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Group identity, group networks, and political participation: Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands

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Abstract This article examines how social identification and group networks, and their interactions, affect Moroccan and Turkish immigrants' political participation in the Netherlands. It uses the data generated by Roex et al. (Salafisme in Nederland. IMES Report Series, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), Amsterdam, 2010) and conducts logistic regression analyses. It conceptualizes how social identifications, networks, and their interactions relate to voting, other institutionalized political participation, and noninstitutionalized political participation separately. Our main finding is that immigrants' origin-country identification affects voting turnout negatively, but other forms of political participation positively, for those who are more embedded in origin-country friend networks, and who visit the mosque more frequently. A difference between the two immigrant groups appears when we consider religious identification and networks. Religious identification has mostly positive effects on the political participation of Moroccan immigrants who are also embedded in religious networks, while it has solely negative effects among Turkish immigrants who are more embedded in religious networks.

Keywords Social identification · Group networks · Political participation · Moroccan and Turkish immigrants

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Introduction

In Europe, problems surrounding immigrants with an Islamic background have come to be regularly ascribed to their religion and national origin. This not only infringes on their sense of welcome and wellbeing, but also runs the risk of discouraging their political participation. Yet, for minority groups to address perceived injustices and improve their position in society, political participation is crucial (Bloemraad and Vermeulen 2014). It is therefore all the more pressing to understand which factors affect immigrants' political participation. Politicians with immigrant backgrounds with strong ties to their ethnic or religious constituency must overcome formidable barriers to enter the precincts of power. Increasingly, the immigrant electorate, notably with Islamic backgrounds, is refraining from participating in local and national political systems (Akhtar 2012; Cesari 2014; Just et al. 2014; Michon and Vermeulen 2013; Nielsen 2013), which is fueling polarization, apathy, and segregation.

This article researches the effects of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants' social identification and group networks on their political participation in the Netherlands. Social identification can affect collective action and political participation, as already theorized (Turner et al. 1987; Kranendonk et al. 2017; Miller et al. 1981; Simon and Klandermans 2001; for overviews, see Klandermans 2014; Van Zomeren et al. 2008). Group networks, both formal (e.g., organizations) and informal (e.g., friends), can encourage political participation as well by exposing individuals to recruitment networks, nurturing political engagement, and making collective resources accessible (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Portes and Zhou 1993; Tillie 2004; Verba et al. 1995). However, social identification and group networks alone do not ensure political participation. Social identification separate from network embedment may indicate that individuals are motivated to pursue group interests but lack access to group resources or recruitment networks. Or, individuals who do not identify with a social group could lack motivation to pursue group interests, even if they are embedded in networks.

Departing from previous research, we examine how individuals' political participation is affected by the interaction between social identification and networks. We focus on the effects of origin-country and religious identification on political participation for individuals with different group and friend networks and frequency of mosque visits. Past studies mostly considered how social identification and/or group networks separately and directly affect political participation or collective action (e.g., Kranendonk et al. 2017; Simon and Klandermans 2001; for overviews, see Klandermans 2014; Klandermans et al. 2008; Tillie 2004; Van Zomeren et al. 2008). However, individuals who feel attached to a group through social identification and are embedded in a group network are expected to participate differently from individuals who socially identify with a group but lack access to networks, which implies an interaction effect. This study also conceptualizes how this interaction between social identification and networks affects voting, other institutionalized political participation, and noninstitutionalized political participation differently.

This article's threefold contribution to the literature offers new theoretical insight into how the interplay between social identification and group networks



affects political participation—a topic not yet systematically studied. We first conceptualize how the interplay affects voting, and institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation. Second, we fuse theoretical insights from multiple fields: social psychology, sociology, immigration studies, and political science. Third, we contextualize the relationship between social identification, group networks, and political participation by considering multiple forms of social identification (origin-country and religious) as well as acknowledging group differences (Moroccan and Turkish immigrants).

Social Identification and Political Participation

Origin-country and religious identification as forms of social identification can be expected to have both positive and negative effects on political participation (for theoretical overview, e.g., Kranendonk et al. 2017). Starting with the positive effects: Social identification can relate to political participation through the process of depersonalization (Turner et al. 1987). Social identification emphasizes the group and leads to a *depersonalization* of the self-concept, which consists of a unique overlap of many social identities (Turner et al. 1987; Brewer 1991). Turner et al. (1987) argue that depersonalization refers to how people come to see themselves less as unique individuals and more as an “interchangeable exemplar of a social category” (1987, p. 50). They argue that depersonalization is the basic process that underlies group processes such as collective action. Brewer explains that depersonalization transforms self-definitions, which can in turn alter “the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation” (1991, p. 476). The social self can therefore also motivate individuals to act on behalf of a group instead of out of mere self-interest (Brewer 1991). Social identification can increase the awareness of belonging to a group with shared political interests, which in turn enhances psychological engagement with politics and incentivizes political participation (Brady et al. 1995).

Many forms of political participation can be used as an outlet of group behavior and as a vehicle for addressing a group’s position (e.g., see Lee 2008, for theoretical overview; Olsen 1970; Tate 1991; Kranendonk et al. 2017). An example is how origin-country and religious identification can influence voting behavior by providing individuals with group interests, and therefore certain policy preferences (Dickson and Scheve 2006).

Origin-country and religious identification can also lead to exclusion and segregation, which could lead to withdrawal from participating in the destination countries, including their political domains. These identifications can therefore also negatively affect immigrants’ political participation (for an empirical example, see Klandermans et al. 2008). Muslim identification in a Muslim-minority environment could function as a proxy for feelings of exclusion, which may decrease Muslim voters’ willingness to participate in democratic European systems (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). Perceived exclusion can sway individuals to expect mainstream society to reject their group interest pursuits (Fleischmann et al. 2011). Religiosity can also facilitate traditional beliefs and practices that complicate participation in



the receiving society (Hirschman 2004; Just et al. 2014), which may also decrease political participation among those identifying as Muslim.

However, the political implications of religious identification could differ between groups. Warner and Wenner (2006) argue that the organization of Islam is inter-related with origin country and ethnicity. We therefore acknowledge that religious identification and networks could be embedded in cultural traditions derived from the origin country. Identifying with both the origin country and the Islamic faith can therefore have different implications for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants, and can therefore also have different implications for their political participation.

Social identification and three types of political participation

Before delving into how different forms are differently affected by social identification and networks, it is important to define political participation. We define institutionalized political participation following Van Deth (2014): voluntary acts conducted by citizens and located in the sphere of government, state, or politics. We distinguish between voting and other forms of institutionalized political participation (from now on referred to as institutionalized political participation) because of the specific nature of voting, which is of very low cost (Verba et al. 1995) in comparison to other forms of institutionalized political participation. Noninstitutionalized political participation is defined as voluntary acts conducted by citizens, not located in the sphere of government, state, or politics, but *targeted at* it (Van Deth 2014). The various forms of political participation each have unique opportunities for and limits to pursuing group-based political interests (Lee 2008).

Two characteristics of political participation matter in how immigrants' social identification affects their political participation: 1. the extent to which the political act is perceived as suitable for the pursuit of group-based interests, and 2. whether it is collective or individualistic (if we want to take processes of group mobilization into account). These two characteristics enable us to distinguish between voting, other institutionalized participation, and noninstitutionalized participation. Voting differs from other forms of political participation by being a political act that is less likely to serve group mobilization. Although we acknowledge the mobilizational value of voting, in contrast to other forms of political participation, voting is an act conducted individually and without necessarily accessing group resources or networks. Voting for the sake of group interests could be perceived as merely symbolic, since most individuals know one vote cannot determine national policies. Lastly, voting forces individuals to choose from an array of political parties and politicians, many of whom may not represent group interests, and it is therefore less suitable for pursuing group-based interests. Other forms of institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations leave more room for individuals to raise awareness of group-specific demands, even if no party or politician is pursuing them. We thus expect origin-country and religious identification and networks to affect voting negatively. We expect this because the act of voting is less suitable for pursuing group interests and requires less group mobilization.



