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Multilingual Moves

Language and Motility of Migrant Communities in Europe

Christopher Alexander Houtkamp

Multilingual Moves

Language and Motility of Migrant Communities in Europe

Voor mijn ouders

Multilingual Moves

Language and Motility of Migrant Communities in Europe

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	prof. dr. F. Gobbo	Universiteit van Amsterdam
	prof. dr. F. Grin	Université de Genève

Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen

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Foreword and acknowledgements

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2015 the immigration and integration debate rose once more to prominence on the European political agenda. It fitted within a trend that had started in the early 2000s in which migration-related issues often dominated the discussion in the Member States of the EU. Angela Merkel's famous, or according to some infamous, declaration that Germany and the German people were well-equipped to handle the incoming migration flows (symbolised by her often quoted statement 'wir schaffen das') laid bare the slumbering division between Eastern and Western Europe on the topic of immigration.

The debates primarily dealt with the protection of the external borders of the European Union (EU). However, an important secondary issue, that was mostly talked about within nation states, was the optimal strategy for integrating as effectively as possible the refugees who qualified for a longer stay in their respective destination countries. The role of language acquisition was arguably the most important element of that discussion. On the one hand language is considered a tool for creating social cohesion, usually in the context of host language acquisition by immigrants. In a policy brief of 2013, the Dutch Minister for Social Affairs Lodewijk Asscher wrote, 'Learning the [Dutch] language is a first requirement for participation. Knowledge of the language grants independence, connects people and presents opportunities' (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2013: 2, my translation). It is safe to argue that this is the prevailing sentiment among the political elite in the majority of West European countries: host language acquisition is of vital importance, both for the individual immigrant and society as a whole. But on the other hand, language is regarded as a source of division, in this case usually referring to the role of migrant mother tongues. These languages, especially when they impair host language acquisition, might help develop undesirable segregated communities.

When this study commenced in September 2014, the immigration debate was still relatively tame compared to the present time (2019). Within these five years we have witnessed, among other events, several Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks on European soil, the refugee crisis, and an attempted coup against the Erdoğan regime in Turkey which had clear ramifications for the Turkish diaspora in Europe. These events have massively influenced this project. Over the course of these four years I have experienced first-hand the strong interaction between the fields of social sciences/ humanities and the 'living world' one is researching.

[1] The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 613344.

Political events thus presented several hurdles that had to be overcome, which was a largely successful exercise. What will be presented in the following chapters is an explorative theoretical and topical study that attempts to fill a particular but relevant niche within migration research: namely the connection between language (policy) and migration; or, to put it differently, the possible causal relationship between language (policy) as the 'X' and migration as the 'Y'. Migration theory has over the decades included many different explanations of why migration flows occur, and of the factors which influence their size and composition. Logical explanations such as income inequality, demography (and population size in particular) and the presence of social networks have both theoretically and empirically been investigated to a great extent. Language and language policy have rarely been featured as a separate explanation, even though in the current age of relatively accessible transnational communication (via the internet) and affordable long-distance travel options it is difficult to imagine language *not* being an important factor.

This study thus aimed from the outset to explore whether this omission of language was indeed justified, or whether perhaps a new explaining factor for migration flows should be added to the existing body of theoretical literature. It was decided to focus on three 'ideal-type' EU countries, according to the existing literature, when it comes to language policy: multicultural Sweden, assimilationist France, and the Netherlands, which transitioned from a multicultural to a more assimilationist country. In the course of the research it became clear that these rather rigid theoretical classifications were much more fluid in practice, a view that has been shared by several scholars (Bertossi, Duyvendak and Scholten 2015). In all three countries data would be gathered on a non-EU and EU migrant group: the Turkish and Polish communities respectively. Previous studies on the effects of migrant languages rarely included perspectives of the immigrants themselves, which is an omission this study aims to correct. These groups were well represented in all three countries and across the whole of Western Europe, which opened up interesting research avenues, such as the connection between different diaspora communities all over the EU. In the social-science literature this development has been described as 'transnationalism'. In their edited volume *The Politics of Multilingualism*, Grin and Kraus (2018) state the relevance of studying transnationalism and questions of multilingualism jointly:

> it is obvious that mobility and transnationalisation entail challenges that can hardly be addressed in the context of the often dogmatic multilingualism associated with the period of expansion of national forms of rule, in which the dominant political tendency was to establish a tight bond between cultural standardisation and social integration. Rather, such challenges seem to require policy architectures that are as complex as the realities which they are supposed to tackle, thereby offering sophisticated institutional templates for linking 'transnational' citizenship and transnationalism (Grin and Kraus 2018: 5).

Indeed, transnationalism is a key concept when attempting to understand processes of migration and integration (or: mobility and inclusion) in the twenty-first century. Technological advances have always been a main driver for social change, and a clear case can be made for innovations in communication and transportation having a comparable effect on the inclusion of minorities. Transnationalism limits the possibilities for nation states to 'integrate' (or assimilate) their minorities within a strict national framework. Thus, transnationalism is an essential concept to include in a policy-oriented study on multilingualism.

In an attempt to establish a causal connection in theory between language and migration, it became clear early in the project that the existing conceptual apparatus, which will be elaborated upon, was not wholly sufficient. Is it logical to assume, for example, that achieving a certain linguistic competence in German would directly cause the respondent to migrate to a German-speaking country? Instead, it is more likely for migration and language to have an indirect relationship. Learning a new language does not directly cause migration, but it expands the options for potential migrants which they can act upon at a later date. Expanding language skills increases mobility *options* rather than *actual* mobility. I argue that to study the connection between language (policy) and migration properly, a comprehensive concept, taking into account both mobility options and actual mobility, is necessary, namely the concept of 'motility'. Motility has its roots in biological research and was introduced in urban geography by Kaufmann et al. (2004) to analyse mobility potential on the local level. In this study motility is further theoretically developed to be employed on the global level. It will be shown that motility is essential to understanding both present-day migration patterns and the connection between language (policy) and migration in particular.

This research has the character of an explorative study, seeking to take the first steps to flesh out the concept of motility. However, several theses will be defended, with the necessary caution. Firstly, the ideal-types of integration policies that are attributed to certain countries are in fact more nuanced in practice, and in the case of the Netherlands warrant a comprehensive reinterpretation. Secondly, perspectives on language acquisition among immigrants are very diverse and depend greatly on several societal factors, the most important of them being social class. Finally, it has become apparent over the course of this study that both the connection between language and migration, and the concept of motility, are valid, and even necessary, tools to understand patterns of migration in the twenty-first century.

Chapter 2

MIGRATION THEORY, MOBILITY AND MOTILITY

Since the end of the nineteenth century, scholars have identified different factors to explain internal and international migration. Different explanations, which vary greatly with respect to the level of analysis (macro/meso/micro) and scientific disciplines (economics, psychology, demography, among others) have been presented over the last century. Current migration theory has however paid relatively little attention to a potentially important set of explanatory factors: namely language, language skills and language policy. According to Itkonen (2008) we need to distinguish between the socially constructed basis of languages and their mental-cognitive representation. The latter primarily refers to a language's identifiable core values, such as a lexicon and a common grammar. By 'socially constructed basis' he primarily refers to the place of language in society, and especially the importance of the interaction between its speakers. Whether the socially constructed basis or the mental-cognitive representation is the most important characteristic of a language, is the subject of extensive socio-linguistic debate. For the purposes of this research, the definition of language as suggested by Marácz (2018) is accepted. He argues,

> The fact that languages or some of its modules are socially constructed does not mean however that they lack a basic core, a prototypical grammatical and lexical system derived from the Universal Grammar that is represented on the cognitive mind-state level (Chomsky 2002: 8-9). A particular grammar is then a stable state that has been derived from the Universal Grammar and might vary from its initial state due to parametric setting (Chomsky 2008: 233). As a result, the English language character of a dictionary of English is common to or shared by all native speakers of English. So, languages, or some of its modules, although socially constructed possess identifiable core features. (Marácz 2018: 226).

Marácz's position, which recognises the importance of language as a social phenomenon and its core identifiable characteristics, is well suited for research on the interaction between language policy, inclusion and mobility. Language policies for immigrants focus primarily on language acquisition, i.e. transmitting certain languages based on the identifiable lexicon and grammar structures. Marácz contends, 'this interpretation of 'languages' facilitates the politics of language, i.e. the intervention of political power into language regimes.' (Marácz 2018: 226). However, especially when analysing the role of language from the perspective of its speakers, there is also an obvious social dimension at work. Language is not exclusively a tool for communication, although that

is obviously one of its main functions, but also a means to identification (Mamadouh 1999, May 2012). Language shapes the way we perceive the world around us, which is arguably also an important aspect of identification (Bauböck 2003). Language policies, which often determine which language is taught to which people, can thus influence the identification processes of different groups in society. It is not unsurprising that states, even though the actual policies are mostly based around the mental-cognitive aspects of language, also strongly consider the impact of their policies on the identification of minorities. A third function of language, next to communication and identification, is its role as an instrument of power. Imposing one's own language on others can be the result of, or perpetuate, political or economic domination, creating a linguistic hegemony – as is seen for example in the discussions on English as a lingua franca by Phillipson (1992) and Korshunova and Marácz (2012). These different functions of language can all directly or indirectly affect the movement of people. If we consider the role of language as a communication tool, it seems a plausible hypothesis that having more language skills will positively influence an individual's mobility options, since the transition from one country to another is smoother in the absence of language barriers. 'Linguistic capital' (Bourdieu 1977, De Swaan 2001) facilitates access to mobility capital. The role of language as a means of identification is also important in the formation of transnational identities. The presence of an ethnic and linguistic network in the country of destination could expand an individual's mobility options.

When considering the role of language in questions of mobility and inclusion, there are several conceptual topics that need to be addressed. Firstly, we should take a closer look at the state of the field in migration theory, and then especially on the role of language therein as an explaining factor. Language is a relatively understudied concept in the field of migration, meaning that there is very little empirical material to draw upon for these reflections. Instead, we will briefly look at the main features of several major migration theories, and then determine where language would or could fit in, based on the already existing theoretical work. Secondly, we will define several key concepts of the dissertation, which can be grouped into two different sets. The first set concerns concepts related to migration, i.e. migration, mobility, motility, transnationalism. The second set consists of notions related to integration, i.e. 'assimilation, integration, segregation, inclusion, and, again, transnationalism. These conceptual reflections will result in a clear distinction between the concepts mentioned, and will explain extensively which ones will be used in the ensuing parts of the dissertation.

[2] This section draws heavily upon a paper published by the present author, namely: Houtkamp, C. (2014). Integrating language in theories on long-distance movement: migration vs mobility and the concept of motility. A'dam Multiling, 1(1), 16-26.

Language and mobility: perspectives from international migration theory[2]

In the nineteenth century, migration research was primarily conducted by social geographers who used factors such as population size to explain international mobility. The breach with this social geography centred approach occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, when economists attempted to explain migration through existing economic models, be they neo-classical or Marxist. Since that time, various migration theories have been designed, which now encompass many different kinds of explanations (e.g. socio-cultural, psychological, networks) and also differ in their level of analysis, ranging from the individual level to the macro-level. A 'grand theory of migration' which synthesises the different theoretical perspectives has not been formulated yet (Massey et al. 2008).

Even though many migration theories exist at the present time, they seldom explicitly mention 'language' as an explanatory factor. This section will attempt to fit language into already existing frameworks of migration theory. First the premises of several major theories, or groups of theories, will be briefly outlined. Subsequently, the possibility of fitting in 'language' as an explanatory factor will be considered. Our analysis focusses solely on theories regarding voluntary migration, as opposed to forced migration. Whilst forced migration is obviously relevant when discussing migration from third countries (i.e. non-EU Member States) to the EU, its relevance diminishes considerably in the case of intra-EU mobility.

Neo-classical economics[3]

The neo-classical approach is among the oldest and best known of international migration theories. It is largely based on models that were originally developed to study international labour migration (Massey et al. 2008). Neo-classical economics argues that international migration is mainly caused by geographical differences in the supply of and demand for labour (Todaro and Maruszko 1987). Countries with a large supply of labour relative to the amount of capital will have low equilibrium market wages and vice versa (Massey et al. 2008). The differences in wages will incite workers to move from the low-wage or labour-surplus countries to high-wage or labour-scarce countries. This leads to a decrease in the labour supply and a rise of the wage levels in the capital-poor nations, and vice versa in the capital-rich nations, which eventually leads to an economic equilibrium, and thus to a dampening of the migration flows.

[3] Neo-classical theory has had many 'successors', such as 'new economics of migration' and 'dual labour market theory'. Even though these theories are clearly different from neo-classicism in many aspects, they still share some key basic principles. Since those principles are precisely the ones that make neo-classicism interesting to study migration from a linguistic perspective, we will treat neo-classicism and its variants such as 'the new economics of migration' as equals, and will thus not further discuss the latter category.

The version of neo-classicism mentioned above is a macro-theory that focusses on larger units of people and is, despite being predominantly focussed on the agency of individuals, also very much interested in the structural factors that cause migration. Other neo-classical economists, such as Sjaastad, prefer an individual-based approach. Sjaastad argues that immigrants have reflected thoroughly on the costs and benefits of their immigration plans (Sjaastad 1962). Immigration is thus in Sjaastad's view purely a rational choice, which is influenced by 'push' and 'pull' factors. Push factors include demographic growth, lack of economic opportunities in the country of origin and low living standards, whilst pull factors include demand for labour, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political freedoms (Castles & Miller 2009).

Neo-classical theory, both at the micro and at the macro-level, assumes that potential migrants have perfect, accurate knowledge of all these 'push-pull factors' and that migration decisions are overwhelmingly based on rational economic motivations. Migration is thus mostly the result of the individual 'agency' of the migrant. 'Constraining factors' such as government regulation are treated as a distortion of the rational market. Borjas claims that neo-classical migration theory leads to a clear and empirically testable categorisation of the types of immigration flows that arise in a world where individuals search for the 'best' country (Borjas 1989). Economic differences between countries suffice to generate migration flows. Eventually, after a long period of migration, wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions are equalised. This, again, leads to an economic equilibrium in the longer term.

Fitting in language as an explanatory factor might seem difficult in this economics-centred theoretical framework. However, it should be considered that the notion of 'human capital' is a key concept in neo-classical theory. Human capital refers to the stock of competences, social skills and personality attributes each individual possesses. Especially the theorists who focus on the individual level assume each individual migrant would pick the destination where he/she can make maximum use of his/her acquired human capital. For example, a skilled auto-technician would preferably migrate to a country where there is a shortage of auto-technicians. The concept of human capital in general has been criticised heavily, most notably by Pierre Bourdieu, who offers a conceptual alternative by making a distinction between cultural capital, that also certainly includes language, social capital, economic capital and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986). However, our initial goal is to fit language within the framework of the existing migration theories, thus at this stage we will use the definitions of human capital that are prevalent within the framework of neo-classicism. It can be assumed that language knowledge is also a form of human capital (see for example Bourdieu 1991), even though this is not explicitly mentioned by neo-classical theorists. Having a fair possession of the first, or at least the second language spoken within the country of destination, would improve the migrant's economic perspectives and allow him/her to make better use of his/her other skills. Finding work and/or housing and making contact

with the autochthonous population or the people from one's own ethnic community is facilitated if the immigrant speaks the languages appropriate for the situation. Thus, if this premise of language as human capital is accepted, learning more widely spoken languages would generate a form of human capital that can be used in a large portion of EU territory, thus also expanding the mobility options of the immigrant. In contrast, if a government's language policy only offers a limited number of languages, or just relatively small languages, that might be a 'constraining factor', hereby limiting mobility.

Structural migration theories

Historical-structuralist theories argue that economic and political dynamics are more significant to understanding migration than individual agency, the latter being the focus of neo-classical theories. Historical structuralism has its roots in Marxism and argues that because political power is unequally distributed among the different nations, the expansion of global capitalism worsened global inequalities. Poor countries were in effect unable to escape their poverty trap, due to their disadvantageous position in the geopolitical structure (Massey et al. 2008). In turn, the poor economic situation in disadvantaged countries causes an increase in emigration.

In the 1970s Immanuel Wallerstein developed a new branch of historical structuralism, which he coined 'world systems theory' (Wallerstein 1974). He analysed the expansion of global capitalism. Wallerstein classified countries according to their dependency on the dominant capitalist powers (the 'core' nations), with peripheral being the most dependent and semi-peripheral having a certain degree of independence. World systems theory argues that migration is mainly a way of mobilising cheap labour for capital. Initially they tended to focus on internal migration, but after the mid 1970s, when the vital role of labour migrants in the Western countries became more apparent, the world systems theorists analysed international labour as one of the ways in which relations of domination were forged between the core countries and the underdeveloped periphery (Castles & Miller 2009). World systems theory argues that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate (Massey et al. 2008). Always looking for higher profits, multinationals in core countries 'invade' the poorer nations in the periphery, looking for land, raw materials, labour and consumer markets. International migration emerges thus as a natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations that occur in the process of capitalist development (ibid.). World systems theorists claim that as land, raw materials and labour within peripheral regions come under the influence of global markets, at the cost of the local communities or national bureaucracies, migration flows are generated, both national and international (ibid.).

Not all the structural approaches have been inspired by Marxism. There are scholars such as R. Skeldon (1997) who, inspired by Rostovian modernism, developed the 'transitional migration approach'. Skeldon argued that a country's migration pattern is linked to its 'development stage'. Skeldon distinguishes five stages of development, as summarised succinctly by De Haas:

> the (1) old and (2) new core countries (e.g., Western Europe, North America, Japan) characterised by immigration and internal decentralisation; (3) the expanding core (e.g., eastern China, South-Africa, eastern Europe), where we find both immigration and out-migration and internal centralisation (i.e., urbanisation and rural-to-urban migration); (4) the labour frontier (e.g., Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Mexico, the Philippines (...) which are dominated by out-migration and internal centralisation; and the so-called (5) "resource niche" (e.g., many sub-Saharan African countries, parts of central Asia and Latin America), with variable, often weaker forms of migration. (Skeldon 1997 in De Haas 2010a: 8).

Skeldon's theory is in a sense the Rostovian alternative to world systems theory: it categorises different nations according to their development level, but does not assume that these different regions have a problematic economic relationship. World systems theory argues that the so-called 'core' is impeding the development of the 'peripheries', whereas transitional migration adopts a more optimistic approach, claiming that countries are fully capable of climbing the development ladder.

These structural theories very much differ in their interpretation of migration as a phenomenon. However, they share one principle that is most relevant in the analysis of whether language or language policy are factors in migration: migration occurs with relatively little agency involved and is mostly reliant on the global economic structure. Furthermore in the case of world systems theory, the assumed capitalist 'penetration' of the periphery countries by the core-countries is crucial for the analysis. To start with the latter: it could be argued that this relationship exists in the EU context, with the West European countries taking on the role of the 'core' that attracts immigrants, and East European ones fulfilling the role of the periphery, with much (temporary) emigration to the core. Turkey, as a non-EU country, would be in the periphery as well. In addition, world systems theory can be applied when departing from the notion of 'nations', and instead categorising the global system using 'language regions'. English, due to the fact the last two centuries have been dominated by two English-speaking superpowers (the U.K. and the U.S.), is 'penetrating' the non-English speaking countries and forcing them to adapt to their linguistic standards. This argument is similar to a socio-linguistic tradition that analyses the role of English and its increased dominance (e.g. Sosonis 2005, Phillipson 2008, Korshunova and Marácz 2012, Ricento 2015). The consequences for the migration system would be that each immigrant is forced to learn at least English

if he/she wants to expand his/her mobility options, given the fact that English is now by far the most spoken first or second language in the EU (Eurobarometer 2012, see Figure 2.1 here). Figure 2.1 compares self-reported second-language proficiency of EU citizens between 2005 and 2012. However, this statement does not necessarily offer us an alternative explanation compared to neo-classical economics. The hypotheses would be similar: learning 'bigger' languages expands one's mobility options. What differs is the evaluation of this development: world systems theorists consider the system oppressive whilst neo-classical economists have a much more positive interpretation.



Figure 2.1. Second-language skills EU citizens
Source: Eurobarometer 2012: 19.

Migration systems theory, transnationalism and social networks

From the 1980s the economic theories of migration were confronted with increasing amounts of criticism (Castles & Miller 2009). It was argued that these approaches did not succeed in explaining the complexity of migration processes, because of their sole focus on economic variables such as wage differences and risk management. Out of such critiques various new approaches emerged, such as migration systems theory, transnationalism and social network theory, which seek to provide a basis for an interdisciplinary approach (ibid.). Migration systems theory argues that migration flows arise usually from prior links between sending and receiving nations, for example by colonisation, political influence, trade, investment or cultural-historical ties (ibid.). Examples include the migration ties

between Algeria and France, or between Germany and Turkey, which was a result of labour recruitment by Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.

The key principle of the migration systems theory is that migration flows can be explained by analysing interacting macro and micro-structures (Castles & Miller 2009). Macro-structures are global-scale institutional factors, such as the developments in the world market, relationships between states, and the judicial framework of both sending and receiving nations to control migration. Scholars of migration systems theory share the view of the formerly mentioned structural approaches that the increased integration of the world economy has heavily influenced the scope and nature of immigration movements. Micro-structures refer to the social networks that are developed by migrants themselves, to cope with migration and settlement (ibid.). Social networks often provide financial, cultural and social capital which make immigration possible. The presence of social networks presents newly arrived immigrants with the opportunity to 'bond' within their own ethnic niche, before 'bridging' towards wider society (Putnam 2007). Migration systems theory claims that migratory chains are usually initiated by an external factor, but that afterwards the migrants follow beaten paths (Stahl 1993) and are helped by family and friends who are already living in the receiving country.

This process of transnationalism, in which immigrants remain in touch with their friends and family in their country of origin, is essential to understanding migration and integration in the twenty-first century. Migration in its classical meaning refers to an act of 'uprooting' during which immigrants largely cut their ties with their economic and social networks in the country of origin. Furthermore, it seemed inevitable that every migrant would go through various stages of 'assimilation' to the host culture, which ends with complete adaptation (Alba and Nee 2003, Gordon 1964). Due to the advancement of communication and travel technology it is easier than a few decades ago to stay in touch with friends and family left behind, rendering the assimilation theory outdated. Acculturation and transnationalism can seemingly co-exist; however according to some scholars, particularly the most affluent and well-educated immigrants can take part in transnational activities (Portes 2011). The question is whether this observation is still applicable in the case of immigrants in the West in 2019. The internet, a very important catalyst for the growing relevance of transnationalism, is relatively affordable for most socio-economic classes.

Social networks, which reflect the existence of transnationalism, make migration easier and safer, thus providing an extra incentive for potential immigrants. Therefore migratory movements, once started, become self-sustaining social processes (Castles & Miller 2009). Massey et al. coined the term cumulative causation to explain this development, which entails that all acts of migration change the social context in which later migration decisions are made. Usually this leads to increasing migration flows (Massey et al. 2008).

That all 'network members' possess similar multilingual and communication skills is evidently an important condition for the network to function. Migration systems theory, social network theory and transnationalism are in practice mostly concerned with the links between communities within Western countries and their families/friends in the countries of origin. However, just looking at the EU context, these theoretical perspectives offer interesting explanations about intra-EU mobility, and the role of language therein. In Europe, many migrant communities are spread out over different countries. For example, Germany and the Netherlands both have a sizeable Turkish community. If we assume that transnational links not only, potentially, exist between the Dutch and German Turkish communities and Turkey, but also mutually between the two communities, then we could derive interesting hypotheses related to motility from this group of theories regarding the effects of multilingual policy on mobility. Teaching Turkish at school to the Turkish children may sow the seeds for later transnational contacts with 'foreign' Turkish communities, hereby building upon the inherent knowledge of Turkish already present in the families. This in turn could then lead to increased mobility between them, which would perpetuate over time, as argued within the migration systems theory.

Migration psychology

Migration psychology theories, as the name implies, seek to explain migration using psychological factors. Similar to neo-classicism, migration psychology emerged as a reaction to social geography, which exclusively viewed migration as an aggregate phenomenon instead of from the perspective of the individual. However, migration psychologists object to the sole economic focus of neo-classicism: according to them there are many, non-financial factors that play a significant role when one decides to migrate.

One of the core texts in this field was written by De Jong and Fawcett in 1981. They proposed to study migration using a 'value-expectancy research model', which consists of seven potential motivations to migrate (De Jong and Fawcett 1981). 'Wealth' includes a wide range of factors that are related to individual economic gain, such as higher wages, lower living costs, good welfare provisions, availability of jobs, etc. Secondly, 'status' encompasses factors that are tied to social standing and prestige, such as occupation and education. Even though status and wealth could be closely linked, the former can also be a separate factor. For example, living a more modern and sophisticated life or having a diploma can in themselves boost one's status. Thirdly, 'comfort' can be seen as the goal to achieve better working and/or living conditions. Fourthly, 'stimulation' refers to exposure to pleasurable activities, such as entertainment and recreation. Fifthly, 'autonomy' encompasses many dimensions which refer to personal freedom. Sixthly, 'affiliation' refers to the importance of being with other persons, such as getting married, accompanying a spouse or joining close friends and/or relatives. Lastly, 'morality' relates to deeply held value-systems that prescribe good and bad ways of living such as religious belief systems. Usually the morality dimension is expressed negatively,

meaning that individuals tend to 'flee' from places which have a wholly different moral system from their own.

When trying to fit language into this value-expectancy model, we should focus mostly on the policy level and the linguistic climate that certain policies might promote. The possible effects of language policies are best captured within the 'comfort' and 'autonomy' categories: a political and policy climate favouring multilingualism would render immigrants feeling comfortable and autonomous, and thus negatively impact their mobility. On the other hand, making it difficult for them to use their own language and pass it on onto their children may be a reason to be more mobile, in the search of an environment which is more prone to accept their language. This is a classic hypothesis that fits into the dilemma of mobility vs. inclusion: being linguistically included, by having access to policies catering to both the host society and mother tongue, would dis-incentify migrants to migrate, and vice versa.

Mobility vs. migration in the twenty-first century

Migration is certainly not a new phenomenon. It has become equally apparent however, especially when discussing the migration systems theory and the role of transnationalism, that its character has changed and will continue to change fundamentally. Revolutionary technological developments, infrastructural developments and the incorporation across the world of regions and countries into global capitalism have all significantly influenced the nature and size of migration flows. The great advances in transport and communication technology in the second half of the twentieth century further facilitated globalisation, and subsequently the international migration process. Transport and communication costs have been sharply reduced. These developments increased the interdependence of countries and peoples, accelerating the breaking down of barriers that in the past hindered the flows of capital, goods, services, ideas and people (Stiglitz 2002). Advanced communication and transport technologies enable migrants to keep in touch easily with their relatives in their country of origin, meaning that they will develop so-called transnational identities (De Haas 2010b).

The classic notion of 'migration' is thus becoming more and more problematic over time. A new concept better capturing the complexity of contemporary international movement is therefore needed. In that respect the so-called 'mobilities' paradigm gives us an interesting perspective, as developed by scholars such as Urry (2002) and Cresswell (2011). This approach provides a broader analytical lens than most migration theories: it studies the movement of people and ideas, analysing the broader social implications of these movements.

The mobilities paradigm offers interesting venues to integrate language (policy) into current theories. Its preoccupation with how mobility can shape and/or create identities is evidently connected to language. Language is naturally essential for communication

purposes, but is also instrumental in the formation of identities (Mamadouh 1999).
Urry (2002) distinguishes three broad categories of mobility: 'corporeal', 'virtual' and 'imaginative' mobility. Corporeal mobility refers to the actual movement of people, virtual mobility to long-distance communication via electronic means (e.g. the internet) and lastly, imaginative mobility implies 'transportation' through images or television. We will only discuss the first two categories, since the relevance of imaginative mobility for the study of mobility and language does not seem evident.

It can hardly be denied that the importance of virtual mobility has increased considerably over the last few decades, primarily due to the developments surrounding the internet. Virtual mobility is in that sense closely connected to theories on transnationalism and migration networks. The concept emphasises the importance of internet developments for the covering of distance, which could before only be traversed corporeally.

It is evident that language in its role as communication tool is crucial for virtual mobility. In that sense, language policy can greatly influence virtual mobility opportunities. Older migration theories, such as neo-classical economics and migration psychology theory, understandably did not account for the rise of the internet in the twenty-first century. The concept of virtual mobility can potentially amend these established theories. Another advantage of distinguishing virtual from corporeal mobility is that it allows us to look conceptually at the interplay between the two.Virtual mobility might lead to corporeal mobility and vice versa, due to the transnational ties that can easily be maintained using the former.

However, one of the mobilities paradigm's main strengths, namely its broad conception of movement and its implications, is paradoxically also a potential weakness. The paradigm succeeds in describing the complex reality of many forms of mobility, but does not yet seem fit to provide a concrete explanation for the movement of people. It is not the goal of the mobilities paradigm to provide an all-encompassing explanation for people's movement. It rather raises important questions and proposes a new methodology (Sheller and Urry 2006).

Motility

Another limitation of both mobility and migration is that in the end they are both predominantly focussed on actual movement. Most mobility and migration studies limit their scope by only analysing past and actual fluidity and have relatively little attention for potential movement. The latter is arguably very important when evaluating the effect of language (policy) on movement: language skills might not be only related to actual mobility, they can also influence the range of one's mobility options. For this reason we argue in favour of the concept of 'motility'.
As we have seen, the concept was taken from its roots in biology and elaborated upon from a sociological perspective by Kaufmann et al. (2004), and has in the core

retained its biological definition: it is used to analyse the potential rather than the actual movement.

Influenced by the work of Bourdieu (1986), it analyses mobility as a form of capital which is intertwined with other forms, like social and financial capital. If considered as such, the obvious question can be raised how motility is or should be distributed across the society. Motility has consequently a connection with the fields of mobility justice (Sheller 2013). Some individuals have more opportunities for mobility than others, the latter category being sometimes referred to as the 'mobility poor' (Cresswell 2008). The question of social justice and mobility is most often discussed in when analysing the effect of natural disasters on the poor – e.g. Sheller discusses the earthquakes on Haiti, while Cresswell analyses the effects of the hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Sheller 2013). This issue is however also relevant to the field we are interested in, namely voluntary mobility. Motility is a form of capital, similar to economic and social capital, and the question of how equally this capital is distributed is a relevant question for academics and policy makers alike. Regarding motility, Kaufmann et al. (2004) identify three main factors:

> Access refers to the range of possible mobilities according to place, time and other contextual constraints, and may be influenced by networks and dynamics within territories. (...) Obviously, access depends on the spatial distribution of the population and infrastructure (e.g. towns and cities provide a different range of choices of goods and services), sedimentation of spatial policies (e.g. transportation and accessibility), and socio-economic position (e.g. purchasing power, position in a hierarchy or social network).
>
> Competence includes skills and abilities that may directly or indirectly relate to access and appropriation. Three aspects are central to the competence component of motility: physical ability, e.g. the ability to transfer an entity from one place to another within given constraints; acquired skills relating to rules and regulations of movement, e.g. licenses, permits, specific knowledge of the terrain or codes; and organizational skills, e.g. planning and synchronizing activities including the acquisition of information, abilities and skills. Competence is multifaceted and interdependent with access and appropriation.
>
> Appropriation refers to how agents (including individuals, groups, networks, or institutions) interpret and act upon perceived or real access and skills. Appropriation is shaped by needs, plans, aspirations and understandings of agents, and it relates to strategies, motives, values and habits. Appropriation describes how agents consider, deem appropriate, and select specific options. It is also the means by which skills and decisions are evaluated. (Kaufmann et al. 2004: 750).

