. The Schengen-model became later the standard for the EU.
Dublin Convention at that stage had been made part of Community Law. These new policies – represented by the great majority of Directives developed between 1999 and 2004 - focus on the perceived problematic nature of (unsolicited) immigration of Third Country Nationals. They tended to develop restrictive immigration policies at the lowest common denominator of Member States. The second kind – represented by a small set of EU directives – serves to improve the position of Third Country immigrants. They include a directive on the immigrants’ right to family reunification17 and on the free movement between member states (after five years of legal residence)18. On balance the interests of the member states have been served much better in the harmonization process than those of the immigrant EU-residents as observers have remarked (Van Selm & Tsolakis 2004; Groenendijk & Minderhoud 2004).

In summary, the European Union has become a significant new political and policy unit at the supra-national level, which has created completely new regimes for international mobility and migration in Europe. On the one hand, the early (West European) EU members have transposed their national policies into common restrictive admission policies in relation to potential immigrants (economic migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers) from non-EU countries. Furthermore, they have made these policies the ‘standard’ for new members of the Union: the acquis requires the new members to build legislation and institutions in conformity with established EU policies in this domain. This strand of EU policies has been characterised by critics as the ‘Fortress Europe policies’.

On the other hand, the EU created a fundamental right to move and settle within the EU area for EU citizens and for long-term Third Country residents of its Member States. The total area of free movement in the EU now counts 28 countries with a total population of more than half a billion inhabitants. About 10 % of them have been born outside their country of residence. An increasing part of these immigrants are “internal EU-migrants”. This increase is due on the one hand to the fact that residents from new accessor states in other EU states change status at accession: from TCN to citizen of a Member State. On the other hand, we see that in the last decade immigration of TCNs in the EU decreases and immigration of citizens of Member States increases (Eurostat 2011: 16-18; Urso & Schuster 2011; 17). The financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s has reinforced the dominance of intra-EU migration. Germany is a strong case in this respect (Sachverständigenrat 2013: 54 ff): while in 2004 the number of new immigrants in the FRG were approximately 50/50 % coming from the 26 EU-partners and TCNs, this percentage shifted gradually to 63,4 from EU-countries and 36,6 % TCNs in 2011. Recent immigration figures of other Member States also indicate such a trend towards stronger internal EU-migration. The strongly increased unemployment in the Southern EU-countries and Ireland may further contribute to this in the near future.

3.3 European Union’s integration policies

In Europe in the 1980s and 1990s there was a growing contradiction between the facts of immigration and the norm of not being an immigration country. In some cases this tension led to early, strongly rights-based integration policies, covering not only the socio-economic, but also the political and cultural spheres of life, such as those of Sweden (since the mid-1970s) and the Netherlands (since the early 1980s). Most national governments in Europe that had recruited guest workers, however, maintained the illusion of return till after 2000 and confined themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures, leaving the integration responsibility in

practice to the local level of cities and to parties in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations.

When, in an increasingly politicised climate of the late 1990s and 2000s, integration policies at the national level were finally introduced in those countries, the term integration started to get a different, specific meaning: where earlier policy conceptions, such as those used in Sweden and the Netherlands in the 1980s, had been rights-based and aiming at structural integration, the new conception focused increasingly on cultural integration as an obligation for immigrants: cultural and value-based commonalities were thought to be essential for social cohesion. Acquisition of citizenship - that was seen earlier in Swedish and Dutch policies as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration - was now increasingly redefined as the crown on a finalised process of cultural adaptation. This new cultural conception of integration for migrants also led to questions of how the society into which newcomers (should) ‘integrate’ essentially defined itself. The claims and outcomes of such discussions on the ‘identity’ of receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, laïcist, equal, enlightened, etc.) are translated into civic integration requirements for immigrants and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. The latest development - compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as developed in the Netherlands - extend this logic even further: under the pretext of integration, such courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective (Guild et al. 2009).

These developments in national contexts, plus the double edged migration policy that we described before form the backdrop and at the same time the determinants of EU integration policies: a set of policy initiatives that is different from both national and local integration policies in several respects (see Goeman 2012). These EU integration policies can be characterised briefly in six points: the genesis of its formal definition, its target group, the status of its policymaking and implementation, its strategies and funds and its organisational setting.

First of all, integration was defined rather limited initially. In fact, until 2003 EU-policies started from the implicit assumption that if the legal position of immigrants would be equal (as much as possible, as the Tampere programme stipulated) to national citizens and if adequate instruments would be in place to combat discrimination, integration processes could be left to societal forces. Thus, legal integration (= equality) was to be ensured by means of the directives on family reunification and free movement Third Country Nationals within the EU after five years of legal residence on the one hand, and by comprehensive anti-discrimination directives on the other.

It was only in 2003 that the European Commission came up with a more comprehensive view on integration policies in its Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (EC 2003). This Communication defined integration as follows: “it is a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-countries nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant’s full participation”. Integration is conceived as a “balance of rights and obligations”. The holistic approach of policies targets all dimensions of integration (citizenship and participation, economic and social rights, cultural and religious diversity). In November 2004, the Council of Ministers responsible for integration agreed on the Common Basic Principles (CBPI) for integration as a first step towards a common framework for a European approach to immigrant integration and a point of reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies (EC 2004).

Secondly, this shift from initially a narrow conception to – in principle and on paper - a very broad conception of integration, however, goes together with a continuation of the limited definition of the target group that comes directly from migration policies: integration policies are supposed to be for Third Country Nationals only. Immigrants who are citizens (or long term residents) from EU Member States do not belong to the target group. They are supposed to be integrated by definition (an assumption that has
been criticised recently by local authorities in regions that received many new immigrants from accessor states after the enlargements of 2004 (Poland) and 2007 (Rumania and Bulgaria).

Thirdly, the foregoing two points raise the question what the status of EU-policies is: while migration policies are communitarian policies (first pillar), integration policies are intergovernmental policies (third pillar). It means that policies have to be decided upon by consensus of Member States and that there is no binding legislation and no directives. On many aspects of the broad concept of integration, like social security, education, housing and health, national governments defend their sovereignty vehemently. Integration policies at the EU level are thus clearly ‘soft’ policies and bound/limited to what national governments allow them to be.

Fourthly, this means that the mechanisms of policy making and implementation are quite different from those of migration policies. A special method, called the “open method of co-ordination” (OMC) has been adopted in the field of integration policies since 2003. National strategy reports are an important tool within the OMC-strategy in which each member state reports on priorities for and achievements of national policies. The Common Basic principles mentioned above is another (paper) tool of the OMC-strategy. Furthermore, specific internal and external monitoring instruments, such as the European Migration Network and MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index), have been developed as well as mechanism to exchange policy practices and expertise (handbooks, integration website).

Fifthly, apart from the paperwork related to the framing and formulation of EU-policies, the European Commission has managed to get agreement on some practical tools for concrete action. From 2004-2006 the INTI-programme (Integration of Third Country nationals) financed action and research, followed by the much more substantial funds that run from 2007 till 2013: the European Integration Fund (EIF) and – especially to compensate states for their efforts regarding the reception and integration of refugees - the European Refugee Fund (ERF). For the European Commission as a policy maker, these funds are important, since they create direct relations between the EU and local and regional authorities (and their policies) on the one hand, and non-governmental civil society partners on all levels on the other hand.

Sixthly, there is this very specific internal organisational setting of EU integration policies: on the one hand, there is DG Freedom, Security and Justice (also responsible for migration policies) that targets particularly the early reception and integration of recent newcomers, that of refugees and accepted asylum seekers in the first place, but also Third Country Nationals until they have become long-term residents. It is in this particular part of EU-policies that West European countries have increasingly ‘uploaded’ their cultural integration requirements for new Third Country immigrants in EU-integration policies. In this process, elements of integration policies that had started in cities in the Netherlands in the 1990s as voluntary training programmes that provided newcomers with a tool kit for smooth integration the new society, gained currency in the Dutch national policies. After the turn of the century, however, their nature changed, as did their currency in other EU member states: they became mandatory integration courses with a strong cultural component; subsequent testing was introduced for those 3rd country nationals who wished to settle. Sanctions to enforce the mandatory character were defined in withholding residence rights and administrative fines. The broad concept of integration of the 2003 Communication and the Common Basic Principles is filled in very specifically and narrowly in this part of EU-policies. The two-way principle of integration (CBP nr. 1) is not recognisable (Carrera & Atger 2011).

On the other hand, there is a second setting from which integration is promoted: the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Its programmes aim to promote social inclusion and cohesion and its sizeable funding is – again – used quite extensively by local and regional authorities (and their policies) on

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19 Hannelore Goeman (2012) uses this term in her analysis of the constitution of integration policies at the EU level. See also Guild et al. 2009.
the one hand, and non-governmental civil society partners on all levels on the other hand. Equality and anti-discrimination are key concepts (the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and its successor the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) is related to this DG). Target groups include immigrants but equally ethnic minorities and the disabled. The priority domains are (equal access to and long-term integration into) employment, education, housing and health.

3.4. Local integration policies: cities and their national and European connections

Local integration policies have always been in the shadow of national integration policies or in the shadow of the absence of the latter. This has basically to do with the fact that migration policies (decisions who is allowed to enter and stay) are national policies. If an immigration policy was followed by a national integration policy, then local integration policies could be stimulated and facilitated by such national policies.

The early and significant engagement of Dutch cities and municipalities in local integration policies, for example, should be understood against the background of the national government deciding in 1980 to have an Ethnic Minorities Policy for the integration of immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Ministerie .. 1980). One of the starting points of that policy was that cities and local authorities should develop an active local integration policy for immigrants and minorities. To stimulate local authorities to do so a special temporary regulation was made to finance the extra costs for setting up local policies (the “Extra Bestuurskosten Regeling”), starting in 1980. Local authorities thus received funding from the national government that they could use to develop local policies, including doing research for such policy development (Uniken Venema 1986). This latter funding facility was readily used as was confirmed in an analysis of research projects on minorities in the Netherlands in the period 1981-1985: the percentage of research projects financed by cities/municipalities had increased from 6 % in 1981 to 25 % in 1984 (Penninx 1988: 13).

Admittedly, such a stimulating environment to develop integration policies at the local level was exceptional in Europe in the 1980s: the Netherlands was one of the few countries that developed a national integration policy quite early (i.e. before the turn of the century). The other country that had an integration policy (still earlier, since 1975) was Sweden20. Probably there were also cities in Sweden that developed local policies in an early phase, although the literature on policy development in Sweden that covers the period between 1965 and 1984 (Hammar 2004) does not mention much about cities as policy makers. For the later period, after 1984, however, there is more evidence that Swedish cities - particularly Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö - have developed local integration policies (and have commissioned research from universities in their cities on a significant scale to develop them (Penninx 2014 forthcoming).

So in the Dutch and Swedish cases in the 1970s and 1980s cities have been stimulated by and have profited from national integration policies. But factual immigration in Europe was not necessarily followed by an integration policy at the national level: most West European countries did have sizeable immigration but no national integration policies till the turn of the century. Nevertheless, immigrants did settle in cities and municipalities and quite a few cities developed integration policies, also in the absence of national policies, as is testified by Birmingham and Bradford in the UK, Berlin and Frankfurt in the FRG, Vienna in Austria or

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20 One could argue that also the UK had early integration policies since the mid-1960s, but these policies focused primarily on ‘race relations’ (in our analytical terminology a policy that focuses strongly, if not solely on the third (cultural/religious) dimension of integration processes. The term integration enters British policies only after the turn of the century (Spencer 2012).
the cities of Zurich, Bern and Basel in Switzerland, to give just a few examples (see the literature that was referred to at the end of 2.1.).

Interestingly, cities also have started early to work together – from city to city – to get local integration policies established or to improve them by ‘exchange of policy practice’. In some cases such a cooperation took place within one national context – often with the aim of forcing the national government to develop policies. Swiss cities are an interesting case in point: in a national context with a long history of temporary employment of foreign workers in which the concept of integration was non-existent (D’Amato & Gerber 2005; Wicker 2003) the cities of Zürich, Bern and Basel developed in the second half of the 1990s so called ‘Integrationsleitbilder’ (integration policy frames: Begert 2005; Kessler 2005; Tremp 2005) and started local integration policies. The implicit suggestion that the national government should have an integration policy and should support cities in their integration policies, however, was not successful: it took several more years before the concept of integration was introduced in policies at the national level in Switzerland.

Initiatives for exchange and learning between cities across national borders also started already in the 1990s. In 1998, for example, the city of Amsterdam and its local district mayors invited policy makers and practitioners from Antwerp, Berlin, Birmingham, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfurt am Main, Liège, London, Manchester, Madrid, Milan, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Utrecht and Vienna for the Ethnic Minorities and Local Government Conference (Bestuurlijk Overleg Stadsdelen 1998). The invited cities, except the Dutch and Swedish ones, all came from countries that had not yet developed a national integration policy at that time.

Whatever the history of local integration policies, a common characteristic during the last decade is that tensions have developed between cities and national governments on issues on which national and local interests diverge. Such tensions may relate to different views on how to implement the (restrictive) immigration policies described above. For example: how to handle illegal migrants in practice? How to implement restrictions on access of illegal migrants to facilities and services in the domains of employment, housing, education and health in order to combat illegal residence? Diverging policy aims may also exists relating to the early reception policies for newcomers, the civic integration courses, the increased cultural requirements for continued residence and for naturalisation. Where national policies may be quite principled, if not ideological on such matters, local policy practitioners tend to look more for feasible practical solutions that are accepted in immigrant communities. Tensions do also arise when the financing of integration facilities is at stake, particularly when national policies do prescribe new policy action for cities and municipalities, but do not deliver the financial and other resources needed to implement it (Penninx 2009b).

3.5 Networks of European cities for integration policies

During the last decade cities that are active in integration policies have developed significant new relations outside their national context, particularly in the form of networks of cities that exchange knowledge and practical experiences in local integration policies. Interestingly, apart from being primarily cross-national horizontal forms of cooperation between cities, they all have a strong connections with the European Commission. This new coalition between the European Commission and networks of European cities came into existence shortly after the European Commission’s start of EU-integration policies in 2003 that we described above. This new constellation is also the reason why most of the network initiatives of cities for
integration policies – though not all of them21 – are networks of exclusively European cities. We will describe the four most important networks below.

The first is the CLIP-Network (Cities for Local Integration Policies)22, established as a European Network of cities in 2006 by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the City of Stuttgart and Eurofound.23 It comprises some 30 European cities. The basic idea of the CLIP-project is that cities learn from each other by exchanging knowledge and experience between cities. This is done in a systematic process involving research institutes that collect material on integration policies in the participating cities. Five research institutes of the IMISCOE Network of Excellence24 have been engaged to do case studies in each of the cities and to compare these cases. The project is organised as a suite of consecutive modules in which specific aspects of local integration policy are studied empirically and compared systematically. The first module was on housing for immigrants (Bosswick et al. 2007), the second on diversity policies in employment and service provision (Spencer 2008), the third on inter-group relations (Lüken-Klassen & Heckmann 2010) and the fourth on immigrant entrepreneurship (Rath et al. 2011). Each module generated some 25-30 case studies, one comparative synthesis report25 and specific policy briefs. Each module was followed by a conference in which the results were discussed among the cities involved and with a wider interested audience. CLIP was funded from 2006 to 2012 by the European Foundation. The CLIP materials focus strongly on policy practices in particular sub-domains of integration policies, enabling analysis of the complete chain from policy formulation to implementation and results, showing the often strong dependence of such policies on the functioning of general institutions at the local and national levels. It also gives important insights into the administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms involved in policymaking and implementation.

The second network is Integrating Cities,26 a project (also since 2006) carried out by Eurocities, a large network of some 140 major European cities. Integrating Cities can be seen as a policy dialogue between Eurocities and the European Commission. The most important platform for dialogue between cities and the EC are the Integrating Cities Conferences (2008–2013 in Rotterdam, Milano, Berlin, London, Amsterdam and Tampere). The network has developed the Eurocities Charter on Integrating Cities as a programme for city governance.

Eurocities has implemented a number of EU-funded projects on local integration as well as initiatives from the Eurocities’ Working Group on Migration and Integration. The oldest of these projects was the INTI-Cities project that ran for 18 months during 2007-2009. The project was about ‘Benchmarking Integration Governance in European Cities’: peer reviews were used to assess integration policies in European cities. By measuring policies against a benchmark of high standards, it aimed at delivering expert-validated, comparative knowledge on local practices in 12 cities from nine EU member states. Four dimensions of integration policy were assessed:

21 The Cities of Migration project (http://citiesofmigration.ca) is an initiative taken by the Canadian Maytree Foundation. It is a project rather than a network. Cities of Migration does not have members. Cities are invited to (mostly virtually) share their experiences and learn from each other. The Cities of Migration project’s main instrument is its website. The Cities of Migration project is now supported by a dozen private foundations from Europe, North America and elsewhere.
22 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip.htm
23 The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a tripartite European Union Agency, whose role is to provide knowledge in the area of social and work-related policies.
24 The five institutes involved in CLIP are the European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) at the University of Bamberg, the Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford, the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam, the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM) of the University of Liège.
25 These case studies are available in the e-library of the European Urban Knowledge Network (EUKN: www.eukn.org) and on the website of the European Foundation (www.eurofound.europa.eu). The comparative synthesis reports are published by the Council of Europe and at www.eurofound.europa.eu.
26 www.integratingcities.eu/
1) General governance arrangements in the field of migrant integration;
2) Policies in support of individual migrant empowerment;
3) Structures and effectiveness in administrative cooperation;
4) Policies creating and supporting partnerships with civil society and migrant associations.

The final report (Niessen & Kirchberger 2009) summarises benchmarks and recommendations.

The INTI-project was followed by the DIVE-project that had a different and narrower focus on the promotion of diversity and equality in local policies, examining how cities and municipalities can effectively implement diversity policies in management and employment policies led by principles of equality. The project was co-financed by the European Integration Fund. The project resorted again to the methodology of benchmarking and peer reviewing:

1) A set of four benchmarks with regard to the four key responsibilities of cities in promoting mutual accommodation were designed: municipalities as policy-makers, employers, service providers and buyers of goods and services;
2) Empirical research was carried out on local integration policies through peer-reviews in four major European cities (Berlin, Rome, Amsterdam and Leeds), involving senior city officials with relevant responsibilities;
3) The benchmark report that resulted from this exercise was shared with actors across Europe. It nurtured the Integrating Cities conferences of Berlin 2009 and London 2010 and contributed to the Cities’ charter on the role of local government in the integration of migrants.  

The results of the project were published in the report “Cities Accommodating Diversity” (Moloney & Kirchberger 2010).

The MIXITIES-project (Making integration work in Europe’s cities, 2010 - 2012) built on the work developed by the INTI- and DIVE-projects. It aimed to develop peer reviews, structured exchange workshops, and toolkits to support cities in delivering the commitments of the Charter. The project focused on three key areas, namely anti-discrimination policy, diversity competences in public services and introductory courses for newcomers. Peer reviews were held on each of these themes respectively in the cities of Gent, Barcelona and Stockholm in 2011. The project’s findings and recommendations were presented at the Integrating Cities conference held in Amsterdam in March 2012.