We can also distinguish between other institutionalized participation (excluding voting) and noninstitutionalized political participation when it comes to their suitability for pursuing group-based interests. For the former, individuals are also dependent on the existing political structures, representatives and parties. Institutionalized political participation can be used to put a group-related concern on the political agenda (e.g., by contacting a politician), but individuals are still dependent on the willingness of politicians to do something about it. Noninstitutionalized political participation is probably less dependent on the ideas of incumbent parties and representatives, and can be somewhat more easily conducted to put issues on the political agenda which have been disregarded or are perceived to be purposely ignored (e.g., the Black Pete demonstrations in the Netherlands; signing a petition for the increase of days for partner parental leave, etc.). This is not to say that these noninstitutionalized forms of political participation are less costly—on the contrary, they often cost more in terms of time and effort. This is just to emphasize that noninstitutionalized political acts can be used more easily to put group interests on the political agenda, independent from the existing political structures. Therefore, for the politicization of social identification, it not only matters whether political acts are conducted individually, but also to what extent the forms of political participation allow for group-specific interests to be pursued.

Group networks and organizational involvement

Social identification often only affects political participation under certain circumstances (e.g., Simon and Klandermans 2001). We argue that one of these circumstances is being in a group network, which we will elaborate on in this section. Group networks can enhance political engagement, expose individuals to recruitment networks, and provide access to collective resources, which in turn can encourage political participation.

More formalized networks can affect political participation. Through organizations, individuals may acquire the abilities (e.g., civic skills, cooperation), the network, and the mindset (e.g., generalized social trust, political interest) that stimulate political engagement and participation (Van der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). Minkoff (2016) shows that joining a civic organization enhances the likelihood of engaging in political activism. Stekelenburg et al. (2016) explain how the relationship between civic and political participations varies according to the civic participation (type, intensity, and scope) and its association with different political activities (individualized versus collective). Van der Meer and Van Ingen (2009) show that a positive association could also be due to a self-selection effect, with individuals' resources and characteristics influencing both organizational involvement and political participation.

Group networks based on immigrants' ethnicity or origin country can positively affect political participation (for an overview, see Bloemraad 2007). Tillie (2004) argues that individuals gain social trust in ethnic and nonethnic organizations, which could spill over to become political trust, thereby increasing political participation. Organizational membership, moreover, can provide access to organizational and



group resources (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Vermeulen and Berger 2008; Vermeulen forthcoming). Pilati and Morales' (2016) study of nine European cities shows how immigrants' involvement in ethnic and pan-immigrant organizations positively relates to the likelihood of engaging in immigration-related political activities. For Denmark, Togeby (2004) notes that a positive effect of organizational participation depends on immigrant groups and forms of political participation.

Formalized religious networks can also positively affect political participation because they provide strong recruitment networks, resources, and incentives for members' involvement in civic matters (Campbell 2013; Hirschman 2004). Connor and Koenig (2013) focus on occupational attainment among immigrants and natives. Comparing Canada, the United States and Western Europe, they argue that religiosity can also be a bridge to integration, as religious organizations provide individuals with integration-facilitating resources. They find that religious attendance tends to be positively related to occupational status in contexts where religion provides a bridge and not a boundary (United States), by providing access to social organizations (religious institutions), which in turn provide access to tangible resources (Connor and Koenig 2013). Cesari (2014) and Just et al. (2014) find that Muslim immigrants who are exposed to religious organizations participate significantly more in politics than those who are not. Verba et al. (1993) likewise maintain that religious institutions positively affect political participation by exposing individuals to political discussions and access to collective resources. Just as with networks based on the origin country, we believe that religious networks can enhance other institutionalized (excluding voting) and noninstitutionalized political participations by providing individuals with a recruitment network and group resources.

In contrast to the previous theories and empirical studies, it can also be theorized that involvement in an immigrant-origin or religious organization does not, or negatively, affect political participation. As counter to Tillie's argument that social trust spills over into political trust, Newton (2001) argues that social and political trust are different things, have different origins, and that they are not necessarily empirically related. Uslander (2002) questions whether organizational involvement generates trust and argues that organizations that connect people to other people who are 'similar' do not produce trust, nor need trust for members to become involved. Following this reasoning, we would probably expect that, for example, ethnic or religious organizations would connect people to others who are like themselves; therefore, these organizations would not generate generalized trust, and thus would not relate to political participation.

Individuals who are connected exclusively to others of the same origin country or religious background might also miss out on recruitment opportunities emerging from those of different backgrounds (Vermeulen and Keskiner 2017). They might also lack access to other groups' collective resources, which could segregate them, also from the political domain.

We expect origin-country and religious organizations to comprise individuals who also identify with the immigrant group or their religion and that this identity motivates them to mobilize in an organization. Origin-country or religious organizational involvement can positively affect forms of political participation, which are more appropriate for pursuing group interests or putting them on the political



agenda. The least appropriate and effective form of participation would be voting, and the most appropriate would be noninstitutionalized political participation, with other forms of institutionalized participation somewhere in between.

H1a Involvement in origin-country or religious organizations negatively affects the likelihood of voting.

Origin-country and religious organizations can provide individuals with group resources and recruitment networks that facilitate other institutionalized forms of political participation (excluding voting), and noninstitutionalized political participation. Nevertheless, these organizations can also segregate individuals from the rest of society, which can deter their participation in the destination country's political sphere. We therefore theorize that organizational membership could affect institutionalized and noninstitutionalized participation both positively and negatively and formulate an exploratory hypothesis to test our mutual assumptions.

H1b Involvement in origin-country or religious organizations affects the likelihood of institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation.

Alongside formal group networks, it is relevant to consider informal group networks, e.g., friends, neighbors, etc. McClurg (2003) finds that individuals' informal networks also affect political participation. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) maintain that politically relevant social capital gets generated in personal networks through social interaction. That capital increases political participation and has an effect separate from organizational involvement and human capital. The generation of this capital depends on the network—specifically, the political expertise within, the frequency of internal political interaction, and its size and extensiveness (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998).

The informal network's composition matters as well (Bloemraad 2007). Origin-country and religious networks may affect political participation by providing strong, well-functioning recruitment networks for political activities. Finding that recruiting tends to cluster within groups and friend networks, Verba et al. (1995, p. 152) show how individuals are likelier to urge someone to participate politically who is of the same gender, race, or ethnicity. Origin-country and religious networks are also expected to make collective resources available (Klandermans et al. 2008; Portes and Zhou 1993, p. 86). These resources, such as information about politics (Bloemraad 2007) and financial or political support, can subsequently enhance different forms of political participation, for example, mobilizing for a protest.

We do not formulate hypotheses for the direct effects of informal group networks on political participation. In contrast to immigrants' organizational



involvement, we cannot expect a self-selection effect when it comes to someone's informal networks. These networks do not indicate whether someone identifies with a social group, and even when they do, the networks do not hint at whether this identity mobilizes these individuals, as could be both expected for organizational involvement. Individuals need to feel both connectedness to the social category, and be embedded in informal networks, to participate politically.

Social identification combined with group networks

The politicization of social identification is generally believed to emerge under certain conditions among some individuals (e.g., Simon and Klandermans 2001). Some conditions mentioned in the literature are shared grievances (e.g., Klandermans et al. 2008), identification with the country of destination, i.e., dual identification (e.g., Simon and Ruhs 2008), and political leadership (e.g., Pérez 2015). We add to this literature by focusing on group networks as another condition for the complex politicization of social identification. Social identification *combined* with embeddedness in group networks is expected to affect political participation, by providing perceptions of group interests as well as group resources and a recruitment network.

We find support for such assumptions in social psychological research. Ethier and Deaux (1994) plea for more contextual analyses of identity processes. Sidanius et al. (2004) find that students' involvement in ethnic student organizations increases ethnic identification (see also Ethier and Deaux 1994), as does a desire to be politically active on behalf of an ethnic group. This supports the notion that the interaction between social identifications and group networks can affect actual or intended political participation.

Origin-country and religious identification can affect political participation both positively and negatively if high identifiers are also in a network of individuals of the same origin country or religion. It could positively affect political participation by providing access to recruitment networks and group resources and facilitating discussion. In other words, if high identifiers are motivated to pursue a group's political interests, they are even likelier to do so when exposed to a well-functioning group-based recruitment network with better access to collective resources. However, individuals could also become segregated from mainstream society if they identify with a minority group and are also embedded in these group networks by feelings of exclusion (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011) or anticipated societal rejection of group interests (Fleischmann et al. 2011), or if the groups themselves have beliefs or principles that complicate participation in the receiving society (Hirschman 2004; Just et al. 2014).



