

## Supplementary materials

### *Approach-avoidance questionnaire*

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) – 7 (Strongly agree). There are no right or wrong answers.

- By nature, I am a very nervous person.
- Thinking about the things I want really energizes me.
- It doesn't take much to make me worry.
- When I see an opportunity for something I like, I immediately get excited.
- It doesn't take a lot to get me excited and motivated.
- I feel anxiety and fear very deeply.
- I react very strongly to bad experiences.
- I'm always on the lookout for positive opportunities and experiences.
- When it looks like something bad could happen, I have a strong urge to escape.
- When good things happen to me, it affects me very strongly.
- When I want something, I feel a strong desire to go after it.
- It is easy for me to imagine bad things that might happen to me.

*10-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-10) questionnaire*

For each of the following statement, please indicate the extent to which this statement describes you using the scale of 1 (very unlike me) – 5 (very like me)

- I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.
- I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
- I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that requires little thought.
- I prefer complex to simple problems.
- Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
- I trust my initial feelings about people.
- I believe in trusting my hunches.
- My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
- When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings."
- I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't explain how I know.

### *Approach-avoidance results*

We ran a generalized linear mixed model with discount level, approach motivation, avoidance motivation, and the two-way interactions predicting participants' choice of deal. The analysis revealed an approach motivation X discount level interaction,  $F(1, 954) = 9.36, p = .002$ . To better understand this interaction, we used a median split to categorize participants as either low or high on approach motivation. Simple effects analysis revealed that only participants low on approach motivation were affected by the discount level. Participants with low approach motivation were more likely to select the BOGO deal when the discount was high (80.77%, 168 of 208) than when it was low (67.79%, 141 of 208),  $F(1, 956) = 8.86, p = .003, b = .15, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.051, .248]$ . However, participants with high approach motivation were equally likely to prefer the BOGO deal both when the discount was high (75.37%, 205 of 272) and when it was low (75.37%, 205 of 272),  $F < 1$ . Avoidance motivation did not influence participants' choice of deal.

Finally, we examined the effects of approach and avoidance temperament on participants' gaze patterns. We ran a generalized linear mixed model with discount level, deal type, approach motivation, avoidance motivation, and their interactions predicting participants' fixation duration. The analysis revealed an approach orientation X deal type interaction,  $F(1, 1908) = 8.87, p = .003$ . Participants low on approach motivation fixated longer on BOGO deals ( $M = 2.10\text{s}, SD = 1.01\text{s}$ ) than on percentage deals ( $M = 1.97\text{s}, SD = .93\text{s}$ ),  $F(1, 1916) = 4.19, p = .041, b = .12, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.005, .243]$ . Participants with high approach motivation, however, fixated a similar amount of time on BOGO deals ( $M = 1.86\text{s}, SD = .98\text{s}$ ) and percentage deals ( $M = 1.80\text{s}, SD = 1.01\text{s}$ ),  $F(1, 1916) = 1.30, p = .253$ .

This interaction was qualified by an approach orientation X deal type X discount level interaction,  $F(1, 1908) = 7.66, p = .006$ . For participants with low approach motivation, the deal type X discount level is highly significant,  $F(1, 828) = 21.77, p < .001$ . When the discount level was high, those participants fixated longer on BOGO deals ( $M = 2.26s, SD = 1.04s$ ) than on percentage deals ( $M = 1.84s, SD = .88s$ ).  $F(1, 828) = 22.02, p < .001, b = .42, 95\% CI = [.244, .594]$ . However, when the discount level was low, participants with low approach motivation displayed the reversed pattern with marginal significance—they fixated longer on percentage deals ( $M = 2.11s, SD = .96s$ ) than on BOGO deals ( $M = 1.94s, SD = .95s$ ),  $F(1, 828) = 3.63, p = .057, b = .17, 95\% CI = [-.005, .345]$ . For participants with high approach motivation, however, the deal type X discount level interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 1084) = 2.41, p = .121$ .

#### *REI-10 results*

We ran a generalized linear mixed model with discount level, faith in intuition, need for cognition, and the two-way interactions predicting participants' choice of deal. The analysis revealed no main effects or interactions for either faith in intuition or need for cognition on participants' choices,  $F's < 1$ .

Additionally, we examined the effects of need for cognition and faith in intuition on participants' gaze patterns. We ran a generalized linear mixed model with discount level, deal type, faith in intuition, need for cognition, and their interactions predicting participants' fixation duration. The analysis revealed a need for cognition X deal type interaction,  $F(1, 1908) = 25.15, p < .001$ . Participants low on need for cognition fixated longer on BOGO deals ( $M = 2.17s, SD = 1.01s$ ) than on percentage deals ( $M = 1.94s, SD = .90s$ ),  $F(1, 956) = 16.60, p < .001, b = .23, 95\% CI = [.121, .346]$ . Participants with high need for cognition, however, fixated a similar

amount of time on BOGO deals ( $M = 1.75s$ ,  $SD = .94s$ ) and percentage deals ( $M = 1.81s$ ,  $SD = 1.05s$ ),  $F(1, 956) = 1.09$ ,  $p = .296$ .

This interaction was qualified by a need for cognition X deal type X discount level interaction,  $F(1, 1908) = 4.79$ ,  $p = .029$ . For participants with low need for cognition, the deal type X discount level is highly significant,  $F(1, 956) = 22.36$ ,  $p < .001$ . When the discount level was high, those participants fixated longer on BOGO deals ( $M = 2.32s$ ,  $SD = 1.05s$ ) than on percentage deals ( $M = 1.81s$ ,  $SD = .88s$ ).  $F(1, 956) = 38.74$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $b = .51$ , 95% CI = [.346, .664]. However, when the discount level was low, participants with low need for cognition fixated a similar amount of time on BOGO deals ( $M = 2.02s$ ,  $SD = .95s$ ) and percentage deals ( $M = 2.06s$ ,  $SD = .91s$ ),  $F < 1$ . For participants with high need for cognition, however, the deal type X discount level interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 956) = 1.80$ ,  $p = .18$ .

Lastly, the analysis revealed a faith in intuition X deal type interaction,  $F(1, 1908) = 4.97$ ,  $p = .026$ . Participants with low faith in intuition fixated a similar amount of time on BOGO deals ( $M = 1.93$ ,  $SD = 1.04s$ ) and percentage deals ( $M = 1.87s$ ,  $SD = 1.01s$ ),  $F(1, 1020) = 1.25$ ,  $p = .264$ . Participants with high faith in intuition, however, fixated longer on BOGO deals ( $M = 2.00s$ ,  $SD = .95s$ ) than on percentage deals ( $M = 1.88s$ ,  $SD = .95s$ ),  $F(1, 892) = 4.20$ ,  $p = .041$ ,  $b = .12$ , 95% CI = [.005, .234].