Looking at these three broad characteristics on the one hand, and our ambition to integrate language in mobility theory on the other, it seems all three factors are relevant for our thinking. Firstly, 'access' refers to contextual possibilities and constraints that determine each individual's range of mobility options. These constraints and possibilities are both of a technological and social nature. Language is obviously essential for communication. In order to even have the option to build up a network, it is paramount to speak the appropriate language. We can thus easily tie the 'access' component of motility to discussions on transnationalism, migration networks and virtual mobility. Kaufmann et al. (2004) emphasise in addition the importance of transport infrastructure. In our case we should consider the linguistic infrastructure. The latter refers to the opportunities (or lack thereof) a state and civil society offer to immigrants to learn its language. For instance, in Western Europe citizenship courses, advanced language courses and the education system are part of the linguistic infrastructure.

Secondly, 'competence' refers to skills that determine an individual's capability to make use effectively of the other two factors. Kaufmann et al. also mention international English as a useful skill, but much more can be said about language in relation to competence. Naturally, already having a solid command of several languages is a sign of competence. However, the aptitude of the potential migrant to learn new languages is also of great importance. It determines if one can use the existing linguistic infrastructure to its maximum effectiveness. In other words: we have to consider the potential migrants' linguistic competence and performance.

Thirdly, 'appropriation' describes how potential migrants perceive their own skills and whether they actually have the desire to move. Some of the factors of appropriation which are connected with 'values' and 'motives' can be indirectly connected to language policy. For example, the type of language policy can influence an individual's sense of inclusion in his/her home society. Oppressive language policies in which minorities have few options to cultivate their own language can be perceived as discriminatory, which can incite a desire to move away from an unfavourable political climate. These types of explanations have some affinity with the migration psychology theory. In addition, appropriation can also refer to the migrant's motivation to learn a new language and thus his/her willingness to make full use of the linguistic infrastructure and competence. Having no desire to learn another language can decrease motivation to be mobile.

Motility thus, due to its main characteristics, offers migration research interesting venues to integrate language within its theoretical framework. This is not the only reason to favour this concept. One of the main arguments supporting the use of motility lies in the word 'potential'. The fact that motility does not compel us to limit our analyses to the actual mobility of people, but also allows us to study their mobility options, opens a new field of research. Especially when considering the effect of language policies on mobility, it is much more likely that they affect one's motility rather than one's mobility.

Hypothesising that, for instance, acquiring more language skills directly influences mobility seems rather far-fetched. It is on the other hand a reasonable assumption that these skills expand an individual's mobility *potential*, in other words, his/her motility. Motility (i.e. mobility capital) and linguistic capital are thus intrinsically linked.

Motility and socio-linguistics: EGIDS[4]

Because it focusses on *potential* rather than *actual* mobility, motility is a potential bridge between the fields of migration theory and socio-linguistics. Motility has value at least in one specific area of socio-linguistics: namely the study of language shift (Houtkamp 2018). Language shift is an especially important concept for this dissertation for two main reasons. Firstly, it nuances the importance of government policy, and especially education, when it comes to the survival of languages. In Fishman's (1991) GIDS (Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale), intergenerational transmission of language is essential. If parents consider it valuable to transfer their linguistic knowledge to their children, there is a good chance that language will survive. The reverse applies as well: if parents fail to see the value of language transmission, that language might eventually become extinct. Intergenerational transmission is thus of key importance in GIDS, but the scale is based on many other political-societal factors as well. The second reason is that the GIDS is quite flexible. New factors can relatively easily be integrated into the existing scale, allowing for it to be adapted to modern times and new insights.

Lewis and Simon (2010) have already expanded upon Fishman's theory and developed the so-called EGIDS (Expanded GIDS) by making a first attempt to add an international level '0' to the scale. EGIDS thus includes an international component in Fishman's original model, which is needed in the current era of ever-increasing globalisation. Fishman's GIDS was originally just designed to analyse the status of minority languages (e.g. Catalan and Welsh). Other scholars (e.g. Gobbo 2015) have also argued in favour of studying the global level in addition to the local and national ones, which should play a more prominent role than in the current iteration of EGIDS. Linguistic issues have to be studied in a global context, since due to the aforementioned great advancements in transportation and communication technology, foreign influences are closer to home than ever. In this section it will be attempted to add an additional component to the international aspect of EGIDS, by assessing the influence of motility. As we have seen, the connection between language as an explaining factor on the one hand, and processes of migration/mobility on the other, has long been understudied both in socio-linguistic and migration literature. It has been argued that the concept of 'motility' is essential in understanding how language and language policy can (in)directly cause migration (Houtkamp 2014).

[4] This section draws upon an earlier published paper by the present author, namely: Houtkamp, C. (2018). The relevance of motility in language shift research. Language Problems & Language Planning, 41(1), 1-15.

However, here it will be argued that 'motility' is not only important when attempting to understand how language potentially influences migration, but also when looking at processes of language shift and language maintenance. Motility can, given the trend of ever further internationalisation, play an important role for instance in the intergenerational transmission of language. Parents might have different considerations (i.e. the perceived status and the economic value of the heritage language) when determining their language behaviour towards their children. The changing international context may play an additional important role for parents when deciding whether to transmit their heritage language.

The (E)GIDS scale and motility

(E)GIDS is a scale designed by Lewis and Simon (2010) to code the survivability of languages, based on institutional and societal factors and, most importantly, the language behaviour of parents towards their children. The interaction of the institutional and social context with individual parents' decision-making largely determines the vitality of a language, and its place on the EGIDS scale.

A language's perceived status is influenced by several factors, many of them mentioned by Fishman (1991). When attempting to answer the question why language shift occurs, he distinguishes between three types of 'dislocation': physical and demographic dislocation, social dislocation and cultural dislocation. These three types are not mutually exclusive. For instance, Fishman argues that recent immigrants, who are thus physically dislocated, are also quite often in a socially disadvantageous position. For the purposes of this argument, the emphasis will be on physical and demographic dislocation, due to its clear connection with motility-related questions. Physical and demographic dislocation refers to population transfer and voluntary or involuntary in-out migration. Fishman argues that at the ethno-cultural level these processes of mobility are one of the major physical threats to intergenerational language-in-culture continuity. He claims that continuing mobility weakens the linguistic group, either by its members moving out of the community or through a significant number of 'foreigners' moving in. Furthermore, concerning the 'emigrants', he argues that they are in an even more difficult position. In most cases they will form a minority in their new destination, meaning that they cannot take it for granted that their linguistic rights will be respected. In short, according to Fishman, both the parents who have stayed within the now weakened linguistic community, and especially those who have themselves emigrated, will see less and less value in transmitting their heritage language (Fishman 1991).

Motility can offer a new perspective on Fishman's analysis, being both a potential catalyst of language shift and, paradoxically, a potential contributor for language maintenance. A key concept to understand this paradox is the notion of 'speech communities' or social networks. The relationship between language and social networks, or 'speech communities', is a major part of socio-linguistic literature (e.g. Milroy 1980, Fishman

1991, Holmes et al. 1993, Stoessel 2002, Milroy 2002). Social networks in general have their own distinct codes and sets of implicit rules (Bourdieu 1986), a principle that also extends to the linguistic domain. Knowing how to speak the right language, both in terms of possessing the necessary linguistic skills (e.g. English, French, German) and using the language in the 'correct' way (i.e. speaking with the appropriate accent, using appropriate vocabulary) can determine whether an individual will gain access to certain social networks. In general, having access to more social capital is a powerful commodity, which makes the study of language and speech communities interesting from a socio-political and socio-linguistic perspective.

Linguistic skills obviously grant more motility when they are spoken by more speech communities across the globe, and/or by high-status speech communities. A language such as English is an obvious example of this phenomenon, granting its speakers access to many international social networks. English would thus fall in the EGIDS scale level 0, which contains the few vehicular languages that have a wide global reach. It needs to be noted however, that international English, or to be more precise, English as a lingua franca (ELF) knows a high degree of hybridisation (Hülmbauer, Böhringer and Seidlhofer 2008, Gobbo 2015). This might be, to varying degrees, a characteristic of most 'level 0 languages'. The attraction of English and similarly powerful languages (e.g. Spanish, Chinese) is a major reason why motility can be a potential catalyst for language shift. These languages will grant such a significant amount of mobility potential that linguistic minorities living in countries where one of these languages is dominant may see little value in maintaining their heritage language. In other words: in these cases motility may be an additional argument for parents in favour of teaching children of minority groups the dominant language at the expense of the heritage language.

However, specifically concerning migrants, or to put it in Fishman's terms, 'physically and demographically dislocated communities', motility can also be a strong argument to transmit the heritage language, even if that heritage language is not at the highest level in the (E)GIDS scale. In other words: motility can also contribute to language maintenance. This would concern in particular those migrant communities that have spread across many different countries. The notion of transnationalism is of key importance to understanding this process. Strong transnational ties between migrant communities in different countries would give the heritage language a higher status, since it can contribute to mobility to many different countries. For instance, the Turkish migrant group is spread all over Europe, having large communities in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and France. Turkish migrants are known for their high level of ethnic organisation, which facilitates the retention of their heritage culture and language. In such a context, learning Turkish may grant the second and third-generation of migrants a considerable amount of motility. If a Dutch-Turk wishes to move to Germany, he/she would have the opportunity to contact German-Turkish communities, which can ease the migration process, without initially having a solid command of German. An important remark to make, though, is that the Turkish language is supported

by an economically relatively strong kinstate (i.e. the country of origin of themselves or their ancestors), with a large population. On the other hand, the Turkish migrant community does not have a particularly high status in most of its host countries (Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver 2003, De Vroome, Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014, Çelik 2015) and their language is sparsely supported by the host countries' governments.

Summarising, it can be said that a desire to increase motility could incentivise the emigrants to continue transmitting their language. At the same time it might also affect the decision-making of the 'remainers'. Social networks are often cited as one of the main explanations for migration processes (Stahl 1993, Massey et al. 2008, Castles & Miller 2009). Similar to the relationship between different emigrant communities, the transnational connection between 'remainers' and the emigrant community is a key factor. The presence of a migrant community is a magnet for new additional migrants from the same country or region, since the support of ethnic peers can help ease in the recently arrived in their new host country. For this reason, migrants tend to follow the 'beaten paths'. Parents who are part of a dwindling community in the country of origin may, even though their linguistic group is demographically dislocated, nonetheless have a compelling reason to transmit their heritage language. Knowledge of the heritage language will grant their children easier access to their ethnic peers abroad.

It can thus be argued that motility can shed a new light on the debate around language shift and language maintenance in the context of globalisation in general and migration in particular**.** In order to understand the precise relationship between motility on the one hand, and socio-linguistic themes on the other, it is useful to examine Lewis and Simon's (2010) clear decision tree on determining the EGIDS level of languages. The three main features of motility, 'access', 'competence' and 'appropriation', fit quite logically in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. shows how the different identity functions of language affect a language's status in the linguistic landscape. For example, a language that is primarily spoken at home and has no official status is for its survival completely dependent on the willingness of parents to transmit the language to their children.

When discussing *access* the two most important questions of the diagram are the level of official use, and the literacy status. The answer to these two questions will probably determine the *linguistic infrastructure*, i.e. the language facilities offered by the state to its various populations.

It has to be noted that regarding the institutional status of the language, and in particular its place in the educational system, it is not only important to consider whether a language is institutionalised, but also *how*. The quality of education is also of crucial importance. For instance, in the Netherlands in the 1980s, several migrant languages had an official status in the Dutch education system, within the so-called OALT (Onderwijs

in Allochtone Levende Talen/Education in Allochthonous Living Languages) policy. Recently, in November 2016, two of the most influential Dutch governmental research institutes, the WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) and the CBS (Central Bureau for Statistics) decided to abolish the term of 'Allochtoon' altogether (Volkskrant 2016). The concepts are deemed inaccurate and stigmatising. This recent development stems from a longer tradition, in which the Dutch government has struggled over how to name its ethnic minorities.



Figure 2.2. The (E)GIDS scale of Lewis and Simon
Source: Lewis and Simon 2010: 114.

The Dutch situation would at first glance tick both 'competence' related questions in the decision tree. A majority of migrant parents transmitted their language to their children, and this language was institutionalised in the Netherlands. However, there was a clear

difference in education between the teaching of European languages such as English, French and German on the one hand, and a migrant language like Turkish on the other. Many different government reports show that teaching of Turkish was inadequately organised (WRR 1989, Turkenburg 2001). One can wonder whether the institutionalisation of the Turkish language has significantly improved the linguistic competence of the children who have been taught Turkish at school. Furthermore, it is questionable whether OALT has made a big contribution to either the motility of Turkish citizens or the survivability of the Turkish language in the Netherlands. It can be argued two additional factors should be included in Lewis and Simon's decision tree: the level of education offered in the language in question (i.e. are the courses offered in primary school, secondary school and/or in higher education) and a comparison between the facilities offered to all languages within the education system (i.e. do the 'bigger' languages receive significantly more institutional support than the 'minority' languages).

Appropriation is particularly important when analysing whether parents transmit their language to their children. One of the possible considerations for parents could be whether the children would gain any material or cultural benefits from speaking their heritage language. These decisions are not purely based on objective factors, but are also largely influenced by the perception of parents. This perception is strongly affected by the other two features of motility, 'access' and 'competence'. With respect to the relationship between parental behaviour regarding language to their children and the institutional landscape, Lewis and Simon state the following:

> The GIDS not only takes into account that intergenerational transmission is an individual decision made by parents, but also that societal and institutional choices are crucial in influencing the parental decisions regarding their language behavior in regard to their children. These social spaces are what Fishman and others have identified as 'domains of use' each constituting a constellation of participants, location, and topic that is closely associated with a particular language. (Lewis and Simon 2010: 105).

The relationship between individual decisions and the societal context in which these decisions take place are both important when analysing processes of motility and categorising language in (E)GIDS. Some societal factors, in particular the effect of migration on language shift and motility, have been discussed previously. It needs to be noted in addition that the 'domains of use' (i.e. whether the language is spoken at home, or is used 'transnationally' via for example the internet, or in the public space) may in the case of migrant communities be widely international. 'Location' related to language shift is transforming into an international concept, in a time where via the internet long-distance communication is readily available at an affordable price, or free of charge. The 'domains of use' have an ever more international character in a globalising world.

Chapter 3

Inclusion, Assimilation and Integration

The degree and nature of the linguistic inclusion of migrants and their descendants in their country of residence is a crucial factor in understanding their degree of motility, because it is closely connected with, and in some cases even partially determined by, the organisation of the linguistic infrastructure. In order to understand the current usage of 'integration' as a concept, it is necessary to delve into post-war scientific contributions on the adaptation process of minorities in majority cultures. Scientific and public understanding of concepts such as 'integration' and 'assimilation' has shifted over the years. One of the major texts on this topic was written by the sociologist Milton Gordon (1964). In his *Assimilation in American Life: the Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*, Gordon analyses the socio-economic and cultural adaptation of immigrants in North America. He concludes that immigrants proceed through seven stages of assimilation:

1. Acculturation[5] newcomers adopt language, dress, and daily customs of the host society (including values and norms).
2. Structural assimilation: large-scale entrance of minorities into cliques, clubs and institutions in the host society.
3. Marital assimilation: widespread intermarriage.
4. Identification assimilation: the minority feels bonded to the dominant culture.
5. Attitude reception assimilation refers to the absence of prejudice.
6. Behaviour reception assimilation refers to the absence of discrimination.
7. Civic assimilation occurs when there is an absence of values and power struggles. (Gordon 1964).

Gordon considered his seven-stage model an empirical reality rather than a normative policy ambition. His view on assimilation could be seen as a natural law: it is *inevitable* that all minority groups, both autochthonous minorities (e.g. black people in the U.S.) and immigrants (e.g. Puerto-Ricans) go through these seven stages of assimilation.

Gordon's view has been criticised on both normative and empirical grounds. Starting with the latter category, social psychologist Berry observed that the adaptation process of immigrants is more complex than suggested in Gordon's theory. He formulated an alternative model, which he referred to as the 'four strategies of acculturation' (Berry 1980). Acculturation needs to be understood as 'the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members' (Berry 2005: 698). Contrary to Gordon, he argues that if different cultural groups come into contact, potential cultural clashes

might emerge, which need to be solved through negotiation in order to achieve outcomes that are acceptable for all parties involved. Immigrants can opt for four different acculturation strategies, namely 'assimilation', 'separation', 'marginalisation' and 'integration'. Integration is in Berry's model thus strictly separated from assimilation. The individual's chosen strategy will be determined by (1) a preference for the majority or for the heritage culture, and (2) a preference for having contact with and participating in society with other cultural groups (Berry 1980).

Assimilation generally still has the same meaning as in Gordon's work: complete adaptation of the minority to the majority culture. Those who opt for this strategy have a preference for the majority culture and actively wish to engage with other groups. Separation means that individuals wish exclusively to orient themselves towards their heritage culture, having little desire to come into frequent contact with other groups. Marginalisation occurs when new arrivals deny both their heritage culture and other cultural groups in society, resulting in a solitary cultural existence. The integration strategy on the other hand is preferred among those individuals who wish to preserve their cultural heritage but at the same time attempt to connect with the majority group in society.

The acculturation model

Berry was one of the first to define the concept of integration, which has been widely used in the public and scientific debate ever since. For example, the Dutch integration policy of the 1980s, that promoted 'integration with preservation of one's identity', could have been inspired by Berry's work. By carrying out survey research, he investigated the effect of each strategy on 'acculturative stress', loosely defined as the psychological, somatic, and social difficulties that may accompany acculturation processes, often manifest in anxiety, depression and other forms of mental and physical maladaptation (Berry 2006). Integration yielded the 'best' results: those who opted for this strategy suffered the least from acculturative stress. In contrast, marginalisation and assimilation were the source of relatively high stress levels (Berry 2006).

Berry's theory is not undisputed. His model has been criticised both on theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g. the 'marginalised' group has never been found). One point of criticism is particularly relevant for our analysis: namely, Berry's original assumption that individuals have a considerable amount of agency to 'pick' the acculturation strategy of their choosing. In other words, the core of Berry's model is based on a degree of free choice. However, in practice the range of choices is frequently quite limited, as Berry later agreed (Berry 1990, Berry 1997). It is questionable whether cultural minorities in general are in a position to choose freely their own acculturation strategy. The society in which they live might already have pre-established norms on how to manage diversity and could (gently) force its newer members to adapt to them, effectively limiting freedom of choice.

Bourhis et al. (1997) succeeded in making a model which accounts for the contextual factors that are underdiscussed Berry's theory. They designed the 'Interactive

Acculturation Model' (IAM) to explain changes in norms on diversity by looking at the stance of the majority culture, the minority cultures and the government. A modern version of the model can be found in Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.1. Interactive Acculturation Model of Bourhis and Montreuil, 2017.
Source: Bourhis and Montreuil 2017: 53.

The model offers a perspective on how factors other than the immigrants' own preference can influence their acculturation process. Without elaborately discussing all the different concepts mentioned, it is important to realise that Bourhis et al. view the norms and values on dealing with diversity as intrinsically dynamic and interactive. Norms concerning the best way to manage diversity are not set in stone and the three main actors (the government, members of the majority and members of the minorities) constantly influence each other's stances.

The model can provide clarification in the conceptual debate on 'integration' if we take into account two empirical findings. First of all, members of the immigrant community generally have a strong preference for 'integration' as a desirable acculturative strategy (Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2003, Hehman et al. 2012, Rojas et al. 2014**)**. Secondly, members of the majority culture usually favour immigrants following the 'assimilation' and in some instances the 'integration' strategy (Horenczyk 1996, Van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk 1998, Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2003). Some analyses found a clear connection between the preference for assimilation and the degree of prejudice towards minorities (Kosic et al. 2005, Zagefka et al. 2014, López-Rodríguez et al. 2014, Rojas et al. 2014). It seems inevitable that these different stances of majority and minority group members will spark and conflict. An important question then would be what kind of state ideology, the government being the third major actor, is in place on the management of diversity. Answering this question takes us a step closer towards tracing the evolution of the concept integration, and thus also the role of language and language policy therein, in the public and scientific debate.

Four state ideologies[6]

To address this issue we need to review briefly the four state ideologies as distinguished by Bourhis et al. (1997). The philosophy of *Pluralism* promotes cultural diversity. Citizens' freedom to express their cultural identity, or identities, is essential for the pluralist ideology. A major difference between pluralism and the other three ideologies is that in the former, the state should play an active role in fostering minority cultures, thus effectively helping them gain a foothold in society. Pluralism is inspired by the ideas of communitarian philosophers such as Charles Taylor, who is a strong advocate of a 'politics of difference' in which minority culture vitality is guaranteed by the state (Taylor 1994**)**. The *civic* ideology, which seems inspired by Jürgen Habermas' 'politics of dignity' (Habermas 1994), shares almost all premises with pluralism. Cultural minorities have the freedom to organise themselves within the 'civic' framework. However, unlike pluralism, this ideology advocates a strict policy of non-intervention in the cultural identity of all citizens, and thus financially supporting them is not an option.

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[6] This section draws heavily upon two articles published by the present author to develop the theoretical foundation of this dissertation: Houtkamp, C. (2015). Beyond assimilation and integration: the shift to 'national 'and 'transnational' inclusion. Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8(1), 73-87; and Houtkamp, C. (2016). Inclusion in the 21st century: an exploration of policy opportunities and challenges. In Ozolina, Z. (Ed.). Societal Security: Inclusion-Exclusion Dilemma: a Portrait of the Russian-speaking Community in Latvia (pp. 29-43). Riga: Zinatne.

[7] See for example the contributions in Sonntag and Cardinal (2015)

The *assimilation* ideology expects the state to intervene in some areas of its citizens' private values**.** Minorities are expected to forsake their cultural and linguistic identities and adapt themselves to the reigning norms and values of their country of residence. This adaptation could happen naturally (in line with what Gordon observed) but can also be imposed via laws and regulations. Lastly, the *ethnist* ideology, which is related to ethnic nationalism, also expects immigrants to adapt themselves completely to the norms and values of the cultural majority. However, in some cases it is impossible for 'outsiders' to ever become a genuine part of the nation. Policies of *ius sanguinis* (i.e. citizenship is awarded based on ancestry) can prevent immigrants being fully accepted, for they do not share the same ethnic kinship as the autochthonous population.

Analysing a country's state ideology, or state tradition, is of crucial importance in understanding its policy towards minorities. Similar to the acculturative preferences of minority and majority group members, ideologies at the state level on acculturation can be subject to change. However, there is also evidence of many cases where a state's historical preference explains its current policy practice very well.[7] Many European states are currently converging towards an assimilation ideology. Since about 2000, mandatory citizenship courses in most European states have aimed to teach immigrants the host society's language and the presumed highlights of the dominant culture (e.g. important national historical events, norms and values). The citizenship regime in Europe has been described by Van Houdt, Suvavierol and Schinkel (2011) as 'neo-liberal communitarianism': immigrants are expected to assimilate willingly and completely within the dominant culture. Still, despite the shift towards assimilation ideology, most countries still refer to their approach as 'integration policy'. These changes partly explain why the concept of 'integration' has deviated from Berry's original definition (engaging with both the heritage and majority culture) in the public debate, and thus consequently why a new concept may be more appropriate.

Beyond 'integration', towards 'inclusion'

The shift towards linguistic and cultural assimilation as a policy principle in our current time is remarkable. In order for assimilation to succeed, immigrants need to forsake their cultural identity. This has always been complicated, but as we have seen in recent times, assimilation is becoming even more difficult, primarily due to the increasing importance of transnationalism.

Transnationalism is a crucial concept in the analysis of minority adaptation processes. Vertovec (1999) points out that due to the connectivity of individuals through increased physical mobility but also via the internet, telecommunications and satellite T.V., notions of 'place' and 'locality' are reconstructed: current communication technology allows individuals to form their own transnational 'fora' to communicate and express their identity. This evolution has consequences for concepts such as integration and inclusion, which are tightly intertwined with the nation state.

Looking at these outlined concepts, it seems that from a normative point of view, 'inclusion-friendly' policy would provide minorities with sufficient room to express their heritage culture and language, whilst not neglecting their connection to the host society culture. For instance, when reflecting upon language policies, an inclusionary policy would be favourable towards the adoption of minority language education in the official school curricula, next to host society language acquisition. In official government institutions, minorities could be addressed in their language of heritage, should they opt for it. However, such policies may not necessarily have in all cases and time periods exclusively positive consequences. For instance, if a minority is backed up by a powerful, potentially aggressive kin-state, designing the most effective inclusion policy can become even more complex. In what follows, we will reflect upon several issues that may arise when pursuing a policy of inclusion. In the past several states have implemented policies that contain some elements of an inclusion-friendly policy, such as those that are inspired by a multicultural ideology. These policy elements have faced empirical scrutiny. The following paragraphs will draw upon these existing empirical studies to outline several potential problems which diversity policies may cause. This list of problems is not exhaustive; however, it should give a general understanding of the type of issues that may arise.

Empirical confusion on the effects of multicultural and assimilationist policies

Multicultural policies contain some elements of our definition of inclusion policy: they allow for cultural diversity and specifically give minorities the opportunity to express their cultural identities. In this section we will briefly discuss research on the effects of these kinds of policies and their assimilationist counterparts, taking inspiration from several scientific disciplines. Research covers, among other topics, the effects of ethnic community building, statistical material on the connection between diversity policy and labour market outcomes, and the influence of policy on the psychological disposition of minorities. Starting with the latter, socio-psychological research into the effects of assimilation policies on the mental health of minorities shows that forced assimilation generates a considerable amount of 'acculturative stress', sometimes leading to mental health problems (Sirin et al. 2013, Goforth et al. 2014, Yoon et al. 2013). Furthermore, it has been found that there is no connection between assimilation policy and the individuals' feelings of belonging to the host society (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). In addition, some minority groups, especially recent immigrants, can benefit from the presence of a strong community of co-ethnics in the host society. This is often called 'ethnic bonding' in minority studies literature (Putnam 2007): newcomers in society use their ethnic niche to ease their access into society. Their ethnic community can provide them with all sorts of assistance, such as finding a job or accommodation. Afterwards, once minorities have settled in, the next step of 'ethnic bridging' will start. Minorities then proceed to build up contacts with members of the majority population. This sequence of events has proved to be successful, for example regarding Polish immigrants in the

U.K. (Ryan et al. 2008). However, other research highlights the possible negative effects of multicultural policies on the adaptation of minorities. Koopmans (2010) concludes for example:

> The results suggest that multicultural policies, which grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host country language acquisition and interethnic contacts, when combined with a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market participation, high levels of segregation, and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for criminal behavior. (Koopmans 2010: 1).

He specifically mentions Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium as countries that either have or had a policy tradition of multiculturalism, but at the same time score very low when it comes to labour market participation of immigrants. By contrast, he finds that countries with a policy leaning towards assimilation, such as France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, have considerably more success integrating their migrants into the labour market. This strand of research would thus suggest that promoting diversity is in fact detrimental to the position of minorities, and that it would be in their best interest to assimilate in the culture of the host society. As this brief look at existing research shows, empirical results do not always paint a clear picture. This makes it difficult to draw a general conclusion on the practical effects of multicultural and assimilationist policies.

The integration and inclusion paradox

The integration paradox concerns how majority and minority groups envision the 'ideal' acculturation strategies of minorities. Research has shown that these preferences can differ greatly. In many cases majority members wish for minority members to assimilate (Horenczyk 1996, Van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk 1998, Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2003), whilst minorities often opt for the strategy of integration in the sense of Berry (Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2003, Hehman et al. 2011, Rojas et al. 2014).

These opposing preferences from the majority and minority groups have at least two possible consequences. The first one is what has come to be referred to as the 'integration paradox' (Buijs et al. 2006; Van Doorn, Schepers and Dagevos 2012; Ten Teije, Coenders and Verkuyten 2013). This concept entails that those minorities who make an effort to integrate (sometimes even to a large extent assimilate) into the majority society are also the ones who have a relatively strong (compared to co-ethnics) perception of discrimination and suffer most from the mental health problems mentioned in the previous section. The efforts of this particular group are, according to themselves, not rewarded by the members of the majority. For instance, when CVs of two candidates for a job are comparable, employers often will not hire someone with a 'wrong' last name, a last name that has a clear migrant origin (Dolfing and Van Tubergen 2005, Lancee 2019). Research in the Netherlands shows that Afghan women who have obtained all the

highest Dutch language acquisition certificates, meaning that their knowledge of Dutch is very advanced, still have trouble on the job market, due to the fact they still have the wrong accent and do not speak perfect 'ABN'(Algemeen Beschaafd Nederlands, standard Dutch) (Ghorashi and Van Tilburg 2006). Majority members sometimes ask for an extreme degree of assimilation, to the point where there is no perceivable difference between majorities and minorities. This is a demand that many minorities do not wish to, or in some cases simply cannot, meet. Thus we can speak of an 'integration paradox': more successful integration can lead to frustration and feelings of rejection. Minorities may be disillusioned with the majority society, which may be a hindrance to achieving social cohesion.

The other consequence of the opposing preferences among majorities and minorities is not based on empirical evidence, but can still be argued as a likely hypothesis. Let us imagine a situation where a policy of inclusion is to be implemented. Minority languages are fully supported. Mother-tongue education is included in the official education curriculum and government institutes offer their communications in all the 'bigger' minority languages as well. Minorities will have the full opportunity to 'integrate' in the Berryan sense: adaptation to the host society whilst also maintaining their own cultural identity. Such a policy would naturally be the best way to achieve social cohesion, since it leaves much room for all members of society to celebrate their own cultural identities. In such a scenario, at least one major question needs to be asked: would such a policy indeed lead to social cohesion, given the fact that majority members usually strongly prefer minorities to assimilate? Majority members might actively oppose this inclusion-friendly policy. Their perception of minorities may deteriorate instead of improve. In the most common situation where the majority not only holds the numerical, but also the political and economic advantage, such a policy could weaken the position of minorities. In other words: a policy of inclusion will then be a detriment to social cohesion. This possible contradiction between inclusionary intentions and segregation-inducing consequences is what we could call the 'inclusion policy paradox'.

(Relatively) powerful minorities

When reflecting upon what constitutes a 'minority', most would first look at population figures. Minorities are always at a numerical disadvantage. However, the question is whether a numerical disadvantage necessarily implies a political or economic disadvantage. This firstly depends on the actual size of the minority: it can be imagined that a minority of 30% would in general be in a stronger position than one of 5%.

Secondly, the political and historical context is of great importance. In some countries, ethnic minorities hold, or have held, positions of political and economic power for decades. A third consideration is whether the given minority has a powerful kin-state that is actively involved in the wellbeing of its co-ethnics across the border. Some scholars analyse the dynamics of minority relationships vis-à-vis their nation state using the

framework of the 'quadratic nexus' (e.g. Smith 2002, Marácz 2014). In this framework it is argued that there are four important actors to consider: the minority group, the nation state, the kin-state (sometimes also referred to as 'external homeland) and an emerging 'Euro-Atlantic space' that mostly consists of supranational organisations such as the EU and NGOs. The interplay between these four actors would influence the position and attitude of minorities within their nation state: actions taken by one of them can disturb the relationships between the other actors as well. For instance: assuming the nation state implements assimilationist policies to promote social cohesion, this might provoke a reaction from the external homeland(s) of the targeted minorities. These minorities, aware of the support of their kin-state, would feel empowered actively to resist the policies of the nation state. In other words: taking into account the complex interplay of many different actors is of crucial importance when reflecting upon the 'ideal' minority policy. The goal of inclusion policy is usually to promote the social cohesion within their borders. It is apparent that the actions of a kin-state can co-determine whether this goal can be achieved.