The possibility of a positive effect is only expected for the interaction effects of social identifications with group networks on forms of political participation, which are appropriate for addressing and pursuing group interests—institutionalized participation and in particular noninstitutionalized political participation. We expect people who identify with a minority group and are also embedded in it to refrain from voting. We form a more exploratory hypothesis to test our mutual assumptions concerning institutionalized and noninstitutionalized participation:

H2a Origin-country and religious identification negatively affects voting for individuals with larger networks with a relatively high number of individuals of the same origin country or religion.

H2b Origin-country and religious identification affects institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation of individuals with larger networks with a relatively high number of individuals of the same origin country or religion.

The same reasoning holds for the interplay between social identification and organizational involvement (Fig. 1).

H3a Origin-country and religious identification negatively affects voting for individuals who are more involved in religious organizations.

H3b Origin-country and religious identification affects institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation for individuals who are more involved in religious organizations.




Fig. 1 Hypotheses



Case: Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in The Netherlands

The political context (the Netherlands) and the groups that we compare are relevant to understand in order to understand how identities, networks, and their interplay relate to political participation. Starting with the political context, the Netherlands offers a compelling case study on the political participation of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in Europe. With a long immigration history, which has bred a sizeable Muslim electorate, the country constitutes a favorable context for minority participation, religious groups included (Michon and Vermeulen 2013). One of the West's highest levels of minority representation and participation nationally and locally is found in the country (Bloemraad 2013). This is the cumulative result of various factors including: the Dutch concept of citizenship; the Netherlands' electoral system; foreigners' right to vote at the local level; and a tradition of pillarization (a system wherein religious and secular groups are organized hierarchically in a so-called pillar: a national political party tops the structure and locally affiliated institutions, such as schools and associations, come below). Considering this political context, it is relatively easy, compared to other countries, for immigrant-origin individuals to participate politically in the Netherlands.

There are however still differences between the levels of political participation between immigrant groups in the Netherlands, which indicates that the group context might matter for political incorporation next to the country context. Compared to Moroccan immigrants, Turkish immigrants have greater political participation and vote more often for someone of the same origins and are therefore better represented (Tillie 2004; Van Heelsum 2005; Vermeulen and Berger 2008; Michon and Vermeulen 2013; Kranendonk et al., 2014; Vermeulen forthcoming).

The identity and organizational processes among immigrant-origin groups might be relevant if we want to understand the different levels of political participation within the same political context. Starting with the identity processes, Turkish immigrants identify much more strongly with their ethnic background (Vermeulen and Brünger 2014), and the importance of their identity manifests itself in political behavior. Moroccan's immigrants' ethnic identity in the Netherlands has become problematized (Michon and Vermeulen 2013). However, this ethnic identity seems less powerful as a politicized social identity. Partly because it is primarily an external categorization, ascribed by the out-group (inhabitants in the Netherlands) and comes less from below, namely from Moroccan-origin individuals themselves. This suggests that the 'Turkish identity' might be more important and more easily politicized for Turkish-origin individuals in comparison to the 'Moroccan identity' for Moroccan-origin individuals.

Returning to the organizational processes, existing research tells us that the latter group is more frequently organized around ethnic networks. The Turkish community in the Netherlands is better represented than the Moroccan community in elective political positions (Michon and Vermeulen 2013). Moreover, group resources and organizational density differ between the two immigrant groups (Vermeulen and Brünger 2014), which may be an indication of how their recruitment networks function. The Turkish community also enjoys more collective mobilizing resources that revolve around ethnicity than the Moroccan community, which affects their organizational capabilities.



In sum, the immigrant groups that we compare, namely Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, vary with regard to our main concepts, namely their levels of political participation, processes of identification and organizational processes. Therefore we take into account that the hypotheses that we formulated can also differ between these groups.

Data and methods

Our study draws data from a survey conducted by Roex et al. (2010) in their exploration of religious orthodoxy among Dutch Muslims. The Central Agency for Statistics in the Netherlands selected the sample for the researchers using registered data. This enabled a representative sample from a population of immigrants, and their children, from predominantly Muslim countries. Individuals' religions are not registered, so the researchers had to rely on the proxy of country of origin in order to sample Muslims. The interviews were conducted face to face, using Computer Assisted Interviewing. The researchers aimed at interviewing as many Moroccan as Turkish immigrants. The interviews were conducted from December 2008 to May 2009 by 233 Dutch interviewers, to avoid origin-based bias. 1103 people participated, giving a response rate of 36 percent. The response rate did not differ significantly for Moroccan individuals (37%) compared to Turkish individuals (36%) (Roex et al. 2010).

One limit of the data was that it came from interviews conducted in Dutch, leaving our sample to comprise solely individuals with the language proficiency needed to respond to the survey (Roex et al. 2010, pp. 207–210). Our findings thus concern Moroccan and Turkish immigrants who possess Dutch-language proficiency. These immigrants and their children are not practically (through language) excluded from political participation. Another drawback is that the purposes for political participation, whether these were individual or group-related, were not inquired by the survey. It would be good to include questions related to the motivations of individuals in future survey studies. It should also be kept in mind that the data solely concerns the Netherlands. This begs the question of the extent to which our findings can be generalized to other Western European countries. We encourage studies that utilize cross-national research designs to further explore this point. Lastly, the data is cross-sectional, which makes it impossible to establish causal effects. We speak of effects, because we derive our causal expectation from theory, but we cannot test it.

In instances when variables had a relatively high number of missing respondents, we created dummies to avoid having to sacrifice data. We divided the sample into Muslims and non-Muslims. The latter were included to estimate the effects of origin-country identification and networks on political participation. When taking voting as a dependent variable, we analyzed a sample of eligible voters, although, when considering institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations, we also included respondents not eligible to vote. We analyzed Muslims separately when researching the effects of religious identification and networks on political participation. Respondents (including non-Muslims) totaled 734–554 of whom could vote. The sample of Muslims alone totaled 654–489 of whom could vote. We ensured that our findings held for the eligible voters sample alone when we



Table 1 Political participation total sample (including non-Muslims)

	Eligible voters		All respondents	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
Having voted	377	68.1	/	/
Institutionalized forms of political participation	37	6.7	48	6.5
Noninstitutionalized forms of political participation	133	24.0	188	25.6
Total	554		734	

Table 2 Political participation religious sample

	Eligible voters		All religious respondents	
	Freq.	Freq.		
Having voted	330	67.5	/	/
Institutionalized forms of political participation	32	6.5	43	6.6
Noninstitutionalized forms of political participation	113	23.1	162	24.8
Total	489		654	

compared voting with the other forms of political participation.¹ We did this to avoid varying effects on different forms of political participation vis-à-vis characteristics of these forms because the varying effects could have actually been caused by the different sample sizes; see, Tables 1, 2.

We used binary logistic regression analyses to deal with nonlinearity and nonnormality of the dependent variables' distribution of errors. The standard errors were clustered on the immigrant groups. We presented the results in log odds, where less than zero represents a negative relative effect and greater than zero represents a positive relative effect.

Operationalization

Political participation

Voting was determined by whether someone cast a ballot in the 2006 Dutch parliamentary elections. Other forms of institutionalized political participation implied

¹ All our main findings also held if we only considered eligible voters. Although effect sizes and direction were similar, there were some rare significant differences due to the smaller sample size.



being a member of a political party and having, in the last 5 years, endeavored to put something on the political agenda or to influence politicians or the government by partaking in one of the following acts specified in the survey: “asked for assistance from a political party or organization”; “visited a town hall meeting organized by the government”; and/or “contacted a politician”. Acts of noninstitutionalized political participation included having: “sought assistance through radio, TV or newspaper”; “joined pressure groups”; “partaken in a protest action, march or demonstration”; and/or “partaken in a political discussion via the internet, e-mail or SMS.”

We modeled voting, and institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations as dummies. We distinguished between no participation (0) and participation in one or more of the aforementioned political acts (1) (for the distribution, see Table 5, 6).

Independent variables

Taking origin-country and religious identification into account, the questions asked to what degree respondents felt Moroccan or Turkish and to what degree they felt Muslim (1 “not at all” to 5 “entirely”).

