Can we talk?: examining willingness and facilitating deliberative capital

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CAN WE TALK? EXAMINING WILLINGNESS AND FACILITATING DELIBERATIVE CAPITAL

by

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M.A., The University of British Columbia, 2009
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Abstract

The question guiding this dissertation is: are people willing and capable of engaging in deliberations with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities?

Willingness for deliberation—the first key step in deliberative processes—has been taken for granted by deliberative democratic scholars. I remedy this by offering a theoretical account of the importance of willingness—especially under conditions of diversity. This is supplemented with an empirical examination of willingness through a survey of the students at the University of British Columbia. While there is an overall willingness for participation in a deliberation, there are differences in specific demographic groups and across particular issues. In other words, there seems to be evidence that there is some unwillingness to engage in deliberations with those with whom one disagrees on topics that touch upon and challenge one’s identity.

Moreover, in examining capacity, I developed at the concept of deliberative capital—the by-product of investments (i.e. instances of respect or attempts at empathy) and easily threatened by divestments (i.e. instances of disrespect or ignoring/attacking others). Early, self-interested, investments contribute to the establishment of an expectation of reciprocity within deliberation.

I further developed and, through deliberative experiments and pre/post deliberation surveys, tested the potency of facilitative treatments aimed at encouraging investments and discouraging divestments under conditions of cultural and religious diversity. Deliberative worth exercises (getting participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round) were shown to be successful at increasing investments in empathy, respect, productive dialogue, and sincerity. Simulated representation (getting
participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each other’s views for a portion of deliberation) was shown to be effective in increasing investments in reason-giving, productive dialogue, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, and respect. Facilitative treatments were also able to reduce the divestments made by men and non-visible minorities who were responsible for a significant majority of divestments under control conditions.
Preface

I identified and designed this research program in consultation with my supervisory committee. The research conducted for this dissertation was approved by the UBC Behavioral Research Ethics Board, Certificate Number H13-03158.
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Dedication

For my mom...
Chapter 1: Introduction

A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed. 

~ Habermas¹

On February 8th 2007, Jean Charest, the then Premier of Quebec, called for the Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accueillir les différences culturelles. The catalyst for Charest’s decision was the years-long accommodation crisis in Quebec marked by a number of cases of cultural and religious minorities requesting accommodation². These cases led to a larger and prolonged legal debate in both the media and the larger civil society regarding the place of religion (and culture) in the Quebec public sphere.

The proverbial straw breaking the camel’s back came in the form of the Hérouxville code. In January 2007, the small parish municipality located roughly 180km Northeast of Montreal adopted a code of conduct or “life standards” which included items such as prohibiting covering one’s face (barring Halloween costumes); banning the killing of women through public beatings or burning them alive; and proscribing symbolic and real weapons from school (Kahane 2007; Aubin et al. 2007). It was in this atmosphere of growing xenophobia and more specifically Islamophobia (and as a response to it) that the Commission was established.

The Commission led by Charles Taylor and Gerard Bouchard came to a close in May 2008 with a 300-page report³. While not a perfect example of the practice of deliberative democracy, the Commission was interesting, innovative, and, ultimately, disheartening because

¹ This quotation is from Jürgen Habermas’s edited book The Inclusion of the Other (1999, 208).
² A prominent example of this was the Multani case [Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys] from 2002-2006 which resulted in the Supreme Court decision to allow a Sikh boy to wear a kirpan in school.
³ The report, the recommendations, and the response to the report are not the focus of this dissertation and as such will not be explained in this work.
of its deliberative undertones. Mandated to hear from the Quebeckers on their views on accommodation of minorities in Quebec, the Commission received many submissions that cannot be characterized as anything but offensive if not completely racist and xenophobic. These include:

1) Quebec Council on the Status of Women which wanted to prohibit “teachers, doctors and anyone working in a public institution in [Quebec]” from wearing “hijabs or yarmulkes”. Their main concern was with the veil, which as a symbol of women’s submission, was detrimental in teaching students the importance of equality between men and women (Magder and Wilton 2007).

2) Andre Drouin, a member of the Hérouxville town council, who stood his ground defending the Hérouxville code and argued that “[i]t doesn’t matter in what country the stoning is taking place,” since “[s]toning takes place, and some of those people will want to come here. It’s important to be preventive” (CBC News 2008).

3) Richard Gagnon, a retiree from Jonquières, who asked whether “[o]n the pretext of making reasonable accommodations, […] we [are] going to tolerate foreigners who come here and impose the burqa?” and noted - most likely to the immigrants - that “[i]f you don’t like it, you can go home” (Heinrich 2007).

The Commission on Reasonable Accommodation was an attempt to democratize the policies surrounding multiculturalism and accommodation. In doing so, however, it highlighted the difficulty of carrying out conversations or consultations on topics that touch upon people’s

---

4 It goes without saying that the Commission also heard from many Quebeckers that defended multiculturalism and argued against the offensive and, often, derogatory comments made by others.
identities as well as their deeply held cultural and religious values and practices\textsuperscript{5}. In short it raises the question of how deliberative democracy can work best under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity.

1.1 Overview of the dissertation

This puzzle is the impetus for this dissertation. More broadly, this work concerns itself with deliberations conducted under difficult conditions of deep disagreement whether or not they arise as a result of cultural and religious diversity. My interest lies in the ways in which we can make deliberation better (and, in some cases, simply viable) in areas where it is most needed and most difficult. More specifically, this work concerns itself with those moments or rather intersections of the practice of deliberative democracy and pluralism\textsuperscript{6} both from a theoretical and empirical lens. Particularly, I look at the difficulties that might arise when participants in a deliberation are asked to talk about their deeply-held values, views, and biases. In doing so, I distinguish between the challenges that arise in even starting the process of deliberation (affecting willingness for participation) and those emerging within the process itself (affecting the capacity for participation).

In this chapter, then, I, first, discuss the importance of willingness for the possibility of deliberation as well as the factors that might induce participants to shy away from engagement, particularly under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity. Without willingness, I argue, we cannot ensure that deliberative engagements are inclusive and representative. The

\textsuperscript{5} These deeply held cultural and religious values and practices include strong beliefs in secularism in the public sphere such as those demonstrated in Quebec.

\textsuperscript{6} I am using the word pluralism, in this instance, instead of multiculturalism to refer to the fact that in many liberal democracies, there are a number of cultures as well as religions and ethnicities. While not mutually exclusive (i.e. I am ethnically Iranian, culturally Iranian, and a non-practicing Muslim like the majority of the people living in Iran), it is important to make the distinction. It is important to note, however, that many scholars, such as myself, use the term multiculturalism as encompassing culture, religion, and ethnicity.
failure to have an inclusive and representative deliberation is a concern for all deliberative endeavours but particularly problematic when convening multicultural deliberations. Without proper inclusivity and representativeness, cultural and religious groups, opinions, lived experiences, and discourses might be left out of consideration. This can undermine the legitimacy, efficacy, and quality of deliberation and further marginalize groups who might already be or feel that they are marginalized in a society.

This theoretical work is supplemented with original survey data collected from students at the University of British Columbia to offer answers to questions such as: What are some of the reasons that would prompt willingness for participation? What are the issues that would make one hesitant about participation? Does the willingness vary depending on the (type) of topic? Does the willingness to deliberate depend on the groups of people involved in the deliberation? Are there any mitigating factors that could motivate those less willing to consider participation?

Second, I examine the concept of capacity as the ability of participants to engage in normatively desired behaviours and actions (such as respect, empathy, and reflection). In order to do so, I take a step back and ask: How do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when deliberations unravel? In the former case, I argue, what we see is participants making a series of investments in different desired behaviours and norms. In the latter, participants are unwilling or unable to make these investments and instead make divestments. In this dissertation, therefore, I introduce and develop a theory of deliberative capital as a way to rethink and reframe the process of deliberation. Drawing from and building on the analytical work done on social capital, I posit deliberative capital as a product of cycles of investment (i.e. instances of respect, taking the extra step to understand, offering a potential compromise, among others) and easily threatened when these investments are replaced by divestments (i.e. dominating the speaking time, ignoring or
attacking the views of other participants, cutting others off, among others).

This reframing allows us to think about ways that we can encourage investments and discourage divestments within a deliberation—and increase deliberative capital. In other words, it allows me to think more carefully about the conditions that make those investments difficult and posit different facilitative methods—geared to encourage reciprocal investments in the face of deep cultural and religious difference—that can be utilized during a deliberation. This theoretical work is also complemented with data gathered from the analysis of two of these treatments utilized in deliberative experiments conducted at the University of British Columbia on the topic of institutionalization of religious arbitration in British Columbia, Canada.\(^7\)

1.2 Deliberative democratic theory

It is necessary, at this point, to give a brief account of deliberative democratic theory, and my place within it, since it is a key theoretical lens of this dissertation. Rooted in the early public sphere theory of Immanuel Kant and agonistic communication of J.S. Mill,\(^8\) deliberative

\(^7\) In a 2007 book chapter, Mark Warren points out two areas in which deliberative democracy literature remains under-developed. The first was “the social psychology of deliberation under conditions of conflict”. The second area was “institutional structuring of incentives to deliberate” (Warren 2007, 273). My dissertation adds to these areas. In terms of the second point raised by Warren, I look at specifically at the reasons for (un)willingness and test to see if some factors could incentivize engagement in a deliberation. In regards to the first point, I look specifically at deliberations under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity. While not always conflictual, cultural and religious disagreement can easily become roots of conflict. I do this by theoretically conceptualizing deliberations under deep diversity as well as experimentally looking at potential facilitative treatments easing and incentivizing investments in deliberative capital.

\(^8\) By this I am referring to I both the Kantian theory of public sphere as well as J.S. Mill’s emphasis on critical debate arising from the freedom of thought, expression and association. Immanuel Kant argued that enlightenment - or man's progress towards a more just civil constitution making men autonomous law makers - would only come about if they freely exercised their reason publicly. By addressing the public, one would exercise his reason while informing and engaging others in a debate in order to critique the existing policies and institutions with the hopes of their reform (Kant 1991) for the better. Similarly, for scholars such as Nadia Urbinati, Mill should be seen primarily as an early theorist and somewhat pioneer of modern deliberative democratic theory (Urbinati 2002). Deliberation for Mill, according to Urbinati, had to be widespread and practiced among citizens, among their representatives and in the communication between the citizens and the representatives. This deliberation would have very few limits (i.e. mainly harm to others) and would be promoted at these three levels. For Urbinati, Mill should be seen not as a consensus-driven deliberative democrat but as an agonistic one. Her claim could be supported by referencing Mill’s
democratic theory is premised on the assumption that under the right conditions, people are able and willing to communicate with each other in an open and rational manner; that through this engagement, people can come to a compromise or, ideally, a consensus; and that the outcomes of these deliberations can then lead to the creation of more inclusive and democratically legitimate public policy (Habermas 1984, 1996, 2002) while also ensuring decisions are informed by the principle that ‘all those affected’. Specifically, through such an engagement or exchange, deliberative democrats hope and expect to see a better-informed and more engaged public (Barber 1984), who have become more aware of their own values and interests through deliberation (Chambers 1996), and who are more tolerant of differing opinions and values (Gutmann & Thompson 1996).

With such promise, a growing number of scholars are also devoted to theorizing the possible applications of deliberative democracy. Deliberative polls (Fishkin et al. 2000, Fishkin 2011) as well as deliberative models have been conducted on a variety of political and public policy issues from Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform (Warren & Pearse 2008) to Biobanking (Lemke et al. 2012). The theoretical vigour of deliberative democracy and the promises of legitimacy, empowerment, a better and more informed citizenry, mutual understanding and social learning (among others) that it offers have made it increasingly popular both theoretically and practically.

At the risk of oversimplifying, the current trends in the literature on deliberative democracy can be divided in two camps: those interested in macro theories and applications of deliberative democracy and those who engage with deliberative democratic theory and practice criticism of the tyranny of the majority and the consensus politics in On Liberty that would often lead to the marginalization of many views and discourses in order to achieve this fabricated "consensus".
on a micro level. The micro level is, mainly, focused on the small manifestations of deliberative democracy in the shape of small-scale deliberative engagements. Deliberative democrats that focus mostly on the micro level include scholars such as James Fishkin, André Bächtiger, Tali Mendelberg and Jürg Steiner amongst others. The macro level is, for the most part, concerned with deliberative democracy on a more systematic level which can (and often does) include small-scale deliberative engagements but is not limited to them. Such deliberative democrats include Simone Chambers and Jürgen Habermas (amongst others) who are interested in deliberative systems and look at the public sphere more broadly. This larger idea of a deliberative public sphere considers the speech acts by different agents such as those made in the media, by court officials and politicians, lobbyists, among others, as contributions (whether normatively negative and positive) to the dialogue in the public sphere.

In order to better demonstrate the difference between these two strands, I will use an example from Canadian politics. In 1993, 37% of the Canadian public supported same-sex marriage. By 2003, this number had raised to 54%. J. Scott Matthews, in a 2005 article titled “The political Foundations of same-sex marriage in Canada”, argues that while sociological (value-based) arguments can explain some of this change, the drastic changes must also have political factors behind them. He concludes that the change can be explained by the role courts and legislatures had in framing the issue of same-sex marriage as one of equality as opposed to difference. So even for citizens who did not support same-sex marriage per se but supported equality rights (such as those in the Charter), support increased (Matthews 2005). While micro theories of deliberative democracy might not identify this as a clear and explicit case of deliberation, macro-theorists would see this change as the evolution of discourse in the larger public sphere - and thus, a clear example of public opinion formation through deliberative means.
in the public sphere.

This is not to say that any scholar belongs exclusively in one camp. Indeed, most theorists and practitioners of deliberative democracy - including the ones I mentioned above - examine and engage with deliberative democracy on both levels. However, I need to make this oversimplified distinction in order to clarify my own work and contributions. In this work, willingness and capacity for deliberation refer to the inclination to commit to and ability to have a meaningful and effective conversation with others in a small-scale deliberative engagement. I do not want to underemphasize the value and importance of the more macro-focused theories of deliberative democracy nor do I want to limit deliberative democratic theory to the instances of organized small-scale deliberative engagements. Moreover, other forms of communication - such as everyday talk, bargaining, and rhetoric - which fall short of the ideal deliberation should also be included as part of the deliberative public sphere. However, for the purposes of this

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9 Everyday political talk, especially with people with whom we might disagree, increases both our future willingness to engage in more organized small-scale deliberative engagements with such people as well as our capacity to engage in conversations of a political nature with people with whom we disagree on cultural and religious values and practices. This is because everyday political talk with people from different cultural and religious backgrounds establishes the similarities and connections, the points of possible convergence, as well as the potential fault-lines in communication. This establishes a framework for future conversations of a similar nature and relieves some of the tension and apprehension for engaging in such conversations in a more structured and institutional way. Moreover, everyday political talk can also be seen to have an educative benefit (Kim & Kim 2008) by teaching people skills in argumentation and communication in their conversations with people from different cultural and religious backgrounds on different topics. Since the outcomes of everyday talk are not set in stone, such conversations almost never leave the participants in worse social situations than before. Similarly, rhetoric cannot be disregarded when looking at the deliberation under conditions of deep diversity in liberal multicultural societies. It is difficult to conceive of a situation where deliberation on cultural and religious values and practices does not include some rhetorical appeals. First, because cultural and religious values are often deeply embedded with individuals and talking about them within a deliberative forum, often, means that these individuals will use emotions to get their points across. Moreover, along similar lines to Dryzek (2010, 14-15), rhetoric, I argue, can be very helpful in situations where some sort of mobilization is needed. An example, drawn from outside of the literature on deliberative democracy is provided by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and her concept of strategic essentialism. This is a method through which minorities (ethnic, religious, among others) can forcefully and effectively represent themselves. It is strategic because while there are many differences between the members within the minority, those differences are strategically and with a purpose in mind set aside for an ultimate goal. It is a form of essentialism because, in putting aside those differences, the minority group represents its identity in a unified and simplified way (Spivak 1990). In situations such as these, rhetoric can be very valuable in order to carry out this strategic
dissertation, my research falls into the latter category, that is examining micro-level deliberative democratic theory through organized deliberations in the form of small-scale deliberative engagements. While I focus on organized small-scale deliberative engagement deliberations, the theoretical work as well as the empirical examination of willingness for deliberation as well as the capacity to deliberate in a productive way with fellow participants has implications for the larger deliberative democratic theory. Neither willingness nor capacity are limited to small-scale deliberative engagements although they are much easier to examine in smaller scale settings.

As my work is concerned with challenges to deliberation under conditions of deep diversity, it is pivotal to acknowledge that there exist broad challenges to deliberation imposed by time and space are among these. Ideal deliberative democracy requires a huge space where “all those affected” could gather, engage in discussions, questions and cross-examinations, persuade and be persuaded by others, and reach mutually agreeable decisions. It also requires enough time for "all those affected" to voice their opinions, challenge others, and, perhaps, change their minds. Time and space, in this sense, are the broadest and most general of mobilization. However, rhetoric can have its drawbacks which can be intensified under conditions of the deep diversity. In such cases, rhetoric can be used by the majority to further marginalize and disenfranchise the members of the minority group. Rhetoric can also be used by the stronger and more powerful members of a minority group to alienate and exploit the less powerful members. For example, the patriarchal practices of a particular culture or religion can be reconstructed overtime through the use of rhetoric. Bargaining, along with everyday political talk and rhetoric, should be considered an integral part of deliberative democracy in multicultural societies. This argument is based on a number of reasons. First, bargaining allows participants of a deliberative forum to come up with compromises on certain elements or aspects of contested cultural or religious practices. While the ideal deliberation within deliberative democratic theory seeks to find the agreements based on reasons are in, bargaining involves a process of give and take during which participants will able to explain which parts of a certain practice or position matters to them and perhaps come to accept that they have to make compromises on other, more peripheral or temporal, related issues. Moreover, bargaining, or incorporating a degree of it within a deliberative forum, will be useful in phrasing the process as a discussion and negotiation over interests and needs as opposed to values and beliefs. The focus on interests and needs as opposed to values and beliefs is one best illustrated by Monique Deveaux (2003, 2006). Such incorporation, makes the deliberative process as well as the decisions made within it appear to be less irrevocable and final. This makes the decisions more provisional and should help in increasing their willingness of participants to first, come forward and engage in deliberation and second, deliberate properly and slowly with other participants since the stakes are not high nor are the decisions ultimate and unchallengeable in the future.
challenges faced by deliberative democrats who want to see the theory made into practice. There have, of course, been attempts to work around these broad challenges. In some ways, innovations in small-scale deliberative engagements in the shape of Citizens’ Assemblies, deliberative polls, citizen juries, consensus conferences, are all compromises in order to deal with the challenge of time and space.

Instead of taking “all those affected” to mean the whole of a citizenry, the attention has been on those with tangible stakes at the issue; instead of including everyone, a random or stratified selection has been put in place; instead of the discussion going on for an interminable amount of time, small-scale deliberative engagements are often limited to several weekends or even a few afternoons.

1.3 Deliberation in the face of deep disagreement

This dissertation is concerned with deliberation under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity. What makes such potential deliberations interesting and difficult is the probability that such discussions can challenge the ontological security\(^\text{10}\) of those involved. For those for whom identities are closely attached to and, perhaps even, dependent on their cultural and religious values and practices, a conversation that challenges those can adversely affect their assurance and conviction in their current identity and place in their world. It can further take away the ability to confidently rely on and make decisions based on one’s expectations about themselves and others giving rise to a feeling like they have little or no control over their decisions and actions. This effect was evident in the public hearings of the Commission on

\(^{10}\) I am borrowing the term ontological security from Anthony Giddens. Defined by Giddens, ontological security is “confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters if self and social identity” (Giddens 1984, 375). When this basic ontological security is challenged, people are likely to experience a general sense of unpredictability as well as dissolution of autonomy and action (Giddens 1984, 62).
Reasonable Accommodation: the presence of immigrants as well as founded (and unfounded) concerns regarding their growing numbers gave rise to expressions of ontological insecurity noted above. However, through such discussions, we might also be better equipped to distinguish between areas where we can reach an agreement (be it in the shape of a bargained compromise or a democratic consensus) and instances where divergences and disagreements will not be deliberated out of existence\textsuperscript{11}. These discussions promise to be difficult. But are they impossible?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to review two distinct bodies of literature that I will bring together in this thesis. The first is the multicultural literature, in particular, Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor’s analyses of cultural difference, before turning to the work of scholars such as Seyla Benhabib (2002), Monique Deveaux (2003, 2006), Sarah Song (2005, 2007), and Jorge Valadez (2001, 2010) who together represent what I will call the deliberative turn in multiculturalism. All four scholars would say no to the above question and argue deliberative democracy provides a key tool for studying, promoting, and fulfilling the promises of multiculturalism within democratic societies.

1.4 Inclusion of the other and multicultural political theory\textsuperscript{12}: Kymlicka and Taylor

While Charles Taylor’s dialogical approach has some deliberative undertones, Will

\textsuperscript{11} I am indebted to Michael Burgess for reminding me of this fact in a workshop at UBC. He argued that in many important instances of deliberation such as those conducted on the issue of biotechnology, the aim of deliberation was far from reaching a rational consensus. Instead, it was (and should have been) geared towards identifying points of convergence and disagreements that will not go away (Burgess 2011). Many other scholars of deliberative democracy have also discussed the normative desirability of consensus as well as its limitations. In particular, Hélène Landemore and Scott E Page have argued that the normative desirability of consensus depends on the deliberative task. When the goal is problem-solving, the normative appeal of consensus remains. However, when deliberation is tasked with prediction, consensus is not practically nor epistemically desirable (Landemore & Page 2015).

\textsuperscript{12} I am using the title of a book or rather a collection of essays by Jürgen Habermas. While Habermas does not posit deliberative democracy as a solution to the conflicts of multiculturalism, the title of this collection sums up the main concern of the literature on multiculturalism and pluralism: how to we best and most democratically include the others.
Kymlicka’s rights-based approach is in some ways a direct challenge to the discursive method in addressing multiculturalism within democratic societies. For Taylor, the human mind, our learning and use of languages, as well as our identities are not accomplished by each person “on his or her own” but through a dialogical process (Taylor 1994, 32-33). Therefore, politics of multiculturalism is a struggle for the recognition of identities and situated among “a number of strands in contemporary politics [that] turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition” (Taylor 1994, 25) such as feminism and race movements. Since, it is through a dialogical process that people debate and constitute their identities which are “partly shaped by

13 In my brief look at the literature on multiculturalism, I have left out a segment of the work - mainly the postcolonial and postmodern approaches to the question of the inclusion of the other. The postcolonial/postmodern writings on multiculturalism, especially demonstrated in James Tully’s work, build upon and, in some ways, criticize both the liberal accounts such as those by Kymlicka as well as their communitarian counterparts such as those offered by Taylor and focus on both state and citizens. Having been written after the first stage of the multicultural experiment as well as with a more critical attitude, these account are more pragmatic and aware of the difficulties that can undermine substantive multiculturalism. These accounts of multiculturalism offer significant insights in to my examination of the characteristics of deliberation when deep diversity exists. Bhikhu Parekh (2000) and James Tully (1995) both provide a vindication for attempts to deliberate openly about culture and religion but in ways that are highly attentive to the imperial and colonial context, respectively, of such deliberations. In fact, both aspire for open intercultural constitutional dialogues that acknowledge deep cultural and religious differences with the aim of creating more fair-minded and equitable constitutions, laws, institutions, and structures. Likewise, Rita Dhamoon (2009) draws attention to the exclusionary and exploitative power relations that exist between and within cultural and religious groups and argues that ‘culture’ is not homogenous, static and bounded as other multiculturalists tend to do but a dynamic process of meaning making that changes depending on the context. Tully, highlights the prevalence of “meta-narratives” that have come about through historical relations and which can severely influence the current and future relations between different groups. This is a key consideration when examining or conducting a deliberation between (and about) cultural and religious groups (and issues). The inequality between the participants, resulting from the power relations noted by Dhamoon and Tully, can affect the willingness for deliberation. Moreover, it can affect the deliberative process by causing distortions in speech, unjustifiably favouring dominant discourses and views, and conclude in an unfair and premature consensus. Finally, seeing ‘culture’ as a dynamic process subject to change rather than a given ‘thing’ we are born into, speaks very much to the potential within deliberative democratic processes for communication, recognition and change. In some ways, the postmodern/postcolonial accounts are much more focused on the journey (the process of deliberation and re-deliberation) rather than the destination (end goal of multicultural accommodation).

14 Taylor's emphasis on recognition can be traced to his reinterpretation of Hegel’s dialectics and struggle for recognition/freedom which he expands to include cultural recognition. For Hegel, the whole history of man has been one of struggle for freedom which is fully realized through mutual recognition. This recognition requires each person to be recognized both as an individual (in his particularity) and as a member of the community (in his universality). For Hegel, the institutions of family, civil society, and the state which all provide opportunities for individuals to actualize their particularity (by making choices and decision) while being recognized as doing so (affirming the universality of individuals) have come about in history so as to aid this process (dialectic) of mutual recognition. This has to be mutual since the misrecognition/nonrecognition of man undermines the recognition of the rest of the members of the community (Hegel 1967).
recognition or its absence”, “nonrecognition or misrecognition” can inflict harm on individuals and can be seen as “a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (26). What Taylor wants is a politics of “equal recognition” which would, through dialogue in a democratic public sphere (37), confer an “equal status of cultures and genders” (27). For Taylor, “equalization of rights and entitlements” (37) does not go far enough. While it has affected “civil […] and voting rights” and even, for some, the “socioeconomic sphere”, it has failed to produce a universal acceptance of the “principle of equal citizenship” (38). A dialogical approach, for Taylor, is the way to produce and sustain this.

Taylor's emphasis on recognition can be traced to his reinterpretation of Hegel’s dialectics and struggle for recognition/freedom which he expands to include cultural recognition. For Taylor, then, multicultural recognition cannot end just with the state. It is and must remain ongoing, mutual, and dialectical. His account highlights two very important conclusions for my examination of deliberation under conditions of deep diversity. The first concerns Taylor’s emphasis on the significance and necessity of recognition for individuals within their communities. Deliberation with people from different cultures and religions about their values and practices is, in itself, a form of recognition. Moreover, Taylor’s attention to recognition and mutual understanding is a key goal of deliberative democrats. Second, and perhaps more important theoretically, is Taylor’s acknowledgement of the dynamic nature of

\[\text{15 For Hegel, the whole history of man has been one of struggle for freedom which is fully realized through mutual recognition. This recognition requires each person to be recognized both as an individual (in his particularity) and as a member of the community (in his universality). For Hegel, the institutions of family, civil society, and the state which all provide opportunities for individuals to actualize their particularity (by making choices and decision) while being recognized as doing so (affirming the universality of individuals) have come about in history so as to aid this process (dialectic) of mutual recognition. This has to be mutual since the misrecognition/nonrecognition of man undermines the recognition of the rest of the members of the community (Hegel 1967).}\]
recognition. Even though Taylor demands authenticity\textsuperscript{16} from individuals subscribing to different cultural and religious practices, his insistence is, nevertheless, placed within his framework of dialectics. Therefore, while it is important to be authentic and recognize the limits of who you can be and what you can present/represent, the dialectics of recognition demand a continuous and dynamic engagement which recognizes the changing nature of identities and practices.

In contrast, Will Kymlicka seems to be aware of the difficulty and, indeed, adverse effects of dialogue over people’s deeply-held cultural and religious identities. Kymlicka’s concern with the moral status of the individual translates into a recognition of the importance of participation in cultural and religious groups as they matter to the individual. For Kymlicka, “individual’s choice is dependent on the presence of a societal culture, defined by language and history” (Kymlicka 1995, 8). In this sense, culture is valuable and necessary for individual autonomy and self-respect. It is important to autonomy because it produces options for individuals. It is important to self-respect as it allows individuals to keep their deep bond and connection to their culture. Furthermore, culture “affects how others perceive and respond to us” (89). His liberal egalitarian multiculturalism holds that Western democracies can hold on to their liberal values and accept, accommodate, and protect different cultures, religions and ways of life from assimilation. The significance of Kymlicka’s account of the importance of culture for my work rests upon his understanding and acknowledgement that cultural and religious identity cannot be separated from individuals’ political decisions. This means that, for Kymlicka, it is not

\textsuperscript{16} Taylor defines authenticity as “being true to myself and my own particular way of being” (Taylor 1994, 28) borrowing the term from Lionel Trilling’s \textit{Sincerity and Authenticity} (New York: Norton, 1969). For Taylor, authenticity is a key factor and therefore any attempt to undermine it (through assimilation for example) is normatively wrong (1994, 38). His account of authenticity and its importance to his theory of recognition can be criticized for being too monolithic and limiting. However, I argue that this demand for authenticity has to be understood in the context of his dialogical approach and, thus, more amenable that criticisms consider.
sufficient to accommodate culture and religion in the private sphere only with the understanding that the political decisions in the public sphere will be autonomous\textsuperscript{17}.

Will Kymlicka’s liberal egalitarian approach speaks to the importance of culture to freedom and self-actualization and thus establishes the relevance of examining the dynamics of deliberative democratic exchanges under conditions of deep difference in liberal multicultural democracies. His account of multiculturalism is driven by his liberal instincts and, thus, his concern for the freedom, development, and well-being of the individual. Since individuals cannot be separated from their religious or cultural backgrounds, deliberation cannot be seen as apriori to culture nor cannot its requirements, its quality or its aims be discussed without due attention to the religious and cultural contexts. This explains why Kymlicka proposes and defends different degrees of accommodation for different clusters of individuals: immigrants, national minorities, and aboriginal people through the principle of group rights along with individual rights backed up by the court system. His account of multiculturalism is based on him identifying and attempting to rectify problems within a diverse, liberal democracy such as Canada. The extent of the problem (non-accommodation, assimilation, and marginalization), the choice (degree of

\textsuperscript{17} This means that, for Kymlicka, it is not sufficient to accommodate culture and religion in the private sphere only with the understanding that the political decisions in the public sphere will be autonomous. This is in stark contrast to liberal thinker John Rawls. For Rawls, pluralism is “inevitable and often desirable” (Rawls 2005, 227). It is inevitable since it is a normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of constitutional democratic regime (xvi). Pluralism is also, and more importantly, desirable because since “the public political culture is bound to contain different fundamental ideas that can be developed in different ways” - the inevitability of pluralism-, “[a]n orderly contest between them over time is a reliable way to find which one, if any, is most reasonable” (227). This contest or rather exchange creates the condition “as if others were bringing forth a part of ourselves that we have not been able to cultivate” (Rawls 1971, 394) on our own. Rawls’s account, however, encounters two problems. First, he does not deal with deep diversity and deep conflict arising from this diversity. In fact, as James Bohman argues, Rawls’s conception of pluralism is too weak because it has nothing to say about deep disagreements and conflicts, except that they should be “avoided” and removed from political deliberation (Bohman 1996, 85). Underneath this approach to dealing with deep conflicts in the political arena is the assumption that politics and political decisions can somehow be coherently separated from the various identities (cultural, religious, ethnic or otherwise) which give rise to deep political disagreements. It is this assumption that leads to the second considerable limitation in Rawls’s work: his notion of autonomy which is limited to the political level, thus, disregarding the many ways autonomy can be undermined and challenged in different areas of human interaction.
“consent”) of the individual(s) to take on that problem, and, thus, the level of accommodation varies. Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is individual-focused and centres around group rights with the state, and more particularly the judiciary ensuring guarantees of protection and accommodation.

1.5 Deliberative turn in multiculturalism

It is out of engagement with the literature on deliberative democracy and multiculturalism as well as the criticisms lodged against both that the deliberative turn in multiculturalism was born. In particular, the feminist critique of multiculturalism—which emphasizes the vulnerable members of cultural minorities who might be disadvantaged by the accommodation of their cultural practices—appears to have been the most important impetus. In particular, I am referring to Susan Moller Okin’s famous essay “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” (1999). Okin’s main problem with group rights and cultural accommodation is that many of the cultures are patriarchal and by accommodating them, we allow for sexist practices to continue. Moreover, due to the unequal power relations within these cultural groups, it is usually the case for the powerful members of the group (men generally) articulate the demands for group rights (12) in accordance with their own interests, with specific exclusion of the less powerful members (women) and often in an antifeminist (12) ways. Okin frames what she sees as the problem in the most concrete and simple way: If we ask the cultures to assimilate to our Liberal standards,

18 This includes the criticism that deliberative democratic theory is, in many ways, tone deaf to culture and gender and that multiculturalism theory fails to engage with democracy in any substantive way.

19 The “feminist” critique of multiculturalism is not the only one. The criticisms against multiculturalism come from different camps with different incentives: 1) Those who advance a cosmopolitan view of culture such as Waldron (1995) those who argue that toleration requires indifference rather than accommodation such as Kukathas (1992) those who argue that multiculturalism sabotages politics of redistribution and egalitarianism such as Barry (2001). For more information, see Song (2010). While these criticisms are not of direct relevance for my own work, I would be remiss in not mentioning them and creating an appearance that criticisms such as those by Okin were the only ones.
which at least in theory uphold the values of sexual equality, we appear to be oppressive. If we try and accommodate the cultures in a pluralistic manner, we have to allow for the often sexist practices of these cultures; in simpler terms: assimilation is oppressive and accommodation, sexist (9).

Seyla Benhabib, Sarah Song, Monique Deveaux, and Jorge Valadez all provide valuable theoretical tools for thinking through deep difference in a deliberative framework rooted in concerns about both multiculturalism’s lack of attention to the full inclusion of all who might be affected and deliberative democracy’s tendency to elide ethno-cultural difference. For Benhabib, a deliberative democratic approach to multiculturalism revolves around three main principles of reciprocity, freedom of association, and freedom to exit20 (2002, 131-32) and is ideal for a variety of reasons. First, under this approach, the agenda of public conversation is not restricted either based on topic or participants. Consequently, it provides opportunities for introducing new issues and topics as well as engaging in the ongoing conversation. Second, by insisting upon reflexive questioning guided by interpretations and justifications (106), a deliberative democratic model induces participants to clearly think through their own reasonings as well as appealing to the reasons that others can accept as well. It also helps the others understand from where the various interlocutors are coming. Third, deliberative democracy locates public sphere in civil society (109) and therefore pays due attention to the communal ties as well as increasing the sites of participation. Finally, by focusing on non-coercion and

20 The principle of reciprocity ensures that the members of different minority groups are not “entitled [to] lesser degrees of civil, political, economic and cultural rights” (131) than those belonging to the majority culture. Second, “voluntary self-ascription” would, through deliberation and discourse, ask adults whether they accept “their continuing membership in their communities” (131) or not. Finally, based on her desire to not “confine women and children to their communities of origin” (86) but instead provide opportunities and situations under which they could exercise maximum agency and make reflexive decisions regarding the practices of their communities, she insists upon freedom to exit.
requiring revisability, a deliberative democratic approach ascertains against marginalization and takes into account the changing nature of cultures, identities and issues\(^\text{21}\).

Song expands on Benhabib’s argument by calling to attention the power relations that are in place between and within cultural and religious groups of a particular liberal multicultural democracy. For Song, deliberation can be a suitable locus for uncovering and revising these power relations. She posits a case for an egalitarian accommodation of cultures\(^\text{22}\) which is similar to Benhabib’s and yet different in its emphasized shift of the focal lens from an internal (focused on cultures internally) to an interactive one which is attentive to the interactions between majority culture and minority cultures. For Song, a deliberative democratic approach has a number of advantages in relation to cultural difference (and gender). First, it creates an ideal circumstance under which to test the reasonableness of the cultural claims. It does so by asking a series of specific questions: what is the impact of a particular cultural practice?; what is the degree of the burden it imposes and on whom?; what is the rationale behind the practice?; does it privilege or burden groups within the group particularly or disproportionately? (Song 2007, 67).

Second, a deliberative approach empowers the individuals to “set the content and procedures of the protection of rights”. Third, it provides “equal opportunity to participate in collective decision-making in the political arena and civil society”. Fourth, it “clarifies what is at stake” (2007, 68). Through this process, a deliberative democratic approach, clears the issue and

\(^\text{21}\) She uses the example of the Scarf Affair in France to show the concerns that arise when voices are not heard. Through this example, Benhabib also demonstrates how deliberative democracy, with its focus on hearing and respecting the reasons of people, would have established the intricacies and complexities of issues and would have resulted in a decision that would have been more inclusive and just: “had their voices been listened to and heard, it would have become clear that the meaning of wearing the scarf itself was changing from a religious act to one of cultural defiance and increasing politicization” (117).

\(^\text{22}\) Song notes that liberal states - with the fundamental value of equal respect- must grant egalitarian accommodation to cultures that are currently being discriminated or have historically and structurally been discriminated (2007, 74).
discovers whether it is intercultural or intracultural (74); it “exposes cultural hypocrisy” (75); it “challenges the dominant culture” (75) by opening it up to questions and demanding justifications; and finally establishes exactly “how contested [...] cultural practices [are]” (75) by emphasizing the ever-changing nature of cultural practices and drawing similarities between the majority culture’s reasons and beliefs and the minority culture’s specific practices.

Deveaux, much like Song, is concerned with the unequal power relations that can undermine ideal deliberation as envisioned by theorists of deliberative democracy. Her greatest contributions to the scholarship on deliberative multiculturalism lies in her attention to the importance of contexts as well as the locating deliberation in informal settings as well as formally structured deliberative designs. Her model recognizes that deliberation can happen at different levels and is not limited to public and political deliberation. It increases and deepens the “scope of deliberation” (95) and, therefore, recognizes the importance of informal and often internal, deliberation. Through this, she argues, her model identifies and emphasizes subtle forms of agency. More importantly, deliberation is better placed in these informal spaces since, for Deveaux, most conflicts of culture are not intercultural but rather intracultural disagreements (Deveaux 2003, 781) over the “interpretation, meaning, and legitimacy of particular customs” of the members of the culture themselves (784). Based on this recognition of the locus of conflict, Deveaux’s deliberative model focuses on “strategic needs and interests” (2006, 96 and 2003, 787) instead of identities.

23 Song uses various examples of instances to establish the hypocrisy of (often) the majority culture. According to Song, it is the majority culture’s framework that allows for the claims of the minorities to be heard and accepted. For example, the similarities between the Hmong practice of wife-capture and the rape laws or between the Chinese wife-murder after infidelity and the laws around the claim of provocation (2005, 479-482) show that allow for cases to resonate and for their reasonableness to be accepted; it is the majority culture’s patriarchal norms that accept the same from the minority culture.
Valadez notes that cultural diversity can lead to intercultural conflicts under a number of conditions: historic “discrimination and oppression”, continued discrimination, and “absence of just sociopolitical frameworks for the resolution of intercultural conflicts of interest” (Valadez 2001, 4). Valadez’s solution to the conflicts of culture is one that recognizes and utilizes public deliberation. His choice is guided by what he considers to be the general advantages of deliberative democracy: “mutual understanding, expanded personhood, ontological security, compromise, collective responsibility, long-term focus” (34). Valadez’s work is singularly valuable in two ways. First, he identifies potential challenges to deliberation arising out of deep difference such as absence of a unitary or common political community, incommensurability of religions and cultures, and inequalities between (and within) cultural and religious groups (39). Second, he reintroduces deliberation as a pragmatic compromise-making apparatus which looks at “strategic rationality that relies on bargaining and values such as prudence, convenience, and self interest” (2010, 159). By lowering the standards for the desirable outcomes (such as rational consensus envisioned by deliberative democrats), he depicts a much more context-driven deliberative approach.

The multicultural deliberative turn as articulated by these four scholars provides a useful framework for my analysis as it brings together feminist, multiculturalist and deliberative democratic theories into a single frame. I will take their analysis further by examining how their theories work in circumstances of deep difference—what makes people willing and able to participate in deliberation. I will make a methodological addition to their works. I have tested,

24 Valadez defines public deliberation as circumstances under which “citizens rationally evaluate the reasons for, and the implications of, policy alternatives in open public forums. Collective decisions do not result merely by aggregating the pre-existing desires of citizens; rather, members of the polity attempt to influence each other’s opinions by engaging in a public dialogue” (2001, 5).
25 Each of these are defined by Valadez at length. For more information, see Valadez 2001, 34-35.
albeit in preliminary fashion, the hypotheses regarding the willingness and ability of people to participate in deliberation under conditions of cultural and religious difference.

1.6 Research question and themes

This analysis brings me back to my original query. Now rephrased, I ask: are people willing and capable of engaging in deliberations with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities? These are, in fact, two different although related questions. The first concerns the willingness of individuals to even participate in such deliberations. The second concerns their ability to engage in a conversation that remains thoughtful, respectful, and productive. This dissertation is centered around answering these two questions. Put simply, what makes people willing to come to the table to talk to each other knowing that their cultural/religious differences will likely be a point of contention? What makes them invest in deliberative capital—adhere to the deliberative norms such as justification, respect, and willingness to compromise—particularly in situations of deep difference? In order to answer these two questions, I engage with a diverse set of literatures and, thus, touch upon a number of themes and queries in political theory in particular and political science in general. Some of these will be discussed explicitly throughout and some are more implicit threads that bring the work together. These include but are not limited to: deliberation, democracy, gender, and trust.

For deliberative democrats, an open and inclusive dialogue fosters the chance for different and often conflicting opinions to be brought up, heard, discussed, understood, and, respected if not accepted. What if the conflicting opinions were rooted not in different sources of information or different interests but in different cultural and religious identities? My interest is in conversations that deal specifically with issues derived from a plurality of cultural and
religious ways of life. Do these conversations pose particular challenges? Do they need to be approached, set up, and carried out differently? Most careful and considered conversations do not occur naturally. They, often times, require attentive organization and execution.

As Clement Attlee once said “democracy means government by discussion, but it is only effective if you can stop people talking”26. Democracy and deliberation are undeniably linked. Therefore, I take democracy to refer not necessarily to rule (power) of (by) the people - the more literal translation from the Greek dēmokratia - but to the engagement in the decision-making process and acceptance of the outcomes based on the acceptance of the process rather than strict agreement with the outcomes. Deliberative democracy is based on this premise: not only are people willing and able to engage in a valuable and potentially effectual conversation with one another, they are similarly willing and able to be persuaded by better arguments and respect the outcomes. My interest lies in situations where this premise is complicated by deep difference. How can the dialogue be carried out and decisions made under conditions of deep diversity?

Gender is another key theme in this dissertation, and it grows out of the deliberative turn in multiculturalism that I describe above which was in many ways an attempt to bridge the gap between not only multiculturalism and deliberative democracy but multiculturalism and feminism. It is impossible to look at the question of deliberation in the face of deep cultural and religious disagreement and not consider gender. For example, looking back to the Commission on Reasonable Accommodation, one is taken aback at the number of times the issue with cultures and religious concerns the women of those cultures and religions. Often one sees the

26 Clement Attlee was the Prime Minister of Britain from 1945-1951 as well as the leader of the Labour Party for 20 years (1935-1955). During his time as PM, he “enlarged and improved social services and the public sector in post-war Britain, creating the National Health Service and nationalising major industries and public utilities” (Brown 2015).
principle of ‘women’s rights’ being used to challenge certain cultural practices even by those not associated with feminism. The ‘niqab’ debate in the 2015 Canadian election in which Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper\textsuperscript{27} argued the wearing of the niqab at citizenship ceremonies was contrary to the rights of women in society is an example of this kind of argument similar to those articulated in Quebec around reasonable accommodation. The perceived need on the part of a ‘secular’ state to protect women from their backward, sexist (if not misogynistic) and violent cultures and religions is abundantly clear. Similar sentiments were also evident in the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act\textsuperscript{28}. Furthermore, as noted previously, it is Okin’s concern with the status of women within cultural and religious minorities within liberal democracies that led to her essay and the subsequent (deliberative democratic) literature attempting to reconcile feminism with multiculturalism\textsuperscript{29}.

\textsuperscript{27} On December 12th 2011, Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced a ban on burkas or niqabs during Citizenship ceremonies. His rationale was based on his conversations with “citizenship judges who told him they are concerned that they can’t tell whether some people are actually reciting the oath during the ceremony because of the garments” (Mackrael and Perreaux 2011). After a court challenge by Zunera Ishaq - wanting to “take the oath of citizenship while veiled” - “Federal Court Judge Keith M. Boswell ruled […] the policy requiring that candidates remove face-coverings or be observed taking the oath as ‘unlawful’” (Lowrie 2015). This decision was met by Prime Minister Harper’s resolution to appeal the decision as well as the Oath of Citizenship Act introduced on June 19th, 2015 in order to “ensure Canadian citizenship applicants show their face while taking the Oath of Citizenship during citizenship ceremonies” (Government of Canada: June 19, 2015). Once again, a debate on cultural and religious practices became preoccupied with the role and status of women - not to mention their wardrobes- within their culture and religion.

\textsuperscript{28} On June 18th 2015, Bill S-7 - the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act (the Act) - received Royal Assent (Government of Canada: June 18, 2015). The legislation, tabled by Canada’s Citizenship and Immigration Minister Chris Alexander, was meant to “strengthen Canadian laws to prevent barbaric cultural practices from happening on Canadian soil” (Government of Canada: November 5, 2014). The legislation amended Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in order to “render permanent residents and temporary residents inadmissible to Canada if they practice polygamy”. It further amended Canada’s Civil Marriage Act by “establishing a new national absolute minimum age of 16 for marriage” as well as requiring “free and enlightened consent” for marriages. Moreover, it amended Canada’s Criminal Code by criminalizing actions “related to early and forced marriage ceremonies, including the act of removing a child from Canada for the purpose of such marriages” and “limiting the defence of provocation so that it would not apply in so-called ‘honour’ killings and many spousal homicides” (Government of Canada: June 18, 2015). It is interesting to note that all of the ‘barbaric’ practices of different cultural and religious groups seem to centre around their treatment of women and children (young women).

\textsuperscript{29} Another way gender plays into this dissertation is through the discussion of facilitative treatments in Chapter 6. Facilitative treatments, I argue, are similar - in their effect - to the institutional rule tweaks posited by Tali
A final theme of this dissertation is trust. This theme is discussed in relation to the concept of deliberative capital. I argue in Chapter 3 that without some modicum of trust in the process of deliberation, it is very difficult to expect participants to behave in a deliberative manner - invest in deliberative capital. Certain conditions can make it more difficult for participants to trust each other enough to take the risk and make early investments. I argue that facilitative treatments can be employed as a way to bypass the lack of generalized trust and get participants investing. With the early investments, participants will learn to expect others to invest. This reciprocal process of investments will, then, increase the trust between participants - as well as in the process of deliberation - incentivizing further investments. However, trust is also a key factor in determining whether people are willing to come to the table in the first place. If I cannot trust others to treat me with respect within a deliberation, I will likely be unwilling to come to the table.

1.7 Methodology

This dissertation is a work of political theory. However, it employs a novel methodological approach as it combines survey and experimental work with a more traditional analysis of key texts in political theory. I see a main contribution of this dissertation to be in theory-building. My goal is three-fold: first, to develop a fuller account of the most important prerequisite of deliberative democracy—willingness as well as the conditions that can

Mendelberg and her colleagues (Karpowitz et al. 2012, Mendelberg et al 2014a, and Mendelberg et al 2014b). Concerned with the disparity between men and women in deliberative setting - i.e. men talk more and women are systematically silenced - Mendelberg, through deliberative experiments, demonstrates that “when women are outnumbered by men, use unanimous rule; when women are a large majority, decide by majority rule” (Karpowitz et al. 2012, 545). When women are a minority, unanimous rule does a better job at protecting women as “they take up their equal share of the conversation” (544). At the end of the day, in order to “avoid the maximum inequality, avoid groups with few women and majority rule” (545). However, while facilitative treatment like institutional rule design are meant to encourage investments in deliberative capital - by ensuring, for example, an “equal share of the conversation” -, they are more broadly applicable.
negatively/positively affect it; second, to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the success and breakdown of speech within small-scale deliberative engagements using my novel concept of deliberative capital; and third, to develop strategies aimed at encouraging investments in and discouraging divestments from deliberative capital within small-scale deliberative engagements.

This work—looking at willingness for deliberation as well as the ability to make investments in deliberative capital by adhering to deliberative norms—needs to remain empirically attentive. This is the main driving force behind engaging in exploratory empirical work through online survey experiments as well as deliberative experiments.

While my dissertation contributes to the field of deliberative democracy in general, it is driven and motivated by the questions and ideas within the field of multiculturalism. It is mainly guided by a simple question: can we find better ways of thinking, talking, and making decisions together in the face of cultural and religious diversity? In my discussion of willingness, I am particularly mindful of the conditions that increase or decrease willingness for participation in a deliberative process under conditions of cultural and religious difference. In developing my concept of deliberative capital and, especially, the facilitative treatments aimed at increasing it, I am motivated by understanding and improving under the same conditions.

The promise of deliberative democracy in providing the space for an intercultural as well as intracultural dialogue has been posited but not examined carefully either theoretically or empirically. This work is an attempt to address the former gap and make attempts at engaging with the latter.

1.8 Dissertation chapter outline

I begin, in Chapter 2, with the primary concept of willingness in democratic
deliberations. Willingness for deliberation is a very understudied issue. For the most part, the theoretical work on deliberative democracy has disregarded the issue of willingness. The issue of willingness is dodged at a deep theoretical level in Habermas’s distinction between communicative and strategic action. For Habermas, while communicative action is “oriented to mutual understanding” (Habermas 1996, 18), strategic action “instrumentalizes speech acts for purposes that are only contingently related to what is said” (Habermas 1984, 289). In other words, communicative actions are those interactions that have a communicative intent; where one seeks to influence others based on the content of his or her claim. Strategic actions, meanwhile, are communications that designed to have an effect on others, but not through (necessarily) convincing them.

The problem with Habermas’s theoretical stipulation is that (a) most political speech has strategic elements, and (b) it “solves” by theoretical stipulation what is in fact a problem: that for deliberation to resolve conflicts people need to adopt a communicative intent to influence through making claims. A willingness that may simply not be there.

The empirical work on deliberative democracy which I take to include scholarly works on the different implementations of deliberative practices (deliberative polls, Citizens’ Assemblies, town hall meetings, community outreach dialogues, among others) as well as experimental and evaluative work of the kind Tali Mendelberg, Jürg Steiner, André Bächtiger, and others engage in, have also, for the most part, left out the issue of willingness. The only purposive work was done by Neblo et al (2010) who shifted the question from the common formulation of “who deliberates” to “who wants to deliberate” and achieved drastically different results. In the next chapter (as well as Chapters 4 and 5) I take a purposive look at willingness. I situate willingness for deliberation in the larger body of work on interest and willingness for
political participation. Going back to Habermas’s early work, I argue that willingness for deliberation should not be an afterthought for scholars and practitioners of deliberative democracy. It is important to pay attention to the patterns of who wants to deliberate, on what topics, and with whom.

In Chapter 3, I move away from the issue of willingness and focus on ability of participants to engage with one another in a respectful, reflective, and constructive way. I argue that when they do, they invest in deliberative capital. I argue that deliberative capital is the by-product of the investments made by participants during the course of the deliberative process. These investments (explaining one’s reasons, waiting for one’s turn, taking an extra step to understand others, among others) increase deliberative capital which in turn facilitates a better and easier dialogue process for all participants. Deliberative capital is threatened when these investments are replaced by divestments (marginalizing comments, ignoring what others are saying, among others). Deliberative capital is defined and identified by its productive function: producing better and easier conversations. The word capital, with its connotations, is helpful in highlighting this process of investing with expectation of future returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking) that occurs during a deliberation. Using an analytical lens, I hypothesize regarding the conditions that can make it more difficult for participants to make investments in deliberative capital. In particular, I pay attention to the pathways to divestment that exist—and can be intensified under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity—in deliberation.

In Chapter 4, I return to the topic of willingness with a more critical multicultural lens. Having acknowledged its necessity to the viability of deliberative democracy as a theory as well as a practical political tool, I look at the conditions under and around which people might be
more or less willing to commit to a deliberative engagement under conditions of cultural and religious difference. This chapter serves as the theoretical basis for the empirical examination of willingness. What are some of the factors that can make participants unwilling to deliberation? How do these factors operate? What are some of the circumstances or reasons that make people willing to take part in a deliberation? What are some of the features of a deliberation that, if known, would make participants more likely to want to engage? Could people be swayed in their decision based on the knowledge that certain individuals and groups will, also, be present in the process?

Chapter 5 discusses the results of a survey I conducted on the willingness for deliberation. It explained the methodology as well as the results. In particular, this chapter answers questions such as: does the willingness for deliberation vary when the deliberation concerns a cultural or religious issue? what factors explain (un)willingness for deliberation? are any mitigating factors helpful in increasing the willingness for deliberation? Does the presence of certain groups reduce the positive attitudes towards deliberation?

Some of results from the survey show that, in terms of expressed willingness, there is no consequential difference between willingness for deliberation on a general policy issue and a multicultural one. More careful examination shows that on the whole, women are much more likely than men to express willingness to participate in deliberations, particularly those on particularly contentious issues of LGBTQ policy in Vancouver school board and violence against women in minority communities. While being a visible minority made one more likely to want to partake in a deliberation on the issue of funding for cultural and religious group, it made the same person less likely to express willing to participate in an unspecified multicultural policy issue. Identifying as very religious made one less willing to deliberate on an unspecified
multicultural policy issue and LGBTQ policy in Vancouver school board—not surprising given that both are highly likely to touch on people’s deeply-held religious values. Seeing oneself as opinionated increased the likelihood while being an introvert decreased the likelihood to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on any issue.

In Chapter 6, I return to the concept of deliberative capital and propose three innovative facilitative treatments—simulated representation, deliberative worth exercises, and cultural translation—which facilitate investments in a deliberation under conditions of deep diversity by helping individuals bypass the pathways to divestment and get deliberation back on track. This chapter serves as a theoretical basis for the empirical examination of simulated representation and deliberative worth exercises in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7 is concerned with the experiments conducted on deliberative capital. I will explain the methodology and results from the experiments utilizing deliberative worth exercises and simulated representation. Do facilitative treatments signal a promising approach to deliberation? While these experiments cannot be seen to offer a definitive account of deliberative capital, due to their limited scope and numbers, I argue that they are and should be seen as starting point for deliberative democratic theorists and practitioners in devising strategies based on the context of the deliberation to make participants more likely to invest in desired behaviours and actions.

In particular, in this chapter, I will show that deliberative worth exercises are successful at increasing investments in empathy, respect, productive dialogue, and sincerity; and decrease respective divestments in rhetorical action, disrespect, unproductive dialogue, cognitive apartheid and hermeneutical exclusion. Furthermore, I will show that simulated representation is effective in increasing investments in reason-giving, productive dialogue, reflection on and
incorporation of the views of others, and even respect. It is also able to reduce cognitive apartheid and rhetorical action, among other divestments. More specifically, facilitative treatments are able to reduce the divestments of men and non-visible minorities who are responsible for a significant majority of divestments under control conditions. However, while deliberative worth exercises are the best at increasing efficacy, reducing the feeling that only a few dominated the conversation, and creating real opinion change in the participants; and while simulated representation produces the most positive subjective evaluations of the process, they both fail to raise the factual knowledge of the participants compared to deliberation under control conditions.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the main findings and contributions as well as the limitations of my work. I will go into detail regarding where further research is necessary. I will also offer a conclusion to my dissertation.
Chapter 2: Willingness, inclusivity and representativeness

In September of 2013, the City of Vancouver engaged in a practice of deliberative democracy after the City Council opted for the formation of a Citizens’ Assembly—similar to those established in Ontario and British Columbia on the issue of electoral reform—tasked with drafting recommendations on a 30-year Community Plan for the Grandview-Woodland neighbourhood\(^{30}\) in Vancouver. The decision was fuelled by a failed process of public consultation in the form of “conversations, workshops, open houses, questionnaires and social media activities” in which over 7500 people participated (Grandview-Woodland Citizens’ Assembly). The failure in question referred to a widespread and cogent concerns raised by members of the community to the City’s proposed “emerging directions” with particular respect to the “specific land use and built form considerations for the Broadway and Commercial precinct, the Nanaimo Street corridor and the Hastings Street shopping area” (Munro 2015, 3).