Fourthly, smaller nation states housing sizeable minorities may fear that their own language and culture is under threat, if there is no policy in place to preserve their own heritage at the expense of minority cultures. In general, globalisation increasingly reduces the economic relevance of smaller languages in favour of the global ones. The influx of migrants is seen as a clear manifestation of advancing globalisation. This would be the case especially when a minority group's mother tongue is a larger, more economically relevant language than the national language. Market forces may then encourage many individuals to focus on learning the larger language instead.

Conclusion

This theoretical exercise leads to at least three main conclusions. Firstly, even though language is understudied in current migration theories, there are venues within their current framework to fit it in as a separate factor. It seems evident that language skills are an intrinsic part of human capital, which is the main explaining factor for neoclassical migration theory. Similarly, language has great importance in setting up and maintaining transnational migration networks. This theoretical observation logically leads to two hypotheses. First, a multilingual language policy, that facilitates the language acquisition of immigrants and their descendants, can increase both the inflow and outflow of immigrants. Such a policy could increase the transnational connectivity of different immigrant groups, which in turn could lead to increased mobility between these communities. Multilingualism would be a catalyst for the already existing mechanism where migrants tend to follow 'beaten paths'. The second observation relates to the hierarchy of languages. We have already seen such a hierarchy in Fishman's GIDS and Lewis and Simon's EGIDS. Another author who designed such a hierarchy is Abraham de Swaan. In his *Words of the World* (2001) he argued in favour of a political-economic analysis of language hierarchy. De Swaan introduced the notion of 'Q-rankings',

which categorises languages based on their number of speakers. Languages ranked higher on the scale have a higher quantity of speakers, and are therefore considered more economically valuable. Those languages would thus have a robust position in the international linguistic landscape. The reverse applies to languages with a lower rank. Formulating the notion of hierarchy in neoclassical terms, speaking a higher-ranking language equals access to more human capital, compared to speaking a lower ranking language. Depending on the social context of the destination countries, speaking high-ranking languages thus obviously leads to better mobility options (i.e. motility).

The second main conclusion concerns the differences between the core concepts of migration/mobility/motility and assimilation/integration/inclusion. It has been argued that mobility, motility and inclusion are more suitable concepts than their counterparts in the present day and age. Assimilation and integration, which are quite similar according to politicians and scholars alike, are becoming distant goals in the age of ever-developing transportation and communication technological advancement. Free access to cheap internet and travel means for everyone in society render assimilation both as a natural process and forced by the state a complex, if not impossible, endeavour. A similar argument can be made regarding migration vs mobility/motility. The classic distinction between 'migration' and 'residential mobility' is based on the notion of 'uprootment'. Processes of migration would always involve a decoupling of the current economic and social context, and immersion into a different one. For instance, migrating from Turkey to the Netherlands involves leaving behind friends/ relatives in Turkey and immersing oneself into the Dutch social and economic context. Again, the technological advancements and the growing importance of transnationalism among migrant communities raise the question whether this 'uprootment' still takes place to the same extent for immigrants as it did half a century ago.

Thirdly, there is a possible interaction between mobility/motility and inclusion. Some scholars suggest that regarding language policy a trade-off exists between mobility and inclusion (Grin, Marácz, Pokorn and Kraus 2014). It claims that promoting more mobility normally leads to less inclusion and vice versa. Motility can be a necessary bridge to gain a better understanding of the intricacies of this presumed trade-off. Motility acknowledges that language policies will not directly impact an individual's desire to be mobile, but 'merely' expands his/her mobility potential. This means that from the perspective of physical mobility, it is unlikely that language policies will have a tremendous impact on the mobility-inclusion trade-off. However, the notion of motility also calls the idea of a static trade-off into question, since motility and inclusion are by no means antagonistic concepts. In fact, in many instances a strong form of linguistic inclusion, meaning that an individual has a solid grasp of both his/her mother tongue and the host society language, is a prerequisite for a high degree of motility. Motility in a sense thus encourages us to think beyond the idea of a static trade-off as a general rule, replacing it with case by case situational analyses.

Chapter 4

Motility and Methodology: an Integrated Approach

This study analyses the way in which language, and language policies influence migration patterns in the European Union. 'Motility' is a central concept in the analysis, and this research ensures that all the relevant factors of motility are analysed. To study 'access', a historically attentive policy document analysis is presented for each of the three countries studied. These analyses cover the time between the 1960s, when so-called 'non-European' guest worker programmes were implemented, until the present day. The goal is to study the development of the respective countries' language policies vis-à-vis their immigrants, including the official motivations presented to make policy shifts. In the motility framework, access, competence and appropriation are linked and to a large degree interdependent, so a solid understanding of the different policy climates is essential. Language policies encompass a wide array of facilities, ranging from translation services to education. This study will focus in particular on those language policies that are most relevant in the acculturation process of immigrants: namely host language and mother-tongue education. The interplay between those two is the main driver of linguistic inclusion of immigrants: host society language acquisition is deemed essential by virtually every official body, whilst depending on the social and political context, mother-tongue education is a source of conflict between immigrants and their descendants on the one hand, and their countries of residence on the other. The documents studied are either those officially issued by the government, such as policy briefs, or are policy papers written by bodies close to the government. These documents either mark changes in official policy, or can be reasonably assumed to have strong influence on policy makers. Great inspiration for this study has been drawn from Sonntag and Cardinal's historical-institutionalist approach to analysing language policy (Sonntag and Cardinal 2015). In their work it is explained how language policies in the present day are to a large extent path-dependent: policy solutions in the present are greatly inspired and can only be understood within the context of their institutional history, or, in the vocabulary of Sonntag and Cardinal: 'state traditions'. Inspired by their approach, the language policies of the countries studied are understood in the dynamic context, historical, institutional and normative, in which the state chooses language policies (ibid.). They outline several key questions that will also be answered in this research:

- What are the principles that inform state actions on language matters?
- What are the institutional and administrative parameters of how the state governs languages?
- How and why does the state intervene in language choice and language use? (Sonntag and Cardinal 2015: 5).

These three questions guide the policy document analysis of the three countries studied in this research: the Netherlands, France and Sweden. Traditionally, these three countries represent an ideal-type regarding immigrant integration policy. France is considered an assimilationist country, or as Bourhis et al. state: 'republican' (Bourhis et al. 1997). Sweden has, at least since it implemented its guest worker programmes, a tradition of multiculturalism, including a relatively generous offering of facilities for minority languages, at the other end of the spectrum. The Netherlands is a so-called 'in-between' case; it was, especially in the 1980s, one of the prominent adherents of the multicultural ideology in Europe, but has in recent times steered its policy in the direction of assimilationism. The Netherlands is, due to its transition from one policy ideology to another, the most interesting case from a theoretical perspective. Therefore the chapter on the Netherlands will be significantly more detailed and expansive than those on the other two countries.

Whilst the three countries, according to the literature, differ in their policy ideological traditions, they are similar on other important criteria. All three have been since the start of their respective guest worker programmes until the present day important immigration countries in the EU, both for EU and non-EU migrants. Furthermore, all three countries have made attempts to formulate a comprehensive policy solution to the growing diversity within their borders. Finally, the two migrant groups studied (which will be discussed in the next section) have a sizeable presence in all three countries.

Thus, in order to study 'access', a detailed picture of the different policy frameworks is crucial. Of at least equal importance is the way the official policy impacts its intended beneficiaries, in this case the immigrants and their descendants. Their self-assessed language skills, their perspective on their respective countries' language policy towards migrants and the possible connection between their language skills and mobility options together make up their motility. To gather the necessary data, semi-structured in-depth interviews have been conducted among members of the immigrant communities. Motility, even though it is underused in current research, has a solid theoretical foundation. Its three-part structure of 'access', 'competence' and 'appropriation' offers a good basis on which to structure the interviews. As such, since one of the primary goals of the interviews is to apply the pre-existing theoretical structure of motility and test its value empirically, the unstructured interview, which is the preferred method when attempting to establish new theoretical concepts based on the interview data, would have been an inappropriate method to use. At the same time however, even though there is a solid theoretical foundation for the concept of motility, this research is still exploratory in nature. Motility has been used sparingly in the social sciences, usually in the local context. The explorative innovation of this study is its use in a global context, which has important implications for the way motility needs to be understood. For instance, the importance of transnational identities is arguably more relevant in the global than in the local urban context. Furthermore, the strong focus on the relationship between motility and language skills and language policy is also new. Explaining and exploring the possible connection between these new elements and the

existing concept of motility as outlined by Kauffman et al. is one of the goals of this study. As such the interview structure, even though it is rooted in a clear theoretical basis, needs to incorporate the flexibility necessary to explore the relatively new motility concept. The motility theorem outlines several factors that require testing, which renders an unstructured interview not feasible; the novelty of the concept when applied to the context of international migration means that the semi-structured approach offers a good balance between formal rigidity and flexibility to study motility in an effective manner.

The interviews have been conducted with members of the Turkish and the Polish communities, and there are several reasons why specifically these two have been chosen. Firstly, there is the sheer size of their diasporas: Turkish and Polish communities are spread all over the EU, and constitute as mentioned previously a sizeable presence in all three countries studied. The size and widespread dispersion of these two groups allows for one major advantage, namely the opportunity to study transnationalism in relation to language and migration, which is essential for research on migration in the present day. Secondly, these two groups allow for a comparison between a non-EU and EU migrant group. First-generation Turkish and Polish migrants have different legal rights in the EU; the latter have more freedom of movement and, in theory, the right to maintain their heritage language in other EU countries according to European Council Directive 77/486EEC.

The interviews explicitly focus on the following motility-related topics, reflected in the questions incorporated in the interview schedule:

- General information about the respondent (socio-economic status, ethnic background, age, gender, etc.)
- Perception of the migrant's own linguistic skills in all languages known.
- Perceived access to physical mobility within the EU, divided into temporary and permanent mobility (motility)
- Willingness/plans to be mobile (motility)
- Frequency of long-distance communication with ethnic peers (virtual mobility/transnationalism)
- Perception of the effectiveness of host society language education
- Type of linguistic education (in the case of second-generation migrants).

Groups are selected by means of snowball sampling. Respondents have been approached using government institutions (e.g. Turkish and Polish embassies in the respective countries), immigrant NGOs, language schools and religious institutions. First contact was made with prominent actors within these institutions to familiarise them with the research. Afterwards, through these contacts, new respondents were recruited. The practical advantage of snowball sampling is the low level of financial and human resources required to execute it. Furthermore, snowball sampling potentially gives the researcher access to respondents who might have been out of reach with traditional sampling methods, due to the fact that the he/

she is introduced by a prominent, trusted member of the community. However, snowball sampling is by definition not randomised. The researcher is dependent on the willingness of organisations to participate, which in itself is a selection mechanism. This leads to the following interview data samples in this study being somewhat skewed: the Poles in the Netherlands (predominantly interviewees who either spoke Dutch or were preparing to learn it), Turks in Sweden (mostly Turks who have at most completed secondary education, interviewed in the Mosque), and the Swedish Poles (respondents mostly educated to tertiary level). Furthermore, potential respondents who have weak social networks can barely be reached using this method. As a result, there is a risk involved that samples might be skewed in a certain category. For instance, if one sample primarily consists of respondents interviewed at a Dutch language school, it is obviously likely that they deem it important to learn Dutch. An effective way to mitigate this problem is to approach a set of actors that is as diverse as possible, which is what has been done for this research.

The interviews are conducted in a language that is as comfortable as possible for the interviewees. The research aims to exclude language as a potential barrier to being interviewed, to avoid a linguistic, and by proxy also a socio-economic, bias in the sample. The interviews were either conducted in Dutch, English or French, or with the assistance of a translator. The vast majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face; some were held by phone and a limited number via skype. Having non-uniform interview methods is not ideal from a purely methodological point of view, as it complicates the comparison between interview groups, but was in some cases necessary for practical reasons. Adopting flexibility in the methodology, but rigidity regarding the content of the interviews and the interview schedule, allowed for the samples to be as diverse as possible in terms of socio-economic status and, most importantly, language skills. However, there are several downsides that need to be discussed and incorporated in the analysis of the interview data. First of all, working with translators removes some control from the interviewer, for obvious language-related reasons. The interview data of the Poles in the Netherlands and Turks in Sweden were predominantly collected with the help of a translator. This risk has been mitigated by primarily asking open-ended questions that require some elaboration on the part of the interviewee. The way in which the interviewees respond to the question would then give an indication whether the original question was properly translated for them. Secondly, potential interview bias (i.e. the different answers respondents could give depending on the persona of the interviewer) can differ between phone, face-to-face and skype interviews. However, all the interviewees have seen the interviewer in person prior to the phone/skype meetings, which would mitigate the risks of interview basis influencing the results. A final potential issue lies with the number of interviews. In total, 72 interviews have been conducted across the 6 groups, with a minimum of 10 interviews per group. If the goal of the study would be to make strong, generalising conclusions on the attitudes of these groups, this number would not be high enough. However, the research goal is a different one. Motility is a fledgling concept in the world of international migration theory and requires significant theoretical and especially empirical development to mature scientifically. It requires a degree of empirical

research on its many intricacies that is well beyond the scope of this study. The interviews presented offer at least two insights: (1) motility is a relevant concept, among different migrant groups of many different social and cultural backgrounds; (2) there are several ways in which motility is linked with the work of socio-linguistic scholars (e.g. Fishman 1991) and migration/integration theory (e.g. transnationalism) that offer promising avenues for future studies. As such, the interview data in this study should be considered as the first, but nonetheless very important, building blocks towards deepening our understanding of motility, migration and socio-linguistics.

Finally, there is a question of how the interviews and the policy-document analysis will tie together to form one cohesive study on motility. The interview data will be actively tested against the results of the policy documents, to answer the following two questions. Firstly: does the policy framework of a given country have a serious effect on the respondents' language-related attitudes and behaviours? There are sources, both from the academic (e.g. Fishman 1991) and non-academic (e.g. Commissie Blok 2004) domain, that question the role of actual policy in linguistic matters. For instance, Fishman argues that language education is not an effective means to promote multilingualism. The most important factor is instead the willingness of parents to transmit the language to their children, independent of state interference. On the other hand Bourdieu argues in *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991) that languages acknowledged by political authority reinforce their position in wider society. Exploring whether policy and the daily life of immigrants have a strong direct or indirect connection is thus a logical goal of this study. A second main question concerns whether the perception of the immigrants regarding their country of residence's language policy and its effectiveness matches with the goals listed in the policy documents, and how we can explain possible discrepancies.

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[8] A question that arises regarding the methodology is the lack of statistical data, for example in the form of surveys. Supplementing the analysis with quantitative data has been carefully considered, and indeed some statistical data have also been gathered and analysed. However, in the end it was decided not to include that material in this study. The most important question when deciding whether to present a certain body of data or not is the following: do those data, in this form, assist the analysis presented? In general, statistical data are very beneficial to the analysis processes of motility. As part of the concluding remarks of this study in Chapter 9, some possible avenues towards setting up such an analysis in future research are suggested. However, to study quantified motility effectively would require a longitudinal design, which lies beyond the scope of this project due to the large time investment needed, that measures a set of specific variables. The study presented here explores effectively which variables would need to be included in a future statistical study. Thus, the methodology as applied here is a necessary step towards running quantitative analyses in the future.

Obviously, there can be a mismatch between how a policy idea is envisioned on paper and its practical application. In the area of migrant language policy, relatively few studies have put the perception of respondents with a migration background at the forefront of the analysis. This study is fundamentally different in that regard. The perspective of the respondents is a vital point of analysis, as it can offer viable insights into the practical implementation of government policy ideas, and it also partially explains the motility of the interviewees (i.e. 'appropriation'). The answers to these two questions combined will paint a clear picture of how a state's policies affect an individual's motility. Motility is influenced by linguistic competence, linguistic infrastructure and appropriation. All three factors are potentially influenced by language policy. Establishing the presence and strength of the connection between language policy and motility is thus the main overarching goal of this study.[8]

Chapter 5.1

LANGUAGE POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS: A POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS[9]

In this chapter the development of Dutch minorities policy, in particular the language policy component, will be analysed. The Dutch policy has been classically categorised as being 'pluralistic' and 'multicultural', whilst since the early 1990s it has allegedly been steering towards assimilation. However, it needs to be noted that in both the political and the academic arenas, opinions on the topic of integration of minorities in the Netherlands and the nature of the policy in both past and present differ. This chapter will not particularly focus on the practical policy and its consequences, but rather on the discursive representation of key concepts and key policy proposals. The goal of this exercise is twofold: first to gain a deeper understanding of the Dutch minority policy tradition vis-à-vis its immigrants, and secondly to pinpoint how, when and why exactly the turning point in policy from 'pluralistic' to 'assimilationist' occurred.

For the analysis, key government texts spanning the period between 1970 (the year of the first comprehensive government policy paper on foreign workers) and 2011 have been studied. Texts include government commentary to the Dutch parliament to defend newly proposed laws, and studies drafted by influential advisory organs such as the WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) and the SCP (The Netherlands Institute for Social Science Research). The chapter will focus primarily on the linguistic component of minorities policy. In the Dutch case, there are two main policy areas of interest in that respect: OETC/OALT (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur/Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende Talen) (Heritage Language and Culture Education/ Education in 'Allochthonous' Living Languages), which was a government-supported initiative to support mother-tongue education for immigrants in primary and in some cases secondary education, and secondly the citizenship course regime which has a strong linguistic focus. Furthermore, the development of general definitions and of goals on 'integration' and 'assimilation' is of interest, due to its obvious implications for the more specific linguistic aspects of minorities policy.

[9] The present author and Marácz contributed equally to this paper. The fragments cited here are part of the contribution of the present author.

1960-1970s: guest worker regime

It has been observed in Houtkamp & Marácz (2018)[1] that due to the rapid growth of the post-war economy and the increasing disinterest of the Dutch population in accepting work at the lower of end of the job market, the Dutch government actively recruited temporary foreign workers from the 1950s to the middle of the 1970s. In the early periods most workers originated from southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, but in the 1960s and 1970s the majority came from states such as Morocco and Turkey. Among government officials the question rose of the appropriate policy response to this newfound ethnic diversity in the Netherlands. One of the first documents that sought to formulate the beginnings of an answer was the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* (Note on foreign workers), drafted in 1970. The document emphasises the economic nature of the foreign migration flow and discusses potential problems regarding recruitment (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 4). In Houtkamp & Marácz (2018) it is further argued that Dutch policy at the time emphasised the temporary nature of these migration flows, assuming that most foreign workers would return to their countries of origin once their labour contracts had ended. In this document however, some allusions to a possible longer stay of the foreign workers were also made. For instance, on the topic of the likelihood that the migrants would opt for family reunification:

> It is more likely that this thought will occur to him after he himself has adapted to Dutch society, and has become convinced that a longer stay in this country offers him perspectives as head of the family. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 9).

There are two relevant notions in this extract: first, it seems that the migrant himself, rather than the government, determines the degree of 'being adapted' to Dutch society. Secondly, when discussing the issue of the adaptability of migrants, it begs the question what kind of criteria would be relevant. The document expands upon this latter notion in ensuing sections. For instance, it comments on the relationship between the autochthonous (i.e. native) Dutch and the migrants regarding adaptability:

> Inclusion of the group of foreign workers in Dutch society implies mutual adaptation. The foreigner must be able to adapt to some extent to the new situation, i.e. the Dutch way of life, the Dutch population will need to be prepared to accept an unfamiliar group with different customs, etc. This will help with the avoidance of conflicts, whilst contributing to the personal wellbeing of foreigners. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 10).

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[10] The present author and Marácz contributed equally to this paper. The fragments cited here are part of the contribution of the present author.

Here the notion of 'mutual adaptability' is explicitly mentioned: both the migrants and the majority population have to adapt to the 'new situation'. This 'mutual adaptability' remains a vague concept however. It can be argued that in practice it can be difficult to imagine how the majority population would adapt to the minority, and to what degree it needs to accept 'different customs'. It seems unlikely that this process would happen automatically. This ambition of 'mutual adaptability' is present in most of the documents in the 1970s, 1980s and to a certain degree also in the 1990s, but is virtually never translated into concrete policy measures.

In an ensuing extract, the positive contribution of the foreign workers' culture is emphasised:

> It is a question of providing information to the Dutch population about the character of 'unfamiliar groups', and the implications their presence can have for Dutch society. Whereas the positive influence of other cultures on our society should absolutely not be disregarded, on the other hand it is about providing information to the foreign workers regarding the country and region where they are welcomed, and the difficulties that may occur during their adaptation. In this regard it is important that the biggest obstacle to mutual contact, the language barrier, should be removed. (ibid.: 10).

A third extract makes the connection between the need for migrants to adapt and the duration of their stay:

> In the process of adaptation the length of stay is an important factor. Regarding the foreign workers, who will usually stay short-term, the focus may even primarily lie on preserving their own identity. Readaptation difficulties upon return to their own country will then be as few as possible. (ibid: 10).

These extracts therefore speak about the question of adaptability but remain vague on its practical applications, using general terms such as adapting to the 'Dutch way of life', the need to accept a group with 'different customs' and the importance of 'mutual relations' between the migrants and the autochthonous population. The one exception is when it comes to the role of language: it is explicitly stated that the language barrier needs to be broken, for it is the biggest barrier to establishing mutual relations. The question of linguistic competence is also addressed in the section on education for foreign workers' children:

> The question arises of what type of education is necessary:- purely their own national education in order to anticipate the possible return of the parents to their home country, so the connection with education there does not raise difficulties; or purely Dutch education to facilitate the integration

> of the children in the Netherlands and allow them to seize all educational opportunities here; in the latter case it is required to provide additional education with the goal of teaching the children about their native language and culture, in order to bridge the gap as far as possible created between parents and children after their emigration. Moreover, in most cases a transition period from national to Dutch education will be needed. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 12).

This dilemma is interesting mainly in that it foreshadows the introduction of mother-tongue education. A clear distinction is made between 'purely Dutch education' that 'speeds up the integration of children in the Netherlands' and 'exclusive minority culture and language education', justified by the possible return of these children to their countries of origin. The concept of 'integration' is not clearly defined in this document, but judging by this extract it seems to be largely connected to and/or facilitated by a knowledge of Dutch and, more importantly, it is explicitly *not* facilitated by mother-tongue education. This suggests that the notion of integration expressed in this document is monolingual.

A different government reacted in 1974 to the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* in a so-called 'memorie van antwoord' (i.e. the official response of the government to the WRR report). Agreement with several statements of the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* is expressed. The 1970s observation that the Netherlands 'is not an immigration country and should not become one' is met with approval. Furthermore, the government's response has some interesting assumptions on the integration and language-learning practices of immigrants. It formulates an expectation of what kind of immigrants are most likely to stay permanently in the Netherlands:

> It also needs to be taken into account that those showing adaptability will stay the longest period of time. This means that time is a decisive factor in the selection process of the group of foreign workers. If the foreign worker wishes to transfer his family after some time has passed, then this is an indication that he has clearly chosen to settle in the Netherlands. (*Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1974: 4).

The government speaks of 'adaptation capability', without formulating a precise definition. However, even though the term lacks a clear definition, it can be inferred that 'adaptation capability' is a quality possessed by the migrants which has very little connection to government policy. The government thus assumed that a distinction between the 'desirable'(i.e. probably working, Dutch-speaking, 'adapted') migrants and the undesirable ones would come about in a natural way with little need for policy intervention in that respect.

> However, despite the self-selection mechanism of 'adaptation capability', the government also expresses its wish actively to reduce migration flows. This is based on a different idea of the value of economic growth (economic growth is not always the utmost goal to strive for), demographic pressure and the 'ensuing damage to the social environment (*Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1974: 6).

Furthermore, the document states that migrants will have difficulty finding their way within Dutch society if they are 'uprooted' from their own cultural norms and practices. The goverment proposes a solution:

> Finally, one has to take care to provide foreign workers with their own community centres, where their personal values and customs may give them some support, because people who are uprooted and under threat of losing their own self-worth cannot be expected to uphold good relations with their social environment. (ibid.: 14).

The notion that the 1974 government was asserting the importance of the heritage ethnic community in the integration process is remarkable. It also paves the way for the later policy philosophy of 'integration whilst maintaining the heritage identity', which will be discussed later in this chapter. This extract also implicitly shows that the political framework of the time seems akin to Berry's definition of integration as reciprocal adaptation between minorities and majorities. Cultivating the heritage ethnic identity on the one hand and adaptation to Dutch society on the other hand are not seen as mutually exclusive:

Where it concerns the possible contradiction between the desired reasonable adaptation to Dutch society on the one hand, and the maintenance of their own heritage on the other, the undersigned are of the opinion that these aims certainly do not exclude one another, rather even that they complement each other.

> Within the framework of building the social environment - promoting heritage and community life - the foreign workers with their families have sufficient opportunities to experience together their own religious and cultural values. This is also expressed by the additional education for the children of foreign workers. (ibid: 19).

The last sentence emphasises the education targeted at the migrants' children. There is very little ambition expressed to organise an extensive language acquisition programme for their parents. It is stated, though, that 'Simple Dutch language acquisition courses could contribute as well [to help them settle in the Netherlands]' (*Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1974: 17) in the early stages after their arrival in the

Netherlands, but plans did not reach further than this. The children should however be integrated in the Dutch education system as soon as possible:

> The former have to be placed for as short a time as possible into a separate class, to familiarise them as quickly as possible with the Dutch language, after which full integration in Dutch education can start. However, this does not imply that these children could not be taught in their heritage language and culture, if their parents would like it. The pupils who will certainly leave the Netherlands after several years should receive this additional education alongside Dutch education in any case. (ibid.: 21).

Considering these two key documents of the 1970s period, the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* and the *Memorie van antwoord*, we can draw several conclusions. First of all, it is often stated that integration policy in this period had little substance, due to the dominant philosophy that the migrants' stay would be temporary. Some extracts justify this conclusion, such as the repeated observations that the Netherlands is not an immigration country. However other extracts show that policy makers were reflecting upon measures to facilitate the adaptation of those who did stay. The idea that migrants should be allowed to cultivate their heritage identity was not just seen as a method to facilitate their return to the country of origin, but also considered a viable strategy to ease their adaptation to Dutch society. Regarding language policy, the documents show a particular concern for the integration of the migrants' children in the Dutch education system. Teaching them Dutch was the primary objective so they could participate in regular classes. The government barely touched upon the subject of adult education for their parents.

WRR Etnische Minderheden (1979)[11]

During the 1980s the Dutch government, consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the right-of-centre liberal party (VVD), made the shift towards a more active integration policy, both for migrants' children and their parents. The 1979 report *Etnische Minderheden* (Ethnic Minorities) by the WRR was key to this changing perspective. The WRR concluded that the adaptation process of immigrants in the Netherlands was problematic, due to three major reasons:

(i) problems of social backwardness: to what extent is the ability of the members of these groups to participate in society on equal terms restricted by their socio-economic position; these problems of social backwardness are often shared by ethnic minorities - admittedly often to a greater degree - with disadvantaged groups within society generally;

[11] The extracts from 'Etnische minderheden' are directly quoted from its English version, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) (1979). Ethnic Minorities.. The extracts from all the other documents have been translated by the present author.

(ii) cultural or identity problems: to what extent are these groups or their individual members prepared and able to adapt to the dominant culture, or else to preserve and experience a sense of independent identity;

(iii) 'majority problems': to what extent is the host society prepared to develop towards a society in which people of diverse ethnic backgrounds can live together harmoniously. In principle, these also form three separate areas for government policy formulation. (WRR 1979: VII).

In this extract it is unclear whether it is desirable that the migrants choose between the majority culture and their own group identity, or develop them simultaneously. What is clear however, is that the trend set in 1974, when the minority culture played an important role in the cultural adaptation process, is continued here by the WRR. The fact that the report also mentions 'majority problems', namely the willingness of the country of destination to adapt to a society where different ethnicities can live together in harmony, is also interesting. It shows that the WRR realised Dutch society had to change if it were to accommodate the advent of newcomers, but is also another sign that the adaptation process was supposed to be mutual: both immigrants and autochthonous Dutch would need to accommodate to each other. The WRR acknowledged that the Netherlands had become an immigration country, contrary to the earlier reports of the 1970s:

> Official policy in the past was strongly influenced by the belief that immigrants intended to remain in the Netherlands only temporarily. This assumption was not only consistent with the objective that the Netherlands should not become an immigration country, but many migrants themselves anticipated temporary residence. (WRR 1979: XVII).

> The point at issue, however, is that the possibility of permanent residence by minority groups should be taken as a basis for official policy and should determine the nature of the facilities offered as long as immigrants wish to remain in the Netherlands. The possibility of individual return migration should not be used as an alibi for evading a policy that would improve the minorities' opportunities to participate in Dutch society. Equally the desire to return must not be used as a weapon to encourage remigration. (WRR 1979: XVIII).

The WRR presented here a thorough reflection on the migrants' orientation towards their own culture versus orientation towards the Dutch society. It is in particular interesting how 'Dutch culture' is defined and what the effects are of a particular form of cultural orientation on different generations:

> All in all it must therefore be expected that the disadvantages experienced by many members of minority groups currently living in the Netherlands will have effects in coming generations. By disadvantage is understood disadvantage in terms of Dutch culture, that is being relatively poorly placed to acquire things to which value is attached by the indigenous Dutch community (education, income, housing, status, power, quality of work, and so on). (WRR 1979: XII-XIII).

Adapting to Dutch culture is here thus defined as 'acquiring things to which value is attached by the indigenous Dutch community'. These attributes are mostly material: income, housing, status, power and good working conditions. By contrast it is assumed that those who opt to focus on their own ethnic culture might value these attributes less. Orientation towards one's ethnic culture is thus seen as a (more or less) deliberate choice to opt out of these material values.

The WRR was, in line with the other 1970s documents, not an advocate of assimilation and instead desired that both cultures adapt to each other. However, the foundation for its argument is quite different:

> In principle, the constitutionally guaranteed liberties rule out enforced assimilation; occasionally other objectives of equal significance for society are even required to take second place to guaranteed liberties. The guaranteed liberties also mean that the government must implement any positive cultural policies with restraint. (WRR 1979.: XX)

> Solutions for these problems must not be drawn up by the host society alone but should be arrived at through a process of communication with the minorities themselves, who must be provided with adequate opportunity for such a dialogue. With good minority participation in policy formulation the nature and scope of cultural reorientation not only become the subject of decision-making by those affected, but at the same time demands may be made concerning various aspects of Dutch society. (ibid.: XXI).

It needs to be remembered that the WRR in 1979 accepted the premise that the Netherlands is an immigration country and also assumed that a significant number of migrants would stay on a permanent basis. The argumentation predominantly used in the other 1970s documents against any form of assimilation, namely that it would hinder the prospects of immigrants were they to return to their home country, is thus not validated in this document. Instead, the WRR pointed to the freedoms guaranteed by the Dutch constitution, which urge the government not to intervene in the cultural lives of its citizens. A second line of argumentation is more of a practical nature. The WRR stated that optimal participation of minorities demands change from both the majority

and minority cultures. If this change does not occur, there is a good chance that minorities fall into cultural isolation and loss of identity, but also into a backward social-economic position. As could already be seen in a previous extract, where Dutch culture was defined in economic terms, the WRR was here making a strong connection between culture and socio-economic position. It is thus clear that the WRR advocated strongly in favour of an intercultural dialogue which should result in adaptation by all the cultures involved.

Therefore it is not surprising that the WRR acted against the concept of 'integration whilst preserving one's own identity', since it assumes that migrant identities do not need to change:

> The objectives relating to the social position of foreign workers in Dutch society stem directly from the point of view that labour migration is and should be temporary in nature. Limiting the number of foreign workers and the length of their stay is therefore a major objective. As long as foreign workers and their families remain in the Netherlands the government aims at 'integration with the preservation of separate identity', but the two concepts are scarcely defined, and in practice the content of these aims is coloured by the expectation of temporary residence. There is no question of there being any long-term conception and objectives, or of these objectives being broken down into specific phases. (WRR 1979: 150).