The third network is Intercultural Cities, a joint action of the Council of Europe and the European Commission started in 2008. It emerged from the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue that the Council of Europe had submitted for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in that same year. The concept of the Intercultural City was developed earlier by the British think tank Comedia. In 2004, Comedia conducted a two year research programme in the UK, United States, Australia, New Zealand and Norway entitled ‘The Intercultural City: Making the Most of Diversity’. It looked at cultural diversity as a source of innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship and how increased intercultural dialogue, exchange and activity can be the catalyst for such a process (Wood 2009).

The Intercultural Cities strategy is a management strategy that publicly advocates respect for diversity and a pluralistic city identity. The Intercultural Cities Programme was developed and first applied in 11 European pilot cities and has evolved since then. The Programme develops tools such as the Intercultural Cities Index for cities to evaluate and develop their policies. It organises international conferences for cities to exchange experience.

27 The Integrating Cities Charter, launched in 2010, commits signatories to fully acknowledge the presence of migrants in their roles as policy makers, service providers, employers and buyers of goods and services. By September 2013, 30 European cities have signed the charter, which is complemented by a process of monitoring and peer learning.
28 http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/Cities/
The fourth network is a more specific horizontal cooperation initiative, the *European Coalition of Cities Against Racism* (ECCAR\(^{29}\)) established in 2004 upon the initiative of UNESCO. The aim of this coalition of cities is to share experiences in order to improve policies to fight racism, discrimination and xenophobia. Since 2008, its annual general conference is the main tool for exchange between cities. In the meantime, 104 municipalities from 22 European countries have joined the network and adopted the "Ten-Point-Plan of Action".

These four European networks described above are all networks that have built up some form of organisation and continuity of cooperation. But apart from these, there have been numerous forms of cooperation of cities that have existed only during the period that they have been funded (mostly by EU-funds). Examples are ELCI - *European Local Cooperation for Integration* (2010)\(^{30}\) - an 18 month project funded by the European Integration Fund that aims to promote knowledge and understanding of the valuable role that migrant organisations could play in integration process. Another example is DELI – *Diversity in the Economy and Local Integration* – financed by the Council of Europe and the EIF. It focuses on migrant-owned small and medium size enterprises in the local economy. In the sections 4-6 below we will refer to more such projects funded by the ERF, the EIF and also the ESF (European Social Fund) for material relating to local integration of migrants. The ESF in particular has funded a number of projects on local labour market integration and on entrepreneurship in which (im-) migrants have a significant place.

3.6 The multi-level governance of migration and integration: a preliminary diagnosis

The foregoing analysis in this section has shown, first of all, that mobility of people across national boundaries has become a prominent feature in Europe and that, as a consequence, the population of European societies, particularly of its cities, has become more divers.

Secondly, it has shown that these two phenomena have become significant issues for governmental agencies at several levels: where initially national governments had a monopoly on the politics of international migration, the European Union has become a significant actor introducing new notions of migration (TCN-international and EU-internal) with different regimes and statuses. When it comes to integration, the picture is even more complex: while initially (before 2000) there were few examples of explicit national integration policies and thus local governments had to deal primarily with the presence of immigrants, national governments and EU agents have started integration policies since the turn of the century, each with their own specific definition of the concept of integration, of target groups and aims of such policies. Local governments are now revising (or forced to revise) their position in relation to these new policy actors: new oppositions - between national and local governments - and new coalitions - between local and EU agents – are introduced.

In the descriptive sense, the multi-level character of policies has clearly expanded, simply because more levels have involved themselves in these policies. If one would have a more normative definition of multi-level governance – in the sense that policy action should be coordinated, complementary and mutually supporting between levels – than the multi-level character is presently quite problematic. The foregoing descriptive analysis demonstrated, for example, that in integration policies, the European Commission

\(^{29}\) [http://www.citiesagainstracism.org/ICCAR.6.0.html](http://www.citiesagainstracism.org/ICCAR.6.0.html)  
\(^{30}\) [http://menedek.hu/](http://menedek.hu/)
circumvents national government by working directly with cities, while national governments have uploaded their new cultural integration policies to the EU-level and prescribe it to the local level.

4. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY - by Tiziana Caponio

4.1. Introduction

This paper investigates the policies and practices of European cities to deal with issues of legal inclusion and participation in the public sphere, considering also the role assigned to immigrant associations in the decision making and implementation of local integration policies.

Although main competence over the legal and political dimension of integration lies at the national level, local authorities can nevertheless enjoy a considerable margin of manoeuvre in implementing national policies and/or can promote specific initiatives to facilitate immigrants’ access to secure legal status (e.g., a dedicate office providing information on how to prepare the naturalisation procedure) or to favour their political participation (e.g., consultative committees).

In this paper I first analyse the issue of legal inclusion, distinguishing between access to legal status for undocumented immigrants on the one hand, and access to naturalisation and permanent status on the other. Then I turn my attention to immigrants’ political inclusion, taking into consideration its two main sub-dimensions, i.e.

1) direct political inclusion, through local voting rights;
2) indirect political inclusion, through consultative committees.

For each issue I analyse cities’ policy frames, taking into consideration the main elements from which frames can be disclosed, i.e.: a) the target of the policy, or in other terms who is defined to be the beneficiary; b) the official aim of the policy; c) the strategy pursued, that is the kind of initiative actually promoted; d) the organisation of policymaking and implementation, in order to point out the model of governance underlying the analysed policy. With respect to governance, a particular attention will be devoted to relations of:

- vertical governance, i.e. with national/regional levels of government;
- horizontal governance, i.e. with NGOs and other local actors.

The information sources are represented by the main research projects carried out in Europe on the two topics. Studies and publications considering various aspects of local integration policies often take also into account matters of legal inclusion and political participation. Yet, in this report we will consider primarily literature and projects explicitly focused on the legal and political dimension of immigrant integration, or which at least assign it a crucial relevance.

The main goal of the paper is that of identifying similarities and differences in European cities’ policy frames on the (sub)dimensions of legal and political inclusion, and to point out the emerging of trends in
terms of convergence or divergence across cities.

4.2 Local policies of legal inclusion

4.2.1. From undocumented to legal residence

The treatment of illegal immigrants is indeed a controversial issue, which however acquires a strong relevance for local authorities in the perspective of notions of urban citizenship (Bauböck 2003). With respect to this matter, a preliminary aspect that has to be considered when analysing local policy frames is that of multilevel governance and intergovernmental relations. In fact, criteria for the regularisation of undocumented migrants and access to legal status are established at a national level. Local authorities characterise as administrative arenas (Caponio 2010a), in the sense that they have responsibility exclusively on policy implementation, with respect to which they can enjoy different margins of responsibility and autonomy/discretion.

A distinction can be made between countries that assign to the cities explicit and formal prerogatives on matters of immigrants’ regularisation and countries where these procedures are highly centralised. This opposition is very well illustrated by the cases of Spain and France (Burchianti 2010). In Spain, through the institution of the padrón municipal, which is an administrative register where immigrants who live in a city can register just with their foreign passport and therefore without necessarily having a regular residence permit, the local administration can play an active role in favouring (or discouraging) undocumented immigrants’ access to legal status. In fact, since 2003, the Spanish immigration law assigns to the municipalities the task of producing the so called “social rooting” (arraigo social) report, which is a fundamental requirement for seeking regularisation. On the other hand, in France the municipalities have no formal competence on matters of immigrants’ legal status. At a local level is the Prefect (Préfet), as representative of the Ministry of the Interior and therefore of the national government, who enjoys quite a lot of discretion power in establishing who cannot be expelled and has to be regularised on the basis of humanitarian considerations.

However, cities, even when do not formally have any competence on matters of regularisation, can decide if simply overlooking the issue, and limit their intervention to what is eventually required by national laws, or if actively promoting policies which disclose a specific framing of the treatment of undocumented migrants. Four different such frames can be identified: 1) the security frame; 2) the humanitarian frame; 3) the human rights frame; 4) the deserving workers frame. These local frames can be more or less consistent with national policy frames on undocumented migration and legalisation (see for instance: Chauvin, Gracés-Mascareñas and Kraler 2013b). Yet, most of the consulted research does not specify the relation between framing processes at different levels of government.

The security frame

The security frame targets primarily national residents, with the aim of reassuring them about the respect of legality in the city and about the enactment of controls on unwanted immigration. Usually, the political discourse in these cities is openly anti-immigrants and the concrete actions carried out are aimed at sending the message that undocumented migrants are not welcomed. The main strategy is that of introducing restrictive measures as public order ordinances that make life for them extremely difficult and therefore impede access to legal status. In terms of policymaking, political actors, and in particular local
government majorities where anti-immigrant parties are represented, have indeed a crucial role; yet, implementation can be more or less consistent with official restrictive policy, depending on the administrative cultures of public officials and street-level bureaucrats.

The municipalities of the Lombardy region analysed by Ambrosini (2012) are a case in point: various ordinances have been approved in the late 2000s to contrast irregular immigration both explicitly, as in the case of enhanced controls on busses and even private houses, or implicitly, as in the case of the ordinances against Roma spontaneous settlements, where undocumented migrants are very likely to find a temporary shelter. These measures aim at excluding and expelling them from the city, while reassuring the local population about the centrality of security for the maintaining of social cohesion. To strengthen the security frame, some municipalities have also approved ordinances which restrict the right to reside officially in a territory by introducing hurdles in the registration procedures, such as the request of providing additional documentation (e.g. proving adequate income, criminal record etc.) or imposing a preliminary check on the healthiness and/or of the ‘decency’ of the dwelling.

The security policy frame emerging in many cities in the Lombardy region at the end of the 2000s can be regarded on the overall consistent with the national approach towards undocumented migration pursued in the same period by the 5th Berlusconi government (spring 2008). In this latter the anti-immigrant Northern League played a crucial role, since one of its leaders, Roberto Maroni, was appointed Minister of the Interiors (Ambrosini 2012, 5). Yet, it has to be pointed out that similar initiatives were undertaken by other Italian cities in the middle of the decade, when at the national level a centre-left government was in power and the policy frame on immigration was far less restrictive towards undocumented migrants (Zincone 2011). A case in point is that of Padua (Ostanel 2013): in the mid-2000s the then centre-left Mayor of the city, Flavio Zanonato, approved a series of ordinances targeting run-down blocks in the area of Via Anelli, indirectly hitting the undocumented migrants who used to live there as squatters.

The humanitarian frame

The policy target in the humanitarian frame is represented primarily by asylum seekers, including also those whose application has been rejected and therefore are at risk of being expelled. This category of migrants is presented as a particularly vulnerable one, which requires special attention and support on the part of public policy. Research on national regularisation policies (Chauvin, Gracés-Mascareñas and Kraler 2013b, 119) show the increasing centrality of employment as a condition for migrant legalisation, challenging the framing of undocumented as vulnerable individuals. Yet, some European cities do not seem to follow this trend, and continue to look at undocumented migrants primarily as individuals facing particularly severe dangers in their home countries and therefore deserving support on the basis of humanitarian considerations.

A strategy going in this direction is the Sanctuary City movement, which started in the US but since the late 2000s has taken more and more grounds also in the UK. Sheffield became a city of Sanctuary in 2007, followed by Bradford, Bristol, Coventry, Leicester, London, Norwich, Nottingham, Oxford and Swansea (Cities of Migration and Maytree Foundation 2012c, 23). According to the Maytree Foundation report Good Ideas from Successful Cities – Municipal Leadership on Immigrant Integration, policies in these cities are aimed at creating a favourable context for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, in the perspective of favouring their permanent stay. In terms of local governance, sanctuary cities-like policies require broad partnerships between different actors, the local Council in the first place, but also NGOs, civil rights movements and community organisations. In the case of Sheffield, the initiative was taken by faith and community groups, but in the course of time over one hundred associations joined the movement (Cities of Migration and Maytree Foundation 2012, 24).
However, the Maytree Foundation report does not provide detailed information on the effectiveness of these policies in terms of changing attitudes in the local population towards refugees and favouring the access of these latter to legal status. More research is also needed on how the sanctuary-city approach to undocumented migration interacts with more restrictive policy frames at a national and European level. The case of the US seems to demonstrate that sanctuary cities, by preventing staff working for city’s services from asking individuals about their status, can effectively hinder the enforcement of federal and state legislation.

**The human rights frame**

A variant of the humanitarian frame can be found in the human rights frame, which regards undocumented in general, does no matter the reason of their stay (e.g., for work reasons, to seek asylum etc.), as particularly vulnerable individuals, who have to face more threats to their safety and security than ordinary residents and are at greater risk of marginalisation because of their lack of a residence permit. Cities that adopt such an approach show a particularly open stance towards undocumented immigrants’ access to fundamental rights, from legal status to health, education, housing etc. and to legal status in particular.

This open stance can often reflect the political struggles between central and local government, as well as between right-wing and left-wing political majorities, around the issue of undocumented migration. A case in point is the Communist city of Pierre-Bénite, in the Lyon area in France, that in the 2000s set up, together with the NGO Cimade, particularly active in supporting immigrants, an “alert system” aimed at monitoring the difficult situations faced by some illegal immigrants in the city and at finding favourable solutions in collaboration with the Prefecture (Cinalli 2008). In this same period, The Socialist city of Villeurbanne (Cinalli 2008), always in the Lyon area, undertook the practice of favouring so called “republican sponsorships” of illegal immigrants on the part of national citizens or local officials. In particular, the sponsor engaged him/herself to support an undocumented immigrant by providing juridical advice to get access to legal status.

As is clear, in the French cities mentioned above the role of politicians in promoting actions overtly contradicting the national political attitude towards undocumented comes to the fore. Other actors such as the NGO Cimade in the case of Pierre-Bénite are somehow associated to the initiative, yet this reflects primarily a top-down approach. Yet, the human rights frame does not imply necessarily a primacy of politics in the system of local governance. In the case of Ghent in Belgium (Gehardt 2010), the municipality offers legal advice to all immigrants, irrespectively of their juridical conditions, in order to favour their access to other services and rights. Public officials together with NGOs are crucial in undertaking and carrying out this kind of legal service.

**The deserving workers frame**

According to the deserving workers frame, undocumented migrants are primarily foreign workers who haven’t been able to enter legally or to keep their residence permit, even though there is a need for them in the local economy. The aim is that of favouring the permanent stay of these – locally - “useful”

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31 Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2012, 244) underline how in France in the mid-2000s many local city halls undertook initiatives similar to that of Villeurbanne to mark their opposition to Sarkozy’s repression of undocumented immigrants.

32 With respect to recent works on the “deservingness frame” of undocumented migration (see for instance: Chauvin, Garcés-Mascareñas and Kraler 2013a), which are focused essentially on national level policy and bring to light the moral basis of
workers. To this end, specific policies are likely to be undertaken especially during national amnesties, such as information and counselling services in order to provide support in filling up the application and following the regularisation procedure. These are usually *ad hoc* measures, which last for the short period of the amnesty campaign. Of a central relevance for the undertaking of such policies is the presence of strong policy networks between trade unions, employers organisations and NGOs. The municipality usually plays a role in the coordination of such networks, favouring the dialogue with Police Headquarters and other concerned public institutions.

Examples of this kind of frame can be found in the studies examining the implementation of national laws on immigrants legalisation in Italian cities. In particular, Zucchini (1998) analyses the implementation of the 1995 amnesty in Turin and Brescia: in the first city, a mobilisation from below took place in order to facilitate the regularisation of immigrant undocumented workers, which lead to the emerging of a network between trade unions, NGOs, the municipality and the Police Headquarters; in the case of Brescia, instead, a far more restrictive framing prevailed, with no collaboration between the Police Headquarters and the other actors concerned with immigrants’ rights, since the former emphasised the supposed neutrality of the regularisation procedure and the respect legality. Another study on the renewal of residence permits in different cities in the Piedmont region (Caponio 2007), shows the emerging of a particularly active pro-immigrant network in the case of Cuneo, sharing a common definition of immigrants as “useful and deserving workers”. In 2003 trade unions, employers organisations, Catholic and lay NGOs, the Province and the municipality of Cuneo, together with the Police Headquarters, started to regularly meet in order to smooth the implementation of the 2002 immigration law, which imposed new restrictions on permits renewals.

**4.2.2 Access to citizenship**

Similarly to the case of access to legal status for undocumented migrants, it is up to national laws to draw the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens and to decide under which conditions the latter may aspire to become members of the national community. However, while only rarely acknowledged and studied, the local dimension of citizenship policy may nevertheless represent a crucial policymaking arena in contemporary receiving countries, since it is at a local level that criteria for membership in a certain community acquire social meaning. This is particularly evident in the case of Switzerland (Helbling 2008 and 2010), which is the best example, and probably unique, of a local political citizenship arena in Europe: in this country final decisions on applications for naturalisation are taken at a municipal level by a political body, either the local parliament, or the executive, or even the entire population through direct ballot (Helbling 2008: 13).

However, apart from the competence formally accorded to local authorities on naturalisation procedures, cities can play a role by promoting specific actions aimed at fostering access to citizenship. These can disclose different framings of the issue. From our literature review, two appear as particularly prominent 1) the enabling and activating citizenship frame; 2) the local citizenship frame.

*The enabling citizenship frame*

The assumption characterising this policy frame is that it is not sufficient for an immigrant to satisfy the formal conditions required by the law (number of years of legal residence, language knowledge etc.) in immigrants participation into the economy and labour market, at a local level a much more utilitarian considerations has to be pointed out, in the sense that deservingness is usually based on arguments regarding the positive contribution of immigrant workers to the local economy, rather than on employment as a civic obligation.
order to apply for naturalisation. More is needed, in particular in terms of knowledge of the procedure, of the responsible bureaucratic institutions and of the possible problems that can arise. Hence, this frame targets foreign immigrants who, according to existing laws, meet all the conditions to obtain naturalisation, and aims at supporting and encouraging them to apply. The policy strategy usually pursued is that of rising awareness on the advantages of being a de jure citizen through citizenship campaigns. However, also other more specific measures are likely to be promoted such as language training to pass tests, administrative support in the undertaking and follow up of the procedure etc. In terms of organisation of policymaking, the initiative can be taken either top-down from the city’s government or bottom-up from NGOs, in both cases leading to the establishing of extensive networks and mobilisation around the citizenship issue.

The naturalisation campaigns carried out in some German cities such as Berlin or Hesse (Chopin 2006: 226) are a case in point. A more elaborated project has been promoted by the municipality of Hamburg, where volunteer facilitators from various different communities have been trained to provide advice about citizenship procedures to those who showed to be hesitant or needed guidance because of linguistic barriers, fear of bureaucratic processes or lack of knowledge on the benefits of naturalisation (Cities of Migration and Maytree Foundation 2012b). The implementation of the project has been carried out by a network of immigrant associations and local pro-immigrant rights NGOs.

The local citizenship frame

The target in the local citizenship frame is not a specific category of immigrants, but rather national legislation, which is regarded as too restrictive and as penalising immigrants integration processes. The aim is that of putting pressure on the national government for undertaking reform of the citizenship law, and to raise awareness in the national and local public on the issue. To this end, information campaigns and demonstrative actions are likely to be undertaken, to show that those who live and are fully integrated in the city should be considered as citizens in every respect. A centrality of the local government and, in particular, of political actors, can be expected in the undertaking of such policies, which have a highly polemic content vis-à-vis the national government.

A case in point is that of the recent initiatives undertaken by many Italian cities among which Rome and Turin to grant the honorary citizenship to immigrant children who were born and have been living in these cities. The honorary citizenship is just a symbolic reward, yet these ceremonies have the goal of putting on the agenda the unfairness of the national law towards second generations in Italy. This allows them to become citizens only at 18 years old, even when born in the country.