In response, the timeline for the plan was pushed back and invitations to “volunteer for the Citizens’ Assembly were mailed to more than 19,000 local households, and were also made available at various locations throughout the community” (Members of the Citizens’ Assembly on the Grandview-Woodland Community Plan 2015, 6). More than 500 volunteered and 48 chosen among those. Without a doubt, the recruitment process was a success. However, the question is also raised that with more than 19,000 households informed and more than 7500 people engaged enough to participate in the initial consultations\(^{31}\), why is it that only 500 would

\(^{30}\) Grandview-Woodland neighbourhood in Vancouver stretches from Clarke to Nanaimo Street and from Burrard inlet to Broadway. The planning process included a couple of blocks south of Broadway as well.

\(^{31}\) The GWCA represents what Archon Fung calls “hot deliberation” involving “participants who have much at stake” (Fung 2007, 165). Since participants are often “drawn to hot deliberations”, they generally “make for better deliberation” (165). Since there is much at stake, hot deliberations often mean participants who are more likely to “invest more of their psychic energy and resources into the process […][making] it more thorough and creative”
volunteer for the deliberative engagement?

In this chapter, I will focus on the concept of willingness for deliberation. I argue that willingness for deliberation is a key, and yet often disregarded, concept in deliberative democratic theory and practice. Unless there are massive incentives or coercion involved, deliberation depends on willing participants. Without such willingness, we cannot secure the representativeness or inclusivity of a deliberative engagement—both of which are necessary for the legitimacy gains provided by democratic deliberation.

I will begin with a brief account of the various dimensions of the willingness to deliberate. These include the general motivations for deliberation as well as the costs that mitigate those motivations. In Chapter 4, I will revisit these dimensions in much more detail and provide a more expansive rationale for them in preparation for an empirical examination of these dimensions (under conditions of cultural and religious diversity) in Chapter 5.

I will, then, trace the absence of attention to the concept of willingness for deliberation to Habermas’s own work. I argue that while Habermas places a great deal of emphasis on legitimacy, he does not explore a key prerequisite of it: willingness. Moreover, I briefly challenge the distinction that Habermas draws between communicative and strategic speech, mainly since the emphasis on the latter has meant a disregard for situations where there may be a lack of communicative intent but a need to influence others nonetheless.

My particular focus remains on the willingness of individuals to participate in small-scale deliberative engagements. However, as I explained in the introduction, while it is easier to identify and examine the willingness for deliberation in small-scale settings, that is not to say

(Fung 2003b, 345). Moreover, the potential participants had already demonstrated a previous commitment to participation in the planning process as the previous consultations had managed to involve 7500 members of that community. level of engagement—considering the costs and risks of participation—is rather remarkable.
that this examination has no implications for the larger deliberative democratic theory.

2.1 Dimensions of willingness: costs and motives

Participation in a deliberative engagement—particularly one that asks for time and
cognitive commitments—entails high costs and effort; even more so that other forms of political
and social participation. This can particularly be the case if the subject of the deliberation
involves issues of identity politics and deep difference. In many ways, willingness to participate
in a deliberation over a public issue should be considered as part of the larger question of
participation in politics as it requires individual investments for a larger social, often political,
goal. However, participation in a deliberation is different in the degree of investments—in time
and effort—it requires as well as the potential returns it promises.

2.1.1 Costs

Committing oneself to a deliberative engagement, at the very least, requires a sacrifice of
time. However, it often demands much more: an effort to become more or less informed, show
up, have conversations about an issue, think, and defend one’s views. Deliberation asks
participants to talk—albeit often in smaller groups—publicly. A 2014 survey by Chapman
University on American fears found that public speaking ranks in the top 5 fears (Ledbetter
2014)\textsuperscript{32}. This signals the costs and risks associated with the decision to engage in an activity that
asks participants to engage in an act that many find daunting.

The cost and effort associated with deliberative engagements will undoubtedly depend on
the topic of the deliberation. More complex issues such as genetically modified foods, electoral

\textsuperscript{32} Public speaking ranks after “walking home alone at night, becoming the victim of identity theft, safety [or lack
thereof] on the internet, and being the victim of a mass/random shooting” (Ledbetter 2014). I recognize that this
survey has limitations and cannot be seen as an infallible foundation for launching my argument. However, it is still
significant to underscore the real unease that surrounds such engagements. For a more complete look at the survey,
please see: http://www.chapman.edu/wilkinson/research-centers/babbie-center/survey-american-fears.aspx
reform, neighbourhood plans, and municipal budgeting (to name a few) require participants to spend the time learning the facts before and during the deliberative engagement as well as discussing them with fellow participants. This necessitates cognitive costs on the part of potential participants: learning, thinking, and making decisions. However, complexity of a topic is not the only factor that can increase the degree of cost and effort associated with deliberation.

Deliberations over difficult topics arising from deep diversity in pluralist societies can impose further kinds of costs and efforts on the part of the participants. Thinking back to the example of Quebec’s Commission on Reasonable Accommodation with which I began the previous chapter, the participation, although not deliberative, demanded an emotional as well as cognitive effort on the part of the participants. It can be a difficult experience to come to a public forum and talk about values and practices that are deeply-held, particularly if you are a member of a minority who faces backlash from members of the majority group in relation to your religious practices or beliefs. While many might simply dismiss the unsavoury comments of some as the racist rantings of a few individuals, these comments are, as previously argued, manifestations of ontological insecurity. A more generous interpreter, of the less seemly comments made during the course of the Commission, would describe them as gut reactions to somewhat unreasonable and groundless but nevertheless deep and visceral fears about the potential loss of culture, language, traditions, values, and practices that were not only prized but viewed by many to be an integral part of what it meant to be Quebecois. It was, therefore, seen as inalienable and nonnegotiable.

Deliberations that might touch directly on the deep differences in beliefs, values, and practices demand much more from their potential participants: mainly their willingness to come to a table, listen to those with whom they profoundly disagree, have their deeply-held values and
practices challenged, and have to defend they views they often see as inviolable. There are emotional costs that need to be considered when considering participating in a deliberation under conditions of deep diversity.

The decision to make the commitment to come to the table for a deliberation is a risky one. The risk of which I speak does not only concern the outcomes. By this I mean, when person x decides to partake in a deliberative forum, the only risk is not that the outcome will not be one that person x desires. The risk concerns the process of the deliberation: the situation is one that promises a degree of cognitive and/or emotional unease and requires participants to follow certain rules. In other words, it asks participants to make investments. I will be going into more detail regarding the particular investments and divestments that are likely to occur during deliberations, particularly ones conducted under conditions of deep diversity, in Chapter 3. However, even prior to coming to the table, the knowledge or the assumption that the process will have these risks and would require investments could potentially reduce the willingness of participants.

2.1.2 Motives

Another factor that needs to be considered when considering the costs and effort of participation in a deliberative forum is the degree to which such a participation is considered to be valuable and as part of the expected social practice. This is true of other forms of participation in the civil society and the political sphere. In order to better understand this point, consider the following example. A particular neighbourhood in City X is mainly made up of immigrants coming from Country Y. The immigrant population, both the new and those who have been settled in the neighbourhood for a while, might not be very active in the formal political institutions. They might be less likely to take part in political parties, join interest groups, and the
turnouts from the community in elections might not be very high. However, at the same time, the members of this community can be highly active in their community institutions such as a community centre frequented by Country Y immigrants. The new immigrants could be introduced and quickly take part in the community activities even though the costs of participation in the community activities are often higher than those for participation in formal political institutions such as voting.

What this example demonstrates is the decision to participate in the civil society as well as the formal political sphere does not always depend on the amount of costs and efforts associated with the participation but the degree to which they see the cost/effort to be a worthy sacrifice and the degree to which they are willing to follow the general norms of their community and meet the expectations of others in doing so\textsuperscript{33}. Formal political participation is also eased for these individuals when it is linked to the activities and norms of the community as a whole; perhaps in the forms of a voting drive, supporting a candidate from the community, forming or supporting an interest group representing the interests/needs of the community, or gathering petitions to oppose a policy that (some of) the community finds bad.

\textsuperscript{33} To demonstrate how one’s willingness to follow the general norms of their community and meet the expectations of others in doing so can increase engagement, it is worth noting an experiment carried out by Facebook during the 2010 elections in the US. The experiment divided all Facebook users over the age of 18 living in the US into three groups. The first group received an informational message encouraging them to vote as well as a link to information regarding polling stations and an “I voted” clickable button. The second group received the same message but also saw “the profile pictures of up to six randomly selected Facebook friends who had clicked the ‘I voted’ button” (Corbyn 2012). The final group received no message. The results showed that while there was no difference between those who got the information message and those who got no message at all, those who received the message as well as pictures of their friends who had voted, “were 2% more likely to click the ‘I voted’ button and 0.3% more likely to seek information about a polling place than those who received the informational message, and 0.4% more likely to head to the polls than either other group”. All in all, the researchers estimate that the information message in addition to the knowledge that one’s friends had voted “directly increased turnout by about 60,000 votes” (Corbyn 2012). 60000 votes might not seem to be too considerable, but the experiment lends credence to the idea that social pressure can be a positive force in increasing political engagement.
Participation is, in other words, at the very least linked to the exiting social capital\textsuperscript{34} in a given community. In this example, the immigrants—both new and old—are representative of a closed network with a high degree of social capital. Entrance into the community entails taking part in the existing norms and rules that exist in the community. Such participation meets the expectation of the other members of the community making those norms stronger and, thus, increasing the likelihood and willingness of all to participate in the norms of reciprocity. Quantities of social capital vary depending on the degree of closure within particular networks and the established norms of reciprocity between the members of the network (Coleman 1990). Smaller communities with higher degrees of community identification and, more or less, full closure mean higher degrees of social capital and more established rules and expectations of reciprocity.

When the majority of members of the community adhere to the norm of participation, it becomes costlier not to participate than to do so. Being part of a network with others who see participation as a norm, it becomes more likely that one decides to fulfill the expectation of others by doing the same. The same network of relationships and norms of reciprocity mean that the effect of political decisions are felt more closely and, thus, the sense of being able to enforce accountability is increased. Perhaps, even on the part of the political candidates hailing from smaller communities, the decision not to fulfill political promises becomes costlier. Not only would one risk being ousted but ostracized as well.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{34}} \text{“Social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2001, 19). It is “defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure” (Coleman 1990, 302). For Putnam, particularly, participation is not only linked to social capital – it is one of two constituent parts of his understanding of social capital. I will return, in more detail, to the concept of social capital as I draw from the analytical work done on this concept in order to develop my concept of deliberative capital in Chapter 3.}\]
A similar scenario is true for participation in a deliberation\textsuperscript{35}. Willingness to commit to a deliberation—put in the time as well as at the cognitive and emotional effort—will ultimately vary depending on a number of factors which include whether the topic under deliberation is one that matters to you; whether you are convinced that the deliberation will bring about an effect; whether you know the people who will be involved; whether you personally find participation to be important in and of itself; and whether those with whom you are closely associated with would expect you to participate.

Moreover, it is important to emphasize that a small-scale deliberative engagement creates a unique scenario: being in the same venue\textsuperscript{36} with a limited group of individuals—going through the same experience as you—for one hour or many months has the potential to create the networks of relationships as well as a conviction in one’s ability to bring about change in both the views and opinions of others in the deliberation as well as the final outcome of the endeavour. I will go into more detail about these costs and motivations in Chapter 4.

\subsection*{2.2 Willingness as a core assumption}

Willingness to engage in a deliberation whether in the more organized format of small-scale deliberative engagements or more generally in the larger political public sphere is a core premise of deliberative democratic theory, but it is one which has curiously been taken largely for granted and is rooted in Habermas’s early works. Habermas’s macro level conception of deliberative democracy incorporates the public sphere into the democratic system and distinguishes the deliberative model of democracy from liberal and republican models as “the

\textsuperscript{35} This is why one can speak of the willingness to participate in a deliberation as Putnam speaks about the importance of willingness (and capacity) to invest in social and civic activities.

\textsuperscript{36} I want to point out that there has been work—both theoretical as well as practical—looking at deliberations carried out online. By venue, therefore, I include physical as well as cyber space. However, most small-scale deliberative engagements are still carried out in face-to-face conversations.
cooperative search of deliberating citizens for solutions to political problems [which] takes the place of the [liberal model’s] preference for aggregation of private citizens or the [republican model’s] collective self-determination of an ethically interpreted nation” (Habermas 2006, 413).

Habermas draws a clear link between deliberation in the public sphere and the development and sustaining of legitimacy in political decision-making. Through his works *The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere* and *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas demonstrates that the transformations in the public sphere from one of “a sphere of criticism of public authority” (Habermas 1991, 51) and mediation between the individuals and the state to one embedded in the modern welfare system and, thus, concerned with the demands of interest groups were the cause of decreasing legitimacy and general malaise of democratic decision-making. As the new relationship of client or consumer and the goods/service provider replaced that of citizen and state, legitimacy was redefined as being able to offer services and guarantee social rights.

Since the organizing principle\(^{37}\) of the liberal-capitalist social formation became “unpolitical” and guided by wage labor and capital, the “economic system also [took] over the socially integrative tasks” (Habermas 1976, 24). This became a problem as the economic crises, instead of remaining within the sphere of economics, transferred into the cultural sphere and became the root of problems with social integration and limited the state’s ability to secure and maintain legitimacy of its governmental institutions (Habermas 1976, 3). Put simply, economic crises became crises of democratic legitimacy. For Habermas, the only way “a legitimation crisis can be avoided in the long run”, is for “the latent class structures of advanced-capitalist societies

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\(^{37}\) Habermas includes a rather helpful table in his comparison of the different social formations. For more information, see Habermas 1976, pg. 24.
[to be] transformed” or for “the pressure for legitimation to which the administrative system is subject [to be] removed” (93). This is achieved through re-politicizing the public sphere through deliberative means.

Since “the inherent telos of human speech” (Habermas 1984, 287) is to reach an understanding, the framework of deliberative democratic politics is embedded in the inherent structures of language, speech, and communication rather than in an ideal normative aspiration. Through talking to one another, we come to understand each other and learn to become rational. This is where the issue of willingness is dodged at a deep theoretical level in Habermas.

As I alluded to in the introduction, Habermas clearly demarcates communicative action from strategic action. Communicative action is “oriented to mutual understanding” (1996, 18) while strategic action “instrumentalizes speech acts for purposes that are only contingently related to what is said” (1984, 289). In the former, “actors in the roles of speaker and hearer attempt to negotiate interpretations of the situation at hand and to harmonize their respective plans with one another through the unrestrained pursuit of illocutionary goals” (1996, 18). In the

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38 My discussion of the legitimation crisis has less to do with my interest in class structures and the degree to which economic crises can become problematic, but rather the importance that Habermas places on legitimacy without discussing the willingness needed for the solution he proffers.

39 This is actually a rather simple idea. When Mary’s mother says “Mary, please put your toys away”, the ultimate aim of that speech act is for Mary to understand her mother and clear the room by putting her toys away. Deliberative democracy is, in its basic form, based on this idea: when we utter speech acts, we want to be understood. Therefore, creating the conditions that best allow for those speech acts to be uttered and understood without the least amount of distortion allows people to understand one another, be influenced by the best arguments, and reach an agreement.

40 It is important to note that this view rationality is rather a novel idea. Somewhat challenging Immanuel Kant’s idea of reason being inherent in each individual who was capable at arriving at the Categorical Imperatives, Habermas argues that rationality can be achieved through discourse: “rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking and acting subjects” (Habermas, 1981, 22). This rationality for Habermas is not a conceptual rationality but, rather, a social one and based on “implicitly shared [and] immanent rationality of speech” (130). It is a communicative rationality that is “oriented to achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus—and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims” (17). Therefore, it is not a rationality existing in the abstract but in communicative relationships.
latter, the orientation is towards securing a particular goal and is designed to have an effect on
others, but not through (necessarily) convincing them. The problem, which has possibly become
clear in my explanation of this demarcation, is that political speech has strategic elements. There
is no way around this. Moreover, Habermas stipulates that for deliberation to resolve conflicts
people need to adopt a communicative intent to influence through making claims. However, this
is assuming that the people are willing to take on such a challenge and pre-committed to such an
intent as well\(^{41}\).

So this distinction aside, how does one, then, ensure that the conditions for deliberative
democratic politics are established? For Habermas, this is done through institutional means.
Building on the institutional criteria of “universal access”, “rational debate”, and “disregard of
rank” (Habermas, 1991, 238) listed in the *Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere*, he
envisions a working public sphere as a “network for communicating information and points of
view” (Habermas, 1996, 360)\(^\). For this to be possible, basic rights—freedom of assembly,
freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, radio, and television—are
necessary as preconditions for a healthy public sphere open to “competing opinions and […]
representative [of the] diversity of voices” (368). In addition to the basic rights, Habermas argues
that a degree of (economic) equality is also necessary to ensure that political influence and
economic power are not confused\(^{42}\).

\(^{41}\) The same issue is brought up and dealt with by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) who argue that
people *ought* to be open to the claims of their fellow citizens. But treating this as an issue of ethics, they do not
really discuss the key questions of intent and motivation—which are often more powerful than ethics in questions
that touch on identity.

\(^{42}\) Habermas argues notes that “only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class
and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can the potential of an unleashed
cultural pluralism fully develop—a potential that no doubt abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-generating
forms of life (Habermas 1996, 308).
For Habermas, then, deliberation and active engagement of citizens in public opinion formation legitimatizes political decision-making. Deliberative democracy is centered around the idea of engaging the citizens at the level of public opinion formation by bringing them together; allowing them to discuss the different ideas and alternatives; getting people to think, amend, and possibly change their own positions; creating a space where the ones with the best and most reasonable arguments prevail; and leaving the option of further discussion and revision of policies and laws open. However, for this to be a possibility, there is an assumption that citizens are willing to participate in deliberations in the public sphere. While Habermas emphasizes the importance of institutional rights and even a degree of egalitarianism, he does not step back to ask whether or not the basic willingness for deliberation exists. This assumption is, for the most part, left unexamined and unchallenged in deliberative democratic theory as it is developed by thinkers after Habermas.

2.3 The indispensability of willingness

Those who engage with deliberative democratic theories and practices, whether they conceive of it in the larger public sphere or in the more limited shape of small-scale deliberative engagements, must keep this core assumption in mind. Any consideration regarding the expansion or improvement of deliberative opportunities in the public sphere or over the setup, process, or outcomes of a small-scale deliberative engagement are incomplete without acknowledging the proverbial elephant in the room: the problem of willingness for deliberation. Why is willingness so important then?

For deliberative methods to be integrated as part of valuable and practical decision-making, there needs to be general willingness for people to potentially partake in them and in a way that is inclusive of people across a range of diverse backgrounds. Thus, without sufficient
and a broadly based form of willingness, deliberation will not be inclusive or representative enough, re-creating the legitimacy crisis which Habermas sought to solve. For Habermas, basic rights and a degree of equality were necessary to ensure that different voices were heard in the public sphere, but there also needs to be willingness on the part of people to come and voice those opinions and views. Willingness is a precondition for the possibility of the meeting any standard of inclusivity and representativeness. Inclusivity and representativeness are two of the commonly cited ideal structural conditions necessary for deliberation. Both are rooted in Habermas’s “all affected principle” which at its foundation maintains that “[t]he political public sphere can fulfill its function of perceiving and thematizing encompassing social problems only insofar as it develops out of the communication taking place among those who are potentially affected” (1996, 365). Without proper inclusivity and representativeness of those included, the legitimacy of the decisions cannot be guaranteed.

If the willingness for deliberation is undermined due to any reason (ranging from time-constraints to lack of interest in the topic or the process, to a desire for conflict avoidance), then, deliberation in both small-scale deliberative engagements as well as the larger political public sphere becomes unrepresentative as only a few will self-select for such participation. This is not to say that everyone has to participate for a deliberation to be considered to be inclusive and representative. In a small-scale deliberative engagement or even in the larger public sphere, not everyone can or wants to talk. There are bona fide constraints posed by space and time. Ideally, however, since not everyone can participate, deliberation should aim for a representation of a

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43 The need to meet these ideal conditions is, subsequently, echoed in most writings on the requirements of deliberative democracy and noted as key components in deciding the quality of a deliberative setting (Steenbergen et al., 2003, Bohman 1996, Gutmann & Thompson 2004, Milewicz & Goodin 2012, to name a few).
44 For Habermas’s theory, this basically means that without willingness, deliberative democratic measures cannot serve as a mitigating factor in legitimation crises.
diversity of discourses and life experiences ensuring that all who will be affected will have an equal opportunity to be voiced and contribute to the process.

It is, therefore, imperative to pay attention to the patterns of willingness for deliberation: who wants to deliberate, why, with whom, and on what topics? In Chapter 4, I look at these questions from a theoretical perspective. What are some of the reasons that would prompt willingness for participation? What are the issues that would make one hesitant about participation? Does the willingness vary depending on the (type) of topic? Does the willingness to deliberate depend on the groups of people involved in the deliberation? Are there any mitigating factors that could motivate those less willing to consider participation?

The failure to have an inclusive and representative deliberation is a concern for all deliberative endeavours but particularly problematic when convening multicultural deliberations involving deep cultural differences. Indeed, communicative intent often trades off with identity. When beliefs, perspectives, and claims are part of defining a person’s identity, it will be very hard to open them to deliberative influence. When the same beliefs, perspectives, and claims are at stake, it becomes more difficult to rely on individuals to only have the intent to communicate with the goal of mutual understanding as opposed to one geared towards influencing others. Without proper inclusivity and representativeness, cultural and religious groups, opinions, lived experiences, and discourses will be left out of consideration. This can undermine the legitimacy, efficacy, and quality of deliberation and further marginalize groups who might already be or feel that they are marginalized in a society.

45 An example of this idea is the concept of “discursive representation” put forward by John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer which focuses on “representation of discourses as well as persons, interests, or groups” (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, 43). It does not limit participation of a discourse based on how many people subscribe to it and eases the arduousness of the task of meeting this requirement by recognizing that representation can be satisfied if discourses are represented as opposed to groups and individuals.
Two examples from the deliberative democratic literature that provide evidence for this concern are Monique Deveaux’s discussion of the consultation process regarding forced marriages in Britain (2006) and Seyla Benhabib’s examination of the scarf affair—L’affaire Foulard—in France (2002). In her book, *Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States*, Deveaux describes a consultation process undertaken by British Home Office on the issue of forced marriages in the South Asian community in Britain in order to gain a better sense of practices surrounding arranged marriage and the incidence and particular manifestation of forced marriages” (Deveaux 2006, 166). What the consultations demonstrated was general and strong support for the “custom of arranged marriages” as well as “community-wide criticisms of the use of force and intimidation in arranging customary marriages” (166). Not only did the community express “a sense of outrage that this custom should be confused or conflated with its forced variant” but they also “prompted calls for greater support services to protect vulnerable girls and women” (166).

Benhabib’s examination of the scarf affair has a less encouraging tone. The scarf affair “began when on October 19, 1989, Ernest Chenière, headmaster of the college Gabriel-Havez of Creil, forbade three girls—Fatima, Leila, and Samira—to attend classes with their heads covered”. “[D]espite a compromise reached between their headmasters and their parents encouraging them to go unscarfed”, each of the girls “had appeared in class that morning wearing her scarf” (Benhabib 2002, 96). They were expelled. Behabib argues that the problem with the scarf affair was that “the girls’ voices [were] not heard in this heard debate” (117). If

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46 The scarf affair in reality refers to more than one incident that I will describe. As Nicky Jones, writing in the Macquarie Law Journal, notes: “[t]he first of these events occurred in September 1989, when three Muslim schoolgirls were expelled from their lower secondary public school in a town in northern France for refusing to remove their Islamic headscarves while at school”. This incident was “followed by similar incidents involving other Muslim schoolgirls around France” (Jones 2009, 47).
we had listened to the girls and tried to understand their reasons for wearing the scarf—an autonomous political decision in their case—then “it would have become clear that the meaning of wearing the scarf itself was changing from a religious act to one of cultural defiance and increasing politicization” (117).

Neither of these two cases represents a case of pure democratic deliberation. Instead Deveaux’s case represents an instance of consultation with deliberative undertones (similar to the Commission on Reasonable Accommodation) whereas the scarf affair represents an instance where deliberation (or even consultation) could have produced much better results. Moreover, these two cases do not represent circumstances where lack of willingness produced poor results in liberal multicultural societies. What these two cases demonstrate is the importance of inclusion for democratic decision-making and are used by both authors to frame their arguments. Particularly, they indicate the need for allowing members of cultural and religious groups—whose practices are under question and contestation—the opportunity to express their opinions and rationales by a space for their values, identities, and lived experiences to be voiced and taken seriously.

If there is a lack of willingness for any reason, then we run the risk of having deliberations (or consultations) that leave out important and relevant voices. If the lack of willingness is more prevalent in cultural and religious minorities or particularly strong when the potential deliberation is on cultural or religious issue, then there is a chance that the emancipatory potential of deliberative democracy remains unfulfilled.

Willingness for deliberation is, therefore, of great importance. Despite this, however, it is rather a disregarded and understudied issue in the literature on deliberative democracy. With the exception of a 2010 article by Neblo et al., the willingness for deliberation has not been the focus
The most striking finding of Neblo et al.’s work was the fact that while usually it is the “whiter, older, wealthier, and better educated” (Goidel et al. 2008, 801) who participate in a deliberation, “[y]ounger people, racial minorities, and lower-income people expressed significantly more willingness to deliberate” (Neblo et al. 2010, 574). The disparity between those who want to deliberate and those who do demonstrates the importance of paying attention to the willingness for deliberation as well as to the process of deliberation.

For people to be willing to participate in a deliberative experience, they must see it as important and appealing enough to potentially invest time and energy in it. This is because this type of (social and) political engagement is comparatively time and energy consuming. It also demands a certain inclination to engage knowing that for at least a portion of the deliberation one might have to listen and respond to ideas and positions with which they disagree. If there is an assumption that disagreement over ideas might culminate in deep feelings of anger, frustration, sadness, among others, then, in some ways deliberation requires emotional investments as well which should not be undervalued. If so, deliberation under conditions of deep diversity might be a particular barrier to willingness for participation. A main task in my dissertation is to identify (and subsequently test) the reasons for unwillingness for deliberation and to see whether conditions of deep diversity compounds those reasons or even give rise to new grounds for unwillingness. The first part will be done in Chapter 4. The second part is carried out in Chapter 5.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I situated willingness for deliberation in the larger body of work on interest and willingness for political participation. Going back to Habermas’s early work *Legitimation Crisis*, I argued that willingness for deliberation should not be an afterthought for
scholars and practitioners of deliberative democracy. It is important to pay attention to the patterns of who wants to deliberate, on what topics, and with whom. In the next chapter, I move away from willingness and discuss the capacity of participants for deliberation. Even if we take it for granted that people are generally willing to come to the table, are they capable of doing so? In particular, are they capable to adhere to the norms and rules of deliberation by remaining open, respectful, and reflective? Are they able to wait their own turn, hear others out, and justify their own positions? Are they able to amend their positions or offer (or agree to) compromises? In the next chapter, I offer a theory of deliberative capital. Deliberative capital refers to the by-product of investments by participants. Investments are moments where participants demonstrate their capacity for deliberation: instances of respect, waiting for one’s own turn, taking an extra step to understand or empathize, offering a potential compromise or agreeing to on.
Chapter 3: Deliberative capital

In March of 2006, the Government of Northern Ireland announced the commission of an “Independent Strategic Review of Education” (Bain 2006, xiii) tasked with “[examining] the funding of the education system, in particular the strategic planning and organisation of the schools’ estate, taking account of the curriculum changes, including the wider provision for 14-19 year olds and also demographic trends” (Department of Education Northern Ireland). The report from the review emphasized the need to reorganize and rationalize the schools and put forth “collaborative approaches to the sharing of facilities and resource [as] standard practice” (Bain 2006, 116). As a way to gauge public opinion on the issue, a deliberative poll was conducted in the city of Omagh (roughly 110 km west of Belfast and 55 km south of Derry) in Northern Ireland.

The results of the deliberative poll showed the transformative effect of deliberation. As a learning process, the deliberation significantly increased the objective knowledge of participants “from 21.8 per cent to 50.3 per cent” (Luskin et al. 2014, 123). As a process of public opinion/attitude transformation, the deliberation was successful in “decreasing [the] support for the status quo […] reflecting [the] increased recognition of the demographic and

47 This “sharing” was to be done “ensuring that the particular identity or ethos of an individual school is preserved wherever possible” (Bain 2006, 116). Considering Northern Ireland’s conflict-ridden past and divided presence, this was a necessary caveat to tag to the recommendation.
48 It is worth remembering that Omagh was the scene of the “largest loss of life in a single incident in Northern Ireland” after the explosion of a car bomb on August 15, 1998 killed 29 people (Melaugh 2014). The attack was carried out by the splinter group rIRA - real Irish Republic Army - in opposition to the Good Friday Peace Agreement (Melaugh 2014). Omagh, therefore, represents a clear case of the violent (political and ethnic) conflict in Northern Ireland. It also made a good location for this particular deliberative poll as Omagh “has a mixed population of Catholics and Protestants. Its primary and post-primary schools represent all the major school types” (Luskin et al. 2014,118).
49 Deliberative polls are not the epitome of deliberation nor of small-scale deliberative engagements. In fact, since the participants in a deliberative poll ultimately make decisions separately, one could argue that deliberative polls circumvent an important portion of the process: the collective democratic decision-making.
50 This refers to the percentage of correct responses on the questionnaires.
curricular constraints” (124) which had prompted the Strategic Review in the first place. As a process of producing (better) mutual understanding and respect, the deliberative process was successful in ameliorating Catholics’ outlook of Protestants - seen to be “much more open to reason” (131). Furthermore, both sides “came to see the other as more trustworthy than they had before deliberating” (131).

What this example represents is a case of a deliberation under conditions of political and ethnic diversity in a country where historical conflict had often been violent. The participants had good reasons not to trust each other or be comfortable with the process that had brought them together. Yet, the deliberation appears to have proceeded and concluded, at the very least, with a modicum of success.

How do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when deliberations unravel? In the former case, I argue, what we see is participants making a series of investments in different desired behaviours and norms. In the latter, participants are unwilling or unable to make these investments and instead make divestments. In this chapter, I outline my theory of deliberative capital as a key concept framing this dissertation and posit investments and divestments as key processes in the concept of deliberative capital.

I begin the chapter by offering a brief account of deliberative capital, situating it within the literature on social capital and deliberative democracy. This allows me to explain the logic behind investments: self-interest and the desire to be treated well by others lead individuals to invest in deliberation. Early investments are reciprocated by others who want the same treatment. Reciprocated investments lead to reciprocity and investments to become the norm, making it more likely for participant to invest and more risky to divest from deliberation. I will, then, give an account of investments and divestments that we can expect to see in deliberation. In
particular, I will explain the indicators of each of these investments—how they manifest in a deliberative exchange.

Finally, I examine a variety of scholarly literatures from psychology, political theory and political science which provide insights into what leads either to investments or divestments focusing specifically on the deliberative situations which involve cultural and religious difference. Subsequently, I will expand on the ways in which conveners and facilitators within deliberation engage in actions that create the infrastructure necessary for and ease as well as encourage the investments made by participants in deliberation; and discourage if not stave off divestments.

These include the use of facilitative treatments—*simulated representation* (getting participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each others’ views for a portion of deliberation); *deliberative worth exercises* (getting participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round); and *cultural translation* (having cultural/religious experts as part of the deliberation to explain beliefs and practices)—which will be discussed in Chapter 6 and tested in Chapter 7.

### 3.1 Deliberative capital

Deliberative capital is the by-product of the investments made by participants during the course of the deliberative process. These investments (explaining one’s reasons, waiting for one’s turn, taking an extra step to understand others, among others) increase deliberative capital which in turn facilitates a better and easier dialogue process for all participants. Deliberative capital is threatened when these investments are replaced by divestments (marginalizing comments, ignoring what others are saying, among others). Deliberative capital is defined and identified by its productive function: producing better and easier conversations. It is valuable
precisely because it is a means to an end. Without a sufficient degree of deliberative capital, good deliberation—one that is open, respectful, and constructive) will not come about. I use the word capital\textsuperscript{51}, with its connotations, to highlight the process of investing with expectation of future returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking) that occurs during a deliberation.

There are three factors that need to emphasized at this point. First, the concept of deliberative capital is an original contribution. While I rely on the literature on deliberative democracy to identify particular investments and divestments, generally disconnected from one another (as deliberative standards/norms and solecisms respectively), framing them together as either investments or divestments related to cycles of reciprocity, creates a new and original concept of deliberative capital, which like other forms of capital (social) rely on individual behavior in the present to create benefits to oneself and others rooted in the principle of reciprocity. I argue the concept of deliberative capital is important because it allows us to see a deliberative engagement as an organic and dialogical whole but one affected by the particular actions of the participants—whether good or bad.

Second, I should emphasize that deliberative capital is an explanatory concept. My contention is that conceptualizing deliberation in these terms (investments and divestments) is preferable to the other ways deliberative democratic literature has been looking at commitments

\footnote{The term ‘capital’ has a long history and many uses. In its traditional usage in economics, capital is an already produced good that can be used in the production of more goods and services and is, thus, one of the factors of production alongside of land, labor, and entrepreneurship. (Hicks 1971, 272). This is a holdings view of capital. However, used more broadly, the term ‘capital’ encompasses other forms of investments and assets including human, academic, social, cultural, public, and spiritual forms of capital. For example, human capital refers to the various skills, knowledge, experiences, and competences of individual(s) as they contribute to the overall productivity of a certain organization or country. The kind that I am interested in is a relational capital - one that exists in the bonds between individuals. Both social and deliberative capital are relational.}
to deliberative norms and expressions of disagreement and bad behaviour within deliberative processes. While I support the normative argument regarding deliberative capital—*i.e. we should have deliberative capital or increase deliberative capital*—I also seek, at a more empirical level, to explain the process of deliberation with a concept that better accounts for the success/breakdown of speech in small-scale deliberative engagements through the principle of reciprocity as a core assumption.

Deliberative capital more accurately encapsulates the role of conveners and facilitators of the deliberative process; and more effectively—as I will explain in more detail in Chapter 6—prompts the formation of strategies or treatments aimed at encouraging investments and discouraging divestments. While I hold that investments are normatively positive (i.e. it is good to give reasons for your views or respect others), my main purpose to explain the process of deliberation and find ways of improving it under conditions of cultural and religious difference. That being said, there are normative goods that are embedded in the idea of deliberative capital. For example, waiting for one’s own turn involves recognition of others as deserving of reasons; it involves reciprocity—which is fundamental to ethics.

Third, the concept of deliberative capital needs to be distinguished from deliberative experience. My contention is that investments increase deliberative capital which in turn produces a better deliberative experience. Divestments reduce deliberative capital which in turn produces a less desirable deliberative experience. Investments (and divestments) are more or less easy to identify and quantify when examining deliberative engagements. Deliberative capital is harder to identify and quantify as *one thing*. However, a tally of the investments and divestments can still give us a glimpse of the overall deliberative capital as can the cycles of investments and divestments—when the investments and divestments are clearly returned and reciprocated within
a deliberation. However, the concept of a positive or negative deliberative experience is ambiguous, imprecise, and almost impossible to identify or quantify.

3.1.1 Problem of pre-commitment

The concept of deliberative capital has, in part, been developed as a response to this problem of pre-commitment within deliberative democratic theory and practice. Theoretically, deliberation—especially in a multicultural setting with participants from diverse backgrounds and on a potentially divisive issue—requires participants to show up to the table with, at least, a degree of commitment to the norms of deliberation. Participants need to be willing to explain their positions either by expanding on their reasons or feelings. They need to be willing to respect each other, listen to one another, and to take in and respond to one another. And they need to be open to a degree of give-and-take or constructive dialogue.

However, this might not always be the case. While I might not come to the table set on derailing the deliberative process, I might not be particularly pre-committed to the norms of justification, respect, equality, among others, and see them as normative. This can be particularly the case if I feel strongly about an issue—for example, if it touches upon my cultural and/or religious values or practices. Since we cannot guarantee that participants will come to the table already committed to these norms necessary for good deliberation, what guarantee do we have that deliberative processes—in liberal multicultural societies—are worthwhile? More practically, how is that, when conducted, deliberations often—albeit some problems—proceed and conclude successfully?

It is in response to these questions that I have developed the concept of deliberative capital. The reason why deliberative processes can proceed and conclude successfully—and why
such processes are worthwhile—is that during the course of deliberation, participants make a series of investments with the expectation of reciprocity. For example, a participant can choose not to make marginalizing comments towards others when disagreeing with them with the expectation that others will not make marginalizing comments about and towards him or her.

These investments, when reciprocated, increase the deliberative capital within a deliberation. They contribute by not only making the atmosphere more positive and constructive but also solidifying the norms of deliberation. The more participants invest, the more it becomes a norm and an expectation that they will do so. In other words, self-interest can be transformed into a norm of reciprocity. These coveted cycles of investments, therefore, are not necessarily dependent on virtuous participants pre-committed to the norms of deliberation. Participants are likely motivated by the desire to have others treat them with an open, explanatory, respectful, and constructive attitude. The concept of capital—with it connotations—is extremely apt at explaining this process of investments with expectation of future returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking).

52 This is not to say that none of the participants value these norms. My point is that for good deliberation we do not need to rely on the participants being pre-committed. For us to think of ways that we can improve deliberation, we do not need to keep our fingers crossed that the participants are going to be ideal deliberative citizens but only good ones. I would like to emphasize, however, as W. Barnett Pearce and Stephen Littlejohn (1997) do so eloquently in their work on moral conflict that I do not want to assume or suggest that “all participants in conflicts are well-meaning and moral people. Some are out to subvert others deliberately for personal gain, and such people can probably be found on side of most issues” (162). However, setting up, facilitating, or participating in a deliberation with the assumption that everyone is morally corrupt will easily become a “self-fulfilling prophecy in which the other becomes as despicable as we treat them” (162).
3.2 Deliberative democratic theory and social capital

While the concept of deliberative capital is original\textsuperscript{53}, it is built on and responds to work already done in deliberative democratic theory looking at processes of deliberation in small-scale deliberative engagements as well as the literature on social capital.

3.2.1 Deliberative democracy

I argue that looking at the deliberative process through the lens of deliberative capital highlights the fact of reciprocity at work which is, for the most part, left out of the other works looking at and evaluating the processes of deliberation such the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al. 2003), Deliberative Transformative Moments (Jaramillo and Steiner 2014), and inductive study of deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2006) as well as those concerned with the type and frequency of disagreements within deliberative processes such as those by Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger (2009) and Stromer-Galley et al. (2015).

Most notably among these is the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Marco R. Steenbergen, André Bächtiger, Markus Spördndli, and Jürg Steiner and later amended by Jaramillo and Steiner introducing the concept of Deliberative Transformative Moments (DTM). DQI is one of the main, and now most frequently used, methods\textsuperscript{54} for evaluating discourse within

\textsuperscript{53}The only other utilization of the concept of deliberative capital by Markus Holdo in a 2015 Critical Policy Studies article. While both Holdo and I are concerned with deliberative democratic practices in organized structures (i.e. small-scale deliberative engagements), our approach to the concept is different. For Holdo, deliberative capital is essentially different from competence, capacity, and skill. It is the “source of social recognition” (2) particularly recognition outside the deliberative field as a result of the participation within it. However, I see deliberative capital as product of investments. Deliberative capital is created and maintained when participants demonstrate themselves as capable—having the capacity—of making those investments. In addition, while I depend on the concept of deliberative capital to critically and analytically understand the moments of success and failure of speech within an organized dialogue, Holdo uses the concept to understand and explain the ways in which the voices of the marginalized, those without access to common forms of capital, can gain empowerment through engagement in a small-scale deliberative engagement.

\textsuperscript{54}For some of the scholarly works using DQI see Lord and Tamvaki 2013, Steiner et al. 2004, and Pedrini 2015, Steffensmeier and Schenck-Hamlin 2008.
deliberative settings. Based on Habermas’s discourse ethics, DQI includes factors such as open participation, justification, common good, respect, and constructive politics (25-26). While DQI is comprehensive, it treats the divestments such as “interruption of a speaker” (27) or “negative statements” about others (29) as absence of quality of discourse55.

Deliberative capital builds on and responds to this limitation of DQI in two ways. First, it emphasizes the fact that investments (adherences to the factors identified in DQI) by participants are made with the expectation of future returns and, when made, are reciprocated by others. Second, it also pays attention the other side of the same coin: when participants make divestments (i.e. interrupt others or make negative statements about them), they reduce the deliberative capital. Just as investments are reciprocated, so are divestments56. Therefore, these divestments do more than just not contribute to quality of discourse. They reduce it and they can have a snowballing effect on others’ behaviour and quality of deliberation as a whole57.

I have to emphasize that I am not taking issue with the contribution that DQI makes in attempts to quantitatively assess the quality of deliberation. In fact, DQI, despite some of its limitations, remains a solid and straightforward way to evaluate the process of deliberation quantitatively. My concern is with the lack of acknowledgement of the ways in which investments and divestments act upon in other—how they can reinforce each other.

55 They are coded as 0 within the Index.
56 Similarly, deliberative capital also responds to and complements the work done by Jennifer Stromer-Galley and her colleagues on analyzing disagreement within deliberation—mainly how it is initiated, what its nature is and how long it lasts (Stromer-Galley et al. 2015, 4). Their analysis is guided by “prior research on expressions of disagreement from Kuo (1994), Pomerantz (1984), and Rendle-Short (2007)” (6). Once again, the reciprocal nature of (poorly expressed) disagreement is not highlighted.
57 It is important for me to note that DQI is well into its second generation, DQI II which pays more attention to the instances that transform deliberation for the better as well as those that do the opposite. However, it is my contention that it does not pay enough attention to how one instance of a speech act that transforms deliberation for the worst can have a productive ability: give rise to more instances of the same speech act.
I make the decision to invest within the deliberative scenario with the understanding that making that investments creates an obligation for the other person or persons to do the same. Therefore, I expect and count on the fact that my investment will be reciprocated by others within a deliberative engagement. As Mark Warren argues, “good manners do not even rely on altruism, since individuals rarely get their way through rudeness, while they do well through cooperation” (Warren 2006, 175). Investments—including the good manners that Warren talks about—are similarly not necessarily dependent on altruism and a moral deliberative intent. Moreover, investments (and equally divestments) are not made in a vacuum. They have an effect (positive and negative) on the behaviour of others.

I do not need to provide sophisticated evidence to claim that when one decides to participate in a deliberation, she wants, ideally, for others to listen and agree with her; or, at the very least, not to be disrespected, ostracized, ignored, or be seen as obnoxious. Therefore, just as in the case of social capital, she might be inclined to make the investments in deliberative capital as “a kind of insurance policy” (Coleman 1990, 310)—as a way to increase the likelihood that others would make the same investments in deliberative capital and ease the process for her.

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58 The literature on bargaining is useful in explaining some of the logic behind investments in deliberation. “Osgood’s (1962) well-known argument that cooperation will be reciprocated rather than exploited” is one example. “Referred to as graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT), Osgood reasoned that unilateral concessions would remove the main obstacle to an opponent’s concession making, which is distrust. The initial concession would set in motion a cycle of reciprocated or matched concessions” (Druckman 2011, 790). A similar logic could be working when participants make investments in a deliberative scenario. The first instance of investment in, for example, respect would increase the trust between the participants and could set in motion cycles of investment in respect. One main difference to keep in mind is that the relationship and cycles that Osgood speaks about occur in a dyad or between two participants in the bargaining. Deliberation, even in smaller groups, has more than two participants. A person’s disinclination to invest will stem from distrust not only in one participant but the group as a whole. Reciprocity, too then, in this case will expand to the group not one person.
3.2.2 Social capital

The concept of deliberative capital, as suggested above, is also built on the analytical work done on social capital. Social capital, briefly, refers to the “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, 248). These resources “facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the [social] structure” (Coleman 1990, 302). These actions, according to Putnam, concern “coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, 67). Social capital, then, has come to be seen as the by-product of the relationships between individuals in a social structure which, in turn, makes actions within that social structure easier, more cooperative, and trusting.

Similarly, deliberative capital is the product of the investments made by participants during the course of deliberation and reduced when divestments replace those investments. When a participant, for example, waits for his or her own turn to speak, it becomes easier for the person speaking to get his or her point across and it makes it easier for others to understand and reflect on what has been said. When I wait for my turn, I expect others to do the same when I am talking. Similarly, when someone ignores the real concerns of another participant in responding

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59 At this point, it is important to highlight an article by Luigi Bobbio entitled “Building social capital through democratic deliberation: the rise of deliberative arenas” in which he analyzes the relationship between social capital and deliberative democracy in two facets: “social capital may be seen as a condition for the development of democratic deliberation, or it may be seen as its result” (Bobbio 2003, 352). In regard to the former, he notes that in some ways deliberative democracy presupposes “the existence of a shared political culture characterized by a strong common identity, widespread openness to dialogue and extensive mutual trust” (352). In the latter, however, Bobbio references the works of Tocqueville and Mill who would lend credence to the idea that “the heritage of civicness tends to increase in situations where citizens are called upon to solve public problems that concern them, through the use of argumentation” (353). He does, however, note the limitations of deliberative democracy in building social capital. “The first concerns the small number of citizens who are involved; The second concerns the fact that deliberative arenas are temporary structures that tend to be dissolved once their task is completed” (354). It is important to single out Bobbio as he is one the few scholars who looks at social capital and deliberative democracy together. However, my own work is different. While I build upon the analytical work on social capital and while I acknowledge the utility of having stocks of social capital in facilitating investments in deliberative capital, I am not using the term deliberative capital as an extension of social capital.
to him or her, it becomes unnecessarily difficult for that person to get feedback on that concern from others. It also becomes for difficult for others—who may or may not have similar concerns—to raise those issues. When I ignore the concerns of someone or dismiss them outright as unimportant or absurd, I leave myself open to a similar treatment. Investments do not simply benefit the person making them but are made for mutual benefit. Divestments do not simply leave the person making them vulnerable to a response in kind but creates an atmosphere that warrants such behaviour.

However, participants do not come to the table with a stock of deliberative capital. Unlike social capital which exists as a common good that (some) people have access to, deliberative capital is created by participants at a particular deliberative engagement. However, the problem is that while investments benefit all those involved in the deliberation, divestments do not necessarily harm those who are engaging in them but others involved in the deliberation. For example, if divestments are mainly made by a particular demographic group, for example men, then it is others at the deliberation table who suffer from those divestments. This why, as I will explain in more detail in Chapter 6, facilitative treatments can be utilized to neutralize these divisions and encourage investments on the part of all those involved.

3.2.3 Trust and reciprocity

Just as social capital is increased through investments in trust and eased (for an individual) by a general assumption that others have a goodwill towards us, deliberation goes forward if and when there is a certain amount of trust and willingness on the part of the participants to make these investments. Social capital depends on the general social norms

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60 This is a key problem of social capital according to Bourdieu. Access to social capital is determined and limited along class divisions.
enforcing (or making desirable) reciprocity. This reciprocity, as Putnam argues, “serves to reconcile self-interest and solidarity” (Putnam 1993, 172). Norms of generalized reciprocity “reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation” (178). Deliberative capital comes about through a similar process of self-interest guiding investments which in turn fulfills the expectations of others and creates and obligation on their part to do the same. Their reciprocal investment, then, creates and strengthens deliberative norms. These deliberative norms, then, incentivize further investments - one’s self-interest will not be fulfilled by straying far from the deliberative norms that others adhere to and risk being penalized by other participants.61.

This means that deliberative capital, just like social capital, has a cyclical nature and tends to be “self-reinforcing and cumulative” (Putnam 1993, 177). Just as Putnam speaks of virtuous and vicious circles in his discussion of social capital, a similar process is true for deliberative capital. If a deliberation is blessed with a stock of deliberative capital—resulting from early and continuous reciprocal investments by participants—then, we can expect future levels of investments on the part of participants. Similarly, if the deliberation is plagued by low degrees of deliberative capital—resulting from early and continuous reciprocal divestments by participants—then, we can expect future divestments.62.

A salient concern within the social capital literature is whether social capital can be built, sustained, and increased across difference. This comes out of Robert Putnam’s finding that

61 In other words, social and now deliberative capital arguments are linked to the theory of repeated games.
62 As Putnam explains, “we should expect the creation and destruction of social capital to be marked by virtuous and vicious circles” (Putnam 1993, 170). While “virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civil engagement, and collective well-being” (177), “Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles” (177).
ethnic and cultural diversity are inversely related to social capital (Putnam 2001). Similar concerns exist in regards to deliberative capital. Deliberative capital is easily threatened when necessary investments are replaced by divestments (i.e. dominating the speaking time, ignoring or attacking the views of other participants, cutting others off, among others) within a deliberative process. Diversity, and the ensuing unfamiliarity between the participants, can make it more difficult for participants within a deliberative process to have the basic trust necessary to make early investments in deliberative capital—*if I feel like others at the table are too different from me, I may feel uncomfortable. This discomfort can reduce my general trust in the process and the participants. It might make me less inclined to invest.* Similarly, divestments can become more problematic under conditions of cultural and religious difference as well.

I will likely feel offended if I am told that my views are regressive and irrelevant while I am defending the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, the same comments are likely to cause more offence if I am defending the right of women to wear the niqab during Citizenship Ceremonies. The second topic is likely to bring up the values and ideas that are more important and deeply connected to me. Therefore, when thinking about deliberation in general and especially those conducted under conditions of deep difference, it is necessary to pay attention to the cycles of investment and divestment, incentives for each, and ways of getting deliberation back on the path of investments.

Analytically and functionally, social capital and deliberative capital are similar. However, they are different in many ways as well. Effects of social capital generally extend beyond the social sphere. As Alejandro Portes notes,

> through social capital, actors can gain direct access to economic resources (subsidized loans, investment tips, protected markets); they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with experts or individuals of refinement (i.e. embodied cultural
capital); or, alternatively, they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials (i.e. institutionalized cultural capital) (Portes 1998, 4).

However, the same is not necessary true for deliberative capital which does not need to and often does not extend beyond the span and scope of the deliberation. It comes about as a result of investments and eases the process of deliberation. Of course, there is indication that satisfaction with participation in one deliberation can increase a person’s willingness to participate in similar future engagements (See Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger 2009). However, the actual deliberative capital—produced by investments and reduced by divestments—does not operate the same way as social capital.

Deliberative capital and social capital also differ in the extent to which the free-rider problem becomes a problem in the process. In the case of deliberative capital, the free-rider problem is less likely because the structure is even more closed. Deliberative capital, similar to social capital, is not a private good63. Deliberative capital of the sort that is valuable for the participants in a deliberation is not a private good. The structures that create interactions between participants and help in the creation of deliberative capital do not solely benefit the person or persons whose efforts would be necessary to bring them about.

However, the source and effect of divestments—person engaging in a behaviour contrary to the norms and rules needed for good deliberation—are very visible in a deliberation. If in a hypothetical deliberation on the ban on niqab in Citizenship Ceremonies, most of the participants continuously make investments benefiting Dorothy who keeps cutting everyone off and making disparaging comments, her actions are visible and identifiable by others in the group who might

63 James Coleman discusses this in some detail. He notes that “the actor or actors who generate social capital ordinarily capture only a small part of its benefits, a fact that leads to underinvestment in social capital” (Coleman 1988b, S119).
continue to make investments towards each other but might choose not to extend the same
courtesy towards her\(^{64}\), thereby, limiting the potential benefits she can take from the mutual
investments.

### 3.3 Investments in deliberative capital

Investments in deliberative capital are instances of participant adherence to positive
deliberative norms that are often self-interested and made with expectations of others to do the
same\(^{65}\). Investments are further made possible and eased by the establishment of rules of
deliberation. Sometimes these rules and norms are outlined—often by facilitators or convenors—and even agreed upon by participants at the start of the deliberation. Investments can further be
encouraged through reminders (by facilitators) about the importance of adhering to those rules.
This can be a powerful tool in encouraging investments by establishing a baseline for the
expectation of reciprocity. Indeed, Grönlund et al. (2015) demonstrate that simple establishment
and enforcement (through reminders) of deliberative rules and norms is enough to prevent group
polarization and increase tolerance even among people with anti-immigrant attitudes.

When participants continue to make these investments, the deliberative standards become
solidified and the expectation of reciprocity becomes stronger: *the more one sees others
behaving according to rules, the more he or she expects them to continue doing so, and the more
likely he or she is to believe that a similar behaviour is needed.* This means that each exchange

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\(^{64}\) For example, Ben, Betty, Susan, and Marcia might continue their investments towards each other—remaining respectful and waiting for their own turn or even asking clarifying questions and paraphrasing each other’s ideas—but they might not do the same towards Dorothy—they might cut her off or not respond to her queries and concerns. I am not claiming that this is normatively positive. I am simply making the case that since this is a possibility, the free-rider problem is reduced.

\(^{65}\) Participants invest in deliberative process by justifying their opinions and feelings, respecting fellow participants, listening to others, incorporating the ideals and views of others into the conversation, remaining sincere, reflecting on what has been said, making attempts at empathizing with others, and by offering concessions and compromises. I will go into detail about the particulars of each of these investments in norms later in this chapter.
of investments reduces the risk of the next round of investments. Knowing (or thinking) that others will follow these deliberative norms, one will be more likely to go along and follow (and even initiate investments in) the deliberative norms, too, thus fulfilling the expectations of others that rules and norms will be followed. This also means that it becomes more difficult for participants to get their way by divesting. The logic of investments in deliberative capital are similar to those explained in the literature on social capital: people will expect their goodwill to be reciprocated (i.e. they take the risk and trust others) unless there is evidence to the contrary.

So what are these investments? They are instances of adherence to particular deliberative standards of reason-giving, respect, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, sincerity, empathy, and productive dialogue. These standards are not original. They have been, for the most part, identified by scholars of deliberative democracy. What I will be doing in the next section is not to provide an ethical rationale for why each of these norms or standards is a good thing but rather to explain what we should look for in a deliberative engagement as an indication of investments in these standards. This is summarized in Table 3.1. Underlying these specific investments is the expectation of reciprocity, without which investments would be risky. In order to explain these as investments, I will utilize throughout this section, a hypothetical deliberation on permitting the wearing of niqab in Citizenship ceremonies in Canada.
### Table 3.1  Indicators of investments in a deliberation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>▼Investments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▼Reason-giving</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Justification</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Explaining the meaning to make it intelligible</td>
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<tr>
<td>▼Respect</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Absence of negative statements in expressing disagreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Absence of interruptions in longer speech acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Asking others what they think</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Rephrasing/repeating what someone else has said</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Apologizing for a divestment</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Using the pronoun “we”</td>
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<tr>
<td>▼Reflection &amp; incorporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Expressing change or amending of one’s view</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Connect one’s point to general ideas</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Connect one's point to others’ ideas</td>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Asking clarifying questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▼Sincerity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Admittance that you don’t know something or not sure how it will work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Consistency in reasons given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▼Empathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Identifying my own emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Acknowledging/communicating the feelings of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Connecting one’s feelings to that of another (can be in shape of an example)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▼Productive dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Offering concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Mediating proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Separating personal feelings from public views</td>
</tr>
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</table>
3.3.1 Reason-giving

Participants invest in deliberative capital by giving reasons for their positions to other participants. This includes both offering a justification or a reason for one’s position rather than simply expressing opinions without any justification for them as a foregone conclusion as well as attempting to make one’s position intelligible to others.