The question of providing facilities for minorities to preserve their own culture, including mother-tongue education, was also addressed. The WRR claimed that providing these facilities does not require a major sacrifice from the majority, but has a significant value for the minorities. Minorities should thus be given plenty of opportunities by the Dutch government to design and maintain their own cultural activities. Mother-tongue education should therefore be generously provided as well. However, again, the primary goal of every policy should be to foster an engaging intercultural dialogue, meaning that these facilities should not in any way lead to segregation. A strong concentration of facilities could be a barrier to intercultural contact:

> Provisions for such matters as religious worship, education in the immigrants' own language, adapted services (e.g. maternity care by women, doctors) do not present the host society with insuperable problems, while they are of great significance to the minorities. By offering instruction in the immigrants' own language alongside education in Dutch, for example, access to their own culture is maintained. Such provisions do, however, require a certain degree of geographical concentration on the part of members of minority groups. Moreover, where a certain degree of concentration exists, facilities arise 'spontaneously', for example in relation to special eating habits. Concentration of this kind should not however reach the point where contact with other community groups becomes restricted. (WRR 1979: XX).

In conclusion, the WRR's definition of integration is primarily economically driven: it advocates cultural adaptation from both sides, but mostly because it would otherwise lead to cultural isolation of minorities, which in turn leads to perpetuating the social inequality of those minorities. Culture and socio-economics are clearly connected. Whether culture should also be valued intrinsically is unclear. The WRR seems to have contradicting positions with respect to the degree of government intervention required or allowed in the cultural make-up of society. On the one hand it nuances the effects of government policy and, more importantly, claims that both a negative (assimilationist) and positive cultural policy go against the freedoms guaranteed in the constitution. On the other hand the document explains why the government *should* provide facilities to minorities which help them gain access to their own culture, such as mother-tongue education. These two analyses are difficult to reconcile. A possible interpretation is that the WRR's argument should be disentangled into two distinct positions: one based on principle and one based on practical considerations. Principally, the government should be very reluctant to intervene in cultural matters, but practically a certain degree of intervention is desirable, since it is otherwise likely that minorities will be locked into a position of lasting social inequality. Considering the remainder of the document, it is safe to note that the WRR's practical considerations supercede its principled reservation.

The WRR's document marks a shift in the thinking about integration and the role of the government in governing the process of cultural adaptation. It presents a sharper definition of integration, clearly differentiating it from assimilation but also warning against the effects of prolonged segregation.

Government reaction to the WRR rapport (Minderhedenbeleid 1981)

Two years after the publication of *Etnische Minderheden* in 1981 the Dutch government gave a provisional[12] reaction. This document is interesting for it contains a rather detailed vision of how the government planned to deal with questions of identity, and how it saw the relationship between the majority and the minority cultures. Similar to the WRR, the government acknowledged the limitations of its own agency and attributed the success and failure of any policy to how groups in society 'avoid discrimination and foster mutual respect' (*Minderhedenbeleid* 1981: 3). The government followed the WRR with respect to its main integration goal:

> The Government agrees with the Council that the Netherlands has become a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, where minorities have the right to equal treatment. The question is what it actually involves. The Government deems this excludes two types of relations, namely forced assimilation and segregation. (ibid.: 5).

[12] Provisional, because the topic is very complex and requires more time for reflection (Minderhedenbeleid 1981: 2)

So both assimilation and segregation were considered undesirable. The government then formulated three main principles which define the relationship between majority and minority:

> The ambition to give minorities an equal position in Dutch society assumes respecting the self-worth of these groups. However, culture and identity are not static concepts. These immigrants will be themselves differently in the Netherlands from when they were still living in their countries of origin.
>
> (...) What applies to minorities also applies to all members of the majority population. The arrival of ethnic minorities has changed society. It also requires the Dutch people who are born and raised here to adapt to the new situation.
>
> (...) After rejecting the isolated position of minorities (segregation) the Government offers the possibility to participate fully in our society. Open communication between the autochtonous and allochtonous population needs to be possible in order to learn each other's perspectives and adapt to each other.
>
> These three points are best summarised in the formula: 'mutual adaptation in a multicultural society with equal opportunities for the autochtonous and allochtonous population'. (*Minderhedenbeleid* 1981: 6).

These three policy goals are similar to what the WRR had proposed, again marking the strong influence of the *Etnische minderheden* report. But, also similar to the previous report, it remains unclear how exactly the Dutch population should 'adapt to the new situation'. It called for respect of the minorities' cultural identity, but also urged that identity is not static and that immigrants will 'be themselves differently' in the Netherlands. Regarding linguistic issues, the document announces the introduction of translation centres, which should ease communication between immigrants and government institutions (*Minderhedenbeleid* 1981: 12). It needs to be emphasised however that this reaction was provisory and of a general nature. Two years later in 1983, the Dutch government presented a comprehensive policy ambition regarding its minorities.

Minderhedennota 1983

The *Minderhedennota* (1983) (Minorities policy document) is an extensive document that covers many different aspects of Dutch minority policy, with themes ranging from housing, to minorities' position on the labour market, to education. As has been stated in the introduction of this analysis, we will predominantly focus on both the general definition of 'integration' used and the linguistic aspects of the policy. The general policy goal is as follows: 'The minority policy is aimed at minority groups to create the conditions necessary to emancipate and participate in society. The mutual adaptations and acceptance of all population groups needs to be promoted.' (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 10).

The general policy trend thus remains largely similar: the general premise is that both majority and minority groups have a relationship based on mutual adaptation. The adaptation required of society to include migrants is even an intrinsic part of the advocated 'emancipation'. The next extract more specifically addresses the issue of mutual adaptation, and its connection to the Dutch language:

> This means on the one hand that Dutch society has to offer minorities the possibilities to develop themselves. On the other hand it means that minorities can be expected to participate willingly in Dutch society and that they make the effort to acquire social skills that are necessary, including a sufficient mastery of the Dutch language. (ibid.: 11).

This extract once again emphasises the importance of mutual adaptation of majority and minority. However, it also outlines at least one effort that can be expected of the minority groups: namely learning the Dutch language. This is the first time in the whole range of documents discussed that Dutch language acquisition is explicitly mentioned as a prerequisite to participating in the Netherlands. The importance of the Dutch language is repeated throughout the remainder of the document, for instance when the accessibility of facilities in society is discussed: 'As such, many ethnic groups' poor mastery of the Dutch language will hinder equal participation in many facilities.' (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 18).

The fact that migrants have to learn Dutch to fit into society is thus explicitly recognised. The *Minderhedennota* is however also addressing the linguistic obligations of the government and the majority society vis-à-vis the minorities. First the general goals of the education policy are outlined:

1. Education needs to prepare members of minority groups and give them the opportunities to participate fully in Dutch society, socio-economically, societally and democratically.
2. Education needs to promote the acculturation of minorities and other members of Dutch society, amongst other things through inter-cultural education. (ibid.: 19-20).

The goals for education are in line with the general ambitions of the new minority policy. It should prepare minorities to participate fully in Dutch society, whilst giving them the option to do so within their own cultural framework. Furthermore through 'inter-cultural education' (which refers to all non-language-related education in OETC), the acculturation of minorities and other members of Dutch society needs to be realised.

Mother-tongue education plays a prominent role in the *Minderhedennota* (1983). The vision on the goal of mother-tongue education had changed since the 1970s, and was explained as such:

> The perspective on this type of education has been shifting in the last few years. Initially mother-tongue education was intended for children of foreign workers, who were supposed to remigrate at a certain point in time. After the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy [WRR] published its report in 1979, which argued in favour of a minority policy framework that assumed permanent residency of these groups, the perspective on mother-tongue education changed as well. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 28).

It is thus explicitly mentioned that the WRR report of 1979 directly influenced the government's stance on mother-tongue education. It reformulated the policy goals in three points:

1. it could contribute to the development of the self-image and the self-awareness of the pupil.
2. it offers better knowledge of and access to the culture of their country of origin, which will help maintain contacts with family members, friends and acquaintances in the heritage country.
3. in the event of remigration, it facilitates inclusion in the school system in the heritage country. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 28).

The argument that mother-tongue education can help the children when they potentially return to their parents' (or their own) country of origin is thus still maintained. However, the justification for the mother-tongue policy has been broadened by two other, completely different arguments. The argument concerning the 'self-image and self-awareness' of the children reveals how the 1983 government thought about the role of minority cultures. It is assumed that the minority culture and language would have an intrinsic value for the children involved. The second argument, which emphasises the ease of access into the 'own' ethnic culture which knowledge of the mother tongue can bring, is quite interesting for it acknowledges the role and importance of transnational contacts. It needs to be noted however that both arguments are actually quite poorly explained. The document does not explicitly state exactly for what reason the self-image, or the identity, of the children should be improved, or why their transnational contacts should be facilitated. Speculating, there are probably three possible interpretations. Firstly, the government could assume that both the children's identity and their access to their own ethnic culture have intrinsic value, promoting the ideals of multiculturalism. Secondly, they could in fact still be connected to the argument of remigration, in the sense that a stronger (cultural) sense of identity combined with a better knowledge of the own culture might stimulate remigration. Thirdly, the government may deem the children's identity and their embedding in their heritage culture instrumental to their successful integration in Dutch society.

1990s

The 1990s marked yet another shift in the policy thinking on the integration of minorities, presided over by a government of Christian Democrats (CDA) and Social Democrats (PvdA). Whereas the 1980s can be characterised as a period where the government clearly emphasised the importance of both the heritage and the Dutch culture, this changed in the 1990s. Government documents shift their focus predominantly to the importance of the integration of minorities in the Dutch culture, and the need to set up Dutch language acquisition programmes, whilst the minority cultures receive less attention. It is again, similar to the 1980s, a report by the WRR that arguably had a strong influence on the political thinking of the decade. In 1989 the WRR published a study entitled 'Allochtonenbeleid' (Policy for Allochthons). Extracts from this study will be analysed first.

One of the striking features of the report is its title. It introduces a concept that we have barely seen before in the previous documents: 'Allochtoon'. The other documents preferred to speak about 'minorities'. 'Allochtoon' is not meant as a substitute for this concept, but rather as an addition. The WRR explains the difference between 'Allochtoon' and 'Minderheden' (minorities) as follows:

> In this report the Council defines 'allochtonous' as: of non-Dutch heritage. 'Allochtonen' are thus foreigners from a legal perspective, ex-foreigners who are naturalised, Dutch people who originate from the (former) overseas areas, including their offspring until the third generation to the extent they wish to consider themselves allochtonous. A 'minority' is an allochtonous group in a disadvantaged position. (WRR 1989: 15).

'Allochtoon' is thus an umbrella concept that covers all migrants in the Netherlands and their descendants until the third generation. Minorities are used as a sub-concept to identify those groups within the 'Allochtoon' population that are in a disadvantaged position. The WRR also provides a concise definition of 'integration': 'The concept of 'integration' is used henceforth in the sense of equal participation in the most important societal sectors and institutions.' (ibid.).

If we compare this definition of integration to the one that was dominant in the 1980s document, there is a clear difference, or to put it more simply, a clear omission. Participation in Dutch society, or 'participation in the most important societal sectors and institutions', was always a core policy goal. What has changed however, is the 1980s notion that integration is a process of reciprocity and mutual adaptation between majority and minority groups. It cannot be inferred from this omission that the WRR in 1989 had completely abandoned the idea that minority cultures are of importance in the integration process.

However, the fact that the role of minority cultures does not feature anymore in the core definition of integration could be a sign of its diminishing importance in political thinking of the time.

That diminishing importance of minority cultures also becomes clear when studying the paragraphs on education. The WRR makes the following general proposals on education for children and adults:

> The Council is of the opinion that better facilities to accommodate non-Dutch-speaking pupils need to be created in education. The Council argues in favour of (...) introducing language classes for allochtonous pre-schoolers who have an insufficient mastery of the Dutch language upon entering primary education. In the period before entering primary education better accommodation facilities for allochtonous children need to be created.
>
> Much better facilities for adult education need to be created as well. (...) The Council advocates introducing a right to education for adult members of minority communities. They should at least have the opportunity to enrol in a basic Dutch language acquisition course, as well as a course covering orientation in Dutch society. (WRR 1989: 12).

The WRR calls for policy measures to improve significantly the Dutch language acquisition of youth and adult migrants. There are more passages that illustrate this strong emphasis, such as the worrying trend that infants have too little contact with the Dutch language (ibid.: 17), the importance of Dutch for immigrant children in their school career (ibid.: 39), the problems observed for minorities on the labour market connected to the Dutch language (ibid.: 115), a proposed connection between Dutch citizenship and Dutch language acquisition (ibid.: 96), and the analysis that education in the Dutch language is significantly more important than mother-tongue education (ibid.: 42-43). Looking specifically at the proposals for adult education, it can be argued that the WRR was laying the foundations in these extracts for the citizenship courses which were implemented in the 1990s and 2000s. These courses have two main pillars: Dutch language acquisition and orientation in Dutch society and culture, which are exactly the components of the adult migrant curriculum proposed by the WRR.

The role of the mother tongue in classes on Dutch language acquisition is deemed uncertain:

> To ensure success of this approach, new teaching methods need to be implemented on a wider scale to improve Dutch second language education. (...) The question whether mother-tongue education needs to play a role in this language education system, and if so, which role, could then be discussed as well. (ibid.: 40).

The WRR then briefly evaluates the success of OETC (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur), the mother-tongue education programme that was introduced in the 1980s. The evaluation focusses on the practical aspects and implications of OETC. It points out that 'the practical realisation of this form of education is not perfect' (ibid.: 42). According to the WRR the results of OETC are difficult to evaluate. However, a possible argument to preserve OETC would be the role its teachers fulfil as a bridge between the school and the parents of minority children. The WRR eventually advises not abandoning OETC altogether, but not to teach these classes during regular school hours. In a later section of the report, the WRR mentions a brief pilot study on the connection between Dutch language acquisition and the mother tongue:

> The Netherlands has run experiments on a limited scale, especially amongst Turks and Moroccans. Research shows these experiments lead to better results than monolingual education, especially in the domain of non-cognitive development. In the cognitive domain there was no, or a limited, difference. A larger emphasis on the heritage language appeared not to be to the detriment of knowledge of the Dutch language. (WRR 1989: 149).

Furthermore it questions whether the organisation of mother-tongue education is a task for the government, or should instead be provided by the allochtonous communities. In that respect, the WRR made the following proposition:

> In the paragraph 1.4.2.2. the Council advised to maintain heritage language and culture education, insofar as it is currently provided by primary education, but to offer it outside of the standard curriculum. As such the initiative regarding this form of education would shift more clearly than in the present to the allochtonous groups themselves. (...) Allochtonous groups for whom primary education does not offer facilities on this issue are, if required, in principle eligible for a compensation of the costs of heritage language and culture education, in so far as Dutch language education is not hindered. (ibid.: 51).

The two interesting aspects of this extracts are the partial delegation of responsibility for OETC to the allochtonous communities, but also in particular the last part of the final sentence: 'insofar this [OETC] does not hinder Dutch education'. This reservation is made several times in the report, for instance: 'Heritage language and culture education cannot be to the detriment of acquiring knowledge, insight and competences that are important to function in Dutch society'. (ibid.: 161).

The Dutch government wrote a response to the WRR's 1989 *Allochtonenbeleid* in 1990, entitled *Voorlopige Kabinetsreactie op WRR rapport 'Allochtonenbeleid* [Provisional cabinet reaction to the WRR report 'Allochtonenbeleid'] (Ministerie van Binnenlandse

Zaken 1990). In this response, the government expressed its general agreement with the WRR. Several extracts are interesting, since they reveal parts of the definition of integration the government wishes to employ:

> The cabinet finds that in the ensuing years all governmental attention should be directed to those routes that truly offer access to society. The integration of allochthones must then be seen in terms of the importance of offering people the opportunities so they can determine independently their own societal position. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990: 1).
>
> Integration is not opposed to identity; it adds a new dimension. Only those who have sufficiently mastered the Dutch language, those who have received a sufficient profession-oriented education, those who have learned to hold their own in a rather harsh and competitive society can fully participate whilst maintaining their own identity. (ibid.: 2).

The goal of integration is thus defined as granting minorities the capability to find their own way in Dutch society. In addition, the tension between integration on the one hand, and preservation of their own identity on the other, should not be overestimated. In fact it is argued that integration, defined as Dutch language acquisition and having a proper education, is a prerequisite to be even capable of preserving their own identity. The role of the minority culture and language has therefore shifted from being an integral part of the integration process (as in the *Minderhedennota* 1983) to either being relegated to an auxiliary position (in the case of mother-tongue education) or being of little importance to integration at all. The argumentation given for this shift in the government's thinking is actually quite clear. The main reason given in the beginning of the 1980s to strengthen the role of minority cultures was also of an auxiliary nature: it was believed that minorities' adaptation to Dutch culture could only succeed if proper respect and attention was given to their own ethnic culture. The intrinsic value of minority cultures played a subordinate role, if any at all. In the later report by the WRR, save for a few exceptions, it was concluded that the connection between preservation of the minority culture and accelerated adaptation to Dutch culture could barely be proven. The instrumental, and only, argument for actively preserving minority cultures and languages was proven false, which prompted the government to reconsider its language policy towards migrants. However, this reconsideration did not lead to radical change, for the government still believed in the useful role mother-tongue education could play in bridging the gap between minorities and the Dutch society (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990: 21).

In 1994, a new redefining policy document entitled *Contouren Nota* (1994) [Outlines Note] was released by the Dutch government. It introduced to the debate the concept of 'citizenship':

> As a guiding principle for a new vision on the presence of people with a diverse cultural heritage in the Netherlands- whether they are newcomers or are staying in the Netherlands for a longer period of time- the cabinet uses the concept of citizenship. The notion of citizenship is evident and is based on the equality of every resident. (...) Citizenship implies that all individuals involved in the integration process choose to permanently participate in Dutch society, with all rights and duties that come with it. Citizenship also implies that citizens carry the responsibility for each other and the preparedness to make this a reality. (...) The willingness and efforts of people from ethnic communities to acquire an equal position in Dutch society for themselves is, more than in the past, of crucial importance. (*Contouren Nota* 1994: 5)

'Citizenship' is thus composed of two main elements: a non-discrimination principle (i.e. 'the fundamental equality of every inhabitant') and the duty of every citizen to participate in society. The latter element was not entirely new, but the fact that the document emphasises the personal responsibility of all Dutch citizens can be considered a change in perspective. Citizens are asked to make a conscious decision to participate in Dutch society, and be fully aware of the rights and duties that this decision would bring them. They would have to 'seize their opportunities' in society themselves. The conclusion of this extract symbolises the change in discourse in this document as compared to previous ones. It declares that 'more than in the past' the willingness and effort of people from ethnic groups to obtain their place in society is of 'decisive importance'. More so than in the 1970s and 1980s, immigrants' and their descendants' adaptation to the Dutch society was now a matter of individual responsibility, instead of a process that is also largely influenced by state policy.

This individualisation of the cultural adaptation process can also be seen in the second major discourse shift made in the *Contouren Nota*. Regarding 'minority policy', which had been a central concept since the *Minderhedennota* (1983), the government stated the following:

> The cabinet opts for citizenship and emphasises the integration of minorities in society. As such, instead of 'minority policy', this cabinet speaks of 'integration policy' of minority groups. (...) The concept of integration policy better expresses that social integration of minority groups and their members is a process of mutual acceptation. This implies that both the 'integrated' and the society where they reside, need to make an effort. (*Contouren Nota* 1994: 6).

The shift from 'minority policy' towards 'integration policy of minorities' reveals an interesting assumption. It is implied that the previous 'minority policy' was not to the benefit of the 'Dutch society' as a whole, for the policy was mostly targeted at the

minority groups. Minority policy in the 1980s contained two main elements: education in the heritage culture and language, and facilitating the adaptation process to Dutch society. Adaptation to the Netherlands was always considered of prime importance, but some form of heritage language and culture education was deemed necessary to achieve this goal. It can be reasonably assumed that when the *Contouren Nota* claimed that the policy was targeted too much towards minorities, it primarily referred to those policies dealing with heritage language and culture education. Thus, by its increased emphasis on 'Dutch' language and culture at the cost of minority variances, this extract can be seen as a redefinition of what 'Dutch society' is: namely, increasingly one that is monolingual and monocultural.

The combination of the increased individualisation and monolingual/cultural focus of the integration policy is important to consider when analysing subsequent policy initiatives. In 1997 the government published the *Memorie van Toelichting: Wet Inburgering* [Explanatory Statement: Civic Integration Law], explaining the necessities of introducing a new citizenship regime. It calls for the introduction of citizenship courses which were meant to help immigrants participate in Dutch society, by teaching them basic knowledge of the Dutch language and some insight in Dutch culture. It explained:

> The permanent immigration at a relatively high level has consequences for integration policy. It is for both society and the newcomers of the utmost importance that they can hold their own in society as soon as possible (...). Civic integration should be seen in this respect as a first step in the integration process: through civic integration newcomers have the opportunity to secure their position in education and the labour market. Civic integration refers to learning the Dutch language and acquiring the initial insights in the societal and institutional relations in our society and the acquisition of an initial insight in the Dutch labour market. (Memorie van Toelichting 1997: 1).

It thus becomes clear that the notion of civic integration is in line with the trend of individualisation and the monocultural focus of Dutch integration policies. An interesting additional point is the fact that civic integration is the first step in the integration process, since it enables access to the education system and labour market, whereas the steps that are supposed to follow afterwards are not made explicit. A few years later, in 2001, the Balkenende-I government, which included the right-wing populist party LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), attempted to expand further upon the differences between citizenship courses and integration:

> To give integration a chance to succeed, the admission of foreigners who contribute to the problems of integration needs to be restricted as much as possible (...) the integration of children who arrive in the Netherlands when they are older is often problematic. (…) Taking into account the

> reduced opportunities to integrate successfully, the maximum age for family reunification, in line with the policy of our surrounding countries, needs to be linked to conditions and lowered. (Regeerakkoord Balkenende I 2002: 16)

This extract shows a slight reformulation of the integration policy doctrine: strict immigration policy with respect to 'the groups that contribute to worsening the integration problems' (i.e. these groups are recently more commonly referred to as 'non-western immigrants') and (mostly) punitive domestic measures to accelerate the integration process. In 2001, the SCP (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, The Netherlands Institute for Social Research) published a report on OALT. The SCP cited the researchers Broeder and Extra on the role of minority language education in the Dutch education sytem as follows:

> According to Broeder and Extra (1999) it is remarkable that policy evaluation was generally often not focussed on progress in mother tongue acquisition, but was restricted to the effects of the mother tongue on the Dutch language and success in education. (Broeder en Extra 1999: 5, cited in Turkenburg 2001: 5).

Broeder and Extra's conclusion is not surprising. The analysis presented in this chapter shows that minority language education was barely perceived as a value in itself by the Dutch government. It was always seen as an instrument towards more successful Dutch language acquisition. In the 1990s the bridging function of mother-tongue education was seriously called into question. These doubts culminated in this extensive 2001 SCP report, which focussed on the practical implementation and evaluation of OALT on the local level. The SCP researchers conducted several interviews with local politicians and with high-school officials. Based on these interviews, the researchers concluded the following: 'The impression that arises after the interviews is that in general municipalities and school management have little affinity with mother-tongue education and cultural education.' (Turkenburg 2001: 108).

OALT could thus not count on the enthusiastic support of the very actors who are most directly concerned with its implementation. A combination of this observation, the increased focus on Dutch language acquisition due to a shift in policy doctrine in the 1990s, and the presumed lack of scientific consensus on the positive effects of mother-tongue education, contributed to the definitive abolition of OALT in 2004.

In the period between the early 2000s and the present time the integration policy philosophy has not changed significantly. Dutch government expanded the citizenship regime in 2005 (*Memorie van Toelichting Wet Inburgering* 2005) and 2011 (*Memorie van Toelichting Wet Inburgering* 2011). Since 2011 immigrants have to pay for their own citizenship courses, whilst those who lack the means to do so, can make use of a government-sponsored 'social loaning system', similar to the one Dutch students use to fund their studies (DUO 2019).

Conclusion

The Netherlands is a very interesting case in this research as a whole, due to its numerous policy shifts since the coming of the guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s. A common popular opinion is that pre-1990s Dutch governments advocated a policy of multiculturalism. While this statement may be true to a certain extent, it has become apparent in this analysis that the underlying motivations for Dutch integration policy, and especially its linguistic component, have remained remarkably constant. In the first document discussed in this chapter, namely the note on foreign workers (that was drafted in the 1970s, the government already acknowledges that migrants wanting to stay need to learn Dutch (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970). Mother-tongue education was to be stimulated, but only to ease the assumed inevitable return of the guestworkers to their countries of origin. In other words: Dutch language acquisition was unsurprisingly the norm, and mother-tongue education only had instrumental value. These two core assumptions have not changed from the 1960s until the present, but their execution has. In the 1980s, when the Dutch government came to terms with the fact that the Netherlands had become an immigrant nation, mother-tongue education was deemed a useful auxiliary for Dutch language acquisition. Following the recommendations of several academics, it was believed that migrant children who have a solid understanding of their mother tongue would be much better equipped to learn a second language (i.e. Dutch) afterwards. Thus, OETC and its later incarnation OALT were being implemented. When doubt was raised on the effectiveness of the bridging function of mother-tongue education, coupled with several practical problems, it was logical from the government's point of view eventually to abolish mother-tongue education altogether. Very rarely has the Dutch government based its justification of OALT on the intrinsic value of mother-tongue education. So when its instrumental argument crumbled, so did the entire policy. Instead the government opted to have an exclusive focus on Dutch language acquisition for immigrants' children.

While the core assumptions on the different roles of Dutch and mother-tongue education have remained constant, the different governments have over time redefined their meaning of 'integration'. Integration was in the 1970s deemed largely unnecessary, since most guest workers were supposed to return to their countries of origin. Moreover, it was believed that only the migrants who had the most affinity with Dutch language and culture would opt to stay, implying that their adaptation to the Netherlands would inevitably be very smooth. In the 1980s, the emphasis was on the joint efforts of the majority and minorities to adapt to one another. Integration was seen as a two-way street, where both actors had to make sacrifices in order to forge a harmonious society.

[13] For a discussion on the differences between 'liberal', 'corporatist' and 'social-democratic' welfare states, see Esping-Anderssen (1990). The Netherlands has always been difficult to classify in this typology, traditionally having characteristics of all three in its policy system, but from the 1990s onwards there is a clear shift noticeable (Goodin and Smitsman 2000).

This implied that immigrants should integrate whilst 'maintaining their own identity'. Assimilation was explicitly labeled as being unneeded and sometimes even seen as undesirable. In the 1990s integration was slowly being redefined, with a larger focus on Dutch culture and a shrinking emphasis on the minority's culture and language. This redefinition co-incided with a Dutch policy shift towards a 'liberal' welfare state, with a greater emphasis on the responsibility of the individual.[13] The introduction of citizenship courses and exams fits this shifting narrative. Integration was also seen more and more as the responsibility of the immigrants themselves, as opposed to the joint approach that was advocated a decade earlier. The fact that since 2011 immigrants have had to pay for their own citizenship courses and exams could be seen as the symbolic culmination of this trend.

Dutch governments over the years may have never been 'multicultural' in the purest sense, particularly concerning the linguistic aspects of integration. The different incarnations of multicultural political theory usually assume that there is at least some intrinsic value to maintaining minority cultures. A diverse society is heralded as a value in itself, rather than as an instrument to achieve other policy goals. The Dutch governments have always treated minority languages predominantly as an instrument. Once that instrument was deemed to be ineffective, the government started looking for a new one. Perhaps it can be argued that the Dutch have a tradition of 'pragmatic multiculturalism' and, by proxy, 'pragmatic multilingualism': once the practical arguments had disappeared, so did their underlying ideals.

Chapter 5.2: Interviews Poles in the Netherlands[14]

Polish migration to the Netherlands has a long history that predates Polish accession to the EU in 2004. In 2002, 10,000 Polish citizens were staying temporarily in the Netherlands (Kindler 2018). After Poland joined the EU, Dutch policy makers expected 20,000 people to arrive, but the number of migrants proved to be significantly greater: 105,000. In similar fashion to other West European countries, post-2004 Polish labour migration occurred primarily through labour recruitment agencies. In 2013, around 90% of Poles staying in the Netherlands were short-term (3-12 months) labour migrants. In 2018, a total of 173,050 individuals with a Polish background, in first and second generation, were present in the Netherlands (see table 5.2.1).

Table 5.2.1

Poles in the Netherlands, 2000-2018.

Foreign background	Topic	2000	2005	2010	2016	2017	2018
Polish	Total population	29180	39815	77178	149831	161158	173050
Polish	First-generation foreign background	16015	24566	57496	117269	125978	134999
Polish	Total second-generation foreign background	13165	15249	19682	32562	35180	38051
Polish	One parent born outside of the Netherlands	11412	12959	15086	18542	19184	19824
Polish	Both parents born outside of the Netherlands	1753	2290	4596	14020	15996	18227

Source: CBS population figures 2018.[15]

In total 12 Poles in the Netherlands were interviewed in Amsterdam and The Hague in 2015 and 2016. The interviewees were mostly first-generation immigrants (10), whilst four were second-generation. All first-generation immigrants worked either in construction or fruit harvesting. Most interviews were conducted either with the help of a translator, or in Dutch, or in English, depending on the preference of the respondent.

[14] In the remainder of this study the groups interviewed will be referred to as 'Turks in the Netherlands, Poles in the Netherlands, Turks in France', etc., incorporating first, second and third generation migrants.

[15] Statistics were compiled using data from the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, Statistics Netherlands) website and applying the necessary demographic filters. https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/37325/table?ts=1571081420820

Dutch vs Polish

All interviewees either spoke Dutch, or were actively learning the language by enrolling in a course. Also, many interviewees planned to stay in the Netherlands in the long term, or were second-generation immigrants and thus were born in the Netherlands, which might influence their perspective on the Dutch language. Dutch is seen as a necessary language to learn for practical purposes, mostly to improve their economic prospects (Appendix 2.1. Interviews 1-10).[16]

The Polish language is treated with the same degree of pragmatism, albeit with a slight sense of cultural attachment. Polish, being the interviewees' mother tongue, is naturally important for them in order to communicate and stay in touch with their country of birth. Also for the second-generation Poles, Polish is most of all important to communicate with relatives in Poland: 'I skype every week with my parents and quite often write with my family through social media. Knowing the Polish language is indispensable to stay in touch.' (Appendix 2.1.8). There is however not always a positive reaction about how important it is to stay in touch with Polish culture: 'Polish is only useful for family visits. I do not care so much about Polish culture or identity. Language is just a practical tool for me to communicate.' (Appendix 2.1.4). The sentiment that language is primarily a tool for communication is echod by many interviewees.

The Poles who were still in the process of learning Dutch, actually argued that Dutch is just as important to them as Polish, sometimes even more so. Considering the fact that most of these respondents fall into the lower categories of social-economic status (SES), this may not come as a surprise: as mentioned previously, Dutch is seen as the best language to improve their economic prospects. These same respondents had split opinions on transmitting their Polish language to their children:

> I don't want to teach my children Polish. I am afraid that they will not learn Dutch as effectively, and Dutch is much more important for them here than Polish. I would make an exception if I can't speak Dutch well enough whenever I get children, then I am of course forced to speak Polish with them (Appendix 2.1.8).