We included indicators for the composition of friend networks. Respondents were asked how many friends and acquaintances were from the same origin country and how many were Muslim (1 “none” to 5 “all of them”). The general effect of informal networks was captured with a question about numbers of friends. For the indicator related to friends, the participants were asked how many very good friends they had (1 “none”, to 5 “10 or more”).

Composition of friend network was likelier to matter if individuals had a larger group of friends. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) maintain that the generation of social capital within informal networks also depends on networks’ extensiveness. To account for the interplay between friend network composition and size, we constructed a new variable that produces four categories comprising combinations of friend composition and number (see Tables 8, 9, 10, 11). The continuous variables of composition of friend networks according to origin country and religion, and number of friends in general (regardless of their background), were split into two groups on the basis of their mean value. In turn, we interacted this variable with origin-country and religious identification to test hypotheses 3a and 3b.²

Organizational membership and composition were also considered. We analyzed sport clubs, leisure organizations, neighborhood organizations, trade unions, and organizations championing international solidarity, nature, and the environment. We distinguished between: not being a member of one of the aforementioned types of organization; being a member of one of the aforementioned types of organization whose composition is unspecified; being a member of an organization in which the individual is in contact with members of the same origin country; and being a

² We also tested hypotheses 3a and 3b using three-way interaction effects with the original continuous variables. The results were similar. We chose to use this method because the graphs were easier to understand than a marginal effects plot for a three-way interaction effect with three continuous variables.



member of an organization in which the individual is in contact with members from all kinds of backgrounds, including those in which the majority is native Dutch. We also included a dummy to indicate whether someone was a member of an immigrant or a religious organization. Lastly, to learn about formal religious networks, we included an indicator that asked how often people visited a mosque (1 “never” to 6 “daily”) as a proxy for religious organizational involvement.

Control variables

It is generally accepted that age and gender influence political participation. Political participation among immigrants can largely be accounted for by resources and factors that affect political participation among nonimmigrants too. Verba et al. (1995) find that individuals’ political participation is best explained by a combination of three factors—resources, psychological engagement, and recruitment networks—for which we included a range of indicators in our analysis.

We also included proxies to account for money, time, and civic skills as general resources (e.g., Verba et al. 1995). We considered a respondent to be educated if he or she obtained a diploma, distinguishing between educational categories of low, middle, and high.³ We included a dummy to measure the effects of having been educated abroad and having a paid job. Respondents were asked how many hours they worked per week as stipulated by their contracts (1 “less than 12 h a week”, to 4 “over 33 h a week”).

We also included proxies for general psychological engagement in politics (e.g., Verba et al. 1995). Individuals who identified as “not interested in political topics” were compared to those who were “somewhat interested in political topics” and “very interested in political topics.” The interested among them were then asked which countries’ political topics they cared about. Response categories were: “the Netherlands”; “country of origin”; “other countries”; and “all countries” (the last two categories were merged as they were theoretically irrelevant). We used “trust in the government” as a proxy for political trust, as respondents were asked how much they had of this (1 “no trust at all” to “a lot of trust” 4). Unfortunately there was no indicator that measured political (internal or external) efficacy.

Networks are also theorized to affect political participation (e.g., Verba et al. 1995). The general effect of informal networks was captured through the aforementioned indicator for number of friends. We also accounted for network of neighbors with the question “How many of your neighbors do you know?” (1 “none” to 5 “all of them”). The general effect of organizational involvement was covered by the previously cited proxy of being a member of an organization.

Alongside these general influences, specific factors seemed to account for, in particular, participation of voters with immigrant backgrounds (e.g., Just and Anderson 2012). We distinguished between first and second generations. We also included

³ Having no education and completing just elementary school or lower vocational training was categorized as “low.” Completing other forms of secondary education or vocational tertiary education was “middle.” Completing education at a (technical) university was “high.”



effect estimates for how many times a week a respondent watched Dutch television or read Dutch newspapers or magazines (1 “never” to 6 “every day”). Additionally, we distinguished between immigrant groups—Moroccans and Turks. Lastly, we controlled for a sense of national identity using the question of the extent to which someone felt Dutch (1 “not at all” to 5 “entirely”).

Results

Turning to our results, we first look at the direct effects that origin-country and religious identification and group networks have on the three aforementioned forms of political participation. Then we consider an interaction between social identifications, number of friends and relative number of friends from the same origin country, and number of Muslim friends. We do this since the size of an individual’s network is, along with its composition, likely to matter (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). Additionally, we include an interaction between origin-country and religious identification and number of mosque visits to account for the interplay between these identifications and religious institutions.⁴ We report whenever a difference appears between Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in testing our hypothesis.

Organizational involvement

Some indicators for social identifications and group networks affect different forms of political participation directly and should be mentioned before we discuss the outcomes for our hypotheses. Table 3 shows the effect estimates for all respondents, divided by eligible voters and all respondents (for all estimates, see Table 12). Origin-country identification has a negative effect on voting likelihood ($P < .05$) and a positive effect on institutionalized political participation ($P < .05$). Having a relatively high number of friends from the same origin country affects voting positively ($P < .001$). Organizational involvement also affects political participation; being an organization member and being in contact with all kinds of groups through it affects voting and noninstitutionalized political participation positively ($P < .001$), compared to not being a member of an organization.

Table 4 shows the analyses of the religious sample (for all estimates, see Table 13).⁵ It shows that religious identification has a negative effect on institutionalized ($P < .001$) and noninstitutionalized ($P < .10$) political participation. For religious immigrants, origin-country identification relates negatively to

⁴ We did not include an interaction effect of social identifications and being a member of an immigrant or a religious organization. Only a few individuals in the survey were members of such organizations. Among them, around 50% or more identify “very strongly” with their origin-country and religious backgrounds. We expected a self-selection effect (Van Ingen and Van der Meer 2016) for individuals who felt they shared interests with their origin-country or religious group and were actively pursuing them through joining an immigrant or a religious organization.

⁵ Size and direction of the control variables are more or less similar to the analyses comprising the total sample.



Table 3 Factors that relate to political participation (sample includes non-Muslims)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	- 0.07 (0.03)*	0.25 (0.11)*	0.17 (0.13)
Identification with being Muslim	- 0.10 (0.20)	- 0.07 (0.04)†	- 0.23 (0.07)***
Origin-country and religious networks			
Friends of same origin-country background	0.13 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.22)	0.07 (0.11)
Friends who are Muslim	0.07 (0.10)	- 0.48 (0.09)***	- 0.21 (0.08)**
Composition organization (ref. no membership)			
Member of an organization (composition unspecified)	0.06 (0.36)	0.14 (0.68)	- 0.35 (0.15)*
Mostly in contact with individuals of same origin-country background	0.39 (0.52)	- 0.73 (0.89)	- 0.24 (0.30)
Mostly in contact with individuals of other backgrounds	0.38 (0.01)***	- 0.37 (0.25)	0.39 (0.02)***
Member of immigrant or religious organization	- 0.43 (0.10)***	1.18 (0.17)***	0.53 (0.43)
Number of mosque visits	0.04 (0.03)	- 0.06 (0.10)	- 0.04 (0.01)***
Social networks			
Number of friends	- 0.05 (0.03)	- 0.12 (0.17)	0.04 (0.03)†
Number of neighbors acquainted with	0.11 (0.00)***	0.12 (0.22)	0.01 (0.11)
<i>N</i>	554	734	734
Df	32	32	32
Pseudo R^2	.176	.192	.098
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). The missing values for religious identification, mosque visits, hours worked per week and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$

voting likelihood ($P < .001$) and positively to institutionalized political participation ($P < .01$). Having relatively more Muslim friends affects institutionalized and noninstitutionalized participation negatively ($P < .001$).