A unique case of local political citizenship arena: Switzerland

In the case of Switzerland, where, as mentioned above, local authorities have full responsibility on deciding on individual citizenship applications, we should expect the emerging of different frames, more or less favourable to accept foreigners as full members of the local community. In this respect, Helbling (2008 and 2010), shows how in some Swiss municipalities rejection rates are higher than in others and identifies three explanatory factors. First of all, different local understandings of citizenship have to be taken into account, since some municipalities emphasise cultural affinity while others show a more universalistic orientation; secondly, rejection rates are influenced by the strength at a local level of the Swiss People’s party, namely the major Swiss right-wing populist party; third, direct democratic decision-making procedures are also relevant, since these may provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties to mobilise the people. As a consequence, at least two opposite frames emerge, one reflecting an ethnic
understanding of citizenship and an anti-immigrant stance, the second more open towards immigrants inclusion on the basis of a universalistic approach.

4.3. Political participation: policies of direct and indirect inclusion

Similarly to access to legal status and citizenship, also the definition of the criteria for access to political rights is primarily a national competence. Cities have no autonomous powers on matters of political participation. Yet, processes of political mobilisation cannot but take place at a local level, where immigrants interact everyday with the receiving society and its institutions. Therefore, the local level is of a crucial relevance for immigrants political participation and inclusion into the public sphere.

Two types of political inclusion can be identified: direct political inclusion, consisting of voting rights and incorporation into mainstream political institutions; indirect political inclusion, through consultative committees or immigrants’ councils. The two are linked together: since access to local voting rights is not the norm in Europe, throughout the 1990s various cities have undertaken initiatives aimed at including immigrants into the local political sphere at least indirectly through consultative institutions (De Haas 1997). Yet, these institutions can serve different purposes, and actually it is common to find them also in cities where immigrants have access to local elections.

First overviews of local policies of direct and indirect political inclusion have been provided in the context of two international research projects: the Unesco-MOST Programme Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (Penninx and Martiniello 2004); the survey carried out among cities belonging to the ELAINE network in 1997 (De Haas 1997). Both projects have pointed out the relevance of intermediary political participation structures at a local level, also in cities where immigrants have access to local voting rights. More recent projects such as the CLIP research module on Inter-group Relations and Intercultural Policies (Heckman and Lüken-Klaßen 2010), show how in many cities these institutions are still relevant today, especially in the context of the intercultural policy turn. Consultative committees and platforms gathering together immigrant organisations can assume a crucial relevance in the implementation of various initiatives aimed at promoting intercultural dialogue, both at a city and district level. Furthermore, the CLIP research shows how indirect political inclusion can be carried out also on a more informal and ad hoc basis, with occasional meetings and/or participation in the implementation of specific initiatives targeting immigrant groups.

On the one hand, direct inclusion through voting rights can be either possible or not, depending on national legislation; on the other, indirect inclusion can characterise either as formal and institutionalised or an informal and/or ad hoc. By crossing these two dimensions, we obtain a typology of possible local frames of political inclusion.

33 According to MIPEX, in 2010 six countries accorded to immigrants active and passive electoral rights at a local level after three years of legal residence, i.e.: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Another six countries allow full political participation at a local level but on a more restrictive basis: Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. Luxemburg enables immigrants to participate in voting after three years of legal residence but not to stand for elections. This is also the case in Belgium, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, even though these countries require five years of residence and registration to the electoral office.
Table 1- Typology of policy frames on immigrants political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect inclusion (consultative committees)</th>
<th>Direct inclusion (voting rights)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Participatory frame</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Egalitarian frame</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Representative frame</td>
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<td>Mediation frame</td>
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In the sub-sections below we analyse these frames and provide examples for each one on the basis of the evidence available in the main research projects on immigrants political inclusion. Among these, of a particular relevance is the LocalMultiDem project, funded by the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission, which has investigated immigrants and ethnic groups political and civic integration by considering, among other factors, the local political opportunity structure in 6 European cities, i.e. Budapest, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. Furthermore, as anticipated above, also the CLIP project on Intergroup relations and intercultural dialogue carried out in 2009 took into consideration immigrant associations and ethnic groups’ representation. Other projects regarding more generally local integration policies have been considered insofar as these take into account the issue of immigrant political participation.

4.3.1 The participatory frame

The participatory frame characterises cities which allow both for immigrant direct and indirect inclusion. Not only foreign immigrants have access to voting right, but also specific institutions are put in place to provide a further channel of political participation. However, these institutions can vary considerably in terms of target and aim. As a consequence, the general participatory frame is likely to assume slightly different connotations, according to the type of consultative institution put in place.

A first goal can be that of providing a venue for the representation of different ethnic communities and immigrant groups. Amsterdam immigrant participatory policies in the 1980s and 1990s appear a case in point. The city of Amsterdam established advisory councils for minorities already in the early 1980s, mirroring the national Minorities Policy. The goal was that of providing venues for the representation of the immigrant communities living in the city and get them more involved in processes of policy formulation. In more concrete terms, five advisory councils were established, i.e. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese/Antilleans, South Europeans and refugees, Chinese and Pakistanis, each one constituted of representatives of individual minority organisations and financially and administratively supported by the city administration (Alexander 2007, 178). In 2003 the advisory councils were discontinued, and a new Diversity Council was set up in 2005. This is constituted of representatives of different immigrant associations and acts as a public inquiry institution (Van Heelsum 2010), i.e. it airs criticisms and gives voice to the concerns of the ethnic communities. It meets about four times a year with the Advisory Board on Diversity and Integration, which comprises also experts. The new institution stresses the necessity of establishing a link and strengthening the dialogue between immigrant associations and the city administration, rather than simply representing the different ethnic minorities, as was the case with the previous advisory councils. According to some scholars (Uitermark 2012), the framing of Amsterdam policies of indirect political inclusion has moved from the multicultural approach of the 1980s and 1990s towards a greater emphasis on the diversity of the city as a whole. As a consequence, consultative institutions should not be aimed at simply recognising the interests of the different groups, but rather at debating and negotiating diversity, in a process where different parts are involved, i.e. members of ethnic groups and experts.
Another development in the local indirect inclusion policy can be found in the case of Copenhagen. Similarly to the Netherlands, also in Denmark access to local voting rights is allowed after 3 years of legal residence. Hence, immigrants can have access to direct political participation. Furthermore, since 1998, an Integration Council has been established “to ‘attend to the interests of the ethnic minorities and act as their mouthpiece’, as well as to ‘guide the politicians, the standing committees and the administration of the city on how to secure an efficient and coherent integration policy’” (Penninx 2010). It used to be composed of nominated representatives of ethnic organisations, in addition to experts and representatives of the social partners, housing corporations and educational institutions. Since 2006 the representatives of immigrant groups are directly elected from the population of residents with (non-western) immigrant origin, and immigrant organisations as such are not involved anymore. A shift from group representation towards individual participation seems to have taken place.

In terms of governance models, the analysed cities seem to disclose a rather top-down organisation, in the sense that the different councils are promoted and set up by the city governing institutions (the council or the executive) and are somehow directly or indirectly linked to them.

### 4.3.2. The egalitarian frame

The egalitarian frame can be found in cities where local voting rights are accessible and no further formal institution of participation is in place, even though informal contacts and/or ad hoc consultation occasionally can take place, often through city participation platforms which are not dealing exclusively with migration related issues. In general, it is assumed that immigrants are de facto politically included since they have full access to local elections, and therefore, if willing, they can participate in the public sphere. Immigrants are put on the same plan as national citizens.

Yet, some of these cities seem to acknowledge that the fact of formally having the right to vote and/or to stand for elections does not entail that political participation will necessarily follow. In other terms, formal equality is not considered enough, while a more substantive notion of equality, implying active participation and concrete involvement in local politics is regarded as key to integration. Cities adopting such an approach will adopt policies of political inclusion that target individual immigrants and aim at fostering their political participation by turning a formal right into a concrete capacity. In terms of strategy, different kinds of actions can be undertaken, such as training courses in voting education, information sessions on electoral rights.

The city of Dublin is a case in point. In Ireland, legally resident non-EU citizens can vote in local elections, yet participation had historically been very low: in the 2007 election, only 8,400 out of a potential of 75,000 migrants registered to vote (Cities of Migration and Maytree Foundation 2012a, 18). Barriers identified included the very young profile age of foreign potential voters and a lack of targeted information on how to register and why they should vote. In view of the 2009 local elections in Dublin, the Migrant Voters Campaign Project was launched with the aim of raising awareness of migrants’ voting right. In particular, the city organised one day voting education training for 74 community leaders who were then involved in delivering voters’ information sessions within their respective communities and in other communities across the city. Posters advertising the project were translated into 25 languages as part of the registration campaign. To carry out the project, immigrant communities and their associations were involved since the very beginning: a steering committee of 16 immigrants from 12 countries representing ethnic, religious, cultural groups and business interests was established (Crawly and Crimes 2010). Therefore, communities have been involved in order to support immigrants’ individual voting rights, which is the very focus of Dublin city policy in terms of political inclusion. In general, immigrant groups are consulted through both informal and formal channels such as focus groups on specific matters like access
to public services, safety and security etc. Yet no permanent consultative committee has been established and consultation is always on an ad hoc basis.

A similar approach can be found in the city of Dortmund (Cities of Migration and Maytree Foundation 2012b). In Germany immigrants do not have access to local voting rights, yet the 20% of the population in 2011 had a migrant background. According to a study carried out by the Max Plank Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity (Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert 2011), they are significantly underrepresented in Germany’s political institutions. In the case of Dortmund, always in 2011 the 28% of the population were of an immigrant origin, yet only the 5% of the local council members had such a background. To address this gap the city of Dortmund launched the project “Politics with Impact” (Politik Mit-Wirkung) with the aim of increasing the political participation of ethnic communities. The project was coordinated by the city Migration and Integration Agency and by the Integration Council, an advisory board founded in 1972 and whose members are elected since 1983. Even if in this city we find a formal representative institution of immigrants’ interests, yet there seems also to be a clear consciousness of the limits of these kind of bodies and of the necessity to be directly involved in policymaking.

Usually the organisation of these policies is of a top-down kind, since these are initiatives promoted directly by the local government which seeks to address individuals. Yet, NGOs and immigrant associations can be involved in various manners in order to reach the potential beneficiaries.

4.3.3 The representative frame

The representative frame emerges when cities establish formal consultative institutions in order to compensate for the lack of access to local voting rights and to provide a venue for the representation of immigrants in the local political sphere. Similarly to the participatory frame, also in this case sub-frames can be pointed out, depending on who is the target of the policy, i.e. the subject to be represented in the consultative committee, if immigrant groups and their organisations, or individual immigrants.

If the target are immigrant communities, and the aim is that of representing the different groups living in the city and giving them the possibility to voice their view and interests in local policymaking processes, a first strategy that can be pursued is that of setting up a consultative committee composed of appointed representatives of the different groups. This is the case for instance in Lisbon of the Municipal Council of Migrant Communities and Ethnic Minorities, a consultative council that includes representatives of the bigger ethnic minority associations, established in 1993 (Ponzo 2010). New members are selected by current members of the Municipal Council and its president according to the criteria of “relevance”: for each of the largest ethnic minority living in Lisbon, those that are regarded as the most relevant associations are invited, while other associations can attend the meetings, although without the right to vote.

However, the target can be represented also by individual migrants living in the city, in the sense that the consultative council can be regarded as an instrument to foster individual participation. Usually this is the case of consultative committees directly elected by foreign immigrants. These committees allow for the representation - depending on the electoral rules - of the immigrants and/or associations, which have received the higher number of votes. This does not guarantee that all the communities present in a city will have a sit, since also inter-ethnic and mixed associations can take part in the electoral competition. The goal is rather that of fostering immigrants’ grassroots participation without taking for granted groups affiliations and identities. A case in point is the Foreigners’ Council (KAV) set up by the municipality of Frankfurt (Lüken-Klaßen and Pohl 2010). Its 37 members are directly elected by third country nationals and participate in all of the City Council committees. Furthermore, it acts as an advisory council of the city
government.

In a similar vein, the “Conseil des Résidents Etrangers Lyonnais” (“Council of Lyon Foreign Residents”) of the municipality of Lyon, set up for the first time in March 2005, was explicitly presented by the city Mayor as an institution which was not aimed at representing communities or immigrant associations, but rather the immigrant population as a whole. This stance clearly reflects the official rejection, quite strong in France, of any representation of communities or particular interests (Cinalli 2008). However, the CREL members were not elected but appointed for three years. After an information campaign carried out in the local press and through organizations in contact with foreigners (consulates, associations etc.), about 200 applications were received. The selection of councillors was made by taking into account different criteria, the idea of diversity being presented as a key one. First, the composition of the Council was made by considering the importance of the different immigrant groups settled in Lyon. Following this principle, 37 nationalities were allowed to enter, and for the most numerous communities (such the Algerians, 3 councillors were assigned, while less important groups obtain two councillors or just one. The rule of parity, i.e. equal representation of men and women, was also respected and criteria such as the age, the social backgrounds and the local districts of the members were also taken into account. Some of the CREL’s members are also associations’ militants. However, most of existing studies on immigrant consultative committees do not allow to conclude that these institutions can effectively compensate for the absence of local voting rights. In other terms, their involvement in policymaking processes is not usually investigated in-depth. In general though, these committees seem to have a quite limited role in the definition of local policy. In the case of Lyon for instance, the CREL is regarded as a place of reflection and proposal. It must gather at least four times a year in plenary assembly, and has a formal right of information about local policies; furthermore it can make proposals, spontaneously or when consulted by the City Council. Yet, the City Council has neither the obligation to consult the CREL each time it examines a special issue related to immigrants’ integration nor to follow its advice.

Similar issues are raised in Però (2005) study of the Consell Municipal d’Immigració established in 2001 by the City of Barcelona. According to the city council official documents, the Consell is a consultative body aimed at favouring immigrants’ participation and at creating the necessary conditions for their access to full citizenship, regardless of their administrative situation. To this end, different actors are taking part in the Consell, not only immigrant associations, but also pro-immigrant autochthonous organisations and ‘mixed’ organisations, as well as representatives of the local authorities and of employers’ associations. Yet, according to Però (2005, 9) its concrete functioning reveals how the Consell played a limited role in local policymaking, since it met rarely, only once or twice per year, and just on the initiative of the city council, while requests for extraordinary meetings coming from the associations were systematically disregarded.

4.3.4 The mediation frame

The mediation frame can be found in those cities where no formal voting rights are accorded and no institutional channel of representation is in place, yet immigrants are consulted when decisions or initiatives that directly concern them are to be taken, either informally or through formal ad hoc consultative platforms. Occasional mediation and consultation is the usual mode of immigrants inclusion into the local public sphere. In terms of organisation of policymaking, usually a centrality of public officials can be noticed: these latter, especially if they have a long experience on matters of immigrants integration, can mobilise the immigrant organisations they are in touch with. This does not of course ensure representativity, but primarily some feedback from part of the policy recipients.
The mediation frame seems to characterise a recent immigration city such as Valencia in Spain (Caponio 2010b). Even though a formal institution of immigrants representation is not present, CAI (Centro de Apoyo a la integración) officials have established networks with the main communities and immigrant organisations, and informal meetings are organised with them when the municipality is in the process of discussing the Pluri-annual Integration Plan. Furthermore, immigrant associations are sometimes involved as partners in the carrying out of specific activities, in particular intercultural festivals and other public events.

A similar approach can be found in the case of Turin (Caponio, Ribas and Nielsen 2000; Ricucci 2009). With respect to immigrants’ political participation, this city has undergone two main phases: the mid 1990s, which were characterised by the prevailing of the representative frame; the 2000s, when an approach based on mediation started to take place. In the first period immigrants’ political participation featured as a particularly prominent issue in the local political agenda, as pointed out by the decision of establishing in 1995 the Municipal Consultative Committee. This was directly elected by immigrants who had been living in the city for more than three years on the basis of a complex electoral system aimed at ensuring the representation of the main geographical areas of origin of the immigrants living in the city, i.e. Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. However, the Municipal Consultative Committee was abandoned in 1997, given the scarce participation of immigrant associations in the meetings. They revealed to be structurally weak, and often lacked the resources to organize on a permanent basis (Caponio, Nielsen and Ribas 2000).

Since then, the issue of immigrants’ participation in Turin was side-lined, even though immigrant associations have often been involved in projects of urban regeneration at a district level, as in the case of the project The Gate, carried out in the Porta Palazzo area and funded by the European Social Fund. In the mid-2000s the then centre-left political majority decided to undertake a formal revision of the City Statute to allow for immigrants’ participation in the city districts elections. Even though the initiative was boycotted by the Council of State, that ruled it as unconstitutional, it clearly points out the emerging of a new framing of immigrant participation, not as groups’ representation but rather as a matter of individual inclusion into general voting rights. At the same time, the city administration had been carrying out processes of informal mediation with immigrant associations on particularly problematic matters. A case in point is the Pellerina Park mediation process. In 2006, hundreds of Latin American immigrants started to join informally together in this park at the outskirts of the city to suit their need for socialisation on Sunday, causing protests among Italians because of noise, rubbish, unauthorised barbecues etc. As a response, the Integration Department initiated a process of counselling with Latin American associations to better organise the use of the park and to allow both Italians and immigrants to benefit from it. Contrary to the case of Valencia, in Turin we find a direct involvement of the Deputy Mayor on Immigrant Integration in these mediation processes. This can be explained by considering the particular background of the then Deputy Mayor as practitioner in the field of urban regeneration and immigrant integration (Ricucci 2009).

A different approach is followed by the city of Milan, where the local administration throughout the 1990s and 2000s had in place neither formal immigrants’ consultative committees, nor informal mediation processes with immigrant associations (Caponio 2005; Cinalli 2008). In this case, mediation has been carried out primarily with Italian NGOs, especially of a Catholic background, working for immigrant integration, that have a long tradition of intervention in the social policy field.

Examples of the mediation frame can be found also in cities with a longer immigration history such as Vienna. In this city, the municipality department responsible for immigrant integration policy (MA-17), is particularly involved in the coordination of the so called ‘Associations platforms’ established at a district level, where different communities, NGOs and local politicians address the development of their district.
As is clear, these platforms have a broader scope than representing the different immigrant communities in the city. They are participatory instruments which provide to associations in general, not only immigrant ones, a voice in district policymaking processes; therefore immigrants and ethnic minorities are treated as equal partners (Fassmann, Kohlacher and Perchinig 2010). In a similar vein, the city council of Kirklees does not provide an institutionalised council for relations with ethnic or religious organisations, since it believes that there are a range of mechanisms for communities to engage, including through local elected members, various voluntary sector networks, consultation exercises and direct contact with officers (Crawly and Crimes 2010b). Yet, the city Council has informal, regular contacts with ethnic and religious organisations and provides funding to most of them.

4.4 Conclusion

The analysis carried out in this paper shows how cities can play a relevant role also in matters which are primarily of a national competence, i.e. access to legal status and citizenship on the one hand and immigrant political inclusion on the other. The literature review shows a highly scattered picture on both dimensions, with different kinds of policies unfolding different frames of immigrants legal and political integration. It is difficult to identify clear trends, either of convergence or divergence. Yet, we can point out at least some prevailing approaches.