At the same time, other interviewees argued that learning the two languages simultaneously is certainly possible, and raise their children bilingually as a result. These interviewees often actively sought outside sources, such as teachers or academic papers. To cite an example:

> My children speak both Polish and Dutch at home. It goes quite well. We looked for some information on the internet and eventually assumed that children can learn two languages at the same time. We also talked to the teacher at their primary school. She was not very knowledgeable on the

topic, so in the end we decided to teach the children both languages. Right now they speak both languages very well, and they did not suffer any linguistic setbacks. (Appendix 2.1.9).

Mother-tongue education

None of the respondents had any experience with the OALT/OETC mother-tongue education regime in the Netherlands, that was abolished in 2004. Some second-generation Poles attended weekend schools to learn Polish. The interviews in this section were thus mainly about perspectives of the immigrants on how mother-tongue education should be organised in the Netherlands. These perspectives among the first-generation immigrants were equally as split as on the issue of transmitting their mother tongue. Those who were in favour of bilingual education also favoured mother-tongue education at school, whilst the others were quite strongly against such a policy: 'I want my children to just learn Dutch at school. I do not want them to be confused. Dutch is by far the most important language for them to learn. I can teach them Polish at home if want. I do not care if they know Polish grammar or not.' (Appendix 2.1.1).

> I do not know if my children should learn Polish at school. My Dutch is not good enough to teach my children, so school should compensate for that. If I would know for sure that Dutch and Polish can be taught at the same time, I would be in favour of teaching Polish at school (Appendix 2.1.2).

This fear of being 'confused' when learning two or more languages simultaneously is a common phenomenon especially among immigrants not educated beyond the secondary level, and the Poles in the Netherlands interviewed here are no exception. However, the tertiary educated respondents were arguing strongly against this form of linguistic assimilation. One such respondent states: 'Mother-tongue education does not hinder the integration of Polish children. Parents should, especially when they are not fluent in Dutch, only speak Polish at home to their children. The children can then learn Dutch at school.' (Appendix 2.1.12). An interesting difference between them and several other groups, such as the Turks in Sweden and the Poles in France, is that very few mention any teacher involvement, or at least by one who is informed on the subject matter. The Dutch Polish group can thus be an example of how a '*laissez-faire*' or discouraging teaching regime can influence the immigrants with only secondary education regarding bilingualism and bilingual education. In addition, another aspect to emphasise once more is how much this particular group is basing decisions in terms of economic costs and benefits.

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[16] In the remainder of this chapter, and the other interview chapters, the interviews will be referred to using their chapter and interview number in Appendix II (Interview Data). For example: Interview number four in the appendix under chapter 2.1 will be referred to as: 2.1.4.

Their attitude towards language and school is heavily influenced by a rational-choice, economic logic, in which the cultural arguments play a clear secondary role. Some interviewees also mentioned the involvement of the Polish government in setting up Polish language schools in the Netherlands:

> It is really bad if the Dutch government does not organise mother-tongue education, and lets the Polish government do it. The current Polish government is very conservative. Those conservative values are not compatible with liberal Dutch values. We should not want a generation of Polish children to grow up with those values (Appendix 2.1.11).

One interviewee, who works at a Polish school in Amsterdam, outlined how unpleasant her encounters were with the municipality:

> Five years ago, a civil servant from Amsterdam visited us [at the school]. He said: "in fact, you are all teaching the children about Polish nationalism". I was shocked. Of course I fundamentally disagreed with him. We are doing the opposite in fact, we emphasise the connection between Poland and the Netherlands. The Polish people have a long history here in Amsterdam and we make sure the children here are fully aware of that. (Appendix 2.1.12).

Dutch language acquisition

Most respondents have significant experience with following different types of Dutch language programmes, both private and (semi-)organised by the government. Their experiences with the government-run programmes are quite poor: 'the Dutch language classes at the municipality did not help me at all. They were too theoretical. I only need the language to speak, I wish they focussed more on that.' (Appendix 2.1.2). 'I learned very little when following the Dutch language programmes, that's why I came here [to a private language school].' (Appendix 2.1.4). Again, many of the Poles interviewed had plans to stay in the Netherlands long-term, so they sought new opportunities by themselves to learn the language. One particular private school, where some of the interviews were conducted, was cited as being 'very effective' because it focussed almost exclusively on 'using the language in practice'. This clearly points to a desire among the interviewed Poles in the Netherlands to follow courses that teach them relatively quickly how to speak, as opposed to grammar lessons. A major problem that was mentioned often, though, is how difficult it is to combine following the lessons with a full-time job:

> At my job [as a fruit harvester], I only have colleagues from Poland, so I cannot speak Dutch there. I work more than 40 hours a week, and I follow Dutch courses four times a week during the evenings. It is very tough for me to keep this up, and I know many of my colleagues cannot do it. (Appendix 2.1.1).

Thus, the combination of language training not being required for staying and working in the Netherlands, and the long working hours of Polish workers, seems to influence negatively the attractiveness of following a Dutch language training course.

Mobility in Europe

Most respondents had no concrete plans to move to another European country, except if they were forced to move back to Poland due to their labour contracts ending, as their intention is to stay in the Netherlands for the foreseeable future. When asked which language would most increase their mobility potential, thus their motility, they all gave the same initial answer: English. Using the same rational choice logic as with the other answers, they mentioned that 'English is the global language', that 'in many countries you can get by with English'.[17] When specifically asked whether Polish could help as well, since the migration process could be facilitated if one can make contact with one's 'ethnic peers', the responses were split. One interviewee argued for instance that: 'I do not think having connection with Poles in other European countries is very useful. Poles who have migrated are often doing low-paid work, those connections are not viable from an economic perspective' (Appendix 2.1.5). Others expressed a more nuanced opinion: 'If the Polish economy would grow, I can imagine Polish being a very useful language for migration.' (Appendix 2.1.3).

Conclusion

The Poles in the Netherlands in this sample evaluate language and language education mainly on their economic merits. This is an interesting development, as it deviates quite strongly from all the other groups interviewed in this research, who to varying degrees also value the cultural dimension of their languages. Given the nature and composition of the sample, there are at least three possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations. Firstly, many respondents have to do low-paid work in the Netherlands (e.g. harvesting fruit or working in construction). It can be argued that for this particular group of immigrants, improving their economic wellbeing is very high on their priority list. It logically follows that when deciding whether to learn a new language, which requires a significant time and effort investment, the economic argument plays a very major role. Secondly, the immigrants with only secondary education generally have less access to academic studies on socio-linguistics, and bilingualism in particular. More highly educated immigrants in this research often argued in favour of bilingualism on the basis of scientific papers, or after having visited an academic conference.

[17] These sentiments where echoed by all the interviewees in Appendix 2.1, except interviewee 12.

These resources are more difficult to access for lower-educated immigrants, meaning that they also lack 'access' to these arguments. Thirdly, apparently the Poles in the Netherlands in this sample had little support from native Dutch teachers for bilingualism for their children, while examples from the interviews conducted in Sweden showed how essential the role of the teacher can be for immigrants with lower education levels when deciding how to raise their children linguistically.

These interviews show how relevant perception ('appropriation') is when assessing motility. The negative perception of the practical usefulness of their Polish mother tongue is a quite considerable driver for monolingualism (Dutch only) or very careful bilingualism (as long as it does not interfere with Dutch). The interviewees also thus saw very little value in Polish as a language that can enhance their motility. The school system (part of the linguistic infrastructure) seemed not actively to promote bilingualism as it did in Sweden and even in France, meaning that the Dutch Poles' perspective on this matter did not change. The logic of these interviewees can be quite adequately summarised as follows: Erst das Fressen, und dann die Kultur.

Chapter 5.3: Interviews Turks in the Netherlands

Post-war Turkish migration to the Netherlands was primarily related to the guest worker recruitment, similar to other West European countries. Between 1964 and 1974, a significant number of Turks migrated to the Netherlands on temporary labour contracts to fill voids in the Dutch labour market, usually in the textile industry and road construction. They predominantly settled in the larger cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, or in smaller cities where the textile industry had a large presence. The Turkish government facilitated emigration to mitigate the repercussions of unemployment in its own state and banked on the remittances from its diaspora to help boost the Turkish economy. The Dutch-Turkish immigrants originated mostly from Central Anatolia and villages around the Black Sea (Azak 2008). After the guest worker programmes were terminated in 1974, in the context of the oil crisis, Turkish migration continued through family reunification laws. In 2018 it was estimated that 404,459 individuals with a Turkish background were living in the Netherlands, measured up to the second generation (see table 5.3.1.).

Table 5.3.1.
Turks in the Netherlands

Foreign background	Topic	2000	2005	2016	2017	2018
Turkey	Total population	308890	358846	397471	400367	404459
Turkey	First-generation foreign background	177754	195678	190621	190331	191513
Turkey	Total second-generation foreign background	131136	163168	206850	210036	212946
Turkey	One parent born outside of the Netherlands	12644	22323	47405	49733	51899
Turkey	Both parents born outside of the Netherlands	118492	140845	159445	160303	161047

Source: CBS Population figures 2018.[18]

In total 11 Turks in the Netherlands were interviewed Amsterdam and Veendam (a small town in the north of the Netherlands) between 2015 and 2017. The interviewees had a varied migration history, so the sample is not without its biases. Most respondents had experienced or were in the process of obtaining higher education. Furthermore, all interviews were conducted in English, as all respondents had mastered the language sufficiently for basic communication purposes. The interviews were semi-structured.

[18] Statistics were compiled using data from the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, Statistics Netherlands) website and applying the appropriate demographic filters. https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/37325/table?ts=1571081420820

Dutch vs Turkish

The interviewed Turks in the Netherlands all considered the Dutch language at least to be of instrumental value, despite many of the first-generation migrants in particular having a limited mastery of the language. For instance, one first-generation migrant mentions: 'I learned Dutch because I wanted to work in and run a bar here. Speaking Dutch is crucial for that kind of work' (Appendix 2.2.1). This attitude is, perhaps unsurprisingly, present in every other sample group that is discussed in this research. The second and third-generation migrants usually also emphasise the social aspect of learning Dutch: they need the language to remain in touch with their Dutch friends and acquaintances.

On the role of Turkish, however, opinions start to differ, both across and within generations. Some interviewees mention that Turkish has a very great instrumental value in the Netherlands for the Turkish community. For instance, a first-generation interviewee claims: 'In the past we could obtain our Dutch driving license in Turkish. We cannot do that anymore, and it hinders a lot of Turkish people to gain their license' (Appendix 2.2.6). Another often cited argument, especially among the first-generation guest workers in the sample, is that mastery of the Turkish language grants them the option to remigrate to Turkey. 'Turkey is my homeland, in the end it is not the Netherlands' (Appendix 2.2.4). 'I will stay just five more years and then I will go back to Turkey' (Appendix 2.2.2). Many of the first-generation immigrants, who came to the Netherlands when they were very young (between 6 and 10 years) experience a stronger connection with Turkey than with the Netherlands. This is an interesting observation in the light of Berry's acculturation strategies. These respondents would according to his scheme be 'integrated' (they feel to some degree at home in both their heritage culture and their host society culture), but it is clear that their emotional connection is stronger with their heritage culture, even if they migrated at a very young age. Interestingly, among the interviewed third-generation Turks, who are usually in their twenties or early thirties, the 'remigration' argument plays no role at all, even though they do see the importance of learning Turkish to communicate with their friends and family in Turkey.

Even though the perspectives on the role of Turkish differ among the respondents, they do agree on the importance of bilingual education for their (future) children. Albeit for mostly practical, or cultural or emotional reasons, they find it important that their children can communicate well in Turkish: 'I want them to learn Turkish so they can communicate with their family in Turkey' (Appendix 2.2.8); 'even though I believe you can get by with English in Turkey, I would still prefer my children to also learn Turkish' (Appendix 2.2.5). One second-generation respondent was raised bilingually by her parents, but initially had no interest in the Turkish language, mostly due to societal factors:

> My parents raised me bilingually, but my Turkish was disastrous (...) I did not want to speak Turkish at school and focussed exclusively on Dutch, because I did not want to be seen as 'that Turkish girl'. (...) My opinion

> on the value of Turkish changed when I was 25, and I followed a course on multilingualism at the university. The teacher made it clear to me that multilingualism really is of great value in itself. (Appendix 2.2.3).

This last account is an example of the importance of the most elusive, yet arguably most important, component of motility, namely 'appropriation'. This respondent did not think her skills in Turkish would be valuable for her success in the Netherlands. In fact, she thought it would hinder her success. So, consequently, she did not develop these skills any further. Only due to an external actor (her lecturer at university) providing a different perspective on the value of multilingualism, did she shift her attitude towards Turkish and make a valiant attempt to perfect her skills in the language.

Mother-tongue education

All the respondents interviewed had been enrolled in some type of mother-tongue education classes in the Netherlands, be it in the early 1980s, or in the early 2000s. In general the respondents were positive about the fact that these facilities existed, except for one: 'I wonder if sending children to mother-tongue education on top of regular school is not too much of a burden for them' (Appendix 2.2.11). The effectiveness of the courses is nonetheless questioned. The third-generation Turks in the Netherlands, who all had an excellent command of the Turkish language, only remembered that they followed the courses only after they were probed in the interview. For instance one interviewee mentioned, 'I remember now that I had Turkish lessons for two or three hours per week, but I cannot remember if they were effective at all' (ibid.). But afterwards all of them mentioned that the time spent on the courses was very little (varying between one to three hours per week). Also, one third-generation Dutch Turk mentioned:

> The Turkish language has certain linguistic elements that are not present in Dutch. Currently many Turkish children have a two years gap in their Dutch linguistic development when they go to primary school. It would be nice if mother-tongue education courses could be a bridge between Turkish and Dutch for those children. (Appendix 2.2.3).

The older immigrants interviewed had more vivid memories of their courses, but again often disputed their effectiveness. They also mentioned the lack of time as a major factor. However, there were also some positive aspects about the Dutch policy in the 1980s. One first-generation migrant claims:

> I followed Turkish lessons and those helped me tremendously when learning Dutch. It was one half a day per week. The lessons at school were much better than those organised in community centres, for two reasons. First of all, at school you are forced to attend the lessons. Secondly, at school a certified teacher from the Turkish ministry was teaching the classes, whilst at the

> community centres there are only uncertified, inexperienced teachers. The lessons focussed explicitly on connecting the Dutch and Turkish languages. (Appendix 2.2.4).

The respondents had very differing opinions on whether mother-tongue education is beneficial or harmful for the integration of Turks in the Netherlands in the Netherlands. Perspectives varied from: 'I don't think it [mother-tongue education] hinders integration. The more languages people speak the better' (Appendix 2.2.1), to 'I believe mother-tongue education can give people the incentive to retreat within their own communities' (Appendix 2.2.5). These perspectives represent polar opposite positions, but the respondents do seem to agree on one important thing: the relative unimportance of the policy itself. Even though mother-tongue education can help or hinder the integration process slightly, the main determining factor lies with the parents, and how they prepare their children for life in the Netherlands: 'Mother-tongue education on its own does not lead to segregation, the parents and how they raise their children is much more important' (Appendix 2.2.11). Another factor that is considered of great importance is the attitude of the native Dutch. Some respondents experienced that they were implicitly or explicitly being excluded by Dutch people: 'A teacher once asked me "will you also be forced to marry someone by your parents?" I immediately understood that I did not entirely belong in that classroom' (ibid.); 'Dutch people often don't give the allochtonous population a "warm feeling of home" (...) mother-tongue education could be a symbol of bringing back that warmth for us' (Appendix 2.2.4). A last factor mentioned is the size of the different Turkish communities across the Netherlands: 'Here in Groningen I believe the danger of us 'retreating' does not exist. That is different in big cities such as Amsterdam or Rotterdam.' (Appendix 2.2.3). In other words: in communities with a larger migrant population the likelihood of segregation is much higher than in cities with a lower percentage of migrants.

The main conclusions of the effects of mother-tongue education are twofold. Firstly, even though most respondents appreciated the idea of these types of facilities existing, their practical effectiveness is called into question if the policy is not organised properly. In that case, the courses are ineffective and contribute very little to improving the Turks in the Netherlands' mastery of the Turkish language, hence also not increasing their motility via Turkish. Secondly, in terms of inclusion mother-tongue education does not seem to play a vital role according to the respondents, being at the most an auxiliary factor for the success or failure of integration. These two conclusions taken together thus show that the mother-tongue education programme as organised by the Dutch authorities in the past is of very little consequence whatsoever, whether positive or negative. Thus, if mother-tongue education is to have any effect on the motility of this community, it needs to be organised in a very different way from in the past.

Dutch language acquisition

The second and third-generation respondents were all fluent in Dutch and had learned the language in the regular Dutch school system, even in those cases when their parents did not speak Dutch at home. The sample is biased in the sense that most respondents were either born in the Netherlands, or came to the Netherlands at such a young age that they could still partially attend primary school in the Netherlands. The mastery of Dutch for the first generation varied significantly. Some were enrolled in some kind of Dutch language acquisition programme, whilst others did not have the opportunity:

> I came here in 1976 (...) I do not speak Dutch very well. When I came here, I worked at a company with 15 other Turkish people, so we only spoke Turkish. I followed some Dutch lessons, but since I did not know any Dutch people I could not use the language daily and I forgot it again. (...) Later on I had the opportunity again to enrol in a Dutch course, but my husband disagreed with me going to school. So I never learned Dutch properly, and I deeply regret that. (Appendix 2.2.6).

An issue pointed out by this respondent, namely the importance of being able to practise the language with native Dutch, is also identified by other respondents: 'the lessons are not that important, communication in practice is key for learning the language' (Appendix 2.2.6), or 'I never followed any lessons, I only learned the language through communication.' (Appendix 2.2.7).

It is thus complicated to evaluate Dutch language acquisition policy based on these accounts. However, one aspect present in every other sample group so far, is the much greater relevance of communication in practice, compared to the courses. Again, this nuances the importance of the effects of policy on language acquisition, and so by proxy on the motility of the Turks in the Netherlands.

Mobility in Europe

As mentioned previously, the first-generation Turks in the Netherlands in particular see a clear connection between learning and maintaining their language, and the possibility of remigrating to Turkey. There is however also a perhaps less obvious relation between mastery of Turkish and mobility in the EU. Namely, some respondents argue that their Turkish helps them to connect to other Turkish communities in the EU, and can in that way increase their migration opportunities: 'Turkish helps me a lot to migrate to other countries in the EU, since I can connect with the Turkish community. I would for example very much like to go to Sweden, and my Turkish will certainly help with that' (Appendix 2.2.3). 'I can very easily make contact with other Turkish communities in Europe and migrate to those countries' (Appendix 2.2.6). However, others claim connecting to other Turkish communities is not straightforward: 'Germans Turks are for example much different than we are. They come from a different region in Turkey and have

different traditions. However I would like to go to Germany: Germans discriminate less.' (Appendix 2.2. Interview 5). Other than Turkish, languages that increase the respondents' mobility are mostly the 'big' European languages such as English, German and Spanish.

The fact that the respondents' mother tongue, Turkish, seems actively to help their mobility in Europe, thus clearly increasing their motility, is an interesting observation. Couple this with the fact that all respondents communicate at least weekly in Turkish via internet services such as Whatsapp or Facebook, and the importance of transnational connections for migration processes becomes clear.

Conclusion

When evaluating the accounts of the Turks in the Netherlands alongside the motility criteria (access, competence and appropriation), several tentative conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the linguistic infrastructure as organised (in the past) by the Dutch authorities, both relating to mother-tongue education and Dutch language acquisition, have very little perceived effect on the respondents' linguistic competence. This means that the 'objective' effect of language policy on migration opportunities is very low, or perhaps even non-existent. However, when it comes to 'appropriation', especially the mother-tongue education can still play a significant role. That policy could encourage the Turks in the Netherlands also to focus on improving their Turkish outside the classroom, since they might experience a decreased stigmatisation of their mother tongue. However, one should be careful when drawing this conclusion, since the respondents also made it very clear that successful integration and acceptance in Dutch society is dependent on more important factors than the linguistic policy, such as the attitude of the native Dutch, and the way Dutch Turkish parents raise their children. In short, linguistic infrastructure for the Turks in the Netherlands is at best a small cog in the machinery of their overall motility and inclusion.

Chapter 6.1

LANGUAGE POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE: A POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

Similar to other countries in Western-Europe, France became an industrial economy and a nation state in the ninenteenth century. Political elites attempted in this period to build the 'republican' democracy which was represented by institutions upholding the principles of secularism and a universal culture (Barou 2014). In principle, the French republican model only acknowledges the legitimacy of group identities outside the public sphere (Schain 2010). Ethnic and religious groups receive no special privileges, nor special protection. Support is only awarded based on individual merit and advancement. Integration of the people within this national society and social cohesion were guaranteed due to the equilibrium of three main elements of society; economy, state and culture (Schnapper 2007). However, integration in this period did not just refer to maintaining this equilibrium, but also to the process of individuals and groups being socialised into the nation (Barou 2014). This started with the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, culminating in the social and political integration of the working class. Successfully integrating citizens in French modern society was assured by two mechanisms: institutions and labour (Lapeyronnie 2009). The institutions made sure that the universal French republican norms were transmitted to every part of the nation, in particular via the republican school system, but also through the family and civil society. They promoted the idea among the populace of a unified, common system of norms and values that transcended class and cultural divisions. Labour granted workers social status and a chance of upward social mobility. As such, the working class was socially and politically integrated into French society, a process that was at its high point during the *Trente Glorieuses*, a period of outstanding economic growth and full employment after World War II (Barou 2014).

Immigration presented the French society and its ability to integrate different groups with a new challenge. France has been an immigration country since the nineteenth century, and is to this day one of the European countries housing the most descendants of immigrants (Bouvier 2012). In 1920 France was, after the USA, the country with the highest share of immigrants, namely seven per cent of the population. In the early 2000s 25 per cent of the population had a first, second or third-generation immigrant background (Algan et al. 2012). The integration of immigrants was traditionally treated similarly to that of the working class before them: they were being included in French society via the institutions and employment (Noiriel 1988). Immigrants were usually recruited during times of economic growth and were employed in many different manufacturing sectors.

Their employment allowed them to participate in French politics via their trade unions and left-wing parties (Barou 2014). Immigrants and their descendants were perceived as being assimilated to French norms and values. In many periods of French history, a policy of integration was thus deemed unnecessary, as assimilation seemed to happen automatically (Weil 2005). At least one notable exception constitutes the 1930s, which is a period that will be discussed in more depth in this chapter upon examination of the main French integration scholar of this period, Georges Mauco.

In this chapter the development of French minorities policy, in particular its language policy vis-à-vis immigrants and their descendants, will be analysed. Several key policy documents of the French state will be discussed, to analyse the historical context that shaped present-day French linguistic policy. Both official government documents and works published by influential advisory policy bureaus will be discussed. The goal of this analysis is twofold: first to gain a deeper understanding of the French minority policy tradition vis-à-vis its immigrants, and secondly, to analyse the motivations for the French government to support some type of mother-tongue education via its policy of ELCO (Enseignment de langues et cultures d'origine). It will be shown that the French republican system seems to advocate policies that contradict its principles of colour-blindness and non-intervention in the cultural domain. However, the reasons for doing so are complex, though insightful for other European cases as well.

Georges Mauco: bringing demography into French policy

France, after its complicated history during World War II, had to reshape its immigration policy after the country was liberated in 1944. The Vichy denationalisation law of 1940, which was primarily targeted at the French Jewish population, was annulled in 1944. 'The lawful status of foreigners was restored, which resulted in an ideological division that also affected the debates on the new nationality code and broader questions about immigration (Burgess 2011). A key figure in these debates is the geographer Georges Mauco, who obtained his doctorate in 1932 with a dissertation entitled *Les étrangers en France: Étude géographique sur leur rôle dans l'activité économique*. The dissertation's goal was to analyse France's migrant situation in a comprehensive manner, and provide practical solutions to manage migration flows properly in the future. In his foreword, Mauco outlined why his stance on the 'immigration question' was of particular importance to France:

> In recent years, France has become one of the primary immigration countries and the problem of foreign labour seems to be the most important of the present day. It is a relatively new problem, at least considering its scale, given the presence in France of a population close to three million foreigners. It is a difficult problem, that raises multiple questions: recruitment, selection, sanitary and professional checks, competition, adaptation, assimilation, the transfer of savings [remittances], dangers caused by minorities, not

> forgetting all the questions of social, educational, religious and moral order that always appear rapidly after large migration flows and that do not appear when the foreigners enter the country slowly, in a process of absorption that allows for rapid fusion. (Mauco 1932: I).[19]

Mauco also remarked later in his foreword that France had not yet established an official comprehensive migration policy, and he advocated its creation (Mauco 1932). Given his initial analysis of the migration situation in France, his recommendation would follow logically. He framed the question of guest workers primarily as a phenomenon creating many problems, both from a socio-economic (recruitment, selection) and a socio-cultural perspective (adaptation, assimilation, questions of social order, religious schooling and morality). These problems needed to be managed by organising a professional immigration division within the French government and strongly regulating the number of immigrants admitted. Such slow developments allowed for a 'rapid fusion' of presumably the immigrant and the native French population.

Mauco went a step further however. In his view France needed to pay attention to the 'assimilation potential' of the immigrants it admitted to the country. He argued on the topic of assimilation:

> To enable assimilation, migrants must first of all adjust and accustom to the host country. They need to find sufficient material and moral wellbeing to enjoy their new social environment and get motivated to stay. (Mauco 1932: 523).

According to Mauco there were several factors that can greatly help the assimilation process, one of the most important being the migrants' ethnic heritage:

> One of the most important factors of assimilation, if we may say so, is the degree of similarity between the migrants and the indigenous population. The more they are alike from an ethnic and linguistic point of view, the more foreigners will integrate themselves easier in their new social environment (...). Moreover, a large part of immigration is an immigration from neighbouring countries, an immigration of mixing, in every respect the best and most healthy one. The only important elements of which the assimilation turns out to be difficult because of too sharp disparities are the Slavic elements: Russians, Poles, etc. However, it needs to be remarked that these disparities are not irreducible and that mixing with the French people still remains possible (...). Eventually, it means that only the African and Asian elements, fortunately not too numerous, are almost unable to assimilate due to ethnic and cultural differences. (ibid.)

[19] The quotations from the French in this chapter have been translated by the present author.

He thus made a rough ethnic hierarchy between peoples that are relatively easy to assimilate (or integrate, he uses both concepts interchangeably, as was not uncommon in his time): immigrants from French border regions (i.e. England, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Spain) have the highest chance to assimilate properly. Within this group, the immigrants from Northern Europe were preferred over those of Southern Europe. Mauco later claimed that France was in fact not a Latin but a Nordic country (Burgess 2011), thus justifying this distinction. They were followed by the Slavic peoples, who would face more difficulty, but these differences were not 'irreducible'. Lastly, Mauco mentioned the 'African and Asian elements', for whom it was nearly impossible to assimilate successfully, adding that luckily there were not too many of these 'elements'. Mauco however emphasised later in his book that France, due to the ethnically diverse nature of the native French population, should in principle have little difficulty integrating different ethnicities, provided the cultural gap was not too wide. He was thus most worried about the cultural differences between the new immigrants and the native population already present (Mauco 1932: 556-557).

One of the other factors that greatly influence the assimilation process which is somewhat related to his ethnic hierarchy, is language. Mauco argues:

> Language plays an extremely important role in assimilation. It is the vehicle of thought and consequently its influence is profound in all matters. Depending whether the language of the migrant has any similarities with ours or not, he will be more or less isolated, more or less submitted to the influence of the French culture and way of life. It explains to a large extent the smooth adaptation and the rapid assimilation of the elements coming from neighbouring countries: Belgians, Italians, Spaniards, and the so difficult and slow compliance of Poles, Czechoslovaks, Russians, etc… The language is all the more important, because the migrant will continue to use it for a very long time and because, unless he is only surrounded by ethnic French, an adult foreigner will have great difficulties using the French language. For certain Slavic and Asian immigrants, the impossibility of having a sufficient command of our language is even an insurmountable obstacle to assimilation. The child itself, despite school and its malleable nature, will yield to the anti-assimilationist influence of its mother tongue. This is true in particular for the colonies or autonomous groups of the foreign population where there is a sort of veto by the adults, preventing the child from yielding completely to the influence of the French language and losing his mother tongue. He will pick it up going back home or when he speaks to his compatriots and, having religious practices, he will always use that language to pray or sing, regardless of his knowledge of the French language, because the language of childhood remains the language of the soul. (Mauco 1932: 518).

Language according to Mauco is thus a prime indicator of assimilation. Therefore, the easier it is for foreigners to learn the French language, the easier it is for them to assimilate. For a successful assimilation foreigners would need to 'submit' to the French language. His views on mother-tongue usage by migrants are thus not very positive. He claims immigrant children could submit easily to the 'anti-assimilation' influence of their mother tongues, since they will also speak that language when they are not at school. These children therefore run the risk of never forgetting their mother tongue, which is a necessary component of the assimilation process, because 'the language of one's childhood remains the language of the soul.' Mauco's language comments are particularly interesting, since he advocates the ideal-type assimilation view as mentioned in theories by Berry. His claim that all migrants need to lose their cultural and linguistic heritage in order to 'fuse' properly with the French Republic fits perfectly into a classic assimilationist view.

The final aspect of Mauco's work to be discussed is his perspective on the role of the school and the assimilation process. It is evident that language education plays a very important role in the school in particular:

> School is the most important factor of assimilation over which the country has control. One could argue that through education true assimilation comes into effect: among the second generation (...). Only the Poles received permission from their employers to found private schools with Polish instructors teaching the Polish language, history and geography during half the lesson time. But Poland is the only country to have obtained these dangerous concessions from the employers, concessions that can be explained by the large scale of Polish migration, the concentration of migrants and their attachment to their national language that has no similarities with ours. (Mauco 1932: 536-538).

Mauco thus considered schools that are partially run by migrants, where migrant languages play a prominent role, to be 'dangerous' to the assimilation process. He argued that this concession was rendered possible only due to the great extent of Polish immigration, which links back to his previous assertions that migration flows need to be managed properly so the assimilation process is not impeded.

Mauco's ideas were especially prevalent and well respected in 1930s France. After the publication of his dissertation, he was renowned as France's most prominent expert on migration (Burgess 2011). In 1938, Mauco was employed by the office of the Under-Secretary of State for Immigration, Philippe Serre. During the German occupation he allegedly collaborated with the Vichy regime and condemned the Third Republic for failing to protect France's ethnicity. After the Liberation, Mauco arguably successfully reinvented himself as a *résistant à la dernière heure* (Burgess 2011). He was appointed

secretary of the Consultative Committee on Population and the Family (Haut Comité Consultatif de la Population et de la Famille), which was charged with advising the government on a new statute on immigration. He held this position until 1970. Mauco's subsequent influence on the resulting post-war French migration policy is disputed. He had several ideological opponents in the post-war government, who advocated a more libertarian-egalitarian vision of the French ideals. In addition, in the immigration policy, elements such as racial selection were not incorporated. The concept of 'assimilation' remained in use however, but not in Mauco's definition. Successful assimilation was defined as being fluent in French. Some historians argue that Mauco's influence on immigration policy has found its way into French national consciousness and migration attitudes of the present day, whilst others claim that his influence is grossly overestimated (Weil 2005, Burgess 2011). Mauco's direct influence on the 1945 immigration and integration policy seemed to be rather limited (Burgess 2011). Even though the documents regularly use the concept of 'assimilation', they do not carry the ethnic and racial connotations of Mauco's work. However, that 'assimilation' entailed simply the capability to learn and speak the French language was a central component of Mauco's work, although arguably one that is less controversial. Sometimes it is argued that Mauco's categorisation of the assimilation potential of different immigrants made its return around the 1990s (Barou 2014).