Returning to testing our first hypotheses, being a member of an immigrant or religious organization has a negative effect on voting ($P < .001$). This supports the notion that immigrant and religious organizational involvement affects voting negatively (H1a), possibly because voting is not well suited for pursuing group-specific interests. Being a member of an immigrant or religious organization has a positive effect on institutionalized political participation ($P < .001$). This partially supports the notion that members of immigrant and religious organizations are likelier to participate politically in institutionalized forms (H1b), but not noninstitutionalized forms. Nevertheless, we exercise caution when making causal claims about the positive effects on political participation. The association could be caused by a self-selection effect (Van der Meer and Van Ingen 2009): individuals who are more



Table 4 Factors that relate to political participation (sample includes only religious respondents)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	- 0.12 (0.01)***	0.27 (0.09)**	0.07 (0.18)
Identification with being Muslim	- 0.12 (0.25)	- 0.09 (0.02)***	- 0.19 (0.10)†
Origin-country and religious networks			
Friends of same origin-country background	0.21 (0.08)**	0.46 (0.30)	0.08 (0.12)
Friends who are Muslim	0.01 (0.08)	- 0.70 (0.12)***	- 0.25 (0.04)***
Composition organization (ref. no membership)			
Member of an organization (composition unspecified)	0.12 (0.27)	- 0.19 (0.34)	- 0.29 (0.00)***
Mostly in contact with individuals of same origin-country background	0.37 (0.64)	- 0.80 (1.04)	- 0.34 (0.20)†
Mostly in contact with individuals of other backgrounds	0.43 (0.12)***	- 0.36 (0.35)	0.22 (0.01)***
Member of immigrant or religious organization	- 0.68 (0.18)***	0.81 (0.23)***	0.63 (0.50)
Number of mosque visits	0.04 (0.03)	- 0.04 (0.07)	- 0.04 (0.00)***
Social networks			
Number of friends	- 0.10 (0.06)†	- 0.17 (0.19)	0.05 (0.03)†
Number of neighbors acquainted with	0.11 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.17)	- 0.03 (0.10)
Immigrant group (ref. Moroccans)			
Turkish immigrants	0.08 (0.15)	0.25 (0.01)***	- 0.23 (0.17)
<i>N</i>	489	654	654
<i>Df</i>	31	31	31
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	.190	.208	.099
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). The missing values for hours worked per week and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$

actively involved in pursuing shared origin-country and religious rights are likelier to belong to an immigrant or a religious organization and to engage in politics. Still, the effect should be distinguished from a self-selection of general civic involvement, which would have shown in the effects of membership in any other nonimmigrant or nonreligious organization or political interest.

Partly consistent with our hypothesis (H1b), we found that religious organizational involvement affects noninstitutionalized political participation but does not affect institutionalized political participation (Table 4). Visiting a mosque more frequently as a form of religious organizational involvement affects noninstitutionalized political participation negatively ($P < .001$). This is in contrast with being a member of an immigrant or religious organization, which was shown to affect institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation positively, although the latter effect is not significant.

Based on these findings, we observe partial support for a negative effect of immigrant or religious organizational involvement on voting (H1a) and partial



support for presumed effects on the other forms of political participation (H1b). Organizations can facilitate group mobilization, which could account for a positive effect; a negative one could possibly be explained by a segregation mechanism.

Interplay between Social Identification and Informal Group Networks

The other hypotheses that we want to test are related to the circumstances under which social identification, namely individuals' networks, politicizes. This section considers social identification's effect on political participation for individuals with different informal networks, both in terms of size and composition. Figures 2 and 3 show the marginal effects of origin-country identification for individuals who have a small group of friends and those who have a big group. Among the general number of friends, the graph distinguishes between those who have few friends and those who have many friends from the same origin country.

We observe that origin-country identification has a statistically significant negative effect on voting for individuals who have relatively more friends from the same origin country, regardless of the number of friends in general. Origin-country identification has no significant effect on voting for individuals with few friends from the same origin country, regardless of their number of friends in general. The statistically significant negative effects are in line with our expectation of a negative effect on voting (H2a), and could possibly be explained by the particular nature of voting, which is less suited for advancing group interests. It is also not surprising that the




Fig. 2 Origin-country identification's effect on voting likelihood for individuals having small or big groups of friends and among which are few or many friends of the same origin-country background ($N=554$) (95% confidence interval)






Fig. 3 Origin-country identification's effect on likelihood to engage in institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations for individuals having small or big groups of friends and among which are few or many of the same origin-country background ($N = 734$) (95% confidence interval)

number of friends in general has no effect on the extent to which origin-country identification relates to voting when we consider that voting is an act that can be conducted individually.

Also consistent with our expectation (H2a) is that origin-country identification has a positive effect on institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation among individuals who have large friend groups comprising many people from the same origin country. These findings seem to support the notion that origin-country identification could mobilize individuals if they are also embedded in larger group networks.

Returning to religious identification, we see that it does not affect political participation across immigrant groups in the same way.⁶ This is not very surprising, since religious practices are embedded within immigrant groups. Contrary to our expectations, Fig. 4 shows that religious identification has a positive effect on voting among Moroccans who have relatively more Muslim friends, regardless of the size of their friend network (H2a). Consistent with our expectations, religious identification has a positive effect on noninstitutionalized participation among Moroccans who have relatively high numbers of Muslim friends *and* have more friends in general (H2b). Also in line with

⁶ Unfortunately, the model was too demanding for institutionalized participation as a dependent variable, since there were not that many respondents who indicated that they had engaged in institutionalized political participation.






Fig. 4 Religious identification’s effect on voting likelihood ($N=489$) and likelihood to engage in non-institutionalized political participation ($N=654$) for individuals having small or big groups of friends and among which few or many are Muslim, according to immigrant group (95% confidence interval)

our hypothesis, religious identification has a negative, although not significant, effect on voting (H2a) and a negative effect on noninstitutionalized participation among Turkish immigrants (H2b), regardless of their friend network’s composition and size. The latter finding could possibly be explained by a segregation mechanism, wherein Turkish immigrants refrain from participating politically if they identify with being Muslim.

Interplay between origin-country and religious identification and religious organizational involvement

Having considered whether the politicization of social identification is dependent on someone’s informal network, we are now interested if it is dependent on the more formalized religious organizational involvement. Since religion, i.e., Islam, is often organized according to national origin in the Netherlands, we also considered an interaction effect of origin-country identification and number of mosque visits for religious immigrants. Figure 5 shows that the interplay between these factors affects voting negatively, but not significantly, among Turkish immigrants. Among Moroccan immigrants, origin-country identification has a negative effect on voting among those who visit a mosque more frequently. Again, both findings fulfill our expectation (H3a), and could possibly be explained by the aforementioned segregation mechanism of voting.

Figure 6 shows that origin-country identification has a positive effect on institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations among individuals who






Fig. 5 Origin-country identification's effect on voting likelihood among Muslim immigrants ($N=489$) for different mosque-visiting frequencies (95% confidence interval)




Fig. 6 Origin-country identification's effect on likelihood to engage in institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations among Muslim immigrants ($N=654$) for different mosque-visiting frequencies (95% confidence interval)



more often visit a mosque. It has a negative effect, or no effect, on institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation among individuals who less frequently visit a mosque. These findings are similar for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and meet our expectation (H3b). Even though the Turkish community in the Netherlands is overall better organized (e.g., Vermeulen and Brünger 2014) on the individual level, the members of the Moroccan and Turkish community both participate more if they identify more with the origin country and are more embedded in networks.

Having considered how origin-country identification's effects are conditional upon mosque visits, as a form of religious organizational involvement, we now turn to identifying with being Muslim. Religious identification has a negative effect on voting for both Moroccan and Turkish immigrants who most frequently visit a mosque. The difference between the two groups is that religious identification has a positive effect on voting for Moroccans who less frequently visit a mosque, while this is a negative—although not significant—effect among Turkish immigrants. Again, we observe that religious identification combined with more embedment in religious networks, in line with our expectations (H3a), has a negative effect on voting (Fig. 7).




Fig. 7 Religious identification's effect on voting likelihood ($N=489$) among Muslim immigrants for different mosque-visiting frequencies, according to immigrant group (95% confidence interval)






Fig. 8 Religious identification’s effect on likelihood to engage in institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participations ($N=654$) among Muslim immigrants for different mosque-visiting frequencies, according to immigrant group (95% confidence interval)

Figure 8 indicates that religious identification has a negative or not significant effect on institutionalized and noninstitutionalized participation among Turkish immigrants. Religious identification also has a negative effect on these forms of political participation among Moroccan immigrants who never visit a mosque, but a positive effect on institutionalized participation among Moroccan immigrants who more often visit a mosque. A similar trend can be observed for noninstitutionalized participation, although it does not reach statistical significance. The findings for Moroccans illustrate how the interplay between religious identification and religious group networks affects both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation positively (H3b). Our findings for Turkish immigrants illustrate negative effects (H3b) and could be explained by the segregation mechanism.