Justification includes explaining the reasons behind a position—i.e. I don’t think we should be banning the niqab because it will be slippery slope that would end up limiting or undermining free exercise of religion or, alternatively, I think that we can ban the niqab in the case of Citizenship Ceremonies because this is one instance where we need full sincerity and openness. It is a sacred ceremony. However, it is important to remain cognizant of the many times that speakers may substitute “feel” for “think” in their conversations. Many instances of the use of “feel”—i.e. I feel like when people choose to come to Canada, they should just follow our ways because they made the choice to come here and wanted to be part of this country—are not about emotions but about reasons, ideas, and values. Both should be considered as part of reason-giving. When I invest in deliberation by justifying my position, I am relying on the expectation that others will try to do the same when they express their positions.

Investments in reason-giving can also take the form of attempting to make one’s point intelligible. Deliberation can often run into problems of intelligibility. There are often different

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67 There is much evidence in support of such a claim. For instance, negotiation literature, built upon and updated according to the insights of experimental psychology, posits this exact relationship. Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman argue, in Negotiation Genius, that “human beings are ‘hardwired’ to accommodate the (seemingly) legitimate demands and in positions of others because doing so allows us to build mutually rewarding relationships with them” (Malhotra & Bazerman 2007, 167). Therefore, they recommend for us to “find some way to justify [our] position” since “that justification will probably increase the odds of compliance—or, at the very least, mitigate the risk that [our] demand will be perceived as illegitimate, unfounded, crazy, or offensive” (168).
points of view expressed within a deliberation. When that deliberation is conducted under conditions of deep diversity, those differences can become moral conflicts meaning that “participants [can] use the same vocabulary but mean different things by it” or even “use different vocabularies for comparable functions” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 68).

Therefore, one of the investments that participants can make is to attempt to articulate the meaning and reason behind their view in a way that is intelligible to the others by drawing examples to ideas and experiences that are familiar to them or by asking whether an idea or position expressed by someone else is similar to one’s own ideas or experiences—i.e. *when I talk about someone wearing a niqab because she interprets her religion as obligating to do so, I don’t mean that because most muslims don’t, she shouldn’t. John talked about how he has a cross drawn on his forehead on Ash Wednesday and he should be allowed to do so because it isn’t all the time and doesn’t affect a sacred ceremony like taking the Oath of Citizenship. But not all Catholics have crosses drawn on their face on Ash Wednesday, but some do; not all Jews wear black hats and side curls, but some Orthodox ones do*.68 They believe that this is what their religion wants from them and they follow it. Women wearing the niqab feel the same and so should be allowed to do what they want. Investing by making one’s point intelligible is dependent upon reflecting on what others have said. Without that, the need to make one’s point more intelligible would not be clear.

3.3.2 Respect

Investments in respect69 include, somewhat commonsensical, items such as avoidance of

68 Examples of Ash Wednesday and Orthodox Jews are taken from a CBC article on the Federal Court’s decision overturning the government’s ban on niqabs (Macdonald 2015).
negativity including ad hominem, sarcastic, and marginalizing statements—i.e. you hate women that's why you think the niqab is ok— as well as absence of interruptions when other are speaking—i.e. Jackson waiting for Susan to finish her point about religious freedom before he brings up the importance of ensuring security at Citizenship Ceremonies. This is done with the expectation that others will do the same by not interrupting or making a negative statement while disagreeing with a person.

More normatively interesting, however, respect also includes attempts at self-facilitation. Self-facilitation refers to the instances where a participant takes the role of the facilitator spontaneously. This can include asking another participant what he or she thinks—i.e. Susan, what do you think about the niqab? or Susan, you haven’t said anything in a while—or pointing out that a particular idea mentioned by another participant has not been dealt with fully—i.e. I think we should think about (or return to) the importance of balance between religious freedom and Canadian values that Susan brought up a while ago.

It can include rephrasing and repeating what another participant has said as a way to help him or her “to think through something that seems unclear or complex, or to help a [another participant] who seems uncertain or ambiguous about what he [or she] is saying” (Bush and Folger 2010a, 39)—i.e. you said we need to treat people equally which means we cannot allow niqabs because they limit some women’s freedom but then you said we need to treat people equally which means we should treat their religious beliefs with equal respect. Am I right? Self-

facilitation is a sign of explicit respect\(^\text{71}\) as it demonstrates not only a recognition but also a desire for others to participate openly and equally. When I invest by asking another participants what he thinks about an issue (engaging in self-facilitation), I do so with the expectation that others, particularly the person whose opinion I solicited, would extend the same courtesy towards me. These investments, therefore, will, theoretically, benefit both the person making the investment—raising the odds of its return—as well as others in the deliberation—by contributing to deliberative capital, and therefore, bettering the quality of the experience.

Another indicator of investment in respect can be seen in moments of group solidarity or instances where a participant uses pronouns “we” and “us” to refer to others in the groups—\textit{i.e.} we all think that freedom matters. \textit{What we differ in is to what degree different limitations on freedom should be allowed and how that can affect us.} This should be seen as an indicator of respect as it signal to the group that it is the group—the ‘we’—that is having the conversation and making the decision together. It is a recognition that others in the group are part of the process and have something valuable to contribute.

Finally, an apology for divestment should also be seen as an indication of respect. These include apologies after cutting someone off or dominating the speaking time—\textit{i.e.} I’m sorry, I cut you off. Go ahead—but also those for more serious divestments such as ignoring someone’s position or making sarcastic remarks regarding someone’s opinion—\textit{i.e.} I’m sorry, I shouldn’t have rephrased your position like this.

\section{Reflection on and incorporation of the views of others}

Participants invest in deliberative capital by engaging in a number of interrelated actions:

\footnote{\textit{Another sign of explicit respect would, of course, include statements that include an unambiguous positive note towards another participant or another group to which the person making the statement does not belong.}}
listening, reflecting, and incorporating the views of others into one’s own discourse. Participants can make investments by simply listening\textsuperscript{72} to one another. However, it is difficult to look for indicators of listening on its own. Reflection\textsuperscript{73} on what has been said is another investment that participants can make in a deliberation\textsuperscript{74}.

Indicators of such investments include instances where a participant admits to a shift or expansion in his or her perspective—\textit{i.e.} I started by thinking that niqabs should be banned because they are a sign of oppression but now I think that my main concern with it is about not being present, not showing your face, when you are becoming a Canadian— as well as attempts to connect my claims to more general principles and ideas—\textit{i.e.} the point that I am making about the freedom to cover’s one’s body is similar to being pro-choice they are all about having the freedom of choice in general.

It can include clarifying questions—\textit{i.e.} are you saying that niqabs should be allowed because banning them actually harms the women who wear them?—as well as attempts to connect what one is saying to another idea already expressed by someone else—\textit{i.e.} what I am saying about being present is similar to Susan’s idea about sincerity and acceptance of Canada and its values. Once again, I ask these clarifying questions, so that others would 1) provide me


\textsuperscript{74} This includes both self-reflection as well as reflection on what has been said by others. In either case, the investment would involve a process of turning back thoughts, ideas, and utterance in order to better understand, interpret, and analyze them. Reflection or rather reflexivity is a fundamental principle of deliberative democracy. In fact, Habermas, in his definition of a rational person includes both reflection and cultural context as fundamental characteristics: “we call a person rational who interprets the nature of his desires and feelings in the light of culturally established standards of value, but especially if he can adopt a reflective attitude to the very standards through which desire and feelings are interpreted” (Habermas 1984, 20).
with answers I seek; and 2) to do the same for me.

Finally, it can take the shape of incorporating the views of others into one’s own discourse (see Gastil et al 2008). It does not necessarily have to be an indication or result of an agreement. One can invest by bringing up another participant’s position correctly in order to disagree with it—i.e. Susan talks about Canadian values as they apply to religious freedom. She is right but she is forgetting about the value of sincerity, openness, and security. Another form of this investment would be to bring up another participant’s position as a form of agreement\(^75\) and to add value and credence to my own argument—i.e. Building on what Susan said about religious freedom, if we care about individual choices and choice of women, we should approach these situations case-by-case to see if a religious practice matters to that individual, or that woman. Another form of incorporation—the most transformative one—is when one incorporate someone’s views as a way to signal opinion change (a move from disagreement to agreement)—i.e. “Ok, I am starting to see where Susan is coming from when she talks about religious freedom and I can’t see how we could reconcile a ban on the niqab while we believe in freedom of religion”.

3.3.4 Sincerity

Participants can also invest in deliberative capital by engaging with each other in a sincere\(^76\) manner. Sincerity in its most basic sense “refers primarily to a correspondence between

\(^{75}\) This agreement can be either an upgrade, downgrade, or an agreement of the same evaluation (Pomerantz 1984). An upgrade is a vehement support of the first speaker by the second speaker. For example, if Susan says: “religious freedom is an important issue for us to discuss when thinking about bans on niqab” and I respond: “oh, religious freedom is the key; it is the most important issue”. The same evaluation happens when the second speaker repeats the assessment of the first speaker. For instance, if I, in response to what Susan said above, would respond by saying: “yeah, I agree with Susan. Religious freedom is important”. A downgrade is agreement but in a weaker form. For example: “Yes. Religious freedom is one of the issues we should talk about”.

\(^{76}\) For a more complete account of the way sincerity has been discussed within the literature see Fishkin 2011, He 2010, Lenard 2008, Ratner 2008, Van Gelder 2012, and Warren 2006, to name a few.
one’s avowal and one’s actual feelings” (Cohen 2010, 1097). However, by sincerity, I mean not only saying things that are free from dishonesty, deception, and hypocrisy but also approaching deliberation with a sincere attitude: engaging with others openly; not sarcastically; taking the step to really and genuinely explaining one’s feelings, beliefs, thoughts, and desires.

Sincerity, however, poses two problems for deliberative democrats. The first is a substantive problem. Too much sincerity can be marginalizing: i.e. Canadians don’t want the niqab and don’t wear the niqab. If you want to wear the niqab, you can just go back to wherever you came from. Mark Warren, in particular, argues that “[d]eliberative diplomacy—which may require expressive insincerities—is to be preferred when issues are at their most sensitive and conditions of discourse less than ideal” (Warren 2006, 164). This approach should be less about expressing insincerities and more about balancing sincerity with respect. Deliberation, particularly one under conditions of deep diversity, requires both. Investments of sincerity and respect are not mutually exclusive.

The second problem is one of measurement. Sincerity is a difficult investment to observe and measure. Indeed, Steenbergen et al. (2003) argued that while sincerity and authenticity were important for deliberative democracy, judging whether an act (or speech act) is sincere requires

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77 Insincerity is different from explicit lying. “While insincerity intends to mislead the audience into making wrong inferences about the speaker's true disposition about his reasons, lying involves deliberately misrepresenting the factual content of the reasons themselves” (Kang 2004, 308).

78 Too much sincerity and honesty can lead to an uncivil exchange between the participants. This could derail the success of deliberation in a variety of ways from making then environment too hostile for some participants to express their views to impelling participants to hang on to their primary opinions more fiercely. One the other hand, too much respect in the form of political correctness, perhaps, could also undermine the success of deliberation by putting too many roadblocks in the way of a free and open exchange of views and opinions. This creates a paradox for multicultural deliberations where there is a need for a degree of honesty and sincerity especially when there is a history of marginalization and mistrust between the participants as well as the possibility that too much sincerity and honesty can contribute to further marginalization and mistrust between participants. Both norms have to exist for a successful multicultural deliberation. Within a deliberation, both sincerity and respect are desired investments. While I will have no guarantee that if I remain sincere and respectful, others will do the same, I am more likely to face insincerity and disrespect if I am insincere and it is observed by others and/or if I am repeatedly disrespectful towards others.
us to make “a judgment about a person’s true vs stated preferences [which] is exceedingly difficult, since the true preferences are not directly observable” (26). While I acknowledge the difficulty of discerning and measuring investments of sincerity within deliberation, it is possible to develop basic guidelines for including investments in sincerity within deliberation. The first step in doing so is adopting a more complex notion of sincerity. The second step is to draw on the literature on legal theory and practice to develop indicators for sincerity.

While much of the literature on deliberative democracy treats sincerity as a simple concept, scholars in other fields do not. There are different, more layered, conceptions of sincerity (Eriksson 2011). Mathilde Cohen, for example, in her discussion of sincerity in the reasons giving by various legal and political decision makers, posits a more complex and useful

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79 The importance of sincerity in the history of political thought can be traced to Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* where he refers to sincerity as being honest and truthful in both speech and action and emphasizes it as moral excellence (Aristotle 1934, 4.7.7-8) as well as Immanuel Kant’s insistence on publicity as an inherent attribute of all public matters (Kant 1991, 125). Kant explicitly draws a connection between justice/legitimacy of laws and their publicity: “all actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public” (126). “The publicity principle mandates not only disclosure but also sincere disclosure” (Cohen 2010, 1100). Without publicity, the laws and affairs of the state would not be known by men. Without this knowledge, men could not exercise their public use of reason to comment on and confer legitimacy upon those laws. Without publicity, there can be no agreement; no legitimacy. However, it is worth mentioning that sincerity in politics has had a rather uncomfortable place in the history of political thought as well. Examples include thinkers such as Plato and his account of the noble lie (Plato 1991, 414e–15c) as well as Niccolò Machiavelli’s account of the usefulness of deception in the management of a principality (Machiavelli 1934, XVIII).

80 John Eriksson, in *Straight talk: conceptions of sincerity in speech*, gives a detailed account of the different ways sincerity has been conceptualized by different thinkers and he puts forth his own account of sincere speech. Summarized, these conceptions are: 1) “Sincerity as Showing: A speech act is sincere if and only if it expresses a state of mind (associated with the sort of speech act performed) speaker has” (Eriksson 2011, 215); 2) “Sincerity as Spontaneity: Sincerity at the most basic level is simply openness, a lack of inhibition” (224); 3) “Sincerity as Presenting Oneself as one Takes Oneself to be: A speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker believes that he is in the state of mind that he believes the speech act functions to express” (225); and 4) “Sincerity as a Communicative Virtue: A speech act is communicatively sincere if and only if the speaker (a) believes that she is in the state of mind that she believes her utterance functions to express and (b) desires that her interlocutor comes to believe, on basis of what is said, that she is in the state of mind that she believes her words functions to express (c) does not desire that her interlocutor, on basis of what is said, comes to believe that the speaker is in a state of mind that the speaker thinks she does not have (d) is properly justified in expressing the particular state of mind that she thinks her words function to express” (232). My purpose is not to go into details about any of these. The point that I am trying to make is that sincerity, unlike how it has been treated in democratic theory, is not a simple concept. There are many different accounts of what exactly counts as sincere speech and how and under what contexts we can judge a speech based on its sincerity.
view of sincerity. Applied to deliberation, when participants give reasons for their positions, they might do so because they honestly believe in those reasons (internalist reading of sincerity) or because they know that a particular reason is more understandable and acceptable by others (externalist reading). Equipped with a more nuanced notion of sincerity—one that moves away from the requirement of reading the minds and hearts of individuals in assessing their sincerity—I draw from the literature from legal theory and practice, particularly those concerned with the sincerity of religious beliefs, and put forward a two-pronged measure of sincerity in deliberation: 1) consistency of ideas and, more importantly, prioritization of issues; and 2) admittance of ignorance about issues.

For example, if I sincerely believe that niqabs should be allowed as part out the commitment to religious freedom, I should be able to provide reasons as to why religious freedom should be protected as part of the commitment to the Constitution or why niqabs—not central to the practice of Islam—should be protected under this right. Similarly, if I sincerely believe that niqabs should not be allowed because one’s face should be seen when taking the oath of Citizenship, then, I should be consistent in (the priority of) my position and, instead, not talk about how niqabs are a sign of patriarchy and have no place within Canada.

\[81\] In particular, Cohen notes that under the internalist reading “decision makers give justificatory reasons that are also their motivating reasons” as opposed to the externalist reading which requires of the decisions makers to “[give] reasons that [they] [think] really justify the outcomes. [They] [do] not need, in addition, to be moved by those reasons” (Cohen 2010, 1097).

\[82\] Sincerity has been and, to some degree, continues to be used as prerequisite in the judicial systems particularly in cases of religious freedom (Hambler 2011). Sincerity of a claimant in her view that a particular practice is necessary for her complete religious observance or that a particular policy or measure infringes upon the full exercise of her religion is often key to the courts granting a religious exemption or particular protection. Relatedly, sincerity has also become key in the decision of prisons in the United States to accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of the prisoners. With the increase of protection for the religious beliefs of prisoners by Congress, prisons have become concerned with the possibility that prisoners would fake their religiosity in order to benefit from the accommodation measures which often mean better meals, more time spent outside of cells, or in the company of others (Moustafa 2014). However, it is worth noting that the difficulty of ascertaining sincerity has meant that in many recent judicial decisions, sincerity has been seen as insufficient (Ogilvie 2012).
Participants can also show sincerity when they admit that they are unsure about their own views and feelings—*i.e.* *Honestly, I don’t know how I really about the issue of niqab. I feel like there’s a lot of noise and confusion about the issue. So I am going to wait and listen to others—or about the particularities of a certain practice or idea they have suggested—*i.e.* *I think maybe the way to ensure that women who are wearing the niqab are doing it because they want to is to maybe have some sort of a test or an interview; I’m not sure exactly how that would work.* Admitting to one’s ignorance or hesitancy signals openness to ideas by others in a way that overconfidence shows the opposite.

### 3.3.5 Empathy

Investments of empathy\(^83\) are another way participants can contribute to deliberative capital. Empathy, similar to sincerity, poses problems for deliberative democrats. The first problem arises from the complexity of the concept of empathy. Empathy has a circular relationship with deliberation: it is both needed during deliberation and, also, is a product of the deliberative process. One the one hand, empathy “[aids] participants in taking the perspective of all others engaged in deliberation (ideal role taking) and [creates] a feeling of solidarity among participants by encouraging them to be concerned about their fellow interlocutors” (Morrell 2007, 390). One the other hand, through the process of deliberation, participants will be exposed to different views and lived experiences. This exposure can reasonably lead the participants to leave the deliberation with a more well-rounded and open understanding which can increase one’s empathy towards those with whom one disagrees.

The second problem has to do, once again, with measurement. What are the indicators of

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\(^83\) For other ways that scholars have incorporated the concept of empathy in their discussion of deliberative democratic theory and practices see Dryzek 2009, Fearon 1998, Mansbridge 1980, Morrell 2010, Steenbergen et al. 2003, Umemoto and Igarashi 2009, Williamson and Fung 2005, *to name a few.*
empathy? What do investments of empathy look like? Empathy can refer to a cognitive and emotive ability to understand another person’s perspective, feelings, situation, and his or her subjective meanings. This is a difficult thing to observe and measure. After all, how can we be sure that one person has achieved this understanding about another? While this (understanding) aspect of empathy can be difficult to pinpoint, different steps—or levels—of empathy can be detected.

I can begin to act empathetically by identifying my own emotions, instincts, and feelings—*i.e.* *I just feel worried that when you hide your face, you are hiding something and I don’t want that when people become part of Canada*—and, more valuably, taking the extra step to acknowledge how others could potentially be affected by those emotions, instincts, and feelings—*[…] I know you probably find this offensive, but this is how I feel.* We know, from literature from sociology (Seyfert 2012) and psychology (Parkinson and Illingworth 2009), that one person’s feelings and emotions can affect those of the others. Empathy, therefore, requires from us to identify and communication not only our own emotions and feelings but also acknowledge and emphasize the potential effect that those can have on others.

Empathy can also be communicated to the other person—*i.e.* *I understand that you feel like we have a responsibility to protect these women from a culture that tells them they have to cover their faces….or: I empathize with how strongly you feel about how important freedom is for Canadians and how a ban goes against this.* In both utterances, the second speaker is repeating the emotions back to the first person. This is a way to acknowledge that, first, the
person has been heard and, second, understood enough84 for those views to be repeated. Acknowledgement of feelings should not be equated with an agreement with them just as empathy should not be seen as consensus.

These moments are instances of empathy. We can identify them within a deliberation when a participants attempts to make a connection between her own feelings and those of another participant85—i.e. I believe in the Canadian Constitution the way you believe in God and religion—or between her own experiences and those of another—i.e. I had a similar experience to that of Susan’s. Susan’s family kept dictating what she should and shouldn’t wear and that’s why she thinks we can’t make that decision for women to want to wear the niqab. I grew up in a country where everyone did that. So I see where she is coming from. I still think that we can draw the line and ban niqabs.

3.3.6 Productive dialogue

The final set of key investments made by participants are investments of productive dialogue86. These investments include attempts at separating one’s personal views from his or her public ones, proposing compromises, and offering concessions. An indication of productive dialogue is when participants take steps to separate their personal feelings from the views they would hold if making a decision publicly—i.e. Do I personally like niqabs? No. Do I think that it

84 This is borrowed from the discussions of empathy in medical literature and tailored to deliberation. Stewart W Mercer and William J Reynolds in their article Empathy and quality of care emphasize the importance both listening to the feelings and situations of others (patients in their case) but also communicating those feelings back (Mercer and Reynolds 2002, S11).
85 I think what Jane Mansbridge referee to as “moments of emotional identification” (Mansbridge 1980, 29) also fits under empathy. She referred to “moments of emotional identification” or “overwhelming understanding”— “a tremendous sense of ‘sisterhood’”—in the women’s movement during which women came “to feel that all women were sisters” (Mansbridge 1980, 29). What she talks about is an understanding, on a visceral level, of others.
86 The idea constructive deliberation—one open to compromise, concessions, and even consensus—has been brought up by many scholars in a number of ways. For more information, see Bächtiger et al. 2010, Bohman 1996, Dembinska and Montambeault 2015, Deveaux 2003, Dryzek et al. 2011, He 2010, Mansbridge et al. 2006, Valadez 2001, Valadez 2010, Umemoto and Igarashi 2009, to name a few.
is our job to make wearing them illegal? What such a demarcation signals is openness to compromise and a decision that does not match the personal feelings of a participant.

Participants can also invest by offering compromises and concessions. This can take the form of “mediating proposals” (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 30)—i.e. how about having a separate Citizenship Ceremony for someone who wants to wear the niqab?—as well as concessions—A separate ceremony is going to be too costly for it to make sense as an option. Also, part of the Ceremony is about being in the room with others, to hear them say the Oath as well. Maybe an alternative would be using some sort of a screen divider? Concessions, common practice in bargaining, might be seen as incompatible with deliberation. However, a small concession “may be sufficient to induce reciprocity, compliance, or agreement” (Malhotra and Bazerman 2007, 171)—all of which are valued by deliberative democrats. Therefore, I am likely inclined to make a concession expecting others to do the same as well.

Finally, I have to reiterate the importance of reciprocity. Reciprocity, which is different from the particular investments discussed above, applies to them all. In other words if somebody else is respectful, reflective and compromising, the ‘virtuous’ circle of investment will need others to act in kind, that is reciprocate these behaviours. Like social capital, where the key is the principle of reciprocity, I invest now with the understanding that others will reciprocate is key to creating a process that builds upon itself and thus produces deliberative capital and further investments.

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87 Many scholars of deliberative democracy have made a point of distinguishing deliberation from bargaining (Bohman 1996, Chambers 2004, Fung 2006, McAfee 2012, Steiner et al. 2004). 88 Malhotra and Bazerman suggest that negotiators should consider making concessions as a part of a successful negotiation strategy—instead of seeing it as a loss. They note that “when the person making the request moderates his demands (and asks for something less extreme), the other side views this as a concession that must be reciprocated. In other words, because the rejected party has ‘compromised’ by asking for less, it is incumbent on the other side to ‘meet them halfway’” (Malholtra & Bazerman 2007, 164).
3.4 Divestments from deliberative capital

Divestments in deliberative capital are instances of participant non-adherence to positive deliberative norms and engagement in undesired behaviours. In particular, it is the instances of no justification, biased information sharing or processing, cognitive apartheid, disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action, and unproductive dialogue which can jeopardize deliberative capital. These divestments that are enumerated here are anti-norm behaviour by participants rather than simply a passive withdrawal of support for the process by not engaging in investments. Once again, the literature has, for the most part, noted these undesired behaviours—often in disjointed and separate works. I will be detailing the indicators for each of them—what one needs to look for in a deliberation to see if divestments are taking place. These undesired behaviours or, what I call, divestment are summarized in Table 3.2.

3.4.1 No justification

A clear instance of a divestment from deliberative capital is when participants make claims without offering a reason for that position, taking the steps to explain their feelings about the topic, or attempting to make their claim intelligible—*i.e.* I just don’t want women to wearing these niqabs in government offices. Just as we would look for words like “because” or “cause” to search for the justification on the part of the participants, the absence of them after a strong claim is an indication of such a divestment.

3.4.2 Biased information processing and sharing

Participants also divest by by sharing or processing the information in a biased way. The most troubling indication of biased information processing can be seen when a participant or a few of the participants attempt to promote a false consensus—claim that an agreement has been made when the case is not true—*i.e.* So we all agree the niqabs are in direct opposition to
women’s rights. I think we can then say that we shouldn’t allow them in a ceremony about Canadian values. False consensus occurs when participant(s) push for agreement and consensus when no such agreement or consensus has been reached.

Table 3.2  Indicators of divestments in a deliberation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divestment</th>
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<tr>
<td>▼ Biased information sharing &amp; processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Pushing for false consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Presenting or being swayed by arguments evoking fear</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Logical fallacy</td>
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<td>▼ Cognitive apartheid</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Ignoring what others are saying—changing the flow drastically</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Not taking into account any of the others’ real concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>▼ Disrespect</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Ad hominem attacks or hypocrisy</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Cutting others off</td>
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<tr>
<td>▼ Hermeneutical exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Using the same term to mean different meanings</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Misunderstandings without resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>▼ Rhetorical action</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Dominating speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Overconfidence in one’s view</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Repetition of the same idea in the face of challenges</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Silencing of speech acts opposed to it</td>
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<tr>
<td>▼ Unproductive dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Rejection of mediating proposals</td>
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<tr>
<td>▶ Rejection of concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ No justification</td>
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Biased information sharing and processing also includes instances of presenting an argument based on fear rather than actual reasons—*i.e.* if we continue to allow niqabs in
Citizenship ceremonies, soon we’re going to have no rights for women and next we’re going to be a society that allows stonings. Such an action not only bypasses the necessity of reason giving but closes down the space for a real back-and-forth.

3.4.3 Cognitive apartheid

Participants can also divest from deliberative capital by engaging in what Bohman and Richardson call cognitive apartheid. Cognitive apartheid refers to a “[failure] to engage with one’s interlocutor as a person of intelligence” by “[reconsidering]” her views on basis of reasons” (Bohman and Richardson 2009, 270). For instance, during a (hypothetical) deliberation over whether the school board could allow Sikh students to wear Kirpans in school, Participant A would only discuss the safety concerns that could arise without listening or incorporating the concerns of Participant B who insists that the Kirpans are an inviolable part of the life of a baptized Sikh. The reverse situation would also be problematic if Participant B would stick to the true exercise of the right to religious freedom (i.e. need for Kirpans) without considering the worries about security and welfare of students at school.

Another, more obvious, indicator of cognitive apartheid can be seen when there is a drastic topic change. Suppose that Participant A has been discussing why niqabs should be banned because they are direct challenge to Canadian values. Participant B brings up the issue that Canadian values include freedom of religion and choice for everyone. Participant A, then, changes the topic to discuss the security implications of niqabs. This is a clear example of non-recognition of others during a deliberative engagement.

3.4.4 Rhetorical action

Participants also divest from deliberative capital by engaging in rhetorical action or
engaging in deliberation in order to simply “justify [my] own standpoint” (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 51) instead of engaging in a real back-and-forth with others. This can include instances where a participant dominates the conversation by going on and on about his or her position without giving the space or time for others to add to or challenge what has been said. Another indicator of rhetorical action is overconfidence is one’s view—*i.e. I am sure that if we really asked the women and they had a chance to talk freely, they would also be against wearing the niqabs*. The overconfidence signals the fact that a participant is not open to different views.

Repetition of the same idea over and over again after it has been challenged is also another indicator of rhetorical action. For instance,

*Participant A*: It might seem harsh, but banning niqabs would free women by forcing them to conform to Canadian values and would nip any tensions in the bud.

*Participant B*: Well, this could simply lead to women choosing not to become Canadian Citizens and therefore would exclude a group of individuals from enjoying the rights proffered to Canadian citizens.

*Participant A*: Well if people learn that the government will not yield not such issues, they would give up their insistence and would simply follow the rules. This will nip the tensions in the bud.

Rhetorical action can also manifest itself in silencing of speech acts opposed to it—*i.e. I think that Canada has religious freedom and part of that for some people is the niqab. I don’t see any other way for us to respect religions without allowing for niqab. There is simply no way we can be Canadian and not allow this*. Silencing can also take the form of cutting someone off to dismiss their opinion. But the example above is apt at showing the hidden ways in which other viewpoints can be silenced without having had the chance to be expressed.

### 3.4.5 Disrespect

Participants also divest from deliberative capital by disrespecting one another. This takes
different forms. A simple indicator of disrespect is cutting someone off—especially repeatedly. The more problematic way in which participants can divest from deliberative capital, however, is when they engage in ad hominem attacks—i.e. how can you be for allowing niqabs? You’re a woman. Participants can also engage in ad hominem hypocrisy (Boham and Richardson 2009).

### 3.4.6 Hermeneutical exclusion

Another type of divestments are those in hermeneutical exclusion. When hermeneutical exclusion happens, “[a]rguments are not extended because they go past each other by using incommensurate terms and meanings […]. Key terms for one side are passed over as unimportant by the other or are defined and used differently” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 72). An indicator of hermeneutical exclusion is the use of the same term to mean different meanings which can often lead to another indicator: misunderstandings without resolution. For example, consider the following example:

**Participant A:** I think what is at the heart of the issue of niqab is that of equality. This is why we simply can’t allow for the practice and sanction it by allowing it in Citizenship ceremonies.
**Participant B:** I think equality is the key issue too. But I can’t see how we can be committed to equality and single niqab and muslims out and treat them differently.
**Participant C:** Treat muslims differently from whom?
**Participant A:** If we allow it, we would be treating men and women unequally which is the problem.
**Participant B:** We accommodate other religions; like the case of the Sikh office in RCMP.
**Participant A:** How is that connected to equality between men and women?

In the case above, which admittedly is a bit clunky, participants are using two different notions of equality: equality between the sexes and equal treatment under the law which in Canada has

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90 Participant A is highly religious and Participant B is an atheist. B uses arguments relying on the Bible. Participant A will know that is a joke and conclude that respect has not been paid.
91 The concept of hermeneutical exclusion is used by Brandon Morgan-Olsen to refer to experiences such as sexual harassment at work in the 1960s where the victims found it difficult to “introduce political claims into the larger political community, because those political claims—once formulated —[were] difficult for the public at large to understand” (Morgan-Olsen 2010, 218).
include accommodation of religious practices including the wearing of the turban by Sikh RCMP officers. The misunderstanding, if not resolved, can frustrate and exhaust participants as they talk past each other.

3.4.7 Unproductive dialogue

Divestments can also take the form of unproductive dialogue. When participants dismiss mediation proposals or concessions outright without discussing them, they are engaging in unproductive dialogue. For example, consider the following example:

Participant A: Ok. I concede that women should be able to wear whatever they want. But I also think that there is something to the value of being present and showing your face when you taken on the responsibility of becoming a Canadian. So perhaps a way for us to keep both is to have a separator screen that can be used. Women who would otherwise wear the niqab, would have the option of taking the oath in the same room on the other side of the screen. This way they can tale of the niqab and remain in the same room and stay true to their religious beliefs.
Participant B: That’s gonna cause even more problems. You either do what everyone else is doing and what the government is telling you or you don’t take the citizenship.
Participant C: I actually disagree because I don’t think we have any right to tell women to uncover their faces.

Neither participant is really responding to the merits of the proposal suggested by Participant A in such a case. There does not have to be an immediate agreement for us to assume that unproductive dialogue. But there needs to be an acknowledgement and engagement with the proposal.

These divestments can challenge and reduce deliberative capital. It is important, however, to note and throughout most of this chapter—notwithstanding the discussion of divestments above—I have mainly talked about the reasons why participants invest in deliberative capital. However, since deliberation is also fraught with divestments from deliberative capital, it is important to examine the reasons why people divest from deliberative capital and engage in undesired behaviours. This especially true in the case of this dissertation, since I am interested in
the ways in which we can incentivize investments and discourage divestments. Therefore, I am taking it for granted that divestments occur often and particularly under conditions of cultural and religious diversity. In chapter 6, I will discuss three facilitative treatments that can discourage the divestments mentioned in the previous sections and encourage investments in deliberation capital.

3.5 The logic behind divestments

In this section, I will explain the logic behind divestments. In particular, I will discuss the conditions, arising out of cultural and religious difference, which can challenge the expectation of reciprocity and reduce the inclination and trust of participants to make initial investments.92

If participants begin to act in a disrespectful manner, no longer reflect on their own positions, are insincere or lack empathy, others will begin to divest from the process as participants feel there is no point in investing under such conditions. The virtuous circle through which deliberative capital is increased now becomes a vicious circle.

Divestments are likely if unfamiliarity and lack of trust between the participants is not mitigated, particularly if there is diversity in participants and/or the subject under discussion is deeply divisive. If participants feel like instances of investment are not useful or will not be reciprocated, they will divest. Their divestments, in turn, will contribute to the formation and/or intensification of divestments becoming a norm in the deliberation. This, sequentially, will make it less rewarding for participants to invest as their investment go unreciprocated in the face of others’ divestments. If I digress from the rules and norms of deliberation and engage in a

92 Just as failure of cooperation—divestment from social capital—is not caused by “ignorance or irrationality or even malevolence” and instead due to an “an absence of coordination and credible mutual commitment” (Putnam 2001), instances of divestment in deliberative capital are not necessarily caused by participants either not knowing how to invest or their conscious and malicious desire to divest from deliberative capital. Instead, instances of divestment should be seen as a lack of mutual commitment to deliberative norms.
divestment, I can expect that others could (and will likely) do the same. This can create cycles of divestments.

There are three additional characteristics particularly in situations of deep diversity that may lead to divestment as well which I analyze in more detail below: ‘pre-existing strongly held beliefs, demographic differences, and disparities in information’. Through out this section, I use the hypothetical example of the ban on niqab in Canadian Citizenship ceremonies—to analyze what is needed to reduce divestments on deliberation.

3.5.1 **Pre-existing and often deeply-held and valued beliefs, opinions, and biases**

Divestments can be the result of differences in pre-existing and often deeply-held and valued beliefs, opinions, and biases. This can be particularly the case particularly if there is a sharp contrast between these different sets of opinions and beliefs. This is more likely to be the case when participants are discussing a topic that touches upon their cultural and religious identities than one that concerns the changes to the electoral system or the budget for the municipal government.

For example, if I sincerely believe that niqabs are a sign of women’s oppression and have no place within a Canadian ceremony and one [or more] of the participants believes in the importance of protecting religious freedom, then, our conversation, most likely will be conflictual. Since I really believe in my position, I will likely be disinclined, at the most basic cognitive and perhaps unconscious level, to listen to those with whom I disagree let alone consider the logic or value behind what they are saying. I am likely to purposefully ignore the

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concerns of the other side⁹⁴ regarding the slippery slope nature of allowing governments to
decide what is and is not an accepted and protected religious practice under the Charter of Right
and instead talk about the Charter guaranteeing the equality of women which I may feel is
undermined by certain beliefs and practices in different religions in Canada.

Likewise, if another participant advances an argument that many of the women who wear
the niqab have expressed that the decision was theirs in interviews, I might be more likely to
“selectively interpret the implications and importance of [this] information” (Mutz 2008, 538)
and argue that the women are most likely fully free to make an autonomous decision on the
practice, growing up within that culture and religious practice.

It can become difficult if not impossible for me to even understand why and how another
person can prioritize freedom of religion over what I understand to be the requirements necessary
to the equality of women. I can become convinced that not only is my view—supremacy of
gender equality—correct but also “objective and neutral” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 23) while
that of the other person is biased towards a particular religion at the expense of the universal
equality of women.

The intensity of the conflict can leave me feeling confused, doubtful, uncertain, and
indecisive (Bush and Folger 2010b, 17) particularly if my views are attacked as racist or
Islamaphobic in the broader society. As a result, I can become more protective of my positions⁹⁵

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⁹⁴ In other words: engage in “cognitive apartheid” (Bohman and Richardson 2009).
⁹⁵ Indeed, as Maureen Linker argues: “It is not surprising, then, that when a debate arises that puts these beliefs in
the spotlight, our ability to reason calmly and effectively maybe tested. We have a whole host of cognitive and the
emotional pressures working against revising these beliefs while simultaneously demanding that we protect our self-
esteeem. Under these conditions, it makes sense that we would lack the motivation to dispassionately assess whether
our beliefs are in fact true, relevant to the issue at hand, and justified. Instead, many of us preserve our existing
beliefs by going on the offensive and attacking challengers or alternatively withdrawing from the debate and thereby
silently refusing to subject our beliefs to scrutiny (Linker 2015, 42).
and keep repeating them without paying attention to responses I have received. I may be disinclined to offer justification for my rationales since, after all, I am correct and do not need to do so. I am also likely to engage in rhetorical action instead of engaging in a real back-and-forth with others.

What is needed under these conditions is to devise ways to get participants to really listen to each other and offer reasons for their views; to internalize the needed investments as positive and desired; and/or to get participants past their cognitive blocks by having a third-party expert as part of the deliberation.

3.5.2 Demographic differences

It is important to note that pre-existing and deeply-held and valued beliefs, opinions, and biases are also influenced by demographic differences (gender, socioeconomic background, cultural and religious identity) which can also serve as conditions for divestments by feeding disparities in speaking time and comfort, different conversational styles and methods of justification, and in-group/out-group dynamics within deliberation.

I do not mean to suggest that demographic factors have a direct influence on divestments. However, the literature suggests that there is likely going to be demographic differences when it comes to the likelihood to invest in and divest from deliberation. Let us consider some of the literature on these various aspects of demographic difference and how they impact investment in deliberation before considering possible ways of addressing these particular issues in deliberative settings.

Gender imbalances in conversation time and ease, addressed in the literature (Karpowitz et al. 2012, Mendelberg 2014a, Mendelberg 2014b), also exist in deliberations under conditions
of cultural and religious difference. Differences in social, economic, and educational backgrounds as well as confidence levels are easily translatable to differences in speaking time and ease as well. The same is true of differences in cultural and ethnic backgrounds resulting in different styles and rules of communication such as cultural norms insisting on more speaking time and attached value to the speech of the elders or deference to those who appear to know more than others. So what kinds of divestments are we likely to see in a deliberation under conditions of cultural and religious difference resulting from simple demographic differences?

Repetition of the same opinions by the same faction of participants is likely as well as the noticeable silence or interruption of others not belonging to that faction. For example:

Participant A: The issue is that niqabs are basically there to limit women and their freedom.
Participant B: But many of these women have said that they freely...
Participant C: Participant A is right. Islam is inherently patriarchal. Do we want Canada to be ruled by such ideas and values?
Participant A: Exactly!
Participant D: Yes, Canada is about freedom and equality. We can’t allow women to be treated differently just because they have a different religion.

This is a clear case of divestments leading to exclusion of some. If investments are limited to a few of the participants within deliberation at the expense of others, then, it would be safe to categorize them as divestments instead. As in the example above, this can become particularly

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96 A simple result is language barriers either from reduced proficiency or confidence. Participants who are either new immigrants or simply apprehensive about their skills can allow others to take control of the deliberation.
97 This is once again researched and documented within the literature see Karpowitz 2009.
98 Consider for instance Gambetta’s account of discursive machismo: “in indexical cultures such as Italy, discursive machismo means that one cannot admit uncertainty or any lack of competence or knowledge” (Gambetta in Dryzek 2009, 1396).
99 Most theorists of social capital note that while normatively undesirable, a degree of exclusion is an inevitable condition of the fostering of social capital (“what makes ‘us’ us is that we are not ‘them’”). Indeed, Pierre Bourdieu (1986, 1989) analogizes, if not equates, social capital with class privilege. This logic—extending beyond class privilege—can also become true during a deliberative session. I.M. Young has brought up similar concerns by criticizing deliberative democratic theory for reinforcing and privileging certain discourses and approaches over others (Young 2002, 2012). There is an argument to be made that selective investments in deliberative capital can be
problematic under conditions of deep diversity especially if investments in deliberative capital are limited to and within different cultural/religious groups\textsuperscript{100}. This means that facilitators must be vigilant that investments in deliberative capital are not limited within cultural, religious, racial groups but that they extend beyond them and, as I explain in more detail in Chapter 6, use facilitative treatments to reduce the exclusive interactions.

These demographic differences, as mentioned above, can cause a division between the participants in the deliberation into: us’s—\textit{who think niqabs marginalize and hurt women and therefore are un-Canadian}—and them’s—\textit{who think freedom of religion is more important that equality and don’t care about women}. Divestments similar to those caused by differences in pre-existing and often deeply-held and valued beliefs, opinions, and biases are, therefore, likely. Cognitive apartheid, and rhetorical action and biased information processing caused by in-group bias and out-group homogeneity\textsuperscript{101} bias are likely. Being required to speak on behalf of another is a potential solution to this problem, especially if the person raising the perspective of minority women for example is a woman and thus more likely to be interrupted due to her gender. Would such a pattern of interruption, demonstrated in the literature change if the man who not only

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\textsuperscript{100} Exclusion, particularly across ethnic, cultural or religious lines, has been identified as a concern in the literature in social capital as well. As Marion Orr argues, “if social capital is confined to individuals of the same ethnic or racial background, cooperation may be facilitated within particular groups, but not necessarily beyond them” (Orr 1999, 9). Similarly, if deliberative capital within a deliberation is confined to individuals of the same ethnic or racial background, good deliberation might be easily facilitated and produced within particular groups, but not necessarily beyond them.

\textsuperscript{101} In-group bias and out-group homogeneity bias are well discussed within the psychology literature. Summarized, in-group bias “refers to our tendency to prefer people whom we believe belong to the same groups that we do, can lead us to minimize or discount people whom we believe belong to groups with which we do not identify” whereas out-group homogeneity refers to the tendency “to judge as extremists those who they debate and who are outside their social group well judging those within their own group as having more varied and nuanced perspective” (Linker 2015, 109-110).
opposed this position in the initial deliberation and interrupted those who made it, were required, instead, to articulate it while the woman listens?

3.5.3 **Disparities in information/understanding of diversity-related issues**

Differences in personal history (i.e. demographic differences between participants) leads to disparities in information/familiarity with topics including accommodation of minority cultural and religious values, needs, and practices. These disparities can lead to a distortion of discourse and thus divestment particularly on the part of the minority participant, as disparities in understanding of diversity-related issues can lead to some participants being excluded from the process of being understood? within a deliberation—particular experiences, views, and needs are left out or discarded as they are misunderstood by others and left unincorporated in the larger discussion. In other words, they can lead to hermeneutical exclusion:

*Participant A:* This is about the freedom of women. Free from rules telling them what they can and cannot do. Canada offers them the freedom. This is why we can’t allow niqabs in a ceremony that is about being Canadian.

*Participant B:* What about their freedom to exercise their religion?

*Participant C:* Really how freely can you choose to be part of a religion that tells you that your face has to be covered. That’s not freedom.

*Participant D:* Yes, Canada has promised these women freedom. That’s what Canada is about: freedom and equality.

*Participants B:* But that’s exactly what these women are being denied? To freely choose to wear the niqab and become Canadians the way they want.

*Participant C:* That’s not freedom.

In this hypothetical scenario, Participant B is not necessarily excluded from the conversation or the understanding of what the others see as freedom. However, different sides are using the concept of *freedom* to refer to two different things. They are excluding each other from full understanding by the way they use and define the term *freedom*.

Under such conditions what is needed is to find ways to get participants to get a sense of what the other person—unfamiliar to us—thinks and feels; to get participants to become more
cognizant of the disparities and distortions of the conversation, especially in the case of a few dominating the conversation, and to try and fix them; and to have a way to have the meanings, values, and practices explained, the exclusions reduced, and differences connected.

3.6 Role of facilitators and convenors

For good deliberation to come about, we need steps taken by everyone involved. In many ways, it should be seen as a collaborative engagement between not only the participants but those who set up the deliberation and, most commonly, those tasked with moderating the conversations. Investments by participants are made possible by convenors and made easier by facilitators. In other words, good set-up and presence of facilitator can act as insurance for those who would make the early investments in deliberative capital. The presence of facilitators, in and of themselves, also acts as a deterrent to divestments as they are tasked with reminding the participants of the deliberative standards that participants should uphold. Skillful facilitation can encourage investments and discourage divestments.

Shifting towards a framework centered around the concept of deliberative capital allows us to see that it is through the specific actions of convenors of small-scale deliberative engagements—those tasked with recruiting participants and putting together the deliberative process—that the different desired structural conditions such as inclusivity (Benhabib 2002, Dryzek 2009, Habermas 1996), representativeness (Fishkin et al. 2000, Mansbridge et al. 2006), equality (Bohman 1996, Cohen 2002, Habermas 1996) and well-informed participants (Somin 2010, Talisse 2004) are made possible. Conveners (try to) bring about these by putting an effort

\[102\text{ The actions of conveners and facilitators are also integral. They serve as an assurance to participants that they are correct in taking the initial steps towards investments and as well as a promise that there is something valuable in the process. Conveners and facilitators need to create this assurance by establishing and promoting a shared intent or plan as well as creating and encouraging adherence to rules of deliberation. These two tasks are and should be seen as interconnected in the deliberation. Their task is to engineer trust in the process of deliberation.}\]
into proper research and development; ensuring a good and wide recruitment process; offering incentives for participation especially for those often do not partake; reducing the concerns and worries regarding participation; and ensuring the provision of good and balanced information and access to experts.

These actions affect the structural arrangement of the deliberation creating an inclusive, representative, equal, and well-informed deliberation. They do so in order to make the process worthwhile. This changes the view of these conditions from normative oughts to prerequisite infrastructure needed for later investments by participants. This infrastructure acts as insurance for potential participants that the process is not haphazard but carefully planned and structure. It serves as assurance that there is something of value in the process. *If I feel like the people setting up the process have spent time and effort into organizing the event and providing, I am more likely to feel like my time is not going to be wasted by participating. I am going to be more likely to take the process and the engagement with others more seriously and see it as valuable.*

Similarly, using the concept of deliberative capital also allows us to see the role of facilitators and moderators in a different light. While many scholars of deliberative democracy have noted the importance of facilitation for the success of deliberation, specific scholarly attention to the role and effect of facilitators has been sparse within the deliberative democratic literature.\(^{103}\) Using the framework of deliberative capital, we can put the role of facilitators in

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\(^{103}\) Examples of works noting the importance of facilitation include but are not limited to Banjade and Ojha (2005), Dryzek et al (2011), and Gastil (2000). Each scholar highlights the necessity and desirability of facilitation. Banjade and Ojha discuss the unpredictability of the path of deliberation and how “[e]xternal facilitation can help overcome such uncertainties and provide an appropriate environment for deliberative practices and collective learning, while leaving space for context-specific innovations to occur within the action learning process” (Banjade & Ojha 2005, 406). Dryzek et al note that in most deliberations “[e]xpert facilitation is […] provided in order to increase the constructiveness of the dialogue, uphold mutual respect and civility and minimize (for example) ad hominem arguments, deception, stereotyping, personal attacks and withholding of information” (2011, 36). Finally, John Gastil tasks moderators and facilitators with “stopping quarrels among witnesses, helping panelists clarify questions
greater perspective.

While the “myth of the neutral mediator” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 21) tells us otherwise, facilitators are committed to “the generative quality of [...] deliberative conversations and mutually crafted agreements” (Forester 2009, 26). This means that while, like referees at a soccer match, they might be impartial towards the outcomes of a deliberation, they are concerned by the “means by which” the deliberation is conducted (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 105). Actions by facilitators during the course of deliberation should be understood as providing an extra level of assurance to the participants that the deliberation is going somewhere as well as enforcing the desirability of deliberative norms\textsuperscript{104} within deliberation and, therefore, encouraging investments by participants.

Facilitators “intervene as necessary” in order to incline participants towards investing in deliberative capital\textsuperscript{105}. They do so by sustaining discursive discipline\textsuperscript{106}—cutting some off and asking others for their thoughts in order—“to make sure that everyone has a chance to say what he or she wants to say” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 187); maintaining a positive atmosphere (Mansbridge et al. 2006)—reminding the participants of the values/norms of deliberation, and get direct answers, and cutting off witness answers that run too long” (Gastil 2000, 150). Despite the agreement in the literature regarding the important role of facilitation in most deliberative engagements, not much work has actually been done looking at facilitation. Their role is mentioned in passing but given emphasis.

\textsuperscript{104} I use the term deliberative norms to refer to a set of desired standards of behaviour within a deliberation. Most can be traced to Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics but amended by other theorists of deliberative democracy. These include justification, respect, open participation, listening to others, sincerity, reflection, empathy, and constructive dialogue. I will discuss each of them in terms of investments made by participants.

\textsuperscript{105} These investments can be easily threatened if the facilitators are too involved in the deliberation or if they have vested interests themselves. Participants may feel that their participation is not of value and disengage instead of making continuous investments and counting on returns. Similarly, if the facilitators fail to bring attention to and correct divestments, a similar problem may arise.

\textsuperscript{106} Discursive discipline refers to “internal constraints on discourse” that often put in place by facilitators and moderators (Moore 2012, 154). “They are mechanisms to ensure that participants engage in sustained, considered, mutually responsive engagement with authentic expression of one another’s views” (Milewicz and Goodin 2012, 14). While the term discursive discipline is used by Milewicz and Goodin (2012), much of what Moore (2012) talks about is conceptually closely related to their notion of discursive discipline.
reducing the fears and discomfort of participants\textsuperscript{107}, and “[sorting]out possible misunderstandings”; and keeping deliberation on track (Mansbridge et al. 2006; Pearce and Littlejohn 1997) by staying mindful of time constrains, focusing on goals, pushing participants past disagreements to points of convergence, and locating points of potential compromise through “[asking] questions that create openings for new types of interaction” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 188). All of these actions serve as a guarantee for participants that their investments are not squandered by creating conditions that ease reciprocal investments by others and (re)emphasizing the value and desirability of the norms. Therefore, by either setting the rules for deliberation or reminding participants of these, facilitators encourage investments by participants and reinforce the expectation within participants that others will also make investments\textsuperscript{108}.

While the main task of facilitators and moderators is to remind participants of the norms of deliberation and to push them towards investments, I argue that in addition to these reminders, cycles of investment can be kickstarted by employing facilitative treatments or exercises. These facilitative treatments take the form of exercises or strategic practices that work specifically to undermine divestments that are likely. I argue that these can be particularly useful under

\textsuperscript{107}I should emphasize that Mansbridge et al. use the concept rather differently. Relying on an inductive evaluation, they note that “elements of a positive atmosphere described by coders included humor, lightness while maintaining a sense of importance, and admissions of fallibility. On the other hand, coders categorized as negative features that discouraged participants by making them feel uncomfortable, frustrated and embattled” (2006, 13). However, I am using it to refer to actions by facilitators.

\textsuperscript{108}It goes without saying that the personal views, preferences, and values of facilitators on the topic under deliberation have no place in the deliberation. However, equally and less noticeably crucial is importance not becoming partial towards some participants over others as a result of the process of deliberation. This is difficult as the process of deliberation is a social one. As such, participants and facilitators spend a fair amount of time (ranging from 30 minutes to 30 days) together. This means that through the process, facilitators can form attitudes and feelings towards the participants: dislike those who dominate the conversation and cut others off and like those who do the opposite. While part of the responsibility of facilitators is to remind the participants of the rules of deliberation and establish and maintain adequate and equal speaking time for everyone, this responsibility cannot be tied to personal feelings towards participants.
conditions of deep diversity as the likelihood of divestments is increased.

These facilitative treatments can be put in place to reduce divestments and penalize them and, therefore, make investments more likely and advantageous. These treatments, which I will explain in much more detail in Chapter 6 and test in Chapter 7, are simulated representation (getting participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each others’ views for a portion of deliberation); deliberative worth exercises (getting participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round); and cultural translation (having cultural/religious experts as part of the deliberation to explain beliefs and practices). This understanding of deliberative capital—with the role of conveners, facilitators, and participants—is summarized in Figure 3.1.

3.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the concept of deliberative capital which I have defined as the product of the investments—instances of adherence to the norms of deliberation. Conceptualizing the process of deliberation using the framework of deliberative capital has a number of advantages.
Figure 3.1 Role of convenors, facilitators, and participants in creating deliberative capital

Contributions by convenors
Proper research and development
Good and wide recruitment
Offering incentives
Reducing concerns
Provision of good and balanced information
Provision of experts when necessary

Infrastructure supporting deliberative capital
Inclusivity in the setup of deliberation
Representativeness of the sample of participants
Equality in organization
Well-Informed participants

Investments by facilitators
Discursive discipline (i.e. enforcing the norms)
Maintaining a positive atmosphere
Keeping deliberation on track
Facilitative treatments (e.g. Forced understanding; Deliberative worth exercises; and Cultural translation)

Stimulus necessary for deliberative capital

Investments by participants
Reason-giving
Respect
Reflection on and incorporation of the views of others
Sincerity
Empathy
Productive dialogue

Increased deliberative capital
First, it takes the principle of reciprocity\textsuperscript{109} as its core assumption. What I do—how I behave—in a deliberation affects everyone else and vice versa. This means that when I am polite and respectful, when I take the time to explain what I mean and to ask questions of others, and/or when I try to cooperate or make concessions, it becomes more likely that others will try to reciprocate the same towards me just as they are likely to cut me off, ignore my positions and ideas, and contravene my needs and claims if I have done the same to them.

Second, it does a better job of explaining the process of deliberation from the setup by the conveners to the strategies used by facilitators to ease conversation and abate disagreement to the (positive or negative) actions of the participants. Third, it better incorporates the conditions or pathways that can problematize the process of reciprocity and expectations of mutual investments. Finally, conceptualizing the deliberative process as one of investments and divestments better equips us to envision and devise strategies directed at incentivizing investments and discouraging divestments\textsuperscript{110}. Investments are important in all deliberations. Under conditions of deep diversity and difference, they become particularly important because the alternative divestments can be particularly hurtful and damaging.