In the post-war period, France was, similar to other West European countries, focussed on recruiting guest workers to fill gaps in the job market. The government initially turned to Algerian colonial workers, but also stimulated migration from 'European families' such as Poland and Italy in the 1950s, and concluded labour recruitment agreements with Tunisia, Morocco, Yugoslavia and Turkey in the 1960s (Weil 2004). However France, despite stimulating recruitment, did not succeed in building up the necessary infrastructure to accommodate the new immigrants, especially in terms of housing (Maussen 2009). Migrants had to find their own way in their new country and relied heavily on their own ethnic networks. These two factors contributed to migrants ending up having to live in *bidonvilles*, or shanty-towns. However, some measures were taken to accommodate them. One important aspect was the support for migrants maintaining their own cultural identity (Favell 1998). For instance, the Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian (post-independence) governments actively wished to prevent their citizens from assimilating into French culture, to facilitate their eventual return when their labour contracts in France ended. This logic is similar to other West-European countries that recruited temporary labour migrants, such as the Netherlands. However, when in the 1970s the French government simultaneously aimed to terminate the guest worker system, and realised that many immigrants would stay in France, this policy position shifted slightly. Paul Dijoud, Undersecretary for Migrant Workers, argued in a speech in the Assemblée Nationale in 1974:

> To take care of their future, is it not enough to declare that they are free to choose between durable assimilation and a return to the country of origin; it is also, and in particular, giving them effective means to assimilate whilst preserving, as much as possible, their ties with their culture and their country of origin (...).
>
> To achieve this panorama of the evolution of the foreign worker living in France, at this moment we have arrived at the point where he should be able to choose freely between durable assimilation and a return to the country of origin. What kind of policy should we implement? In the end the most reasonable solution appears maintaining, within certain limits, a politics of assimilation, which would eventually lead to a more liberal naturalisation policy, whilst (...) founding a politics which I would describe as balanced, based on the return of some foreign workers to their country of origin whenever they wish (...). Two sets of measures need to be taken. On the one hand, we would like to allow those who wish to stay in France temporarily to maintain ties with their heritage culture, facilitating as much as possible the preservation of their religious traditions, cultural ties, even the use of their mother tongue. That seems fair. (...) Finally, France has a duty to guarantee all foreign workers that contribute to our prosperity the rights (...) which are as far as possible similar to those enjoyed by the French. (Assemblée Nationale 1974: 5976).

The central thought expressed by Dijoud is that migrants can 'choose their own destiny' and pick between a longer stay in France and assimilation, or a temporary stay, in which case more attention needs to be given to the immigrants' heritage language and culture. When Dijoud refers to assimilation, he does not seem to advocate a complete abandonment of the heritage culture however; he states he wishes to facilitate immigrants' connection to their heritage culture as much as possible. This statement is rather vague, due to its usage of multi-interpretable vocabulary such as 'as much as possible', but Dijoud does argue that within his idea of assimilation, the government is obliged to give immigrants the means to maintain their ties with their heritage culture and country.

The analysis of French immigration policy from the time of Mauco until the mid-1970s has led to at least two preliminary conclusions. Firstly, in the three decades after the Second World War, there seems to be rather limited evidence that French immigration and integration policy was heavily influenced by its so-called republican and assimilationist traditions. In fact, the French and Dutch approaches to the guest worker programmes were strikingly similar, even though both countries had different ideological backgrounds when it came to dealing with ethnic diversity. Secondly, the concept of assimilation is used in many different ways by different officials. For Mauco, assimilation is defined along the lines that scholars such as John Berry would use fifty years later: the complete adoption of French culture and the abandonment of the heritage culture. Institutions for immigrants, in particular those teaching the migrant languages

to children, were deemed highly undesirable. However, Undersecretary Paul Dijoud's concept of assimilation does not seem to have demanded complete abandonment of the heritage culture, and temporary workers were even encouraged to maintain very close ties with their home countries. In 1973, to accommodate the children of these temporary workers, the French government set up mother-tongue education classes (Enseignment de langues et cultures d'origine) (ELCO).

ELCO was established with the explicit principle that knowledge of the mother tongue is an essential requirement for learning a second language, in this case usually French. Interestingly, on the official government website, it was stated that ELCO seeks to conform to the European directive of 1977 that compels EU Member States to offer mother-tongue education to the children of immigrant workers: 'They are put into practice on the basis of bilateral agreements based on a European directive of the 25th of July 1997, aimed at the education of children of foreign workers.' (Eduscol.fr 2019). The government cited three complementary goals that ELCO needed to fulfil, which were complementary:

- To structure the language spoken in the family environment;
- To favour the personal development of youth, from different cultural backgrounds;
- To valorise the diversification of the languages at school. (ibid.)

This list combines practical and ideological/idealistic goals, even though some might seem rather vague at first glance. It can be assumed that 'structuring the language spoken in the family' stems from the idea that in all families, informal domestic mother-tongue education does not neccesarily give the children a good linguistic grammar and vocabulary of language. Given the fact that the building up of such a linguistic base is necessary for the children to be able to learn a second language more easily, it is logical that this is an important goal of ELCO. In other words: for the mother tongue to fulfil its role as a bridge towards French language acquisition, solid education in grammar and vocabulary is paramount. The second goal, the 'personal development of youth from different cultural backgrounds', leans towards the acculturation-related argument that is often presented by integration researchers (e.g. Berry 1980). It seems to refer to the necessity for young people's cultures and languages to receive some recognition in the school system, in order for them to realise their potential. Socio-psychologists would argue that this second goal is also important to reduce 'acculturative stress', i.e. the negative emotions one may experience when trying to adapt to a different culture. Thirdly, the valorisation of the language diversity at school is arguably the vaguest goal. It is unclear how this 'valorisation' could be effected in practice, but it might refer to a general fostering of cultural diversity and perhaps the ensuing diversity in ideas and perspectives, from which all pupils may benefit.

ELCO is open to all pupils, even for children who do not have the 'correct' migrant background belonging to the respective language:

> Presently, it also concerns children who are not native speakers of the respective language and will integrate progressively in linguistic education.
>
> Education in heritage language and culture is primarily provided in the first grade. It is organised, as much as possible, in the schools, the establishments, where there is demand from the families. They are open for every child, whom the family wishes to enrol, as long as there are enough places available. (Eduscole.fr 2019).

Currently the French government has concluded bilateral agreements with nine countries, namely Algeria, Croatia, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Serbia, Tunisia and Turkey. These countries were chosen with the rationale that they are the primary sources of migrants to France. The classes are organised during out-of-school hours, usually on Wednesday afternoon or on Saturday. Teachers originate from one of the nine treaty countries, or are recruited within France with the assistance of the local consul of one of these states.

ELCO and HCI

In the 1980s the French government, headed by the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste), recognised the need to develop a comprehensive integration policy. Policies before that time, such as ELCO, had a predominantly pragmatic orientation (Maussen 2009). In the mid-1980s however, faced with numerous socio-political challenges to the French political model of unitary government and national integration under the leadership of the state, the government reinvented the so-called 'republican model' of managing cultural diversity (ibid.). Its core principles were that migrants could integrate on an individual basis in a neutral and secular public space, which leaves no room for separate ethnic institutions. In particular, this 'republican model' was seen as a contrast to the Anglo-Saxon multicultural model (Favel 1998). In this context the French government founded the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* (HCI) in 1990, as a scientific bureau to present policy advice to develop integration policy according to republican principles. Until its dissolution in 2013 by the Hollande government, the HCI wrote several reports on ELCO, its practical effects and its place in the French education system. The HCI's reports were mostly critical of the ELCO system for several reasons:

> These classes are mainly held outside regular school hours, and though falling under the [French] academic authority, are barely scrutinised, except in those cases where obvious unwanted deviations are being observed. Sometimes, the authorities needed to intervene in order to reprimand a teacher carrying an ostensible religious sign violating the laws concerning secularism (‘*laïcité*’) in the sphere of education. (Haut conseil à l’intégration 2013).
>
> The content and the education issues are too rarely validated. (Haut conseil à l’intégration 2011a: 27).
>
> Doesn’t the continuation of ELCO, in particular concerning lessons given outside regular school hours, stigmatise certain cultures and languages, whilst others, such as Chinese and Japanese, garner more interest, occupying an important position in the standard modern language education curriculum in recent years? (Haut conseil à l’intégration 2011a: 28).
>
> Turkey is currently shaken by a movement rejecting Kemalism, secularism, (‘*laïcité*’) and Europe. Known for its interference in foreign countries, the Turkish government is particularly active in France, especially regarding ELCO. In fact, if ELCO is not perpetuated, for example in primary education, pupils are easily picked up by associations or schools based on the Quran. The Turkish education and cultural sector has seen a strong expansion on French territory, with considerable financial support. (Haut conseil à l’intégration 2013).

These extracts present a good overview of the HCI’s insights on ELCO, as they have been developed since the HCI’s foundation. Its concerns can be categorised in four themes, namely (1) whether ELCO can be reconciled with the republican integration model, (2) the poor organisation of the courses and inspection of the courses, (3) the different treatment of the ELCO treaty languages when compared to non-ELCO languages such as Chinese and Japanese, and (4) the practical socio-cultural and political effects an abolition of ELCO could have on communities where mother-tongue education is still in high demand.

The first concern is to be expected, considering the HCI’s mission which seeks to promote an ‘equal’, a ‘secular’ and culturally non-interventionist public policy. ELCO, especially if children who are not mother-tongue speakers cannot enroll in the course, is in its theory and practice a contradiction to these ideals. When the report states that ‘the authorities needed to intervene in order to reprimand a teacher carrying an ostensible religious sign violating the laws concerning secularism (‘*laïcité’*) in the sphere of education’, it is an evident illustration of both the HCI’s mission, but also

a practical result of French republican policy philosophy. The second observation, the poor organisation of the courses, is a concern that is voiced in many different European countries that experimented with the same system, such as the Netherlands. The HCI's third concern is also of a practical nature and addresses a core issue when designing a mother-tongue education policy. Namely, which mother tongues should be supported by the government considering the highly diverse linguistic landscape, and whether the different foreign languages need to be treated equally in principle within the school system. The fourth concern is of particular interest, since it acknowledges the geopolitical implications of mother-tongue education policies, especially when the migrant group affected is backed by a relatively powerful kin-state such as Turkey. The HCI seems to acknowledge that French language policy also needs to take the political development of Turkey into account, especially when that country seems to run counter to French republican ideals. It warns the French government that if ELCO is not available anymore for children who are interested in learning the Turkish language, Turkey has already set up several institutions in France, sometimes with a strict religious background, where they could easily learn the language without needing consent and support from the French state. The combination of these four concerns led the HCI to propose the following in 2011 and 2013:

> Recommendation: Since its first report in 1991, the HCI has always advocated abandoning education in heritage languages and cultures, since it seemed to run contrary to the aim of integration. It [HCI] restates this recommendation here, which it considers to be an expression of the strong will to integrate in French society and to develop education of these languages integrated in the standard modern language curriculum, in particular as modern language 2 and modern language 3. (Haut conseil à l'intégration 2011a: 29).
>
> At the end of this study, we cannot emphasise enough the fact that social success of immigrant children hinges primarily on the mastery of the French language.
>
> Concerning ELCO, to suppress it or to let it slowly fade away would not aim to abandon teaching the foreign languages carried by immigrant families and their children. However, it would assume acknowledging other present day immigrant languages such as Chinese, several African languages (Bambara, Soninké), Russian, even Tamul. Taking into account the great number of languages, teaching them could only be considered with regard to local demand.
>
> For this purpose, implementing reforms of the education system by creating optional extracurricular activities could be a welcome opportunity to experiment with introducing these languages in primary schools, without restricting them, however, just to children of migrants. Mobilising

> associations and assistants being in possession of a certificate in language teaching would allow for the possibility to offer an adapted education programme controlled by the 'Education Nationale' and independent of the country of origin.
>
> Furthermore, private initiatives are flourishing. Even if the involvement of associations could be encouraged, we deem it nonetheless useful to be somewhat vigilant. Indeed, we have been made aware that, under the guise of homework help or language education, some associations have engaged in proselytising that does not facilitate integration.
>
> In any case, these forms of education need to be put into a framework that guarantees the quality of the content and pedagogic methods, respecting the values of '*la République*'. (Haut conseil à l'intégration 2013).

The HCI thus envisions a solution where the ELCO languages are integrated in the regular school system, as living languages that can be chosen by all pupils, regardless of his/her ethnic background. Rather than abolishing the system of living languages, the HCI seeks to integrate the languages better within French education by granting the government better control over the quality and teacher assignments, meaning that the material being taught is subject to much more rigid inspection. In the HCI's proposal, there is even room for languages that are arguably not high in the linguistic hierarchy in France, but can still be taught in school if there is sufficient local demand.

A system complying with the HCI's recommendations throughout is currently being implemented. It is interesting to note how HCI and the French government, even though their republican ideology is often classified as a philosophy of assimilationism, have expressed policy ideas committed to both mother-tongue education and a neutral school space. The linguistic infrastructure, a key component of motility, seems (at least on paper) to be adequately organised for children with a migrant background within this 'assimilationist' policy framework. It could even be argued that this type of infrastructure, where the 'migrant languages' are on the same level as other modern languages such as Chinese and Russian, will positively affect the value the citizens with a migrant background attach to their mother tongue (i.e. the 'appropriation' component of motility). At this point in the analysis this is merely a hypothesis however, that may or may not be verified during the interviews presented in a later section.

French language acquisition

With the reinvention of the republican tradition as a banner for national identity in the 1980s, the French language, and especially the need for immigrants to learn it, was a central point of contention in the immigration and integration debate. The normative perspective on this policy differs between scholars. Some argue that the language debate

is a covert method to restrict immigration (by imposing ever-higher language standards for migrants) and a convenient method to avoid discussing and acting upon the socio-economic aspects of migrant integration (e.g. Climent-Ferrardo 2015), whilst others praise its effectiveness and generous funding (e.g. Yoffe 2010). In 2005 the French government radically changed its language policy vis-à-vis migrants:

> Art. L. 117-1. – A proposal has been offered to every foreigner admitted for the first time in France to conclude an individual 'welcome and integration contract' with the government in a language that he understands. This contract aims at specifying the conditions under which the foreigner will benefit from state policies, taking into account his situation and personal background, and is meant to benefit his integration whilst respecting the fundamental laws and values of the French republic. These policies include in particular, if the need has been established, linguistic education. (LOI n° 2005-32).

The key policy measure proposed here concerns the 'contrat d'acceuil et d'intégration' (CAI) ('Welcoming and integration contract'), the goal of which was to commit new migrants to respect the so-called 'fundamental values' of the French Republic. The contract itself states the following on the French language (CAI):

> The French language is one of the foundations of national unity. Knowledge of French is thus indispensable to your integration and will facilitate contact with the wider population. (...) The enrolment to these free courses is carried out by the Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration. (...)
>
> Article 1: Commitments of the Government
>
> If necessary, language learning, and the time it takes is based on the needs and learning capacities of each individual. These courses aim at achieving a linguistic level corresponding with the level required for the '*diplôme initial de langue française*' (Contrat d'intégration républicaine 2016).

In the proposal, the only fundamental value that is explicitly mentioned is a compulsory linguistic education. In the contract, language plays a very prominent role and is on the same value-level as equality between men and women and the interdiction of polygamy and forced marriages. The moral value the French government attributes to its language can hardly be understated. In 2016 the CAI was replaced by the 'contrat d'intégration républicaine' (CIR), which did not fundamentally change the value-based language approach.

The French language thus became a symbol of successful or failed general (not just linguistic) integration. The government officially organised several facilities to help the newly arrived migrant to attain the desired linguistic proficiency. In the CIR it is stated that

after a language test, the migrant is prescribed 50, 100 or 200 hours of language lessons (CIR 2016: 7). Courses were intended to be financially and geographically as accessible as possible, even though the latter goal proved difficult to achieve for migrants in rural areas (Yoffe 2010). An empirical assessment of the post-CAI/CIR language policy does not exist to this date. Based on interviews with policy makers, previous scholars have identified several shortcomings, such as a lack of teacher quality control and the rigid content standardisation which offers few possibilities to adapt to specific individual linguistic needs (ibid.). At the same time, language providers are offered organisational flexibility, so they can tailor both to working migrants by teaching in the evenings, or provide longer days of classes for those who wish to progress more quickly.

Conclusion

Drawing a line from the work of Georges Mauco and the post-war period until the present day presents a rather complicated picture of the French linguistic policy on paper. The conceptual thread binding different French policies from different time periods together consists of one word: assimilation. This is a concept that was already *en vogue* in the nineteenth century, with France being one the few immigration countries of its time. In the 1930s Mauco's understanding of assimilation was both ethnic and linguistic in its nature. Starting as early as in the post-war immigration act of 1945 however, assimilation became seen as just the ability to speak French. There seems to be a strong tradition of treating the French language as the most important aspect of a migrant's acculturation process, that culminated in the CAI and CIR contracts in the present day.

The effects of CAI and CIR are debatable, especially in the absence of comprehensive empirical evidence. It seems questionable whether the single act of signing the contract motivates migrants to respect the 'French values'. Furthermore, as Climent-Ferrardo (2015) argues, the French language policy could very well be set up with the indirect goal of rendering it more difficult for would-be migrants to enter the country and obtain a residence permit. Especially the fact that most migrants already need to pass a French language test in their country of origin before even being allowed to enter French territory seems to suggest at least an ulterior motive on the part of the French government.

As argued previously, the linguistic infrastructure (access) is a key component in assessing a migrant's, or group of migrants', motility. In that sense, the CAI and CIR provide quite generous facilities: migrants receive reasonably extensive hours of language training in a financially and geographically accessible way. Furthermore the ELCO system is on paper quite generous as well. The HCI, the main advisor of the French government until the organisation's dissolution in 2013, always assessed ELCO critically, but with the goal of preserving and improving the policy, not discarding it. The idea to open up the ELCO languages also to pupils who are not mother-tongue speakers seems a sound method to ensure the migrant languages' survival in the education system.

The existence of ELCO alongside France's strong focus on the French language paints a complicated picture of the country's assimilation/republican model. Policy-wise, it seems the French government does not discourage migrant mother-tongue speakers from using their own languages, and even facilitates some of them in the official education system by integrating them fully in the language curriculum. However, it is very clear that the French language is leagues ahead in terms of policy priorities. Policy-makers are arguably satisfied with migrants' 'assimilation' from a linguistic point of view when the newcomers speak French. At that point, speaking other languages alongside French is not deemed problematic, and is even supported if the language is high enough in the linguistic hierarchy. The question is how this system of promoting linguistic assimilation on the one hand and supporting some linguistic diversity on the other would impact the immigrants' perception on the value of their linguistic repertoire (the 'appropriation' aspect of motility).

Chapter 6.2: Interviews Poles in France

Polish migration to France is a centuries-old phenomenon and can be divided into five phases (Debaene 2013). Firstly, between 1831 and 1835 roughly 50,000 to 100,000 Polish refugees migrated to France as part of the 'Great Emigration'. They fled repression associated with the partitioning of Poland, which was exarcerbated after the collapse of the November Uprising in 1831.[20] Secondly, in the twentieth century Interbellum, France welcomed a large influx of Polish workers, mainly from poor, rural regions, as part of the second migration. They worked primarily in the mining and agricultural industries. The Polish community grew rapidly in this period, and in 1931 it numbered 507,811. Thirdly, many Polish Jews migrated after 1968, due to political upheaval and anti-semitic policies in their homeland. Their numbers were estimated between 12,000 and 20,000. The fourth wave is referred to as 'Solidarity migration', and consisted of political refugees who fled the country after the declaration of martial law by the Polish Communist authorities (1981-83). These migrants usually intended to stay permanently, and had a relatively easy path to French citizenship, before Communism collapsed after 1989. Around 600,000 Polish nationals were granted French citizenship between 1980 and 1989. The fifth wave of Polish migration to France occurred between 1989 and the present day, and was primarily economically motivated. The freedom to move across borders, which was further reinforced after Polish accession to the EU in 2004, stimulated a large wave of often temporary economic migration. It is difficult to obtain exact figures on the number of individuals with a Polish background in France, since the country does not collect statistics based on ethnicity, especially not concerning second and third-generation migrants. In 2012 the number of Polish nationals living in France was estimated at 350,000 by Eurostat, but this does not include the number of French citizens with a Polish background.

In total eleven Poles in France were interviewed in areas around and in Paris in 2017 and 2018. Most of the interviewees were female (7 females and 4 males). The age range varied from 22 to 61, with a relatively even spread within that range. All the interviewees were first-generation immigrants. Most respondents were either highly educated or in the process of obtaining higher education. Interviews were either conducted face-to-face or by telephone, after the interviewee and the interviewer had met briefly in person, and were held in English or French, and in one case with the help of a translator, depending on the preference of the interviewee.

[20] Also referred to as the 'Polish-Russian war 1830-1831', this was an armed rebellion in partitioned Poland against the Russian Empire.

French vs Polish

All the interviewees thought the French language to be of great instrumental importance. They either spoke the language fluently, were actively trying to learn it by enrolling in language training courses, or deeply regretted that due to varying circumstances had not been able to learn the language. One interviewee states, when asked why she thinks learning French is important to her: 'my family lives in France, my husband is native French. I need French for my social contacts and to be independent.' (Appendix 2.3.1). Another interviewee, who is a young mother, claims: 'I want to learn French so I can communicate with French children and their parents when I take my own child to the playground. I also learn it to obtain the French nationality.' (Appendix 2.3.3). This type of practical approach to the French language is characteristic for all the interviewees. However, considering the fact that virtually all interviewees were planning to stay in France long-term, this might not come as a surprise.

When it comes to Polish, the respondents emphasise mostly the practical and sometimes the cultural benefits of speaking the language and transmitting it to their children. One interviewee states: 'Our Polish family does not speak French, so I want my child to be able to communicate with his grandparents. (...) I also want them to be able to participate in Polish religious activities. We have to maintain our language, culture and religion.' (Appendix 2.3.4). Another claims: 'Polish is the key to understanding their culture. (...) Through me, they are connected to Polish culture. Also, there are a lot of academic studies that claim bilingualism is very beneficial.' (Appendix 2.3.2).

Thus, the accounts of the Polish French interviewees are quite straightforward, and comparable to other ethnic groups. They approach both languages with a great sense of practicality, and feel a stronger cultural connection to the Polish language. It is interesting, but at the same time somewhat predictable, to note that the one interviewee with concrete plans to leave France in the foreseeable future is also the one with the least motivation to learn the French language. This type of calculated reasoning (weighing the effort needed to learn the language against the language's practical use in daily life) is something that can also be seen at some of the other interviews with other ethnic groups.

In terms of motility, there is one striking observation that can be made on the basis of these short accounts: namely the importance of the role of the teachers, and government officials, when discouraging or promoting multilingualism. Several respondents (5 out of 11) explicitly mentioned that French teachers encouraged the bilingual education of their children, and that this encouragement played a significant role in deciding whether to teach their children Polish at home. This greatly influenced the 'appropriation' factor, as the government emphasises the value of the parents' mother tongue, which in turn makes them perceive their language as more valuable and worthy of respect.

Mother-tongue education

Many respondents have children whom they send to a French-Polish school, usually privately financed (i.e. not supported by the French government). They thus have, through their children, experience when it comes to this type of education. Furthermore, respondents mentioned the 'Lycée Montaigne' as a French school that supports bilingual education, also in Polish. The interviewees' perspectives on mother-tongue education show strong variation. For instance, when asked their opinion on whether the French government shows enough support for Polish education, one interviewee claims: 'No, the French government is doing nothing. I wish they would do more.' (Appendix 2.3.5). Another argues: 'It is impossible for the French government to accommodate all languages. Therefore it is much better for them to only focus on French.' (Appendix 2.3.1). Then, a different interviewee, who is of Polish descent but grew up in Belarus, provides yet another perspective: 'It is great that the French government allows the setting up of private business, such as mother-tongue education schools. I come from Belarus, so I have nothing to complain about the French government.' (Appendix 2.3.3). These three responses symbolise the three-way divide in perspectives: a greater call for more state intervention (i.e. more financial and organisational support for mother-tongue education), an understanding for the French monolingual position and an advocate of a laissez-faire approach.

The respondents disagree on whether mother-tongue education can be a driver for segregation of minorities instead of inclusion. One respondent: 'This [segregation] does not happen with the Poles.' (Appendix 2.3.5). There are also different perspectives, underlining potential problematic aspects of mother-tongue education: 'mother-tongue education is only problematic when the parents do not speak French at all. I do speak French, so it is not a problem for me, but it might be for others' (Appendix 2.3.6); 'for the Poles it is not an issue, segregation might happen with other cultures.' (Appendix 2.3.1). A third interviewee remarked,

> Even if mother-tongue education could cause segregation, it is still better to control it as a government. If the government does not offer anything, parents who still want a bilingual education for their children will look for alternatives on their own. Then you will have no idea who teaches the classes and what kind of education and cultural ideas are being taught to the children. (...) Such a [mother-tongue education] system would also stimulate the migrant children to be more connected through French culture, since it also respects the children's own cultural and linguistic background. (Appendix 2.3.11).

These responses, albeit quite different, do share one common characteristic, namely the nuancing of the role of the education system in wider societal outcomes. Polish immigrants who have the will to raise their children bilingually will find ways to do

so, either by enlisting them in private schools (if they have the financial means) and/or by teaching them Polish at home. One of the respondents claims on the topic of linguistic assimilation: 'monolinguism does not work. People travel, go on the internet, it cannot work. Assimilation is in our time simply not possible.' (Appendix 2.3.1). This means that regarding motility, the French mother-tongue education system seems to be of rather little consequence, neither positive nor negative. An exception could be made on an individual level for the attitudes of the teachers. They might influence parents who are on the fence when it comes to mono- or bilingualism. The teachers' advice can thus help determine the linguistic capabilities of the French-Polish children, therefore either increasing or decreasing their motility.

French language acquisition

One of the respondents migrated to France as a political refugee in the 1980s when she was 9 years old, and followed most of the French education system in a small village school. At the time of migration, she spoke no French and was simply put in a regular class school with native French pupils:

> At first I refused to speak, but I still understood a lot. The school paid a lot of attention to me and offered me several methods to catch up to the other children. One of them was to go to a summer camp with other French children to be completely immersed in the language. At the same time they offered me courses on Polish culture and language. This worked very well, after one year I had completely caught up. (...) If France has a reputation for having a bad language policy, then I guess I was very lucky to stumble upon the right school and the right teachers. They helped me through the difficult linguistic moments. (Appendix 2.3.6).

Naturally this account is anecdotal, but it symbolises that government policy in theory and its practical application on 'the ground' are not always congruent. The French language policy, which is sometimes characterised for its monolinguism and lack of understanding for language diversity, has worked very well in practice for this respondent.

In more recent times, many interviewees either already spoke some French before they migrated, learned French through a government programme or took privately organised lessons. The result is that most of them have a fluent or near-fluent command of the language, despite being first-generation immigrants. Some followed courses at the municipality: 'There are lots of good courses offered by the Paris municipality. There are many different levels and you can enrol for a very affordable price (...) They have certainly helped me a lot.' (Appendix 2.3.11). Another respondent stated: 'The courses are very decent. They might be too theoretical though [there is too much focus on grammar].' (Appendix 2.3.4). A third respondent learned French following an online course: 'I enrolled in a télélangue online course. I do not know why I did not go the

municipality, my husband recommended the online courses. I probably would have learned more with a good teacher, but these courses are quite effective nonetheless.' (Appendix 2.3.3). And then, there are interviewees who came to France with a previous background in French (learned at high school in Poland) and simply improved upon this knowledge when they arrived in the country.

Thus, in general the respondents' opinions on French language acquisition programmes are remarkably positive, especially when compared to the Dutch and Swedish groups interviewed. Sometimes the overly theoretical approach is criticised, but in general, the courses are praised for their effectiveness and accessibility. It needs to be emphasised again, however, that many of the respondents were either affluent or highly educated, or both, and most seem to have little trouble picking up a new language. The one respondent with a lower education background, who only speaks Polish, stated as previously noted that she had trouble combining her full-time job with language training.

Mobility in Europe

In general, the interviewees stated that English is the most important language for mobility in Europe. Some also mentioned that learning one of the Slavic languages (e.g. Czech or Russian) offers access in most of Eastern Europe. Polish is not seen as a valuable language for being mobile. Some interviewees claimed that they do not enjoy associating with Polish enclaves in other EU countries. Going back to Poland is also a rather controversial topic, as this response shows: 'Polish is the most useless language of all. Poland does not accept strangers. I will never go there. It is a country without multiculturalism.' (Appendix 2.3.2). This last sentiment might be motivated more by the interviewee's political view rather than the value of the Polish language itself.

Conclusion

The views of the Poles in France interviewed in this sample show several interesting motility-related aspects, especially concerning appropriation and the linguistic infrastructure of French society.

On appropriation, it is interesting to note that these respondents were heavily influenced by both academic studies, or in some cases even conferences, and the native French teachers on the subject of bilingualism. These sources helped them convince themselves of the fact that it is valuable to speak and transmit the Polish language in France. It is clear that some parts of the French education system, in particular the existence of bi-lingual schools and certain teachers promoting multilingualism, influence appropriation.

At the same time the influence of that same education system is nuanced, when it comes to mother-tongue education. It is seen as a positive facility, and some argue that it could help integration by showing immigrants and their children that French society is prepared to support financially and organisationally the development of

minority languages and culture in France. However, at the same time, it is deemed that bilingualism will continue, even if the French government fails to offer support.

On the topic of French language acquisition however, the perspectives are completely different. There is remarkable satisfaction with the language acquisition programmes offered by the French government, much more so than in the other two countries (the Netherlands and Sweden) that are analysed in this research. Thus, insofar as knowledge of the French language increases motility (which it notably does, both directly through offering more migration options in Europe, and indirectly, by facilitating inclusion in French society, which in turn improves individuals' economic wellbeing), this aspect of French policy has a clear and positive influence. Mother-tongue education, however, seems to have very little influence.

Chapter 6.3: Interviews Turks in France

Similar to other West European countries, large-scale Turkish migration to France was initiated by a bilateral labour recruitment agreement signed by France and Turkey in 1965, in an attempt to cover shortages on the French labour market. The French National Bureau of Immigration (OFII, L'Office Français de l'Immigration et l'Intégration) actively recruited Turkish workers to industrial areas (Alsace, Vosges, Rhône-Alpes). After 1974, formal labour recruitment ended, and a significant number of Turkish migrants moved their families over to France through family reunification. Currently the majority of Turkish immigrants and their descendants are still located in these industrial areas, as well as Paris, Côte-d'Azur and Provence. Similarly to the Poles in France, exact figures on the Turkish community in France are unavailable, since France does not collect data based on ethnicity. However estimates range from 800.000 to 1.2 million.

In total eleven Turks in France were interviewed in Paris and Mulhouse (a city in the Alsace region) between 2016 and 2018. The sample is relatively balanced in terms of important social characteristics. Of the eleven interviewees, three were younger than 25 years old, 5 were between 25 and 65 years old, and 3 were older than 65. Furthermore, four belonged to the so-called 'third generation' (i.e. grandchildren of immigrants), two to the second generation and five were first-generation immigrants. A major difference between this sample of Turks in France on the one hand, and the Dutch and Turks in Sweden on the other, is the slight overrepresentation of Turkish Kurds and political refugees. Four interviewees (about a third of the total sample) were Kurdish political refugees. All interviews were conducted in French, without the help of a translator.

French vs Turkish

The interviewees all deemed it of the utmost importance to master the French language. The language was seen as a crucial tool to succeed on the French labour market: 'if I do not speak French, it is impossible to find a job in France' (Appendix 2.6.8); 'I want to stay in France. I want to work here and start a new life.' (Appendix 2.6.3). Alongside the economic reasons, many respondents also cited the important socio-cultural benefits of speaking French: 'I admire the French culture of liberty and equality, it was one of the reasons I chose France over other European countries. Knowing the French language gives me access to the richness of French culture.' (Appendix 2.6.5).