On the legal dimension, some cities emerge as advocating a conception of urban citizenship (Bauböck 2003) open towards undocumented and/or towards immigrants access to naturalisation, often contrasting national restrictive understandings of who has the legitimate right to live in a country. Yet, and opposite to this, other cities adopt a security framing, which is aimed at excluding – more than at including – undocumented immigrants from the local society, while as far as citizenship is concerned, the ethnic frame characterising some cantons clearly goes in the same direction. Local administrations do not emerge as necessarily more accommodative or far-sighted than national authorities. Matters of economic utility for the local economy can represent a legitimate base for some opening towards the incorporation of undocumented migrants (see the deserving workers frame). Yet, such an open stance cannot be given for granted.

As for access to citizenship, the lack of systematic studies on local level policies, does not allow us to advance generalisations on cities’ frames on this specific issue. As a matter of fact, and with the exception of Helbling (2008 and 2010) study on Switzerland, existing research usually takes into account virtuous cases of cities that have undertaken an initiative on this matter, yet we lack a clear picture of the factors that can push cities to mobilise on immigrants’ naturalisation. The experience of some of the analysed cities, and in particular those which are grouped under the enabling citizenship frame, seems to suggest that citizenship can be a contested issue across levels of government, and in particular between national and local levels. In Italy, through symbolic policies such as the granting of honorary citizenship, some cities have overtly contested the incapability of the national government to bring about a reform of the obsolete 1992 citizenship law.

As for political inclusion, four different frames have been identified as emerging from the crossing of two distinct dimensions, i.e. direct inclusion through voting rights, which is dependent upon national legislation; indirect inclusion through consultative committees, informal mediation and/or ad hoc consultation (see Table n. 1). In other terms, cities where immigrants enjoy local voting rights can either pursue a strategy aimed at strengthening their individual participation in local elections, which unfold a
prevailing egalitarian frame, or can promote specific institutions in order to provide a further channel of political participation, as in the participatory frame. If local voting rights are not available, cities can either set up consultative institutions in order to compensate for the lack of electoral political participation, as in the case of the representative frame, or prefer to carry out just informal and/or ad hoc consultation with immigrant associations, as in the case of the mediation frame. In any case, if we consider those cities where consultative institutions are in place, we see that these can serve different purposes and reveal at their turn different frames of immigrants indirect inclusion, i.e.: the group-oriented frame, aimed at ensuring representation and recognition of immigrant groups and associations; the individual participation frame, which on the contrary emphasises immigrants individual participation, as in the case of the representative frame; the diversity frame, which regards as crucial the recognition and negotiation of diversity rather than of difference.

Again though, also with respect to the dimension of political inclusion, it is difficult to identify clear trends, since most of the analysed studies are descriptive and limited to the cities’ recent experiences. The few ones that adopt a historical perspective seem to reveal a certain disenchantment towards consultative institutions, especially if these are aimed at group recognition. A certain trend towards mainstreaming political rights can be hypothesised, as emphasised by those cities that show a preference for elective consultative committees and/or adopt a strategy aimed primarily at putting pressure on the national government in order to allow immigrants’ access to local voting rights. As a consequence, consultative institutions are regarded more and more as instruments for establishing a dialogue between the different actors involved in matters of immigrant integration, rather than as strictly representative bodies.

To sum up, in terms of multilevel governance, cities appear indeed crucial actors both on the legal and political dimension. Cities are not only the level at which national policies are concretely worked out, but they show a considerable capacity of elaborating their own original policy approaches even on matters, such as undocumented access to legal status, naturalisation and political participation, which are traditionally of a national competence. Yet, if and to what extent cities promote more accommodative and pragmatic policy frames is an open question. Cities can either promote inclusion, as most of the cases analysed by the literature reviewed in this paper seem to suggest, or exclusion, or can be simply indifferent towards the legal and political dimension of immigrants’ integration. More systematic research taking into account also cases of “unfriendly” cities cannot but be of an extreme relevance in order to shed new light on the factors accounting for different trends in local immigrant integration policy.
5. IMMIGRANTS’ EQUAL ACCESS AND EQUAL USE: A REVIEW OF LOCAL POLICIES IN THE DOMAINS OF HEALTH CARE, HOUSING, EDUCATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET - by Blanca Garcés–Mascareñas

5.1 Introduction

Integration policies could be defined as those policies that aim to facilitate immigrants' integration process in its three dimensions: the legal/political, the socio-economic and the ethnic-cultural-religious. This chapter focuses on policies regarding the second dimension, specifically on those fostering the socio-economic incorporation of immigrants in health care, housing, education and the labour market. Though these four domains are highly institutionalised and mainly a matter of national policies, cities are the place where the challenges and problems around the structural incorporation of immigrants are first felt. Therefore municipalities have also developed specific policies, either to complement or give a response to national policies. As we will see in this paper, local policies tend to focus on very specific problems, "repair" non-working national policies or oppose policies defined at higher administrative levels, particularly when their restrictive character goes against other political imperatives (such as social cohesion or public order) of higher priority at the local level.

Since local policies in these four domains are extremely intermingled with European and national policies, this chapter will look at the different policy levels to then focus on specific local policies and the role of local actors. Sometimes the response to national policies is explicit, by developing particular policies at the local level. Sometimes it is implicit, by changing policies through implementation practices. Therefore, when analysing local responses, we will pay attention not only to formal policies but also to specific programmes as well as the implementation practices of street-level bureaucrats and professionals.

The analysis of each domain is divided in two different dimensions: equal access and equal use. Equal access refers to those policies aimed at guaranteeing that migrants are not formally or informally excluded when accessing particular social provisions and the labour market. It mostly refers to (rejected) asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, thus those categories of migrants who may be excluded by law or due to other more practical barriers. Equal use refers to those policies aimed at guaranteeing equality in terms of use and policy outcomes. As it is well-documented, immigrants may face particular barriers in the domains of housing, health care and the labour market and migrant children may underperform in schools. This chapter will identify local policies and practices aiming at reducing these gaps.

For each domain and in each dimension we will look at how policies frame the problem and give a response, what the main target groups are and how policy definition and implementation is organised among the different administrative levels and actors involved. How are problems defined and from which perspective? Are there contradictory policy frames? To which policy frames do policies respond to? Are policies specific or general? Do they target migrants or specific migrant groups? Are target groups defined in broader socio-economic terms? How is the relationship between the different administrative levels? Do these different levels cooperate with each other, do they complement each other or rather oppose to each other? To what extent contradictions and tensions between different administrative levels respond to different policy frames resulting from different political priorities?
All these questions will be answered on the basis of existing academic research and reports issued by different institutions at the EU, national and local levels and by the different stakeholders in the different domains. This paper is not comparative in nature. Though based on the experience of different EU cities, the final goal is to identify common trends and compare differences between the different domains and actors involved rather than comparing different cities and signaling where, how and why their policy approaches differ.

5.2 Health care

5.2.1 Equal access

Though the right of everyone to health care is explicitly mentioned in numerous international instruments in human rights ratified by EU member states, it is a fact that a high percentage of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants in Europe have limited access to health care. A comparative study of the 25 EU member states before 2004 found that asylum seekers were only entitled to emergency care in Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain and Sweden (Norredam et al. 2006). According to the rights granted to undocumented immigrants, the project “Health Care in NowHereland” (Bjorngren-Cuadra and Cattacin 2010) classified EU27 countries into three groups: 1) countries in which undocumented migrants have no rights to free emergency care (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania and Sweden); 2) countries in which they have minimum rights to health care, in most cases emergency care free of charge but are required to pay for primary and secondary care (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom); and 3) countries in which migrants have the right to receive health services for no fee or a moderate fee (France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal).

In the last years several studies and reports have examined and compared migrants’ access to health care in most EU countries (PICUM 2007; Rechel et al. 2011; Doctors of the World 2013; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013; PICUM 2013). They coincide to note that migrants’ exclusion is not only grounded in migrants’ legal status but also in other indirect or informal barriers. First, migrants’ exclusion from the insurance system and from the state-funded scheme for uninsured persons means that in many countries asylum seekers and undocumented migrants are required to pay the full cost of treatment. Consequently, they only go to hospitals when they have serious diseases, usually receiving unaffordable bills. Second, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants tend to lack information about their rights to access medical services and many undocumented immigrants often do not seek medical help because they fear being discovered and deported. Third, high descentralisation of competences from the central government to the regional and local entities, together with long and complex procedures, have led to important implementation gaps and disparities. As noted by Didier Maille, from the organisation Comède, “in small cities, the lack of knowledge is remarkable and the law is interpreted much more restrictively. Some agents even go beyond the law” (quoted in PICUM 2007: 31).

The PICUM report on Access to Health Care for Undocumented Migrants in Europe (2007), which systematically analyses and compares 11 EU member states, identifies health care providers and hospitals, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other, as key actors in the actual provision of health care services to undocumented migrants. With regard to health care professionals, this report observes that all interviewed doctors and nurses expressed a different understanding of the term “urgent” when compared to the one established in legislation. For instance, in contrast to legal rules, medical professionals strongly
stressed the urgency of providing mental health to undocumented migrants. This study also notes that, while medical staff generally apply professional codes and duties, hospital administrators may be much more strict in their implementation practices (PICUM 2007: 9).

With regard to NGOs, the PICUM report notes their key role in providing direct health care and health care-related assistance to undocumented migrants. Due to increasing restrictive policies and the aforementioned gaps and failures of the health care system, NGOs and charities make a “tremendous effort to fill the gaps and correct the failures of the state system and on many occasions feel obliged to constantly improvise solutions” (PICUM 2007: 10). The main services provided by NGOs to undocumented migrants are: advice and help to access mainstream medical services, either by informing them about their rights or bringing them to those medical centers that are more friendly to undocumented immigrants; direct health care assistance through clinics and mobile units run by volunteer health care providers; reference to health care providers within their networks; direct provision of medicines; coverage of bills for care, medicine or tests prescribed to undocumented migrants; and other initiatives, such as the provision of a small card containing the patient’s medical history and treatments prescribed (Ibid: 9-10). Though the preference is for solutions to make the general system work, in some cases – particularly in those countries where undocumented migrants are not covered or covered only partially – NGOs end up organising a parallel charity-based system.

The high degree of autonomy health care institutions have tended to result in big disparities from municipality to municipality. In Brussels alone, there are nineteen municipalities with different requirements and procedures. While some are rather restrictive and ask for cumbersome procedures, others are more open and even proactive when attending undocumented immigrants. For instance, the social welfare centers in Brussels Capital and Molenbeek municipalities provide a “medical card” to secure undocumented immigrants’ treatment or receipt of medicine for certain period, thus saving them from passing through the whole procedure each time (PICUM 2007: 24). The municipality of Munich decided in 2006 to set up a medical contact point for “uninsured people”. Similarly, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt offer anonymous consultation hours to facilitate undocumented migrants’ use of their services (PICUM 2007: 45). In contrast to other Dutch cities, Rotterdam facilitates the vaccination of children whose parents are not registered in the County Clerk’s office by accepting them on referral by midwives, general practitioners or schools and by providing these vaccinations free of charge (PICUM 2007: 67). In 2012 the Spanish government’s decision to exclude undocumented immigrants from full access to health care has been opposed by several autonomous communities (e.g. Basque Country and Catalonia) and implemented differently at different regional and local levels.

5.2.2 Equal use

Though “third country nationals” tend to have full equality of treatment vis-à-vis residents from other EU countries and nationals, immigrants face specific barriers in accessing health services that go beyond legal restrictions (Mladovsky 2011: 185). The Council of the European Union, in its Joint Report on Social Protection (2008: 11) noted that “despite overall improvements in health there remain striking differences in health outcomes not only across Member states but also within each country between different sections of the population according to socio-economic status, place of residence and ethnic group, and gender”. Several studies have explained the disparities in the use of health care services among immigrants and ethnic minorities as the result of the interaction between factors such as language, communication, sociocultural factors, “newness” and cultural difference (Norrendam & Krasnik 2011; FRA 2013; Durieux-Paillard 2011).

Language barriers tend to result in a lack of comprehensive information about entitlements, medical
services and procedures. Moreover, poor communication may result in a poor identification of health problems. Besides language, stigmatization can also represent an additional barrier. For instance, a Dutch study showed that medical consultations with migrants were shorter, doctors were verbally more dominant and migrants less demanding compared to non-migrants (Meeuwesen et al. 2006). Social marginalisation and limited social networks may also hamper access to health care (Bhopal 2007; Worth et al. 2009). Similarly, being a newcomer tend to inhibit equal use of health care services, in particular for those migrants who do not receive any introduction to the system (Worth et al. 2009). Finally, the absence of culturally appropriate and sensitive services has also been pointed as a key factor when explaining the low take-up of services by minorities (Qureshi, Berridge and Wenman 2000; O’Neale 2000; Ahmad 2005).

Despite these differences in the use of health care services, in most European countries migrants’ health and access to health services are not addressed by specific policies. According to Mladovsky (2011: 186) only 11 of the former 25 EU member states have established specific national policies aimed at improving migrant health. In some countries these are integrated into broader policies. For instance, in England migrant health policy is part of more general policies concerned with “race” and “black and minority ethnic” groups. In Ireland they refer to migrants (including asylum seekers and undocumented migrants), travellers, ethnic minorities and children of migrants born in Ireland. In the Netherlands policies use the broad conceptual umbrella of “cultural difference”. In other countries, such as Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, the focus is more narrowly on migrants. Mladowsky (2011: 187-9) briefly review each of these policies per country. In general terms, these mainly consist of working groups of experts that produce reports and identify best practices, policy documents and specific programmes.

Migrant health care policies target patients (demand side) and/or providers (supply side). Those targeting patients are mostly aimed to provide information on health services and entitlements, as well as education programmes to improve health literacy (Netto et al. 2010). Those policies targeting providers seek to overcome linguistic, cultural and administrative barriers by setting up interpretation and translation services, culturally informed models of care or culturally tailored public health programmes; by using cultural support staff (health mediators); by training staff in diversity; or by diversifying the workforce and promoting the involvement of migrants in all aspects of health care delivery (Fernandes and Miguel 2009; WHO 2010). More recently, increasing emphasis is being placed on the development of the “whole organisation approach”, in which cultural competence is no longer regarded as a property of individuals but of organisations (Mladovsky 2011: 193).

If we look at the actors involved, there seems to be national institutions (ministries of health and immigration, councils on health care and expert groups), on the one hand, and health care providers, on the other. While the former issue reports on migrants’ use of the health care system and define general health care policies and mid-term national plans and programmes, the latter carry out more concrete initiatives aimed to increase the take-up of services by migrants and ethnic minorities. The Open Society Institute report on Muslims in Europe. A Report on 11 EU Cities (2010: 165-66) identifies some of these initiatives. For instance, the General Hospital of Slotervaart (Amsterdam) provides special consulting hours for Moroccan diabetes patients by a Moroccan nurse. Also in Slotervaart the I-Psy centre for intercultural psychiatry offers specialist and accessible help to people with mental health problems related to migration, change of culture and living conditions. The Dutch Intercultural Care Counsellors Foundation, founded in Amsterdam in 2003 by a doctor of Turkish origin, provides outreach in health care information – culturally sensitive and accessible in terms of language – through informal settings.

This same report describes a couple of similar initiatives taken at the local level. In Leicester the local health body launched a programme to improve the understanding of coronary heart disease in the South Asian community by recruiting “peer” educators, with access to the community and understanding of their
perspectives and needs. Similarly, mosques and Radio Ramadan were used to provide information about specific medical campaigns. In the London Borough of Waltham Forest, in 2004 the council undertook a major media campaign to challenge smoking, incorporating an important black, minority and ethnic component in its outreach activities. Other London boroughs have channeled some of their campaigns through local imams. The Waltham Forest Faith Communities Forum partnered with local authorities to implement a system of “health preachers”, which aimed to communicate important messages on health to the borough’s Muslim, Christian and Sikh communities by training their religious representatives (OSI 2010: 166). Interestingly, the initiatives taken by local authorities are mostly focused on dissemination and communication strategies.

Further research is needed to identify concrete programmes and practices aiming at establishing appropriate and accessible health services to migrant populations. More needs to be done too to assess the effectiveness of “best practices”, which are rarely, if ever, rigorously evaluated (Ingleby 2009). Finally, it is important to note that concrete initiatives taken by health care institutions may help to bypass or reduce some policy failures but “do not fix the system”. As pointed by Rechel et al. (2011: 6), “for long-term sustainability, structural changes are required that embed good practices in health policy and practice”.

5.3 Housing

5.3.1 Equal access

Though the right to housing is explicitly recognised as a basic right among a wide range of international instruments (PICUM 2004; Scappucci 2010), access to housing is one of the main problems for undocumented migrants in contemporary Europe (PICUM 2004: 4). In its report on the housing situation of undocumented migrants in six European countries, PICUM states that undocumented immigrants “live in the homes of their legal relatives, share rooms with other migrants, pay provisions to legal residents who act as the formal tenant or rent on the unofficial housing market” (PICUM 2004: 13). Consequently, they tend to pay more, may live in overcrowded apartments and, due to their legal and economic precariousness, run a higher risk of becoming homeless. Moreover, undocumented migrants are extremely vulnerable in case of abuse by the landlord, even when the law protects tenants' rights irrespectively of their legal status.

As undocumented migrants are excluded from state-subsidised housing or support due to their lack of a residence permit, they are mostly relegated to the private market. The specific market conditions in each country are thus of particular relevance. In countries such as Spain and Italy, where there is a scarcity of rented housing, prices and conditions for renting tend to be even more unaccessible for undocumented migrants. Immigration policies, in countries such as the Netherlands or Italy, push undocumented migrants even more to the margins as owners can be sanctioned for renting private accommodation to migrants without a residence permit. For those undocumented migrants unable to secure housing, local NGOs may provide temporary accommodation. NGOs do also work on establishing relations with homeless shelters in order to widen undocumented migrants' housing possibilities, and try to improve existing relationships between private owners and tenants (PICUM 2004: 42). These initiatives are mostly funded by local authorities.

In her book on the exclusion of undocumented migrants from most social provisions in the Netherlands,
Pluymen (2008) argues that, in comparison to the national government, local authorities tend to feel a higher need to provide a safety net for destitute migrants. This is justified on the basis of three arguments. The first is of an humanitarian nature: moral arguments on the inclusion of those residing in the municipality prevail over national regulations aimed at exclusion. The second argument is in terms of public health, public order and safety. In this case, imperatives to prevent overcrowded housing and urban decay may be of higher priority for local authorities than those related to immigration control. The third argument is in response to national policies: feeling burdened with the practical implications of the shortcomings of national migration policy, local authorities protest and try to persuade the government to reverse certain aspects of its migration policy. Though local actions evoke a picture of protest, Pluymen argues that on closer consideration they show much resemblance and partial compliance to national rules. The reason is simple: municipal measures of inclusion have their limitations too. In view to curtail the number of destitute immigrants looking for shelter, which increase with increasing national exclusionary regulations, municipalities have tended to limit housing subsidy to particular target groups.