Before moving on to Chapter 4—which offers a look at the conditions that might make potential participants less willing to make the decision to come to the table at all—it is important to acknowledge an important consideration. I have not chosen not to critically evaluate and

\textsuperscript{109} I have to emphasize that I am using the concept of reciprocity rather differently than it is commonly used in the deliberative democratic literature. Reciprocity, according to Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “holds that citizens owe one another justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively enact” (2004, 98). This means “[trying] to offer reasons that other similarly motivated citizens can accept even though they recognize that a share of only some of one another’s values” (1996, 13). My use of the concept of reciprocity is closer to the way scholars of social capital use the concept. Social capital is, in some ways, “the accumulation of obligations from others according to the norm of reciprocity” (Portes 1998, 7). It operates based on “mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future” (Putnam 1993, 172).

\textsuperscript{110} In Chapter 6, I outline and describe in detail three strategies aimed at doing exactly this.
challenge the norms/rules of deliberation. While I recognize the need to allow and appreciate instances of speech which do not adherence to these norms within the larger public sphere, I believe that within the more structured small-scale deliberative engagements, these norms and rules are essential.

For example, while a disrespectful speech act within the larger public sphere—\textit{i.e. most Canadians are bigots and Islamophobes and they prove this when they side with Harper and his ban on niqab}—can be useful in opening the space necessary for a useful, needed, and, perhaps even, emancipatory conversation about the fact of multiculturalism in Canada, it can be not only negative but perhaps devastating within a small-scale deliberative engagement. This is because the smaller numbers and closed nature of small-scale deliberative engagements will make this statement more personal, hurtful, and potent. While within the larger public sphere, such a comment can give pause and start a critically thoughtful process, it can stop and perhaps derail the conversation within a small-scale deliberative engagement. After all, how can I make a point about the potential validity of the ban, if someone has already called me bigoted or islamophobic?

I have chosen to keep the norms of deliberation within a small-scale deliberative engagement because the alternative—divestments in the form of antipathy towards these norms—can not only be detrimental in the short-run to the deliberative process but also harmful to those involved in the process in the long-run.
Chapter 4: Willingness for deliberation under conditions of diversity

This chapter is guided by an overarching question: is willingness for deliberation much different under conditions of deep diversity? What are the reasons prompting willingness and spurring on unwillingness for participation in a deliberation, especially one conducted under conditions of difference and diversity? Having established the necessity of willingness for deliberative democracy in Chapter 2, in this chapter I look at willingness with more critical lens. The main aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical explanation of the factors—variables—that can, theoretically, affect willingness for deliberation.

In order to provide a more complete account of the factors—or variables—that can affect willingness, I draw on not only the literature on deliberative democracy that examines difference but also from multiculturalism, identity politics, feminist theory, sociology, public opinion, and political psychology.

Examining these factors in-depth and offering a theoretical rationale for their ability to affect willing is necessary as this chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the empirical examination of willingness through a survey of 437 students at the University of British Columbia in Chapter 5.

4.1 Multistage explanatory model of willingness for participation in a deliberative engagement

Willingness for participation for deliberation, under conditions of cultural and religious difference, is shaped by many, interconnected, factors.

One’s personal history or social background—including one’s gender identity, income,

\[111\] Difference means both cultural and religious diversity amongst participants and/or that the subject matter under discussion involves questions that touch on deeply held cultural and religious values.
education level, ethnic/cultural background, religiosity, among others—can affect one’s willingness. Furthermore, the self-assessment of one’s personality and capacities can also have an impact on the willingness to partake in a deliberation. Other factors that can affect willingness for deliberation are: which issues a potential participant might find important or interesting (i.e. the environment versus violence against women); who she prefers to talk to in a deliberation (members of her community or strangers); what motivates or worries her (enjoying new experiences or wanting to avoid conflict), and how she prefers the process to be structured (with rules and facilitation or not). However, these factors are interconnected. One’s social background will undoubtedly affect one’s personality as well as one’s interests, anxieties, motivations, and preferences which are, furthermore, affected by her (self-assessed) personality and capacities as well.

These are summarized above in Figure 4.1. These factors operate together and, often times, reinforce each other in increasing or decreasing a person’s willingness to take part in a deliberation.

The most important consideration of this chapter is that while the model remains valid for explaining willingness for deliberation, the connections, potency, or the direction of the effect of each of the factors can be and is likely different when it comes to deliberations under conditions of cultural and religious diversity. For example, the preference for established rules and facilitation might be stronger when participants consider engaging in a deliberation on a multicultural issue. So, while I will discuss how different underlying factors can operate to increase or decrease willingness, this has to be taken with a grain of salt. Context matters. The same frame or reason can make one individual willing to participate and another, unwilling. A mitigating factor can make one individual more inclined to come to the table and another, less
inclined\textsuperscript{112}.

Figure 4.1  Multistage Explanatory Model of Willingness for Deliberation

4.2  Factors affecting willingness for participation in deliberation

In the following sections, I look at the factors that can affect willingness for participation in a deliberation. Focusing particularly on the ways in which diversity can affect the willingness, I outline and explain the factors that can motivate participants to participate or deter them from

\textsuperscript{112} This potential variation is not limited to the question of willingness for deliberation and extends to all areas of social science where the diversity in the individuals leads to a variation in the ways they view the world and make decisions within it.
I will begin by considering how factors such as social background (such as gender, status as a visible minority, religiosity), personality traits and capacities (such as being opinionated or introverted), and issue importance and interest can affect willingness for deliberation—particularly one conducted under conditions of cultural and religious difference.

I will follow this by analyzing how different anxieties—particularly a desire for conflict avoidance—and different motivations—particularly making a difference and learning something new—can operate by reducing or increasing willingness for deliberation. Finally, I look at the ways in which the set-up and structure of deliberation as well as conversation partners (i.e. fellow deliberators) can influence the overall willingness for deliberation.

As this chapter sits between a theoretical (Chapter 2) and an empirical (Chapter 5) examination of willingness, its purpose is to give an explanation for the factors/variables that are included in the empirical examination of willingness for participation in a deliberation. What is the theoretical connection between each of these factors (including gender, conflict avoidance, introversion, desire to affect change, issue interest, among others) and the hypothetical willingness to partake in a deliberative engagement? Has the literature on political engagement and participation as well as deliberative democracy discussed this relationship and, if so, how?

### 4.2.1 Social background and personal history

Do factors such as gender, status as a visible minority, religiosity as well as income, age, and education levels affect willingness for deliberation? And do they do so differently in a multicultural setting? We know, from the literature, that these demographic differences have an affect on political participation. Within Canada, age, gender, income, religion and union membership, and length of residency within Canada have been large predictors of participation.
within politics (Gidengil et al. 2004, 102-3).

Literature on deliberative democracy also demonstrate that participants in deliberations are most often, “wealthy, educated, and professional” (Fung 2003b, 342) as well as “whiter [and] older” (Goidel et al. 2008, 801) while “younger people, racial minorities, and lower-income” and, to a lesser degree, “women, less partisan people, and non-churchgoers” have “expressed significantly more willingness to deliberate” (Neblo et al. 2010, 574).

Intuitively, an argument can be made that if the demographic differences result in an unequal distribution of resources as well as in general responsibilities—such as those associated with gender\(^\text{113}\), income\(^\text{114}\), education levels\(^\text{115}\), and belonging to a visible/racial minority\(^\text{116}\)—


\(^{114}\) For example, Cicatiello et al. (2015) demonstrate that for activities they view as “unconventional politics” - such as signing petitions, engaging in boycotts, engaging in civil disobedience by partaking in demonstrations and strikes or occupying a space, discussing politics and belonging to a political parties - “income negatively and significantly interacts with inequality in explaining unconventional political participation while, when looking at individuals' involvement in conventional political activities, income does not significantly interact with inequality” (Cicatiello et al. 2015, 476). There is much support in the literature for the negative link between income inequality and levels of participation in politics. However, it is important to note that there are noteworthy works refuting the strength and durability of this link. An example of such work is that of Daniel Stockemer and Lyle Scruggs (2012). Looking at “550 democratic elections between 1970 and 2010”, “little evidence [of] electoral turnout [being] affected by income inequality” (Stockemer & Scruggs 2012, 764). Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between general resource scarcity (on an individual level) and high levels of societal inequality (on a more general level). Research by Lancee & Werfhorst demonstrate that inequality manifests itself both at an individual and societal level. So that, for example, “the rich participate more in more unequal societies than in more egalitarian societies” (Lancee & Werfhorst 2012, 1174)

\(^{115}\) The literature on political participation has long identified the important (and positive) relationship between education and political participation. The relationship between education and political participation is a complicated one. The literature has identified three ways in which education and political participation are correlated. The first identifies a direct and causal link. Education increases knowledge and endows the participants with the skills necessary for participation. The second view treats education as a proxy for other factors such as political socialization, socio-economic state, among others. This basically means that the same factors that increase participation, determine the type of education. The relationship is more correlative rather than causal. The third view, there is a causal relationship between education and participation but it is more complicated. Education, in the third model, has an indirect causal link. Education increases social standing and status. The social status, then, is the cause of increased participation. There is ample theory and evidence for each model. (For a more in-depth examination of these three models as well as the empirical evidence supporting each, see Persson 2015). A lack or insufficient objective competence - not knowing enough - or particular complexities around an issue can be
willingness for participation in a deliberation is likely reduced as the costs of participation go up\textsuperscript{117}. We also know that religiosity can increase participation in traditional forms of politics (e.g. voting) while reducing the willingness for participation in the less traditional ones (e.g. protesting) (Secret et al. 1990) while youth has the opposite effect (Milan 2005). Willingness for deliberation is, therefore, likely going to be affected by these factors as well.

My interest lies in whether these factors can have a different effect on willingness for participation in a deliberation around cultural and religious difference. Are women, visible minorities, and those who identify as religious more or less willing to participate in a deliberation that concerns cultural and religious difference? Do differences in age, income, and levels of education have a different effect on willingness for participation when the participants know that

\begin{itemize}
\item challenge for deliberation. This can become particularly problematic during the course of deliberation. It is difficult to assess whether or not lack of objective knowledge reduces willingness for deliberation. However, work by Loren Collingwood (2012) suggests that this could be the case. Collingwood looks at the willingness of participants for more direct democracy. She starts with the preliminary contentions that, first, “public opinion polls overstate true voter support for the ballot initiative process” and (Collingwood 2012, 572) and, second, “the stability of a voter’s attitude toward direct democracy is structured primarily by the presence or absence of a college education”. This basically means that support for direct democracy is lower than what we have come to believe and whether or not a person consistently supports such endeavours is tied to their education levels. Using “a split sample survey experiment”, she exposes “a treatment group of voters to questions about specific upcoming initiatives before they are queried about their feelings toward direct democracy” (579). What she finds is that “in the abstract, voters are strongly supportive of the ballot initiative process”; however, when they “actually go through the process of deciding how to vote on initiatives, […] voters without a college degree decrease their support for the ballot initiative process” (584). She attributes this to a “reduction of confidence” that “less-educated voters […] experience” (584) in regards to their “ability to participate in politics” (585). What this means for deliberative democracy is that whatever the general support for deliberative engagement might be, it might depend on specific topics.
\item For instance, looking closely at the Ethnic Diversity Study (EDS) and focusing on “the relationship between voting and the intersection of immigrant status and ethnic markers”, Tossuti - in a study commissioned by Elections Canada - found that eligible voters from Chinese, South Asian and black backgrounds voted at lower rates in the previous federal, provincial and municipal elections compared to non-visible voters (primarily of European origin) from the same birthplace group. [Even] among Canadian-born voters, blacks reported the lowest rate of federal turnout” (2007, 19). Also see Guterbock and London 1983, Megyery 1991, Lien 1994, Banducci et al. 2004, Bird et al. 2010, and Wright & Bloemraad 2012.
\item Consider for instance the results by Scervini and Segatti, who looking at electoral turnout in Italy, demonstrate the intersectionality of different inequalities and the ways in which they can lower participation rates. Looking at two sets of data (one for electoral information and one for income), they find that “while low-educated voters living in more equal regions are as likely to go the polls as high-educated ones, low-educated people living in more unequal regions are much less likely to vote than high-educated voters” (Scervini & Segatti 2012, 410).
\end{itemize}
the topic of deliberation will touch upon differences in values and practices embedded in different cultures and religions?

4.2.2 Personality traits and capacities

Differences in the self-assessment of one’s personality and capacities can influence one’s willingness for participation in a deliberation as well. These include (the self-assessment of) personality traits such as introversion or conservatism as well as capacities such as need for cognition, opinionatedness, internal efficacy, and language competence/confidence.

4.2.2.1 Introversion

For example, if I consider myself to be introverted—shy, reserved, quiet, and inhibited\(^{118}\)—then, I will likely prefer not to participate in activities that would require a degree of social interaction that might bring a lot of attention to myself (Costa and McCrae 1992). Participation in a deliberation, especially one that would bring together a diverse and unfamiliar group of people, would constitute such an activity. Moreover, if the process involves deliberation over diverse, and conflictual, cultural and religious values and practices—it seems to follow that I would be even more uncomfortable and less willing to participate.

4.2.2.2 Conservatism

If I am or consider myself as someone who prefer things to remain as they are, I might be more likely to see “any change [as] equal to a loss”\(^ {119}\) (Linker 2015, 111).

\(^{118}\) For more information, see Mondak and Halperin 2008.

\(^{119}\) The threat of loss of control can be a powerful factor in preventing people and groups in participating in deliberative democratic processes. This can be a particular worry for those communities in which authority figures, such as elders or religious/cultural leaders, are held in high esteem and have a considerable degree of sway over their members. The process of deliberation, with its unknown variables, can seem threatening to people (particularly with those with already existent control) who do not want to entrust the process with the future of the cultural or religious practices. Similarly, it can as equally worrisome to people, groups, and organizations who traditionally have been able to affect change through legal and institutional ways. Politicians, lobbyists, managing directors of companies and organizations, among others, all fall into this category.
I might see deliberation as a disconcerting process during which “[I] might learn something new that will change what [I think] or who [I am]” (Pearce & Littlejohn 1997, 37) or through which changes could be implemented. While not specific to multicultural deliberations, it can be of particular challenge if the deliberation is conducted under conditions of deep diversity and if it concerns (contested) cultural and religious values. In this scenario, the status quo encompasses not only the values and practices deeply-held and seen as inviolable by (all, many, or even a few of) members of the minority cultural or religious group, but also the values and principles of the majority culture.

For instance, consider that instead of resorting to courts—as we often do—we were to hold a hypothetical deliberation over allowing women to wear niqabs while holding jobs in the public sector120. On the one side, the desire to keep the status quo might lead those who favour a woman’s right to choose to wear the niqab to want to avoid a deliberation. They may find comfort in the court system which has so far upheld this right and wish to avoid a process that could add “democratic” legitimacy to their opponents. On the other side of the issue, proponents of the ban may be more comfortable and confident in leaving the decision in the hands of trusted politicians, and the engagement itself might be a daunting prospect. Deliberation has too many unknown variables and leaves open the possibility that one can come face-to-face and have to accept, for instance that many women wear niqabs freely and sometimes without the support of their families or spouses. This is one example of how conservatism can reduce the willingness of both sides for participation in a multicultural context.

120 This became a contested issue in Quebec during the debate over the Charter of Values and was then floated by Prime Minister Harper as a possibility in the federal public service during the 2015 election campaign. The defeat of the PQ in the provincial election and the Conservatives in the federal election means that a proposed ban is, for the time-being at least, a none-issue. However, for the purposes of this thought experiment, I am leaving the option open for this to remain an issue.
4.2.2.3 Cognitive curiosity and opinionatedness

If I am or consider myself to be someone who enjoys engaging in activities that require cognitive effort—dealing with more complex problems or situations that require more thinking—then, I have a “propensity toward seeking out, acquiring, and thinking critically and carefully about information” (Darity 2008, 452). This (self)assessment will likely make me want to participate in a deliberation—particularly one carried out under conditions of cultural and religious diversity. Differences in cultural and religious values and practices will most likely add a layer of complexity and difficulty to the process of deliberation by simply complicating the process of reconciling and compromising regarding those values and practices. I might also simply enjoy talking to and learning from people who are as different from me as possible.

Similarly, if I am or consider myself to be opinionated—with a disposition “to create and hold attitudes” (Bizer et al. 2004, 996), then I am more likely to want to see myself as capable of participating in a deliberation since I see myself as being able to hold my own even in an argument even against strong opposition. If the deliberation is carried out under conditions of cultural and religious difference, the same proclivity or the self-assessment of it will also likely be a predictor of increased willingness. Even if the topic is on an unfamiliar cultural/religious value or practice or demand for recognition/accommodation, the unfamiliarity is unlikely to hold back my willingness.

4.2.2.4 Internal in/efficacy

On the other hand, if I believe there are issues that I do not know enough about or I feel like I am not very good talking about things that I do know, I might find the idea of participating
in a deliberation daunting\textsuperscript{121}, since it asks a lot from me\textsuperscript{122} and I feel like I do not know enough about a topic to participate effectively. Therefore, complexity of a particular issue under deliberation, as well as unfamiliarity with an issue is likely to reduce this kind of person’s subjective competency or internal efficacy\textsuperscript{123} and therefore their willingness to participate in deliberations.

Low internal efficacy is affected by demographic differences—particularly in education levels and age but also gender and status as a visible minority\textsuperscript{124}— which in turn affect one’s self-assessment of her capacity for participation. Therefore, it becomes important to consider if there is a gap (derived from gender, culture, religion, among others) in the willingness for the deliberation? Does this gap differ when there are different deliberative topics at hand? Do some topics make some groups think that they do not have the knowledge or confidence necessary to

\textsuperscript{121} Internal efficacy is a key factor in examinations of political participation and is positively related to a person’s actual participation in politics (Reichert 2010, 65). Further evidence by Fox and Lawless suggests that the importance of confidence (internal efficacy) pervades to the decision to run for office. They note that “the extent to which individuals are confident and perceive that they possess politically relevant skills and traits” affects “their assessments of whether they are qualified to run for office” (Fox & Lawless 2014, 504-505; see also: Fox & Lawless 2011).

\textsuperscript{122} Indeed, participation in politics requires much of us. As Pierre Bourdieu argues: “nothing is less natural than the mode of thought and action demanded by participation in the political field” (Bourdieu 1991, 176). It requires “the corpus of specific kinds of knowledge theories, problematics, concepts, historical traditions, economic data, etc.” (176) as well as the “more general skills such as the mastery of a certain kind of language and of a certain political rhetoric – that of the popular orator, indispensable when it comes to cultivating one’s relations but non-professionals, or of the debater which is necessary in relations between fellow professionals” (176). Bourdieu refers to the costs associated with participating in politics professionally (i.e. running for office as opposed to voting). What he saying that aside from specific bodies of knowledge that are required (i.e. knowledge of crime statistics or federal/provincial jurisdictions), potential politicians also require to have certain skills. In relation to the realm of linguistics, those include knowing how to speak to appeal to the non-politicians (i.e. gain their support) and how to speak when address fellow professional politicians (i.e. in order to sound better and more convincing than they do). But it is not stretch to consider the similar costs associated and skills required to participate in politics in a non-professional capacity particularly if that participation stretches beyond the act of voting. When the participation includes publicly speaking and defending one’s positions in a deliberative engagement, similar skills will be helpful.

\textsuperscript{123} Internal efficacy refers to a person’s “sense of his or her own competence to understand and effectively participate in politics” (Gainous and Martens 2012, 236).

\textsuperscript{124} Many scholars (Fox & Lawless 2011, 2014, Fulton et al. 2006, among others) suggest, there are variations in confidence or internal efficacy levels in different groups: women, new immigrants, visible minorities, among others. These variations, as they demonstrate, are not actually caused by objective in/competence but, rather, by the simple fact of belonging to these groups.
engage in deliberation? Reduced internal efficacy can arise from the complexity of a potential topic under deliberation\(^\text{125}\) (biobanking for instance) which can make some participants—those with lower levels of internal efficacy—worry regarding their ability to contribute productively to a conversation as well as how they will be perceived by fellow participants if they appear unknowledgeable or inarticulate. Not wanting to look stupid can be a strong force in holding people back from participation.

Such concerns can also arise due to unfamiliarity with a particular issue. A deliberation that brings together persons from different cultural and religious backgrounds and touches upon values, needs, and practices of the participants could make some feel ill-suited and ill-prepared to have a conversation. After all, what can I contribute to a conversation about Sikh boys wearing kirpans, if I do not belong to that culture or have not had any personal experiences familiarizing me with this issue or something similar to it. Furthermore, concerns about whether or not one’s contribution will be politically correct, might lead potential participants to be concerned with self-censorship and, thus, stay away from deliberation.

### 4.2.2.5 Language competence and confidence

If I believe that I cannot talk as much or as effectively because of my language skills, the process of deliberation with others can seem particularly unnerving. Language competency or

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\(^{125}\) It has to be noted at this point that complexity of political (as well as economic, social, health, among others) issues as well as the general lack of information, education, and sophistication on the part of the average citizenry has been cited as one of the major criticisms against deliberative democracy - the theory is too ideal and asks for too much considering the ignorance of the public. Ilya Somin, following the footsteps of Robert Talisse (2004), argues that the “vast size and complexity of modern government make it unlikely that most citizens can ever reach the levels of knowledge and rationality required by deliberative democracy” (Somin 2010, 253). He, however, argues that this ignorance, which “extends to knowledge of political parties, ideologies and the basic structure and institutions of government” as well as “information about specific policies” (258), is neither surprising nor even irrational. Since the only reason behind the attempts “to accumulate political knowledge” is to “cast a better-informed vote”, which for Somin is not nearly enticing enough, lack of education and information as well as an unwillingness to change the situation “represents rational behavior on the part of most voters” (259).
lack thereof can be particularly problematic when deliberation is taking place in a multicultural society. The fact of multiculturalism in a society often translates to more than simply have people from different cultures living together and communicating with one another about their different cultural practices. Multiculturalism, more often than not, implies linguistic diversity as well. This might seem to be a rather simple idea. But it is not to be disregarded when one considering deliberation in multicultural societies. Whether one thinks to deliberation in the larger public sphere or in the smaller small-scale deliberative engagements, discourse is usually mono-linguistic.

“The sense of the value of one’s own linguistic products is a fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one occupies in the social space” (Bourdieu 1991, 82). It shapes the “sense of one’s own social worth” (82) and one’s general perspective and expectations of one’s self—whether one thinks of oneself as shy or confident; struggling or competent, among others. Within a deliberation, then, one’s use of word choice, proper grammar, and even accent will undoubtedly signal one’s position to others in the linguistic arena and shape one’s impression of her own ability to participate. While there is an objective competency side to language skills, I may be objectively competent (able to get views across) but feel subjectively incompetent about my skills. Disregarding the objective or subjective nature of my language incompetence, feeling that you are not competent or confident enough to engage in a discourse can reduce your inclination for participation.

4.2.3 Issue interest/importance

If I believe that the deliberation is on a topic that is particularly important or interesting, then, I will be more willing to partake in the deliberative process. Therefore, another factor that can undoubtedly affect one’s willingness to participate in a deliberation is the topic. I may decide
to participate if I think the issue is of particular relevance to me or my community. I may also
decide to participate if I have strong attitudes and views formed around the topic. For example, I
may feel strongly about LGBTQ rights and but not at all about biker safety. Therefore, I might
be more willing to take part in a deliberation on the Vancouver School Board’s LGBTQ policy
than on a proposed increase in the number of separated bicycle lanes around the city of
Vancouver.

What I find important or interesting is undeniably shaped by my personal history and social
background. The correlation between demographic factors (gender, race/status as a visible
minority, religiosity, income, education, and age) and issue preferences/importance has been
well-established within the literature (Campbell 2004, Gilens 1996, Scheve and Stasavage 2006,
among others). The same will be true of the issue that people will find interesting or important as
topics of deliberation. This factor—issue importance or interest—can only be assessed by asking
participants specifically about particular topics and their relative willingness to participate in
deliberations over those topics.

4.2.4  Anxieties about participation in a deliberation

The concerns about the costs of participation—lost time or lost wages—will likely reduce
willingness for participation in a deliberation. While, this is unlikely to be amplified under
conditions of cultural and religious diversity, it can be more problematic if deliberation is carried
out between communities where there is income disparity between different cultural, ethnic,
religious, and racial groups. Moreover, it is a concern which will likely be higher for those with
lower incomes. However, concerns about the awkwardness, if not the discomfort, involved in
engaging in a deliberation with people with whom one disagrees is mostly likely amplified under
conditions of cultural and religious diversity.
My interest and strong feelings about an issue—particularly one that touches on my identity—can make me more willing to want to come to a deliberation on that issue. However, at the same time, it can make me more concerned about the process of deliberation. I may be concerned about talking to people with whom I fundamentally disagree on this issue. I may be more concerned about having my views attacked by others. I may also be more concerned about being judged by other participants for my ideas. Willingness for deliberation, then, will also depend on a host of anxieties and concerns which can act as deterrents. When what worries me about participating in a deliberation outmatches what makes me inclined to come to the table, I will decide against participation.

4.2.4.1 **Time and resources**

If I believe that the deliberation process will pose an undue burden on me, by either costing me time and/or money, I will likely be less willing to participate as well. I will be concerned that participation takes a significant amount of time particular if it one that requires a long-term commitment (i.e. if it taking place over a longer period of time). I might also care more about where the deliberation was going to be held. I would care about the proximity of the location to where I live/work as well as how easily I would be able to get to the site. Once again, this is common to deliberations in general. But if the deliberation is conducted in a culturally, ethnically, or religiously diverse setting where some participants—divided along these lines—have a more difficult time and have to take on more burdens to participate, this can become a particularly important issue to consider.

4.2.4.2 **Discomfiture**

If I believe that the deliberation process will be a source of particular discomfort and
awkwardness, I might be less willing to partake in it. This can be a particularly salient concern if the claims and challenges one faces in a deliberation are those that are closely related to one’s identity. This means that in a deliberation over a topic and with people where there is a larger concern that my identity, as well as my deeply-held values and beliefs can be challenged, worries about the discomfiture of deliberation become more salient than, for example, concerns about the financial costs of deliberation—whether lost time or wages. As concerns regarding one’s identity are central to this dissertation, I will spend more time explaining how such concerns can act as deterrents to willingness for participation in a deliberation that can touch on that identity.

I may want to avoid subjecting myself to a process that would put me in a situation I would be expected to talk about and defend my views in front of others especially if I know that others can challenge and question me. If I strongly believe in an idea or a position—which can often be rooted in my cultural and/or religious outlook—then I may worry more about the possibility that others might attack my view and positions. For example, if I really believe that I have to wear the niqab to be a good, modest Muslim woman or, alternatively but similarly, believe that Canada cannot accept and condone patriarchal practices of different cultures and religions, participation in a deliberation over the potential ban on niqabs during Citizenship ceremonies can be daunting. I may not want to explain my position publicly. I may not want to hear what others have to say. I may want to avoid being questioned, challenged, and attacked for my views.

Worries about the intensity of disagreement can lead me to think twice about participation that could lead to heated arguments. For example, even if I am interested in LGBTQ rights and find them to be an issue of great importance, I still may want to avoid coming to a deliberation on the implementation of a LGBTQ policy in schools that likely includes people
who think the being LGBTQ is nothing more that social experimentation and that such policies take away from a parent’s right to teach their child family-oriented values. I may feel more comfortable leaving the decision to political institutions (including City Hall, the school board or even the courts) instead of conversing with people I disagree with.

Conflict is uncomfortable while agreement/consensus is pleasant. “After all, who wants to engage in a discussion of a difficult, often uncomfortable issue with people dramatically different than oneself if not compelled to do so?” (Ryfe 2002, 365). Wanting to avoid heated disagreement and conflict can make question whether or not I should participation in a deliberation.

Conditions such as pre-existing and often deeply-held and valued beliefs, opinions, and biases as well as widespread polarization around an issue can intensify these concerns and anxieties. While it is possible to look into the reasons (i.e. not wanting to hear disagreement) that prompt disinclination for participation in a deliberation, especially one on a cultural or religious topic, it is more difficult to ascertain if pre-existing conditions are the root causes of those reasons (polarization around the issue). However, the connection between these conditions and the anxieties are analytically and logically sound.

Polarization around an issue prior to deliberation can be a source of reduced willingness for participation in a deliberation. Knowing that opinions and beliefs are sharply contrasted on

\[\text{\textsuperscript{126} This is a key fact put forth by Elizabeth Theiss-Morse and John R. Hibbing. They argue that for some, if not many, “clashing interests are a source of discomfort” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002, 142) and most prefer to move away from conflict and “return to the warm feelings generated by consensus” (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005, 234). Moreover, empirical evidence seems to suggest that individuals generally prefer to talk to those with whom they already know they agree as opposed to those with whom they (might) disagree. (Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995; Mutz & Martin 2001; also see Eveland & Hively 2009).} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{127} Also see Mutz 2006.} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{128} Polarization has also been conceptualized within the literature on deliberative democracy as an outcome of the process of deliberation itself. For more information see Sunstein 2000, 2003 and Schkade et al. 2007.} \]
an issue under deliberation and the ensuing assumption that deliberation will be upsetting can may make people hesitant about participation. Under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity, polarization around an issue that touches upon a minority (or majority) culture or religion’s beliefs and practices can become particularly troublesome and make deliberation particularly undesirable in the view of potential participants. For instance, consider if there were to be a deliberative engagement over the issue of legalizing polygamy after the resurgence of the polygamy debate in Canada129.

The polygamy debate “between academics, experts, and legal authorities” (Fowler 2012, 93) was—and remains—rather heated. On the one side, the prohibition seemed to challenge the constitutional right to freedom of religion. On the other, the prohibition was in tune with the general view of the practice as “associated with gender inequality and the exploitation of women and children” (93). The BC Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the prohibition was met with applause from “many religious, women and children’s rights groups” as well as disagreement and criticism from “some feminist scholars and civil libertarians” (Browne 2014). A deliberation on this topic, as with many others in a pluralistic society, would bring together these divergent, and often sharply polarized, viewpoints.

Pre-existing and often deeply-held and valued beliefs, opinions, and biases can make potential participants wary of participation in an engagement that subjects them to different viewpoints than their own and perhaps even forces them to face their own inconsistencies. Under

129 I am referring to the debate in Canada was brought into the forefront after “the failed prosecution of two prominent members of the Fundamentalist Mormon sect in Bountiful, British Columbia” (Fowler 2012, 93). As a result, The BC Supreme Court opened a reference case into the constitutional validity of the prohibition of polygamy in the Canadian Criminal Code. After 42 days of legal arguments, the BC Supreme Court upheld the prohibition acknowledging that while it violated religious freedom, the concern with the harm to children and women outweighed the violation (i.e. the violation passes the Oakes test, See R. v. Oakes) (Reference Re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada).
such circumstances, the general desire to strive towards and maintain a cognitive consistency or avoid cognitive dissonance can negatively affect willingness by making participants reluctant to put themselves in a situation where they have to justify (and worse, amend) their views that are being challenged by others who are profoundly committed to their perspective because of religious values. This is a potent concern under conditions of cultural and religious diversity when identities are stake: people need to be able to locate themselves within a world in which their identity makes sense—otherwise, they “lose” themselves. Therefore, we must expect a degree of resistance to the claims that can unsettle identity.

This can be a particular problem in conversations that require of us to “[think] and [reason] about social differences and injustice” which can elicit “strong reactions […] to new information that conflicts with our sense of ourselves and how the world works. People who are experiencing cognitive dissonance often feel hostile, surprised, confused, or withdrawn” (Linker 2015, 97).

There are two ways in which the need to remain consistent is necessary. The first way involves the need for consistency between two or more thoughts or beliefs that a person holds; for example: the two thoughts that 1) immigration is good for Canada; and 2) we need to sustain or increase the levels of immigration. The second way involves the need for consistency in a thought/belief and actions of an individual. An example of this would be believing in the importance of a free practice of religion in Canada and signing a petition against the proposed ban on religious symbols in public spaces. While consistency is important and cognitively as

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{130}}\text{Another example, outside the topic of multiculturalism, could be: 1) Canada gives too much money to foreign aid and 2) Canada needs to reduce the amount it sends out as foreign aid. An inconsistency would be if a person believes that Canada spends too much of its budget on foreign aid and yet needs to keep the same levels or increase them.}\]
well as emotionally necessary, it would be simplistic to assume that individuals are cognitively consistent across their beliefs and actions. When there are inconsistencies (i.e. identifying multiculturalism as one of the benefits of Canadian society and supporting the ban on religious symbols in public spaces, for instance), individuals attempt to rationalize them—sometimes more successfully than others.\(^{131}\)

Deliberation, especially one that touches upon one’s deep beliefs and biases rooted in cultural and religious attitudes and, thus, not examined consciously, can be of particular discomfort to participants as being questioned and having to provide rationales is part of the process. As Braman et al. - looking at the gun debate in the United States -, argue “it is not comforting—indeed, it’s psychically disabling—to entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s harmful that force one to renounce commitments and affiliations essential to one's identity” (Braman et al. 2005, 8).\(^{132}\) While their case specifically deals with regulation of guns in the United States, it is not difficult to see how the same attitudes regarding what is harmful/harmless as well as good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate, just/unjust, among others can be attributed to different topics under deliberation—especially if the deliberation is conducted under conditions of deep cultural and religious diversity.

\(^{131}\) Leon Festinger, author of the pivotal work *A theory of cognitive dissonance*, used the example of smoking to demonstrate this process of rationalization. A person, he explains, “who continues to smoke, knowing that it is bad for his health, may also feel (a) he enjoys smoking so much it is worth it; (b) the chances of his health suffering are not as serious as some would make out; (c) he can't always avoid every possible dangerous contingency and still live; and (d) perhaps even if he stopped smoking he would put on weight which is equally bad for his health. So, continuing to smoke is, after all, consistent with his ideas about smoking” (Festinger 1957, 2).

\(^{132}\) There is further evidence in the psychology literature particularly that supports what Braman et al. argue in their 2005 paper. For instance, working based on the insights of Leon Festinger, Andrew Elliot and Patricia Devine designed experiments looking at cognitive dissonance. In two induced-compliance experience at the University of Wisconsin, students who were most against a tuition increase were asked to write an essay in support of the increase. What they found was that “cognitive dissonance is experience as psychological discomfort” (Elliot and Devine 1994, 387). This discomfort was an index variable made up of students who responded feeling “uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered” (386) all due to having to entertain these contradictory and dissonant views.
A deliberation over the Canadian government’s proposed *Oath of Citizenship Act*\(^{133}\) would undoubtedly include strong beliefs regarding the importance of freedom to practice one’s religion as well as the harm associated with forcing women to uncover their faces when they do not want to do so. Conversely, the deliberation would also include those with pre-existing assumptions regarding the practice of covering one’s face and associate it with gender inequality and oppression of women. Just the fact that one has to entertain such differing views can be difficult. When there is inconsonance in different beliefs and values held by the same person, the prospect of putting oneself in a state of cognitive tension become more confusing and awkward. As Jane Mansbridge notes, “most of us will go to some lengths to avoid living in states of emotional or philosophic tension” of the kind deliberation produces (Mansbridge 1980, 233)\(^{134}\).

### 4.2.5 Motivations

If I am interested in an issue or find it of special importance to me or my community, I might be particularly inclined to take part in a process that discusses or makes decisions about that issue\(^{135}\). However, even if this is not the case, I may still be inclined to participate in a

\(^{133}\) See Chapter 1, Footnote 27.

\(^{134}\) It is, at this point, important to note an interesting finding by Jennifer Stromer-Galley and Peter Muhlberger. Looking at the effects of agreement/disagreement on willingness for future deliberations, they note that while “prior research on everyday political discussion suggests that disagreements might have a negative effect on satisfaction with the deliberation experience and on willingness to participate in future deliberations” (Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger 2009, 186), in their own study, this was not the case. “Disagreement does not dampen satisfaction or motivation” (186). Their results, they argue, “[suggests that] it is possible to involve a politically substantial fraction of the public in organized deliberation without the adverse effects predicted by some” (186).

\(^{135}\) Do the same reasons people get involved in politics—by voting, joining political parties, joining protests, among others—explain their willingness to participate in a deliberation? A significant amount of work in the literature on political behaviour, public opinion, and political parties has dealt with the question of why people participate in politics the in the *ways* that they do. Ching-Hsing Wang, relying on 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 American National Election Studies demonstrates that both rationality (party differential) and emotion (emotional differential) affect turnout (Wang 2013). Blais and Rheault (2011) using a new survey question in the 2008 Canada Election Studies survey found out that the sense of being able to bring about change was an important indicator for the decision to vote. For those who paid more attention to politics, the competitiveness of election also played a role—making it seem more likely that one’s vote would make a difference. On the topic of political party membership, research by Lisa Young and William Cross (2002) has showed that for most people, it was their
deliberation for a number of factors.

I might be inclined to participate if I see deliberation as a new experience which I would like to have. I might also like to participate as it might give the chance to talk about my ideas. Likewise, I might be motivated by the possibility of persuading others or bringing about change. Engaging in a deliberative process might seem worthwhile to me if I see it as a learning experience or a way to meet new people and strengthen my community ties.

Under conditions of deep diversity, a deliberative process might appear to be an alternative and novel way to have conversations that deal with cultural and religious diversity. While deep diversity can complicate the process of talking and learning for those averse to talking with those with whom they disagree, it can serve as an appealing process for those who are interested in a process that requires thinking about issues, talking about them with others, and learning in the process. For others, deliberation might serve as process that allows one to voice her opinions and perhaps to bring about change. This might be more appealing to those who are, more or less, less satisfied with the status quo decision-making processes. Neblo et al. (2010) show that it is “people less likely to participate in traditional partisan politics who are most interested in deliberative participation” (566).

Emphasizing deliberation as a forum to express one’s opinions and, perhaps, to make a more direct difference might be an inducement for those who might be less satisfied with the status quo decision-making processes. Under conditions of cultural and religious diversity, a
deliberation can be the opportunity for those who enjoy talking to others from diverse backgrounds to have the chance to do so. Furthermore, it might also persuade a person from a minority culture or religion to come to table as an opportunity to explain where she comes from and what she believes in—to “set people straight” about a particular cultural or religious value or practice. Finally, underlining deliberation as a process that could create or strengthen social and community networks and relationships can be a strong incentive for those who value such networks and relationships.

4.2.6 Preferred conversational partners

My willingness for deliberation can also depend on who else is going to be at the table. I may prefer to have my friends at the table—knowing their views and opinions beforehand—or I might value meeting new people and having a diverse set of ideas at the table. In either case, my social space can affect my willingness for deliberation.

Social space is, in Pierre Bourdieu’s words, a (multi-dimensional) space constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe136” (Bourdieu 1991, 229).

136 These dimensions include linguistic, educational, economic, cultural, social, among others; each of which can be classified as a form of capital. The process of differentiation and distinction is key as people and groups of people are basically “defined [and confined] by their relative positions in this space” (Bourdieu 1991, 230). As Bourdieu explains in another piece: “social space […] presents itself in the form of agents endowed with different properties that are systematically linked among themselves: those who drink champagne are opposed to those who drink whiskey, but they are also opposed, in a different way, to those who drink red wine; those who drink champagne, however, have a higher chance than those who drink whiskey, and a far greater chance than those who drink red wine, of having antique furniture, playing golf at select clubs, riding horses or going to see light comedies at the theatre” (Bourdieu 1989, 19-20).
I may prefer to stay within my own social space. This means that the presence of certain groups could negatively or even positively affect my willingness to partake in a deliberation. For instance, I may be more inclined to participate in a deliberative process if I had prior knowledge that people from my social space (school friends, community members, family, colleagues or co-workers, among others) were also partaking. I might feel more comfortable with their presence and less threatened by the possibility of a difficult or a tense conversation. For example, as a Muslim woman considering participating in a deliberation on the ban on the niqab in Citizenship Ceremonies, I may feel more willing to participate when I know that others from my community are also going to be there.

Accordingly, I may feel apprehensive about partaking in the process that includes people from a different social space than mine. Deliberation, as a process committed to openness and inclusion, grants legitimacy to different sides of an argument. In deliberations under conditions of deep diversity, the feeling of unfamiliarity can easily become a source of distrust and discomfort. Even more so, I may want to avoid participation if I know that there will be people—belonging to social spaces—that I do not like. I might feel that conversation with them might be pointless; might even give them credibility or legitimacy; might not be worth my time; might

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137 Bourdieu acknowledges, however, that these spaces are not static because if they were, there would be no social change or class upheaval - and make connections within those social spaces and contribute to each others’ capital within those spaces (Bourdieu 1991, 245). The example that he provides is that of the alliance between intellectuals and industrial workers - one dominated in the cultural field and the other one in the economic one. As there is a similarity between the circumstances, a misunderstood alliance is formed.

138 Alternatively, I might be inclined to participate if I am interested in what others—outside of their social space—with whom I disagree have to say. Or perhaps, I might be more inclined to participate with people outside my social space whom I consider to be equal or better (i.e. politicians, union leaders, policy-makers, among others). I might be inclined in these cases if I assume that I might be able to influence those who have a degree of power. This is a point that Neblo et al. (2010) address in their paper on willingness. They note that “[m]ost people were motivated by the thought of talking with a high-ranking government official” (575) and concluded that this was evidence in support of “enthusiasm for vertical (i.e., republican) deliberation than horizontal deliberation” (575).
only lead to more conflict\textsuperscript{139}. I may, using the example above, think that having members of the Conservative party of Canada at the deliberation would not only be unhelpful but that their presence would get in the way of the conversation.

4.2.7 Preferred set-up and structure

My willingness to take part in a multicultural deliberation depends on my social background and my personality and capacities—or at least, my assessment of them. It will also be affected by whether or not I consider the particular topic to be important or interesting; whether what motivates me to participate can overcome what concerns me about the same process, and whether the people whom I want to talk to will be present.

How the conversation is going to be organized, how long it is going to last, and whether or not there would be incentives also affect my willingness for deliberation as well. These structural/organizational factors cannot only make an impact on my willingness\textsuperscript{140} for deliberation but they can do so by acting as mitigating factors reducing the impact of my anxieties and the self-assessment of my capacities and personality.

If my unwillingness stems from the potential discomfort involved in participating in a deliberation, in other words if I have misgivings about heated arguments, worries over talking about and defending my views publicly, concerns regarding having my views challenged

\textsuperscript{139} This is idea is in some ways expounded on by W. Barnett Pearce and Stephen Littlejohn. While they are concerned with peacemaking dialogue rather deliberative democratic process, their insights on the difficulty of some to accept “outsiders” as having legitimate arguments is transferable to this work as well. As they explain, peacemaking “means talking kinder or, less aggressive ways” with those with whom we deeply disagree. While this might be “attractive” to us it can also “give credence and some legitimacy to the other side”. This, according to them, means for those who “do not accept outsiders”, engaging in such practices would be “tantamount to defeat” (Pearce & Littlejohn 1997, 139).

\textsuperscript{140} I have to point out that not knowing what the process will be like can act as a source of unwillingness. Potential participants might assume that the process would be a shouting match, an organized debate or even resembling those conducted in legislatures or courts with participants taking turns to address the whole group and answer questions and criticisms from the audience or, perhaps, that speech making is followed by voting. Knowing what to expect can reduce the fear of unknown.
publicly, and anxieties over hearing viewpoints I do not want to hear, knowing about the presence of facilitators can be key mitigating factor.\textsuperscript{141} Knowing that someone will be tasked with making the conversation easier, more polite, and on track as well as help in bridging the views and finding compromises can go a long way in reducing the concerns that I might have regarding the level of discomposure during a deliberation.

If I am particularly concerned with the outcomes of deliberation and a decision made (hastily) by average individuals, a reminder of the openness of the process to future revision can lower the perceived risks of deliberation and increase my inclination to take part in the process.

Some of the concerns with my internal efficacy—feeling I do not know enough and cannot contribute effectively and productively—can be alleviated if I knew that I would have access to information packets beforehand or knowing that experts would be present at the deliberation from whom I could ask questions. For example, if I am invited to take part in a deliberation about policies aimed at reducing violence against women in South Asian communities, I may feel like not being from those communities, I will have nothing of value to contribute. Knowing that I will be able to catch up and ask questions makes it likelier that my worries will be alleviated.

Shorter deliberations can persuade me to come if my main concern is with the time. Same can be achieved if I could participate online instead of commuting to the site. Taking the deliberation online can also reduce my worries about face-to-face conversations especially if I consider myself to be reticent and shy. The same is true of allowing anonymous participation—by allowing participants to write down their views and having them read out in the earlier stages

\textsuperscript{141} This can especially if it concerns cultural and religious values and practices which are often seen as nonnegotiable
of deliberation.

If I am dissuaded from participating because I am concerned with the costs of participating and my lack of resources, reimbursement might be a helpful incentive\(^\text{142}\). Finally, in multicultural societies with people from different linguistic communities, knowing that I could possibly have access to a translator could make me more willing to come knowing that I could still effectively get my ideas across. Finally, providing translators (for those concerned with language competency) and taking the deliberation online (for those who are more reticent or concerned with the time it would take to make it to the deliberation site) can facilitate willingness.

It goes without saying that not all of these will be possible: some deliberations require more time; some deliberations need to take place face-to-face; some deliberations will not be paid; some deliberations cannot provide translators. However, keeping these in mind can assist in better setting up deliberations by knowing what makes people not want to talk and ways of alleviating their concerns.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an outline of the factors that can affect willingness for participation in a deliberative engagement—particularly one conducted under conditions of cultural and religious diversity. The aim of this chapter has been to offer a theoretical basis for the empirical examination of the effect of these factors in the next chapter.

\(^{142}\) If resources and opportunities needed for participation for deliberation are unfairly divided along cultural, religious, ethnic, racial lines, among others—which as I explained is a possibility—then it would be valuable to consider a distributive justice approach in alleviating the condition. This would include reimbursing those for whom engagement is costlier and, perhaps, exclusively financially incentivizing deliberation for marginalized groups who might not otherwise participate. This is a point made by Archon Fung when he refers to steps such as engaging in “affirmative action through recruitment” for deliberation as well as providing “structural incentives for low-status and low-income citizens to participate” (Fung 2003b, 342).
Many different, interconnected, factors often act upon each other and can impact the willingness of individuals to partake in a deliberation. In the next chapter, I will examine the effect of these factors on the willingness for deliberation. In particular, I will look at whether willingness for deliberation varies when participants are invited for a deliberation on a general policy issue versus an issue that touches upon the multicultural character of Canada.

My aim in the next chapter is to see whether the different factors that I discussed in this chapter operate in a different way or with a different degree of potency when the participants are asked about their potential participation in a deliberation on a general versus a multicultural issue. For example, does the anxiety over the potential discomfort caused by engaging in a conversation with others negatively affect potential willingness for deliberation on a multicultural issue more than a general issue? Or, does the idea/frame of deliberation as a new experience motivate participants to engage in a deliberation more when they are asked to participate in a deliberation over a general policy issue versus a multicultural one? In addition, I will also look at whether or not set-up and structure factors (such as facilitation, the time deliberation will take, information provided) will make participants more or less willing to participate and whether that willingness depends on whether or not the deliberation is on a general versus a multicultural issue.

Finally, I will look at willingness for deliberation on specific topics: 1) Instituting a LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning) Policy—by Vancouver School Board; 2) Raising the minimum wage in British Columbia; 3) Community Dialogue over Violence Against Women in different cultural/religious communities; and 4) Government Funding for cultural and religious programs and activities. Once again, I will look to see whether the different factors that I discussed in this chapter affect the willingness to participate in a
deliberation on each of these topics. In each case, I inquire whether participants view the presence of groups with high stakes on the issue (labour/free-market activists in the second topic or feminists in the third) as a helpful addition to deliberation or a hindrance to it. The aim of this chapter as well as the next is to provide a more comprehensive look at the concept of willingness for deliberation—especially under conditions of cultural and religious difference.
Chapter 5: Survey on willingness

“It depends entirely on the topic, and how it is structured, as well as who else will be there. If it's skillfully facilitated, there are a balance of opinions and reasonable people, and it's an issue I care about, I'm all over it.”

~ A participant in the survey experiment

In Chapter 2, I situated the concept of willingness within the larger literature on political participation as well as discussing the indispensability of the concept to the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. In Chapter 4, I returned to the concept of willingness with a more critical lens. In particular, I paid attention to the factors that can influence a person's willingness to participate in a deliberation, particularly one conducted under conditions of cultural and religious difference. In this chapter, I offer a exploratory empirical look at willingness for deliberation as well as the factors that can increase or decrease it under conditions of cultural and religious difference using survey data collected from 437 students at the University of British Columbia. I will begin by providing an overview of the data and the methods used in analyzing the data. I will follow this by summarizing the findings from the study. Finally, I will discuss the results explaining their significance.

5.1 Data and methods

The data was collected through an online survey (see Appendix A). The participants were all students at the University of British Columbia. The recruitment process was two-pronged. I was able to recruit 175 participants by contacting different departments one-by-one asking to disseminate the survey link as well as putting up posters around campus. Participation was incentivized by 1/25 chance to win $50. 262 participants were recruited as part of a larger subject pool study organized through the University of British Columbia’s Public Opinion Lab. As an

\[143\] This is one of the responses to the open question in the survey: “Is there anything else that might make you feel more positive (interested in participating) or more negative (less interested in participating) in a deliberation?”
incentive for participation, students were given extra credit for the course through which they were recruited. Both studies were approved by BREB\textsuperscript{144} prior to recruitment of participants\textsuperscript{145}.

The data is analyzed through simple table comparisons and t-tests as well as ordered logistic regressions. I have also used factor analysis\textsuperscript{146} in order to create an index of variables which measure the same concepts as well as, and in order, to reduce the number of independent variables in the regression analysis. In the next section, I will give a brief overview of the variables used in the regression models before delving into the findings which include both simple table analyses as well as a discussion of the regression results.

5.1.1 Dependent variables

There are six dependent variables. The first two inquire after the broad willingness for deliberation both on a general public policy issue and a public policy issue that pertains to the multicultural nature of Canada. The next four are more specific policy areas: instituting a

\textsuperscript{144}BREB refers to UBC's Behavioural Research Ethics Board which is responsible for reviewing behavioural or social sciences/humanities research, or research that may involve the study of patients or health care providers.

\textsuperscript{145}The decision to use students instead of the general public was based on a number of reasons. One of the reasons was ethical. The topic of the deliberative experiment requires of the participants to reflect on, present, and debate their cultural and religious values and practices. Debates over deeply-held values and interests, especially those that can challenge the ontological and emotional security of participants, can potentially be uncomfortable. Therefore, the logic behind using students was to reduce the risks associated with the study. Since the other participants with whom they will deliberate are fellow students, there is a lesser degree of hierarchies between students which could make some more vulnerable. Moreover, undergraduate and graduate students will be more familiar with various research endeavours at the university. They are often asked for their participation in surveys and experiments conducted either by fellow students, graduate students, or the university. This means that they are less likely to see their engagement in either the survey or the experiment as something unknown and unfamiliar. Finally, students are used to these kinds of discussions as part of their high school and university education. This means that their level of discomfort when engaging in deliberation should be minimal. Another reason had to with the time and financial constraints. The recruitment of participants from outside of the university would have taken both more time as well as posed undue financial burdens on the investigator—Afsoun Afsahi. Third, many within the field of experimental political science believe that the use of students does not necessary inherently problematize experimental research (Druckman & Kam 2011). Indeed, they note that “students and the nonstudent general population are, on average, indistinguishable when it comes to partisanship (we find this for partisan direction and intensity), ideology, the importance of religion, belief in limited government, views about homosexuality as a way of life, the contributions of immigrants to society, social trust, degree of following and discussing politics, and overall media use” (85-86).

\textsuperscript{146}This means using both the dated factor command in stata as well as using polychoric. Factor analysis was necessary since many of the questions in the survey were getting at the same larger principles. Moreover, due to the small sample size, it was necessary to keep the variables in the regression to a minimum.
LGBTQ policy in the Vancouver School Board, looking at increasing or maintaining the minimum wage in British Columbia, examining the causes and solutions to violence against women in cultural/religious minority communities in BC, and funding for cultural and religious groups in British Columbia through programs like Embrace BC. All four of these specific questions dealt with a local (Vancouver or British Columbia) issue in order to ignite the same levels of interest\textsuperscript{147}.

5.1.2 Independent variables

The logistic regression models include demographic (control) variables of gender, religiosity, and self-identification as a visible minority\textsuperscript{148} as well as two variables capturing the respondents’ assessments of their personality and capacities: introversion and opinionated\textsuperscript{149}.

The other independent variables (deliberative citizenship\textsuperscript{150}, conflict avoidance\textsuperscript{151}, informed

\textsuperscript{147} All of the dependent variables are coded from 1-4: I definitely wouldn’t participate; I don’t think I would do it, but maybe; I would think about it; and I would do it for sure if I was invited. While these categories are non-standard, they were chosen to get the best possible measurement of the grey area between intentions of non-participation and participation. To see the complete text of the question as well as the small preambles of information given, see Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{148} Education, age, and income are left out due to the particularities of the sample. Since the respondents are all students, education and age do not vary significantly. Similarly, their assessment of the income of their parents might not be accurate. They are still logically expected to affect a person’s willingness to participate in a deliberative engagement as explained in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{149} Introversion is a composite made up of personality factors shy, quiet, and introverted which were asked separately in the survey. Furthermore, it is standardized variable ranging from -2.08 to 2.26. For a detailed factor analysis, see Appendix G. The variable of opinionated asks: Compared to the average person, do you have fewer opinions about whether things are good or bad, about the same number of opinions, or more opinions? It is coded 1-3. A number of variables discussed in Chapter 4 are left out of the analysis. These are: conservatism, fluency, and need for cognition. Conservatism was left out since none of the survey variables were really getting at the personality facet. I was hoping that conventional and uncreative could be indexed together but their pair-wise correlation value was only 0.39. Fluency was left out since there was very little variance in the variable to make it worthwhile; almost 65% of participants notes that fluency in English was not an issue for them. Similarly, need for cognition was left out due to low variance. Once again, there are particularities associated with the sample. These factors are likely an issue for the general population but not for students at a university.

\textsuperscript{150} Deliberative citizenship is a composite variable made up of seven reasons put forth in the survey as part of a list of potential motivations or anxieties that could make people more or less willing to participate. These are: 1) It might give me a chance to make an actual difference; 2) It might make me think about my own ideas and feelings more carefully; 3) Some deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in the political process to actually change policies; 4) It is chance to express my opinions; 5) I might be able to learn something by talking
participation\textsuperscript{152}, and agreeable participation\textsuperscript{153}) are all index variables which have been constructed through factor analysis. The dependent and independent variables are summarized in Table 5.1.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Variable & Description  \\
\hline
Informed participation & Composite of three structural factors put forth in the survey\textsuperscript{152}  \\
Agreeable participation & Composite of three structural factors put forth in the survey\textsuperscript{153}  \\
\end{tabular}
\caption{Index Variables}
\end{table}

151 Conflict avoidance is a composite variable made up of four reasons put forth in the survey as part of a list of potential motivations or anxieties that could make people more or less willing to participate. These are: 1) What if you were provided with concise, balanced information about the topic beforehand? 2) What if experts on the issue were available to you during deliberation? You could ask them any question you wanted and they would give presentations explaining the different sides and points that are important? and 3) In the case that deliberations do end in decisions affecting policy, what if the policy affected by the process of deliberation were open to future review and deliberation at a later time? My educated guess as to why the last one is connected to the other two is that they all get at the view that decision making requires information and expertise. The first two offers the information and the third provides a chance for the decision to be revised later on. For a detailed factor analysis, see Appendix G.