The French language thus served a major practical purpose for these respondents, as they argued it is necessary for them to integrate well in French society. They approached the Turkish language with a similar practical angle. All respondents greatly valued the Turkish language, but mainly to stay in touch with their Turkish friends and family: 'my grandparents speak French very poorly. If I cannot speak Turkish, I cannot talk with them.' (Appendix 2.6.4). 'I still have lots of family in Turkey, I need to be able to speak Turkish if I want to communicate with them.' (Appendix 2.6.3).

The reasons cited for valuing both the French and Turkish languages were arguably straightforward and practical. In the case of these Turks in France however, the arguments they have not mentioned to defend their attitudes might be even more interesting than the ones they did present, especially compared to the Polish and Turkish immigrants in the other countries. Particularly concerning Turkish, the mother tongue of these interviewees, it is striking that they only mentioned practical benefits of knowing the language. The Dutch and especially Turks in Sweden mentioned the importance of Turkish to gain access to cultural and religious resources from Turkey. The Turks in France mentioned none of these arguments.

Mother-tongue education

Staying true to their practical approach regarding the Turkish language, the interviewees in general favoured the French government supporting mother-tongue education at state schools. An often cited reason: 'the more languages one speaks, the better it is.' One interviewee summarised the practical angle of most respondents quite well: 'I raise my children bilingually, they speak both French and Turkish. However, I am not a Turkish nationalist. If we were able to, I would be just as happy teaching them French and Chinese.' (Appendix 2.6.3). The first-generation respondents either spoke both Turkish and French at home with their children, or only spoke Turkish and let their children learn French at school. Both methods seemed to have the same result: the children were fully bilingual. There was however a split in opinions regarding both the availability of mother-tongue education at school and the organisation of this mother-tongue education. Some respondents argued that their schools, or their children's schools, offered mother-tongue education in the regular curriculum: 'I finished my final exams this year. I was given the option to follow Turkish classes during my school time, and I took them. Sadly the courses were hardly ever held due to practical reasons. However, one of my subjects on my final exam was Turkish and I passed it with flying colours.' (Appendix 2.6.4). However, apparently other schools offered no such facilities: 'My children right now cannot follow Turkish at school. I think it would be good if they could.' (Appendix 2.6.3). Another mentioned: 'It would be good if the French government would organise these mother-tongue education classes. It would show the immigrants that the government also respects and recognises their cultural needs, which is in my opinion very important in this day and age.' (Appendix 2.6.5). These respondents came from the same region (Mulhouse in the region of Alsace-Lorraine) and were discussing roughly similar time periods (mainly the year 2018), so it is difficult to explain why there is such a great difference in facilities offered.

Similar to other groups researched in this study, the Turks in France who did have any experience with mother-tongue education in France were critical of the way it is organised:

> I would never send my children to mother-tongue education here. The teachers are flown in from Turkey and are civil servants of the Turkish state.

> They carry their religious and political ideologies with them and teach them to our children. If the teachers were not civil servants of the Turkish state, I would certainly send my children to these classes. (Appendix 2.6.5).

This respondent was not one of the political refugees, but rather a labour migrant. Another interviewee had a similar perspective : 'I would never send my children to a school with Turkish classes, even if I had the opportunity.' (Appendix 2.6.1). Another respondent was however quite satisfied with the current facilities: 'The state is already organising Turkish lessons at school. Turkish mosques also give lessons. The children can go there. We should never force the children to go, it should be voluntary. Even children of four years old can already decide for themselves.' (Appendix 2.6.6).

French language acquisition

The interviewees in general had a positive view of the facilities offered by the French government to learn the French language. Those who were born in France, or migrated at a very young age (4 years old or younger) smoothly learned the language at school. However, even those who went to a French school at a later age, because they migrated when they were older, and adult first-generation immigrants, were rather positive. When prompted on his experience when coming to France at the age of 14, one interviewee recollected:

> I went to a special school for foreigners (Espace Alpha). Within three months they taught me the basics of the French language, so I could transition to a regular French high school. I was not fluent, but I spoke the language quite well, especially considering the short time I was at Espace Alpha. This system worked very well. The school also helped me tremendously with the mental health problems I had as a result of my difficult migration history. The school found a loving host family and I was allowed to attend the classes, despite being an undocumented migrant for four years. Sarkozy [president between 2007 and 2012] sadly closed the school however. (Appendix 2.6.3).

Another interviewee was six years old when he came to France, and had more difficulty adapting to the language:

> I was simply dropped immediately into a regular French school. This was very difficult at the start since I did not speak French at home, and I had no background at all in the language. Eventually, after a long ramp-up time however, I managed to learn the language properly. Right now I am fluent. (Appendix 2.6.2).

In other words: the accounts of the respondents show the effectiveness of the French system to teach younger newcomers the French language from their perspective, even though this might have changed in very recent times given the forced closing of schools

such as ‘Espace Alpha’. Even for the older immigrants there were facilities offered by the French government. However, this group had to overcome a more difficult barrier to actual attendance:

> When I came to France in the 1970s, I was in my early twenties. I spent thirteen years working in Paris. I had to work sixteen hours a day. After one year, the French government offered me the opportunity to follow French language lessons for free. I was not allowed to do so by my employer, since he wanted me to keep working, so there would be no time to attend the classes. Later, when I moved to Mulhouse, I learned some French myself by talking to my colleagues. At that point the French language acquisition courses were too easy for me, since they started with the very basics, so in the end I never followed any courses. (Appendix 2.6.1).

Another interviewee recounts a similar story: ‘I am the son of a single mother with two children. She had to work hard to support her family and that allowed for no time to follow any of these courses.’ (Appendix 2.6.4). In other words: the facilities were there but due to difficult economic conditions this interviewee could not attend the courses. This is a familiar scenario that was also heard among the other immigrant groups in this study: first-generation immigrants with little financial security often do not have the opportunity to attend language acquisition courses, since it is difficult to combine them with their often time-consuming jobs. However, it needs to be noted that there were no complaints about the facilities offered, but rather about their accessibility for the less financially secure immigrants.

Mobility in Europe

Completely in line with their practical angle, the Turks in France often cited English as being the most useful language for mobility in the EU, as it is at least a secondary language in most countries. Those living in the Alsace also often mentioned German as a useful language to learn and speak, citing that ‘Germany is our neighbour’ (Appendix 2.6.2) and ‘Germany is Europe’s biggest economy, if I could speak German I could also go work there.’ (Appendix 2.6.4). The Turkish language was also often cited as a very useful tool for mobility in the EU: ‘if I want to migrate, it would be very easy to connect to a different Turkish community. That could help me tremendously when I have just migrated.’ (ibid.). However, none of the interviewees had any concrete plans to leave France, not even to go back to Turkey after their retirement. This made the Turks in France again an exception compared to the Swedish and Turks in the Netherlands, They seemed to be more attached to their current country of residence when compared to the other groups. When discussing motility though, it is very interesting how its three different components (access, competence and appropriation) interplay in the case of these Turks in France.

Firstly, the Turks in France expressed a positive opinion regarding the facilities for learning French, and were split regarding facilities offered for Turkish. The 'access' component of French language policy (i.e. the linguistic infrastructure) is therefore debatable. However, it is interesting how government policy seemed to have very little effect on either competence or appropriation. All respondents spoke Turkish fluently, including the third-generation migrants, and taught their children (if they already had them) Turkish at home. All interviewees spoke at least French and Polish and had bilingual children. Also, French language policy either did not influence the migrants' attitude to the Turkish language at all, or at best its influence was not significantly negative. The interviewees still see great practical value in learning, speaking and transmitting Turkish. In other words: for these Turks in France government policy (i.e. 'access') is practically irrelevant for the way they perceive their mother tongue's value in enhancing their motility.

Conclusion

The Turks in France in this sample can be characterised by a single word: practicality. They view languages as tools to improve their socio-economic and, to a much lesser extent, socio-cultural wellbeing. For that reason they all emphasise the importance of the French language, but also place great value in maintaining and speaking the Turkish language as well. Other immigrant groups also expressed a somewhat utilitarian approach regarding language learning; however, this was also largely based on socio-economic status. The financially poorer immigrants valued the socio-economic aspects of language much more highly than the richer ones. This relationship between the desire for multilingualism and socio-economic status cannot be found among the Turks in France. The sample was diverse in terms of socio-economic status, but the practical focus was omnipresent.

This practical focus also seemed to affect the way they value their different languages for their motility. The Turks in France evaluated how different languages can help their mobility potential in the EU, and government policy could do very little to change their perspective. A good illustration of this development is the mixed opportunities offered by France to follow mother-tongue education on the one hand, and, on the other, the staunch determination of all the Turks in France to maintain their own language for practical purposes.

Chapter 7.1

Language Policy and Immigrants in Sweden: A Policy Document Analysis

Swedish immigration and integration policy has a remarkably different history compared to France and the Netherlands. Sweden's experience with relatively large migration is fairly recent. It was only in the 1930s that the country became a fully-fledged migration country. At the time, immigration flows consisted mainly of Swedish Americans returning to their home country. In the 1940s, Sweden welcomed many political refugees. Guest worker recruiting started in the 1950s and 1960s. At first the guest workers originated primarily from other Nordic countries, but following similar trends in other North and West European countries, the flow of non-Nordic guest workers also grew steadily in the 1960s. Another similarity between Sweden and its European neighbours is the fact that the guest worker system was all but dismantled in the 1970s, in Sweden's case due to labour unions being much more restrictive about work permits. However, due to family reunification and a steady flow of political refugees, the number of non-Nordic migrants in the country kept increasing. Before the arrival of the guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden could be considered a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation, that attempted to assimilate the few immigrants it received into Swedish culture. There was no concept of multicultural policy on the policy agenda in the 1960s (Tawat 2019). The ruling Social Democratic Party combined a tentative support for labour migration with a strong opposition to multiculturalism. The Prime Minister Tage Erlander stated in a speech to Parliament in 1965, 'We Swedes live in an infinitely happier condition [in comparison to the Americans]. The population of our country is homogenous, not only in regards to race but also in many other aspects' (translated by Wickström 2015: 516). The anti-multicultural sentiment could be considered a remnant of Sweden's pre-war assimilationist tradition. In the post-war period some ethnic and cultural diversity was tolerated, even though it was explicitly expected that these differences would not continue past the first generation (Wickström 2015).

A turning point in the Swedish debate is the publication of a newspaper article written by holocaust survivor David Schwarz in 1964, addressing the poor conditions of immigrants living in Sweden (Schwarz 1964). He argued in favour of government-supported facilities to promote Sweden's different minority cultures. Schwarz was a public intellectual with very little capacity to put the immigrant issue on the political agenda by himself, but he did pave the way for other actors, such Finnish and Estonian activists (Román 1994).

Scholars have offered different explanations, aside from the importance of individual actors such as Schwarz, for the transition from an assimilationist to a multicultural policy. Some point towards supranational factors (Demker and Mälmström 1999). The policy for Swedes abroad was aimed at preserving their Swedish identity to ease their potential return, and by way of reciprocity immigrants living in Sweden were treated similarly. A second explanation revolves around Swedish prestige in the international arena (Hansen 2001). Sweden's ethnic policies shifted, starting with the invasion of Denmark by Nazi Germany in 1940, towards an internationalist foreign policy approach, supporting minority rights in South Africa and the United States. In that context, it followed logically that minorities in Sweden itself should be granted cultural rights as well. Thirdly, many scholars point to various other actors on the national level, be it the trade unions pressuring the ruling Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) to grant more rights to foreign workers (Johansson 2008), civil servants advocating that the state abandon its *laissez-faire* integration policy (Hammar 1985), or the pivotal role Olof Palme played in transforming the assimilationist ideology of his own Social Democratic Party (Tawat 2019).

In 1975, the ruling Social Democratic Party showed a shift in ideology, and a new immigration and integration policy was adopted following three principles:

1. equality (the same rights and living standard for the native population and immigrants alike);
2. freedom of choice (offering minorities a genuine choice between retaining and developing their original cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity);
3. partnership (reciprocal solidarity and tolerance between the native population and immigrants).

This policy passed parliament without any notable problems. Brännström notes, however, that this policy was considered unimportant in Swedish politics, and was mainly instituted as a response to the accusations of assimilationism coming from Swedish national minorities and international partners (Brännström 2015).

In this chapter the policy history of Swedish language policy vis-à-vis its immigrants will be analysed, using original documents and secondary sources. The focus will lie specifically on mother-tongue education (which was called 'home language education' by the Swedish government prior to the 1990s) and Swedish language acquisition programmes. Furthermore, there will be a discussion of how Sweden's policy tradition has been shaped since the 1960s and how it fits into the theoretical frameworks of motility and inclusion. Prime attention will be paid to the facilities offered (on paper), and the justifications presented to mark various changes in policy.

Swedish mother-tongue education: exceptionally generous?

In many typologies, Sweden's minority policy is often characterised as being firmly multicultural (Joppke 2007). One element that certainly contributes to this characterisation is its mother-tongue education policy. Currently, Swedish schools are obliged to facilitate mother-tongue education if (1) there are at least 5 interested pupils, and (2), a qualified teacher to teach the language is available. The root of this generous policy can be traced back to the 1960s, more specifically to the report 'Skolgang burta och hemma' (Schooling Home and Abroad) of 1966. In this document, the Swedish government outlined the organisation of Swedish language acquisition classes for Swedes living abroad, but also stated that minorities living within the country were entitled to mother-tongue education. Furthermore, the report claims that parents and pupils should decide for themselves to what extent they wished to assimilate to Swedish language and culture, which is a clear indicator that Sweden was taking several steps on the path of multiculturalism. It needs to be noted however that at the start of the mother-tongue education regime, the vast majority of minority pupils were Finnish, thus originating from a Nordic country. It is safe to assume that the initial mother-tongue education regime was set up mainly to incorporate these pupils, and not necessarily for cultures and languages that originate much further from the Swedish border.

In this context it is relevant to outline briefly the political and academic context in which debates surrounding mother-tongue education took place in the 1960s and 1970s. As mentioned before, general Swedish integration policy was in the process of transitioning from a assimilationist towards a more multicultural approach. Language policy, regarding both the role of Swedish (which will be discussed in a later section), but also the role of the immigrant and national minority languages were a central element of public debate. A prime illustration of this fact is the notion, now considered controversial, of so-called 'semilingualism' (Milani 2007). Semilingualism refers to the idea that individuals who are confronted with more than one language in their youth will struggle to master all of them proficiently. Instead, they will speak both languages 'half-way'. In the 1970s this debate centred around Sweden's Finnish population, but it would resurface again in 2006 in the context of mother-tongue education (ibid.). Implicitly 'semilingualism' was mentioned in the present study in some of the interviews, when parents expressed their doubts about raising their children bilingually and/or sending them to mother-tongue education classes, precisely because they feared the children would struggle mastering several languages at once.

Swedish mother-tongue education was solidly formalised in the Home Language Reform act of 1977, in which this education provision was seen as a right for all Sweden's minorities. This policy's practical implementation was not an entirely smooth process. According to estimates, the number of pupils taking mother-tongue classes increased elevenfold between 1970 and 1982 (Opper 1983). This sharp increase urged the Swedish government to take both short and long-term measures to improve the rate at which

teachers could be recruited. In 1976 programmes were launched to train teachers who were bilingual in Swedish as a first language, and in Finnish, Turkish, Spanish, Greek or Spanish as a second. This did not resolve the immediate quantity problems however, so in 1977 bilingual teachers who did not have the official Swedish teaching qualifications, but usually had qualifications from their country of origin, were allowed to give mother-tongue education classes. In 1982 the government expanded the range of languages, adding Serbo-Croat, Danish, Arabic, Syriac, Polish and Macedonian to the curriculum. Susan Opper (1983) argued that at the time of writing her paper, even though there had been overwhelming political support for mother-tongue education, it was by no means guaranteed that the policy would survive in the long term. This is a notion that was later echoed by Hyltenstam and Tunoela (1996), who argued that Sweden's mother-tongue education system started off as a rather revolutionary and ambitious project, but was in the end bogged down due to a decrease in political will and economic support. Opper noted that some Swedish academics did not fully agree with the direction of the mother-tongue education regime. Ekstrand, a leading Swedish socio-linguist in the 1980s, summarised the conclusions of several research projects in the 1970s and 1980s concisely in eleven points. The following overview offers a concise summary of the Swedish academic debate on multilingualism at the time, and helps a better understanding of the policy context as well.

> (1) It is possible for children from all social classes to become bilingual. If they have problems in language development, reasons should be sought in situational and social factors, rather than in bilingualism per se. (2) It is possible for immigrant children from all social classes to do well in school, although usual SES [socio-economic status] differences may be expected. If problems arise, reasons should not be looked for in bilingualism, but elsewhere. Do not overlook the fact that immigrant children as well as native children may have all sorts of problems such as dyslexia, learning disabilities, etc. (3) It is essential to keep up the mother tongue development in immigrant children, although a fully native-like level cannot be expected. (4) It is equally important that immigrant children obtain early command of the language and culture of the host country. (5) There can actually be too much mother tongue teaching in certain situations, for instance if the language of the host country is not allowed to enter education for several grades, or when the child does not have good opportunities for interaction with the host society. (6) There is a cost attached to being different [from the norm]. (7) Early bilingualism is not harmful. On the contrary, it is highly advantageous. (8) Although the educational model in many cases is not as crucial for school achievement as may appear from the debate, a truly bilingual/bicultural education should be the objective. Segregated education may contribute to tensions among different minority groups as well as between minorities and the majority. (9) It is perfectly possible to find school models that involve

> majority and minority children as in the composite classes in Sweden. Thus, a truly multicultural education is no Utopia, but perfectly feasible. (10) It takes several years to automatise language to a high level of rapid functioning, as is true for other cognitive functions. (11) Language functions are dependent on the socio-cultural support. If this is weak, language does not develop maximally, or deteriorates. If it changes, language dominance also changes. (Ekstrand 1983 cited in Opper 1983: 207-208).

These points are highly interesting in light of future developments, both within Sweden and in the other countries discussed in this thesis. They show the importance of socio-economic factors in bilingualism and suggest that pupils in the lower social classes might have more difficulty becoming fully bilingual. At the same time however, it was argued that even though it may be difficult, it is not *impossible*, and if children are faced with difficulties at school, one ought to first look at 'situational and social factors' before concluding that bilingualism is the main issue. The idea that 'there can be too much mother-tongue teaching' seems to reflect the fear of mother-tongue education leading to the pupil not connecting properly with Swedish majority culture, which is a point raised in some of the previous interviews in this study as well. The idea that 'early bilingualism is not harmful' currently represents a majority of socio-linguists, but is nonetheless an interesting statement given the idea of 'semilingualism' that was briefly discussed in a previous section.

The eleven conclusions summarised by Ekstrand fit very well in the motility framework. For example, the 'access' and 'competence' aspects of motility are discussed in the fifth conclusion, where it is stated that there can be too much mother-tongue education. This statement might not be accurate, from the perspective of increasing the pupils' motility. Purely from a linguistic competence point of view, all other factors being equal, a higher degree of language skills would lead to a higher degree of motility. However if indeed the access to mother-tongue education is so great that it interferes with access to host society language education, the picture may look completely different, especially considering the need to speak the host society language for socio-economic mobility. As such, motility in itself presupposes a certain degree of inclusion. Furthermore, Ekstrand's conclusion 11 stresses the connection between access and appropriation, by emphasising the importance of the support of external actors in society on the perceived status of their mother tongue among migrants.

In the 1990s and early 2000s a renewed debate took place on Swedish language policy, which also affected the policy and practice of mother-tongue education. Arguably though, despite Swedish not being explicitly on the policy agenda, it always had a *covert* presence, meaning that the relevance and primacy of Swedish was implicit in every policy, even as early as in the 1970s when the shift to multiculturalism was all but complete (Milani 2007). Coinciding with the resurgence of Swedish national identity politics, the importance of the

language was put at the forefront again from the early 2000s. English at the time was rising to prominence in the higher echelons of society, and the prominence of that language was further reinforced in the new language policy enacted in 2005 (Cabau 2014), or as Lindberg (2007) would argue: 'The position of English in the Swedish speech community has actually become comparable to that of a second language rather than a foreign language, since many people in Sweden today use English on a daily basis in different contexts.' (Lindberg 2007: 72). The official guidelines of the new policy, *Best language- a concerted language policy for Sweden* (*Bästa språket - en samlad svensk språk politik*) were the following:

- Swedish is to be the main language in Sweden.
- Swedish is to be a complete language, serving and uniting society.
- Public Swedish is to be cultivated, simple and comprehensible.
- Everyone is to have a right to language: to develop and learn Swedish, to develop and use their own mother tongue and national minority language, and to have the opportunity to learn foreign languages. (Prop. 2005/06:2, translation by Lindberg 2007: 74).

This was a clear official marker to protect and, above all, underline the status of Swedish, considering the rising prominence of English on the one hand, and the relatively high number of minority and migrant language speakers on the other. Still, the Swedish official policy could by no means considered a return to assimilation, given its emphasis on a 'right to language', that language not being *just* Swedish.

English had been the most important compulsory foreign language since 1962. In addition, in the 1990s the Swedish government allowed for the existence of partially (usually 75%) state-funded independent schools, which could also have their own linguistic and cultural profile.

Thus, the English language was promoted further, whilst at the same time the other languages, especially those in the mother-tongue education programme, were pushed to the background. In the 1990s the government decided to decentralise the mother-tongue education policy whilst at the same time cutting its budget (Cabau 2014). The local municipalities now had the authority to decide how much they wanted to spend on mother-tongue education. The organisational aspects of mother-tongue policy left something to be desired, as there were severe time restrictions (40 to 120 minutes per week, usually). Furthermore, national minorities complained about the lack of dissemination to parents. The decline of mother-tongue education policies made national minorities decide to make use of their recently granted right to establish their own schools, a development which had been deemed unacceptable by earlier policy makers in the 1970s. The responsibility for organising mother-tongue education thus slowly transferred from the state to the community level.

In 2002 a state commission published a report, based on survey research among mother-tongue actors, aiming to bridge the gap between the policy intentions and policy practice:

> These included measures for the integration of mother-tongue instruction into the daily school schedule by providing instruction in different school subjects in the students' mother tongues. To bring about a necessary change in attitudes, the Agency proposed measures for the dissemination of knowledge about the value of mother-tongue education to civil servants and decision-makers. Moreover, the need for new techniques and teaching methods and continued work in support of the development and production of teaching aids in different languages was emphasised. Other prerequisites for successful mother-tongue education, according to the National Agency, were increased actions for the training and integration of multilingual teachers. The proposals focussed on mother-tongue instruction and its important role in the fulfilment of educational goals in multicultural and multilingual Sweden's knowledge development. (National Agency for Education 2003, cited in Lindberg 2007: 77-78).

Swedish mother-tongue education policies are generous and are deemed by some to be an example to be repeated in other West European countries, for they seem to run counter to the trend of 'assimilation' that is omni-present in current-day policies.

It is clear that the linguistic infrastructure, even though it is generously present on paper, is faced with several practical difficulties. The fact that due to a lack of funding the ethnic communities are increasingly responsible themselves for setting up their own schools can lead to a difference in quality between the mother-tongue education programmes. In addition, official national and ethnic minorities (i.e. the Fins, Jews, Saami, Roma) have had a special status on paper ever since they were officially recognised as such. For instance, they are exempt from the '5 pupil rule' and from the rule that pupils are only eligible to enrol in mother-tongue education classes if the target language of education is the same as the language they speak at home. A recent report by the Swedish Language Council (2017) made a thorough study of mother-tongue education, but focussed mostly on the officially recognised national minorities. There is thus a clear rift between migrants and their descendants on the one hand, and national minorities on the other, which runs counter to the ambition of the Swedish governments in the 1970s to treat all minorities equally from a legal and rights perspective. Yet it can also be argued that the advocacy of minority groups, in particular the Swedish-Finnish minority, has also strengthened the position of migrant languages in Swedish education.

Given the context of the implementation of mother-tongue education, namely primarily as a means to avoid accusations of 'assimilation', it could be assumed that also in Sweden, similar to France and the Netherlands, the policy was primarily implemented to achieve an external

goal, not because of its own merits. Currently, the policy is still in place but its organisation and standards, in the case of migrant languages, are in many cases of questionable quality. Pupils are not to the full extent benefiting from the facilities they have on paper.

Swedish for Immigrants (SFI)

Currently, SFI (Svenskundervisning för invandrare) is a system of free language courses for immigrants who are older than 16. Courses are offered in three levels (SFI 1, SFI 2, SFI 3). SFI 1 is targeted at the illiterate, SFI 2 at students who have undergone schooling in their country of origin, but are unfamiliar with the latin script, whilst SFI 3 is aimed at those who can read latin script and wish to attain a somewhat higher understanding of the Swedish level. The government summarises the role of SFI as follows in a fact sheet document:

> SFI forms part of the school system and aims to provide basic knowledge of the Swedish language. SFI also aims to provide adult immigrants who cannot read or write the opportunity to acquire these skills. The individual is to be given the opportunity to develop his or her ability to communicate orally and in writing in Swedish in everyday, social and working life situations. SFI is also intended as preparation for further study. Municipalities are obliged to offer SFI to adult immigrants who lack basic knowledge of the Swedish language. Courses should normally be available within three months of the individual's registration as a resident of a municipality. Depending on his or her educational background and prior knowledge, the student is placed in one of three study programmes with varying degrees of intensity and speed. Regardless of the study programme begun by a student, he or she is entitled to continue studies until completion of the highest course. (SFI fact sheet U13.012).



Figure 7.1.1 Number of SFI enrolled students 2003-2013.
Source: Statistics Sweden, Yearbook of Educational Statistics 2015: 229

When passing the final test of SFI 3 ('Kurs D'), the student should have a B1 level in the Swedish language. There has been a steady increase in demand for SFI courses, even though immigrants are not obligated to enrol.

The first SFI programmes were set up in the 1960s, with the first official curriculum released in 1971. The programme focussed primarily on guest worker immigration, given that they composed the majority of the Swedish migration flow in that period. The explicit aim of the document was 'to give the immigrant such language skills and information that he can live and function in the Swedish society' (Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015, their translation). An interesting difference between Sweden and a country such as the Netherlands, in the same time period, was that Sweden did not seem to tailor its policy to the assumption that the immigrants would eventually leave the country again. In the Netherlands in the early 1970s a language policy to help integrate the immigrants was virtually non-existent, whilst in Sweden it was being put in place. In 1986 Sweden reformulated its education policy for adult migrants, stating as its main goal: 'the immigrants' relevant knowledge in the Swedish language as well as about Swedish society and working life so that the immigrants will use his/her rights, influence his/her own situation and fulfil the demands and obligations that daily life offers' (Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015, their translation). Rosén and Bagga-Gupta argue that this policy indicates a shift from the bare 'worker-approach' in the 1970s to a pluralistic approach in the 1980s. The document also discusses many differences that were introduced due to migration (e.g. differences in terms of life-style and understanding the nature of society), but these were not put in a negative light. Instead, the document states the following: 'The basic education should be founded upon a democratic view of society and human beings: human beings are active, creative, can and should take responsibility and search for knowledge, in order to, in cooperation with others, understand and improve their own and others' standards of living.' (National Board of Education 1986, cited in Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015: 76). In this context it could be argued that learning Swedish was not part of a goal to assimilate the migrants, but to integrate them in the Berryan sense of the concept: providing Swedish language education to immigrants is a necessary condition to allow mutual reciprocity to occur. Furthermore, it is mentioned in the 1986 document that migrants who have recently arrived may experience feelings of 'identity threat' that may evolve into 'feelings of frustration', a statement that was in line with the notion of 'acculturative stress' often mentioned by socio-psychological studies of integration (Berry 2006, Sirin et al. 2013, Goforth et al. 2014, Yoon et al. 2013).

The role of SFI was perceived differently again by the centre-right government at the start of the 1990s, as the lack of Swedish language skills on the part of the migrants became a central point of debate. Ever since then, the idea of cultural and linguistic diversity as a sign of strength in the country has been under pressure. The following text is derived from a proposed law of 1993:

> Good command of Swedish and knowledge about Swedish society is of major importance for the integration of the immigrant in Sweden. There are alarming signs of inadequate skills among immigrants (...). The competition in today's labor market highlights further the requirement of good skills in Swedish and knowledge about Swedish circumstances. (Proposition 1993: 9, translated by Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015).

This indicates, as Rosén and Bagga-Gupta also state, a shift from valuing language for its effects on social cohesion and cultural exchange, to its usage in pure economic terms. The Swedish language has, since the 1990s, been considered primarily as a necessary tool for migrants to be economically self-sufficient, because good command of the language was held to be absolutely necessary for success on the labour market, and by proxy for successful integration. In 2006 the Swedish National Board of Education published a report that continued the focus on economics, and stated:

> SFI gives people with a first language other than Swedish the opportunity to learn and develop a functional new language. This also includes good pronunciation, since this is closely related to communicative competence. (...) The education must provide the prerequisites for such mastery of the language that pupils can profit from their studies and become involved in social and working life. (Swedish National Board of Education 2006, translated by Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015).

An interesting detail is the explicit mention of 'pronunciation' of the language. The importance of not only being able to speak the host language, but also to sound something like a native speaker, has been researched in the Netherlands by Ghorashi and Van Tilburg (2006). They concluded that even having the highest language certificates (C1-C2 level, which SFI does not even provide) is not enough to be relatively successful on the labour market, if the immigrant does not possess a good Dutch accent.
Despite the growing importance the Swedish governments has attached to SFI, it is still not compulsory for migrants to follow the courses. However, in recent elections the Social-Democratic Party proposed to change this, and even to tie access to the welfare state to the migrants' attendance rates at the SFI courses.

Conclusion

Swedish integration policy, with its language policy as a central component, has been a much contested topic in academia. Some scholars have argued that Sweden's approach has led to it being the least successful in producing labour market success for its immigrant population (Koopmans 2010). These studies confirm the stance of Swedish politics since the 1990s and also justify the policy shifts towards treating language mainly as an economic tool for the newcomers, whilst driving the social cohesion and cultural aspects to the background. On the other hand, Sweden has performed relatively well on the

social-psychological front. The ability of immigrants to cultivate their heritage language and culture resulted in less acculturative stress and therefore reasonable psychological wellbeing (Berry 2006, Sirin et al. 2013, Goforth et al. 2014, Yoon et al. 2013).

This brief analysis of the development of Swedish mother-tongue education and SFI leads to three relevant motility-related questions. First of all, given the government shift to an economic approach to integration, and the different perspectives on the results of Swedish policy, the question arises which of the two is more valuable: the migrants' economic or social-psychological wellbeing? In the end this is a normative discussion. The second important question concerns the actual importance of the language policy for (1) the willingness of immigrant parents to transmit their mother tongue to their children, and (2) the perception the migrants have regarding the value of their mother tongue ('appropriation' in terms of motility). The Swedish linguistic infrastructure, especially concerning mother-tongue education, is at present disadvantageous for unorganised ethnic communities, that lack the organisational skills and perhaps the social network to set up solid mother-tongue education classes for their children. The strength of the kin-state and its willingness to step in when the host-country government fails to provide adequate facilities is also very important in this regard. This situation might however be relatively irrelevant, if migrants are barely influenced by government policy. As such, government policy may be an overestimated component of motility.