In this regard, both Pluymen (2008) and the PICUM report (2004) coincide to observe a growing tendency in the Netherlands to provide assistance and shelter only to immigrants that are willing to take concrete measures to return to their countries of origin, immigrants in an extreme vulnerable situation and immigrants that still have a chance to obtain a residence status. While assistance to the first group seems to be aimed at facilitating return, temporary shelter to particularly vulnerable groups (i.e. severe medical conditions, people who can difficulty return to their country, victims of trafficking, women who divorce a national before three years of residence in the Netherlands and pregnant women) aims at providing secure housing on a short term basis. Finally, asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers are mostly presented “as more deserving” than pure economic migrants. Their deservingness has to do with migrants’ claims of vulnerability in their countries of origin but also with their long term residence and integration in the Netherlands. For instance, when the Dutch government passed the Alien Act (2001), which excluded asylum seekers in the second procedure and rejected asylum seekers from most social provisions, 170 local authorities (including Rotterdam, Utrecht, Amsterdam and The Hague) opposed this policy and decided to keep them in social housing as they were considered almost as “Dutch citizens” (PICUM 2004: 23).

Though more research should be done in this area, the study conducted by PICUM in six European countries, which is mostly based on interviews with staff of both homeless organisations and NGOS, seems to indicate two main trends. On the one hand, countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Germany seem to give priority to (rejected) asylum seekers upon undocumented migrants. When NGOs offer temporary housing to undocumented migrants, this is done either under strict conditions (working for legalisation or return) or without any kind of economic support by local authorities. On the other hand, NGOs in countries such as Italy and Spain do not seem to discriminate between different groups of undocumented migrants, priority is given on the basis of vulnerability in receiving societies rather than on specific conditions and public funding for initiatives to accommodate undocumented migrants does not seem to be conditioned to particular target groups. In any case, access to emergency accommodation is very limited. This means that most undocumented migrants have to solve their housing problems on their own.

5.3.2 Equal use

Housing of immigrants is considered a key issue not only to assess the state of migrants’ structural integration in the receiving society but also to promote integration processes of migrants and their descendants. When referring to immigrants' housing situation, two very distinct questions arise. On the
one hand, housing conditions and access to decent and affordable housing relate to questions on migrants' structural incorporation. On the other hand, migrants' segregation patterns are often mixed up with discussions on cultural integration and migrants' identification. In the next paragraphs, I will refer to the two questions separately, considering in each case the framing of the problem as well as the main policy measures and target groups.

With regard to migrants' access to decent and affordable housing, the problem is framed in terms of equality. As stated by the CLIP final report on housing, “ethnic discrimination, as well as discrimination of migrants on the housing market, is a widespread phenomenon” (CLIP 2007: 24). Discrimination can be direct, for instance by excluding non-nationals from city-owned social housing schemes or reducing migrants' chances to access particular housing as a result of anti-segregation quotas. Discrimination can also be indirect, mostly resulting from unequal treatment and unequal opportunities on the private housing market on the basis of class, ethnicity or place of origin or as a consequence of migrants' unequal access to information in a highly intransparent housing market.

Several measures have been undertaken by local authorities to overcome or minimise these problems. Sometimes these measures target migrants as a distinct group, for instance by setting up mediating agencies between landlords and tenants or housing information services for migrants. In Scandinavian countries, specific legal provisions are in place for asylum seekers and refugees to access social housing independently from the regular scheme (ibid.: 26). In France and Luxembourg (mostly single male) migrant workers are offered accommodation (in the so-called foyers) at very affordable prizes. In Amsterdam special housing programmes have been implemented for asylum seekers and the most vulnerable groups: recent immigrants, older people, women, unaccompanied young migrants, Roma and other non-migrant ethnic communities.

Most of the times, however, policy measures in the domain of housing do not focus specifically on migrants but rather on households with low or middle incomes. Some measures are directed at the demand side, by increasing the renting or purchasing capacities of the target households through premiums or subsidies, reductions in mortgage payments, free loans or reductions in borrowing costs (ibid. 2007: 31). Other measures target the supply side by increasing the offer of affordable housing in the city. This can be done by either increasing the stock of social housing or subsidizing the creation of private housing with affordable prizes. In countries with a very limited stock of social housing, measures targeting the supply side are more rare and mostly rely on private housing projects. For instance, as documented by the CLIP Project (van Heelsum 2007), local authorities in Terrassa (Spain) have been negotiating with investors and were promoting new regulations at the regional level to set up quotas for low-income households in new building projects.

Besides policy measures on housing, most European municipalities have developed broader policies on segregation and urban renewal. The combination of spatial, social and ethnic segregation is often seen as a problem with negative consequences on migrants' cultural and social integration, particularly language competence and social capital; migrants' structural integration, as they may remain “trapped” within their own ethnic communities; and integration in terms of migrants’ identification. In recent years the problematization of ethnic segregation has been questioned. In both scientific research and politics the question is whether segregation constrains or rather facilitates immigrant integration. Related to spatial segregation, the impoverishment and decay of particular urban neighborhoods is also considered a problem in terms of the physical quality of housing, public security and community relations.

Several measures have been undertaken to reduce ethnic segregation in particular neighbourhoods. Some cities have pursued anti-segregation goals by imposing quotas for specific groups of non-natives or vulnerable groups. As noted by the CLIP Report, this kind of measures are not problem-free: first, they may
go against the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial and ethnic origin and, second, the “appropriate” level of ethnic “mixing” may be difficult to define and justify (ibid.: 17). Resettlement projects have also been implemented to fight socio-spatial segregation, though again these policies have been questioned as social networks are often an important resource within immigrant communities. More recently, in cities such as Amsterdam and Vienna, ambitious housing projects have been set up with the explicit aim to promote ethnic and socio-economic mixture as well as diversification in forms of ownership and rental structures (ibid.: 18).

Other measures do not explicitly pursue anti-segregation goals but may have important anti-segregation effects. These include: spreading public housing around the city; opening access to social housing areas to middle-class income groups; promoting gentrification, particularly in the inner city districts or former industrial areas; or improving the image of a city district. These measures are often part of larger urban renewal policies, which can be defined as the rehabilitation of impoverished urban neighborhoods through large-scale renovation or reconstruction of housing together with social measures aimed at improving social cohesion. The literature on ethnic segregation and urban renewal has blossomed in the last two decades. A key question is whether these policies help to reduce segregation in the city as a whole or rather reduce segregation in particular target areas while increasing it in other more peripheral zones. In this regard, there is growing consensus that effective anti-segregation policies should address the structural features of the entire city, thus going far beyond a pure urban and neighbourhood centered approach.

With regard to the governance model, housing and neighbourhood policies are above all a matter of local authorities. Measures to ensure migrants' access to housing or to reduce social and ethnic segregation are mostly defined and implemented at the local level. In some countries these policies have received important national and thus financial support. In other countries measures defined and implemented at the local level were turned into national policy. In contrast to the governance models observed in the three other social domains, local policies in the domain of housing are not a complement or a response to national policies but rather the primary policy itself. It is thus not a coincidence that when EU legislation (more precisely, the Almunia package on state aid) defined “social housing” as restricted to “disadvantaged citizens or socially less advantaged groups”, Eurocities responded with a public statement defending “the freedom of Member States and their local authorities to define, organise and finance services of general (economic) interest (...)” and demanding local autonomy “to choose the form of provision of housing services based on an objective and transparent evaluation of the needs of our citizens” (Eurocities 2013).

### 5.4 Education

#### 5.4.1. Equal access

In most EU countries the right to education for undocumented children is protected by law or at least is not explicitly denied. In countries such as Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands the right to education for undocumented children is explicitly referenced in legislation. In France, Spain, the UK and Poland the use of the expression “all children” turns undocumented migrants implicitly included. Only countries such as Hungary and Malta restrict access to education to citizens and legal residents (PICUM 2008: 16-21). Although the right to education is mostly protected by law, many reports coincide to observe a big gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical entitlement granted to all children independently of their legal
status and, on the other, the concrete practices undocumented children encounter.

The PICUM report on *Undocumented Children in Europe* (2008) and its later report on the *International Conference on Undocumented Children in Europe* (2009) examine in detail the practical barriers limiting undocumented children access to education. One of the most serious problems arise when schools ask children for proof of residence. The reason for such a request is that many schools are responsible only for the minor residents in their particular district. In countries such as the Netherlands, Poland and Hungary schools do also justify identification document requests by arguing that funding is allocated according to the number of students enrolled, thus having a problem with the presence of undocumented children without valid documents. Other possible barriers include the fact that minors may not live with their parents and some schools tend to deny school registration by other family relatives.

Growing immigration control and tough immigration discourses do also have an impact on undocumented children's access to education. Parents' fear of being detected if sending their children to schools is regularly expressed in many interviews with undocumented immigrants. As stated by the PICUM report (2008: 28), “in the majority of cases fear is tied to the general climate more than to specific episodes related to school surveillance”. But this is not always the case. For instance, in 2006 the then Minister of Interior Sarkozy sent police to French schools to detect undocumented migrants who went to fetch their children from school (ibid: 27). In Germany the obligation of public officials to denounce undocumented migrants often prevented in practice undocumented children’s access to education (PICUM 2009: 18). The University of Oxford report “No Way Out, No Way In” (Sigona & Hughes 2012) denounced that the increased demands on public authorities by the Home Office – such as asking social services to report suspected undocumented migrants – were pushing children away from essential services such as schooling.

Other problems include the fact that, though access to primary education is free, irregular families are excluded from economic aid for extra expenses such as books, transportation, school meals, etc. Many NGOs do also report that even when there is no problem in access to education, there is a problem receiving a diploma at the end of the scholastic career as then residence permission or an identification document is often required. Finally, undocumented children tend to have no access to education before and after compulsory schooling. While inclusion in the kindergarten mostly depends on local authorities’ decisions, access to vocational and professional school (for children 16 to 18 years old) is jeopardized by either schools or companies arguing that undocumented minors won't have a residence permit and therefore won't be allowed to work. As stated by Charlotte van Zeebroeck of Service Droit des Jeunes in Belgium: “In practice, the majority of these (training) centres refuse to take children in irregular situations because the aim of training programmes is to find a job afterwards. Institutions and businesses are of the opinion that undocumented children will never be regularised and so will never have the official right to work” (quoted in PICUM 2008: 38).

In her research on the effects of the Linkage Act (1998) in undocumented migrants’ exclusion from public services, van der Leun (2003; 2006) concluded that sectors with a high level of professionalisation (such as health care and education) were more likely to soften the impacts of the law. Similarly, Pluymen (2008) argued that professionals (like doctors and teachers) tended to work in a more individual-rights-oriented structure. However, the more recent reports by PICUM (2008; 2009) show that school practices may differ significantly. On the one hand, both reports observe that many schools take undocumented children independently of whether they can prove residence or whether their expenses will be covered by national and local governments. On the other hand, these same reports note that some schools discourage the enrollment of undocumented migrants because they won’t be able to get the school's reimbursement by the state, they may not know the existence of alternative funds for undocumented children or they fear the negative impact these children may have on their test-score statistics (PICUM 2008: 23-26).
The stance of local authorities with regard to undocumented children's access to education seems to be diverse too. In some cases local authorities cover extracurricular expenses such as money for books and transportation (ibid: 32). The CORAM's report (2013) also shows that in the UK, while undocumented migrants have no recourse to public funds, they may get financial support from local authorities under community care and children's legislation. In the financial year 2009/10 1,729 children and family cases (for a total amount of &19m) were supported by 37 local authorities. In other cases local authorities restrict undocumented children's access to education. For instance, the municipality of Milan issued a circular that excluded the children of irregular immigrants from enrolling in nursery schools. Interestingly, in 2007 the Court of Milan declared this ordinance discriminatory, thus forcing Italian municipalities to cover undocumented children's access to kindergarten. Municipalities may also jeopardize access to education by refusing registration of particular groups. In France several NGOs have denounced that some municipalities tend to discriminate Roma people, either by refusing their registration or by dismissing them from the land on which they live (ibid.: 25). In Spain some municipalities refuse to register irregular migrants, which in practice means excluding them from access to education and other social services.

Besides school professionals and municipalities, NGOs seem to be key for the practical inclusion of undocumented children in education. First, they have developed concrete projects to reduce or overcome the practical barriers limiting undocumented children access to education. For instance, as most undocumented children have no access to vocational classes, several NGOs have developed good practices to facilitate their insertion (particularly that of unaccompanied minors) into the work force (ibid.: 38). Second, NGOs are also key to respond to national and local exclusionary policies or lobby for policy change. In France the NGO Education Without Borders was created in response to the government’s attempt to use children to detect irregular migrants with the aim to protect migrant children's right to education and prevent the expulsion of their families (ibid: 29). In the Netherlands the cooperative Learning Without Papers asked local governments to make education for undocumented children practically possible by providing financial help (ibid.: 32).

5.4.2 Equal Use

Education is considered key both to assess the state of migrants' integration in the receiving society and to promote integration of migrants' descendants. EU institutions have passed several policy papers expressly targeting the education of migrant children. For instance, the Commission's green paper Migration and Mobility: Challenges and Opportunities for EU Education Systems (2008) identified effective policies and practices to improve learning achievements of migrant children. One year later the Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2009) issued their policy documents requesting member states to work at different administrative levels in order to ensure that migrant children are offered fair and equal chances. The Commission's Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training (ET 2020) includes education of migrant children among the priority areas.

This political interest in the education of migrant children has been accompanied by a growing number of research studies and projects in this area (e.g. SIRIUS 2013; EDUMIGROM 2011; EURIDYCE 2009; OSF 2009; NESSE 2009; Includ-ED 2008; TIES 2005). These projects provide evidence on the performance of migrant students in different European countries. One of the main conclusions is that differences between 'minority' and 'majority' pupil populations vary greatly from country to country: while in some countries immigrants underperform on average, in others they are on a more equal standing or even perform better. These projects do also shed light on the specific structural factors that may explain differences in migrant children's performance. These factors include features of the education system (such as ability tracking, age of selection, transitions between early, primary and secondary education, ethnic majority bias in
textbooks and teaching practices); resources allocated; legal framework for enrollment (according to legal status, parental choice or residential catchment area); integration policies; and national discourses on migration and integration (for a more detailed overview of these factors, see Sirius 2013: 7-8).

Most EU member states – either at the national or regional level – have developed particular policies to raise the achievements of migrant children in education and thereby reduce the gap between 'minority' and 'majority' pupil populations. These policies mainly consist of targeting additional resources – in the form of finance and additional staff – at those groups who are most at risk of underachieving. When migrants are identified as a separate target group, initiatives tend to provide language support (e.g. language support classes, additional teachers and qualification programs to teachers). Particular reception classes are also set up to introduce newly arrived migrant students to the host language and education system of the receiving country. When migrants are not identified as a specific group, allocation systems target the wider group of socially disadvantaged.

Though education is a matter of national or regional governments, local authorities have set up particular initiatives to “repair” some of the problems produced or not given response by national policies. Municipalities do sometimes finance extra-curricular activities to support pupils in risk of underachievement. Also in view to reduce drop-out, the municipality of Rotterdam introduced new types of schools (neighbourhood schools or vocational schools) to provide students with a couple of extra years before having the possibility to access the academic track. Some cities have also developed particular programmes to reduce migrant children's concentration in underperforming schools. For instance, the city of Vic (Spain) implemented a local policy aimed at distributing migrant children equally among local (public and private) schools. The city of Leicester (UK) encouraged exchange between schools with different ethnic and religious backgrounds (Sirius 2013: 14). Though anti-segregation school measures have hardly been evaluated, the book by Bakker et al. (2011) concludes that in order to be effective they need to be contextual and comprehensive and engage the whole community of actors and stakeholders.

According to a study conducted within the Sirius Project (Golubeva 2012), local NGOs do also focus on specific problems such as the transition from primary to secondary school or the level of school dropouts. As they mostly 'work around' existing policies rather than attempting to change them, most of their initiatives do also consist of extra-curricular activities such as offering private tutoring to immigrant students, organising language courses for their parents or promoting migrants students' access to university. When NGOs target changes in the school system, they tend to combine “soft” methods such as networking with “hard” methods such as recommendations to introduce positive action in teaching staff recruitment. According to Golubeva (2012: 6), their methods of advocacy are non-confrontational: “rather than disrupt cooperation with other stakeholders in their fields by posing demands for immediate policy change, they work through projects aiming at modest step-by-step change in the future”.

Finally, implementation practices by teachers and school institutions are key both when explaining migrants' education performance and policy outcomes. With regard to the former, several studies have shown that teachers' attitudes and expectations not only affect students' aspirations but also can have a major influence on the student's school trajectory and their tracking to lower quality schools (Huttova, Mcdonald and Harper 2008; Strand 2008). Focusing on teachers expectations towards pupils with an immigrant background, Spietsma (2009) concluded that teacher expectations in Germany were sometimes biased by the names of their pupils. With regard to the impact of implementation practices on policy outcomes, there is hardly any research on how teachers and schools modify official policy. A notable exception is the study by Bruquetas-Callejo (2014) on policy models and school practices of reception in Rotterdam and Barcelona. This study shows that schools and teachers develop discretionary practices either as a reaction to material organizational constraints or to close the gap between ideological values and real outcomes. Therefore the author concludes that the analysis of the local field and the daily practices of
professionals is essential when aiming to understand how policies work in practice.

5.5 Labour Market

5.5.1 Equal access

Access to the labour market is not a right but rather a privilege of those considered legitimated members, which include citizens and legal residents and exclude not only undocumented migrants but also rejected asylum seekers and in many European countries also asylum seekers and family immigrants. Simultaneously, employment has become more and more a condition for membership. As showed in a recent special issue published by International Migration (Chauvin, Garcés-Mascareñas & Kraler, 2013), employment requirements are key in regularisation and renewal procedures. In practice, this means that not having a formal job or not having a formal job with the required conditions (e.g. full time contract) may represent no way out or a way back into illegality.

While work is not a right, fair work conditions are. The principle of safeguarding at least safe and fair working conditions is expressly protected in instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families (ICMW) and the ILO-Convention No. 143 (LeVoy, Verbruggen & Wets 2004: 59). If we look at national legal systems in Europe, protection to undocumented migrants workers varies from full exclusion (e.g. Sweden and Great Britain) to full legal inclusion (e.g. Italy) (LeVoy, Verbruggen & Wets 2003: 59). In Germany, while industrial tribunals are obliged to inform the Foreigners Office about undocumented workers, they are not obliged to investigate the residence and work permit status. According to Cyrus (2003: 109), the distinction between the obligation to transmit but not to examine the status opens an opportunity for undocumented workers to present a case in industrial tribunals. In practice, however, most immigrants are afraid of making use of their right as workers because of the well-founded fear of being reported to the Foreigners Office and subsequently deported.

NGOs and immigrant organisations working for the protection of undocumented migrant workers have mostly focused on regularisation procedures as a means to achieve undocumented immigrants' legal recognition and therefore their de facto protection in the labour market. In the case of Spain, trade unions, immigrant associations, employers’ organisations and some regional governments pushed the central government for regularisation campaigns in several occasions (Garcés-Mascareñas 2012: 143-162). Both in Spain and France criteria for employment-based regularization have often been formalized following contentious negotiations between the government and labor unions (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012: 250). Trade unions have also been key in providing legal assistance to undocumented migrants willing to regularise. While the role of trade unions in facilitating migrants' access to legal status is well known and documented, much less can be said with regard to the role of municipalities. As Caponio shows in this report, municipalities may have some room for manoeuvre as key implementers of regularisation procedures. They can also act as part of a wider network of mobilised organisations and institutions either to lobby the central government for regularisation or to provide immigrants with legal assistance.