152 Informed participation is a composite variable made up of three structural factors put forth in the survey as part of a list of features that could make participants more or less willing to participate. These are: 1) What if there were facilitators whose job would be to make the conversation easier by keeping it polite and on track? 2) What if the facilitators were to try to bring views together? They would try to work through the differences and help everyone to find a compromise? 3) What if you could put your views in writing so they could be presented without anyone knowing they were yours? Later on, if you felt comfortable, you could tell others what your views are? For a detailed factor analysis, see Appendix G.
5.2 Findings

One of the easiest ways to compare general willingness for deliberation to the willingness for deliberation on a multicultural policy issue is to look at the raw numbers in Table 5.2. It is interesting to note that a large majority of the respondents (83.2% and 81% respectively) expressed at least some level of willingness for participating in a deliberation either on a general public policy issue or a policy issue related to multiculturalism. It is important to also note that there is no significant difference looking across the rows in each column. A paired t-test was run between the two variables. The results (p=0.75) indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between our two variable scores. This basically means that, at first glance, there is no consequential difference between willingness for deliberation on a general policy issue and a multicultural one. In other words, people seem to be just as willing to talk about a general public policy issue as a multicultural policy issue.
In order to carry out more meaningful analysis, I also included and examined a list of questions inquiring after the willingness for participation in a deliberation on specified policy issues. The issue can arguably be put on a spectrum based on the degree to which they are likely to touch upon people’s deeply held cultural and religious values: minimum wage in BC (least likely), funding for cultural and religious groups, LGBTQ policy in schools, and violence against women in immigrant communities (most likely).

Table 5.3 summarizes the results from simple tabulations looking at the willingness for deliberation on the specific topics. The results show more of a difference looking across the rows for each of the topics.\textsuperscript{154}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & Willingness for general deliberation & Willingness for multicultural deliberation \\
\hline
I definitely wouldn't participate & 3.5\% (7) & 3.5\% (7) \\
\hline
I don't think I would do it, but maybe & 13.4\% (27) & 15.5\% (31) \\
\hline
I would think about it & 52\% (105) & 50\% (100) \\
\hline
I would do it for sure if I was invited & 31.2\% (63) & 31\% (62) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Willingness for participation in deliberation}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{154}In order to better understand whether there was a significant difference between the willingness for deliberation, a series of t-tests was carried out. The results of paired t-tests between the variables inquiring after the willingness for deliberation on specific topics as well as those looking at willingness for deliberation on an unspecified general public policy issue and willingness for deliberation on an unspecified multicultural policy issue show that there is no statistically significant difference between general willingness for deliberation and willingness for deliberation on either the issue of minimum wage or violence against women while there were significant differences when compared to willingness for deliberation on the LGBTQ policy and funding for religious and cultural communities. The exact same results were true for willingness for multicultural deliberation compared to the issues specified. While there are statistically significant differences between the willingness to deliberate on minimum wage versus...
## Table 5.3 Willingness for participation in deliberations on specific issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness for deliberation</th>
<th>LGBTQ Policy</th>
<th>Minimum Wage</th>
<th>Violence against Women</th>
<th>Funding for cultural/religious groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I definitely wouldn't participate</td>
<td>8.7% (33)</td>
<td>2.65% (10)</td>
<td>3.2% (12)</td>
<td>7.7% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't think I would do it, but maybe</td>
<td>22.7% (86)</td>
<td>13% (49)</td>
<td>17.7% (67)</td>
<td>19.9% (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would think about it</td>
<td>35.9% (136)</td>
<td>45.2% (171)</td>
<td>39.6% (150)</td>
<td>48.3% (182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would do it for sure if I was invited</td>
<td>32.7% (124)</td>
<td>39.15% (148)</td>
<td>39.6% (150)</td>
<td>24.1% (91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=379 N=378 N=379 N=377

Once again, a majority of respondents expressed some degree of willingness for deliberation on each of the issue. The most popular issue was that of minimum wage (nearly 40%)—unsurprising considering the sample is made up of students who most likely have minimum wage jobs—and the least popular issue was that of funding for cultural and religious groups in BC (24%). What is important to note, however, is that nearly 9% of participants indicated that they would not participate in a deliberation on LGBTQ policy in schools and 8% said the same for the question funding for cultural and religious groups. There is significantly less willingness for participation in a deliberation on these two topics than for participation in a

LGBTQ policy and funding for cultural and religious minorities, the same was not true for the question of violence against women. Similarly, while there was a statistically significant difference between wanting to talk about the LGBTQ policy issue versus violence against women in cultural communities, the same was not true when looking at the LGBTQ policy question and funding for cultural and religious communities. Finally, there was a statistically significant difference between the willingness for deliberation on the topic of violence against women versus funding for cultural and religious communities.
deliberation over either violence against women in cultural minority communities or minimum wage in British Columbia.

I had expected low levels of willingness for participation of the issue of LGBTQ policy but not for the issue of funding for cultural and religious groups. I had expected low levels for the issue of violence against women as both this issue and that of LGBTQ are contentious and likely to touch on people’s deeply-held cultural and religious values, beliefs, and identities. However, the results show that while there might be less willingness to discuss a contentious issue—like LGBTQ policy, contentiousness is not the only factor at play.

With a better understanding of the differences between the different dependent variables, I carried out a series of ordinal logistic regressions\(^{155}\) as well as calculated predictabilities to look at the effect of each of independent variables on the dependent variables in turn. The respondents were asked a series of questions about their background (gender, age, among others) as well as those inquiring after their self-assessment of their character and personality (introversion and opinionated). These questions where followed by questions asking after their willingness for participation in a deliberation; followed by a series of questions inquiring after the reasons for their willingness or lack thereof. Therefore, the regressions were first ran with background and character questions and then with the post-hoc reasons.

Instead of including the regression tables—the results of which are not readily self-evident, I have included tables summarizing the calculated predicted probabilities for a participant choosing the response category “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for each of

\(^{155}\) An ordinal logistic regression was deemed to be the best fit as the dependent variables have more than two categories and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is indeed ‘higher’ than the previous one. In order to test the validity of each of the models likelihood ratio tests (omodel logit as well as brant tests) were carried out on each of the regression models.
models, going from the lowest to the highest value in the independent variables. The regression tables can be seen in Appendix G. Table 5.4 summarizes these probabilities without the post-hoc rationales for (non)participation.

Table 5.4  Change in predicted probabilities “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for each independent variable without post-hoc reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on:</th>
<th>Unspecified general public policy issue</th>
<th>Unspecified multicultural public policy issue</th>
<th>LGBTQ policy in schools</th>
<th>Minimum wage in British Columbia</th>
<th>VAW in minority groups</th>
<th>Funding for cultural/religious groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender*</td>
<td>+17%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+12%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>+16%</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>+9%</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible Minority**</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td>+14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinionated</td>
<td>+25%</td>
<td>+8%</td>
<td>+17%</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>+19%</td>
<td>+15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introversion</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-42%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Male-Female                      ** No-Yes

Bolded numbers signify significance in original regression

There are a number of factors that need to be highlighted here before discussing the reasons that respondents have identified as drivers of their willingness or lack thereof. Women are more willing than men to participate on the more contentious issues. They are 12% more likely to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on the issue of LGBTQ policy and 16% more likely than men to express willingness to come to the table on the issue of violence against women in minority communities. They are also not any less likely than men to express willingness to participate in deliberation on other topics. In fact, they were 17% more likely to express willingness for deliberation on a general, but unspecified, public policy issue. Therefore,
based on these results, it can easily be argued that women are more interested in participating in deliberative engagements.

Identifying as very religious has a varied effect on one’s willingness for participation in a deliberative engagement. What I want to emphasize at this point is that the very religious were 11% less likely than those who identified as not-religious to express willingness for participation in a deliberative engagement on the topic of instituting a LGBTQ policy in Vancouver schools. A conversation that will touch upon the religious values of participants will presumably be uncomfortable for those who see themselves as very religious. This validates the general notion that we may want to avoid conversations that will strongly touch on our religious values and will most likely be fuelled by disagreements on different sides.

Identifying as a visible minority has a generally positive effect on one’s willingness for deliberation. However, the key finding is that visible minorities are 14% more likely than those who do not identify as visible minorities to express willingness for participation in a deliberation on the issue of funding for cultural and religious groups in British Columbia. This relationship is very similar to that between gender and the issue of violence against women. Just as women are more likely to want to engage in a conversation about an issue where they, likely, not only believe they have much to contribute to, but also have a stake in, visible minorities are more likely to be willing to engage in a conversation that they would know something about and that could potentially affect them.

The relationship between believing that one has something to say and expressing willingness to participate in a deliberative engagement is validated more generally as well. Seeing oneself as opinionated—having more opinions than others—makes that person more likely to express willingness for participation across the board. But particularly, he or she would
be 25% more likely to be willing to have a conversation on a general public policy issue and 19% more likely to express willingness to discuss the issue of violence against women—a culturally contentious issue.

Just as identifying as religious made one less likely to want to discuss the issue of LGBTQ policy in schools—likely due to wanting to stay away from an uncomfortable situation, a similar relationship is seen between seeing oneself as an introvert and expressing willingness for deliberation. Introversion reduces the likelihood for expressing willingness across all issues but particularly, it makes one 42% less likely than someone who does not identify as an introvert to be willing to engage in a deliberation on the issue of violence against women in minority communities. Figure 5.1 shows the effects of opinionated (on willingness for participation on a general public policy issue) and introversion (on willingness for discuss the issue of violence against women).

**Figure 5.1** On the left: Predicted Probability of responding “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for deliberation on a general issue affected by opinionated. On the right: Predicted Probability of responding “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for deliberation on Violence against women affected by introversion.
Table 5.5 summarizes the calculated predicted probabilities for a participant choosing the response category “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for each of models, going from the lowest to the highest value in the independent variables including the post-hoc reasons of: deliberative citizenship, conflict avoidance, informed participation, and agreeable participation.

Willingness for deliberation on a general, unspecified issue.

Table 5.5  Change in predicted probabilities “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for each independent variable with post-hoc reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on:</th>
<th>Unspecified general public policy issue</th>
<th>Unspecified multicultural public policy issue</th>
<th>LGBTQ policy in schools</th>
<th>Minimum wage in British Columbia</th>
<th>VAW in minority groups</th>
<th>Funding for cultural/religious groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender*</td>
<td>+10%</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible Minority**</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>+13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinionated</td>
<td>+16%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+17%</td>
<td>+13%</td>
<td>+10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introversion</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td>-36%</td>
<td>+5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative Citizenship</td>
<td>+91.94%</td>
<td>+63%</td>
<td>+39%</td>
<td>+59.7%</td>
<td>+65.3%</td>
<td>+46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Avoidance</td>
<td>-32.8%</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed Participation</td>
<td>+28.1%</td>
<td>+23%</td>
<td>+13%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+47%</td>
<td>+22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeable Participation</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>+19%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+9%</td>
<td>+25%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Male-Female
** No-Yes

Bolded numbers signify significance in original regression
The model shows that women are significantly more willing to engage in a deliberation as are those who identify as visible minorities—although not to a statistically significant degree. Unsurprisingly, thinking of oneself as being opinionated increases willingness for deliberation. As levels/concerns regarding conflict avoidance go down, willingness for deliberation increases. This is not surprising. Moreover, as participants ascribe more value to informed participation (being provided with information and experts and having the chance to revise decisions), their willingness for participation increases as well. The strongest relationship exists between the variable of deliberative citizenship and willingness for deliberation. As levels of deliberative citizenship (concerns with making a difference, expressing views, listening to others, among others) go up, so does the willingness for deliberation. The fact that deliberative citizenship has a much stronger relationship with the willingness for participation in a deliberation than that between conflict avoidance/averseness and willingness signals that respondents seem to be driven more by motivations for participation than their anxieties regarding the same.

Willingness for deliberation on a multicultural, unspecified issue

This model shows an inverse relationship between one’s status as a visible minority and willingness to participate in a deliberation on a multicultural issue. This was, at first, surprising. However, it can be explained by the fact that as a person identifying as a visible minority, I may want to avoid having conversations that might put me on the spot. The opposite relationship was seen between one’s levels of religiosity and willingness to participate in a multicultural deliberation. Once again and unsurprisingly, as levels/concerns regarding conflict avoidance go down, willingness for deliberation on a multicultural issue increases as well. Once more, the most significant and strong relationship is seen between deliberative citizenship and willingness for deliberation.
5.2.1 Willingness for deliberation on LGBTQ policy in schools

The analysis of the regression model on the question of instituting an LGBTQ policy by the Vancouver School Board shows that, once again, women are significantly more likely to express willingness for participation in such a deliberation. Interestingly, as the levels of religiosity go up, the willingness to participate in a deliberation on this topic decreases significantly. This is an interesting finding as those with deeper religious commitments are undoubtedly interested in this topic and would arguably see themselves as having a stake in the issue. However, they seem to be shying away from participating in the deliberation. Seeing how the issue is both interesting and mainstream in its other facets, it is not surprising that a self-assessment as being opinionated increases willingness for deliberation. Once again, the most significant and strong relationship is seen between deliberative citizenship and willingness for deliberation.

5.2.2 Willingness for deliberation on minimum wage in British Columbia

The model looking at the issue of minimum wage in British Columbia is the least clear and statistically interesting. It is the only issue on which women seem to be less willing than men to come to a deliberation. However, the coefficient is small and also not statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, both, thinking of oneself as being opinionated as well as deliberative citizenship have a strong and statistically significant relationship with willingness to engage in a deliberation on minimum wage.

\[\text{footnote}\]

\[\text{footnote}\] By this I mean that while the respondents might not have been familiar with that specific policy proposed by the school board, they have likely heard about and formed opinions about other issues relating to the LGBTQ community.
5.2.3 Willingness for deliberation on VAW in minority communities

Gender has a significant effect on one’s willingness to engage in a deliberation on the issue of violence against women in minority communities with women being much more willing to participate in such a conversation. Once again, both being opinionated and valuing deliberative citizenship have a strong and positive relationship with one’s willingness for participation. An increase in the value ascribed to informed participation also increases the willingness for participation. Most interestingly, this model was the only one for which introversion was a statistically significant and negative factor. As one’s identification as an introvert increased, the willingness to participate in a deliberation on this topic decreased. This is, after some thought, not surprising. The topic, as I noted above, is likely to be the most contentious of the rest and those who see themselves as introverts seem to want to shy away from such a topic.

5.2.4 Willingness for deliberation on funding for cultural/religious groups

One’s identification as a visible minority is, just as it was for deliberation on an unspecified multicultural issue, an important predictor of willingness for deliberation on this topic. However, while it had a negative relationship with one’s willingness to participate on an unspecified multicultural topic, it has a positive and strong, and statistically significant relationship with the willingness to participate in a deliberation on the topic of funding for cultural and religious groups. One reason for this relationship can be that those who identify themselves as visible minorities might simply feel like they can contribute more productively to a conversation on a topic that has or might affect them. Other independent variables that are strong predictors of willingness for deliberation on this topic are: opinionated, deliberative citizenship, informed participation, and conflict avoidance.
5.3 Discussion

So what does this all mean? In Chapter 4, I posited a theoretical model for understanding the factors that can affect a person’s willingness for deliberation, summary of which can be seen in Figure 4.1. In short, I noted that one’s personal history or social background—including one’s gender identity, income, education level, ethnic/cultural background, religiosity, among others—can affect one’s willingness for deliberation. Furthermore, the self-assessment of one’s personality and capacities can also have an impact on the willingness to partake in a deliberation. Other factors that can affect willingness for deliberation are: which issues a potential participant might find important or interesting (i.e. the environment versus violence against women); who she prefers to talk to in a deliberation (members of her community or strangers); what motivates or worries her (enjoying new experiences or wanting to avoid conflict), and how she prefers the process to be structured (with rules and facilitation or not). However, these factors are interconnected. One’s social background will undoubtedly affect one’s personality as well as one’s interests, anxieties, motivations, and preferences which are, furthermore, affected by her (self-assessed) personality and capacities as well.\footnote{Unfortunately, the low sample size as well as time constraints prevent statistical analysis of the relationship between the different independent variables but that the theory behind it, explained in Chapter 4, remains sound.}

5.3.1 Social background and personal history

The results from Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show that demographic factors do indeed affect one’s overall willingness for deliberation. In fact, Table 5.5, shows that gender, one’s status as a visible minority, and one’s identification as very religious affect willingness for deliberation even when other factors—reasons—are included within the model. In the only scholarly examination of willingness for deliberation, Neblo et al. (2010), had already found that “younger
people, racial minorities, and lower-income people expressed significantly more willingness to deliberate” (574).

The results from my study are more varied and signal an interesting interplay between demographic factors and the topic of deliberation. As previously noted, in all of the statistically significant models, women are generally more willing than men to participate in a deliberation. Even with the reasons included in the model, women are 10% more likely to express willingness to partake in a deliberation on an unspecified public policy issue; 11% more likely to want to discuss the issue of LGBTQ policy in Vancouver schools; and 15% more likely to want to have a conversation about violence against women in cultural and religious minority communities in BC. The last two which are undoubtedly the most contentious issues proposed are particularly telling. Women are much more likely than men to be willing to put themselves in situations where the topic is difficult and divisive.

While women are more willing to participate in deliberative engagements, particularly in those that are likely to be impassioned, the same is not true for religiosity. In fact, the secondary model which includes the rationales for (non)participation, shows that those who categorized themselves as very religious are 17% less likely than those who saw themselves as not religious to want to partake in a deliberation on an unspecified multicultural issue and 16% less likely to be willing to engage in a deliberation on the School Board’s LGBTQ policy. I have already explained the reasons as to why someone who identifies as very religious might shy away from participation in a deliberation over LGBTQ issues. However, it is important to emphasize the fact the same person would also be 17% less likely than his or her non-religious counterpart to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on a general, and unspecified, multicultural
policy issue. I argue that the unknown nature of this topic gives rise to same concerns and anxieties that exist when considering participation in a deliberation over LGBTQ policy.

One’s status as a visible minority affects the willingness for deliberation as well. However, this effect is not consistent across all issues. When the post-hoc reasons are included in the regression, this varied relationship becomes more visible. Those who see themselves as visible minorities are 13% more likely than those who do not to want to engage in a deliberation on funding for religious and cultural communities but 10% less likely to want to come to a deliberation on an unspecified multicultural issue. I believe that the unknown nature of the unspecified multicultural policy issue gives rise to same anxieties that prevent the very religious from expressing willingness to participate in a deliberation on the same topic. When one feels like one’s identity might be challenged, one might feel less inclined to express intention for participation.

5.3.2 Self-Assessment of personality and capacities

The results from Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show that that one’s self-assessment of her personality and capacities have an effect on willingness for deliberation. As it can be seen in Table 5.5, even with the inclusion of other factors—reasons—within the model (including that of conflict avoidance), someone who scores highest on the introversion scale is 36% less likely to be willing to participate in a deliberation on the topic of violence against women in cultural minority communities than someone who scored lowest on the same scale and on the same topic. While the effect of introversion on the willingness for participation in a deliberation on the issue of violence against women is slightly smaller when post-hoc reasons are included (36% compared to 42%), it is worth noting that introversion can reduce willingness for participation on a contentious issue such as that of violence against women. This, perhaps, signals that
deliberation on difficult issues can be made more difficult as those who would self-select for it are likely those who would not shy away from a heated conversation.

Being opinionated, or self-identifying as one, is also a strong predictor of willingness for deliberation\(^\text{158}\). As Table 5.5 demonstrates, categorizing oneself as opinionated made someone 10% more likely than someone who saw herself as having fewer opinions to be willing to come to a deliberation on the topic of funding for cultural and religious groups. Similarly, the same (hypothetical) person was 16% more likely to express willingness for deliberation on an unspecified general public policy issue; 15% more likely to want to talk about the LGBTQ policy; 13% more willing to talk about violence against women in cultural communities; and 17% more likely to indicate an inclination to talk about the issue of minimum wage in British Columbia. This is not a surprising finding.

5.3.3 Motivations and anxieties

As it can be seen in Table 5.5, the strongest predictors of willingness for deliberation are the particular motivations for and anxieties surrounding participation in a deliberation. This statement on face value is not particularly novel. Moreover, the respondents are asked for their reasons after they have already been asked about their willingness for deliberation.

There is an argument to be made these post-hoc reasons are rationalizations by individuals. However, there is no better way of asking respondents about their reasons for (non)participation. Therefore, it is important to consider where they are effective and to what degree.

\(^{158}\) Looking at the text responses in the survey (those inquiring after some other reason that would make participants feel more or less positive about participation), the importance of feeling confident in one’s capacity to participate became clear. Here is one example of a response: “I simply do not feel that I have enough knowledge in a certain public area to defend my opinions at this point in my life.”
Conflict avoidance was a strong predictor of willingness for deliberation. Generally, as conflict avoidance went up, willingness came down. This fits well with the theoretical (and to a lesser degree empirical) work by scholars like Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) as well as Mutz (2006). As it can be seen in Table 5.5, those with highest levels of conflict avoidance tendencies were 37% less likely to want to participate in a deliberation on an unspecified multicultural policy issue than those with the lowest levels of those tendencies. They are also 33% less likely and 27% less likely to want to come to a deliberation on an unspecified public policy issue and on one dealing with the topic of funding for cultural and religious groups respectively.\(^\text{159}\)

The strongest predictor of willingness for deliberation and the only variable that was statistically significant across all models was that of deliberative citizenship. Deliberative citizenship, as explained above, is a composite variable made up of the following factors: making a difference (in policy); thinking carefully; expressing one’s views; learning from others and about things one does not know about; and making one feel closer to her community.

Scoring the highest value on deliberative citizenship made someone 39% more likely to express willingness to talk about the LGBTQ policy issue; 46% and 60% more likely to want to talk about funding for cultural and religious groups and minimum wage in British Columbia respectively. Having high levels of deliberative citizenship meant that one would be 65% more likely to be willing to talk about an unspecified multicultural issue as well as the issue of violence against women in cultural and religious communities.\(^\text{160}\) Most interestingly, someone

\(^{159}\) Looking at the text responses in the survey (those inquiring after some other reason that would make participants feel more or less positive about participation), the importance of conflict avoidance was reiterated. Here is one example of a comment made: “I wouldn't go because I would get attacked for not having left-wing views on most topics such as oil.”\(^\text{160}\) Looking at the text responses in the survey (those inquiring after some other reason that would make participants feel more or less positive about participation), the importance of deliberative citizenship was captured. Here is a
who scored highest on deliberative citizenship was 92% more likely than someone who scored lowest to express willingness for participation in a deliberation on an unspecified public policy issue.

There are two main takeaways from analysis of these two factors. The first is the finding that conflict avoidance indeed becomes a stronger predictor of lack of willingness for deliberation in when the topic of deliberation concerns an unspecified multicultural policy issue than another unspecified but more general public policy issue. The second takeaway is the in each of the dependent variables looking at willingness, deliberative citizenship had a stronger relationship than conflict avoidance. This might signify that the positive aspects of deliberation outweigh the potential emotional costs that accompany it. This should be a comfort to deliberative democrats. What we find to be appealing and normatively positive about deliberative democratic processes are also what the public finds important and what seems to affect their decision in favour of participation.

5.3.4 Structural factors

As it can be seen in Table 5.5, the results from the regressions show that while informed participation (value ascribed to having access to experts, information, and having the chance to revise the decision later on) has, for the most part, a consistent and strong positive relationship with willingness for deliberation across all models, the same is not true for agreeable participation (value ascribed to having rules, facilitators, and the chance to express positions selection of such comments: “Knowing the likelihood that our recommendations would be seriously considered - if there wasn't really a change they would be, I would be less interested in participating”; “engaging with a diverse range of people that I would never have encountered before”; “Getting to know different ideas and why people think like that”; and “I might be able to convince someone of my opinions”.

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anonymously at first). The small and limited sample size is undoubtedly a reason behind such a finding.

Someone who finds that informed participation makes her feel much more positive about participating in a deliberation is 47% more likely than someone who does not feel the same way to express willingness for participation in a deliberation on the issue of violence against women in cultural and religious minority groups. The same person would be 28% more likely and 22% more likely to be willing to participate in a deliberation over a general but unspecified public policy issue and funding for religious and cultural groups respectively.

The effect of agreeable participation on willingness for deliberation, as noted above, is not clear. While the results show that someone who finds that agreeable participation makes her feel much more positive about participating in a deliberation is 19% more likely than someone who does not to express willingness for participation in a deliberation on an unspecified multicultural policy issue, the same person seems to be 14% less likely than someone who finds that agreeable participation makes her much more negative about participation to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on an unspecified public policy issue\textsuperscript{161}.

\textbf{Figure 5.2} shows the effects of deliberative citizenship (on willingness for participation on a general public policy issue), conflict avoidance (on willingness for participation on a general multicultural policy issue), informed participation (on willingness for discuss the issue of

\textsuperscript{161} A number of structural factors (online participation, weekend participation, one hour deliberation, one day deliberation and being paid) were left out of the regression as there was little meaningful variance between them for each of the models. The issue of the translator was left out as well since 63% said that this would not make a difference; a number that corresponds well to the number of people for whom fluency in English was not an issue.
violence against women); and agreeable participation (on willingness for participation on a
general multicultural policy issue).¹⁶²

Figure 5.2 Top left: Predicted Probability of responding “I would do it for sure if I was invited” for
deliberation on a general issue affected by deliberative citizenship. Top right: Predicted Probability of the
same for deliberation on a multicultural issue affected by conflict avoidance. Bottom left: Predicted
Probability of the same for deliberation violence against women affected by informed participation. Bottom
right: Predicted Probability of the same for deliberation on a multicultural issue affected by agreeable
participation.

¹⁶² Something that was not included in the survey but came out as important in the text responses was the issue of
representation and representativeness of the sample. While I cannot rely on the text responses to offer a statistically
significant finding, it was interesting to make a note of the different iterations of the same concern with
representativeness of the participants: “It would make me feel more negative if there wasn't enough people who
discussed topic was personal. (for example, talking about homeless problem in Vancouver there were no actual
homeless person there or talking about rights of some ethnic group there should be people from that group)”; “If I
am assured that the participants are a true representation of the polity as a whole and aren't hand picked to suit
political ends”; “including minorities”; “A guaranteed opportunity to speak - a lot of people are shy and often go
unheard because of the louder people in the room. Not me personally, but I think it is valuable to hear everyone's
opinion.”; and “Being able to hear a wide variety of opinions would be the greatest benefit.”
5.3.5 Conversation partners

Do people find the presence of particular groups to be an advantage or a hindrance? It was not possible to include particular groups (i.e. Muslim, feminists, liberal, among others) within the models in any helpful or meaningful way\(^\text{163}\). Therefore, I will not be offering an answer to the question of whether the presence of members from group x would reduce or increase the willingness of a person to participate in a deliberation or not.

However, it was possible to gauge which groups of people the respondent wished to include or exclude in deliberation on the more specific policy issue areas. For each deliberation on a specified issue, participants were asked about their attitudes towards the presence of members from groups with a high stake on the issue. The idea was to see if people would want to have a conversation with people who would theoretically care and argue strongly one way or another; and especially to see if they saw the presence of some groups more positively or negatively than others.

When thinking about participating in a deliberation on the topic of the LGBTQ policy in the Vancouver School Board, the respondents were much more open to the idea of including LGBTQ activists than either religious people from any faith or denomination or traditional family-values activists as seen in Table 5.6. A significant portion of respondents (40%) thought that traditional family-values activists would get in the way of the conversation while a

\(^{163}\) This is perhaps achieved more easily if the groups are general enough (i.e. politicians or community leaders). Indeed, Neblo et al (2010), found that the willingness for deliberation increased when people knew that a member of Congress would be present. I saw similar results in the text portion of the survey questions: “I would be more inclined to participate if a significant political figure was present”; “having a mp there or the mayor would make me say yes”; “having a current politician there”; and “I might be more positive about coming if significant political leaders were also in attendance".
significant majority (almost 80%) thought that the presence of LGBTQ activists would be helpful\(^{164}\).

Table 5.6  Attitudes towards the presence of certain groups in deliberation over LGBTQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religious people of any faith or denomination</th>
<th>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer activists</th>
<th>Traditional family-values activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It would helpful to have them</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It really doesn’t make a difference either way</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They would get in the way of the conversation</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it can be seen in Table 5.7, When considering whether or not to participate in a deliberation on the issue of minimum wage in British Columbia, respondents found the presence of members of BC’s Federation of Labour much more helpful than that of free market activists by a margin of 13%\(^{165}\).

Table 5.7  Attitudes towards the presence of certain groups in deliberation over minimum wage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Free market activists</th>
<th>Members of BC Federation of labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It would helpful to have them</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It really doesn’t make a difference either way</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They would get in the way of the conversation</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{164}\) A t-test was done between each of these groups. There was no statistically significant difference between people’s attitudes on the presence of religious people of any faith or denomination and traditional family-values activists. However, there was a statistically significant difference between people’s attitudes on the presence of LGBTQ activists and either of the two other groups. It needs to be emphasized that I would not expect this to be the same in the general population. This is likely a student-sample effect, given how progressive students tend to be on this and related issues.

\(^{165}\) While the numbers look close, a t-test between the two show a statistically significant difference.
When thinking about accepting a hypothetical invitation to a deliberation on the issue of violence against women in cultural and religious minority groups in BC, the presence of feminists was seen with the most negative light. As it can be seen in Table 5.8, 15% of respondents thought that they would get in the way of the conversation. While there was no difference between the attitudes of respondents in regards to the presence of people from the Sikh or Muslim community, they were the most welcoming towards people from different cultural and religious backgrounds.

Table 5.8 Attitudes towards the presence of certain groups in deliberation over VAW in minority communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feminist activists</th>
<th>People with different cultural/religious background/affiliation</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It would helpful to have them</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It really doesn’t make a difference either way</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They would get in the way of the conversation</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a deliberation on the topic of funding for different cultural and religious groups through programs such as Embrace BC, respondents were most welcoming to people from different cultural and religious background and least welcoming to those with conservative political attitudes. As it can be seen in Table 5.9, 16% thought that people with a conservative

166 A series of t-tests showed no statistical difference between feminist activists and muslims; no statistical difference between Sikhs and Muslims but difference between other groups.
political attitude would get in the way of deliberation whereas more than 75% saw those with a liberal political attitude as helpful additions to the conversation.

Table 5.9  Attitudes towards the presence of certain groups in deliberation over funding for cultural/religious groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>People with different cultural/religious background/affiliation</th>
<th>People with liberal political attitude</th>
<th>People with conservative political attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It would helpful to have them</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It really doesn’t make a difference either way</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They would get in the way of the conversation</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What these numbers signal is the fact that, while there is some small variance, the majority opinion is that the presence of all the groups is seen as helpful to the conversation. In other words, most people believe that all-affected or all-interested parties should be part of conversation—their presence adds something valuable to the conversation.

5.4 Limitations

There are a number of limitations with this study. The first has to do with the sample size. There are not many observations in each of the categories in order to make definite conclusions about the findings. The second has to do with the sample itself. The participants are all students which limits the variance in age of the participants as well as their education levels and even, to a degree, their incomes—as they would only be able to report on the income of their family as opposed to their own. Another limitation of the study has to do with the fact that all of the respondents were, at the time at least, residents of Vancouver, BC or surrounding cities. This creates a geographical limitation to the study. The final limitation of the study has to do with methodology. In Chapter 4 I noted that the independent variables that affect willingness for
deliberation can have a correlative if not causal relationship with one another. The methodology used in my analysis here prevents me to comment on that relationship. One way to counteract this is to use multilevel modelling to take in the relationship between the variables more clearly. A better sample size and variance is preferable for such a study. 167

5.5 Conclusion

Are people willing to engage in deliberations with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities? The results show that a large majority of respondents express at least some level of willingness for participating in a deliberation on any of the issues proposed to them. Moreover, when asked about the presence of particular groups, there is support for the inclusion of those affected or interested in the issue under deliberation.

Are some demographic groups more likely to signal their willingness to invest their time and energy by participating in a deliberation? In other words, as I asked in Chapter 4, are women, visible minorities, and those who identify as religious more or less willing to participate in a deliberation that concerns cultural and religious difference? The results show that women are much more willing than men to express willingness on three of topics—general unspecified public policy issue, LGBTQ policy in Vancouver schools, and violence against women in minority communities. They are not any less likely than men to express willingness for

167 Issue interest, which undoubtedly affects willingness for deliberation was left out of the regression analyses. The reason is simple. Adding a variable within a survey that asks “what if the issue was interesting to you” does not provide one with any meaningful answers. It is not as if someone would say: “Yes, I would be more willing to participate or feel more positive about participating if the issue was completely uninteresting and irrelevant to me”. But looking at the text responses in the survey (those inquiring after some other reason that would make participants feel more or less positive about participation), the importance of the topic and issue interest become clear. Here is a selection of a few of the responses: “[I would be more willing] if the topic was of big importance to the community” ; “the issues being deliberated would obviously be by far the most important factor in whether [I] attend or not”; “It really depends on the issue being deliberated”.

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participation on the other topics proposed. Women, more than men, appear to be willing to invest and come to a deliberation. In Chapter 7, I look at the results from deliberative experiments to see whether women, who appear to be more willing to invest their time to come to a deliberation, are also more likely to invest in deliberative capital by adhering the deliberative standards.

Religiosity seems to have the opposite effect, however. As it can be seen in Table 5.5, those who express high degrees of religiosity are on the whole much less willing that those who do not to express willingness for participation on all but one of the issues—violence against women in minority communities. However, what stands out is their particular unwillingness to partake in a deliberation on the LGBTQ policy in Vancouver school board. They are also much less likely to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on an unspecified multicultural policy issue. This demonstrate that the fact that there is indeed a degree of unwillingness to participate in a deliberation that is likely to touch on very deeply-held religious values and beliefs.

One’s status as a visible minority has the most interesting effect on the willingness for deliberation. I have to emphasize that visible minorities, much like women, are more likely than non-visible minorities to express willingness to invest their time and energy and participate in deliberation on all except one of the issues—unspecified multicultural policy issue. In particular, on the issue of funding for cultural and religious groups—where there is likely both interest and feeling like one can contribute effectively and knowledgeably—visible minorities are much more likely to express willingness for participation. However, when faced with an unspecified multicultural policy issue—which could, conceivably, put participants in an uncomfortable position depending on the issue—visible minorities were much more reticent to express willingness for deliberation. This also signals the fact that, at least to some degree, we may want
to shy away from and not participate in discussions that cause us discomfort and awkwardness. In Chapter 7, I look at whether one’s status as a visible minority plays a role in their willingness to invest in deliberative capital.

Do personal assessments of one’s personality and abilities play a role in affecting willingness for deliberation one way or another? In other words, is there support for my contention in Chapter 4 that introversion will reduce willingness for deliberation particularly if the topic poses concerns of contention and discomfort? And, additionally, do the results from the survey show that one’s efficacy—particularly one’s evaluation of whether one is opinionated or not—increase one’s willingness for deliberation? The results from Table 5.4 provide support for both of these contentions. Identifying oneself as an introvert reduces willingness especially for those that promise a contentious discussion. Seeing oneself as opinionated increases willingness; a fact that is not surprising.

What about the particular motivations or anxieties? In Chapter 4, I particularly focused on the concerns with discomfort that can arise when considering participating in a deliberation that can bring up people’s cultural and religious values and identities. Conflict avoidance, a composite variable, plays a role in reducing willingness for participation. But what is interesting is that conflict avoidance plays a small role in reducing willingness in the most obviously contentious topics—LGBTQ policy and violence against women. The strongest effect is seen when participants consider participation in a deliberation on an unknown topic whether on a general public policy one or one that concerns a multicultural policy issue. It is perhaps the fear of unknown and assumptions of conflict that play a role. Moreover, deliberative citizenship or the degree to people feel like it is important to be good deliberative citizens showed a strong effect on increasing willingness for deliberation. This is perhaps not ground-breaking but what
matters is that even on the most culturally and religiously contentious issues, such a desire plays a strong and positive role—much more than conflict avoidance.

In the next chapter, I move away from the concept and examination of willingness and return to the issue of capacity. In particular, I discuss three facilitative treatments which can be employed in the course of a deliberation—especially one touching on people’s identities—that can encourage investments in and discourage divestments from deliberative capital on the part of the participants.
Chapter 6: Facilitative treatments in the face of divestments

How can we get participants in a deliberation to engage in desired behaviours? How can we incentivize their investments in deliberative capital within a deliberative process? This chapter outlines three innovative facilitative treatments that can be utilized at the beginning or during a deliberative process to incentivize investments and discourage divestments. They are simulated representation (getting participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each other’s views for a portion of deliberation); deliberative worth exercises (getting participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round); and cultural translation (having cultural/religious experts as part of the deliberation to explain beliefs and practices).

The main aim of this chapter is to serve as the bridge between the larger abstract and theoretical analysis of deliberative capital in Chapter 3 and the specific facilitative treatments that can be utilized to increase deliberative capital. It serves as the theoretical underpinning and explanation for the empirical examination of simulated representation and deliberative worth exercises through deliberative experiments in the next chapter. The deliberative experiments, which will be discussed in the next chapter, were on the topic of allowing religious arbitration in British Columbia as a way for residents of BC to resolve their disputes using religious law. Both simulated representation and deliberative worth exercises were utilized, separately, and contrasted with a deliberation without a particular facilitative treatment. While facilitative treatments are only one of the ways deliberative democrats can engage in innovative designs in
order to make deliberation better\textsuperscript{168}, when thinking about deliberation under conditions of deep diversity, it is important to think about the best mechanisms and practices that encourage investments.

6.1 Facilitative treatments

So what are facilitative treatments? Facilitative treatments are mechanisms or exercises that can be utilized during a deliberation either at the start of the deliberation or during the course of the deliberation. They are an extension of an already-existing intervention within the dialogue: facilitation and/or mediation\textsuperscript{169}.

“In structured deliberation[s], face-to-face disagreement is often mediated through moderators, facilitators, debating rules, civility codes, turn taking, shared information, and many other mechanisms designed to manage disagreement” (Chambers 2013, 205). These facilitative treatments are another tool in that box of strategies. Within deliberations, especially those conducted under conditions of cultural and religious difference, trained facilitators are necessary to enforce certain basic rules—to encourage investments and discourage divestments—

\textsuperscript{168} Another way that this can be achieved is through adjustment of institutional rules of deliberation. The work done by Tali Mendelberg is an excellent example of such adjustments. Tali Mendelberg and her colleagues (Karpowitz et al. 2012, Mendelberg et al 2014a, and Mendelberg et al 2014b) are concerned with the disparity between men and women in deliberative setting - i.e. men talk more and women are systematically silenced. Mendelberg, through deliberative experiments, demonstrates that “when women are outnumbered by men, use unanimous rule; when women are a large majority, decide by majority rule” (Karpowitz et al. 2012, 545). When women are a minority, unanimous rule does a better job at protecting women as “they take up their equal share of the conversation” (544). At the end of the day, in order to “avoid the maximum inequality, avoid groups with few women and majority rule” (545).

\textsuperscript{169} Most deliberative engagements are facilitated by moderators or facilitators. They act as intervenors in a conflict: “[a]ll participants in the system have reflexive effects on one another, and that intervenor can be affected by the conflict, just as the conflict is affected by the intervenor. The effect of this understanding, then, is to see conflict as much more changeable than before, a systematic, continuous process that can be influenced is subtle and sophisticated ways by changing the orientation of the participants or by adding a third party (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 47). The facilitators are intervenors. They might not be exactly the third party as deliberations include more than two parties and generally more than two sides to the argument. They “are often successful because they do offer opportunities for changing the context of the disputes by suggesting new phrase for defining what is going on” (79).
particularly if individuals are targeted based on their minority (cultural and religious) beliefs. I have in my own deliberative experiments relied on the ability of facilitators to encourage conversation, defused conflict, and raise questions. Facilitative treatments, including those I have devised, are not an alternative to careful and artful facilitation. Rather, they are an addition. I have already discussed the important role of facilitators in Chapter 3.

The purpose of facilitative treatments is to change the conditions under which the deliberation takes place in order to facilitate participants’ investment in deliberative capital. Such treatments can be employed at the start of the deliberation and built into the structure of the process if the conveners and facilitators suspect that either the topic or the makeup of the deliberation are likely to reduce the capacity of the participants to follow the ground rules and norms of deliberation. They can also be utilized during the deliberation as an amendment to the process when unanticipated obstacles and challenges to investments in deliberative capital arise. These treatments are not being proposed as a panacea to the problems of deliberation under the conditions of deep difference. They will likely work in some contexts but not in others and may or may not be durable as participants might leave the deliberation without actually changing their position. But, during the course of the deliberation, they might mean greater investments in deliberative capital by all and hence better deliberations.

The facilitative treatments that I have been pointing to throughout this chapter are: simulated representation, cultural translation, and deliberative worth exercises which can be used separately or together within a deliberative engagement. I devised these treatments by engaging with literatures on education, psychology, sociology, bargaining, mediation, facilitation, management, and deliberative democracy in order to address the problems identified by deliberative democratic and multicultural political theorists as to why deliberations may fail.
6.2 Simulated representation

Facilitative treatment of simulated representation can be used to discourage divestments such as cognitive apartheid, rhetorical action, biased information processing, and insufficient attempts at understanding or recognition as well as to encourage investments such as justification, listening to others, reflection, empathy, and even attempts at a productive dialogue.

Simulated representation works as follows: after the preliminary round(s) of deliberation, participants are broken down to dyad or triads - preferably made up of those between whom there is deep disagreement as demonstrated by the previous round(s) of deliberation. The participants, then, have to talk in the dyad or triads and listen to one another. They will be instructed to ask each other the following questions: what are your reasons for holding position x? what is the motivation behind your decision to do x? how do you feel about x? They will be told to really attempt to understand the reasons, feelings, and motivations of one another, learn it well and remember it well enough as they would have to present it to the larger group in the next round. After the dialogue in the dyads (and triads) has ended, deliberation will resume.

However, for the next round, instead of each participant presenting and defending their own viewpoints, they will be asked to present and defend views and opinions as if they were the other person with whom they were paired or grouped. This means that A will be asked to present and argue for the positions, reasons, and feeling of B as if they were her own. B, similarly, will be asked to present and defend the views and opinions of A. After that round, deliberation can resume normally. For longer deliberations—taking place over several days/months—the same method can be utilized several times. I should perhaps emphasize here that under this facilitative treatment

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170 In a triad, the facilitative treatment would work as follows: A presenting B, B presenting C, and C presenting A. The idea behind this is to get participants to take in what the other side is saying knowing that they will have to account for it in the next round of deliberation.
treatment, facilitators will be present and tasked with keeping the conversation on track and ensuring that the basic deliberative standards. The logic behind this is simple: in the worst case scenario, facilitator would not require, say, racist views to be repeated and amplified.

This facilitative treatment can reduce the cognitive blocks which can prevent participants to really listen and take in what others are saying. It can also lessen the tendency to not critically think about one’s ideas. And it can teach the difficulty of knowing what it is to hold and argue for a different view that one’s own.

The purpose behind this facilitative treatment is, as the name may suggest, to get participants in a deliberation to try to better understand each other and the ways in which they may be defining certain key terms and then to represent those views as if the views were their own. This facilitative treatment works in two parts. First, it can force us to move beyond simply defending our positions and values to teaching them to others. Teaching is a dialogical process and forces us to remain responsive to the other side to ensure that our efforts have been worthwhile. Second, it can force us to move simply beyond listening to others to really hearing them in order to articulate and defend them in the next round. While deliberation can bring different people with divergent backgrounds, feelings, views, and motivations together in one room and arrange a conversation between them, it cannot guarantee that the participants will listen to one another in a manner that would bring a Gadamerian fusion of horizons\(^\text{171}\) or, at least, a better understanding between the participants. Put simply, such a treatment is designed to, hopefully, bring about a degree of “cognitive empathy” (Spencer 1995) in the participants.

\(^\text{171}\) I am referring to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of a hemeneutical fusion of horizons best explained in his book *Truth and Method*. Gadamer accepts that individuals cannot be separated from their historical, cultural, societal, political, educational (among others) contexts but insists that through a dialogue and a back-and-forth exchange of views and demands for more explanation, individuals can find similarities between these different backgrounds or beliefs (horizons) and reach an understanding (Gadamer 1975).
Simulated representation seeks to break the cycle of incommensurate definitional or moral conflict with which mediators are more than familiar. As Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) explain,

A common pattern in moral conflict is the juxtaposition of incommensurate assertions, followed by a stunned silence or pause after which each side acts as its own moral order suggests. Each participant is surprised and offended by the others’ actions and denounces it. Each takes offence at being denounced and protests its own virtue…and so it goes (73). By forcing participants to take the position of the other side, this cycle of assertions and the sense of incommensurability that accompanies it can be disrupted.

The rationale behind this particular facilitative treatment comes from engaging with three sets of literature in education, psychology, and deliberative democracy.\(^{172}\)

Role-playing in classrooms as a way to teach students the ability to understand one another as well as the motivations of different historical, fictional, and imagined characters is widely practiced at different levels of education. Within psychology literature, perspective-taking and imagined contact has proven to be good technique in changing the stances and cognitive outlooks of people in a more positive way. Within deliberative democracy, Michael Morrell has

\(^{172}\) These include the literature on role-playing in the classroom such as Blatner 2000, Jarvis et al. 2002, Sumler-Edmond 2013, Kodotchigova 2002, Douglas and Coburn 2009, and Wender 2014, as well as the literature on perspective-taking such as Ku et al. 2010, Galinsky et al. 2008, Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000, Shih et al. 2009, and Wang et al. 2014. From deliberative democracy, the work by Michael Morrell (2007, 2010) on inducing empathy within deliberation is particularly useful.
showed how empathy exercises can change the perspective of participants to be more inclusive and, yes, empathic.\textsuperscript{173}

Within the literature on education, getting students involved in different exercises of role-playing is rather commonplace and has generally yielded desired outcomes of: more engaged learning, more empathy, and more interest, among others. One of the more compelling outcomes of role-playing for those interested in conversations between people with divergent identities, values and beliefs is that of empathy. Empathy, according to those involved in its practice, is a skill which can be learned (and therefore, taught). Role-playing as “an experiential type of learning” (Blatner 2000) can imbue students with much needed recognition of the feelings and motivations as well as reasons and experiences of others. It can teach children about the “world around them” as well as about the “feelings, emotions and plights of others” (Jarvis et al. 2002); it substantiates the experience of and imbues students with empathy for a “character in a particular time in history” (Jarvis et al. 2002, Sumler-Edmond 2013) such a woman fighting for universal suffrage or a Métis after Louis Riel’s hanging; it can provide “an opportunity to be emotionally involved in cross-cultural learning and reflect upon cultural differences” (Kodotchigova 2002, 5); it can give students “a better understanding of the emotional dimensions of legal disputes and assist in building empathy with clients” (Douglas and Coburn 2009, 62) in a law school; and it can make teachers more empathetic by checking in with students through

\textsuperscript{173}This is a positive change. Indeed, perspective-taking and role-playing have been utilized by deliberative democrats. An example is Michael Morrell’s inducements of empathy which was discussed previously. Another example is Baogang He’s experimental deliberation between Chinese and Tibetan students on the issue of Tibet autonomy (2010). During the course of the dialogue, He carried out “an intellectual exercise” by asking the Tibetan students “to imagine what they would recommend to Chinese President Hu Jintao on handling the Tibet issue, if they were his policy advisers” and similarly asking the Chinese students “to consider how they would act if they were policy advisers to the Dalai Lama” (He 2010, 724) as way to get the students to consider the perspective of someone in another role than they would commonly imagine for themselves.
“impromptu letters” describing their feelings at that moment (Wender 2014, 36). Role-playing is not a one-step process where participants play a role and then magically learn what it is to be the person in that role and empathize with them fully. In fact, role-playing, more often than not, start with “the more superficial, obvious, almost clichéd parts of a role” (Blatner 2000) but grows substantively as more thought goes into the process; more questions are asked; and more connections are made.

Within the psychology literature, perspective-taking - asking people to imagine and write about the daily life, motivations, and feelings of another person (from an outgroup) - has proven to be helpful in making the other seem more like oneself (Ku et al. 2010), better the understand of other’s motivations in negotiations (Galinsky et al. 2008), stimulate empathy, reduce bias and prejudice, and curtail stereotypic thinking (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000, Shih et al. 2009, Wang et al. 2014). All the more, imagining contact with an other has been shown to reduce negative “anticipatory physiological responses to interactions with outgroup members” (West et al. 2015, 432).

In the literature on deliberative democracy, Michael Morrell stands out in emphasizing empathy as a key ingredient for not just deliberative approaches to democracy but democracy in general. He draws a connection between empathy and role-playing which, according to him, “[allows] us to understand how others feel about a moral norm” and perhaps enables us “to recognize when there is a generalized attitude about the validity of a norm” 174 (Morrell 2010, 79). In order to induce empathy, for instance, he “provided subjects in […] groups with

174 Morrell’s account of empathy-induction has much in common with the basic insights of Robert Goodin’s “internal deliberation”. Goodin argues that since deliberation “consists in the weighing of reasons for and against a course of action”, “it can and ultimately must take place within the head of each individual” (Goodin 2003, 54). Therefore, we need to focus on the task of “democratizing our internal reflections - rendering them more expansive and more empathetic” (71).
narratives reflecting the experiences of family members of both victims and perpetrators of capital crimes” (2012, 12). This empathy-induction through role-taking can get people “to pay attention to the thoughts and feelings of others [which can] increase the likelihood that they will perceive even distant others as multifaceted and complex and thereby interrupt the simplifying processes of the disposition system or the affective tally” (2010, 108).175

Facilitative mechanism of simulated representation has much in common with role playing, perspective taking and even Michael Morrell’s empathy-induction. However, it is about more than playing a role and, thus, learning what the other person is thinking and feeling but a secondary process of pushing participants to ensure they actually understand that viewpoint and gain an appreciation for what the other is feeling and thinking by arguing for her views, feeling, rationales, and motivations. Putting a participant in a position where she is asked to imagine the views, feelings, and experiences of another, especially one with whom her own views deeply diverges and argue for her point of view can provide an instrument that forces a participant to relate to and feel for the other while also gaining knowledge about her perspective on the world.

By asking the participant to not only imagine what it is to be the person with whom she disagrees but to also, for a brief time, put forth and defend that person’s views and opinions will—for lack of a better word—can facilitate her to move beyond her subjective reality and consider the other’s experience as legitimate. This goes beyond the common practice of imaginative role-playing (where one is asked to play the role of a client - for law students for

175 Empathy-induction can be helpful under conditions of deep diversity. For example, thinking back to the example of L’affaire du Foulard discussed in Chapter 2: how would empathy-induction have contributed to a more democratic, thorough, and compassionate response? In that scenario, all parties involved would be instructed to read an account of the experiences of each other. In that account, attention would be given to the motivations, rationales, and feelings of the girls (as well as the administrators) and demonstrated the complexity of their decision. Perhaps, through such a process, the decision would have been a more democratic, empathetic, and multicultural one.
instance—or that of an African slave in the South prior to the civil war) and perspective-taking which asks participants to write an imaginary story of what it would feel like to be another person. Simulated representation can push participants past their typical and well-established impulse to separate and leave behind those views and opinions that are not congruent with their own.\(^{176}\)

At a basic level, this process can undermine cognitive apartheid. By forcing the participants to listen to, take in, remember, present, and defend another’s positions, they are prevented from simply not hearing the concerns of the other side.

In addition to challenging cognitive apartheid, simulated representation can also challenge a wide array of cognitive biases—particularly confirmation bias\(^{177}\) and belief bias effect\(^{178}\)—by rerouting the pathways that ease these biases. Simulated representation can create circumstances under which it becomes difficult—if not impossible - to not to listen to views and opinions that differ from and (potentially) contradict one’s own. Since one has to listen to, learn,

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\(^{176}\) The closest concept in the literature to what simulated representation attempts to produce is “transspection” or the “effort to put oneself into the head (not shoes) of another person” and to “to believe what the other person believes and assume what the other person assumes” (Maruyama 1978, 55). Different from both “analytical “understanding”” and ““empathy””, transspection involves “a trans-epistemological process which tries to experience a foreign belief, a foreign assumption, a foreign perspective, feelings in a foreign context, and consequences of such feelings in a foreign context, as if these have become one’s own. In transspection a person temporarily believes and feels whatever the other person believes and feels. It is an understanding by practice” (55).

\(^{177}\) Confirmation bias refers to a “cognitive bias in which one tends to look only for evidence that confirms one’s beliefs and to ignore or pay less attention to evidence that contradicts one's beliefs. This tendency is thought to be pervasive and to negatively affect the way individuals approach problems or make decisions” (Sullivan 2009, 99). This has an affective dimension to it as well. As Maureen Linker explains, due to the interconnectedness of cognition and emotion, “our tendency toward confirmation bias is a tendency to hold on not only to the content of our beliefs but also the emotions and expectations associated with those beliefs” (Linker 2015, 38).

\(^{178}\) A key finding in support of *dual-process models of reasoning, produced by creating a conflict between logical reasoning and prior beliefs. For example, in the following invalid syllogism, the conclusion conflicts with prior beliefs, and only about 10 per cent of undergraduate students accept it as valid: *No millionaires are hard workers; Some rich people are hard workers; Therefore, some millionaires are not rich people.* In contrast, when the same argument is couched in the following terms, in which the conclusion conforms to prior beliefs, more than 70 per cent accept it as valid: *No addictive things are inexpensive; Some cigarettes are inexpensive; Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes.* This shows that people tend to be influenced by both the logic of arguments and the believability of their conclusions (Colman 2009, 85).
and remember the views that are different from one’s own, for a brief time, one must not only consider but articulate in the strongest possible terms, this different viewpoint. Furthermore, simulated representation can pressure participants to reflect more critically on their own positions. Since they have to teach their positions and ideas to another person in a comprehensive way, they could become more aware of the problem in their own arguments. This process may, thus, change the adversarial attitude towards a more collaborative one and ease the process of deliberation.

It is at times, very easy in the course of the conversation to gloss over what the other person is saying. This can become particularly problematic when there is disagreement and part of that glossing over is caused by a mental block, a conscious or often unconscious cognitive move to block what the other person is saying. So while we listen the other side, we can fail to hear the other side. Through simulated representation, participants may come to realize that the other is more like them than they previously realized or were willing to acknowledge even to themselves. They might come to see that even if they do not share similar rationales and experiences, the feelings and motivations are familiar to them. Simulated representation may possibly induce “moments of emotional identification” and “overwhelming understanding” that Jane Mansbridge believes are more necessary for equal respect between participants than equal abilities (Mansbridge 1980, 29).

Having had to listen to, learn and remember, and then present and defend another person’s positions might also elucidate the nuances of the other’s opinions; it can clarify why a particular practice or belief holds such sway over someone or why they feel particularly attached to it. It can reduce negative and stereotypic thinking. Moreover, much like perspective-taking, simulated representation can “[increase] helping behavior towards [members] of the outgroup”
likely as their conflict, new Americans at relationships differences 179 potential facilitator, previously, a this what participants, to, at least briefly, look beyond their own interests and think of others as well. While not abandoning their self-interest (Mansbridge et al. 2010), people should have the ability to consider that is in the best interests of others as well.

Deliberation under conditions of deep diversity cannot not aim solely for consensus derived from either rationality and/or empathy but simulated representation can both illuminate the arguments made by others and create a greater sympathy for their position since you are now in their shoes making the argument. This can open doors to negotiation and fair(er) compromises. Even if the facilitative treatment of simulated representation does not result in an emotional connection between participants, it may reveal information hitherto unknown and lead to new kinds of compromises, not thought of before179.