We thus see that the effects of origin-country and religious identification are often conditioned by someone’s networks: both informal friend networks as well as more formalized networks. Origin-country identification often has a negative effect on voting, and a positive effect on institutionalized and noninstitutionalized



political participation, for individuals who are more embedded in origin-country and religious networks. For religious identification we see differences between Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. Among Moroccan immigrants, religious identification more often affects political participation positively if these individuals are also more embedded in informal and more formal religious networks. We observe solely negative or not significant effects of religious identification on the political participation of Turkish immigrants, among those who are more embedded in religious networks.

Conclusion

We theorized that individuals' group networks are important for the politicization of social identification. We also acknowledged that these factors can relate differently to voting, and institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation.

We found support for this assumption when considering organizational involvement as well as the interplay between social identifications and group networks. Origin-country identification has a negative effect on voting, while it has a positive effect on institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political participation among individuals who are more embedded in origin-country-friend networks and individuals who are more involved in religious organizations. These findings could be explained by the notion that individuals who identify with a social group also perceive themselves as having common interests, and embedment in a group network could then provide access to group resources and recruitment networks.

We anticipated religious identification to relate to political participation differently according to the immigrant group. Among Moroccan immigrants, the interplay between religious identification and networks, both informal and formal, often has a positive effect on political participation.⁷ Moroccan immigrants who identify with being Muslim and are embedded in groups with relatively more Muslims seem able to mobilize individuals to pursue group interests or address the group's societal status. Although Muslim identities are often problematized in society and integration debates, they can nonetheless serve as a vehicle for some individuals to navigate the receiving country's political domain. This finding also indicates that even though the Turkish community seems overall better organized (e.g. Vermeulen and Brünger 2014), the Moroccan individuals who are well embedded in networks also participate politically more. It could be that the existing research has missed the mobilization of the Moroccan community on the basis of their religious networks, and focused too much on the ethnic networks.

Religious identification has a negative effect on all forms of political participation among Turkish immigrants. This effect is even stronger for individuals who are embedded in religious networks, both informal and formal. This finding illustrates

⁷ However, the effects were not significant for noninstitutionalized political participation, with the exception of religious identification's effect on voting for individuals who visit the mosque more often.



our theorized negative relationship between religious identification, embedment in religious networks, and political participation. One possible reason is that identifying with being Muslim and being embedded in religious networks segregates Turkish immigrants from mainstream society. Refraining from participating in the political system can have serious consequences, especially for a religious group, in terms of becoming increasingly stigmatized. Since political participation is crucial for improving minority-group positions in society, these results of withdrawal and their implications should be taken seriously.

The withdrawal from politics by religious Turkish immigrants could also be explained by the supply side of politics. This means that Turkish immigrants considered no party or candidate suitable for pursuing their group interests. The emergence of the immigrant-origin party in the Netherlands, DENK (meaning ‘Think’ in Dutch and ‘Equal’ in Turkish), attracted many Turkish-origin Muslims. DENK managed to gain three seats in parliament the first time it participated in the national elections in March 2017. It seems that this party might have been able to attract the group that, according to our analyses, withdrew from participation in Dutch politics. However, our data are older, and things might have changed in the meantime, so more research on the success of DENK, and their ability to attract the previously nonparticipating religious Turkish electorate, is required to verify these expectations.

Existing studies show that the effect of social identification on political participation interacts with different conditions (e.g., Pérez 2015; Simon and Klandermans 2001; Simon and Ruhs 2008). Our findings indicate that social identification’s effect on political participation also interacts with group networks, their composition and size, as well as organizational involvement. This contributes to our understanding of the complicated manner in which social identification gets politicized. We plea for a contextualized approach to the politicization of social identification that takes into account composition and size of individuals’ networks, along with the characteristics of specific types of political participation.

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Appendix

See Appendix Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17.



Table 5 Descriptive statistics total sample (including non-Muslims)

	Eligible voters					All respondents				
	Mean	Sd.	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Sd.	Min.	Max.	N
Control variables										
Age	39.9	12.5	21	79	554	37.1	13.6	16	79	734
Psychological engagement										
Trust in government	2.7	0.7	1	4	554	2.8	0.7	1	4	734
Reading Dutch newspapers/magazines	3.7	1.9	1	6	554	3.7	1.9	1	6	734
Watching Dutch television	5.3	1.4	1	6	554	5.3	1.4	1	6	734
Social networks										
Number of friends	2.9	1.1	1	5	554	2.9	1.1	1	5	734
Number of neighbors acquainted with	3.4	1.2	1	5	554	3.4	1.2	1	5	734
Identification										
Feeling Moroccan/Turkish/other origin-country background	4.0	1.0	1	5	554	4.0	1.0	1	5	734
Feeling Muslim	4.4	1.0	1	5	489	4.5	0.9	1	5	654
Feeling Dutch	3.5	1.0	1	5	554	3.4	1.1	1	5	734
Individuals' religious and origin-country networks										
Relative number of friends of same origin-country background	3.4	1.0	1	5	554	3.3	1.0	1	5	734
Relative number of Muslim friends	3.5	1.1	1	5	554	3.5	1.1	1	5	734
Religious organizational involvement										
Number of mosque visits	3.1	1.7	1	6	489	3.1	1.7	1	6	654



Table 6 Descriptive statistics religious sample

	Eligible voters				All respondents			
	Mean	Sd.	Min.	Max.	Mean	Sd.	Min.	Max.
Control variables								
Age	39.9	12.4	21	78	37.0	13.6	16	78
Psychological engagement								
Trust in government	2.7	0.7	1	4	2.8	0.7	1	4
Reading Dutch newspapers/magazines	3.7	1.9	1	6	3.7	1.9	1	6
Watching Dutch television	5.3	1.4	1	6	5.3	1.4	1	6
Social networks								
Number of friends	2.9	1.1	1	5	2.9	1.1	1	5
Number of neighbors acquainted with	3.4	1.2	1	5	3.4	1.2	1	5
Identification								
Feeling Moroccan/Turkish/other origin-country background	4.1	0.9	1	5	4.1	0.9	1	5
Feeling Muslim	4.4	1.0	1	5	4.5	0.9	1	5
Feeling Dutch	3.5	1.0	1	5	3.4	1.1	1	5
Individuals' religious and origin-country networks								
Relative number of friends of same origin-country background	3.4	1.0	1	5	3.4	1.0	1	5
Relative number of Muslim friends	3.6	1.0	1	5	3.6	1.0	1	5
Religious organizational involvement								
Number of mosque visits	3.1	1.7	1	6	3.1	1.7	1	6
N	489				654			



Table 7 Variables (including non-Muslims)

	Total sample (including non-Muslims)				Religious sample			
	Eligible voters		Total		Eligible voters		Total	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
Control variables								
Male	280	50.5	351	47.8	241	49.3	306	46.8
Female	274	49.5	383	52.2	248	50.7	348	53.2
Place of birth: Abroad	437	78.9	528	71.9	389	79.6	472	72.2
Country of birth: Netherlands	117	21.1	206	28.1	100	20.4	182	27.8
Moroccan background	270	48.7	364	49.6	235	48.1	322	49.2
Turkish background	284	51.3	370	50.4	254	51.9	332	50.8
Socioeconomics								
<i>Having a paid job</i>								
Yes	328	59.2	415	56.5	285	58.3	363	55.5
No	226	40.8	319	43.5	204	41.7	291	44.5
<i>Hours worked per week</i>								
0–12	27	4.9	65	8.9	26	5.3	61	9.3
13–24	45	8.1	58	7.9	39	8.0	52	8.0
25–32	32	5.8	38	5.2	30	6.1	36	5.5
More than 33	190	34.3	212	28.9	161	32.9	179	27.4
Lower education	302	54.5	426	58.0	278	56.9	396	60.6
Middle education	176	31.8	218	29.7	147	30.1	184	28.1
Higher education	56	10.1	61	8.3	44	9.0	48	7.3
Education abroad: Yes	335	60.5	412	56.1	297	60.7	368	56.3
Education abroad: No	219	39.5	322	43.9	192	39.3	286	43.7