To what extent municipalities work for the labour incorporation of undocumented migrants and other categories of migrants without a work permit is hard to say. In principle, there is little controversy that access to the labour market is not a right but rather a privilege. In practice, however, things may be more complex. For instance, in Barcelona registration in the municipal census (El Padrón), which in Spain it is a
must for all residents irrespectively of their legal status, gives immigrants access to the so-called “welcome courses”, which are also aimed to facilitate immigrants' incorporation in the labour market. This means that undocumented immigrants are invited to take part in these courses while at the same time they are not allowed to work. While they are not allowed to work, employment is the only way to access legal residence. This explains why in 2013 the municipality of Barcelona developed a specific programme for the labour incorporation of a group of undocumented immigrants from Senegal who were squatting an old factory building. In exchange to leave the place, the municipality could not offer them a residence permit but could facilitate their labour incorporation as a first step towards regularisation.

5.5.2 Equal use

Employment is key for immigrants' integration in receiving societies. Moreover, in the past two decades, employment has become one of the highest priorities of immigrant integration policies. The case of the Netherlands is paradigmatic. In the 1990s, as a reaction to the so-called Ethnic Minority Policies, the Dutch government chose to put “the delicate cultural dimension outside of the field and to focus on the economic activation of individual migrants” (Scholten & Timmermans 2004). This was part of a broader policy line focusing on “work, work, and once again work” (Bruquetas-Callejo, García-Mascareñas, Penninx & Scholten 2011: 146). Though employment policies did not target immigrants as a specific group, the underlying assumption was that they would indirectly promote their participation. In the Netherlands, as in many other European countries, considerable sums have been invested in general schemes to fight unemployment. Though these policies have been a matter of national (and sometimes regional) governments, cities have developed complementary programmes to promote employment, ethnic entrepreneurship and diversity in the composition of the municipality’s workforce. In the next paragraphs, we will look at each of these three areas separately.

Few research has been done on local policies aiming at fighting unemployment at large. Eurocities (2011) issued a report which compared local job centres in different European cities. One of the major conclusions was that job centres are run differently and have different roles across the EU. Sometimes job centres are managed at the national level (e.g., UK, Belgium), sometimes they are organised by the city (e.g., Sweden, Ireland) and sometimes they are a joint initiative between the national government and cities (e.g., the Netherlands, Norway). Where cities have the lead, job centres tend to complement the national employment service, for instance by focusing on particular groups such as those more distanced from the labour market and on benefits-to-work transitions. Where public employment services have the lead, job centres tend to complement local social services, for instance by limiting the influx of clients into social assistance. Where job centres are a ‘joint initiative’ between cities and public employment services, complementarity is rather an organisational matter (ibid: 5).

One of the key questions is whether local governments pursue general or targeted policies with regard to unemployment group inequalities. In an interesting study comparing the manner in which Amsterdam and Berlin policymakers and policy practitioners deal with youth unemployment among immigrant groups, Vermeulen and Stotijn (2010) show that both cities combine an adherence to general programme demands with pragmatically accommodative approaches. On the one hand, in line with national policies, local authorities in Amsterdam and Berlin have deliberately chosen to follow a general policy free of ethnic categories and specific groups. On the other hand, when it comes to implementation, local policy offers considerable room for cultural and ethnic difference: in Amsterdam by providing intensive personal guidance, which has proven remarkably helpful for immigrant youth; in Berlin by building a network that enables to reach particular migrant groups or by employing staff with a particular immigrant background.

In the past years research on ethnic entrepreneurship have flourished considerably. More specifically, the
CLIP Project (Cities for Local Integration Policy) compared the promotion of ethnic entrepreneurship in different European cities. The CLIP final report on ethnic entrepreneurship concludes that policies in this area are generally in the hands of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Trade Affairs and the Ministry of Labour at the national level and their municipal counterparts at the local level (2011: 88). Together with these public actors, business associations, immigration associations, educational institutions and support agencies work to promote and support (ethnic) entrepreneurs. According to the same CLIP report, the development and implementation of active support measures at the local level is not self-evident. In most European cities ethnic entrepreneurship has not played a major role in the overall strategy supporting the integration of immigrants (ibid: 87). Only in a few, such as Amsterdam and Dublin, ethnic entrepreneurship has gained some strategic importance as a part of a bigger economic and integration agenda (ibid: 42-44).

Local measures promoting entrepreneurship mostly focus on improving the personal capability of entrepreneurs by providing effective, accessible, customer-friendly and cost-efficient advice and information services. Local measures attempting to improve the business environment for entrepreneurship are more rare as these competencies lie particularly at the national level. However, the CLIP report identifies few initiatives, which are mostly linked to deregulation, urban planning and involving and empowering businesses associations (ibid.: 69-81). One of the key questions, here again, is whether measures aiming at promoting entrepreneurship are group-specific or rather general in nature. Most European cities seem to choose for general colour-blind measures as the basic assumption is that ethnic entrepreneurs do also benefit from them and group-specific policies may be easily argued away as being discriminatory or “too multicultural” (ibid.: 86). However, more research should be done on how these general measures, apparently free of ethnic categories and specific groups, are implemented in practice.

Finally, both the DiveProject from Eurocities (2010) and the CLIP project (2008) have looked at the approach European cities take to managing diversity and ensuring equality of employment opportunities. As the majority of migrants in Europe work in the private sector, local authorities are considered to be in a unique position to improve the access of migrants to the labour market. Moreover, as local authorities buy huge amounts of goods and services for their daily work, they could take diversity and employment of immigrants as one of the key criteria when selecting their providers. The results of the CLIP project show that local policies in this area are very diverse. First, some cities have an explicit policy while others do not. Second, approaches among cities with an explicit policy in this area differ too. Some cities justify their policy from a discrimination or equality perspective, emphasising migrants’ rights to be free from discrimination and to have equality of opportunity in jobs and services. Other cities place a greater emphasis on a diversity management approach, highlighting the benefits the city can gain from cultural pluralism (CLIP 2008: 119).

5.6 Conclusion

When looking at health care, housing, education and the labour market together, how are policies framed at the different levels, what are the main target groups and how can the governance model be characterised? With regard to equal access, thus referring to asylum seekers and undocumented migrants’ access to social provisions, a clear tension arises between migration control and human rights frames. In contrast to what most of the academic literature on irregular migration suggests, this tension is not always the result of opposing, on the one hand, national law and, on the other, local policies and implementation practices. This tension exists within the law itself: while immigration policies increasingly exclude
undocumented migrants from most social provisions, the right to health care and education as well as the protection of workers irrespectively of their legal status is often explicitly recognised by law. The tension between exclusion and inclusion exists as well at the local level: while humanitarian concerns as well as other policy imperatives (e.g. public health and social cohesion) and professional duties (e.g. by doctors and teachers) may lead to more inclusive practices, exclusionary trends have also been identified. For instance, hospitals and school administrators may be very strict in their implementation practices and local authorities may jeopardize migrants' legal access to health care and education by refusing registration of particular groups.

In terms of target groups, most policies granting social rights to (rejected) asylum seekers and undocumented migrants do not target them explicitly. In fact, it is the other way around: as some social rights are not granted to citizens but to individuals qua persons, they turn anybody into an object of the law and a locus of protection. In practice, however, some distinctions are made. If we look at the four domains in detail, we realise that equal access is only guaranteed to particular groups: access to health care is often provided only in case of emergency; with regard to access to social housing or temporary shelter, many Western European countries give priority to rejected asylum seekers upon undocumented migrants; while compulsory education is a right and a duty for any children residing in the country, undocumented children are mostly excluded from kindergarten and vocational education; finally, though the law protects workers irrespectively of their legal status, in practice protection is only given in cases of extreme vulnerability (e.g. victims of trafficking).

When looking at the governance model with regard to migrants' equal access, two questions should be highlighted. First, in some cases, policies and practices at the local level seek to “repair” non-working policies at the national level. This is the case of policies and programmes aiming at reducing the practical barriers limiting access to health care or education. In other cases, policies and practices at the local level go against the national level: mostly to include those excluded by immigration policies but sometimes to exclude those included by law. Second, most inclusive practices at the local level are a matter of professionals and NGOs. As we have seen throughout the chapter, professionals in the health care and education sectors and NGOs in the four domains are key to guarantee undocumented migrants' access to minimum social rights. Sometimes they use their discretionary power to extraofficially include those excluded. Sometimes they are financed by local authorities to provide minimum conditions to those de facto residing in their municipalities. Interestingly, except for some programmes in the health care sector, municipalities do not intervene directly but rather indirectly by financing NGOs and immigrant organisations.

If we look at policies on equal use, thus referring to the structural integration of legal residents or citizens with an immigrant background, the scenario is quite different. In terms of policy frames, the question here is not in terms of immigration control versus human rights but rather in terms of equality. In this regard, no clear tension or contradictory demands arise in this policy field: there seems to be consensus that all citizens (in terms of all recognised members of the community, either legal residents or nationals) should enjoy equal use and equal opportunities in these four domains. Policies aim therefore to reduce and overcome practical barriers, either linked to immigrants' linguistic and cultural difference or to their more disadvantaged socio-economic condition. Interestingly, measures aiming at immigrants' structural integration are sometimes mixed up with measures aiming at their cultural assimilation. A clear example are anti-segregation policies, which have less to do with immigrants equal access to housing and more with a particular understanding of immigrants' integration and ethnic mixture in urban neighborhoods.

In terms of target groups, it is no surprise that most policies in this area do not focus exclusively on immigrants but rather on low-income households. As practical barriers and differences in the outcomes greatly depend on socio-economic factors, most policies target the more generally disadvantaged by either
providing them direct (economic) support or allocating more public resources in schools or neighborhoods with a greater concentration of low-income households. Some policies do target immigrants in specific though. This is mostly the case when policies seek to reduce cultural and linguistic barriers or introduce diversity criteria in the provision of social services. With these purposes national and local governments have set up interpretation and translation services and have launched specific programmes to train public staff in diversity or increase the ratio of immigrant employees in public institutions. Policies do also target immigrant groups according to their specific vulnerability (e.g. provision of social housing to asylum seekers) or particular needs (e.g. reception classes for newly arrived migrant students).

Finally, when looking at policies on equal use, the model of governance seems to be quite heterogeneous: while health care is mainly a concern of national institutions and health care providers, and education seems to be in the hands of schools, NGOs and to a lesser extent municipalities, housing and the labour market are a matter of local authorities. As said before, measures to ensure migrants' access to housing or to reduce social and ethnic segregation are mostly defined and implemented at the local level. Measures seeking to promote the integration of immigrants in the labour market are both a matter of national and local policies. What is common to all these policies is the fact that they do not attempt to change the whole policy framework but rather introduce very concrete measures so as to “repair” very concrete problems produced or not given response by national policies. The multilevel governance (vertical and horizontal) that characterises this field is part of the explanation. The main result is that these measures may help to reduce some policy failures but do not seem to “fix the system” or “solve the problem” as a more long-term structural change would be required.

6. LOCAL POLICIES AS CULTURAL INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES – by Patrycja Matusz-Protasiewicz

6.1 Introduction

This paper investigates the policies and practices of cultural integration and social cohesion at the level of European cities which have been confronted with the growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity caused by the influx of immigrants from all around the world over the past decades. As statistical data shows the majority of some 47 million foreign-born residents of the European Union lives in cities. European cities have been thus put under pressure to produce and maintain effective governance regimes which would mitigate the potential disturbances ignited by the above-mentioned growing diversity of their populations (Eurostat 2011).

On the one hand many European cities have been able to minimize the negative effects of low birth rates and ageing population on their societal, demographic and economic sustainability thanks to growing number of immigrants. On the other hand the growing ethnic diversity put the cities in front of new governance challenges to develop and implement new policies able to reconstitute and regulate the social cohesion of their multi-ethnic and multicultural populations. Scientists have recently dedicated a lot of attention to the cultural integration of migrants, their relations with local communities and other social groups as well. As Van Crean, Vancluysen, Ackeart (2009) pointed out immigrants not only live in cities, but
establish feeling of belonging with their neighbourhood and city much faster than with the receiving country.

For a long time cities have been perceived as agents which were limited in their governance activity to the simple implementation of immigration policies developed at the national level. However the burden of immigration and the difference in its recognition between national and local level have encouraged cities to reshape the national policies for the local purposes and produce other genuine tools and mechanisms to promote local integration strategies and policies in the area of cultural integration. The cultural dimension of immigrant integration seems to be most flexible area in which cities authorities have formulated and implemented their own strategies adapted to the specific local needs.

This paper is based on the analysis of empirical findings from main research projects and networks such as: CLIP, Eurocities, Intercultural cities, INTI-CITIES, the DIVE-project and the MIXTIES-project. Empirical materials from those projects were complemented with data provided by the Open Society Institute Project *Muslims in Europe* which looks at the local integration policies targeted at Muslim communities. While analyzing the existing materials, this paper tries to use the multilevel governance model (MLG) taking into account the possibility of horizontal and vertical cooperation between the different governance levels as well as the perspective of policy transfers (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000) which provides the MLG with the possibility to reflect on the questions why, who and how utilize the cooperation across the various levels in terms of policy learning processes and exchange of good practices. In the MLG the decision making process is based on negotiation between different levels and takes a form of formal and informal consultations (Hooghe 2007). In the case of urban networks we should understand the vertical relations as relations between cities and the national and EU levels. The horizontal relations shall be then understood as relations between actors within the specific local level, but also as relations between various local levels when cities share policy experience with other cities (in the process of exchange of good practices). Moreover this paper takes the governance as a set of not only formal, but also informal institutions. The informal contacts and networks are recognized as very important at the local level where pragmatic solutions might become viable policy outcomes. Immigrant organizations and their crucial role in the negotiations and implementations of integration projects and initiatives is also highlighted as the necessary component on the local governance regimes. The cooperation between public and private institutions is a key element of MLG model and will be thus incorporated into the analytical approach used by this paper (Svedrup & Kux 1997).

This paper is a part of KING report on local integration policies, in which this area is subject to analysis in three dimensions: legal-political, socio-economic and cultural-religious. In the first dimension T. Caponio (2014:1): “investigates the policies and practices of the European cities to deal with issues of legal inclusion and participation in the public sphere, considering also the role assigned to immigrant associations in the decision making and implementation of local integration policies”. In case of legal-political domain of integration the competence lies mainly at national level and the local authorities implement national policies. However, it happens more and more often that they try to develop local strategies promoting political participation. Socio-economic domain is similarly as legal-political one a matter of national policies but local authorities have developed their own strategies to complement national policies. B. Garcés-Mascareñas (2014:1) in the paper on socio-economic dimension “focuses [...] especially on policies

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34 CLIP Network was established as a European Network of Cities in 2006. The main idea of this initiatives was the exchange of good practices and strengthening of policy learning processes. The CLIP network cooperated strongly with the CLIP research group responsible for studies on local integration policies. All materials and case studies are available at [http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/help/casestudies.htm?utm_source=website_rightcolumn&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=allcases20130503](http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/help/casestudies.htm?utm_source=website_rightcolumn&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=allcases20130503). The Integrating Cities project started in 2006 as an initiative of Eurocities network. The main aim of the project was to promote dialogue between the Eurocities Network and the EU institutions (mainly the European Commission) on the effective governance in European cities. More information at [www.integratingcities.eu](http://www.integratingcities.eu). In order to strengthen the policy learning across the EU Eurocities has developed many EU financed projects, among others the INTI-project and the DIVE project.
fostering the socio-economic incorporation of immigrants in health care, housing, education and the labour market”. This paper takes the cultural-religious dimension as focus point of local policies.

The aim of this paper is the identification of common practices used by the cities in cultural integration policies. The paper is divided into five sections analyzing the following issues: framing and definitions of cultural integration and social cohesion at the city level, institutions responsible for the development and implementation of local integration policies, resources of the implemented actions, and the targets and tools used by cities in this particular area.

6.2 The meaning of cultural integration and social cohesion: framing and definitions

The following section discusses the plurality of theoretical concepts of the cultural integration and social cohesion. Because the literature on diversity and integration of immigrants involved different disciplines including anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, or history and psychology, it is difficult to find one commonly accepted definition of cultural integration or social cohesion. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to cover all existing literature. Therefore this paper concentrates only on the selected definitions which are suitable to its research purpose and resonates in the policies and practices employed by cities themselves.

Social cohesion has no universally accepted definition and is rather a contested concept. In most cases social cohesion is connected with the principles of solidarity, togetherness, sense of belonging to the local community, and the acceptance of common values. According to Demireva (2013:3) “social disorder, or rather social disorganization is often thought to be the opposite of social cohesion. Frequently social cohesion is simply defined as ‘solidarity’ and somewhat interchangeably used together with the terms ‘community cohesion’. As is the case with related concept of social capital, cohesion seems better identifiable through its possible outcomes”. There has been scientific discussion about the concept of social cohesion, its definition and relations to other terms as immigration, diversity, social capital. One example is the special issue of journal Ethnicities (Holtung & Mason 2010). Many researchers have analyzed the impact of immigration and growing diversity on social cohesion using very diverse indicators (as ethnicity, religion, place of birth, nationality) which makes cross-national comparisons difficult. Some authors argue that a high degree of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity might have a negative effect on social cohesion and community trust (Alesina & La Ferrara 2005; Putnam 2007). This paper looks at cultural/religious integration through the lens of social cohesion. Cultural integration in this approach is supposed to lead to social cohesion in the local context.

Although the legal, socio-economic and political integration issues of immigration policies in the receiving countries have been developed on the national level and left not much space for the local authorities to manoeuvre, the reality of governance in the particular local levels shows that cities were nevertheless able to deal with policy transfers from the national level in an inventive manner. When contrasted with the practice of the national level cities seem to be skilfully spontaneous, flexible and capable to easily targeting the most acute issues in the process of immigration policy-making. Moreover cities do not implement the national policies as a final rule, but use them as a delineating framework which must be further modified, accommodated or renegotiated in the everyday governance practice with the other local stakeholders identified below in this paper.
Cities involved in the European city networks seem to understand the integration as a two-way process which fosters mutual understanding and respect for all groups living in the community. Cultural integration and social cohesion have been defined by the cities rather broadly covering in some cases issues that go beyond the cultural domain.

From the political perspective at the local level it is challenging to develop and implement policies which attempt to manage the cultural diversity in order to maximize social and economic benefits and reduce costs at the same time.

Based on the empirical materials from the projects mentioned in the introduction the activities undertaken by cities in the area of cultural integration, we might distinguish three way of framing the issue: firstly, cultural integration aiming at the economic growth; secondly at the avoidance of conflicts within community; and thirdly at the recognition of diversity.

6.2.1 Cultural integration aiming at economic growth

In local cultural policy documents, diversity may be perceived as a source of attractiveness, innovation and competitiveness. Cultural integration is then developed as a cross-sectoral issue engaging different stakeholders such as public institutions, business organizations, media, NGOs, civil society organizations, immigrant organizations, churches and trade unions by managing diversity in the most effective way. In this perspective, Khovanova-Rubicondo and Pinelli (2012) claim that “diversity is an asset, a source of dynamism, innovation, creativity and growth.” Literature on the urban development has connected diversity with the growth of attractiveness for investments and innovations in the city (Sassen 2001).