At this point, it is important to address a potential challenge to this facilitative treatment: what if the participants treat it without due respect? Or what happens if a participant tries to use this opportunity to make fun of the person whose view she is representing and defending? This is a fair and important concern. However, there are two important considerations. First, as noted previously, this facilitative treatment will be used in conjunction with facilitation. The role of the facilitator, here, would be ensure that the basic rules of respect are enforced—to stop the potential dehumanizing or disrespectful kind of behaviour. Second, the same rationales that exist

179 Indeed, John Forester demonstrates that when deliberations seem to be stuck between seemingly irreconcilable differences in values and interests between two or more parties, “more information and more concerns, [and] new relationships” (Forester 2009, 55) can move the deliberation forward. He demonstrates this exact point by looking at the conflict between a developer in Southern California (wanting to build 100 new homes) and the local Native Americans (wanting to protect their ancestral burial ground) which came to an agreement after the introduction of a new interest: using the land for a veterans’ home. While this might seem paradoxical that a new interest resolved the conflict, a veterans’ home was embraced by the Native Americans who saw such a proposal as one that respected their land. The deliberation concluded with the developer setting aside land for the veterans’ home as well as building a memorial for Native Americans (46-50). Simulated representation can make this compromise more likely and more equitable.
for people to generally follow the norms and rules of deliberation, and invest in deliberative capital, apply here as well. When Participant A decides to divest by treating this exercise as a joke, she leaves herself open to same treatment by the other person. It becomes in the best interests of Participant A to treat the exercise seriously and pay due respect to Participants B whose views she is representing. Moreover, the more participants follow the exercise properly, the more it becomes a norm and the more egregious straying from that norm becomes.

6.3 Cultural translation

The facilitative treatment of cultural translation can be utilized in order to discourage divestments such as biased information processing, hermeneutical exclusion, and insufficient attempts at listening, understanding, or recognition as well as to encourage investments such as listening to others, reflection, empathy, and even attempts at a productive dialogue.

The facilitative treatment of cultural translator works as follows: cultural translators will be incorporated into a deliberation in a similar manner as experts often are. In a deliberation over, for instance, Best Practices for Child Protection Advocacy, experts such as child psychologists might be asked to make an appearance to discuss the cost/benefit analysis of a stable environment for cognitive and emotional development of children versus staying with a family who can provide the children with an ontological security regarding their roots.

In the case of the BC Citizens Assembly, experts were brought in to talk about different kinds of electoral systems, their benefits and drawbacks. Cultural translators can likewise be employed when the deliberation in conducted in multicultural societies and the topic of deliberation is likely to emphasize deep differences in cultural and religious outlooks and touch upon people’s entrenched values and beliefs.
The particular problems that this facilitative treatment can address are: unfamiliarity with a topic or disparities in information especially about a cultural practice and the difficulty and disinclination to learn from someone at the table explaining the particular practice. The main task of cultural translators is to, first, draw on and build upon the symbolic capital and power they have as experts to open the space for open dialogue and provision of information and, second, to bridge the practices and values of participants by putting them in terms that all sides can understand and accept.

Their role will be, for the most part, similar to those of experts. Just as experts are frequently utilized in a deliberative arena to provide necessary information, correct factual misunderstandings, and provide useful tools for participants to do their task, cultural translators can similarly do the same. Knowledgeable in the cultural (and religious) traits, values and practices of different groups in the deliberation, they would be tasked with recognizing the instances of cultural conflict and misunderstanding. Furthermore, they would be asked to clarify the anthropological and sociological motivations and origins of a value or practice. As third parties within a deliberation, they “can skillfully participate in making new, more productive patterns” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 79). While the translators can be people from a culture who can ‘translate’ that culture to others, it is more likely and, perhaps, more effective for them to be scholars who are either able to provide expert knowledge on the history of subordination, discrimination or key practices of a particular cultural or religious group.

The rationale behind this particular facilitative treatment comes from engaging with two sets of literature: deliberative democracy and translation studies.

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180 Indeed, trained anthropologists, sociologists, theologists, cultural studies scholars, and the like, might be best at filling the role of cultural translators in a deliberation.
Within the literature on deliberative democracy, Braman et al. propose the use of identity vouchers in the form of “public figures who are associated with competing cultural orientations” (2005, 297). Focused on the conflictual and seemingly unending debate over the regulation of firearms in the United States, they note that, the participation of identity vouchers could cause individuals who may have rejected a position “out of hand” to accept it if that position it is put forth by someone “who [possesses] high esteem within their cultural or ideological group” (298). Their idea of identity or cultural vouching is similar to my idea of cultural translation as it treats the differences in culture/identity as its core motivating force. But it is different. The role of the vouchers and translators is not the same—the former seeks to open the space for listening and the latter extends this role to include the space for explanation and understanding.

Drawing on translation studies, cultural translation and the role it can play within deliberation can be seen as a natural extension of the concept of translation in general. Therefore, the role of the cultural translator bears many similarities not only to that of experts often recruited but also to that of a translator looking to render a text from one language to another. Languages are by-products of history and “carrier[s] of culture[s]” (He 2012, 74). This means that a phrase or even the use of a word in a text in a historical moment (with its cultural, personal, political, etc.) has a deep influence on how we interpret the text.

While they are focused on public debates, a similar approach could be done in mini publics over an issue. This would be done in either one of two ways. First, a participant from a particular—cultural, ethnic, racial, religious—group, someone who would be considered a kin, can volunteer to act as a voucher. In this situation, Participant A who belongs to and is considered the kin of group X will act as a voucher for the views and interests of the other group (group Y). Second, a kin is included in the structure of the deliberation similar to the inclusion of facilitators and moderators. This “kin” or voucher is identified to the other participants and has the task of explaining the views of the group to members of her/his own group. The purpose of including a voucher would be to get people to listen and accept the merits of the other side presented to them by a member of their own group and someone they consider to be a kin.
economic, social, among others, characteristics) might not be easily translated word-for-word. The role of the translator, then, often becomes one of translating cultures as well as words. This requires the translator to not only be proficient in two languages (source and target) but also in the particular tenor of two cultures. A good translator would have to know not only the language but the hidden cultural meanings and contexts attached to the saying. A translator, then, outside the confines of a deliberative engagement has to be bicultural as well as bilingual (Simigné Fenyő 2005, 62) as she has to play a role in “facilitating intercultural interaction and understanding” (Salmeri 2014, 78).

Translation requires of the translator to think about the “intended function and effect” (Bedeker and Feinauer 2006, 138) of a particular text in the source text and then determine the degree to which the translation would require imitation or transformation. When thinking about cultural translators, a similar logic would apply. Cultural translators will have to discern what function a cultural or religious practice or belief serves in that particular (source) culture/religion. Then based on that understanding determine if an equivalent function exists in the target audience. Translation of that belief/practice will be done based on that.

For example, in a hypothetical deliberation over Sikh boys wearing of kirpans in schools, participants on one side view the other as strange and perhaps even deviant due to the others’ desire to bring a weapons to schools; and participants on the other side view the others as ignorant and closed-minded if not chauvinistic. The cultural/religious translator would be able to connect the practice of wearing kirpans to more familiar practices of Catholic confirmation or a person becoming Bālígh in Islam and the particular rituals and responsibilities attached to the practice of a religion. Moreover, the same translator might shed light on the anti-gun/weapon culture that finds kirpans alarming. Having done so, the participants might find it easier to
connect to the perspective of the other; recognizing the importance of ritual and practice in adhering to a religion and identifying with fears of the other side as well. Cultural translators can make a deliberative compromise more attainable during a deliberation.182

Why should convenors of a deliberation consider including professional (expert) cultural translators? As those involved in translation know well, some of the common challenges of translation include the difficulty of finding an equivalent or at least a way to explain the proverbs, slangs, among others (Salmeri 2014) that have their roots in a particular cultural mindset. There will be similar if not added challenges in a deliberative setting. While all participants might be competent in the language of the deliberation, there might not be competent in each other’s cultural and religious perspectives and traits.

Cultural translators would be seen as experts183 within the deliberation and as such they could be “perceived as more likely to present information that is valid, compelling, or otherwise ‘correct’” (Clark et al. 2012, 90). Even if the expert—cultural translator in this scenario—provides an argument with which one party disagrees, they are still more likely to carefully listen

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182 Another, more controversial, potential example to consider is that of continued practice of female genital cutting. While mainly “concentrated in 28 countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada (SOGC) says the problem affects women [in Canada] too” (Kielburger and Kielburger 2013) as Canada admits many immigrants from countries where FGC is practiced. Many women have gone through the process prior to coming to Canada and many undergo it after arriving by, most commonly, flying back to their country of origin for the practice (Kielburger and Kielburger 2013). While to most, the practice is seen as deplorable and actionable, challenging the practice “requires that the socio-cultural dynamics of the practice be well understood if behavioural change is to be accomplished” (Gruenbaum 2005b, 429). This requires the presence of a translator if there is ever to be an open conversation regarding the practice. Indeed, efforts to change the practice in Africa has shown that through dialogue “the same value [love of one’s daughters] can be utilized to give meaning to alternative practices” (Gruenbaum 2005b, 431) and “alternative rites” (Gruenbaum 2005a, 490) such as “circumcision through words” (491).

183 The use of cultural or religious experts should not be seen as unorthodox. W.B. Pearce and S.W. Little John in Moral Conflict: when social worlds collide discuss a number of different cases of dialogue one of which is “the Burton experiment between Greek community and Turkish Community over the conflict in Cyprus”. In this experiment, social scientists were included and were “asked questions designed to clarify the positions of different participants” particularly “[providing insight into why a solution favored by one side was objectionable to the other” (1997, 154). Cultural and religious translators fulfill a similar role.
to those arguments (94). This is due to their expectation that the experts would provide good and strong oppositional arguments and, thus, careful listening is needed to find good rebuttals (97). Paradoxically, the same careful listening can have the (unintended) effect of being persuaded by that argument (94). A relatively similar process took place during the course of the Taylor-Bouchard Commission (see Chapter 1 for more details). At times the commissioners would engage in a kind of education as scholars about the nature of historical discrimination, for instance, to facilitate discussion at forums in local communities.

In a deliberation under conditions of deep diversity where the parties might view each other, their values and practices, as well as opinions and perspectives as not only dissimilar but strange and perhaps disconcerting, cultural translators that would be placed in the deliberation as intermediaries providing expert translation can assist in increasing cross-cultural awareness184.

Indeed, a fast-paced process of gaining cultural perspective awareness could be arranged during a deliberation with the use of cultural translators. Participants might start with a basic “awareness of superficial or very visible cultural traits” otherwise known as “stereotypes”. As the translator guides the participants through drawing connections and similarities between practices and traits - or at least between the feelings and convictions attached to certain traits and practices even if the traits and practices are too dissimilar - the participants can move towards an “awareness of significant and subtle cultural traits that contrast […] with [their] own”. Finally, a

184 This is a similar point by scholars in the field of negotiation. Negotiators are often told to learn to “understand and speak” the language of the other party even if the negotiation is not taking place in a cross-cultural context. Idea is that “when you speak the other side’s language, you not only build a sense of kinship; you also signal that you care about there needs and are interested in building a long-term relationship” (Malhotra & Bazerman 2007, 97). In a deliberation with a cultural translator, this sense of kinship is mediated by not only the facilitator but also by the cultural or religious translator.
successful translation might get participant close to an “awareness of how another culture feels from the standpoint of the insider” (Hanvey 1976, 2004, 15).

6.4 Deliberative worth

The facilitative treatment of deliberative worth exercises can be utilized in order to discourage divestments such as insufficient attempts at respect, understanding, or recognition, cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action as well as to encourage investments such as respect, empathy, listening to and incorporating views of others, reflection, and even attempts at a productive dialogue.

Deliberative worth exercises work as follows: much like all deliberations, participants will be made aware of the ground rules of the deliberation - if they do not draft the rules themselves - at the beginning of the deliberative process. These rules would include simple civility instructions: do not interrupt others, do not personally attack participants, listen to each other respectfully and carefully, give reasons for why you believe something, among others. At the end of each round of deliberations (can be 15 minutes or one whole day), participants will be asked to write down the name of a fellow participant they deem to have been the best deliberator and one sentence explaining why that was the case.\textsuperscript{185} They will be reminded of the guide based on which they would decide who best engaged in the deliberation following the rules (i.e. made investments in deliberative capital).\textsuperscript{186} This is followed by the facilitator collecting the names and reasons, reading them to the group, and keeping a tally during the deliberative process.

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\textsuperscript{185} For instance, “Sarah because she made sure that more quiet people—like me—got a chance to say what wanted to say by asking us directly”.

\textsuperscript{186} This is similar to the reflection sessions at the end of session of dialogue described by Pearce and Littlejohn: “In most cases, toward the end of the session, participants are asked to reflect on their process. They maybe asked what they have done or refrained from doing to make the conversation go as it did. This gives them an opportunity to identify and acknowledge their specific contributions to the dialogue. A final open-ended question usually elicits allusions to aspects of the dialogue that were especially valued” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 189).
While this might seem to be a rather trivial practice, it operates by tapping into real cognitive, psychological, and emotional needs of people and reinforcing the cycle of investment in deliberation, not only for oneself but in the way one deliberates, others’ investments too.

The particular problem that this facilitative treatment can address is the possibility—if not the tendency—of participants forgetting about the norms and rules of deliberation. Utilizing this facilitative treatment means that in addition to, and perhaps instead of, the constantly reminding them, participants become cognizant and internalize these norms.

The rationale behind using deliberative worth exercises is based on the insights from both deliberative democratic literature as well as the literature dealing with the notion of face and face-saving actions.

Within deliberative democracy, in particular, Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw (2002) and Bächtiger et al. (2010) discuss the process of delaying actual deliberation—sequencing deliberation—by incorporating “alternative forms of communication [occurring] in earlier stages of communicative processes” (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 59). This “period of ‘dialogue,’ defined as an open-ended discussion in which participants do not try to solve a problem but instead simply try to understand each other's experiences, languages, and ways of thinking and arguing” (Mansbridge et al. 2006, 8) can be seen as way to teach the participants about the norms and rules of deliberation and getting them to internalize those norms and values. This is similar to deliberative worth exercises in the sense that both are tailored to teach and embed the norms and values of deliberation.

The literature on face and face-saving highlights the degree to which people generally try to maintain their image. Face can be defined as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (Goffman
1967, 9; Goffman 2003, 7). Since it only becomes a matter in social interactions, face as a loaned object from society, can and “will be withdrawn unless [she] conducts [herself] in a way that is worthy of it” (Goffman 1972, 322). Expressions such as “lose face” or “save face” are familiar to us. We prefer not to lose face but rather save it—keep up that self-image in front of others to the best of our abilities187. While there are cultural differences in approach to face and face-work, generally, “people in all cultures try to maintain and negotiate face in all communication situations” (Ting-Toomey 2009, 372)188.

There are a number of reasons a person might be motivated to save her face—her image or her subject evaluation of herself. Face-saving can motivate people to act in a way that would protect their face and promote its continuation and acceptance by others as well as oneself. For example, if I pride myself as being a person who is devoid of prejudice against gay couples and I am, more or less, acknowledged and well known by my social circle as being so, then I will be motivated to stop myself from making disparaging comments about a gay couple who is engaged in overt public displays of affection on the subway; even if, for example, I would make such comments about a heterosexual couple under similar circumstances. The desire to save one’s face can stem from a number of factors: my personal emotional or cognitive connection and fondness for that particular image, the “pride and honor” that are potentially associated with that image, as well as the influence and sway that particular image has on others (Goffman 2003, 8). Using the example above, my disparaging comments could make me realize that I am not as

187 It is worth noting that this saving face or losing face refers to both our desire to be seen in a positive light by others as well as the desire not to be negatively imposed upon by others. The first is a “desire for approval” and the second is a “desire for autonomy” (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987 in Lim and Bowers 1991, 416).
188 While concerns with face and face-negotiation occur in every culture, there are differences between them. As Ting-Toomey argues, “in individualistic cultural communities, there may be more situations that evoke the need for independent-based actions” whereas “in collectivistic communities, there may be more situations that demand the sensitivity for interdependent-based decisions” (Ting-Toomey 2009, 374).
unprejudiced as I thought I was and therefore feel chagrined and discomforted by the realization. Furthermore, I would lose my image in front of others. They would no longer view my face as an unblemished fair person. My feelings of pride and self-regard would also be reduced as a result of my face-endangering action.

Similarly, within a deliberative setting—especially one with explicit ground rules regarding the desired norms and behaviours—participants can be encouraged to engage in face-saving strategies based on the need “for others to acknowledge their friendliness and honesty” and to see them as “’likeable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘friendly’, ‘agreeable’, ‘cooperative’, ‘alike’, and ‘affiliated’” (Huang 2014, 180). Therefore, a participant can be motivated to participate in a way that would put forth and sustain an image of her as reasonable, fair, polite, considerate, agreeable rather than unreasonable, prejudiced, uncivil, boorish, and obnoxious. This can push participants to become self-policing in their attitude and become better deliberators. This can contribute to a reduction of cycles of divestments if it does not kickstart investments. It can be instrumental in the creation of a safe space for participants to feel at ease and have a conversation with fewer worries of deliberation becoming overly uncomfortable and uncivil.

While there is benefit in getting the tensions, disagreements, hurt feelings, anger, and frustrations out during the course of deliberation, the manner in which this process happens matter a great deal. Civility induced by face-saving exercises can delay the real issues from surfacing. It can dampen the passion that arises in deliberations with parties and over issues that matter deeply to people. It can curb the rightful anger that needs to be voiced in conversations about a history fraught with discrimination, oppression, and marginalization. But it can also
reduce and penalize hurtful, negative, and damaging comments and behaviours that can surface during a deliberation as well.\textsuperscript{189}

An informal, and limited, deliberative worth exercise already takes place in the larger public sphere. For the most part, it is of little wonder or surprise that after making marginalizing comments (i.e. racist, sexist, homophobic), politicians as well as others in the public eye are often forced to distance themselves from those comments, apologize, make attempts at amends, and, perhaps even, resign from whatever position they previously held. Within the larger public sphere, overtly uncivil and offensive utterances are often penalized. Within small-scale deliberative engagements, however, the same process occurs but in a different manner.

Small-scale deliberative engagements are structured conversations. They are part of the larger public sphere and yet different from it. While blatantly impolite participants will not have the option of distancing themselves from their comments, they can be pushed to apologize, and, in extreme cases, they can be asked to leave the deliberation. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 3, the role of the facilitators within deliberation is to ensure a modicum of civil conduct. What the structured nature of small-scale deliberative engagement, unlike the larger public sphere, offers us is the chance to motivate the opposite—to provide a carrot rather than simply using the stick.

Deliberative worth exercises can be utilized to incentivize good behaviour and help start or continue cycles of investment in deliberative capital. The more participants invest (even if it to be seen as a good deliberator and to save face), the more investments become the norm of the

\textsuperscript{189} Similar sentiments on both sides have been noted in the literature. Most notably, Mark Warren has argued for a degree of “deliberative diplomacy” “when issues are at their most sensitive and conditions of discourse less than ideal” (Warren 2006, 164) even if the diplomacy means that the conversation is not as sincere as required by Habermas’s ideal speech situation of least communication distortion. Conversely, Abigail Williamson and Archon Fung have posited the opposite that, at times, the “overemphasis on civility may prevent the airing of important criticisms” (Williamson and Fung 2005, 48). Since these concerns (on both sides) have been noted in the literature, I do not see deliberative worth exercises as, somehow, earth-shattering to the practice of deliberative democracy.
deliberation. Since participants will be made aware of the rules (i.e. different investments they should make) in order to make their evaluations, deliberative worth exercise can bring about investments such as justification, productive conversation, listening to and incorporating the views of others in addition to simple respect and civility. As investments rise, deliberative capital increases and deliberation becomes better, more considered, and more civil.

I have established, by looking at the literature, that the use of facilitative treatments may be justified by their results in a deliberation. It is, at this point, important to acknowledge and address two facts. First, there are a number of ways in which the use of facilitative treatments can unsettle some deliberative democrats. Second, there a number of other potential facilitative treatments offered by other scholars of deliberative democracy. In the following sections, I will, first, address the potential challenges to facilitative treatments; and, second, discuss the other facilitation methods discussed in the literature through the lens of a deliberation conducted under conditions of cultural and religious difference.

6.5 Conclusion

There are a number of important considerations about which we need to remain cognizant. First, I do not claim that these facilitative treatments, even if utilized in the best way possible, will lead to perfect deliberation in small-scale deliberative engagements nor do I claim that without them a deliberation will be disastrous or futile. What I am saying, however, is that these are among the tools in the facilitation toolbox. They can be used in order to improve the conditions; to end the cycles of destructive divestments; and to perhaps start and/or maintain the virtuous cycles of investments that we know instinctively and empirically are necessary for a high quality of deliberation and an open and comfortable atmosphere for carrying out conversations that can otherwise be stressful and harmful.
Second, many, including scholars of deliberative democracy and multiculturalism, might view their use to be an unnecessary interference in the deliberative process. Indeed, Jaramillio and Steiner (2014) view active facilitation as an interference. However, most deliberations are facilitated. It is, indeed, difficult—if not impossible—to have a deliberation that is tasked with producing a tangible product (a set of recommendations for a city’s budgeting priorities or a new electoral system) without facilitators who can ensure that the deliberation is staying on track and the conversation is progressing towards an end-result. Similarly, it is just as difficult to have a deliberation over a topic that can bring up divergent and, often, oppositional views ingrained in people’s cultural and religious identities and values without a moderator who can ease the conversation and ensure that basic rules of civility are upheld. Facilitators often have to feel their way and devise solutions on the spot during a deliberation. Facilitative treatments are an extension of the work already being done by facilitators and moderators during a deliberation.

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190 Facilitative treatments will undoubtedly add a layer of regulation in the deliberative process. This might be of concern to those who are interested in the more unmonitored effects of deliberation. However, deliberation - as it is practiced in small-scale deliberative engagements today, is “regulated by an extensive and structured set of agreed rules” (Bobbio 2003, 346). These regulations determine the who (the participants who are recruited, the experts that are contracted, among others), the what (the topic under deliberation), and the how (the form of the deliberative arena, i.e. a Citizens’ Assembly versus a deliberative poll). The regulations also devise and, more or less, enforce the timeline of the deliberation (learning, discussing and making decisions phases). Regulations also structure the form of the conversations and impose (loose) rules of conversation as well as the method of decision-making (consensus, majority rule, minority reports, among others).

191 There are guidelines for facilitation and conflict resolutions. Indeed, there are handbooks, courses, and whole degrees centred around the best practices around conflict resolution. I argue, however, that the dynamics of a conversation can, sometimes, be more complex than the guidelines can encompass. Often times, facilitators devise ways of dealing with a particular issue or particular participants on the spot. John F, Forester, using in-depth interviews with different moderators and facilitators, provides a narrative of how moderators and facilitators feel their way, use different methods and humour to get the different parties to try to find moments of agreement. For more information see Forester 2009.

192 Furthermore, there are many deliberative democrats who are engaged in institutional innovations within a deliberative arena. Among the scholars that have critically evaluated the role of institutional design in deliberation, Chris Karpowitz and Tali Mendelberg merit emphasis. In particular, the work by Karpowitz et al. (2009) on the incorporation of “enclave deliberation among the disempowered within civic forums” (576) as well as those concerned with changing the institutional rules to ensure that the marginalized voices (women in particular) are heard (Karpowitz et al. 2012, Mendelberg et al 2014a, and Mendelberg et al 2014) are clear cases of how institutional innovations can benefit deliberation.
With these in mind, I turn in the next chapter to discuss an experiment that used two specific facilitative treatments discussed in this chapter: simulated representation and deliberative worth exercises carried out at the University of British Columbia between undergraduate and graduate students on the topic of whether or not religious arbitration in British Columbia should be allowed.
Chapter 7: Experiments on deliberative capital

“I think we don't all have to agree in order to have a common bond.”

~ S7P3

Considering the already-existing and continuing influx of diverse populations into Canada, and British Columbia, is religious arbitration a helpful and necessary institution for fulfilling the promises of multiculturalism or is it a hindrance to the integration of people into Canadian society? This was the question posed to 40 undergraduate and graduate students in November 2015 in deliberative experiments looking at the efficacy of facilitative treatments of deliberative worth exercises and simulated representation. In particular, I looked at whether these treatments were successful at encouraging cycles of investments in and discouraging divestments from deliberative capital\textsuperscript{193}. If the last chapter examined the empirical question of willingness to participate through a general survey, this chapter examines the empirical question of investment in deliberation once people are at the table, through deliberative experiments along with pre and post survey data. Building upon the theoretical work in both chapter 3 where I offered an abstract analysis of deliberative capital, namely what leads to investments in, and divestments from, deliberation and chapter 6 where I suggested three facilitative treatments to encourage such investments and discourage divestments, this chapter tests both kinds of theoretical claims, in practice, namely through a controlled experiment in deliberation across difference.

\textsuperscript{193} At this point, it is important to explain the reason behind not running an experiment using the facilitative treatment of cultural translation which was described in detail in Chapter 6. There were a number of reasons for this decision. First, cultural translation works best for a deliberation involving members from the different cultural and religious communities as opposed to students—which constituted the participants in these deliberative experiments. Second, cultural translation is best suited for deliberation on a topic that touches upon a particular (and often contested) cultural or religious practice or value. This not explicitly the case for religious arbitration. While religious values and practices such as unequal inheritance laws in Islam or role of women in Orthodox Judaism do come up, the topic is not expressly about those and thus, cultural translation is the optimal facilitative treatment. Third, both the added cost and time were are factors in this decision.
There are two aims in this chapter, therefore. The first is to look at deliberative capital regardless of the facilitative treatments at work in order to answer two questions about deliberation itself: are investments and divestments reciprocated within deliberation and can we see cycles of investments and divestments on the part of the participants? More specifically, what is the relationship between investments/divestments and difference—gender and visible minority status of the participants and the subjects under discussion? I argue we can draw preliminary conclusions about what leads to investment and divestment and begin to identify how gender and visible minority/religious belief impacts whether individuals invest their time by coming to a deliberation (see Chapter 5) and then how willing they are to make investments once at the deliberation table. The second aim of this chapter is to examine the impact on deliberation of certain kinds of facilitative treatments. In order to see which facilitative treatments were successful, I analyze the overall tally of investments and divestments for each deliberative session that vary in relation to the treatment used.

In the previous chapter, I posited that deliberative worth exercises could be utilized in order to discourage divestments such as insufficient attempts at respect, understanding, or  

194 At this point, two important issues related to my methodology should be noted. First is the analysis of the data. The deliberative sessions were audio-recorded with the consent of the participants and I transcribed the recordings. A preliminary coding was done manually on the transcription pages. After getting a sense of the codes—from both the theoretical work done in Chapter 3 as well as the preliminary round of coding—I entered a series of “hypothesis codes” into the nVivo program—a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software. As I analyzed the conversation, it became clear that some of the codes were indicators of different factors than the ones I originally assumed prior to looking at the dynamic of deliberation. This will be discussed later in the chapter. A final round of coding—or rather checking—was done by turning off the codes and checking to see if I would ascribe the same codes again. The second factor has to do with the data, itself. While the pre and post deliberation questionnaires include all of the participants, I have only included the transcriptions and coding data from 2 tables from each of the deliberative sessions. There are two reasons. The first has to do with the fact that on November 8th, only 10 participants showed up which meant that we could only organize two tables. In order to get a more equivalent sense of the other two days, where I was able to organize three tables, I only included two tables from each day. The second reason has to do with time constraints. I would have been able to include the third table for November 1st and November 7th deliberations but that would have meant finding a way to equalize the number of investments and divestments for 3 tables for two conditions (control and deliberative worth) and 2 tables for simulated representation.
recognition, cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action as well as to encourage investments such as respect, empathy, listening to and incorporating the views of others, reflection, and even attempts at a productive dialogue. Furthermore, I argued that in order to discourage divestments such as cognitive apartheid, rhetorical action, biased information processing, and insufficient attempts at understanding or recognition and to encourage investments such as justification, listening to others, reflection, empathy, and even attempts at a productive dialogue, the facilitative treatment of simulated representation could be used.

By looking at particular investments and divestments in three sessions during the deliberative experiment, I was able to examine if there were indications that the facilitative treatments, did what I expected them to do. The analysis of the facilitative treatments is furthered by an examination of the pre and post deliberation questionnaires administered in all of the sessions. While the transcriptions and qualitative analysis allows me to gain an understanding of deliberation as it is happening, the pre and post deliberation questionnaires offer me a glimpse at the effects of deliberation. The literature on deliberative democracy tells us that deliberation makes a difference. My interest, however, is not in the effect of deliberation per se. Instead, I am interested to see if there are differences across different facilitative treatments in political efficacy and empowerment, personal evaluations of deliberation, opinion change, empathy, and knowledge gain, among others in relation to both difference with respect to the participants in the study as well as subjects of deliberation which touch on deep difference.

7.1 Participants and procedure

The participants were all students—both undergraduate and graduate—at the University of British Columbia between the ages of 18 and 38. They were recruited through a number of
methods\textsuperscript{195}. Overall, 103 students expressed interest in participation. 61 participants expressed secondary interest in the process after more details were given. 54 confirmed their participation\textsuperscript{196}; 40 showed up to the deliberation\textsuperscript{197}. The students were divided into three groups for three different sessions of deliberation on three separate days\textsuperscript{198}. The first group of participants—14 students—constituted the control group. The second group, made up of 16 students, deliberated while the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth was utilized. The facilitative treatment of simulated representation was used with the third group of students made up of 10 students. Participants were thanked for their participation with $30 and reimbursed for additional costs\textsuperscript{199}. This study was approved by BREB\textsuperscript{200} prior to recruitment of participants.

A week before each of the deliberation days, participants were sent an information pamphlet (see Appendix E) on religious arbitration. Participants were also sent the timetable for each day, the list of discussion questions (see Appendix D), as well as rules of deliberation (see Appendix F). The three deliberative engagements were held at the University of British Columbia. The topic for all of them was whether British Columbia should allow religious

\textsuperscript{195} Methods of recruitment included: 1) Invitation question at the end of the online survey discussed in Chapter 5; 2) Advertisement posters put up around the campus; 3) Direct invitation sent to students through different departments as well as professors and instructors who I contacted; 4) Direct invitation sent to members of different student groups at UBC; 5) Advertisements in department newsletters; and 6) Advertisements in social media sites/groups of the different student clubs/organizations. The last two methods of recruitment were only used when the departments or student group presidents asked me to do so.

\textsuperscript{196} My plan was to have 18 participants for each of the deliberative settings. However, as in the case of all deliberative endeavours, not everyone showed up on the day.

\textsuperscript{197} The demographic makeup of the participants was as follows: gender: 25 female, 14 male, and 1 transgender; status as visible minority: 12 identify as a visible minority, 19 identify as not a visible minority, and 9 did not know; ethnic background: 17 participants identified as white, 13 as East Asian, 3 as South Asian, 2 as West Asian, 2 as Black, 2 as Latin American, 2 as Southeast Asian, and 4 as other; and religiosity: 7 attended religious services frequently, 3 often, 5 moderately, 12 rarely, and 13 noted that they never attended religious services.

\textsuperscript{198} The deliberations were held on November 1st (control), 7th (deliberative worth), and 8th (simulated representation).

\textsuperscript{199} This was only the case with one participant who was reimbursed for parking costs at the university.

\textsuperscript{200} BREB refers to UBC’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board which is responsible for reviewing behavioural or social sciences/humanities research, or research that may involve the study of patients or health care providers.
arbitration as a method of conflict resolution for some civil cases. All events started at 10 am and ended around 2:15 pm (depending on how long post-deliberation questionnaires took). There were three breaks including a lunch break. At the start of each of the deliberation days, participants were asked to fill out a pre-deliberation questionnaire (see Appendix B). After a short round of informal discussion aimed at reducing the stress of deliberation, participants were given general guidelines by me, the organizer, who repeated the rules of deliberation as well as the suggested questions for discussion. Audio-recording devices were used at each table on all of the days as a way to record the conversation. A limited number of notes were also taken by facilitators and given to the organizer. At the end of each day, a post-deliberation questionnaire was administered\textsuperscript{201}. All of the sessions were moderated by trained facilitators.

I have to, at this point, explain the process through which I have measured investments and divestments. As noted before, the sessions were all recorded and transcribed. Relying on the insights of Johnny Saldana’s \textit{The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers} (2009), I created a set of hypothesis codes based on the norm and anti-norm behaviour already identified by the literature on deliberative democracy. These codes correspond to Table 3.1 (page 66) and Table 3.2 (page 81) in Chapter 3\textsuperscript{202}. An initial, preliminary round of coding was done as I transcribed the audio files. This allowed me to gauge the extent to which the indicators matched the investment. For example, through this early round of coding, I recognized that instances of referring to fellow interlocutors as “we” or mentioning “us” or “our” were all

\textsuperscript{201} To see a complete list of these questions see Appendices B and C.
\textsuperscript{202} As Johnny Saldana explains: “Hypothesis Coding applies researcher-developed “hunches” of what might occur in the data before or after they have been initially analyzed. As the corpus is reviewed, the hypothesis-driven codes confirm or disconfirm what was projected, and the process can refine the coding system itself” (2009, 118).
instances/indicators of respect. I have to emphasize, as Johnny Saldana does, that “coding is not a precise science; [it is] primarily an interpretive act” (2009, 4).

After this preliminary round of coding, I inserted the codes into nVivo program and proceeded to code speech acts while listening to the audio-files at the same time. This allowed me to take note of variance and subtly of speech acts. For instance, listening to the audio files while coding allowed me to realize and recognize the difference between cutting someone mid-speech and interjecting when another participant had paused in their speech act. Finally, after this was done, I created a new copy and went through the process again to ensure the accuracy of my codes. In the following sections, I will discuss some of the findings from the studies²⁰³.

7.2 Deliberative capital

In Chapter 3, I offered a new way for us to look at the dynamics of deliberation. A key aspect to my concept of deliberative capital, similar to social capital, is the notion that investments and divestments reinforce reciprocal cycles of investment or divestment, respectively. For example, if I am cut off by one participant, I am more likely to either stop speaking and/or cut off the same participant or even another participant since I accept the behaviour to be a normal part of the deliberation process; similarly, if I am treated with respect, I am more likely to want to participate and contribute in a way that is respectful of others.

²⁰³ In the following sections, I will discuss segments from transcriptions. I have chosen to include conversation fillers such as “like” and “um” in the passage. While I am cognizant that these make reading the passages more difficult. However, there is a reason for this. Only by including them can one see the difference between a participant getting cut-off when he or she is mid-sentence or when he or she is using a conversation filler such as “um”. The difference is important.
7.2.1 Cycles of investments and divestments

So are divestments\textsuperscript{204} reciprocated? The short answer is: yes. There are definitely segments of the deliberation which signal the fact that divestments are reciprocated. While it is not possible to quantify the exact rate at which this happens, it is clear that early divestments make reciprocated divestments more acceptable over time. Therefore, when the total numbers of divestments are higher or equal to the number of investments, we can conclude that divestments are reciprocated and lead to further divestments. However, it is possible to identify the instances where divestments are instantly returned. So, what does a divestment cycle look like? The following example is taken from one of the tables in the control group:

\textit{“K1P4\textsuperscript{205}: It’s hard to tell though cause people can just as a personal thing, people just do it and... K1P3: I know, like, like... K1P5: Yeah, that’s what I am saying if it’s happening, how much is it happening? How much are we saying it happening and when. Not every single Muslim person, every Catholic, or, you know, Jewish, like... K1P4: Honestly, not everyone would do that.”}

What this example shows us is a clear example of a cycle of divestment. As K1P4 attempts to make her case, she is cut off by K1P3 who is then cut off by K1P5. At this point, before either K1P3 or K1P5 can finish off their thoughts, K1P5 is cut off by K1P4. Overall, there were thirty-one instances in the control group which was conclusively coded as a divestment cycle. Even when deliberation is generally going well—when participants are investing—divestments are returned. The following example is taken from the deliberation under the facilitative treatment of

\textsuperscript{204} Divestments, as I explained in Chapter 3, refer to instances of engagement in anti-norm behaviour.
\textsuperscript{205} As per request of most of the participants, I have refrained from using their names and, instead, use an alphanumeric signifier instead. The first letter (K, in this case) refers to the first letter of the first name of the facilitator at the table. The first number (1, in this case) refers to the date (November 1st).
deliberative worth—the focus of which was to get the participants to monitor their own
behaviour and follow the norms and rules of deliberation; in other words: to invest:

“K7P1: [TALKING OVER P5] Well that...
K7P5: ...Or is that just not arbitrated?
K7P1: I don’t know if...
K7P5: ...or solved?
K7P1: I don’t know if that needs religions arbitration because...
K7P5: Yeah
K7P1: I’m, I’m not sure but I think people who are atheists, they don’t really believe in religion, so...
K7P5: Yeah.
K7P1: As you mention, I think like...
K7P5: [CUTTING P1 OFF -- INAUDIBLE]”

This is the only instance of a cycle of divestment in the group deliberating with the
facilitative treatment of deliberative worth in place. Therefore, at face-value, this particular
divestment cycle is not overly consequential. However, as I said previously, what it does show is
that divestments are really returned. Even when the overall deliberation is going well and mostly
we see investments, single divestments are returned quickly. Moreover, while this might appear
from the transcriptions that people are trying to carry on the conversations when one person
hesitates, when listening to the audio-recordings, however, it is abundantly clear that cutting-off
is going on. Even under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation, there were seven
clear instances of divestment cycles. All of these point to the simple fact that one participant’s
behaviour affects the behaviour of all. One divestment can push a negative reciprocation that can
lead to a series of divestment cycles within deliberation.

The two examples of divestment cycles mainly concern instances of disrespect (in the
form of cutting each other off and not waiting for one’s turn). The following is an example of a
series of divestments that start with getting cut off and end with an ad hominem attack (in the
form of a straw man fallacy). It is important to contextualize the following discussion. C8P4 has
been discussing her view that not only should there be no religious arbitration but also the state should not assume any responsibility in taking on the task of teaching cultural and religious communities about their legal rights and responsibilities. She brings up the example of a teacher getting fired from a Catholic school for being a lesbian as a reason why the state should stop subsidizing religion. This conversation happens after her argument:

“C8P1: And you see, what I would love to see, I would love them to know that they can do that; I’d love to see them know that that is not legal to do what they did. And then I would love to see the justice system look at that and say—oh wait, we missed something. And then push through a bill for, or implement some law…
C8P4: … this, this is a real case.
C8P1: …that would PREVENT that from happening.

[Facilitator talking]
C8P4: So where is line drawn?
C8P1: I see this as a separate issue...
C8P4: Really? Really [LOUDER THIS TIME] I think it’s pretty clear.
C8P1: …than religious arbitration. It’s close.
C8P4: It’s pretty common.
C8P1: But I think…
C8P2: …but you saying, you saying that school doesn’t have, shouldn’t have the right to be catholic in world...
C8P4: No, no, no, I’m just saying that…
C8P2: […] their values
C8P4: No I don’t think so at all. It’s just that why are taxpayers who are not Cath—not all Catholic like, why are they funding this school?
[…………..206]
C8P1: I still think it’s important for everyone to know how to follow the law. […] educated and have the renounces to know how to follow the law; that whether or not to change that law, to […] it’s a different story…
C8P4: Not at all. it’s just that I don’t believe in giving resources to them.
C8P1: You don’t think they should know the law better?
C8P4: No that’s not what I think.
C8P1: [Laughs] No you’re right, I’m sorry. [Laughs]”

As it can be seen above, C8P1 is cut off by C8P4 who is insisting that the case she is discussing is not hypothetical but real. C8P4 who consistently cuts the other participants off is

206 I have left out the middle part of the conversation in order to keep the chapter short.
complaining that her real concerns are not being taken seriously. There is a degree of cognitive apartheid by C8P1 as well as C8P2 who cuts off C8P4 later in the exchange. Finally, this section of the dialogue ends with C8P1 making a straw-man fallacy statement by twisting the words of C8P4 and presenting them in an oversimplified and incorrect manner. Even though he apologizes, he also laughs. Divestment cycles are not created in a vacuum. While I have taken sections of a deliberation to make a point, it is important to note that the dynamics that create the more obvious instances of divestment cycles are present throughout the deliberation.

However, just as divestments are reciprocated so are investments. The following is an example of a cycle of investments in reflection and incorporation of the views of others. In an earlier part of the conversation K1P3 had discussed the main reason for his view that religious arbitration should be allowed was that since it was already happening, government regulation would add consistency and protection of rights. Much later in the discussion, K1P4 revisits this issue and adds two points to it: 1) gradual change and 2) media/publicity. What is interesting is that as soon as she does revisit the issue, K1P5 picks up on the first addition while K1P3 rephrase and repeats the second one and connects to more general principles of publicity:

“K1P4: But I would say that, umm, if they have this regulation, the government can actually, umm, because they can control probably more, they can probably ask the media to say something, or [...] where they can have press release or something. So they can actually increase awareness about everything. Umm, if you are in this case, you should get informed consent. If you are in this case, you shouldn’t force someone to do this. And, I think that would gradually change the situation. You said, people were probably doing this anyways, and without regulation, they can, they probably think, oh, that’s the only way we can do this and we’ll just force her to do it. Force this person to do it. And the government can say, like, so, umm, this actually this and this case is not right.

K1P3: Yeah.

K1P5: And maybe, gradually, people would change their [outlooks].

K1P3: Yeah. I don’t think it’s necessarily regulation. I like what your point was to bring it out, right? Make it more public.”
As the conversation continues, the same themes are picked up and repeated by other participants as well. The above example is taken from the deliberation under control conditions. There were a total of six instances where an investment cycle could be identified.

Another example, taken from the groups deliberating under deliberative worth facilitative treatment, demonstrates how participants can listen to one another and build on what the previous person has said:

“K7P6: Yeah, I'm, like, even, like, um, I don't know what to call it, Canadian law or civil law, or whatever. And that's still interpreted too. So, like, even normal law, it's like, one judge will see the law one way and on sees it another way. So, in some ways, interpretation of religious law isn't necessarily [...] just, there's, there is no one definition of any law [too]. It's always interpretative. Um, maybe you could have some kind of training or even certification; so it would verify credentials or something. This might be an option.

K7P1: So, like trained arbitrators?

K7P5: Exactly

K7P6: Yeah.

K7P2: There should be a qualification that [sort of, test or] something like that. So before [you do] arbitration, the arbitrator have to be qualified based on some standards or regulations, so in that case the [...] would have some, [a program] I guess, [...].

K7P6: Yeah, for sure.

[Facilitator asking if K7P4 has something to say]

K7P4: No, it's already been touched on. It was just that both people are gonna agree on the same arbitrator, so, like you said, it's, it's gonna be, they're verifying that person.

K7P6: Yeah.

K7P4: And then they're putting the decision in their hands. So, they're probably gonna think that person is best.

K7P5: Yeah, exactly.

K7P3: I also feel like having, like, maybe a list of options provided by the, um, somebody.

[LAUGHTER]

K7P4: As suggestions?

K7P3: Yeah.

K7P1: So that they if they don’t know anyone, it would be helpful.”

What the above example shows is a fluid conversation which transitions from K7P2 and K7P6 talking about qualifications and training for arbitrators to K7P4 emphasizing the choice of the people in picking the arbitrators. K7P3, then, adding to this, talks about having some sort of a list. K7P4 asks whether the point would be to suggest arbitrators to people seeking arbitration
and K7P1 adds the reason for such a suggestion: if people do not know an arbitrator beforehand, the list would make it easier for them to find and choose one. This is an example of six participants coming together to make one complete point about one theme.

I have to re-emphasize that it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the exact rate at which investments are returned or reciprocated but the general pattern is present. Moreover, early investments make reciprocated investments more likely and when there are a high number of investments in a deliberative setting, we can conclude that investments are reciprocated and lead to further investments. In the passages above I have identified the instances where investments are reciprocated immediately.

7.2.2 Who invests? Who divests?

The issue with respect to overall investment is the degree to which differences amongst participants impacted whether one was more likely to invest or divest? Since the pre and post deliberation questionnaires were anonymous, there was no easy way of including religiosity in the analysis, but it was possible to look at differences in investments and divestments in relation to gender and status as a visible minority.\(^\text{207}\)

In Chapter 5, I argued that on the whole, women are more likely than men to express willingness to participate in a deliberation—particularly in the case of deeply divisive issues such as violence against women in minority communities and LGBTQ policy in Vancouver.

\[^{207}\] I took into consideration the unequal ratio of male/female as well as a visible minority/not a visible minority. The analysis is based on this ratio taken into account. In order to do this, the number of investments for each category made by female participants was divided by the number of females in each group and the same was done for males. Similarly, the number of investments for each category made by visible minorities in each group and the same was done for non-visible minorities. This was the easiest way to standardize the numbers to see the average number for each category for each demographic group.
school board. In other words, they expressed more inclination to invest their time and energy to participate in such a process.

**Figure 7.1** provides an overview of the percentage of investments and divestments in the deliberations in relation to both gender and status as a visible minority. A similar pattern to the survey findings in Chapter 5 is seen here, namely women are more likely to participate but also they participate in a way that creates reciprocal cycles of investment.

**Figure 7.1  Investments and divestments by gender and status as visible minority**

When looking at investments made in all deliberative sessions (regardless of the facilitative treatment), women accounted for 57% of the investments compared to 43% made by men. In fact, when looking at all of the speech acts coded as being made by female participants, 89% were investments compared to the 64% made by male participants. The other side of the
same coin shows that women accounted for 23% of all the divestments whereas men accounted for 77% of those divestments.

What about one’s status as a visible minority? In Chapter 5, I argued one’s status as a visible minority has a varied effect on the willingness for participation in a deliberation. While on the whole, it seemed like those who identified as a visible minority were more willing to participate, in one of the statistically significant models (unspecified multicultural issue), being a visible minority made one less likely to express willingness; while, in the other (funding for cultural and religious groups), they were more willing to participate. While only 45% of all investments were made by those identifying as a visible minority—compared to 55% who did not— it is important to note that 92% of the speech acts made by those identifying as visible minorities were investments in deliberative capital compared to 73% for those not identifying as a visible minority. Based on these results—which are preliminary—women and visible minorities are better investors in deliberative capital by a significant margin. Males and those who do not identify as a visible minority are more likely to engage in divestments.

In other words, there were most instances of investments—reason-giving, respect, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, sincerity, empathy, and productive dialogue by women and visible minorities than by men and non-visible minorities. Likewise, there were more instances of divestments—no justification, biased information sharing or processing, cognitive apartheid, disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action, and unproductive dialogue by men and non-visible minorities than women and visible minorities.

### 7.3 Facilitative treatments: process

The second important question I sought to address through these deliberative experiments was whether certain kinds of facilitative treatments could encourage investments and discourage
divestments in deliberations—especially when the subject of deliberation was one that engaged issues of deep cultural difference. In order to test this, participants were divided into three groups. The first group deliberated under control conditions, the second group deliberated under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth, and the third group deliberated under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation. I will begin with a brief explanation of the procedures used for both facilitative treatments before going into detail as to the outcome in each case.

7.3.1 Deliberative worth: procedure

The second group of participants arrived in the Buchanan Penthouse, UBC on November 7th, 2015 and were told that they were going to have a conversation with one another on the issue of religious arbitration in British Columbia—particularly whether the province should consider allowing the resolution of some of the civil cases through other institutions that relied on religious rather than secular/civil law. They were reminded of the rules of the deliberation and told that at end of each session of deliberation (3 total), they, anonymously, would be asked to write down the name of a fellow participant at their respective tables whom they thought was the best deliberator—someone who best followed the norms of deliberation. They were also asked to include their reasons for their choice on the piece of paper. Aside from this instruction and the selection of the best deliberator, the deliberation proceeded as it did in the control group.

7.3.2 Simulated representation: procedure

The third group of participants engaged in their deliberation on November 8th, 2015. Participants were also discussing the question of religious arbitration but were told that after a preliminary round of deliberation, they would be partnered up with another participant at their table with whom they disagreed and given the chance to interview the other person. They were
instructed to take notes if necessary and told that in the second round of deliberation, they would be playing the role of the other participant. They were instructed to pay attention to the disagreements that they had at the table in that preliminary round of deliberation. Following that round of deliberation, the participants with the help of their facilitator at the table—who was also paying attention to the differences and disagreements—were partnered up with a fellow participant and after an interview period, they continued deliberation in their new roles, articulating a position opposite to their own. After this round of deliberation, the participants reacquired their own roles and viewpoints and deliberation proceeded normally.

### 7.3.3 Results

*Figure 7.2* gives an overall outlook of the deliberation process on issues of deep cultural difference under control conditions as compared to the ones conducted under the facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation\(^{208}\). A few conclusions can be drawn from these findings. The first is that, overall, in all of the deliberative settings, investments outnumber divestments even when the subject is divisive along cultural lines. Under control conditions without designed facilitative treatments, participants still follow the norms and rules of deliberation. It is worth keeping in mind that all of the sessions were facilitated.

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\(^{208}\) I considered not including the coding of speech acts when participants were actually playing the new roles. However, after the second round of coding I decided against this. The main reason is as follows: participants continued making investments and divestments when they were in the role-playing mode. In particular, I wanted to take note of the instances where participants took extra steps to explain and expand on a position that was not expressly discussed between the two during the interview process. I also wanted to take note and include the instances were participants were glib or when they misrepresented what the other side has said. However, I did the analysis for this. See Appendix H for the equivalent of Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 which do not include the role-playing portion. The analysis did not show any meaningful difference.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that both facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation seem to help encourage investments and discourage divestments even when discussing issues that involve deep cultural differences.\textsuperscript{209}

If one focuses on the dark red strip in each figure, it is clear that deliberative worth does a better job of curbing divestments and, when looking at the light green strips, fostering investment cycles. The third conclusion that can be drawn has to do with the divestment cycles. The bright red strip is the largest in the control group and almost impossible to see under deliberative worth. This means that the corrosive divestment cycles are most likely to occur in control conditions where participants deliberate with a facilitator but without any particular facilitative treatments; and least likely to occur when participants are particularly concerned with their behaviour and their adherence to the rules and norms of deliberation.

\textsuperscript{209}Under control conditions, 56\% of the speech acts coded were investments compared to 96\% under deliberative worth conditions and 93\% under simulated representation. Comparatively, control conditions produced 44\% divestments compared to 4\% and 7\% under deliberative worth and simulated representation conditions respectively.
While Figure 7.2 is helpful at giving us an overall look at the deliberation dynamics, it does not provide information regarding the particular investments and divestments as well as the number of instances of their occurrence. In Chapter 6, I offered a theoretical explanation as to why particular facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation would encourage particular investments and discourage particular divestments. Deliberative worth exercises make participants mindful of their behaviours knowing that others are making judgments about them based on that behaviour. This, I argue, can help encourage better behaviour. Simulated representation, meanwhile, gets the participants to switch places for a duration of the deliberation. This pushes participants to take the steps to really listen and understand their fellow interlocutors which can also encourage investments. It is, therefore, important to take a closer look at the breakdown of the investments and divestments in each deliberative session to test these theoretical claims.

What specific investments and divestments occurred in each session and to what extent did they occur? Figure 7.3 offers a breakdown of the investments in each of the deliberative sessions as well as the percentage of the speech acts coded under each category. Figure 7.4, meanwhile, shows an exploration of the component parts of the divestments.
Figure 7.3  Breakdown of the investments in each deliberative setting

- (Empathy) Control Conditions
- (Empathy) Deliberative worth
- (Empathy) Simulated representation

- (Productive dialogue) Control Conditions
- (Productive dialogue) Deliberative worth
- (Productive dialogue) Simulated representation

- (Respect) Control Conditions
- (Respect) Deliberative worth
- (Respect) Simulated representation

- (Reason-giving) Control Conditions
- (Reason-giving) Deliberative worth
- (Reason-giving) Simulated representation

- (Sincerity) Control Conditions
- (Sincerity) Deliberative worth
- (Sincerity) Simulated representation

- (Reflection & Incorporation) Control Conditions
- (Reflection & Incorporation) Deliberative worth
- (Reflection & Incorporation) Simulated representation
7.3.3.1 Deliberative worth

In the previous chapter, I posited that deliberative worth exercises can be utilized in order to encourage investments such as respect, empathy, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, and even attempts at a productive dialogue; as well as to discourage divestments such
as insufficient attempts at respect, understanding, or recognition, cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action. Compared to the control group, there was a significantly higher percentage of investments in respect (19% compared to 8%), reason-giving (30% compared to 17%), and reflection on and incorporation of the views of others (31% compared to 20%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth in effect. There was also a slightly higher percentage of instances of sincerity (8% compared to 6%) and productive dialogue (4% compared to 3%).

In particular, there were ample instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation by encouraging other participants to participate by either asking others what they thought or attempting to rephrase or repeat what others had said for the group at large.²¹⁰

For example, at one of the tables, the participants were having a discussion regarding the possibility of instituting limitations on religious arbitration through the use of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One of the participants, S7P1, was particularly silent in the conversation. This prompted self-facilitation by one of the participants:

“**S7P3:** What do you think [S7P1]?
**S7P1:** I’m not too sure.
**K7P3:** You’re not sure? What do you, what’s, what’s the, what’s the worry that you have?”

An instance of rephrasing or repeating another participant can be seen in the same group after the discussion had turned to the scope of the arbitration process—in particular, can there ever be a religious arbitration process over criminal issues. S7P5 was having difficulty phrasing her disagreement with a broad scope. S7P2 rephrased what she had been trying to say and, in

²¹⁰ In total, there were 57 instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation under deliberative worth compared to 22 under control conditions.
doing so, made it more intelligible. This, then, allowed S7P3 to add the conversation under a conceptual category which had previously been brought up:

“S7P5: But that would [...] conflict of [...] or because, um, if their religion, um, or the people, um, um, um, forgive the thief or, um, the murderer and, um, let them back into society, people that are not religious might be like, um, we deserve some type of consequence; so how, because then, um, [...] should.
S7P2: Yeah, I feel like it would conflict cause I mean, by not punishing him because the family forgives the murderer, you’re still letting the murderer back into society. And he could, or he or she could murder other people who wouldn't be so forgiving. Right? So, there are somethings where it’s like it’s, it's good to forgive people, yes; but, there does need to be a level of punishment or restriction on the person to protect other people. [...] S7P3: There’s a sort of an affectedness principle where there are some, there are some disputes which really just affect the people that are involved like, I guess even divorce doesn’t do that; because if they’re children, it affects them. But there might be some property disputes for example, that might just affect those two people; but a murder, yes it affects the family but it also affects the people who are potential victims in the future.”

These are two examples of investments taken from the deliberations under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth. Moreover, there were many instances of the participants invoking the pronouns of “we”, “our”, and “us” to refer to the deliberative group. For example:

“K7P6: One thing I don’t know [...] we haven’t gone over is the economics of it. Like, specially, um, [if it's] regulated and stuff; I guess, like, taxes and stuff like that. Like, if, if, I am, my gut feeling is economically will be a lot better than, than, the courts and things. I, like, I’d imagine it’s being more informal setting. Maybe even communities would even, would kind of [formed it] as well themselves a little bit. So I think the economics of it is probably really good for religious arbitration. Um, [I think we talked about, cause like,] I think with a lot of policies, ultimately, it really comes down to economics. It often decides whether something is implemented or not. If it’s economically sound is a big, a big part of it.
[...]
K7P4: Ok, um, yeah; economics. That was where I, I, was wondering as well. Cause the decision and the outcome, if that’s subject to appeal. Are we still saying it's subject because saving reservations, right? If the subjects appeal, will that cost more? Um, I don’t know.”