Table 7 (continued)

	Total sample (including non-Muslims)				Religious sample			
	Eligible voters		Total		Eligible voters		Total	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
Psychological resources								
Interest in political topics concerning the Netherlands	145	26.2	191	26.0	124	25.4	166	25.4
Interest in political topics concerning country of origin	31	5.6	42	5.7	30	6.1	41	6.3
Interest in political topics concerning other/all countries	153	27.6	206	28.1	136	27.8	182	27.8
No interest in political topics	225	40.6	295	40.2	199	40.7	265	40.5
<i>N</i>	554		734		489		654	
Organizational membership								
Not a member of an organization	379	68.4	502	68.4	341	69.7	455	69.6
Member of an organization (composition unspecified)	47	8.5	58	7.9	40	8.2	50	7.7
Mostly in contact with members of same origin-country background	27	4.9	40	5.5	26	5.3	38	5.8
In contact with individuals of all kinds of backgrounds	101	18.2	134	18.3	82	16.8	111	17.0
Membership in immigrant or religious organization								
Not a member	522	94.2	692	94.3	460	94.1	619	94.7
Member	32	5.8	42	5.7	29	5.9	35	5.4
Missing								
Hours worked per week	260	46.9	361	49.2	233	47.7	326	50.2
Education	20	3.6	29	4.0	20	4.1	26	4.0
Trust in government	48	8.7	70	9.5	42	8.6	63	9.6
Feeling Muslim	68	12.3	83	11.3	-	-	-	-
Mosque visits	68	12.3	83	11.3	-	-	-	-
<i>N</i>	554		734		489		654	



Table 8 Composition of friend network, according to origin country and number of friends in general (regardless of origin country) for eligible voters

	Small group of friends	Big group of friends
Few friends of same origin country	21.3	28.9
Many friends of same origin country	20.2	29.6
<i>N</i> (100%)	554	

Table 9 Composition of friend network, according to origin country and number of friends in general (regardless of origin country) for all respondents

	Small group of friends	Big group of friends
Few friends of same origin country	21.4	30.0
Many friends of same origin country	19.5	29.2
<i>N</i> (100%)	734	

Table 10 Composition of friend network, according to religion and number of friends in general (regardless of religion) for eligible voters

	Small group of friends	Big group of friends
Few Muslim friends	18.0	24.3
Many Muslim friends	24.5	33.1
<i>N</i> (100%)	489	

Table 11 Composition of friend network, according to religion and number of friends in general (regardless of religion) in total sample

	Small group of friends	Big group of friends
Few Muslim friends	17.6	24.9
Many Muslim friends	24.5	33.0
<i>N</i> (100%)	654	



Table 12 Factors influencing political participation likelihood (sample includes non-Muslims)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	-0.07 (0.03)*	0.25 (0.11)*	0.17 (0.13)
Identification with being Muslim	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.04)†	-0.23 (0.07)***
Origin-country and religious networks			
Friends of same origin-country background	0.13 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.22)	0.07 (0.11)
Friends who are Muslim	0.07 (0.10)	-0.48 (0.09)***	-0.21 (0.08)**
Composition organization (ref. no membership)			
Member of an organization (composition unspecified)	0.06 (0.36)	0.14 (0.68)	-0.35 (0.15)*
Mostly in contact with individuals of same origin-country background	0.39 (0.52)	-0.73 (0.89)	-0.24 (0.30)
Mostly in contact with individuals of other backgrounds	0.38 (0.01)***	-0.37 (0.25)	0.39 (0.02)***
Member of immigrant or religious organization	-0.43 (0.10)***	1.18 (0.17)***	0.53 (0.43)
Number of mosque visits	0.04 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.01)***
Social networks			
Number of friends	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.12 (0.17)	0.04 (0.03)†
Number of neighbors acquainted with	0.11 (0.00)***	0.12 (0.22)	0.01 (0.11)
Immigrant group (ref. Moroccans)			
Turkish immigrants	0.05 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.00)**	-0.29 (0.17)†
Control variables			
Men (ref. women)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.25)	0.28 (0.25)
Age	0.25 (0.01)***	-0.19 (0.04)***	-0.10 (0.02)***
Age ²	-0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Born in the Netherlands	0.91 (0.40)*	-0.24 (0.21)	-0.23 (0.07)**
Identification with being Dutch	0.28 (0.23)	0.08 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.06)
Having a paid job (ref. no paid job)	0.24 (0.22)	0.14 (0.38)	-0.10 (0.25)



Table 12 (continued)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Hours worked per week	-0.36 (0.01)***	-0.21 (0.28)	-0.21 (0.13)
Middle education (ref. low education)	0.46 (0.04)***	0.55 (0.07)***	0.37 (0.14)**
High education (ref. low education)	0.40 (0.50)	0.96 (0.43)*	0.24 (0.22)
Education abroad (ref. no education abroad)	0.20 (0.41)	0.22 (0.39)	-0.02 (0.10)
Interested in political topics concerning origin country (ref. Dutch topics)	-1.40 (0.11)***	-0.24 (0.59)	0.02 (0.49)
Interested in political topics concerning other/all countries (ref. Dutch topics)	-0.37 (0.10)***	-0.22 (0.65)	0.26 (0.16)
Not interested in political topics (ref. Dutch topics)	-1.58 (0.07)***	-1.91 (0.47)***	-0.91 (0.13)***
Trust in government	0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.12 (0.00)***
Reading Dutch newspapers	0.09 (0.11)	0.31 (0.06)***	0.05 (0.06)
Watching Dutch television	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)*	0.04 (0.11)
<i>N</i>	554	734	734
Df	32	32	32
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	.176	.192	.098
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). The missing values for religious identification, mosque visits, hours worked per week, and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 13 Factors influencing political participation likelihood (religious sample)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	-0.12 (0.01)***	0.27 (0.09)**	0.07 (0.18)
Identification with being Muslim	-0.12 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.02)***	-0.19 (0.10)†
Origin-country and religious networks			
Friends of same origin-country background	0.21 (0.08)**	0.46 (0.30)	0.08 (0.12)
Friends who are Muslim	0.01 (0.08)	-0.70 (0.12)***	-0.25 (0.04)***
Composition organization (ref. no membership)			
Member of an organization (composition unspecified)	0.12 (0.27)	-0.19 (0.34)	-0.29 (0.00)***
Mostly in contact with individuals of same origin-country background	0.37 (0.64)	-0.80 (1.04)	-0.34 (0.20)†
Mostly in contact with individuals of other backgrounds	0.43 (0.12)***	-0.36 (0.35)	0.22 (0.01)***
Member of immigrant or religious organization	-0.68 (0.18)***	0.81 (0.23)***	0.63 (0.50)
Number of mosque visits	0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.00)***
Social networks			
Number of friends	-0.10 (0.06)†	-0.17 (0.19)	0.05 (0.03)†
Number of neighbors acquainted with	0.11 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.10)
Immigrant group (ref. Moroccans)			
Turkish immigrants	0.08 (0.15)	0.25 (0.01)***	-0.23 (0.17)
Control variables			
Men (ref. women)	0.08 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.14)	0.23 (0.16)
Age	0.25 (0.02)***	-0.21 (0.04)***	-0.11 (0.01)***
Age ²	-0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Born in the Netherlands	0.72 (0.43)†	-0.64 (0.18)***	-0.24 (0.18)
Identification with being Dutch	0.22 (0.26)	0.28 (0.05)***	-0.04 (0.02)*
Having a paid job (ref. no paid job)	-0.00 (0.32)	0.47 (0.59)	-0.07 (0.13)