According to the empirical research, cities are aware that local labour markets need immigrants. However, immigration might bring both benefits and costs. Immigrants are tax payers on the one hand; the management of the highly diverse population demands higher costs on the other hand. The process of permanent negotiation which underpins the governance regimes is indeed costly in terms of time, finances, and manpower for its management. Nonetheless the social purpose of the policies employed in various European cities take the principle of interculturality which tries to turn the potential costs into real benefits. In the case of Stuttgart the municipal integration policy has been re-oriented towards such an explicit intercultural approach. The concept of integration is based on the Pact for Integration, a coalition between the public sector, the private sector and civil society organizations. Copenhagen’s Integration Policy promotes the interculturality as social equity, it openly claims that the interaction of Copenhagen’s citizens with different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds will facilitate the city with the linguistic and cultural skills needed to face the challenge posed by globalisation.

Immigration is in many cities seen as both economic and cultural challenge which can be dealt with reasonably only though the adoption of an intercultural approach to integration. This long-term systematic diversity-oriented approach assumes that culturally diverse community may contribute significantly to innovations and economic growth. The intercultural approach aims to strengthen the intercultural dialogue and cooperation in order to maximize economic benefits. The Intercultural Cities concept “is based on the assumption that social exclusion has, at least partly, cultural causes. Cultural exclusion transforms into discrimination in the labour market and the workplace, in education, in the neighbourhoods, in public space, in the institutions of power” (Wood 2009). This way of approaching integration shows that the constantly redefined concept of social cohesion and cultural integration is interdependent with the integration in the economic and political domains. This kind of governance employed by cities is flexible, cross sectoral and engages various stakeholders in the negotiations about the final goals and tools of cultural integration.
6.2.2 Cultural integration aiming at avoiding conflict

Growing ethnic and cultural diversity can aggravate difficulties in the intergroup relations and hinder communication between immigrant groups and local population (Lücke-Klaßen & Heckmann 2010). The depiction of specific immigrant groups is easily manipulated, presenting Muslims as a threat to societal peace for example. In such a case cultural integration or diversity management aims at conflict avoidance and combating negative attitudes towards immigrants, xenophobia and racism. The coexistence of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity might lead to conflicts over values and competition for resources. Local authorities are aware of the potential sources of conflicts and try to prevent or manage the tensions. According to the AMICALL research findings, local authorities have used a range of activities as: “tackling misinformation and misapprehensions (...), avoiding, mediating and defusing tensions and conflicts; creating understanding between different communities which share common places; and building a shared and inclusive local sense of belonging and identity of all citizens” (Collett & Gidley 2012). There has been a whole variety of tools developed by cities in order to promote intercultural dialogue and intergroup relations within community such as educational campaigns, cultural events promoting diversity, information campaigns about equal treatment and non-discrimination. All this has been aimed at strengthening of common sense of belonging but also combating discrimination in both the hard domains (education, labour market, health care) and the private life.

Implementing policies aiming at avoiding intergroup tensions and the potential conflict are indeed strongly related not only to the domain of cultural integration, but also economic one. Failure to engage with the diversity management brings high social costs.

6.2.3 Cultural integration aiming at recognition of diversity

Integration policies developed in member states of European Union differ considerably due to differences in political systems, historical experiences in migration, ethnic structure of immigrant population and many other factors. According to the IDEA project we can distinguish three groups of countries in the EU: Western European countries (most advanced in integration policies), South European countries and Central Eastern European countries (being in the process of transformation from sending to receiving country). New member states (in majority from CEE region) have accessed EU in the specific moment when integration issues were highly on the political agenda at the national levels and EU level. The available financial sources for integration of third country nationals (European Integration Fund EIF) have influenced the development of first integration programs and strategies. Despite the still low number of immigrants in the new member states and low priority of the immigration issue on the political agenda, the availability of financial resources have constituted an important incentive in the learning processes and implementation of pilot integration programs. According to Pawlak (2013) the main role in the formulation and implementation of integration goals have been taken up by NGOs in Poland due to the lack of explicitly formulated governmental integration policies. These NGOs have played an important role in the negotiations with public institutions in the course of the development of the new Polish Migration Policy (Matusz Protasiewicz 2013a, 2013b). This is comparable with Germany before 2000 when NGOs, churches, trade unions played important role in the integration of foreign residents and were thus compensating the absence of governmental integration policies (Penninx 2014).

Having analyzed the materials from CLIP research in many cases of CEE cities the spirit of diversity has been invoked in the city promotions. In the case of the cities Wroclaw and Lublin in Poland one may witness a set of promotional practices based on an appeal to their alleged multicultural and multi-religion heritage in order to attract investors and tourists (Matusz Protasiewicz 2013a). In this sense the promotion of diversity has been understood as strongly connected to the economic growth and as sign of Europeization.
In all the above-mentioned policies of cultural integration, local governance is not made by city administrations and imposed on immigrant groups. At the national level, it seems that state is imposer rather than negotiator, mediator and promoter who would reflect on the policy needs. In contrast the local authorities, seems to perform the exact role of negotiator, mediator and promoter who engages in the permanent discussion with the broad civil society and reflects thus on the inhabitants needs. City administrations constitute the most important and steering force in such governance regimes, but they are inevitably complemented by a huge amount of ethnic, religious and national organizations which tend to create coalitions in order to compel the city administration to act or create harmonious co-existence. The increasing role of immigrant organizations in the decision-making process will be explained later in this paper.

Apart from the three ways of framing cultural integration in local policies mentioned above, there are some other differences among cities across Europe in terms of defining and approaching cultural integration and social cohesion. Based on the empirical material, three models related to governance of policies – can be recognized. The first is the interventionist model, visible in Vienna and Bologna, which attempts to encompass all sectors of cultural, social, economic, religious, ethnic integration. The second is the regulatory model, visible in Copenhagen and Turku, which is selective and based on the active intervention to the social and economic sectors of integration, but indifferent or neutral to the cultural, ethnic, and religious sectors. In this sense, the second model promotes integration policies by using general institutional policies or relevant domains. The third can be coined as the passive model, visible in Porto and Dublin, which lacks of a proper infrastructure (Porto), or is characterized by general reluctance to invest into social cohesion measures (Dublin). The model presumes that immigrants speak already the local language, do not suffer from a language barrier and can thus integrated without any additional help.

In conclusion the analyzed examples of practices in cultural integration prove the diversity of approaches among European cities. Cities also create various governance regimes which gain their own characteristic features though the mediation and negotiation with the plurality of local actors in process of formulation and implementation of suitable cultural policy goals. In the case of lack of national integration policies, cities have developed their own strategies in the management of cultural diversity (Italy, and some cities from CEE region). As CLIP, AMICALL and DIVE research confirms local authorities feel much more legitimatized than national ones in ensuring equal access to public services and spaces for diversity for all residents.

6.3 Institutions responsible for the development and implementation of local cultural integration policies

In cities involved in the European networks of cities mentioned in the introduction, the integration of immigrants has become an important duty for the local administration. While developing integration policies, cities establish normally one directing institution which is administering integration agenda. At the same time, a variety of other institutions like cultural offices or special funds emerge to complement those policies. In terms of formal institutions, many cities tend to institutional isomorphism - they create institutional frameworks which resemble each other across Europe. It seems that cultural integration in the cities has covered many areas of economic and social life and become thus a very cross sectoral and cross-departmental issue.
6.3.1 Specific organisational embedding within the local administration

In the majority of cities where cultural integration policies have been formulated, special departments have been developed in order to coordinate the implementation. In some cities, e.g. Frankfurt, special departments dealing with integration have been given the same position in the administration structure as other departments. Frankfurt city has established a special Office for Multicultural Affairs which can communicate with other offices at the same hierarchical level. The name of the office indicates its approach to integration. The main question is no longer how migrants can be integrated into German society, but how the local administration can adapt to be more suitable for dealing with the demands of the heterogeneous, multicultural population. In other cases departments or sections dealing with integration issues and diversity management have got less independence. Departments and units responsible for the management of integration policies have moreover developed both formal and informal contacts with local actors involved in this public policy in order to formulate goals, learn immigrants needs and get support in the implementation process.

The table below presents some examples of institutions established in the European cities:

| MAIN OFFICES: Office of Development, Intercultural Integration of Policies and the Third Sector (Bologna), Office for Integration (Dublin), Department of Integration - Dezernat für Integration (Frankfurt), Department for Integration Policy - Stabsabteilung für Integrationspolitik (Stuttgart), Immigration and Citizenship Department - Consellería de Inmigración y Ciudadanía (Sevilla), Department for Promoting Human Rights, Gender Equality, Relations with National Minorities and Religious Communities and Civil Society Development - Mayor’s Office (Zagreb), Department of Integration and Employment (headed by the Deputy Mayor Kent Andersson) + six employment and integration centres - Arbets- och integrationscenter (Malmö), Office for Integration - within Department of Employment and Integration (Copenhagen), Department of Social Development - and the particular units: Education and Citizenship/Educatie en Inburgering, E&I + Diversity Unit/Unit Diversiteit + Platform Amsterdam Together/Platform Amsterdam Samen, PAS (Amsterdam), Municipal Department for Integration and Diversity Affairs - M17 (Vienna), Department of Citizenship and Civil Rights (Terrassa), Department of Social Affairs of the Lisbon (Lisbon), Department of Social Development (Breda). |

6.3.2 Civil society organizations cooperating with public institution in the formulation of cultural integration policies

As mentioned above, the MLG involves a variety of actors which attempt to reshape the various decision-making processes. The emergence of the non-institutional actors, such as NGOs, results in the fact that more and more decisions are made with the participation of the public opinion using social consultation. The case of integration policy at the local level might be a good example of such practice. There is variety of forums or new advisory boards set up to increase participation of immigrant communities in the policy-making or in the policies as such. This is again an isomorphic feature across Europe. Apart from these formal legal or visible institutions, there is plenty of informal invisible institutions like personal networks among the city bureaucrats/and politicians and variety of community leaders, or visits of city politicians at the national/religious celebrations and festivals, respectively a tradition of some politicians to quote Koran (Breda) next to Bible in their speeches or publicly appreciate the presence of immigrant groups in the city (Vienna).

Therefore, it is not the type of institutions per se which differentiates the cities from each other, it is the
specific institutional mix that cities use in order to culturally and socially integrate immigrant communities. Some cities prefer complete institutionalization of relations with plenty of formal and informal institutions (Vienna), some cities prefer informal institutions (Turku), some cities do not develop almost any formal institutions (Lisbon) and give way to the activity of immigrant organizations. Having rather only informal institutions does not necessarily mean that the immigrant integration is underdeveloped (Copenhagen).

Immigrant organizations play a crucial part in the governance of local integration policies. Immigrant organizations form institutionalized voices of immigrant communities, thus they articulate needs and requirements of those groups. There are however more actors which try to actively shape the specific governance regimes than immigrant organizations. These can be also trade unions (Bologna), business associations (Vienna), foreign funds (Lisbon) beside immigrant organizations or city administration. The immigrant organizations hold nonetheless primacy in the field.

**6.4 Resources for cultural integration policies in cities**

As the empirical materials mentioned in the introduction suggest, the majority of city integration activities is funded from the city budgets. The majority of immigrant organizations is funded or co-funded by the city administrations. National funds are also important, but it seems that they are not dominating. For immigrant organizations the European Fund for Integration of Third Country Nationals started to be an additional source of funding. In new member states this source was the only available and influenced the development of integration programs on the local and national level (Matusz Protasiewicz 2013a).

The funding techniques follow the rationale of specific governance characteristic models. Thus Vienna as a representative of the interventionist model disposes of the Vienna Integration Fund which is a fully institutionalized fund with properly defined mission, established and professional personnel and stable financial resources. Copenhagen and Turku as a representatives of regulatory model have funded the integration activities indirectly through general cultural and socio-economic funds. Lisbon as a representative of passive model basically without any institutionalized funding infrastructure. The local authority has been trying to use European funds for financing the integration activities.

The social purpose of funding is clear in all cases. Firstly, there are funded projects for language integration - providing language courses (Turku explicitly) or integration courses. Secondly, the majority of funding goes to "inter-projects" - interfaith, interethnic, intercultural. Thirdly, some cities like Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Amsterdam refuse to fund projects with religion (or inter-religious contexts) as explicit factor. Copenhagen and Turku go even further when they do not fund under explicitly interethnic or interfaith programmes. In this cities, projects must fit into existing general cultural and socio-economic schemes. In contrast, Kirklees's flagship project, based on the inter-faith fora, is based on religion as a dominating identity category. In some cities, like Antwerp, where the integration is understood as two way process, funded projects must promote relations between groups in general rather than between two specific groups, including both immigrant and local populations.

Finally, private funds shall not be excluded from the analysis. Private funding is indeed an important source for the realization of immigrant policies in Lisbon and Dublin. In Stuttgart, funds- like the Robert Bosch Foundation and others play also an important role. Therefore not only public, but also private funding makes cultural integration activities possible.
6.5 Target groups and tools of cultural integration in cities

This section aims to defining the target groups and tools used by cities in local integration policies. Showing different examples this paper identify trends in approaching integration. In the implementation of diversity-oriented policies, city authorities have to stimulate cross-sectoral cooperation between different departments of local administration and collaboration with non-governmental organization as well as other institutions. Negotiation on the formulation of integration goals and cooperation in the implementation of integration programs with a variety of diverse actors require appropriate and properly institutionalised tools.

6.5.1 Target groups

Although the majority of integration plans (on the local level) is set in universal and general terms, these plans are implemented in cooperation with actors operating within the city and the realm of governance, since we no longer talk about the system of government, but system of governance with plenty of actors in terms of integration policies. By this logic, these policies will thus target the most active, most problematic or most demanding immigrant communities which are able to produce their own elites or leaders within the cities. Taken the above-mentioned into account, it is natural that Muslims become the targeted group number one. Muslims form one of the most active, visible and demanding immigrant groups in European cities. They also belong to the older immigrant groups in contrast to the internal movers from the CEE. They tend to create religious communities, build religious buildings and have a dress code which is being contested or have burial rituals different from the Christian ones.

The local community as a whole

In the majority of cities, integration policies are focused on the majority of immigrant populations - including not only TCNs, but also EU internal movers. This can be the case of Poles in Dublin, Breda or Bologna; or alternatively Romanians in Lisbon, Terrassa, Valencia or Bologna. At the same time, Ingrians (former ethnic Finns returning from Russian to the homeland) in Finnish cities like Turku represent a special case of immigrants. It seems that cities promote strategies to create local identification which would be based on diversity, but highlighting the identity category us - like "We Copenhageners" or "We Amsterdammers". As it was mentioned before, the intercultural approach aims at the creation of common sense of belonging and a set of shared values. As empirical research shows, immigrants are more likely to develop sense of belonging to the local community than to the receiving state (Van Crean, Vancluysen, Ackeart 2009).

Policies concerning relationships between ethnic and religious groups

There are no reliable data about Muslims in the European Union and any estimates in this field depends on definitions of the receiving countries. According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights there are at least 13 millions of Muslims in the EU constituting of around 5 per cent of its total population (FRA 2006). Muslims as a group are very diverse in terms of religion, language, ethnicity and they are perceived as a threat by native population. According to OSI research some of the prejudices that Muslims face are part of a “generic anti-immigrant” prejudice which is directed at Europe’s post war non-western immigrants. At the same time there is evidence that they also face “specific anti-Muslim” prejudices which
have “developed as a result of stereotype-generating process in the last couple of decades” (OSI 2010).

Integration policies focus more on the non-European, non-Christian minorities. This is also the case, because the European minorities (mainly EU internal movers) are rather new without proper institutionalized organizations. They also do not tend to provoke as many conflicts, because they better fit into the host societies (it does not say they fit completely) in comparison with the immigrants coming from Africa, Maghreb, Arab countries, Turkey or Indian continent. In the case of EU internal movers the legal status and the equal access to all economic and social domains play an important role in their position in the receiving societies.

Despite the persistence in targeting Muslim communities, the growing tendency is to support policies and strategies which try to impact on the relations among all ethnic, national, religious groups within the particular cities, not only between the host society and these groups. Not only the projects improving relations between host society and particular ethnic and religious societies are encouraged, but also between immigrant communities (Arabs and Jews, Turks and Kurds). At the same time, strategies do not focus only on ethnic categories, but also on gender, age, generation categories. Projects try to highlight women, focus on the immigrant youth, and the second immigrant generation at the same time, because these groups seem to represent the most endangered groups.

The concepts, strategies and policies promote both bonding and bridging relations at the same time. They promote financially and organizationally (giving training to employees and providing offices in many cases) the establishment of ethnic, religious and cultural organizations. They use them as a part of infrastructure in order to strengthen the cities’ social cohesion. At the same time these ethnic, religious and cultural organizations are compelled to ally or unite with the organizations from the different ethnic, religious and cultural background. Or they are required to take part in the intercultural actives. In this way the policies promote bonding capital as a prerequisite for the expansion of bridging capital throughout the city.

Finally, it must be highlighted that in most cases policies address all immigrants living in the cities. Thus they involve both third countries national as well as the EU internal migrants, even if the EU documents on integration (financed from the EU sources) should target only TCNs and not EU internal movers and other categories as undocumented migrants or residents with immigration background.

6.5.2 Tools

Cities have institutionalized a diversity of tools. A categorization of these into three kinds tools according to their function is suggested: platforms, channels, spaces. In a strive to reconstitute, reconfigure or again to balance, negotiate, promote cultural integration and social cohesion, city administrations (but also immigrant organizations themselves independently) tend to create platforms, channels, spaces to promote us-identities.

Platforms

Platforms are created to promote different kinds of interreligious or interethnic fora, networks, associations, discussion or facilities where the different ethnicities, religions, or nations meet and discuss both conflicting topics and topics which can unite. These can also be dialogues between police and immigrant groups. These can be promotion of tolerance through common sport activities. There is a variety of such platforms.
One such platforms is the *Zonatelli Intercultural Center* situated in Bologna. The centre was established in 1999 with the aim to promote intercultural dialogue within the city. It has received a task to develop and sustain relations with ethnic or mixed associations and institutionalize thus the relations between the Bologna city administration and the individual organizations. Apart from this task, the Zonatelli centre focuses on the socio-cultural empowerment of the second immigrant generation. It has thus become an organizational centre for many intercultural projects financed not only by the city, but also by the national and EU level. Its intercultural orientation leads the centre to promote the original cultures of second immigrant generation only as a prerequisite to develop intercultural dialog and cultural exchange. A similar role was played by the independent and already abolished *International Meeting Point* in Turku. The platform was set up in 1989 as a meeting point for immigrants who wanted to establish immigrant organization. The International Meeting Point offered moreover courses and advices on how to properly register and establish the immigrant organizations. It was also providing legal help or language courses in Finnish and Arabic or teaching the Koran. Another example, Malmö has rebuilt the *Rosengard city district library* into a multifunctional meeting point. The library provides room for weekly lectures attended mainly by immigrant women and a separate room where the local immigrant men can congregate and play chess and cards. The library employs multilingual staff and offer book in 20 different languages. Also Stuttgart's *German-Turkish Forum* established in 1999, chaired by former city mayor, and financed by the Robert Bosh Foundation, promotes German-Turkish cooperation in education, parenting, art and culture, and science.

Valencia provides an interfaith example in the case of the *Chair of the Three Religions* at the University of Valencia which was established in 2000 to provide courses on Christianity, Judaism and Islam at the postgraduate and master level under different disciplinary perspectives. The *Chair* is a result of agreement among the main associations representing all three religions—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—on the city and national level. Its activities are not limited to the teaching activities, but also include collaboration with the religious centres situated in the city.