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211 There were 30 instances of participants using the pronouns of “we”, “us”, and “our” compared to 14 instances in the control group.
Both participants use the word “we” as way to bring others in the conversation: we have not talked about something; or we are still thinking of keeping reservations.

In addition to the investments in respect, there were also many investments in reflection on and incorporation of the views of others. In particular, there were many instances of opinion change. For example, K7P1 who had previously made the argument that women should not be seen as minorities within their religious communities since they freely and consciously choose to be part of that religion, made the following comment in the second round of deliberation:

“**K7P1:** Yeah, but also, like, when it comes to civil, like, conflicts maybe it’s about, like, child being taken away from the mother. And even though it’s civil but it’s something really really [sentimental to like] the mother. So maybe, like, in these cases, like, arbitration might not be a good idea.

**K7P6:** Yeah.

**K7P1:** So even though it isn’t criminal thing, but still.”

Most importantly, there were frequent investments in connecting one’s opinion to that of another, often times, by adding to what someone had previously said:

“**K7P4:** [**K7P3**] you mentioned that people should go through some kind of information session.

**K7P3:** Yeah

**K7P4:** and so, I think that’s probably key to making sure consent is understood, um, everyone’s on the same page; and so.”

K7P3 had been the one rephrasing and repeating what others had said as well as connecting her points directly to that of others. In this exchange, K7P4 is extending her the same courtesy by bringing up a point that K7P3 had brought up much earlier and then connects her own argument to it.

212 There were 195 instances of reflection and incorporation compared to 126 in the control group.

213 There were 120 instances of this investment compared to 75 in the control group.
Finally, there were many investments in productive dialogue including a mediating proposal\textsuperscript{214} by K7P4:

\textit{“K7P4: I think mediation might be a better avenue. Because arbitration is binding and there’s so many issues that can come up with this if, if, it is a binding kinda thing. But then with mediation, perhaps, is a way of, not appeasing but like dealing with, um, people’s freedom of expression and allowing them to, um, kinda, exercise that as well as giving them that legal avenue. But arbitration is so, like in my mind, I see it as such a, a very, like, decisive thing. And then, if you have arbitration and [like religious arbitration], that’s, like, a whole host of issues that can come up with that. So mediation is something that I see can be interesting.”}

This mediating proposal—interestingly on the topic of mediation—came after a disagreement in the group over the necessity of arbitration decisions being binding as well as the worry that binding decisions would leave those going without the chance to appeal the decision.

In addition to the investments, there was a significantly lower percentage of divestments in disrespect (0.6% compared to 18%), rhetorical action (1.3% compared to 10%), and cognitive apartheid (0.8% compared to 7%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth in effect compared to the control group. There was also a slightly lower percentage of instances of biased information sharing and processing (0.32% compared to 4.2%) and hermeneutical exclusion (0.2% compared to 0.9%).

While most of the deliberation under control conditions was that of investment, as discussed previously, there were many instances of divestments. In particular, one of the more troubling divestments in the control condition was that of participant(s) pushing for false consensus\textsuperscript{215} which did not occur in other sessions. The following is an exchange between two

\textsuperscript{214} There were 21 mediating proposals under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth compared to 10 under control conditions.

\textsuperscript{215} There were 12 instances of false consensus in the control group compared to only one instance under the deliberative worth treatment.
participants after one participant decides to call the other on forcing a consensus by constantly summarizing the conversation as if there was an agreement between all:

“S1P3: Ok, so we all agree.
S1P1: I don’t agree with that.
S1P3: What?
S1P1: [laughs] I think you’re trying to...
S1P3: I thought you said...
S1P1: ...come to consensus
S1P3: ...I thought you said...
S1P1: ...too quickly...
S1P3: ...you know...
S1P1: ...I think...
S1P3: ...I mean, I’m just trying to find common...
S1P1: ....Yeah, and I think that’s the problem…”

The problem with pushing for false consensus is that inherently it is a sign that participant(s) are not paying attention to the disagreements or points of contention. Indeed, they are processing the information in a way that is biased in favour of what they want to hear.

In addition, there were fewer instances of participants ignoring the real concerns of the participant talking before when participants deliberated while consciously monitoring their own behaviours\(^{216}\). The problem of cognitive apartheid whether it manifests itself in ignoring or not responding to the main concerns of the other side or changing the topic drastically, is that it antithetical to the essence of deliberation as an exchange of and response to ideas, reasons, and feelings of one another.

An example of cognitive apartheid can be seen in the following exchange. The background is as follows: K1P1 was explaining about how in Brazil—her country of origin—indigenous communities were allowed areas of control and autonomy. Her concern was that

\(^{216}\) While there were 35 instances of ignoring the real concerns of others under control conditions, there were only 3 instances of the same behaviour under deliberative worth treatment.
while this worked in Brazil, it did lead to isolation of the communities which, in her opinion, may not be suitable for Canada and religious groups. It is perhaps worth noting that K1P1 was not a very confident English speaker and did not contribute as much as K1P3 who at many times dominated the conversation:

“**K1P1:** So, it’s, I mean, it’s kind of isolation, isolation, if you do that inside the city, for instance, you create, I mean, isolated community; and, umm, they way to do the, umm, integration is not be true; cause you’re creating, umm, patches of places...

**K1P3:** But I think, I think with this is that the jurisdiction would be all of Canada. Umm, and, I mean, I think, like, where I’m coming from political science anyways, my research tends to focus on, umm, the, umm, the dissolution of the nation-state. And, umm, you know, I, I really think that, like, it’s, like, if, if they were going to say, you know, it’s only, umm, you know, in these areas, obviously, with the average, normal, umm, people, it’s only there; it’s only in their community; once you step outside the community, the, umm, the sentence still holds; right? You can’t, you’re not then exempt from whatever punishment or whatever; if you; cause it would be effectively, like, um, you know, running away to Mexico or whatever; you’d just run to, umm, so, I think, you know, making, making their jurisdiction just everywhere, um, in Canada, kind of...

Most importantly, the largest block of divestments in the control condition was that of disrespect\(^\text{217}\). While most of those were participants cutting each other off, there were a number of instances of ad hominem attacks\(^\text{218}\)—usually in shape of some participant making fun of the others’ concerns by trivializing what the other person has said. The following passage from one of the table includes both cutting as well as an example of such trivialization:

“**S1P2:** I, I don’t think there should be up to religious arbitration because that’s where you get into, un, conflicting human rights violations within the context of Canada; then, then that starts it back to Canadian society as a whole. Do we want to be that society where we allow stoning and all that? Or do we wanna, you know, maintain other stuff? I think, um, it would have to be restricted, restricted to the point where you’re not harming anybody. And again, the definition of harm is [S1P3 IS TALKING OVER HIM] [...] right?

**S1P3:** [......] [say someone] can’t drink coffee, because you’ve traumatized [because of] [S1P2 IS TALKING OVER HIM].

\[^\text{217}\] In particular, there were 115 instances of disrespect in the control group compared to four under the deliberative worth facilitative treatment.

\[^\text{218}\] There were a total of five instances of ad hominem attacks under the control conditions compare to the zero in deliberative worth conditions.
S1P2: [...] it’s not easy. It’s not an easy thing to, to just place the definition on. But I think it’s important to consider it at all times.”

In this instance, S1P3 is clearly trivializing S1P2’s concern with potential human rights violations by saying that it is somehow similar to a person banning coffee because he or she was traumatized drinking coffee.

Deliberative worth exercises also helped in cutting back the instances of rhetorical action\(^\text{219}\). In particular, there were no instances of a participant silencing others—by saying something that signals that all other options or disagreements are effectively pointless\(^\text{220}\). For example, consider the exchange below:

“S1P3: To ensure that to a certain extent, a finite extent, um, I think we, do we all agree that we cannot please everyone? [...]to do so, in a multicultural society? Do we all agree on that? [pauses] I mean, it seems kinda reasonable.  
S1P1: well, um.... 
S1P3: Um, but I mean, so then,...the question, then, that we should be considering is where we set the bar, um, how much arbitration can take place?”

In this conversation, S1P3 is responding to the argument by S1P2 that there should be some limits to religious arbitration which may not please religious communities. S1P3 who is in favour of religious arbitration “asks” others if they agree that there is no way to please everyone. He, then, positions that view as the “reasonable” one. He does not wait for others, particularly S1P1, to assent to the fact that they all agree and moves on to say that, in effect, since everyone agree with that, they can move on to the next question.

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\(^{219}\) There were a total number of 66 instances of rhetorical action under control conditions. Under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth, there were eight instances of it.\(^{220}\) There were 12 instances of silencing under control conditions.
Furthermore, there were also fewer instances of participants using the same term to discuss different ideas or running into a misunderstanding without realizing or attempting to fix it—in the deliberation with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth\textsuperscript{221}.

Deliberative worth exercises were successful at getting the participants to acknowledge the feelings of each other; engage in self-facilitation; express less negativity when disagreeing with each other; show solidarity and respect by using pronouns like “we”, “our”, and “us”; offer mediating proposals; and admit their ignorance. The fact that participants knew that others at the table were mindful of their behaviour made them more mindful of their own behaviours. Moreover, the congenial atmosphere that was created because of this mindfulness made it easier for participants to forgo professing to have all of the answers and admit ignorance about different topics. Deliberative worth exercises were also similarly able to reduce cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action as well as disrespect and unproductive dialogue.

7.3.3.2 Simulated representation

In the previous chapter, I argued that in order to discourage divestments such as cognitive apartheid, rhetorical action, biased information processing, and insufficient attempts at understanding or recognition as well as to encourage investments such as justification, listening to others, reflection, empathy, and even attempts at a productive dialogue, the facilitative treatment of simulated representation can be used. Compared to the control group, there was a significantly higher percentage of investments in reason-giving (36% compared to 17%) and respect (21% compared to 8%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of simulated representation in effect. There was also a slightly higher percentage of instances of

\textsuperscript{221} 15 instances in the control group compared to only one instance under deliberative worth conditions.
reflection on and incorporation of the views of others (28% compared to 20%) and productive dialogue (5% compared to 2%).

There were more than 2.5 times more instances of reason-giving either through offering a justification or making attempts to make what one had said before more intelligible under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation than in the control group\footnote{There were 109 instances of reason-giving in the control group compared to 288 instances of the same investment under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation. Incidentally, there were more instances of investments in reason-giving under this treatment than under deliberative worth conditions which had 189 instances of it.}. This was perhaps incentivized because of the process of facilitative treatment: participants had to do a good job of getting their positions and rationales on the table in order to find the points of agreement and disagreement; then, they had to invest further by explaining those rationales to the person with whom they were paired in order to ensure that he or she was able to represent their view in the next round; furthermore, participants in their role-reversal were motivated further to properly present, justify, and make the other side intelligible knowing that the representation of their views and rationales were in the hand of the other side; and finally, they were induced to invest in deliberative capital by justifying and making their views intelligible after the role-reversal was over in order to remind others of their original positions and take ownership of it.

Once again, providing some examples through a more qualitative analysis deepens our understanding of how this treatment leads to certain kinds of investments. The following passage is an investment in justification. However, I should add that C8P1 is actually against religious arbitration\footnote{As I noted before, I have decided to include the role-playing portion as part of the analysis because it allows me to see the degree to which participants took steps to justify the positions of others.}. He is presenting, justifying and making intelligible the view of C8P2 with whom he was partnered:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
“**C8P1:** Well, what I’m thinking is that it’s possible to have these sort of religious arbitration system as well. In fact, it’s probably better to have it, um, appointed by government or managed by government because what might be happening now is we don’t have some kind of established governmental system to to ensure that, um, appropriate people are acting as judicial individuals in arbitration. Communities might be getting together and deciding these things by themselves and they may not have as much fairness as you would get if this was a provincially or federally mandated program where, um, arbitrators are screened to some extent or you know they’re, there might more legal counsel available, um, so in a sense by by implementing this formally, might help remove problems that are happening or even more problems that are happening informally. Because people aren’t really, they don’t have any official means carrying on this process.”

Furthermore, there were ample instances of participants demonstrating their reflection on and incorporation of the views of others. In particular, there were many instances of participants amending or changing their minds throughout the course of the discussion under this facilitative treatment. Sometimes, they admitted to the change. At other times, they simply added an issue or a factor as part of their argument. In the following passage, S8P6—a strong supporter of religious arbitration—admits that he conceded a flaw in his opinion as a result of the deliberation and particularly as a result of being paired up with S8P1—an ardent opposer to religious arbitration. I have only included a fraction of his speech act:

“**S8P6:**...but then, the only thing I’ll say is that I’ve been naive in the sense that I put in so much trust into the fairness of the religious arbitrators. Believing that they would try to the best of their ability to be very, um, unbiased and fair to both parties. And deciding strictly based on, um, strictly based on what the rules are and what their opinions are.”

Moreover, there were many instances of the participants connecting their points to that of another. In the following passage, C8P4—who is against religious arbitration because she is concerned with the inequalities that it can lead to—begins her speech act by noting that her

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224 There were 226 instances of reflection on and incorporation of the views of others under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation compared to 195 under deliberative worth conditions and only 126 in the control group.

225 There were 16 instances of amending/changing one’s view under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation compared to six under deliberative worth conditions and eight in the control group.
concerns are the same as C8P1 who had talked before her and, instead, uses her time to better explain the point that C8P3—whose English was not very good—was trying to make:

“C8P4: Um, Ok. my [concern’s] pretty much like yours. So I’m just gonna, um, elaborate on Jenny's idea on religion in China. I came from Hong Kong, SO IT’S a different political system; um, and it’s supposed to be that way at least for the next 30 years; so, until then, um, so, from what I’ve known from the media is that there is no way that religious arbitration is gonna happen cause the party’s is everything and that is absolute; and I think it’s interesting to know that, there really isn’t any, I don’t think there’s even any formal religion in China as, cause, I, I think religion’s not actually allowed in China for a while; So, it brings about the idea that when we’re so used to like multicultural here in Vancouver and then, you go to another country and it’s really, when it’s just one, you, when you come to multicultural country, you can’t really accept that; if that makes any sense. So I think that’s even more sensitive topic for people.”

In addition to the investments in reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, there were also more instances of investments in respect than in the control group\textsuperscript{226}. In particular, there were quite a few instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation by asking others what they thought:

“C8P4: So, Can I say you want freedom to express your religion?”

Here, C8P4 was asking C8P3 if she could summarize her argument as such. And:

“S8P6: So can you make your points again about the whole circular oppression thing?”

This is S8P6 asking S8P1 to repeat a point that she had made earlier in order for other as well as him to understand it. Those are just two examples of self-facilitation.

It has to also be noted that in both groups deliberating under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation, there were numerous instances of investment in rephrasing and repeating the point of the other side as the participants engaged in their role-reversal. I bring this up because there was only one instance of a participant presenting her own view instead of that

\textsuperscript{226} 21\% of all speech acts coded under simulated representation were instances of respect compared to 8\% for control conditions.
of the person with whom she was paired. In fact, at times, there were many passionate exchanges
between participants presenting the views and rationales of the other side:

“S8P6: Like, the, the, on [...] degree of affectability, um, I guess, um, to a large extent, whatever
decisions are to be made, if they are binding, then, it might be a basis for constant, um, it’ll be
like a ripple effect, like—ok, this was what decision was made by religious arbitrator, and so,
this is, um, what should be happening; so, it kinda red, um, reduces the level of, um, like freedom
people have, and [...] it’s not necessarily just affecting the people who it’s between, it can also
affect the big [one?] in society; like, in property law disputes, um, and the [frankly?] things like
that. So, yeah, inherently affecting all the people’s rights, and freedoms, in the society that
you’re. Which is kinda that [...] for example. So yeah. And, and creating religious arbitrators,
you might be restricting all the people’s, um, freedoms.

S8P1: But I think that’s already, an, assuming hypothetical that you’re affecting someone else;
right? um, maybe, maybe they can be a decision between two people, right?, that if two people,
um, by their own freedom have chosen to go together through that religious arbitration, then, no-
one else is involved. Because just as there’s situation in which other people are involved also,
situations that only two people are involved. Maybe in that case, two people have decided, this is
the way to go; this is the way, the guidelines I live by. And as long as it stays in this civil area of
justice, um, why not using that? Just by assuming, um, a hypothetical [messier?] situation, that
this mean that this kinda being a simple one in which you can do this religious arbitration.

S8P6: So then do you draw the line between what religious arbitration, arbitrators would decide
upon the what they’re doing in the [...] point? Cause in the end, then, as it is becoming more of
up to them, like, what is it? Creating even more bias, but, deciding again—this is what should,
like, this [...] just more very direct [...], in the sense that it can just create more of a problem
than a solution.

S8P1: I guess also the arbitrator could see what’s, if that situation could be resolved; be a
religious arbitration. If the arbitrator in a, [...] sees that —no this issue, um, affect people
outside of the religion. Then, the arbitrator could say— [...] or their children will? or, um,
maybe, he or she, or they can make the decision.”

Most importantly, there were frequent investments in productive dialogue, particularly,
participants were more likely to make concessions and show willingness to compromise. For
example:

“S8P1: I would say, maybe we could implement religious arbitration. Since, it’s already there,
it’s no point to analyze it. But then, I would make point in getting rid of it at some point in the
future.”

and,

“C8P1: Ok. Now I concede that that’s a good example where arbitration could work.”
and,

“C8P2: But I’m saying, I’m, I am the one willing to compromise.”

However, based on the results from these two sessions, there was no indication that simulated representation was actually successful at encouraging investments in empathy. There were fewer instances of investments in empathy in simulated representation than either the deliberation under control conditions or under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth. It might be that while simulated representation allows participants to understand the rationales of the other side better, it does not achieve the same results when it comes to others’ feelings. But it could also be that the exercise (interview and role-reversal) puts a great deal of cognitive effort on the participants who feel like they must learn as much as they can and worry about misrepresenting the other side. Therefore, there are fewer chances for emotional connection. In fact, there is evidence of such worries:

“C8P1: What if we strongly accidentally misrepresent the other person’s perspective? Like a straw man sort of thing?”

and,

“S8P2: Can I be me for this answer? [...] Because I don't know what she would think about.”

There is also the possibility that there were not a larger percentage of empathy in the simulated representation condition because the participants felt like it did not need to be stated as they knew that in that condition, they would need to be more empathetic and they could focus on other issues instead of making explicit speech acts that were empathetic.
In addition to the investments, there were significantly fewer instances of biased information processing, cognitive apartheid, disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action when participants deliberated under the facilitative treatment of simulated representation than when they were deliberating under control conditions.

I have already given some examples of such divestments in the control conditions. Therefore, I will only highlight the most corrosive which were limited under simulated representation: cognitive apartheid, and rhetorical action. The following is an instance of cognitive apartheid:

“K1P2: Umm, I think. it was mentioned by you, earlier [K1P3], how would it be funded? So, it would add an extra cost. That would be a con.
K1P3: I would almost put that as a pro though. because, umm, in this way, like it’s the people who want to go through the religious arbitration. like I don't have to pay for your religious arbitration. right? I don't have to pay for your, umm, I see this as being in the public domain, umm, oh sorry, the private domain.”

What is interesting about this example is that K1P2 is actually bringing in an issue that K1P3 had brought up earlier in the conversation regarding the costs associated with religious arbitration. K1P3 does not change the topic but ignores what K1P2 had been trying to reiterate: there are costs associated with a state-sanctioned and institutionalized religious arbitration process particularly one, that based on the previous conversations, would provide legal counsel and would have strict regulations to ensure that the process and outcomes did not violate human rights. K1P3 is not only ignoring what K1P2 is trying to put on the table but is actually guilty of

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227 There were 27 instances of biased information processing under control conditions. There was only one under simulated representation.
228 There were 12 instances of cognitive apartheid under simulated representation, compared to that of the control condition: 43.
229 There were 115 instances of disrespect under control conditions. There were 27 instances when participants deliberated under simulated representation.
230 There were six instances of hermeneutical exclusion, compared to 15 which occurred under control conditions.
231 There were 66 instances of rhetorical action under control conditions. There were 15 under simulated representation.
cognitive dissonance. As a strong believer in state-regulated and controlled religious arbitration, K1P3 sees the process as one that would be state-sanctioned and yet within the private domain. The issue of cost is not revisited until much later in the deliberation and is not discussed fully when it is brought up.

Just as cognitive apartheid can halt the exchange of ideas and an examination of their pros and cons, so can rhetorical action. The following exchange comes after one of the participants, S1P5, raises the issue that each religion has many sects and that this might mean different arbitrators for different sects. Her question was whether, in a diaspora made up of very few people in one particular sect, people would be able to find arbitrators? And whether this inequality—effectively allowing some religions to solve problems via religious arbitration while closing down the option for smaller sects, and religions—should be seen as an argument against religious arbitration:

“**S1P1**: Hmmm, yeah.
**S1P4**: It’s a good question.
**S1P3**: Is there a question? Don’t we all agree no?”

Here, S1P3 is actually shutting down the possibility that this is even a question worth bringing up. A contextual factor that makes such a divestment particularly problematic is that both S1P4 and S1P5 had difficulties with speaking comfortably in English and, therefore, did not speak much throughout the deliberation. One of the few times that they did, they were effectively silenced by S1P3. The facilitator was able to bring the issue up again for recapitulation. However, the divestment is still problematic.

Simulated representation was successful at getting the participants to participants to really justify their positions and make sure that others understand them. It was also capable of getting the participants to see more areas of mediation and concession; to connect their ideas to
those of others; and rephrase and repeat the positions of others. The fact that participants were paired up and asked to present the view of others forced them to think about and better explain their own positions and allowed them to better take in and understand the rationales behind the positions of others. Simulated representation was also able to significantly reduce the number of statements made without justification and those made to promote a false consensus. Furthermore, it was able to reduce drastic topic change and rhetorical action\footnote{232 I have include the breakdown of these investments/divestments with their sub-categories for each deliberative setting in Appendix H.}.

### 7.3.4 Effects of facilitative treatments on different demographic groups

In the previous section, I provided an overview of the different investments that deliberative worth exercises and simulated representation encourage and the particular divestments that are reduced when participants deliberate under such facilitative treatments; and earlier on in the chapter I gave an overview of the investments and divestments as they related to the gender and visible minority status of participants. In this section, I put these two questions together and examine more closely, the effect of facilitative treatments in relation to encouraging investments and discouraging divestments by both men versus women and by those who identify as visible minorities versus those who do not.

**Figure 7.5** summarizes the percentages of investments and divestments by gender in each deliberative session. Looking at this figure, it becomes clear that the percentage of investments for both men and women increased under facilitative treatments; for men the increase is particularly dramatic. In the control condition, men and women were different, as discussed earlier, with men doing more divestments and less investments than women. However, the facilitative treatments wipe out this gender difference. Under facilitative treatments, however, the
same percentage of the speech acts by men and women were investments and divestments. While the results are exploratory, it seems that facilitative treatments encourage investments with a dramatic effect on men in particular.

**Figure 7.5 Investments and divestments by gender in each deliberative setting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Divestments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female (in control)</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-visible</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (in control)</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-visible</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (in deliberative worth)</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-visible</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (in deliberative worth)</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-visible</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (in simulated representation)</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-visible</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (in simulated representation)</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-visible</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7.6** summarizes the percentages of investments and divestments by status as a visible minority in each deliberative session. Looking at this figure, it is clear that the percentage of investments for visible minorities and non-visible minorities increased under facilitative treatments. In the control condition, visible minorities and non-visible minorities were also different, with non-visible minorities doing more divestments and less investments than visible minorities. However, deliberative worth exercises wipe out this difference altogether but non-visible minorities in the simulated representation condition were not quite as positively affected by this treatment as under deliberative worth.

**Figure 7.6 Investments and divestments by status as a visible minority in each deliberative setting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Divestments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority (in control)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Visible minority (in control)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority (in deliberative worth)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Visible minority (in deliberative control)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority (in simulated representation)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Visible minority (in simulated representation)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What these breakdowns show is that, under control conditions (that is with no facilitative treatment), men and non-visible minorities made the most number of divestments and facilitative treatment offsets this in a significant way. Deliberative worth in particular was effective with these two groups by reducing their divestments and hence increasing deliberative capital. Simulated representation has similar but slightly less effective consequences. It is important to note that these findings are based on a qualitative analysis of the data.

7.3.5 Facilitative treatments: outcomes

In the previous sections, I have demonstrated that deliberative worth exercises were successful at increasing investments in empathy, respect, productive dialogue, and sincerity; and decrease respective divestments in rhetorical action, disrespect, unproductive dialogue, cognitive apartheid and hermeneutical exclusion. Furthermore, I showed that simulated representation was effective in increasing investments in reason-giving, productive dialogue, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, and even respect. It was also able to reduce cognitive apartheid and rhetorical action, among other divestments. In both cases I showed that these facilitative treatments had a disproportionate and positive impact upon men and non-visible minorities.

In this section, I analyze the outcomes of the deliberation based upon data gathered from pre and post deliberation questionnaires, which allow us to get at the effect of deliberation (in contrast to the transcriptions analyzed above which offered us a glimpse into the process of deliberation). Do these pre and post deliberation surveys, on the effect of deliberation, reinforce or contradict what we learned above from analysis concerning the process of deliberation? Thus, I examine whether the facilitative treatments increased the likelihood of certain expected outcomes generally associated with deliberation, namely: increased political efficacy, increased
empathy, opinion change\textsuperscript{233}, increased knowledge, and favourable attitudes towards deliberative process including willingness to participate in future deliberations.

\textbf{7.3.5.1 Political efficacy}

First, I analyzed participants’ responses to the following statement (before and after the process of deliberation): “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on”\textsuperscript{234}. Overall, there was a statistically significantly mean increase of 0.3 points (from 0.1 to 0.4; \(p=0.012\)) in all groups. When divided by different groups, the largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.44 (from 0.12 to 0.56; \(p=0.03\)). The smallest effect was seen under control conditions (0.21 to 0.36; \(p=0.43\)). There were also moderate gains (0.3 points) increase under simulated representation (\(p=0.28\)). Thus, the larger increases in political efficacy was under deliberative worth exercises, perhaps because the more congenial atmosphere under deliberative worth better enables participants to view contributions to political conversations and decision making as easy and manageable. In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the overall change in political efficacy. The results can be seen in Table 7.1.

\textbf{Table 7.1 Effect of facilitative treatments on political efficacy}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
                                & Coefficient & Standard error & P-value \\
\hline Deliberative worth treatment  & 0.29        & 0.27           & 0.278  \\
Simulated representation treatments & 0.16        & 0.30           & 0.607  \\
—Constant                      & 0.14        & 0.20           & 0.469  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{233} I am fully cognizant that opinion change is not a marker of high quality deliberation. In fact, it could be evidence of a loss of autonomy in holding ones beliefs. However, a change is still interesting and worthy of study.

\textsuperscript{234} The variable is coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2).
Compared to the control group, there was a 0.29 units increase in political efficacy under deliberative worth and 0.16 units increase under simulated representation, but the results, are not statistically significant, probably because of the small sample size (40 across all three groups).

### 7.3.5.2 Decision-making ability

Secondly, the participants were asked about their expectations regarding the ability of the group to make a decision before the deliberation and asked about their assessment of the same ability after the deliberation\textsuperscript{235}. Overall, there was a statistically significantly mean increase of 0.4 points (from 0.6 to 1; \textit{p}=0.007) across all groups. When divided by different groups, the largest increase was under the control group: an increase of 0.64 (from 0.43 to 1.07; \textit{p}=0.022). There was an increase of 0.44 under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth (0.625 to 1.06; \textit{p}=0.048). There was no difference under simulated representation (0.8 to 0.8; \textit{p}=1.000). The results from the simulated representation are not surprising. The more people understand both sides, and the more they think that everyone understands both sides, it becomes more likely for someone to think that decision-making will not be any easier.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the overall change in decision-making ability. The results can be seen in Table 7.2.

**Table 7.2 Effect of facilitative treatments on decision-making ability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>\textit{P}-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{235} Both variables are coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2).
Compared to the control group, there was a 0.21 units decrease in evaluation of decision-making ability under deliberative worth and 0.64 units decrease under simulated representation. However, the results, unfortunately, are not statistically significant. This is likely the result of the small sample size (40 across all three groups). Figure 7.7 shows the effect of deliberation on these two factors for each group.

Figure 7.7 Effect of deliberation on political efficacy and decision-making ability

7.3.5.3 Interpersonal reactivity index: empathy

The participants were asked a series of questions from Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1983) gauging their empathic response before and after deliberation. The participants were presented with seven questions gauging their empathic concern scale before and after the deliberation. There was almost no significant difference between the empathic response of

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236 These included: I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me; Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems; When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them; Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal; When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them; I am often quite touched by things that I see happen; and I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. All variables are coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2).
participants before or after deliberation. This is not surprising considering that a very small percentage of the investments made in each of the deliberative sessions was in empathy. Only 3% of all investments in the control group and under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth were investments in empathy. The number is even lower under simulated representation: 1.3%.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the overall change in empathic concern. The results correspond to the findings above. The results are summarized in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Effect of facilitative treatments on empathic concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared to the control group, there was a 0.02 units decrease in empathic concern under deliberative worth and 0.03 units increase under simulated representation. However, the results, unfortunately, are not statistically significant. This is likely the result of the small sample size (40 across all three groups).

Furthermore, the participants were presented with seven questions gauging their perspective-taking scale before and after the deliberation. There was almost no significant

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237 I, furthermore, created index variables made up of all of the empathic concern variables for both pre and post deliberation. There was a -0.004 difference (p=0.9498) across all groups. When divided by groups, the average difference between post deliberation and pre deliberation was +0.05 for control, +0.07 deliberative worth, and +0.07 for simulated representation.

238 These included: I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view; I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision; I sometimes try to understand my friends better by
difference between the perspective-taking of participants before or after deliberation\textsuperscript{239}. This was surprising considering that much of the deliberation is about the exchange of ideas and hearing the other side out. There was an almost equal increase of perspective-taking under control and deliberative worth conditions (+0.23 and +0.24 respectively) and almost no change under simulated representation (-0.01).

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the overall change in perspective-taking ability. The results correspond to the findings above. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.03 units increase in perspective-taking under deliberative worth and 0.23 units decrease under simulated representation. However, the results, unfortunately, are not statistically significant. This is likely the result of the small sample size (40 across all three groups). The results are summarized in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4  Effect of facilitative treatments on perspective-taking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, Figure 7.8 shows the effect of deliberation on empathic concern and perspective-taking for each group.

\textsuperscript{239} I, furthermore, created index variables made up of all of the perspective-taking variables for both pre and post deliberation. There was a -0.0004 difference (p=1.0000) across all groups. When divided by groups, the average difference between post deliberation and pre deliberation was +0.23 for control, +0.24 deliberative worth, and -0.01 for simulated representation.
7.3.5.4 Information gains

The participants were asked a series of questions checking their factual knowledge regarding the issue of religious arbitration as well as the legal factors surrounding the issue. All of this information was provided in the information package sent beforehand. The same questions were asked before and after deliberation to see whether deliberation increased the knowledge of the participants. There were some knowledge gains (+0.12) in participants from before to after deliberation (from 0.53 to 0.65; p=0.34). When divided by different groups, the largest increase was in the control group: an increase of 0.24 (from 0.47 to 0.71; p=0.24). The smallest effect (+0.03) was seen under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: (0.58 to 0.61; p=0.88). Finally, there were small gains (+0.08 points) increase under simulated representation (from 0.56 to 0.64; p=0.77).

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the overall information gains. The results correspond to the findings above. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.2 units decrease in information gains under deliberative worth and 0.15
units decrease under simulated representation. Both results are statistically significant. The results are summarized in Table 7.5.

Table 7.5  Effect of facilitative treatments on knowledge gain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, I looked at the number of questions in which there was a knowledge gain or loss for each of the groups. The control and deliberative worth groups had the largest number of questions for which there was a knowledge gain (5 out of 9) compared to simulated representation which had 4. The knowledge losses are more interesting. The control group had the fewest, only 1, compared to deliberative worth which had 2 and simulated representation which had 4 instances of knowledge loss. Figure 7.9 summarizes these two methods of analysis looking at the effect of deliberation on knowledge gain in each deliberative scenario.

The results are not surprising as the focus of the control group was not on the exercise. The participants were not preoccupied with either behaving properly or staying in character. This perhaps allows for the information gains that we do not see in either of the groups deliberating under facilitative treatments.
7.3.5.5 Opinion change

The participants were asked six questions before and after deliberation to see if their opinions changed as a result of the deliberation process.

One of the questions asked participants regarding their views on whether or not religious arbitration should be allowed in British Columbia. Overall, there was no difference in opinion from pre-deliberation to post-deliberation. However, when divided by different groups, important differences came to light. The largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.25 (from 0 to 0.25; p=0.04). This was followed by simulated representation where, unlike deliberative worth, participants became 0.2 points less supportive of religious arbitration as a result of the deliberation (from 0 to -0.2; p=0.17). The smallest change was seen in the control group (from 0 to 0.14; p=0.34).

---

The variable was coded from never allowed (-1) to always allowed (1).
In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the opinion change on this question. The results correspond to the findings above. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.39 units increase in support for religious arbitration under deliberative worth and 0.06 units decrease under simulated representation. The results are summarized in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6  Effect of facilitative treatments on general support for religious arbitration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another question asked participants whether they thought that the procedural rules and oversight by Canadian courts can ensure that vulnerable groups are protected under religious arbitration\(^{241}\). Overall, there was very little difference (+0.075) in opinion from pre-deliberation to post-deliberation. Once again, when divided by different groups, important differences came to light. The largest, and only positive, increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.25 (from 0.31 to 0.56; p=0.26). This was followed by simulated representation where, unlike deliberative worth, participants became 0.1 points less convinced that procedural rules and courts could protect vulnerable groups as a result of the deliberation (from 0.4 to 0.3; p=0.78). There was no change in the control group. Figure 7.10 summarized the results of these two first questions gauging opinion change.

\(^{241}\) The variable is coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2).
In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the opinion change on this question. The results are summarized in Table 7.7. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.25 units increase in belief in the efficacy of procedural rules in protecting vulnerable groups under deliberative worth and 0.01 units decrease under simulated representation. Both results are statistically insignificant, however.

Table 7.7  Effect of facilitative treatments on views on efficacy of procedural rules and courts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.3289814</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.3722</td>
<td>0.790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>-6.94E-17</td>
<td>0.240254</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other questions gauged the participants’ views on religious arbitration and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—particularly on sections of the Charter which deal with equal treatment, religious freedom, and multiculturalism. Two questions, which were merged for the purposes of analysis, asked the participants whether they believe that religious arbitration should
be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism; and then, as part of Canada’s commitment to freedom of religion.

The largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.37 (from 0.97 to 1.34; p=0.16). This was followed by the control group where there was an increase of 0.22 points as a result of the deliberation (from 0.57 to 0.79; p=0.49). The smallest change was seen in simulated representation (from 0.35 to 0.4; p=0.94).

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the opinion change on these two questions as one merged question. The results are summarized in Table 7.8. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.16 units increase in belief that religious arbitration should be considered as part of Charter’s commitment to freedom of religion and multiculturalism under deliberative worth and 0.16 units decrease under simulated representation. Both results are statistically insignificant, however.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other two questions, which were also merged for the purposes of analysis, asked the participants whether they believe that religious arbitration should not be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to equality between persons; and then, as part of Canada’s commitment to procedural legal equality.

As it can be seen, the largest decrease was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: a decrease of 0.53 (from -0.2 to -0.7). This was followed by the simulated representation
group where there was an decrease of 0.3 points as a result of the deliberation (from 0.25 to 0.55). The smallest change was seen in the control group (from -0.18 to -0.25).

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the opinion change on these two questions as one merged question. The results are summarized in Table 7.9. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.46 units decrease in belief that religious arbitration should not be considered as part of Charter’s commitment to personal and legal equality under deliberative worth and 0.23 units decrease under simulated representation. Both results are statistically insignificant, however.

Table 7.9  Effect of facilitative treatments on opinion: “religious arbitration should not be allowed because of Charter’s commitment to personal and legal equality”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatments</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.11 summarizes the results of these two merged questions gauging opinion change.

Figure 7.11  Effect of deliberation on opinions on religious arbitration and Charter values
I can conclude based on the questions gauging opinion change that deliberative worth was the most successful at creating the conditions for real opinion change. Perhaps the less adversarial atmosphere of deliberative worth allowed participants to really take in what was being said and change their opinions as a result.

7.3.5.6 Participants’ evaluation of deliberation

The participants were asked a series of questions after the deliberation asking the participants to offer their evaluations of the deliberation on a number of factors. In the next section, I will summarize these findings in order to see if there was any significant difference between these evaluations depending on the facilitative treatments. Instead of going into detail about all of these, I will only touch on the main questions as well as those were there is a significant difference between the three conditions.

The participants were asked about their satisfaction with the process and outcome of deliberation. As it can be seen in Figure 7.12, on the whole, there was not much difference between any of the groups. Participants were, on the whole, very satisfied with the process and outcome of deliberation. This may signal that the facilitative treatments do not make an overall difference in the satisfaction of the participants with the process and outcome of deliberation.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on satisfaction with the process (Table 7.10) and satisfaction with the outcome (Table 7.11). Compared to the control group, there was a 0.25 units decrease in the satisfaction with the process and 0.17 units decrease in satisfaction with outcome of deliberation under deliberative worth. There was an insignificant increase (1.4e-16) in satisfaction with the process and 0.04 units increase in satisfaction with outcome under simulated representation. All results are statistically insignificant, however.
Figure 7.12  Participants' evaluation of deliberation

Table 7.10  Effect of facilitative treatments on satisfaction with process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>1.40E-16</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.11  Effect of facilitative treatments on satisfaction with outcome

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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However, as it can be seen in Figure 7.12, there were significant differences between the evaluation that only a few participants dominated the discussion between the different conditions. It is perhaps not at all surprising that a very small group of participants deliberating under deliberative worth conditions believed that only a few dominated the discussion since the treatment encouraged the participants not to engage in such a behaviour. It is also unsurprising that a large majority deliberating under control conditions believed otherwise.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the evaluation that only a few dominated the conversation. The results are summarized in Table 7.12. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.51 units decrease in this evaluation under deliberative worth. There was also a 0.27 unit decrease this evaluation under simulated representation. All results are statistically insignificant, however.

Table 7.12  Effect of facilitative treatments on evaluation that only a few people dominated the conversation

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treatments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Participants were also asked whether they believed that as a result of the deliberation, their opinions on the topic changed. This was different from the questions that actually looked at
their opinions before and after deliberation. What is surprising is that while the questions looking at actual opinion change showed that it was under deliberative worth that we saw the largest degree of opinion change, when participants were asked about their subjective evaluation of opinion change, there was a significant difference. Participants deliberating under simulated representation expressed the most amount of change and those deliberating under deliberative worth expressed the least degree of it.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the participants’ evaluation that their views changed as a result of the conversation. The results are summarized in Table 7.13. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.15 units decrease in this evaluation under deliberative worth and 0.14 units increase under simulated representation. Both results are statistically insignificant, however.

<table>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
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While I am not surprised by the results of simulated representation—after all, role-playing could have achieved this—the results for deliberative worth are surprising and hard to explain. Perhaps, what this question gets at are the basic values of participants that remained unchanged even though the nuances of their opinion did change.

Similarly, participants were asked if they believed that the deliberation helped them empathize with others and their views. While the actual empathy questions showed no real difference between control conditions and facilitative treatments and actually showed that
simulated representation decreased perspective-taking ability, participants’ subjective views show a different story. As it can be seen in Figure 7.12, participants deliberating under simulated representation were much more convinced that the deliberation made them empathize with others than those who deliberated under deliberative worth.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on the participants’ evaluation that as a result of the conversation, they learned to empathize more. The results are summarized in Table 7.14. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.27 units decrease in this evaluation under deliberative worth and 0.16 units increase under simulated representation. Both results are statistically insignificant, however.

Table 7.14  Effect of facilitative treatments on evaluation that the process helped one empathize more

<table>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Constant</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</table>

Finally, when participants were asked if they would be open to participating in the future, there was a small amount of difference between the groups. As it can be seen in Figure 7.12, participants who deliberated under simulated representation expressed much more willingness for future participation than those deliberating under control conditions and slightly more than those deliberating under deliberative worth.

In order to test the difference between the different conditions, I ran a regression on their professed willingness for participation in future deliberations. The results are summarized in Table 7.15. Compared to the control group, there was a 0.15 units increase in this evaluation.
under deliberative worth and 0.21 units increase under simulated representation. Both results are statistically insignificant, however.

Table 7.15  Effect of facilitative treatments on willingness for future deliberation

<table>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth treatment</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulated representation treatments</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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7.4 Limitations

There are a number of limitations with this experimental study and the survey that accompanied it. Just as with the earlier survey, this one had a small sample size. There were only 40 participants divided in three groups. Moreover, the participants were all students—limiting the variance in age as well as education levels; and most likely, political and social beliefs. Moreover, all the participants are, residents of Vancouver, BC or surrounding cities creating a geographical limitation to the study.

There are two main methodological limitations with this study as well. The first has to do with the fact that I was the only coder analyzing the transcriptions. This creates two sources of bias. First, there may be a gendered pattern of interpretation of what counts as an investment or divestment. Second, during the course of coding, I simultaneously listened to the audio recordings which means that I was aware of the gender and, to some degree, the status of a participant as a visible minority or not. This could, perhaps, create a form of bias as well. Moreover, I was aware of which condition was which while coding the transcriptions. This can perhaps create a bias in favour of the facilitative treatments. I did my best to reduce this by going through the coding process at three different times. However, it would be best to have someone
(preferably more than one) else going through the transcriptions, doing coding without knowing about the conditions to ensure the accuracy of the codes. The second methodological limitation has to do with lack of replication. Due to lack of funds and time, I was not able to run each of these settings (control plus two treatments) more than once.

7.5 Conclusion

Are people capable of engaging in deliberations with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities? The results from the control group show that they are indeed capable of doing so. Are there better ways of organizing such discussions to incentive investments in deliberative capital and discourage divestments? The results from the deliberations conducted under different facilitative treatments show that the answer is yes. Is there support for the idea that investments and divestments are reciprocated within deliberations? Yes, different passages show that investments and divestments are often reciprocated and that one cycle of divestment can lead to another; as does a cycle of investment.

In this chapter, I used both coded transcriptions as well as pre and post-deliberation questionnaires to examine the dynamics within as well as effects of deliberations under control conditions compared to deliberation conducted under facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation. An important takeaway from this chapter is that contrary to the old accusation that deliberative democracy favours dominant cultures and a male-centric style of interaction, these findings show that (a) women and minorities are more deliberative in their orientations relative to men and non-visible minorities, and (b) the treatments reinforce these deliberative orientations.
Furthermore, I showed, within the caveats described above, that deliberative worth exercises were successful at increasing investments in empathy, respect, productive dialogue, and sincerity; and decreasing respective divestments in rhetorical action, disrespect, unproductive dialogue, cognitive apartheid and hermeneutical exclusion. Furthermore, I showed that simulated representation was effective in increasing investments in reason-giving, productive dialogue, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, and even respect. It was also able to reduce cognitive apartheid and rhetorical action, among other divestments. More specifically, facilitative treatments were able to reduce the divestments of men and non-visible minorities who were responsible for a significant majority of divestments under control conditions.

The pre and post deliberation questionnaires showed the strengths and weaknesses of each of these deliberative conditions. Deliberation under control conditions was the best at raising the factual knowledge of the participants. I posited that the fact that participants’ focus was not on the particularities of the facilitative treatments made it easier for them to gain knowledge. Meanwhile, deliberative worth exercises were the best at increasing efficacy; reducing the feeling that only a few dominated the conversation; and creating real opinion change in the participants. Simulated representation produced the most positive subjective evaluations of the process. While there was no increase in factual knowledge, participants felt like they had gained information. While there was no change in empathic concern, participants felt like they had come to empathize with others. And while there was no significant opinion change, participants believed that their opinions changed a result of their participation.

What this shows is that these facilitative treatments are different tools that contribute to the building of different results. There is no one fix-all or achieve-all facilitative treatment. They
do not make deliberation better all in the same way. They are tools that give the conveners and facilitators of deliberation more ways to shape deliberation in particular ways. I am fully cognizant that this can lead to the objection that it gives the conveners and facilitators too much power. However, it would be equally possible for groups of deliberators to choose the facilitative treatments on their own. They could be presented with what each of these treatments can achieve and then given the option to pick one or both at different times during deliberation.

The overall message of this chapter is that these two facilitative treatments are effective at increasing investments and reducing divestments in deliberations conducted under conditions of cultural and religious diversity in ways which have a particularly positive impact on men and non-visible minorities.
Chapter 8: Speaking theory to practice and practice to theory

On Tuesday 13 April 2010, The Dialogues Project—“a collaborative project launched by the City of Vancouver to increase understanding and strengthen relations between the city’s Aboriginal and immigrant communities” (Wong & Fong 2012, 19)—was officially launched. By 2012, more than 2000 people had participated in it. Phase 1 of the project included dialogue circles—aimed at creating a space for Aboriginal and immigrant/non-Aboriginal communities to come together and share their stories and viewpoints; community research which included both a literature review to see “what information regarding Aboriginal communities [was] available to newcomers” (21) and to recommend what was needed to fill the gap; twelve cultural exchange visits which allowed the participants to learn about each other’s experiences; youth and elders programs which hosted discussions “particularly around intercultural and intergenerational relations” (21); as well as a legacy project which gathered stories about the “diverse Aboriginal and immigrant experiences of the Grandview-Woodlands neighbourhood” (City of Vancouver). Phase 2 of the project aimed at implementing the recommendations of the communities that participated in the project.

What stood out from this project were what Wong and Fong termed “‘a-ha’ moment[s]” (20) between the participants. Particularly, the common themes or experiences that, despite their different backgrounds, all participants could identify with: “desire to seek understanding” and the “experience of racism” (20). Just as the Taylor-Bouchard commission discussed in the introduction was not the epitome of deliberative engagement, neither is this Dialogues Project. However, while the former shows how a bad environment can give rise to disrespectful and unreflective moments, the latter shows that “[if] safe and respectful talking environments are created, participants will take the time to build trust and share their experiences”—lessons from
which can inform and shape public policy (Suleman 2011, 53). In other words, it shows how conversations that touch on people’s identities can be successful.

8.1 Willingness and capacity

I started on this question by looking at the claims of cultures within multicultural liberal democracies. Susan Okin’s work on the ways multiculturalism can be bad for women (and minorities within minorities in general) was the impetus for this dissertation. Her work, while not perfect by any standard, was enough to poke holes at the literature on multiculturalism which had dominated the field; particularly works by Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor and, to an extent, James Tully. So, if multiculturalism demands accommodation and if accommodation of cultures and religions can sometimes result in an accommodation of their discriminatory practices and beliefs—either in the shape of sexism, racism, homophobia, among others—what is the best way forward? Irrespective of their particular differences, for deliberative multiculturalists such as Sarah Song, Monique Deveaux, Seyla Benhabib, and Jorge Valadez, the best way forward was through adopting and using deliberative democratic methods. So far, so good.

The question that I sought to answer was: are people willing and then capable of engaging in deliberation with people with whom they disagree on issues that deal specifically with their religious and cultural identities and can this be done in a way that creates a positive rather than negative cycles within the deliberative process? It would be best if people were willing and capable of having such conversations, but are they? And in the face of impediments to such conversations, are there ways we can better structure and facilitate these conversations? After all, when talk ends, marginalization begins. When we fail to communicate, we resort to violence. It is, therefore, not just intellectually but morally important for us to know how best to
talk each other in a respectful, reflective, and constructive way. This dissertation is the product of asking these questions and attempting to answer them both theoretically and empirically.

8.1.1 Examining willingness

Are people willing to partake in multicultural deliberation? A preliminary examination of the concept of willingness for deliberation shows that the concept as a whole has been taken for granted by theorists of deliberative democracy and, for the most part, ignored by those scholars who look at deliberation more empirically. However, this oversight is not one that can or should be easily overlooked. Without willingness, we cannot ensure the representativeness or inclusivity of a deliberative engagement.

So are people willing of engaging in deliberations with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities? A cursory empirical investigation of the willingness for participation for deliberation in my survey shows interesting findings. First, there seems to be some degree of willingness for participating in a deliberation on any of the issues proposed to them. These issues included two unidentified issues—general public policy issue and a multicultural policy issue—as well as four specific issues of: minimum wage in British Columbia, violence against women in minority communities, instituting a LGBTQ policy in Vancouver School Board, and funding for cultural and religious minority groups.

When participants were asked about their attitudes towards the presence of particular groups in deliberation on each of the specific issue areas, respondents showed support for the inclusion of those affected or interested in the particular issue. This is perhaps an affirmation of empirical support for Habermas’s all-affected principle which at its foundation maintains that “[t]he political public sphere can fulfill its function of perceiving and thematizing encompassing
social problems only insofar as it develops out of the communication taking place among those who are potentially affected” (1996, 365).

When looking at specific demographic groups, however, there seems to be evidence that there is some unwillingness to engage in deliberations with those with whom one disagrees on topics that touch upon and challenge one’s identity. Men, for instance, are much less likely than women to want to partake in a deliberation on the LGBTQ policy in Vancouver schools, and violence against women in minority communities. Very religious respondents are much less willing than their non-religious counterparts to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on the LGBTQ policy in Vancouver school board. Similarly, when faced with an unspecified multicultural policy issue—which could, conceivably, put participants in an uncomfortable position depending on the issue—visible minorities were more reticent to express willingness for participation in a deliberation.

While lack of willingness is a concern in small deliberative engagements of the kind I focus on in this dissertation, the same case is true for the larger public sphere. We must pay attention to whose voices we hear loudly in the public sphere and whose voices are left silent—either because of disinterest or more insidious reasons such as widespread inequality, prejudice and bias—making potential speakers unwilling to partake in the larger conversations.

8.1.2 Facilitating deliberative capital

If they are willing, the second question is whether people are capable of engaging in deliberations, and under what conditions, with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities? The concept of deliberative capital provides a theoretical tool to answer this question. I found that people are capable of engaging in deliberations with one
another, when investments rather than divestments occur by individuals in the deliberative process, leading through reciprocity, to mutual benefits for all participants and increasing deliberative capacity.

The concept of deliberative capital responds to a theoretical gap in the literature of deliberative democratic theory: the problem of pre-commitment. Of course people ought to want to follow the rules and norms and to uphold reciprocity within a deliberation. Of course, they ought to come to the deliberation table and make speech acts with a communicative intent. However, we cannot rely on the intentions of others nor can we ask of those who have come to the table to have the goal of reaching mutual understanding when all they want is to be heard and to influence those around them. So, with this in mind, why do deliberations, usually, proceed with a modicum of success? In other words, why do participants invest?

The early investments by participants are self-interested and perhaps with the hope of a complementary response on the part of the others. After all, when “people interact, they engage in an ongoing give-and-take process that is based on mutual responsiveness to each other’s behavior”\textsuperscript{242} (Sadler et al. 2009, 1005). These investments, when reciprocated, increase the deliberative capital within a deliberation. They contribute by not only making the atmosphere more positive and constructive but also solidifying the norms of deliberation. The more participants invest, the more it becomes a norm and an expectation that they will do so. In other words, self-interest can be transformed into a norm of reciprocity.

This reframing allows us to think about ways that we can encourage investments and discourage divestments within a deliberation particularly through the use of facilitative

\textsuperscript{242} This is a well-known phenomenon in social psychology. When a person is warm towards another person, the other person attempts to be warm as well. Hostility is likewise returned.
treatments. For example, deliberative worth exercises which gets participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round; or simulated representation which gets participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each others’ views for a portion of deliberation can encourage investments and divestments.

So, are people capable of engaging in deliberations with those with whom they disagree on topics that touch upon and challenge their cultural and religious identities as well as the values and practices attached to those identities? Are there better ways of organizing such discussions to incentive investments in deliberative capital and discourage divestments? In order to answer this question empirically, I ran a series of deliberative engagements which included both facilitative treatments mentioned above as well as a control group with no facilitative treatment. The results from the control group show that they are indeed capable of engaging in multicultural deliberations but not to the same extent as when treatments are introduced. The results from the deliberations conducted under different facilitative treatments show that such treatments improve the quality of deliberation by increasing investments and decreasing divestments.

Particularly, deliberative worth exercises were shown to be successful at increasing investments in empathy, respect, productive dialogue, and sincerity; and decreasing respective divestments in rhetorical action, disrespect, unproductive dialogue, cognitive apartheid and hermeneutical exclusion. Moreover, simulated representation was shown to be effective in increasing investments in reason-giving, productive dialogue, reflection on and incorporation of the views of others, and even respect; and reducing cognitive apartheid and rhetorical action, among other divestments. More specifically, facilitative treatments were able to reduce the
divestments of men and non-visible minorities who were responsible for a significant majority of
divestments under control conditions. However, when it came to raising the factual knowledge of
the participants, control conditions were the clear winner.

Once again, while this work is specifically focused on the interactions and speech acts
within small-scale deliberative engagements, similar concern should exist when we consider
deliberation in the larger public sphere. Political speech is full of hazards. It operates within
domains of conflicts and among people invested in different positions and perspectives. When
speakers make statements that are understood by their targets as disrespectful or even as verbal
assaults, political discourse is impeded. Therefore, it is similarly important for us to look at how
we currently regulate and make judgments about speech acts within the public sphere; how we
should make judgments about speech acts; and, most importantly, how we can improve discourse
in the public sphere.

8.2 Speaking theory to practice and practice to theory

This dissertation sits at the centre of the theory and practice of deliberative democratic
time. I began this dissertation by looking at the different works by the theorists of deliberative
democracy in order to answer: are people willing and capable of engaging in deliberations that
can touch upon their identities and cultural and religious values and beliefs with those with
whom they may disagree? In particular, I looked at to what extent other theorists of deliberative
democracy—going back to Habermas—had discussed the importance, if not the necessity, of
willingness for participation in deliberative democratic engagements. I found that for the concept
had been disregarded and taken for granted by theorists of deliberative democracy.

Meanwhile, there were few, but disconnected, works outlining the reasons why people
would be unwilling to participate in conversations that would be conflictual. Most notably, Mutz
(2006) drawing from Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005) argued for the presence of conflict avoidance which would make participants unwilling to partake in discussions with those with whom they politically disagreed. However, there was no work that provided a comprehensive account of the factors that could make participants unwilling to participate and the rationales for those factors. In other words, there was no list of factors and the reasons they would/could make participants reluctant to come to a deliberation. When looking at the works of deliberative multiculturalists, this became more of a glaring disregard. Are people willing to have conversations that can put their identities, religious and cultural values and practices at risk?

My work on the issue of willingness for deliberation has been, in part, to build a theoretical foundation for the factors identified as barriers to willingness for deliberation. Drawing on psychology and public opinion (among others), I identified and explained those factors that could, often in conjunction with one another, reduce one’s willingness to come to a multicultural deliberation as well as those that could do the opposite. The next step was to use the theory to guide the practice—to work in and incorporate those factors into testable models to see if, indeed, these factors that were identified were effective at reducing (or increasing) the willingness for participation in deliberation.