Table 13 (continued)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Hours worked per week	-0.30 (0.01)***	-0.28 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.09)*
Middle education (ref. low education)	0.68 (0.20)**	0.57 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.09)***
High education (ref. low education)	0.82 (0.12)***	0.44 (0.69)	-0.03 (0.27)
Education abroad (ref. no education abroad)	0.19 (0.31)	-0.20 (0.54)	0.04 (0.14)
Interested in political topics concerning origin country (ref. Dutch topics)	-1.43 (0.20)***	-0.13 (0.53)	-0.15 (0.52)
Interested in political topics concerning other/all countries (ref. Dutch topics)	-0.62 (0.22)**	-0.12 (0.55)	0.21 (0.21)
Not interested in political topics (ref. Dutch topics)	-1.70 (0.04)***	-2.23 (0.61)***	-1.03 (0.08)***
Trust in government	0.04 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.16)	0.11 (0.03)***
Reading Dutch newspapers	0.10 (0.07)	0.37 (0.09)***	0.03 (0.10)
Watching Dutch television	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.25 (0.02)***	0.06 (0.19)
<i>N</i>	489	654	654
Df	31	31	31
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	.190	.208	.099
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). The missing values for hours worked per week and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$



Table 14 Interplay between origin-country identification and origin-country friend networks (sample includes non-Muslims)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	0.14 (0.33)	- 0.25 (0.11)*	- 0.07 (0.18)
Identification with being Muslim	- 0.11 (0.20)	- 0.13 (0.04)**	- 0.26 (0.07)***
Origin=country and religious networks			
Friends who are Muslim	0.17 (0.10)†	- 0.41 (0.09)***	- 0.14 (0.11)
Number of mosque visits	0.05 (0.02)**	- 0.07 (0.06)	- 0.04 (0.01)***
Categorical variable for size and composition—origin country—of social networks (ref. small group, few from origin country)			
Big friend group, few friends from same origin country	0.71 (1.66)	- 2.46 (1.91)	- 0.79 (0.38)*
Small friend group, many friends from same origin country	1.00 (1.34)	- 3.11 (7.36)	- 1.93 (0.88)*
Big friend group, many friend from same origin country	1.16 (1.64)	- 3.68 (0.41)***	- 1.34 (0.90)
Origin-country identification*size and composition			
Origin-country identification*big group, few friends from origin country	- 0.20 (0.39)	0.57 (0.43)	0.27 (0.05)***
Origin-country identification*small group, many friends from origin country	- 0.32 (0.38)	0.77 (1.68)	0.42 (0.29)
Origin-country identification*big group, many friends from origin country	- 0.29 (0.38)	1.04 (0.04)***	0.40 (0.26)
N	554	734	734
Df	36	36	36
Pseudo R ²	.177	.208	.104
Prob > χ ²	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). Control variables of Table 12 are included but not reported. The missing values for religious identification, mosque visits, hours worked per week, and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models
 Source: Roex et al. (2010); † P < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001



Table 15 Interplay between religious identification, Muslim friend networks, and immigrant groups (religious sample)

	Voting	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification		
Identification with origin country	- 0.10 (0.04)**	0.07 (0.15)
Identification with being Muslim	- 0.09 (0.07)	0.06 (0.15)
Origin-country and religious networks		
Friends of same origin-country background	0.17 (0.15)	- 0.00 (0.17)
Number of mosque visits	0.04 (0.04)	- 0.05 (0.01)***
Turks (ref. Moroccans)	0.11 (0.50)	2.22 (0.61)***
Categorical variable for size and composition—religious—of social networks (ref. small group, few from origin country)		
Big friend group, few friends who are Muslim	- 0.54 (0.84)	1.75 (0.31)***
Small friend group, many friends who are Muslim	- 3.18 (0.69)***	- 0.08 (0.88)
Big friend group, many friend who are Muslim	- 2.58 (0.17)***	- 0.31 (0.91)
Religious identification*size and composition		
Religious identification*big group, few friends who are Muslim	0.13 (0.14)	- 0.38 (0.06)***
Religious identification*small group, many friends who are Muslim	0.63 (0.13)***	- 0.14 (0.15)
Religious identification*big group, many friends who are Muslim	0.66 (0.03)***	0.08 (0.16)
Categorical variable for size and composition—religious—of social networks (ref. small group, few from origin country)*immigrant group		
Big friend group, few friends who are Muslim*Turkish immigrants	1.70 (1.48)	- 3.13 (0.25)***
Small friend group, many friends who are Muslim*Turkish immigrants	4.43 (0.75)***	- 1.61 (0.44)***
Big friend group, many friend who are Muslim*Turkish immigrants	4.13 (0.50)***	0.08 (0.50)
Religious identification*immigrant group		
Religious identification*Turkish immigrants	0.03 (0.11)	- 0.63 (0.11)***
Religious identification*size and composition*immigrant group		
Religious identification*big group, few friends who are Muslim*Turkish immigrants	- 0.47 (0.32)	0.87 (0.04)***
Religious identification*small group, many friends who are Muslim*Turkish immigrants	- 0.92 (0.20)***	0.52 (0.10)***



Table 15 (continued)

	Voting	Noninstitutionalized
Religious identification*big group, many friends who are Muslim*Turkish immigrants	- 1.00 (0.15)***	- 0.03 (0.12)
N	489	654
Df	42	42
Pseudo R ²	.206	.113
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). Control variables of Table 12 are included but not reported. The missing values for hours worked per week, and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$



Table 16 Interplay between origin-country identification, mosque visits, and immigrant groups (religious sample)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	0.30 (0.14)*	- 0.35 (0.13)**	- 0.34 (0.23)
Identification with being Muslim	- 0.12 (0.24)	- 0.05 (0.01)***	- 0.17 (0.12)
Origin-country and religious networks			
Friends of same origin-country background	0.20 (0.09)*	0.49 (0.29)†	0.09 (0.13)
Friends who are Muslim	0.02 (0.08)	- 0.70 (0.09)***	- 0.24 (0.02)***
Number of mosque visits	0.61 (0.26)*	- 0.98 (0.45)*	- 0.62 (0.06)***
Social networks			
Number of friends	- 0.09 (0.07)	- 0.17 (0.22)	0.04 (0.05)
Network composition			
Turks (ref. Moroccans)	2.76 (0.09)***	0.24 (0.03)***	- 0.24 (0.17)
Origin-country identification*number of mosque visits	- 0.12 (0.05)**	0.22 (0.09)*	0.14 (0.02)***
Origin-country identification*Turkish immigrants	- 0.57 (0.04)***		
Number of mosque visits*Turkish immigrants	- 0.76 (0.15)***		
Origin-country identification*number of mosque visits*Turkish immigrants	0.16 (0.04)***		
<i>N</i>	489	654	654
<i>Df</i>	35	32	32
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	.193	.217	.105
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). Control variables of Table 13 are included but not reported. The missing values for hours worked per week, and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$



Table 17 Interplay between religious identification, mosque visits, and immigrant groups (religious sample)

	Voting	Institutionalized	Noninstitutionalized
Social identification			
Identification with origin country	- 0.13 (0.01)***	0.27 (0.10)**	0.07 (0.17)
Identification with being Muslim	0.47 (0.06)***	- 0.30 (0.04)***	- 0.15 (0.03)***
Origin-country and religious networks			
Friends of same origin-country background	0.19 (0.08)*	0.49 (0.33)	0.07 (0.12)
Friends who are Muslim	0.00 (0.06)	- 0.73 (0.16)***	- 0.25 (0.05)***
Number of mosque visits	0.47 (0.09)***	- 0.69 (0.08)***	- 0.29 (0.10)**
Social networks			
Number of friends	- 0.09 (0.06)	- 0.16 (0.22)	0.05 (0.03)
Network composition			
Turks (ref. Moroccans)	2.18 (0.37)***	- 2.06 (0.83)*	- 0.44 (0.20)*
Religious identification*Turkish immigrants	- 0.42 (0.12)***	0.55 (0.27)*	0.04 (0.01)**
Number of mosque visits*Turkish immigrants	0.15 (0.04)***	1.15 (0.05)***	0.54 (0.12)***
Religious identification*number of mosque visits	- 0.09 (0.01)***	0.14 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.02)**
Religious identification*number of mosque visits*Turkish immigrants	- 0.04 (0.01)***	- 0.26 (0.04)***	- 0.12 (0.02)***
<i>N</i>	489	654	654
<i>Df</i>	35	35	35
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	.201	.210	.102
Prob > χ^2	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors are clustered within immigrant groups (Moroccan and Turkish). Control variables of Table 13 are included but not reported. The missing values for hours worked per week, and trust in the government are modeled as dummies and included in the models

Source: Roex et al. (2010); † $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$

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