Interfaith dialogue constitutes also the cornerstone of integration policies in Kirklees. The Kirklees city administration actively promotes the establishment of interfaith networks in order to involve the representatives of all religious groups residing in the city into the governance process. The city administration has succeeded to receive a national grant for its project *Interfaith Kirklees* and established seven faith centers which provide reference points not only for the members of the particular religious groups, but all citizens who would like to learn about the everyday practices of religions present in the city. Especially school excursions are organized in the centers. Apart from these centers, the *Kirklees Faith Forum* exists with the aim to enhance the collaboration of all faiths against any sort of discrimination and injustice. A similar function plays the *Council of Religions* founded in 2009 in Frankfurt am Main or the *Roundtable of Religions* established in Stuttgart. Both try to reduce the chance of tensions and interreligious or intercultural conflicts, while promoting interreligious tolerance.

A different kind of platform is provided by the *Poldermoskee* project in Amsterdam. The *Poldermoskee* is supported by Amsterdam’s communal politicians, although it is a strictly independent project of second generation Muslims who were unable to organize and gather on their own principles in the existing Muslim facilities controlled by the older first generation. The *Poldermoskee* provides space for all young Muslims which promotes their integration or at least stabilization within Dutch society. The center provides possibility to meet for all Muslims irrespective of their ethnic background. It conducts lectures and sermons in Dutch language and organizes weekly guided tours for visitors, invites people from the neighbourhood and organizes meetings on taboo issues. The *Poldermoskee* functions therefore as a shelter for young generation of Dutch Muslims and also a liberal center which promotes coexistence with the Dutch society.

There is variety of other platforms. As it was mentioned above, these platforms can be represented by the organized communication between local police forces and representatives of the local communities.
Vienna’s Land Office of Criminal Investigation together with African migrant organizations organized for example a Project Fair and Sensible whose mission was to organize workshops in the police academy and establish advice center which would prevent any cultural misunderstandings between African citizens of Vienna and local police forces. Antwerp’s police disposes of its own Diversity Unit which is active in the prosecution of anti-discrimination cases or in the mediation of conflicts between various ethnic groups. Completely different platforms can be formed on the basis of intercultural meetings through sport activities. Dublin for example, has co-funded the project Count Us In which is run by the Sport Against Racism Ireland established in 1997 as a direct response to the increase of racist attacks in Ireland. As such the project shall promote intercultural dialogue in the selected Dublin’s schools. Although the described platforms have encompassed various sectors of societal activities, they have social purpose. They promote interfaith and intercultural values through the various way of social meetings among the broadest diversity of engaged citizens in the cities concerned.

Channels for political participation

Channels are fora and groups which try to channel opinions, needs and demands of immigrant groups to local policies and policy makers. These are initiated by the city councils themselves or initiated by the immigration communities. Integration funds can also constitute channels through which the city councils promote projects which best suit their integration policies. Since projects are dependent on financial aid, the public institutions can steer integration policies and projects by channelling financial aid.

City administrations try to promote political participation of immigrant groups through the various advisory fora. In these fora immigrant organizations can gather and express their voices on the behalf of the ethnic or religious groups they represent. The forums are indeed a substitution for the voting rights which many of immigrants lack. Although they are purely advisory and sometimes rather dysfunctional, the advisory fora may provide a certain political inclusion of immigrant voices into the decision-making procedures employed by cities. Bologna established its Council of Foreign and Stateless Citizens of the Province of Bologna and Neighbourhood Councils of Foreign Citizens following the unsuccessful proposal in the administration to grant foreign residents voting rights in local elections. Both regularly elected councils are consultative bodies which can suggest measures and programmes related to the integration policies. However, they have had a limited influence on the city policies so far. In Dublin the immigrant population has full voting rights in the local elections. Thus, the electoral process is a channel itself. The city of Dublin regularly has recently organized public campaigns in cooperation with the immigrant organizations to raise immigrants’ awareness of their voting rights and invites the representatives of immigrant institutions to advise on the policy-making related to the integration issues. The citizens of Frankfurt am Main without voting rights can take part in elections for the Foreigners’ Council. Almost every city disposes of advisory immigrant bodies. These vary in terms of representative potential and the level of institutionalization. The Vienna Integration Conference is a pure umbrella for immigrant organizations. Zagreb establishes special councils for its national minorities. Copenhagen’s Integration Council comprises of representatives elected by non-Western population and appointed experts. In Valencia the Alternative Forum for the Protection and Rights of the Social Integration of Immigrants was founded by immigrant organization as a protest against the dysfunctional official forum.

The cases of Breda and Amsterdam deserve closer scrutiny. Aliens do in principle have voting rights in local elections, but the city of Breda does not have an immigrant council similar to other cities. The decision-making process in Breda is based on the bottom-up method of the so-called appreciative inquiry which presupposes that the whole population will take part in the enactment of city policies. Thus, the Breda’s immigrant population is fully involved in the political participation.
Amsterdam has, on the other hand, indulged in the policy of *verbinding* (connecting). The policy is not aimed at the interethnic relations *per se*, but targets potential conflicts among all social groups. Yet, the practice of *verbinding* attempts to channel particular policies in order to mediate potential interethnic and intercultural conflicts. On the level of neighbourhoods, connection points have been identified which could promote social cohesion. Immigrant organizations have been stimulated to become more diverse in the scope of operation. The anti-radicalization policies were enacted to include potential radicals back into society. There were also attempts invoked by the city officials to use the religious infrastructure as a best platform for the regulation of immigrant integration.

Moreover, there has been another channel which was used by the city officials in order to articulate the city administrations’ attempts on the interculturality towards the representatives of the immigrant groups. It is the institutionalized habit of the high city representatives quoting from the Koran during public speeches as a form of interreligious practice. The regular visits on *iftar*, a special dinner event which is organized at the end of Ramadan, have become an institutional practice as well. The high Viennese officials have started to attend the *iftars* since 2002. In Stuttgart, mayor has invited the Muslim representatives to celebrate *iftars* in the town hall. *Iftars* have been frequented by the high officials of the city administration or organized in the town halls also in the city of Breda.

Integration funds represent the most assertive channels through which the city administration can steer the integration processes. Since the immigrant organizations are highly dependent on the material capabilities provided by the city administration, cities can easily shape and condition the content of projects realized by the immigrant organizations. As such the city administrations can shape the internal mission of the immigrant organizations themselves to a certain degree. Thus where cities sponsored only under general labels and policies like in Copenhagen or Turku, this did not enhance a sound network of immigrant organizations. On the other hand where immigrant institutions became part of institutionalized financing and associational culture, a vibrant network of immigrant organizations has emerged which is prone to respond to the demands raised by the city administrations. The cities of Bologna, Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart and Vienna are examples of such process.

*Spaces*

Spaces are socially produced. They may take the forms of multicultural spaces. Multicultural festivals, for example, are events during which the diversity is displayed in the streets and the intercultural spaces are being created. These can be intercultural events in libraries or galleries. These can also be office spaces offered to the immigrant organizations without the requirement to pay a rent. These can be spaces for the ethnic and religious minorities to celebrate their national holidays. These can be finally the spaces where the minorities can practice their religion, thus feeling in the city as home. It seems that the policies practiced by the city administrations tend to be underpinned by the principles based on the promotion of the sense of belonging to the city. The financed activities are aimed on trust building, sense of belonging, and community building rather than on any straightforward claims for integration. Thus, city administrations tend to promote the creation of platforms, channels and spaces which would empower the sense of belonging within their whole populations, domestic society and immigrant groups at the same time. Local policies are highly pragmatic and react on the concrete needs of their local populations.

Festivals have become the best practice to display the growing cultural diversity in the public space and promote the spirit of interculturality among the inhabitants of the city. Dublin has dedicated the majority of its integration efforts to the organization of cultural festivals. One example is a regular organization of the *Fusion Project* which celebrate cultural diversity. Similarly, Frankfurt am Main organizes a variety of festivals like *Frankfurt Stage* which is a well-attended cultural action featuring live music and extended
opening hours in many of Frankfurt’s museums with the aim to support cultural diversity of the city population. Festival 23 Nisan has become one of the biggest events in Stuttgart. 23 Nisan is a Turkish national day. The festival has taken place in the city since 2001 and is regularly visited by 10,000 and 20,000 people every year. Analogously, Malmö Museum has developed programs of exhibitions which attempt to promote cultural heritage, diversity, empowerment and human rights within a cosmopolitan perspective. Apart from the above mentioned examples, the spaces of interculturality are to be produced in the school curricula or local media. Exactly the social production of space and the contested nature of this production impels cities to be flexible and permanent negotiators which must interact with a variety of actors in order to reconstitute social cohesion which would be otherwise permanently eroded.

6.6 Role of networks of European cities for local integration policies

As mentioned above, the development of local integration policies is based on negotiations between plenty of actors within the MLG. In the MLG the horizontal and vertical cooperation between actors play a crucial role. One of the roles played by the European networks of cities is the creation of the consensusal knowledge (Stone 2012). The perspective of policy transfers applied to the analysis of the DIVE, INTI-CITIES and MIXTIES reveals precisely how cities can gain from their activity, how they can create, share and further promote their experiences and find policy inspiration thanks to the established bureaucratic and expert networks. As Schultze (2003) claims cities have been liberated within the European MLG. They are no longer pure policy-takers, but can function effectively as policy-makers when connected into the EU networks of cities. As members of such networks, they can more easily shape policies in upstream policy-making and downstream policy delivery. Schultze (2003:135) summarises precisely the role of urban networks in the vertical and horizontal cooperation when he writes that "through networks cities can account for ‘soft’ outcomes such as shaping and setting important parameters for the debate between institutions and with the general public". He adds that cities can also "exert joint control over policy outcomes through influencing the policy agenda, in particular through getting their policy proposals into key documents which serve as important references for decision-making and implementation" thanks to their engagement in the city networks.

The literature dealing with the policy transfers highlights several points which can be relevant for the analysis of the vertical and horizontal policy exchange of integration policies throughout the EU policy space. Thus Dolowitz and March (2000) identify several question in one of the essential texts related to policy transfers. Two of these questions ask why actors engage in policy transfers and who are the key actors in the practice of these transfers. They answer that the policy transfers will be enacted by the policy actors who feel the lack of domestic policy initiative in the particular policy domain. At the same time, they highlight epistemic communities and policy experts as the main facilitators of the successful policy transfers. Stone’s (2012) contribution identifies sophisticated networks consisting of bureaucrats, policy transfer entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations, policy experts as the main infrastructure for policy transfers. As she further claims, these networks can produce a consensusal knowledge which can be then easily disseminated across governance levels involved. This knowledge will resemble soft transfers of norms and knowledge rather than ready-made hard policies, since while knowledge can be easily learnt, hard policy transfers will be implemented unevenly and will be never complete. Eberlein and Grande (2005) emphasize that the formal networks and institutional connections are complemented by informal networks and policy forums which bring beneficial effects on the socialization of the above-mentioned actors. Evans (2009) highlights among others the growing role of internet and electronic communication in the policy transfers.
The INTI-CITIES (Catsaras & Kirchberger 2009), DIVE (Moloney & Kirchberger 2010) and MIXTIES (MIXTIES 2013) projects were initiated thanks to the EUROCITIES, one of the oldest city networks in the EU multilevel governance, and certain policy expert networks, concretely the Migration Policy Group, which felt that the governance of immigration produced on the national levels is inefficient and does not reflect the integration needs of the local level. The projects strived to create a consensual knowledge which would be applicable regardless of its specific context. The projects used the benchmarking method among the participating cities and theoretical knowledge to provide a "standard, which moves away from context-specific local knowledge and produces de contextualised knowledge that can be applied in other places" (Moloney & Kirchberger 2010: 4). The result was the creation of the EUROCITIES Charter on the Integrating Cities and a contribution to the database of good practices on integration policies organized by the European Commission. The EU resources played the crucial role, because the projects were co-financed by the EU funds including the Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. The projects allowed the development of formal and informal expert and bureaucratic networks which were further consolidated during the organization of several conferences where the actors could meet directly and a socialization process could be easily provided. The consensual knowledge created within the project has been moreover promoted though internet webpages, and it is thus accessible to a wide spread audience. The crucial role of various networks is thus the management of policy exchange horizontally and vertically across the European MLG.

6.7 Conclusion

In the case of cultural integration policies in European cities we have distinguished three way of framing: cultural integration aiming at economic growth, cultural integration aiming at avoiding conflict, cultural integration aiming at recognition of diversity. In terms of governance of these policies, there is as a set of rules, practices, formal and informal institutions, multiple personal networks which tend to take part in development of local cultural integration and social cohesion policies. In terms of framing and defining cultural dimension of integration and social cohesion we have observed as well a range of approaches with diverse targeted groups and tools used for practical action. While looking at the question convergence, it is important to understand that European cities all act in very different historical, political, economic and societal contexts, and their role and competences differ. However, it is important to stress that in cultural domain local authorities have found more space for independent acting than in socio-economic and political domain where cities depend more on national legislation. For many years this specific area of integration was not seen as an important asset, but it has recently become one of the main policy-making domains. According to the evidence from the research material, cultural integration policies produced by the local governance regimes try to encourage the sense of belonging and shared values, avoid conflicts in the ethnically and culturally diverse populations and introduce recognition for the immigrant diverse cultures. Thus policies and public services are being adapted to the needs of multicultural populations and the participation of immigrants in public life is promoted.

As it was pointed out the cities authorities have within the governance implemented multiple concepts and strategies using very cross-sectoral approach in terms of framing and targeting cultural policies. All the strategies have covered very diverse field of activities in some cases overlapping the hard domains of integration analyzed in our research by Caponio and Garcés-Mascaréñas (diversity in access to housing, diversity and equality in jobs and service provision and diversity in education).

When we look at cultural integration as impulse for economic growth, some cities have introduced the
**Intercultural Approach**, which looks at diversity as a source of innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship. In this sense the successful management of diversity which highlights the importance of immigrants as a source of new linguistic and cultural assets might influence the attractiveness and economic and social potential of the particular city. In this approach the city administrations try to strengthen the intercultural dialogue and steer it into the maximalization of economic benefits.

Some cities (Amsterdam, Breda, L’Hospitalet, Terrassa from CLIP research) have defined their approach as diversity policies focusing on cultures of their residents. In this case emphasis is not on individuals but rather on the needs of particular groups living in the community. The development of positive intergroup relations is a central element of social cohesion approach. In this approach cities look at diversity as an asset and fully accept cultural and religious diversity of its residents. It is the way of recognition of diversity, acceptance of different groups with diverse culture. This process of recognition should lead to social cohesion understood as a process of bringing people together in the local context.

In terms of targeting groups and issues for the cultural integration the cities authorities have proven to be more flexible and pragmatic than the national level. As the examples show the local integration policies and policies aiming at the social cohesion have targeted the TCNs, internal movers, and residents with the foreign background (second and third generation). The social purpose of the policies was impregnated with the principles of interculturality. Trying to focus on social cohesion in the community and peaceful intergroup relations many cities have been focusing on Muslim community not only as most numerous but also most diverse in terms of culture and ethnicity (OSI, CLIP). Religion plays moreover a very important role for Muslim community what impels city administration to invent new measures and policies which would cater for Muslims’ religious needs. In the policies and programs targeted at Muslim communities cities have included many issues as religious practices, buildings, burials, education, food and dress code to mention only a few. All these issues might be very sensitive in the relations between Muslims and local community taken into account that Islam is a highly politicized issue in European societies. On the one hand cities authorities have been trying to avoid conflict based on the religious and cultural differences, on the other hand they have been trying to fulfil the needs of new residents and respect their rights.

Finally, indeed changes in governance of local integration policies have taken place. In the very beginning of their development the integration policies became embedded in the existing institutional context. While integration of immigrants has become high priority for local authorities in many European cities, a variety of special departments within administration structure has been developed getting high competences. For those departments or units the cooperation with local actors as immigrants organizations, NGOs, churches, media, and policy experts has become an everyday practice. According to CLIP findings “a relationship between the council and migrants groups can be realised by having migrant representatives in the council, or by creating of a consultative body. The proportion of persons with a migration background in elected positions, however, is rather low or non-existent in most cases” (Lüken-Klassen & Heckmann:51). The low number of people with immigrant background in city councils is connected with the lack of voting rights (analyzed precisely by Caponio). In the process of setting goals for cultural integration policies as well as in the implementation of it, local authorities have used extensive consultative bodies of immigrants, immigrant organizations and other actors involved in these issue. As it was already mentioned in the field of cultural integration the cities authorities have gained more space for manoeuvre and it is why the horizontal cooperation with local actors have been strongly developed in almost all cities. Many cities from CLIP and Intercultural cities have reported the institutionalized consultative bodies representing migrants organizations and NGOs (e.g. Amsterdam, Antwerp, Athens, Bologna, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Stuttgart, Tallinn, Terrassa, Zurich etc). Even if this kind of bodies has been established in many cities, the actual relations with integration departments or units with this council is based on formal as well as informal contact which might be initiated from both sides. Formal and informal contacts depend strongly on the kind of issue which must be solved. City authorities have been using different tools of
governance as consultation, public debates, or evaluation of migrants organizations projects in order to include immigrants in decision making process. Immigrant organization have been involved both in the defining of main issues, demands and interest and after in implementing policy goals through projects mainly financed form local authority resources.

Because integration of immigrants is not only high on the agenda of local authorities but also at the top of EU agenda there have been many measures introduced to support multilevel governance of integration. Many tools such as the Handbook of Integration, the Web Site on Integration and the European Integration Forum have aimed at providing best practices and stimulate exchange of good practices among all levels involved (EU, national and local level). In all documents the EC stressed the important role of local authorities in immigrants integration policies. The support of urban networks from EU funds has undoubtedly improved the position of cities playing now as a collective actor in the decision making process, collaborating in the vertical dimension with national and EU actors.

Based on the examples of the cities participating in the city networks mentioned in the introduction we can say that all the tools, actors and ways of creating integration policies at the local level perfectly fit in to the MLG. According to Schmitter (20040) the MLG should be understood as a policy-making process engaging actors representing different levels of power but aiming at the same goals. Thus the examined governance model should be considered primarily from the perspective of the role and participation of actors (in case of this paper the role of the city administration). In the development of integration policies the European Commission plays a key role in stimulating local actors for the bottom-up initiatives and taking part in formulation of common goals. City authorities have been indeed involved in governance networks trying to establish different coalitions in order to achieve common goals in order to create common integration goals and policy frameworks.

All networks in which European cities were involved (CLIP, Eurocities, Intercultural cities) have used different tools in their horizontal and vertical cooperation. Firstly cooperation within networks aimed at exchange of good practices and strengthening transfer of knowledge among participants involved. In terms of dissemination of knowledge in both the horizontal and vertical dimension, the urban networks have organized workshops, conferences and consultations with national and EU institutions. Cities focus on policies addressing cultural issues, mutual understanding and anti-discrimination in all public domains. In all this, the cities are much more independent from the national legislation and try to use cooperation within networks to transfer policies and good practices. According to Martinelli (2014) “EU governance is also multistakeholder network governance”. In the creation of adequate goals and measures in cultural integration, diversity policy and intercultural policies the city authorities have used both the new opportunities (within and beyond networks), tools, exchange of good practices, benchmarking, peer reviews, city-to-city mentoring, research and cooperation with experts, dissemination of knowledge (publishing documents, reports, organizing conference, workshop, training) in order to play an important role as collective actors which are able to more actively participate in the creation of new policies on the European level.