The results from the practice offer a few lessons for the theory. The most important is that there is some reluctance to engage in deliberations with those with whom one disagrees on topics that touch upon and challenge one’s identity. But this reluctance, for the most part, depends on the interaction on the demographic group and the topic at hand. For example, men are just as likely as women to express willingness to participate in a deliberation on an unspecified multicultural policy issue but much less likely to want to come to a deliberation on
the issue violence against women. The theoretical work on the factors that can reduce
willingness has to be attuned to these interactions.

Moreover, I looked at the issue of capacity for deliberation especially one that touch on
one’s identity and in doing so I developed a theoretical framework for understanding the success
or breakdown of speech within more structured deliberations centred around the idea of
deliberative capital as the by-product of investments—deliberative oughts—and
threatened by divestments—deliberative ought nots. This new framework both complements and
addresses some of the gaps in the increasingly utilized Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et
al. 2003). Instead of seeing desired factors (i.e. justification) as either there or not, this
framework highlights the reciprocal process of investments with expectation of future returns
(i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am
talking) as well as divestments with respective consequences that occur during a deliberation.
This reframing allowed me to think about ways that we can encourage investments and
discourage divestments within a deliberation through the use of facilitative treatments.

Once again, the results from the practice offer a few lessons for the theory. Women and
visible minorities were on the whole more likely to avoid engaging in these deliberative ough
nots (divestments). Facilitative methods, meanwhile, can be used to encourage investments and
rein in divestments—particularly by men and non-visible minorities who made the most number
of divestments under control conditions. The most important lesson for deliberative democratic
theory, however, is the need for theorists to better account for the importance of facilitation—
facilitators and the tools they can use—within scholarship by theorizing about the particular
methods and the ways in which they can be utilized to ease the deliberative process.
8.3 Contributions to deliberative democracy (and multiculturalism)

This dissertation makes a number of contributions both to the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. My first theoretical contribution lies in my exploration of the concept of willingness for participation in deliberation. With the exception of an *APSR* article by Neblo et al. (2010), scholars and practitioners of deliberative democracy have long disregarded the importance of willingness for deliberation. While Neblo et al. look at willingness empirically, they leave the theoretical examination of it untouched. I trace this disregard to Habermas’s early works including the *Theory of Communicative Action*.

I argue, however, that the issue of unwillingness must be explicitly addressed in both the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, as it is fundamentally connected to our discussions of the democratic dimensions of deliberative democracy. If we are not willing, we are not participating. If we are not participating, we are not included or represented. If we are not included or represented, our voices are left unheard and the decisions are made without us. Without willingness of those most affected to partake in deliberation, there is no claim to legitimacy for that deliberative engagement. These issues of willingness, participation and voice are particularly true in the case of women and ethnic minorities, as both Song (2005, 2007) and Deveaux (2003, 2006) have argued. Thus, the work undertaken by Neblo et al. (2010) is not able to shed light on areas where deliberation is most necessary and most difficult: under conditions of cultural and religious difference. This dissertation contributes to deliberative democracy by examining willingness for participation for deliberation under these conditions specifically.

In particular, my dissertation suggests that we may need to rethink the very concept of stakeholders in deliberation. The assumption within the literature on deliberative democracy has been that when an issue is very important for an individual or a group—when it bears
directly on their beliefs and interests—they will be more, not less, likely to want to participate in a deliberation about it. However, the results from the survey offer evidence that topics that touch upon contentious identity-related matters may make religious and visible minorities disinclined to participate in deliberations. This suggests that perhaps such deliberations should be seen differently from others.

My dissertation also contributes to the literature on deliberative democracy by further merging the two ways of thinking about deliberation as 1) a matter of social psychology, and 2) a matter of institutional design. As for the former, I specifically examine the conditions under which people discuss issues about which they feel strongly—issues that often touch on their deeply-held values and beliefs and, often, identities. As for the latter, I discuss and demonstrate how the modification of the institutional design of a deliberative panel—in the shape of facilitative treatments—can overcome social-psychological barriers to deliberation posed by cultural or religious identities and the values and interests associated with them. In doing so, I also contribute the neglected study of facilitation within deliberative democratic theory and practice.

My second main theoretical contribution lies in the concept of deliberative capital. I rely on the literature on deliberative democracy to identify the particular investments and divestments which are often listed, disconnected from one another, as deliberative standards/norms and solecisms respectively. It is in the framing of these as investments and divestments that my contribution lies. I argue that such a framing is important because it allows us to see a deliberative engagement as an organic whole which is affected by the particular actions of the participants—whether good or bad.
Finally, my dissertation also contributes to the scholarship on multiculturalism. At its most basic level, this dissertation is a continuation and, in some ways, a response to the work of deliberative multiculturalists (i.e. Behabib, Song, and Deveaux) who found the solution to the conflicts between liberalism and multiculturalism—particularly between culture and gender—in deliberative democratic methods. They posit that we should deliberate. I ask: do we want to and can we? In particular, I contribute to this literature by looking at ways in which women, visible minorities, and those with high levels of religiosity differ in their interest in civic engagement—in this case, participation in deliberative engagements—from their, often less marginalized, counterparts: men, non-visible minorities, and those with lower levels of religiosity.

Second, I look at the deliberation dynamics to see whether women are more likely than men and visible minorities are more likely than non-visible minorities to invest in deliberative capital. The short answer is yes. Moreover, I look at the potency of facilitative treatments in easing difficult conversations around identity and cultural and religious values. Both treatments increase investments across all groups. But they do so at in disproportionate rates - resulting in equal investments across the categories. They also decrease divestments for all those involved in the deliberation. Most importantly, they significantly reduce the divestments made by men and non-visible minorities. In other words, under facilitative treatments, the proportion of investments and divestments between men and women, and visible minorities and non-visible minorities is almost equal.

8.4 Contribution to political theory

One of the main contributions of this dissertation lies in its methodological approach. This dissertation bridges political theory, particularly deliberative democratic theory, with an empirical analysis of the preconditions for successful deliberation which includes the often
disregarded willingness to deliberate on the part of all players as well as the way communication works on the ground. The majority of those whose works engage in an empirical examination of deliberative democracy (i.e. works by Steiner, Bächtiger, Neblo, Mendelberg, among others) are not done by theorists of deliberative democracy but rather comparativists and political psychologists. Their works, while incredibly valuable, do not, therefore, engage with the theory of deliberative democracy. As such, many of the theoretical gaps and issues are left unexamined—such as the theoretical disregard for willingness—by even those who study it empirically.

The mix of survey experiments and deliberative experiments with political theory is a novel methodological approach which has allowed me to engage with and critique the theory. This has allowed to me to create hypotheses which are then explored through survey and experiment work. As a theorist, then, I have been able to take what I have found through such empirical examination to modify, amend, and strengthen the theory. More of such work needs to be done by political theorists in general and theorists of deliberative democracy in particular. Political theory should engage with empirics—whether it is in the shape of surveys, experiments, or careful discourse analysis of archival data243. Only through such engagement can political theory properly inform the empirical examination and benefit from its findings.

243 An example of such work is done by Katrina Chapelas (Chapelas 2016, forthcoming) who engages in careful discourse analysis of framing and representational strategies of collective actors in two instances of urban collective action in Vancouver. Through methodical coding and discourse analysis, she finds that the framing tactics of these actors and the ways their struggles interpret and construct the meanings, values and powers associated with particular groups of urban dwellers and urban spaces are intricately linked to the socio-economic status of the actors involved and to the particular qualities and histories of the places in which they are situated.
8.5 Limitations

I have in Chapter 5, and to a lesser extent, in Chapter 7 discussed the limitations of this dissertation. At the risk of being repetitive, there are a number of limitations with both empirical studies within this dissertation. Both studies—survey and experiment—have relatively small sample sizes. There are not many observations in each of the categories in order to make definite conclusions about the findings. The participants, in both studies, are students which limits the variance in age of the participants as well as their education levels—and likely their political and social values and beliefs to an extent. Moreover, all the participants are, residents of Vancouver, BC or surrounding cities creating a geographical limitation to the study. I will not go into detail regarding the particular methodological problems of each study as I have already discussed them at length in Chapters 5 and 7.

8.6 Future work

There are two main ways I believe the work done in this dissertation can and should be extended. The first is to address the limitations addressed in the previous chapters and reduce them to the best of my abilities. The second is to expand this work to the larger public sphere. This work is concerned with examining the willingness for participation in and improving speech in small-scale deliberative engagements. While such a focus is helpful as it allows for a better and more careful empirical examination, it does not pay attention to “all these things that we call deliberation […] within a systematic framework” (Chambers 2013, 201). Therefore, my hope is that I can extend this work and contribute to the newest generation, if not turn, in deliberative democracy: systems theory. Such an approach “removes the theoretical burden of trying to make a single site of deliberation embody all the ideals of deliberation” (202) and instead looks at the different “parts of a [deliberative] system, each with its different deliberative strengths and
weaknesses” and allow for speech acts which can “have low or even negative deliberative quality with respect to one of several deliberative ideals, may nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall deliberative system” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 2–3).

In particular, and as I have already alluded in this conclusion, I would like to extend my concern with the quality of speech to those within the larger public sphere: what mechanisms do we have to adjudicate, mediate, and moderate speech in the public sphere and how do we make judgments about the quality of this speech? Such an examination would aim to produce a systematic list of the formal mechanisms that regulate speech and an account of the more interesting and challenging informal mechanisms that, often through societal pressure, seek to challenge, suppress, and punish certain kinds of speech based on particular norms and ideals. On a more normative front, I would aim to establish what constitutes a good public sphere and an acceptable speech act? What criteria should we take into account when judging public discourse? What mechanisms can we employ to incentivize investments and discourage divestments aimed at improving speech within the larger public sphere.
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Appendices

Appendix A  Survey questions

A.1  General questions 1

1. What’s your gender?

Female  Male
Other (transgender, etc...)  Refuse to Answer

2. What’s your age?

18-21  22-25  26-29  30 or older  Refuse to Answer

3. What’s the highest level of education you have completed?

High School  1st year of undergrad  2nd year of undergrad  3rd year of undergrad  4th year of undergrad  Bachelor's degree  (some) graduate degree  Refuse to Answer

4. What’s your religious affiliation?

Anglican/ Church of England  Baptist  Buddhist/ Buddhism  Catholic/ Roman Catholic/ RC  Greek Orthodox/ Ukrainian Orthodox/ Russian Orthodox/ Eastern Orthodox Hindu  Jehovah’s Witness  Jewish/ Judaism/ Jewish Orthodox  Lutheran  Mormon/ Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Saints Muslim/ Islam  Pentecostal/ Fundamentalist/ Born Again/ Evangelical Presbyterian  Protestant (Other)  Sikh/ Sikhism  United Church of Canada
Christian (Other)
Christian Reform
Salvation Army
Mennonite
None, Atheist
Other (Please Specify)
Don't know
Refuse to answer

5. How religious are you?

Very religious
Somewhat religious
Not religious
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

6. How often do you attend religious services?

Once a week or more
2-3 times a month
Once a month
Several times a year
Only on special holy days Never
Refuse to Answer

7. Do you consider yourself a member of a visible minority?

Yes
No
I don’t know
Refuse to Answer

8. To what ethnic or cultural group do you belong?

Canadian
British
Chinese
Dutch
English
French
German
Indian
Irish
Italian
Polish
Scottish
French Canadian
Inuit, Metis, Aboriginal
Quebecois
Other (Please specify)
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

9. In addition to being Canadian, to what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestors belong on first coming to this country?

Canadian
British
Chinese
Dutch
English
French
German
Indian
Irish
Italian
Polish
Scottish
French Canadian
Inuit, Metis, Aboriginal
Quebecois
Other (Please specify)
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

10. Which city or town do you consider your hometown?

Please specify

11. Please estimate the total annual household income of your parents.

Under $25,000
$25,001 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
$150,000 and over
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer
12. What type of problems do you prefer to solve: simple problems or complex problems?

Simple problems
Complex problems

13. Compared to the average person, do you have fewer opinions about whether things are good or bad, about the same number of opinions, or more opinions?

Fewer opinions
About the same number of opinions
More opinions

Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

14. I have opinions about almost everything.

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

15. I like to have responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of thinking.

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each pair of traits. You should rate the extent to which each of these traits applies to you, even if one trait applies more strongly than the other.

I see myself as….

16. Extroverted

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
17. Enthusiastic

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

18. Critical

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

19. Quarrelsome

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

20. Dependable

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

21. Self-disciplined

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
22. Anxious

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

23. Easily upset

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

24. Open to new experiences

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

25. Reserved

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

26. Quiet

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
27. Sympathetic

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

28. Warm

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

29. Calm

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

30. Emotionally stable

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

31. Conventional

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

32. Uncreative

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

33. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: We need to increase opportunities for people to get involved in politics and have an active role in decision-making.

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

Before answering more questions, consider the following: Some people suggest that making our democracy more “deliberative” will increase the opportunities for people to get involved in politics and have an active role in decision-making. Deliberative democracy is a process where a group of citizens are brought together for a conversation about a public issue. An example of this is a deliberation sponsored by a governmental body that has promised to present the recommendations of the deliberation to the relevant officials and to consider (or even implement) them. This conversation can be short (one hour) or longer (one or more days or even over a few months). The idea is that through a thorough discussion, citizens learn a lot about the issue and other people’s perspectives on it. This way, the group can make good decisions about that issue. However some people argue that the conversations might not be comprehensive or informative enough; and if the deliberation leads to actual decisions, they will not be informed or technical enough or they might not be able to balance the many interests involved on a given issue.

34. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: deliberative democracy is a worthwhile way to get people interested and involved in politics?

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Refuse to answer
Don't know

A.2  Control - Generic issue

35. In the recent years, there has been an increased interest in deliberative democracy. Many organizations, for example, carry out a deliberative process where you spend some time (a day or more) learning about and discussing an important public issue and then making group recommendations on what should be done.

If you were personally invited to take part in such a process, how willing would you be to participate?

I would do it for sure if I was invited
I would think about it
I don’t think I would do it, but maybe
I definitely wouldn’t participate
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

Whether or not you think you would accept an invitation to discuss an important public issue, we would like to know about your reaction to some of the reasons why people might or might not want to take part in a deliberative democratic event.

A.3  Treatment - Multicultural issue

35. In the recent years, there has been an increased interest in setting up deliberations that bring people from different cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds together to talk about tensions that arise from the multicultural nature of Canada (and countries like it). Sometimes, minority ethnic, cultural, and religious groups have certain practices (for example, dress code, norms of family life, or the social roles of women and children) that many Canadians consider improper and different from their views and values. Sometimes, our differences can create conflict about what policies are best for our communities. One way to try to get past this is to bring ordinary people together to understand and discuss the different points of view and the different options.

If you were personally invited to take part in such a process, how willing would you be to participate?

I would do it for sure if I was invited
I would think about it
I don’t think I would do it, but maybe
I definitely wouldn’t participate
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

Whether or not you think you would accept an invitation to discuss a controversial cultural issue
in a culturally diverse group, we would like to know about your reaction to some of the reasons why people might or might not want to take part in a deliberative democratic event. There would likely be very strong personal views to deal with in a deliberation like this.

A.4 General questions 2

If you were invited, how much would the following things contribute to making you feel positive or negative about participating?

36. It will be a new experience.

   Enough to make me say no
   Much more negative
   A little more negative
   Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
   A little more positive
   Much more positive
   Enough to make me say yes

37. This kind of discussion could lead to heated arguments.

   Enough to make me say no
   Much more negative
   A little more negative
   Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
   A little more positive
   Much more positive
   Enough to make me say yes

38. It might give me a chance to make an actual difference.

   Enough to make me say no
   Much more negative
   A little more negative
   Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
   A little more positive
   Much more positive
   Enough to make me say yes

39. I would be expected to talk about and defend my views in front of others.

   Enough to make me say no
   Much more negative
   A little more negative
   Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

40. It might make me think about my own ideas and feelings more carefully.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

41. Some deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in the political process to actually change policies.

42. It is chance to express my opinions.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

42. If I felt strongly about something being discussed, other participants might attack my views and I would hear points of view that I really disagree with.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

43. I might be able to learn something by talking to people who have different ideas.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

44. There are lots of issues and information that I might not know much about.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

45. I might be shy and uncomfortable talking to others.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

46. It might make me feel closer to my community (friends, school, etc…).

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

47. Participation in a deliberation like this takes a significant amount of time.

Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

48. I am not comfortably fluent speaking English.
Enough to make me say no
Much more negative
A little more negative
Doesn't affect me or change how I feel
A little more positive
Much more positive
Enough to make me say yes

49. Is there anything else that might make you feel more positive (interested in participating) or more negative (uninterested in participating) about coming to a deliberation?

Now, thinking of the same kind of “deliberative democracy” event, there are some ways of doing this that might make you more positive about participating.

Would any of these features make you more willing to participate?

50. What if there were facilitators whose job would be to make the conversation easier by keeping it polite and on track.

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

51. What if the facilitators were to try to bring views together? They would try to work through the differences and help everyone to find a compromise.

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

52. What if you could put your views in writing so they could be presented without anyone knowing they were yours? Later on, if you felt comfortable, you could tell others what your views are.

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

53. In the case that deliberations do end in decisions affecting policy, what if the policy affected by the process of deliberation were open to future review and deliberation at a later time.
Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

54. What if you were provided with concise, balanced information about the topic beforehand

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

55. What if experts on the issue were available to you during deliberation? You could ask them any question you wanted and they would give presentations explaining the different sides and points that are important.

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

56. What if the discussion was online rather than face-to-face?

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

57. What if the discussion took place on weekends instead of the weekdays?

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

58. What if the deliberation was only an hour?

Much less willing
Less willing
59. What if the deliberation would only take 1 day?

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

60. What if you were paid for the time you spent participating?

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

61. If English is an issue, what if translators were present during the discussion?

Much less willing
Less willing
Doesn't affect or change how I feel
More willing
Much more willing

62. Is there anything else that if provided would make you more willing to participate?

A.5 General questions 3 - Issue specific

Now that you have answered some questions on deliberation in a general sense, we would like to get a bit more specific. Deliberation is often over a specific topic. I am going to briefly tell you about four hypothetical issues that could be the subject of a deliberative process. After reading about each one, we would like you to answer some questions about a deliberation on that issue.

1. Instituting a LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and queer) Policy - Vancouver School Board

In June 2014, the Vancouver School Board changed one of their policies to better support transgendered students. Part of it included using new ways to address students in written communication, such as “xe, xem, and xyr” (gender neutral pronouns). Moreover, it allowed students to choose the name that they identified with and to be called by that name, and to
choose which washroom they preferred. This policy was met with a lot of controversy and debate. Supporters of the policy pointed out transgendered students were disproportionately at risk for dropping out of school, self-harm and suicide. They said these policies could help. Opponents, however, argued that these policies threatened the traditional values they wanted to see in schools. Moreover, there is some concern that the confidentiality clause of this policy, the one preventing parents from finding out if their child discusses gender issues with a teacher or counsellor, takes some parenting responsibility away from parents and puts it in the hands of school staff

63. If you were personally invited to take part in a one day deliberation over the LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and queer) policy in the Vancouver School Board, how willing would you be to participate?

I would do it for sure if I was invited
I would think about it
I don’t think I would do it, but maybe I definitely wouldn’t participate
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

How important are the following reasons for your lack of interest in participation?

64. I am not really interested in this topic.

1- not important at all

| 10 - very important

65. This kind of discussion could lead to heated arguments.

1- not important at all

| 10 - very important

66. I would be expected to talk about and defend my views in front of others.

1- not important at all

| 10 - very important

67. These kinds of deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in the political process to actually change policies.

1- not important at all

| 10 - very important
68. If I felt strongly about something being discussed, other participants might attack my views and I would hear those points of view that I really disagree with.

1- not important at all
| 10 - very important

69. There are lots of issues and information that I might not know much about.

1- not important at all
| 10 - very important

70. I might be shy and uncomfortable talking to others.

1- not important at all
| 10 - very important

71. Participation in a deliberation like this takes a significant amount of time.

1- not important at all
| 10 - very important

72. Is there any other reason that explains your disinterest in participation?

73. Would you find the presence of religious people of any faith or denomination (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, etc...) in a deliberation over LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and queer) school policy helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

74. Would you find the presence of LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and queer) activists in a deliberation over LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and queer) school policy helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
75. Would you find the presence of traditional family-values activists in a deliberation over LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, and queer) school policy helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

2. Minimum Wage in British Columbia

In March 2014, British Columbia's union leaders called for an immediate increase in the minimum wage to $13 an hour from the current $10.25. Proponents argue that a minimum wage increase is long overdue as adjusted for inflation, minimum wage in British Columbia has not changed much between early 1970s and 2013. They note a higher minimum wage will benefit most low-paid employees which are the most economically (and therefore socially) vulnerable. For example, in B.C., someone working full-time, year-round on the minimum wage falls far below the poverty line, especially in urban areas. A salary based on working 35 hours per week and 50 weeks per year at the minimum wage is almost $18,000. The opponents argue that the government should not be intervening in wages. In the short term, raising business’ labour costs will force them to scale back on employee hours and jobs. A minimum wage increase, according to them, will result in job loss.

76. If you were personally invited to take part in a one day deliberation over the issue of minimum wage increase in British Columbia, how willing would you be to participate?

I would do it for sure if I was invited
I would think about it
I don’t think I would do it, but maybe I definitely wouldn’t participate
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

How important are the following reasons for your lack of interest in participation?

77. I am not really interested in this topic.

1- not important at all
10 - very important

78. This kind of discussion could lead to heated arguments.
1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

79. I would be expected to talk about and defend my views in front of others.

1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

80. These kinds of deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in the political process to actually change policies.

1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

81. If I felt strongly about something being discussed, other participants might attack my views and I would hear those points of view that I really disagree with.

1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

82. There are lots of issues and information that I might not know much about.

1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

83. I might be shy and uncomfortable talking to others.

1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

84. Participation in a deliberation like this takes a significant amount of time.

1 - not important at all
| 10 - very important

85. Is there any other reason that explains your disinterest in participation?

86. Would you find the presence of free market activists in a deliberation over minimum wage
increase in British Columbia helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

87. Would you find the presence of members of BC Federation of Labour in a deliberation over minimum wage increase in British Columbia helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

3. Community Dialogue over Violence Against Women in different cultural/religious communities

Canada is home to people from a number of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds who practice a range of different religions. Some of these cultures and religions have values and practices that don’t fit well with to the liberal values that underpin Canadian democracy, like the values in our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Some of these contested practices involve forced marriages, exchange of dowries, preferring sons to daughters, and, in extreme cases, honour killings. Many of them have made headlines in British Columbia, and they have sometimes involved members of the South Asian community in Surrey, BC. While most would agree that violence against women is not limited to cultural and religious communities, even groups within this ethnic community suggest that “economic dependence, rigidly defined traditional gender roles and language barriers and lack of social safety net” (Indo-Canadian Women’s Association) make immigrant women of these cultural and religious communities more vulnerable. Some argue that the way to deal with this problem is from the outside: reducing the accommodation of cultural and religious practices and forcing members of these communities to adopt liberal values as their own. Others argue that more work has to be done within different communities, teaching women about their options and pushing for change within the community.

88. If you were personally invited to take part in a one day deliberation over the issue of violence against women in different cultural/religious communities, how willing would you be to participate?

I would do it for sure if I was invited
I would think about it
I don’t think I would do it, but maybe I definitely wouldn’t participate
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer
How important are the following reasons for your lack of interest in participation?

89. I am not really interested in this topic.
   1 - not important at all
   10 - very important

90. This kind of discussion could lead to heated arguments.
   1 - not important at all
   10 - very important

91. I would be expected to talk about and defend my views in front of others.
   1 - not important at all
   10 - very important

92. These kinds of deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in
   the political process to actually change policies.
   1 - not important at all
   10 - very important

93. If I felt strongly about something being discussed, other participants might attack my views
   and I would hear those points of view that I really disagree with.
   1 - not important at all
   10 - very important

94. There are lots of issues and information that I might not know much about.
   1 - not important at all
   10 - very important

95. I might be shy and uncomfortable talking to others.
   1 - not important at all
   |
10 - very important

96. Participation in a deliberation like this takes a significant amount of time.
1- not important at all
| 10 - very important

97. Is there any other reason that explains your disinterest in participation?

98. Would you find the presence of feminist activists in a deliberation over violence against women in different cultural/religious communities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

99. Would you find the presence of people with different cultural backgrounds or different religious affiliations than yours in a deliberation over violence against women in different cultural/religious communities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

100. Would you find the presence of Sikhs in a deliberation over violence against women in different cultural/religious communities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

101. Would you find the presence of Muslims in a deliberation over violence against women in different cultural/religious communities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
4. Government Funding for cultural and religious programs and activities

In 2009, Embrace BC was launched. The aim of the program is to provide “resources and tools that help citizens of British Columbia further understand the importance of diversity and increase their level of community engagement around multiculturalism and anti-racism”. It will do this by providing funding opportunities for groups, offering resources, campaigns and events in order promote multiculturalism and reduce racism, as well as setting up historical wrongs legacy initiatives (a product of which was the May 2014 formal apology from all members of BC legislative assembly to Chinese Canadians for historical wrongs committed by past provincial governments). Embrace BC is funded through the federal and provincial governments. Some argue that this funding is necessary for a healthy multicultural society as these programs and initiatives foster understanding between citizens. Others argue that the money will be better spent in other areas that provide services to all Canadians and that programs directed towards differences between people will just make those differences more visible.

102. If you were personally invited to take part in a one day deliberation over government funding for cultural and religious programs and activities, how willing would you be to participate?

I would do it for sure if I was invited
I would think about it
I don’t think I would do it, but maybe
I definitely wouldn’t participate
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

How important are the following reasons for your lack of interest in participation?

103. I am not really interested in this topic.

1 - not important at all
10 - very important

104. This kind of discussion could lead to heated arguments.

1 - not important at all
10 - very important

105. I would be expected to talk about and defend my views in front of others.

1 - not important at all
106. These kinds of deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in the political process to actually change policies.

1- not important at all

10 - very important

107. If I felt strongly about something being discussed, other participants might attack my views and I would hear those points of view that I really disagree with.

1- not important at all

10 - very important

108. There are lots of issues and information that I might not know much about.

1- not important at all

10 - very important

109. I might be shy and uncomfortable talking to others.

1- not important at all

10 - very important

110. Participation in a deliberation like this takes a significant amount of time.

1- not important at all

10 - very important

111. Is there any other reason that explains your disinterest in participation?

112. Would you find the presence of people with different cultural backgrounds or different religious affiliations than yours in a deliberation over provincial funding for cultural and religious programs and activities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them

It really doesn’t make a difference either way

They would get in the way of the conversation

Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

113. Would you find the presence of people with a liberal political attitude in a deliberation over provincial funding for cultural and religious programs and activities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

114. Would you find the presence of people with a conservative political attitude in a deliberation over provincial funding for cultural and religious programs and activities helpful or would they just get in the way?

It would helpful to have them
It really doesn’t make a difference either way
They would get in the way of the conversation
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

A.6 Invitation questions

Finally, I would like to invite you to take part in a deliberation with fellow students that brings people with different backgrounds and values together. The topic would be concerned with the multicultural nature of Canada and the conflicts or tensions that arise from living together with deep differences. It will concern itself with a specific policy question and asking the participants for their input and their final decisions regarding the policy. The deliberation will be over the course of one day (on a weekend). If you decide to participate, a small information package would be sent to you a week before the deliberation and would outline the topic of deliberation and a few bits of information outlining the main positions of each side. The deliberation will take place in a room at the University of British Columbia. In thanks for your participation, a gift of $30 will be given to you.

115. Would you be willing to come to a day of deliberation with fellow students?

Yes! (please contact afsoun.afsahi@alumni.ubc.ca)
I’m not sure, maybe if I had more information. (please contact afsoun.afsahi@alumni.ubc.ca)
Definitely not.
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer

Finally, I would like to invite you to take part in a deliberation with fellow students that brings
people with different backgrounds and values together. The topic would be concerned with the multicultural nature of Canada and the conflicts or tensions that arise from living together with deep differences. It will concern itself with a specific policy question and asking the participants for their input and their final decisions regarding the policy. The deliberation will be over the course of one day (on a weekend). If you decide to participate, a small information package would be sent to you a week before the deliberation and would outline the topic of deliberation and a few bits of information outlining the main positions of each side. The deliberation will take place in a room at the University of British Columbia. In thanks for your participation, a gift of $30 will be given to you. The deliberation will include conversation moderators whose job it is to make sure the conversation advances easily, is kept on track, and remains as respectful as possible.

115. Would you be willing to come to a day of deliberation with fellow students?

Yes! (please contact afsoun.afsahi@alumni.ubc.ca)
I’m not sure, maybe if I had more information. (please contact afsoun.afsahi@alumni.ubc.ca)
Definitely not.
Don’t know
Refuse to Answer
Appendix B  Pre-deliberation questionnaire

1. What is your gender?
   ☐ Male  ☐ Female  ☐ Transgender  ☐ Other

2. How old are you?
   ☐ 18-21  ☐ 22-25  ☐ 26-29  ☐ 30 or older

3. What the highest level of education you have completed?
   ☐ High School  ☐ 1st year of undergrad  ☐ 2nd year of undergrad
   ☐ 3rd year of undergrad  ☐ 4th year of undergrad  ☐ MA
   ☐ (Some) PhD / professional degree

4. What’s your religious affiliation?
   ☐ Anglican/ Church of England
   ☐ Baptist
   ☐ Buddhist/ Buddhism
   ☐ Catholic/ Roman Catholic/ RC
   ☐ Greek Orthodox/ Ukrainian Orthodox/ Russian Orthodox/ Eastern Orthodox
   ☐ Hindu
   ☐ Jehovah’s Witness
   ☐ Jewish/ Judaism/ Jewish Orthodox
   ☐ Lutheran
   ☐ Mormon/ Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Saints
   ☐ Muslim/ Islam
   ☐ Pentecostal/ Fundamentalist/ Born Again/ Evangelical Presbyterian
   ☐ Protestant (Other)
   ☐ Sikh/ Sikhism
☐ United Church of Canada
☐ Christian (Other)
☐ Christian Reform
☐ Salvation Army
☐ Mennonite
☐ Agnostic
☐ None, Atheist
☐ Other, please specify

5. How religious are you?
☐ Very religious  ☐ Somewhat religious  ☐ Not religious  ☐ Don’t know

6. How often do you attend religious services?
☐ Once a week or more  ☐ 2-3 times a month  ☐ Once a month
☐ Several times a year  ☐ Only on special holy days  ☐ Never

7. Do you consider yourself a member of a visible minority?
☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ I don’t know

8. What is your immigration status?
☐ I was born in Canada and so were my parents.
☐ I was born in Canada and my parents were foreign-born.
☐ I am foreign-born.

9. What is your ethnicity? Please choose all that apply. This question is asking how you self-identify.
☐ Indigenous (e.g., Inuit, Metis, Aboriginal)
☐ African (“Black”)
□ European ("White")
□ West Asian (e.g., Afghani, Iranian, Kurdish, Turkish)
□ South Asian (e.g., Punjabi, Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan)
□ East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese)
□ Southeast Asian (e.g., Thai, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Filipino)
□ Hispanic (Latin American)
□ Other, specify .............

10. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
□ Most people can be trusted
□ You can’t be too careful in dealing with people

11. Which of these two contrasting statements best describes your opinion about politics?
□ Politics should be about finding a compromise between people with different views
□ Politics should be about sticking to your convictions and fighting to implement them

The next items ask you to respond to a series of statements. For each one, please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

12. I believe that through the conversation that we are going to have, we will be able to make a decision together.
□ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Neither agree nor disagree
□ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

13. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.
□ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Neither agree nor disagree
14. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
   □ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

15. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
   □ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

16. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
   □ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

17. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
   □ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

18. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
   □ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

19. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
   □ Strongly agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

20. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to &quot;put myself in his shoes&quot; for a while.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

28. Have you read the information pamphlet that was sent to you prior to this event?

☐ Yes ☐ Somewhat ☐ No

29. How familiar are you with the issue of religious arbitration?

☐ Very familiar ☐ Somewhat familiar ☐ Can't say
☐ Somewhat unfamiliar ☐ Very unfamiliar

This section asks you about some facts concerning this case.

30. Arbitration is one of the legal methods available for dispute resolution in Canada.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ I don’t know

31. British Columbia currently has/allows institutionalized religious arbitration.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ I don’t know

32. The right to freedom of religion is one the arguments made against religious arbitration.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ I don’t know

33. The right to equality under the law is one of the arguments made against religious arbitration.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ I don’t know

34. The right to freedom of religion is one of the arguments made in favour of religious arbitration.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ I don’t know
35. The right to free exercise of contracts is one the arguments made in favour of religious arbitration in British Columbia.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

36. If we do not allow for institutionalized religious arbitration recognized by courts, people will not be able to use religious rules to resolve their disputes.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

37. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives everyone a right to freedom of religion.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

38. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms highlights multiculturalism as a value to be preserved and enhanced.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

This section asks you about some of your personal views on this subject matter.

39. Which of these is closer to your views on religious arbitration

☐ The decision to either allow or disallow religious arbitration is a simple one.

☐ The decision to either allow or disallow religious arbitration is a complicated one

40. In general, do you think religious arbitration should:

☐ Never be allowed

☐ Sometimes be allowed

☐ Always be allowed

For this next set of questions, please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
41. Procedural rules and oversight by Canadian courts can ensure that vulnerable groups (often women and children) are protected in cases resolved through religious arbitration.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

42. Religious arbitration SHOULD be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

43. Religious arbitration SHOULD be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to freedom of religion.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

44. Religious arbitration SHOULD NOT be allowed given Canada’s commitment to equality between persons.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

45. Religious arbitration SHOULD NOT be allowed given Canada’s commitment in procedural legal equality (treating everyone equally under one law)

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree
Appendix C  Post-deliberation questionnaire

1. In general, how satisfied are you with the PROCESS as a whole?
   □ Very satisfied  □ Satisfied  □ Neutral
   □ Dissatisfied   □ Very Dissatisfied

2. In general, how satisfied are you with the OUTCOMES of the process?
   □ Very satisfied  □ Satisfied  □ Neutral
   □ Dissatisfied   □ Very Dissatisfied

The next items ask you to respond to a series of statements. For each one, please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

3. I felt that the other group members did not accept me as part of the group.
   □ Strongly agree  □ Agree  □ Neither agree nor disagree
   □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

4. The other group members respected my views on the issue we discussed.
   □ Strongly agree  □ Agree  □ Neither agree nor disagree
   □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

5. The other group members were rude and impolite towards me.
   □ Strongly agree  □ Agree  □ Neither agree nor disagree
   □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

6. The other group members were close-minded. They wouldn't fully consider all points of view.
   □ Strongly agree  □ Agree  □ Neither agree nor disagree
   □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree
7. I felt that there were people in my group who had no idea what they were talking about.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

8. A few people dominated the group discussion.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

9. Most of the conflict in our group focused on the issue itself.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

10. Our group carefully examined the important issues surrounding religious arbitration.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

11. The GROUP WAS DIVERSE enough to make sure that a wide range of views were considered.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

12. I had ample OPPORTUNITY in the small group discussions to EXPRESS MY VIEWS.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree
13. Overall, I feel that people expressed what was TRULY on their mind.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

14. Many people expressed strong views WITHOUT offering reasons.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

15. I LEARNED a lot from participating in this process.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

16. I had ENOUGH INFORMATION to participate effectively.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

17. MY VIEWS on the issues CHANGED as a result of this process.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

18. This process helped me CLARIFY my views.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

19. This process helped me EMPATHIZE with the challenges of others.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree
20. I would be open in participating in OTHER PROCESSES like this one.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

21. I believe that through the conversation that we had today, we were able to make a decision together.

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

22. Your conversation was moderated by facilitators. Please indicate which is closest to your own opinion:

☐ The facilitators were completely biased.
☐ The facilitators were mostly biased.

☐ Can't say.
☐ The facilitators were mostly unbiased.
☐ The facilitators were completely unbiased.

In the next section, you will be asked a series of questions which you were asked in the beginning of today’s events. Please answer them honestly without trying to remember specifically what you put down earlier.

23. Which of these two contrasting statements best describes your opinion about politics?

☐ Politics should be about finding a compromise between people with different views
☐ Politics should be about sticking to your convictions and fighting to implement them

For this next set of questions, please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
24. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.

☐ Strongly agree    ☐ Agree    ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree    ☐ Strongly Disagree

25. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.

☐ Strongly agree    ☐ Agree    ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree    ☐ Strongly Disagree

26. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.

☐ Strongly agree    ☐ Agree    ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree    ☐ Strongly Disagree

27. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.

☐ Strongly agree    ☐ Agree    ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree    ☐ Strongly Disagree

28. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

☐ Strongly agree    ☐ Agree    ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree    ☐ Strongly Disagree

29. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.

☐ Strongly agree    ☐ Agree    ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree    ☐ Strongly Disagree

30. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
31. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

32. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

33. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.

34. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.

35. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

36. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
37. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

38. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree  ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree  ☐ Strongly Disagree

This section asks you about some facts concerning this case.

39. Arbitration is one of the legal methods available for dispute resolution in Canada.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

40. British Columbia currently has/allows institutionalized religious arbitration.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

41. The right to freedom of religion is one the arguments made against religious arbitration.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

42. The right to equality under the law is one of the arguments made against religious arbitration.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

43. The right to freedom of religion is one of the arguments made in favour of religious arbitration.

☐ True  ☐ False  ☐ I don’t know

44. The right to free exercise of contracts is one the arguments made in favour of religious arbitration in British Columbia.
45. If we do not allow for institutionalized religious arbitration recognized by courts, people will not be able to use religious rules to resolve their disputes.

46. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives everyone a right to freedom of religion.

47. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms highlights multiculturalism as a value to be preserved and enhanced.

This section asks you about some of your personal views on this subject matter.

48. Which of these is closer to your views on religious arbitration

49. In general, do you think religious arbitration should:

50. Procedural rules and oversight by Canadian courts can ensure that vulnerable groups (often women and children) are protected in cases resolves through religious arbitration.
51. Religious arbitration SHOULD be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism.

52. Religious arbitration SHOULD be considered as an option as part of Canada’s commitment to freedom of religion.

53. Religious arbitration SHOULD NOT be allowed given Canada’s commitment to equality between persons.

54. Religious arbitration SHOULD NOT be allowed given Canada’s commitment in procedural legal equality (treating everyone equally under one law)
Appendix D Questions for deliberation

1. Should British Columbia allow the resolution of some disputes according to religious law? Considering the already-existing and continuing influx of diverse populations into Canada, and British Columbia, is religious arbitration a helpful and necessary institution for fulfilling the promises of multiculturalism; or is it a hindrance to the integration of people into Canadian society? British Columbia has never allowed an institutionalized religious arbitration process. Should the government consider it allowing a more formal religious arbitration process instead of the informal one which currently exists?

2. Should there be limitations? What kinds?

3. What institutional measures would be necessary to ensure the confidence of both sides?

4. What alternatives would you suggest or would you like to see implemented for those who wish to adjudicate some cases according to religious principles?
Appendix E  Pamphlet on religious arbitration

Should British Columbia allow the resolution of some disputes according to religious law?

E.1  What is arbitration?

Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in which parties voluntarily submit their case to an impartial third-party for a binding resolution. This binding resolution is called an award.

E.2  Advantages:

- Informal procedures
- Privacy
- Economy
- Amicability
- Speed and efficiency

E.3  What is religious arbitration?

- Religious arbitration has a long history in Canada. After the British conquest, Catholics preferred to resolve disputes among themselves. They often chose to take their disputes to a local Catholic priest rather than to deal with the secular courts
- Religious arbitration is defined as a voluntary dispute resolution process, conducted according to religious principles. This process is a substitute for proceedings in civil court
- All participants in a religious form of arbitration have voluntarily agreed to an alternative way of solving their disputes
- Like other forms of arbitration, it involves resolving a dispute outside the boundaries of judicial system
• It involves resolving a dispute in accordance to a chosen body of religious law

E.4 Who would want this?
• People who see their religious community norms as having moral authority and want them to have the force of the law
• For example: during the Sharia law debate on Ontario, many members of the Muslim Community (primarily in Toronto), with ties to the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice proposed and defended religious arbitration. Former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd, commissioned to study religious arbitration, recommended the continuation of religious arbitration.

E.5 Who wouldn’t want this?
• People who do not want to see the secular state sanction decisions based on religious values. They might be concerned with erosion of the separation between religion and judiciary. They might also be concerned with unequal power relations within religious communities
• For example, during the Shari law debate in Ontario, 53 organizations opposed the religious arbitration process. Among these were Muslim Canadian Congress, The Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Canadian Federation of University Women, and The National Association of Women and the Law. For most of these, the negative impact on vulnerable women and children was the main cause of opposition.

E.6 What must be in place if religious arbitration is to occur?
• Parties would have to either sign an arbitration agreement to have a religious panel resolve the dispute.
• OR: include an arbitration clause in the contact they had already signed before
• Courts review the process of arbitration to make sure that both parties obey the procedures that the both have already agreed to.

E.7 Current state of arbitration in British Columbia:

• In September 2004, BC Attorney General Geoff Plant announced that he had "no plan to take any action to change the laws of British Columbia to give any special recognition to any set of religious laws."

• There is a way that religious arbitration could occur in BC however. The courts have applied the BC Commercial Arbitration Act to family arbitration. The Act states that anyone may be appointed as an arbitrator with the consent of the parties involved. This could, of course, include persons of any, or no, religious persuasion.

• There are no qualification requirements for arbitrators.

• The BC Commercial Arbitration Act provides for choice of law to be used for arbitration.

• Further, Section 23 of the Act provides that, with the express consent of the parties at the time of arbitration, a dispute “may be decided on equitable grounds, grounds of conscience or some other basis”. This could include religiously-based codes.

• The Act contains no specific safeguards specifying what counts as consent to arbitration other than the general requirements of “natural justice”.

E.8 Existing religious arbitration institutions in North America and Europe:

• Beth Din of America (BDA) and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in the United Kingdom (MAT) are two examples of religious arbitration tribunals working within the secular legal system without significant complaints or troubles.

• Beth Din of America:
• Founded in 1960 for American Jews committed to living in accordance with halakha
• Gained acceptance by presenting Jewish law and dispute resolution in a way that drew upon language, categories, and principles that were familiar to the secular legal establishment
• It allowed the secular court system to see the BDA process as transparent, legally sophisticated, and fair
• Muslim Arbitration Tribunal:
  • Established in 2007 for Muslims committed to solving their disputes according to Islamic Law
  • Previous to MAT, Islamic courts existed in UK for decades but without formal, transparent procedures. They also did not operate within a secular legal framework
  • In 2008, the British government formally recognized the MAT's network of Shari'a courts, ensuring that their decisions would be enforced by the secular courts

**E.9 Six pillars of religious arbitration as practiced by BDA and MAT:**
• Formal, sophisticated rules of procedure that protect parties' rights to due process
• Appellate processes that promote transparency and accountability in their respective arbitral proceedings
• Respecting the ultimate legal authority of the state and limiting their jurisdiction to resolve certain kinds of cases
• Use of common commercial customs and principles
• Dual system fluency by employing arbitrators familiar with both their respective religio-legal and state law norms
• Active roles in governing and guiding their respective religious communities, and in representing the interests and concerns of their co-religionists to the broader society

E.10 Arguments in favour of religious arbitration:

Religious freedom
• Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (The Charter), part of the Canadian Constitution, establishes the "fundamental freedom" of "conscience and religion".
• Some believe religious arbitration is an important part of a free exercise of one’s religion
• It allows individuals to resolve disputes in accordance with shared religious values and norms
• Religious arbitration provides the only forum for resolving many claims that would otherwise be beyond the authority of courts to resolve including, but not limited to, disputes between religious institutions and their leaders or members.

Multiculturalism
• Section 27 of the Charter notes that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”
• Multiculturalism goes beyond recognition and inclusion and, at times, requires self-governance and social integration.
• Religious arbitration can increase the participation of people with different religions, such as Muslims, in the judicial system and integrate them into the broader society

Freedom of contract
• The decision to arbitrate a case falls under the freedom of contract
• Parties should have the right to enter into any contract they choose—including one that contains a religious arbitration clause
• This facilitates economic and time efficiency, while reducing the taxing emotional impact of adversarial litigation

**Transparency and protection**

• By institutionalizing religious arbitration tribunals, the government can ensure a sufficient level of control over the protection of individual's rights and freedoms. They can:
  o ensure that it remains fair and sensitive towards gender issues
  o ensure voluntary participation and informed consent
  o ensure that dispute resolution is not subject manipulation by the religious community.

**E.11 Arguments against religious arbitration:**

**Religious freedom (and multiculturalism)**

• Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (*The Charter*), part of the Canadian Constitution, establishes the "fundamental freedom" of "conscience and religion".
• A big part of this freedom rests in each individual’s liberty and subjective choice in interpreting religious norms his or her own way
• When religious norms are given the force of law, it could force individuals to act in a way that is opposed to their (religious) beliefs
• While addressing the needs of cultural groups is important, we should make sure that promoting cultures doesn’t oppress the individuals belonging to a culture or religion
(In)Equality

- Section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on […] sex”
- Section 28 emphasizes the commitment to sex equality: "all the freedoms referred to in [the Charter] are guaranteed equally to male and female persons”
- Many religious codes frequently contain provisions that discriminate against females
- For example, under Jewish law, women cannot serve as judges
- For example, under Islamic law, men inherit twice as much as women.
- Instead of dividing the assets, men give their wives, an amount of money (mahr) agreed in the marriage contract; this amount may sometimes be symbolic
- Religious arbitration lacks substantive protections for certain parties, particularly women
- It also lacks procedural protections. This includes the risk of arbitral bias which can occur when the arbitrators are unfairly favouring one side over the other. For example, a case of a divorce being determined by a panel made up of a majority of men.

Lack of voluntary submission

- Arbitration needs to have been agreed to by both participants. It has to be voluntary
- Parties to a religious arbitration might not have voluntarily consented to the process. They may even be forced into arbitration through various communal or other pressures.
- Inequity of power between genders in the context of religious arbitration can be a source of this lack of voluntariness
• Individuals belonging to a religion (e.g. Muslim women) may be considered bad adherents to their faith, socially shunned and excluded from society, or alienated from family if they do not agree to arbitration.

**Lack of informed consent**

• The parties may not be aware of the binding effect of arbitration agreements, how to procedurally contest an arbitration agreement, or the benefits and costs of alternative methods of dispute resolution

• They might not be fully informed about their rights

• This can be particularly problematic if the arbitration involves a foreign spouse, given language barriers or a lack of familiarity with Canadian law
Appendix F  Rules of deliberation

We want this experience to be pleasant for all. This conversation is meant to be a dialogue rather than a debate. The goal here is for you to listen to each other and to make decisions together.

There are some simple ways to achieve that:

1. **Be collaborative:** You are making a decision together. If you think your point is stronger, persuade others. Don't just try to prove them wrong.

2. **Find common ground:** Try to see if others are saying something that you find acceptable to you. Make basic agreements with each other.

3. **Listen to each other:** Wait for the speaker to finish before you contribute. Try to understand what he or she is saying. Ask questions if you don’t.

4. **Justify your own views:** Use what others are saying as a way to reflect on your own thoughts and positions. Find the reasons behind why you are saying something. Share those reasons with the group.

5. **Remain open-minded:** Consider that other points of view are based on good reasons too. Think about where you think an agreement with others is possible for you.

6. **Stay courteous:** Avoid personal attacks. This is about discussing arguments, not people. Don't make it about the character of the participants.

Try and follow these rules.
Table G.1  Factor analysis for personality questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Introversion</th>
<th>Unstable</th>
<th>Unfeeling</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted</td>
<td>0.7829</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiet</td>
<td>0.7753</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shy</td>
<td>0.7928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4926</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxious</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7564</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tense</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7609</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moody</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6313</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsympathetic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5955</td>
<td>0.6631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5351</td>
<td>0.5907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5029</td>
<td>0.7267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table G.2  Factor analysis for structural questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Deliberative Citizenship</th>
<th>Conflict Avoidance</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It might give me a chance to make an actual difference.</td>
<td>0.6918</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It might make me think about my own ideas and feelings more carefully.</td>
<td>0.4790</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some deliberations, done by a range of average people, can sometimes be used in the political process to actually change policies.</td>
<td>0.7611</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is chance to express my opinions.</td>
<td>0.4927</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I might be able to learn something by talking to people who have different ideas.</td>
<td>0.7894</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are lots of issues and information that I might not know much about.</td>
<td>0.4741</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It might make me feel closer to my community (friends, school, etc...).</td>
<td>0.6241</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This kind of discussion could lead to heated arguments.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6326</td>
<td>0.6342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would be expected to talk about and defend my views my views in front of others.</td>
<td>0.6255</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I felt strongly about something being discussed, other participants might attack my views and I would hear points of view that I really disagree with.</td>
<td>0.6775</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I might be shy and uncomfortable talking to others.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4353</td>
<td>0.7980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table G.3 Ordered logistic regressions without post-hoc reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on a general, unspecified issue</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on a multicultural, unspecified issue</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on LGBTQ policy in schools</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on minimum wage in British Columbia</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on VAW in minority communities</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on funding for cultural/religious groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.823*** (0.311)</td>
<td>0.0257 (0.305)</td>
<td>0.544*** (0.207)</td>
<td>-0.0152 (0.213)</td>
<td>0.694*** (0.215)</td>
<td>0.190 (0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.144 (0.243)</td>
<td>-0.238 (0.250)</td>
<td>-0.312* (0.168)</td>
<td>0.123 (0.170)</td>
<td>0.176 (0.175)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible Minority</td>
<td>0.265 (0.314)</td>
<td>-0.176 (0.314)</td>
<td>0.104 (0.215)</td>
<td>0.181 (0.222)</td>
<td>0.290 (0.223)</td>
<td>0.745*** (0.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinionated</td>
<td>0.711*** (0.233)</td>
<td>0.196 (0.218)</td>
<td>0.428*** (0.157)</td>
<td>0.503*** (0.160)</td>
<td>0.420*** (0.163)</td>
<td>0.447*** (0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introversion</td>
<td>-0.361** (0.176)</td>
<td>-0.280 (0.176)</td>
<td>-0.0499 (0.115)</td>
<td>-0.0395 (0.119)</td>
<td>-0.435*** (0.124)</td>
<td>-0.0515 (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut1</td>
<td>-1.074 (0.760)</td>
<td>-3.404*** (0.810)</td>
<td>-1.550*** (0.505)</td>
<td>-2.402*** (0.590)</td>
<td>-1.962*** (0.581)</td>
<td>-0.947* (0.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut2</td>
<td>0.661 (0.679)</td>
<td>-1.399** (0.696)</td>
<td>0.0400 (0.483)</td>
<td>-0.306 (0.480)</td>
<td>0.331 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.608 (0.490)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut3</td>
<td>3.387*** (0.740)</td>
<td>0.954 (0.690)</td>
<td>1.680*** (0.493)</td>
<td>1.817*** (0.491)</td>
<td>2.223*** (0.516)</td>
<td>2.830*** (0.518)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(Standard errors in paragraphs)
Table G.4  Ordered logistic regressions with post-hoc reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on a general, unspecified issue</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on a multicultural, unspecified issue</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on LGBTQ policy in schools</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on minimum wage in British Columbia</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on VAW in minority communities</th>
<th>Willingness for deliberation on funding for cultural/religious groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.623* (0.376)</td>
<td>0.0540 (0.340)</td>
<td>0.522** (0.218)</td>
<td>-0.0828 (0.226)</td>
<td>0.683*** (0.229)</td>
<td>0.0061 (0.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.333 (0.295)</td>
<td>-0.558* (0.296)</td>
<td>-0.431** (0.179)</td>
<td>-0.00752 (0.183)</td>
<td>0.0294 (0.188)</td>
<td>-0.110 (0.182)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visible Minority</td>
<td>0.337 (0.366)</td>
<td>-0.633* (0.350)</td>
<td>0.121 (0.220)</td>
<td>0.207 (0.230)</td>
<td>0.228 (0.233)</td>
<td>0.760*** (0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinionated</td>
<td>0.628** (0.294)</td>
<td>-0.0344 (0.249)</td>
<td>0.369** (0.168)</td>
<td>0.368** (0.173)</td>
<td>0.297* (0.177)</td>
<td>0.309* (0.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introversion</td>
<td>-0.234 (0.217)</td>
<td>-0.188 (0.195)</td>
<td>0.0304 (0.121)</td>
<td>0.0665 (0.127)</td>
<td>-0.391*** (0.133)</td>
<td>0.0711 (0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative Citizenship</td>
<td>1.745*** (0.316)</td>
<td>0.805*** (0.219)</td>
<td>0.379** (0.149)</td>
<td>0.541*** (0.160)</td>
<td>0.650*** (0.164)</td>
<td>0.583*** (0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Avoidance</td>
<td>0.324* (0.192)</td>
<td>0.322* (0.187)</td>
<td>0.0394 (0.115)</td>
<td>0.154 (0.120)</td>
<td>0.0277 (0.121)</td>
<td>0.256** (0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed Participation</td>
<td>0.732* (0.443)</td>
<td>0.441 (0.372)</td>
<td>0.179 (0.249)</td>
<td>0.0434 (0.254)</td>
<td>0.763*** (0.255)</td>
<td>0.456* (0.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeable Participation</td>
<td>-0.210 (0.439)</td>
<td>0.314 (0.364)</td>
<td>0.0534 (0.245)</td>
<td>0.0937 (0.252)</td>
<td>0.267 (0.264)</td>
<td>-0.106 (0.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant cut1  
13.06*** (2.232)  
5.525*** (1.671)  
1.901* (1.049)  
2.106* (1.119)  
4.189*** (1.144)  
5.169*** (1.111)  

Constant cut2  
15.14*** (2.269)  
7.889*** (1.678)  
3.543*** (1.053)  
4.254*** (1.080)  
6.651*** (1.135)  
6.863*** (1.131)  

Constant cut3  
19.36*** (2.587)  
10.96*** (1.820)  
5.291*** (1.079)  
6.560*** (1.122)  
8.838*** (1.189)  
9.392*** (1.195)  

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
(Standard errors in paragraphs)
Appendix H  Extra figures

Figure H.1  Comparison of deliberation under different facilitative treatments (without role-playing portion in simulated representation)
Figure H.2  Breakdown of investments (without role-playing portion)
Figure H.3 Breakdown of divestments (without role-playing potion)
Figure H.4  Breakdown of investment categories

Empathy

Control Conditions  Deliberative worth  Simulated representation

- Identify feelings
- Acknowledge feelings
- Connect feelings

Productive Dialogue

Control Conditions  Deliberative worth  Simulated representation

- Concessions
- Mediation
- Personal v. Public

Reflection & Incorporation

Control Conditions  Deliberative worth  Simulated representation

- Amend/Change
- Clarify
- Connect to general
- Connection to other

Respect

Control Conditions  Deliberative worth  Simulated representation

- Apology
- No interruption
- Rephrase/repeat
- We, us, our

Reason-giving

Control Conditions  Deliberative worth  Simulated representation

- Justification
- Intelligible

Sincerity

Control Conditions  Deliberative worth  Simulated representation

- Admit ignorance
- Consistency
Figure H.5 Breakdown of divestments categories