The third question is closely related to the previous one, namely, the comparison between the effects of official mother-tongue education (and its quality) and the language situation at the family home. The fact that some minorities (e.g. the Finnish) have the financial and organisational power to set up their own mother-tongue education programmes, while other minorities do not, points to a discrepancy on the group level. However, these discrepancies obviously also exist on the individual level. The linguistic skills that are being transmitted to a migrant child depend greatly on the language mastery of the parents. In other words: the average child growing up in a household with parents who are university graduates will probably enter the mother-tongue classes having a much higher level of linguistic mastery, compared to the child of the average blue collar worker. The question is whether it is at all possible for government education programmes, especially when they provide merely a few hours per week of mother-tongue education, to bridge the gap created by the social location of a pupil.

These three questions will be addressed in reviewing the interviews that were held with Poles and Turks in Sweden for the purposes of this research.

Chapter 7.2: Interviews Poles in Sweden

Polish migration to Sweden can be roughly categorised in six waves (Lubínska 2013, see table 7.3.1.); however the current presence of citizens with a Polish background has its roots in the post-war period and beyond. A significant number of Polish migrants left, or fled, the country during World War II and the Communist period (1947-1989). An interview-based study from the 1990s showed that, compared to migrants from Chile, Iran and Turkey, Polish migrants in Sweden had a higher socio-economic status (SOS 1999). Most Polish migrants settled in Sweden's big cities: Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg (SCB 2010). They originated primarily from the regions of Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie and Mazowieckie.

After Polish EU accession in 2004, Polish migration to Sweden increased, even when compared to the other new Member States. However, it is also argued by some scholars that EU accession has not had a large impact on migration from Poland to Sweden, when compared to other countries (Kindler 2013), due to the existing large Polish diaspora present in Sweden before 2004, and to Swedish recruitment agencies being very selective.

In 2018 Statistics Sweden estimated the number of Polish immigrants to be 92,759 people (Statistics Sweden Poles 2019). However, similar to the situation of the Turks in Sweden, this does not include second and third-generation immigrants, so the actual number of Swedish residents with a Polish background is most likely significantly higher.

A total of ten Poles in Sweden were interviewed in Stockholm and in Umea (Northern Sweden) in November 2017. All interviewees were first-generation Polish immigrants. Furthermore, while there is strong variation in the sample in terms of age (ranging from 22 to 65) and gender (6 females, 4 males), the sample is not without its biases. Most respondents had either benefited from higher education or were in the process of obtaining it. Furthermore, all interviews were conducted in English, as all interviewees had mastered the language sufficiently for basic communication purposes.

Swedish vs Polish

Similar to the other groups interviewed, the Poles in Sweden in the sample acknowledge the importance of learning the language of the country they are residing in, at least for its instrumental usage. One interviewee, an architect who came to Sweden in 2013, cites her reasoning: 'You need Swedish for your work. You also need it to make Swedish friends.' (Appendix 2.5.5). However, when asked specifically about how she weighs these two motivations (work and establishing a connection with native Swedes) she mentions the following about making Swedish friends: 'I think connecting to the Swedish society is not very important. Swedish people are not very welcoming.' (ibid.).

Table 7.3.1

Waves of Polish migration to Sweden.

Migration period	Time period	Description of migration type
(1)	from the late 19th century to 1939	for the most part economically motivated
(2)	1939-1944	forced population displacements, closely related to wartime developments
(3)	1944-1980	- repatriation of Poles from the USSR - the migration of ethnic Germans from Poland under intergovernmental agreements - migration by people of Jewish origin
(4)	1980s	the migrations of the 1980s
(5)	1990s	the transition period
(6)	after 2004	post-accession Polish migration

Source: Lubińska (2013:74).

The difficulty of connecting to Swedish people is observed by other interviewees. It drove them to emphasise the economic value of learning Swedish even more than they would have otherwise. Another interviewee, who migrated to Sweden in 2014, stated that she aimed to reach the 'heart of the Swedes' (Appendix 2.5.2), but mentioned at the same time that she feels Swedes are 'very closed to foreigners' (ibid.). For this reason, she emphasised that alongside her Swedish language skills, she also greatly values her skills in Polish to build up a social network in Sweden, saying that she is 'very strongly involved with the Polish community.' (ibid.).

These responses are representative of the total body of the interviews, and thus two major observations can be made. Firstly, learning Swedish is primarily seen as a vehicle for economic success, and secondly, the respondents in general do not prioritise establishing strong cultural and social connections with the Swedish native population. The latter can partly be explained by the respondents' attitude, and partly by the perceived closedness of the Swedish population towards newcomers.

Mother-tongue education

The interviewees' view on mother-tongue education (i.e. should the Swedish school system provide Polish language acquisition courses for their children? Are the parents willing to raise their child bilingually?) are closely related to their attitudes towards both the Polish and Swedish language in general. In previous interviews it has been noted that the way language is viewed, and attitudes regarding language transmission from parents to children, seem to be closely related to the social-economic status (SES) of the respondent. Because the sample of interviews in Sweden is strongly biased towards high SES respondents, the cross-class comparison cannot be made in this section. However, these high SES Poles in Sweden have very similar views to the other high SES

respondents from other groups and countries. For instance, they all support some form of multilingual education, both in the school system and when raising their children: 'Yes, I am Polish, so I want my children to feel Polish. Later [when they grow older] I want them to pick between the Swedish and Polish identity.' (Appendix 2.5.6).

An interesting aspect of this response is the dichotomy made between the Swedish and Polish society, and the notion this interviewee felt his children must 'pick' between the two. When prompted about this issue and whether a bilingual education might thus eventually lead his children to pick the Polish society, and thus be segregated, this interviewee responded: 'I do not think raising my children bilingually hinders their integration: they speak Swedish and Polish fluently. It is impossible for them to just stay in their Polish community.' (ibid.).

Another interviewee showed scepticism towards the effects of mother-tongue education, even though she was generally in favour of the policy: 'Bilingual education might risk a little that the children stay entrenched within the Polish community. It can be challenging for a parent and the school to avoid this from happening.' (Appendix 2.5.8).

However, other interviewees do not see this risk: 'Raising children trilingual does not disturb their integration. There are studies proving this. If you are a child, you can learn the languages with relative ease. Mother-tongue education does not let children be closed off. This type of risk only exists if the parents push it.' (Appendix 2.5.7).

An IT professional, who migrated to Sweden in 2013, had mixed views about the effects of official mother-tongue education policies at Swedish schools, and parents raising their children bilingually:

> I want my children to learn how to read and write in Polish. Two or three hours per week at school is however not enough. I think mother-tongue education policies influence integration. It might go slower, but it is not dangerous. I think that if you force people to use one language, their integration will go much faster. Mother-tongue education can increase the probability of stopping integration. However, at the same time cultural diversity enrichens a country. In the end, it is the responsibility of the parents how the integration process will go. (Appendix 2.5.3).

The interesting aspect of this extract lies in how this interviewee tries to weigh both the positive aspects of Swedish mother-tongue education policy, namely the cultural enrichment for the country and the bilingual skills for the individual child, and the negative, namely higher chance of stopping integration. His conclusion that in the end the parents are responsible corresponds to the analyses made by Fishman (1991), who also emphasised the crucial role of parents in the linguistic development of their children, as opposed to government policy.

Some of the respondents had children who were currently enrolled in a mother-tongue education class at Swedish primary schools. The choices that some of these parents made concerning which language they wanted them to learn there, and the parents' perspective on the practical value of these classes, can be called quite unexpected, as they sometimes forsake Polish language acquisition for other, 'bigger' languages. In the previous extract, the respondent argued that two to three hours per week of language classes is not enough to be effective. The effectiveness of the courses is universally disputed by all the respondents. Most of them state that the mother-tongue education classes are 'not helpful' but 'better than nothing', since they at least give the children a very small basis in Polish grammar and literature. An interesting exception is a first-generation immigrant who came to Sweden in 1981 at a very young age with her parents. Her school career was entirely in Sweden and she had both Swedish and Polish language classes. She comments:

> Sweden at the time had a fantastic school system for foreigners. Not anymore though, foreigners are now simply thrown into a Swedish-speaking class. Now they experience a lot of stress. (...). I followed Polish mother-tongue education and the courses were very good. It helped me a lot with my education and to learn Swedish and helped me stay in touch with my Polish language. (Appendix 2.5.9).

Two crucial differences between the last-cited interviewee and the other respondents are firstly that she followed mother-tongue education herself and can now make a comparison between her own experiences and her children's, and secondly that she followed these courses in the 1980s, when the Swedish mother-tongue education facilities were more extensive than in 2017. Over the decades the Swedish government has shrunk the facilities available and this has had ramifications for the policy's effectiveness.

A first-generation Polish immigrant observed that the Polish government has attempted to compensate for the lack of good mother-tongue education facilities in Sweden:

> Sweden used to have a decent organisation. It went downhill these last few years. Polish embassy is now organising a lot of courses for children as young as four years old. There the children learn both about the Polish language and culture. A lot of Poles are sending their children there. The Polish government fills the void left by the Swedish government. (Appendix 2.5.11).

Thus, she stated how the Polish government aims to fill the void that is seemingly left by the Swedish language system. This illustrates the extent to which a sizeable heritage country such as Poland can exert its influence over its diaspora.

Swedish language training

As mentioned in the section on Swedish vs Polish, all respondents expressed the view that learning Swedish is very important, at least for their labour market success. Many of them followed Swedish language courses, but they chose different programmes. For instance, one interviewee mentioned:

> I followed a SFI course for working people. It was two hours per week, which was very little. (...) I quit after three months. The courses were focussed too much on grammar. I just wanted to speak. I did not need the grammar lessons. They insisted to keep using this method despite my and other people's complaints. (Appendix 2.5.6).

However, another recent (2016) first-generation migrant followed a different programme: 'I am still learning Swedish very intensively. I want to work. I enrolled in a programme for academics to learn the language. The Swedish government provides it. It was 8 hours a day. I now speak Swedish at a B2 level.' (Appendix 2.5.4). A final interviewee did not have the opportunity to go to classes: 'I learn Swedish at home now, I do not have the time to go to classes. I need to know Swedish to read official documents and for the kindergarten. Right now, I can understand Swedish but cannot speak it.' (Appendix 2.5.3).

The examples given here do not show a clear pattern, as can be seen with the other groups that were being interviewed. This can be explained by the fact that the respondents did not all follow the same programme. Some followed a SFI course, which is part of the official Swedish citizenship regime and the most common course chosen by recent immigrants, while others had more specialised courses tied to their profession, and others again had no opportunity to follow any course and can as EU citizens who fall under the regime of freedom of movement opt out of following an official language acquisition programme altogether.

Despite this lack of a pattern, several tentative observations can be made when analysing this interview material. The first is the importance the respondents explicitly and implicitly attribute to the practical organisation of the courses. For example, the academic course had a much better structure that allowed for better language acquisition, indicating the importance of solid organisation.

The second observation concerns the problem of time constraints. This is part of the problem with the SFI courses, as they are only given for a few hours per week, since its participants usually have full-time jobs. They cannot commit the time to an academic course that takes eight hours per day. Some respondents decided not to follow a course at all, which contributes to the fact that they currently only have a passive understanding of Swedish. There was also a interviewee who enrolled in an on-line course: 'I follow state sponsored on-line courses because I lack the time to go

to class myself. My results depend a lot on my self-discipline. I can understand and speak a little bit of Swedish now.' (Appendix 2.5.5).

Language and motility in Europe

As opposed to the Turks in Sweden for instance, many of the Swedish-Polish respondents have the ambition to leave Sweden at some time in the future. This is not very surprising considering the sample bias of the interviews: many respondents are highly educated and came to Sweden either to take an academic position or as part of an extended labour contract. They often cite as reasons for leaving that they want their children to go to a Polish school, or that they simply go to where they have opportunities on the labour market. This group of people thus already had a considerable amount of motility even before they came to Sweden, for both language and non-language related reasons.

This group of interviewees thus requires little 'help' from government policy to enhance their own motility and that of their children. The children are usually speak at least two languages at home and are well equipped from a linguistic point of view to migrate to a range of different European countries. These considerations also lead to the respondents favouring other languages over English (since they usually speak that language already) when reflecting upon which new language would increase their mobility options in the EU the most. To quote a few examples:

> 'German would help me the most, but I will never learn it. I don't like the sound of the language'. (Appendix 2.5.5).
>
> 'German. German has the biggest labour market in Europe'. (Appendix 2.5.7).
>
> 'German, it is the biggest European language after English'. (Appendix 2.5.8).
>
> 'French and Italian, a lot of people speak French and I love Italy. German and Russian would help as well, but I do not want to learn those languages because of history.' (Appendix 2.5.1).

Conclusion

The interviewees in this sample proved themselves in many aspects to be similar to all the other migrant community members interviewed in this research. They considered Swedish a necessary language to learn, for economic reasons first and (sometimes) social reasons too. There were differing opinions on mother-tongue education, with some valuing it, others being critical, but there was widespread agreement on the need to improve vastly its current practical organisation. The respondents presented similar perspectives on the Swedish language courses offered by the government, mostly criticising the practical structure of the courses.

There are two notable observations made by some respondents in the sample. Firstly, there is the impression that the Polish government, through its embassy in Sweden, is organising language courses for its diaspora, hereby partially replacing the role of the Swedish government in the education of Polish immigrants. This development fits well in the model of the quadratic nexus (Marácz 2014), in which national minorities, national states, kin-states and the 'Euro-Atlantic space' are interwoven. The national state scaling down its involvement in minority language education, a development that was noted in chapter 7.1, has created more room for the Polish embassy to exert influence over its diaspora.

The respondents' motility was already substantial, by virtue of their higher education degrees and mastery of the English language. However, even though demographically this group is different from the Turks in Sweden discussed previously, two core observations regarding the effects of government policy on their motility are remarkably similar. Briefly to reiterate: firstly, they see a clear connection between their language skills (be it Polish, English, German or another major European language) and mobility potential. Secondly, the organisational structure of both mother-tongue and Swedish language education is criticised. The only major difference is that the Swedish-Polish interviewees did not think mother-tongue education was a potential catalyst for segregation, rather laying the responsibility with the parents.

Chapter 7.3: Interviews Turks in Sweden

Turkish migration to Sweden was initiated by Swedish companies recruiting guest workers to satisfy demand for labour in the 1960s. Many Turkish migrants originated from central Anatolia, to be exact from the towns of Kulu and Cihanbeyli, and predominantly had a 'low education' background (Baser and Levin 2017). A smaller number came from urban areas such as Istanbul, but those were 'high-skilled' and thus were not recruited as part of the guest worker programme. Labour migration continued until 1973, when due to economic downturn these programmes were terminated and a stricter migration policy was adopted. Migration from Turkey continued at that point through family reunification policies. After the 1970s Sweden welcomed Syriac and Kurdish refugees, who fled Turkey after the military intervention in 1971.

In 2018 there were officially 49,948 first-generation Turkish migrants in Sweden. However, when including the children and grandchildren of the first-generation migrants, who are not categorised by ethnic background in Swedish statistics, it can be assumed that number of Swedish residents with a Turkish background exceeds 100,000 (Baser and Levin 2017).

In total, 11 Turks in Sweden were interviewed in Stockholm and in Fittja. Fittja is a municipality close to Stockholm, with a relatively large share of immigrants of non-Western origin. 7 of the interviewees were first-generation immigrants, one was of the second generation and three from the third. The interviewees from the second and third generations were either still studying or had finished tertiary education, whilst most of the first-generation migrants had a history of doing manual work. Some of the latter group did finish managerial education programmes tailored towards their work. Most first-generation migrants were interviewed with the help of a translator, whilst the second and third generations were interviewed in English.

Swedish vs Turkish

All first-generation immigrant interviewees, who planned to stay in Sweden long-term, acknowledged the benefits of learning Swedish as a second language, and said they had this already held this view upon arrival in the country. One interviewee, who migrated to Sweden in 1972, stated: 'When I came to Sweden I followed SFI courses for 1.5 years. I was a bus driver, and the courses taught me the vocabulary needed to perform my job.' (Appendix 2.5.2). This statement is exemplary for all first-generation Turkish migrants in this interview sample: they all realised immediately that learning the language was an absolute requirement for them. The newly arrived migrants proceeded to learn Swedish, either by means of a course, by consuming Swedish media, by connecting with native Swedes, or a combination.

Length of stay is however a determining factor for the willingness of migrants to learn the language. Another interviewee, a recent first-generation immigrant who benefited from higher education, had a different view about learning Swedish: 'I came here in 2014 and will go back in 5 years. I can speak Turkish, English, Arabic and Persian but only have a basic knowledge of Swedish. I don't need to learn Swedish because I will go back to Turkey in a few years.' (Appendix 2.5.5).

He thus mentions that due to the fact he is only staying in Sweden for seven years, it is not worth the effort for him to learn the language. Furthermore, the sizeable network of Swedish Turks gave him the opportunity to associate himself mainly with the Turkish community, thus essentially reducing the incentive to learn Swedish. The potential reward for learning Swedish did not weigh up against the opportunity costs.

The last interviewee quoted was the only one of the respondents who was not planning to stay in Sweden long-term. All the other respondents were either born in Sweden and were not planning to leave, or had lived in Sweden for several decades already. They had all learned Swedish and acknowledged the practical and economic value that learning the language brings them. This observation on its own may be unsurprising, but becomes more interesting when looking at it in conjunction with the respondents' attitudes towards Turkish. Given the fact that most respondents aim to build a future and family life in Sweden, or have already done so, the question of language transmission towards their children becomes relevant. In the socio-linguistic literature the willingness of parents to transmit their mother tongue to their children is considered a very significant predictor for the survival of a language (Fishman 1991). The views and attitudes of the respondents differed greatly in this respect for varying reasons.

For instance, a first-generation immigrant stated:

> I mostly spoke Turkish and Kurdish and just a little bit of Swedish with my children at home. They only learned Swedish after they were three years old at primary school. I sent them to a Turkish school where most teachers and class-mates spoke Turkish. They haven't been able to continue their education because their level of Swedish wasn't high enough. I sometimes regret that. (...) If I had to pick between my children not knowing Turkish and Kurdish or Swedish, I would prefer them not to know Swedish. Our community is tightknit and they need to able to communicate with other Turks. (Appendix 2.5.4).

He expressed an ambivalence regarding the linguistic education of his children. He considered Swedish the more economically productive language, as it is a necessity for receiving a decent education, but values the connectivity of his children to Turkish co-ethnics and Turkish culture even more.

Another interviewee had five children who, according to him, speak five languages (Turkish, Swedish, German, English, Italian). He is very content that they have a fluent command of Swedish, but also points out the importance of Turkish: 'Just focussing on learning Swedish [for his children] may help them to adapt to Sweden in the short term. In the long term them not speaking their mother tongue might cause identity issues.' (Appendix 2.5.2).

He expressed his satisfaction with the linguistic competences of his children and valued the economic importance of the Swedish language. At the same time he indicated the importance of the Turkish language, as a vehicle for their Turkish identity. It is interesting to note that he sees the Turkish identity as something completely separate from the Swedish identity, thinks this separation needs to be acknowledged and respected by his children, and believes that not being sufficiently immersed in the Turkish heritage culture can cause identity issues.

One of the interviewees was a second-generation Swedish Turk who is currently attending university. He expressed the following sentiment regarding his connection to the Swedish and Turkish languages:

> At home, I spoke in a Turkish dialect with my parents. Most Turks would be able to understand me when I speak it. I went to a school with many immigrants, and I had a lot of Turkish friends with whom I spoke Turkish. (...) I taught myself Turkish, especially after my mother passed away, but at the same time also wanted to immerse myself in Swedish culture. (...) I felt different because of my background and wanted to belong with the Swedes. I didn't want to meet any more Turks. (...) As I reached my late teenage years, I started to also see the importance of learning Turkish. I perfected the language on my own through self-study. Right now I have written several academic papers in Turkish and published a book about a Turkish poet [in Turkish]. The Turkish language is the link to my heritage, but I only started seeing that when my socio-economic conditions improved. I feel a calling to solve the problems with my cultural heritage. (Appendix 2.5.10).

This quote mentions several interesting developments. As a young child this interviewee only knew how to speak a specific Turkish dialect. Then he realised at the still relatively early age of eight that he needed to have a good command of the Swedish language in order to succeed in Sweden, and thus he took many steps to build up a 'native Swede' circle of friends. Then during his late teenage years he re-evaluated the Turkish language for his cultural and intellectual development, and brought his skills to an academic level. There are at least two factors worthy of note in this interviewee's history. Firstly, he clearly went from a perspective of 'segregation' (when he was very young) to one of 'assimilation' (from his eighth until his late teenage years), to one of 'integration' (from

his late teenage years onwards). Secondly, these phases seem to be connected to his socio-economic wellbeing. He comes from a relatively poor background and his initial assimilation into Swedish language and culture gave him the opportunity to advance on the social ladder. Consequently, after alleviating his immediate economic problems he had the opportunity and the will to perfect his level of Turkish and study his cultural heritage. For this interviewee, bilingualism and bi-culturalism have proven to be a form of luxury. After having lived through these three different phases of linguistic upbringing, he presents the following reflection on how he defines 'integration':

> Right now, I see integration as having a dual identity. However, immigrants need to find their own place and purpose in the country they live in, and that will always require a great degree of adaptation to the mainstream society. (...) I don't like the Turkish associations here. They preserve conservative values. It is impossible to be integrated if you are active in them. (Appendix 2.5.10).

Mother-tongue education

The respondents' perspective on mother-tongue education, either for themselves or for their children, is often connected to how they perceive the value of the Turkish language. However, when focussing on the question whether the Turkish mother tongue needs to be taught *at school*, the perspectives of the respondents differed strongly. For instance, one was clearly in favour of monolingual Swedish education:

> I purposefully sent my children to a Swedish school, without other Turkish students. They needed to be immersed in Swedish culture and language. (...) I spoke Turkish with them at home, and that was sufficient for me. (...) My children speak four languages, and can speak both Turkish and Swedish at the native level. (Appendix 2.5.9).

Three others claimed instead that learning the mother tongue at school is beneficial for several reasons: 'I think learning the mother tongue first helps with learning a second language. Learning the mother tongue helps teach basic grammar rules.' (Appendix 2.5.7).

> Swedish teachers encourage mother-tongue education. They explained raising a child bilingually has many benefits for his development. A good foundation of my child in Turkish will only help him to learn Swedish afterwards. (Appendix 2.5.1).

> Turkey is our mother land, and mother-tongue education is my right. It is my right that my children can learn Turkish at school. The more languages they know the better it is. (Appendix 2.5.8).

The statements above were all from first-generation migrants. However, the interviewees belonging to the second and third generation expressed a different view on the matter of mother-tongue education. A third-generation young Turkish girl, who was to attend university in 2017, received mother-tongue education at a Swedish school and expressed a strong view on the matter:

> I would raise my children bilingually. Turkish is in my heart and it is part of my culture. Not learning Turkish is not a viable option at all. At school there need to be facilities for mother-tongue education. If children don't learn the language when they are young they might not be able to learn the language at all. (...) The Turkish language gives us a foundation to understand what is right and what is wrong, if we don't know our language anymore we don't know what it means to be a Turk. (Appendix 2.5.6).

However a second-generation Swedish Turk had a diametrically opposed opinion:

> When I was 7-8, I purposefully refused to go to Turkish mother-tongue education. The teachers were bad, the starting level was very poor. I already spoke much better Turkish at home. The courses were also stigmatising. The Turkish language has a very low status in Sweden, so if you take those courses you will have a low status as well. (...) Traditional mother-tongue education is not creative. I read Turkish poems and taught myself the Turkish language that way, that was way more effective. (...) When the law of mother-tongue education was adopted in Swedish Parliament in 1976, it was useful, because immigration was recent then. Right now, Turkish children just attend these classes for easy points. Teachers of Turkish origin in Sweden only teach those classes because they are incapable of teaching other subjects. I think there will be no more interest in mother-tongue education at school in the future. The Turkish community in Sweden has no common aim or common interest. (Appendix 2.5.10).

The strongly differing opinions of these two interviewees show a glimpse of the rift that seemingly exists in the Swedish Turk community, with one group aiming for the institutionalisation of Turkish culture whilst the other points out several principled and practical objections. The practical organisation of mother-tongue education is also criticised by those who support its principle. For instance:

> My child had one hour of Turkish every week. This was not enough at all for him to learn the language. Germany and the Netherlands had an agreement with Turkey on labour migration. There Turkish teachers from Turkey came to teach the migrant children. Sweden did not have such an agreement, so it was more difficult to get good teachers from Turkey. In Germany and the Netherlands it is a lot easier to learn Turkish than here. (Appendix 2.5. Interview 7).

Language training courses

As noted in the previous paragraph, most first-generation respondents have taken a Swedish language training course and recognise the benefits of learning Swedish upon arrival. The effectiveness of the courses however varied for the different respondents.

One interviewee recalled:

> When I came here I did not go to language school. I immediately went to work in a restaurant. During the evenings and the holidays I went to a language course called SFE [Swedish Foreign Education, a similar course to SFI but not exactly the same]. I think you need to keep on educating yourself your whole life. Finding a Swedish partner and a job are by far the best ways to learn the language, rather than the courses. (...) Most Turkish men around me did not go to a language course. They did not have time to go, because they had to make money. The tight Turkish network and strong Turkish identity are then becoming a problem. They did not need to learn the language, did not have the time to do it, so they did not. (Appendix 2.5.1).

This account mentioned several factors that were alluded to by other respondents as well. Firstly, effectiveness of the language training courses is uneven and it is argued that learning the language by practising it yields better results. Secondly, it was pointed out that poorer immigrants often lack the time to attend the courses. Furthermore, due to the presence of a large Turkish community in Sweden, the incentive to make an effort to learn Swedish is either significantly reduced or completely absent. Other respondents shared similar experiences.

These sentiments are representative of the views of the first-generation respondents. They see the importance of Swedish language acquisition, sometimes regret that they didn't learn the language immediately upon arrival and question the practical effectiveness of the courses. It is also interesting to note that many were incentivised to learn Swedish by their employers. Following a Swedish language course was often a prerequisite for obtaining a promotion, thus presenting the immigrants with a clear economic incentive.
Language and mobility in Europe

When confronted with the question of which language is most useful in order to be mobile within Europe, there is one clear front-runner, namely English. When requested to reflect upon different languages they would like to learn and/or use , in order to improve their mobility in Europe, many also acknowledged the value of Turkish and sometimes other European languages:

> Turkish and Kurdish are very valuable languages for me to travel around Europe. It makes it very easy for me to connect to communities in different countries. (Appendix 2.5.4).

> Turkish gives me a lot of options to visit/move to other countries. For instance: Denmark. (Appendix 2.5.6).

> German is a very useful language for me. Germany is a big country with a big Turkish community. Turkish also helps me a lot when migrating within Europe. (Appendix 2.5.8).

> French and German would benefit me most. Turkish is also very useful when moving to other countries. (Appendix 2.5.2).

The respondents often refer to the sizeable Turkish networks all over Europe, that they can easily connect with when moving to another European country. Furthermore they unsurprisingly mention most often the three big European economic languages, English, French and German, as being very useful. A second-generation interviewee had a slightly different perspective on the role of Turkish:

> I would move to any European university that offers me a research job. English and Swedish are for me the most useful language in terms of mobility options. I won't need Turkish at all, unless my job would involve studying Turkish networks. If I go to another European country, I have no desire at all to connect with the local Turks. (Appendix 2.5.10).

Conclusion

Most respondents considered Swedish a language they primarily need to learn for their economic benefit, and saw Turkish as the vehicle for their cultural heritage. Some expressed very strong views on the need to keep Turkish alive within the Swedish-Turk community. Several respondents even claimed that knowledge of Turkish, despite it being an economically less beneficial language when compared to Swedish, is much more important than knowledge of Swedish. There is a clear separation felt between the Swedish and Turkish identities, and the respective languages are seen as the vehicles of these identities.

Both mother-tongue education and the citizenship courses were evaluated moderately positively in principle, but criticised on practice. The facilities were either not sufficient or poorly organised (in the case of mother-tongue education) or did not focus enough on practical conversation skills (in the case of citizenship courses). When it comes to the citizenship regime, it was also often mentioned that especially the first-generation immigrants lacked both the time and the incentive to learn Swedish. Their poor socio-economic situation, the presence of a sizeable Turkish community and the fact that the migrants were not obligated by the government to pass a language test were reasons that many of them initially were not interested in learning Swedish, often to their regret.

Turkish was often cited as a very useful language to know when migrating within Europe, thus enhancing the respondents' motility. Many respondents have connections with other European Turks, which opens up the possibility to bond in a community of their ethnic peers if they decide to migrate.

The question thus remains: how are language and motility connected in the situation of Turks in Sweden? The results above have shown that this connection very much exists. There is a fairly favourable, albeit not perfect, linguistic infrastructure present that helps Turks in Sweden gain the necessary linguistic skills. Furthermore they see a clear connection between the languages they speak (especially Turkish) and their mobility opportunities within Europe. Several additional remarks need to be made, however. Firstly, it can potentially be argued that the Swedish linguistic infrastructure's balance might be too much in favour of the minority languages. Despite Swedish language courses being free of charge migrants sometimes still do not feel incentivised to attend them, since they think they can live satisfactorily just within the Turkish communities. Years later they often regret this decision. Secondly, the interviews give ample reason to reconsider the structure of both Swedish and Turkish language courses, as their effectiveness has come under scrutiny. Thirdly, the complicated question needs to be addressed of whether state-sponsored minority language training will not lead to a segregation instead of inclusion of the immigrant communities. Given the very strong feelings both older and younger Turks in Sweden express when discussing Turkish language and culture, and the sharp distinction some make between Swedish and Turkish identity, this is a potentially valid concern that requires reflection. At the same time, a policy of assimilation seems doomed to fail, given the strong transnational connections many Turks in Sweden maintain in the present day.

Chapter 8

LANGUAGE POLICY AND MOTILITY: COMPARING COUNTRIES AND MIGRANTS

Selma Sonntag and Linda Cardinal (2015) outlined three relevant questions in studying language policies from a historical-institutionalist perspective, that have also guided the policy document analyses in this research:

> What are the principles that inform state actions on language matters? What are the institutional and administrative parameters of how the state governs languages? How and why does the state intervene in language choice and language use? (Sonntag and Cardinal 2015: 5).

The concept of 'path dependency' is essential for the historical-institutionalist approach, in the sense that policies of the present can and should be understood within the context of their respective state traditions. The analyses presented here on the Netherlands, France and Sweden were intended to formulate an answer to these questions. In this section a comparison will be drawn between the three countries, and will build on the following questions:

1. *How did the state traditions concerning language policy vis-à-vis immigrants develop from the post-war period until the present day?* The previous chapters answered this question; in this chapter the differences and similarities between the three traditions will be spelled out.
2. *To what extent do these language policy ideologies influence the motility of the immigrants residing in these countries?* Given the three-factored nature of motility (access, competence and appropriation), this second question can be split again into three sub-questions. The questions of 'appropriation' and 'competence' will be mainly addressed when discussing the interviews.
3. *How important is the role of 'path dependency' specifically in the domain of migrant languages?* It is imperative to realise that the document analysis in this research is not sufficient to prove or disprove completely the value of the national model and state tradition approach in general integration and language policy research. Our study focussed exclusively on the linguistic aspect of integration policies, even though that is inevitably embedded in the integration policies as a whole.

The expectation, based on previous theoretical work, was that France, Sweden and the Netherlands would fall more or less into three separate categories, namely

'assimilationist' (France), 'multicultural' (Sweden), and from previously 'multicultural' to 'assimilationist' (the Netherlands). The 'model thinking' tradition of integration scholars, or the idea of categorising countries based on presumed policy ideologies, bears some crucial similarities with the historical-institutionalist approach of Sonntag and Cardinal regarding language policy, especially where it concerns the importance of path dependency. Model thinking also attempts to understand present day integration policy based on the presumed governance tradition of each country. Model thinking has an extensive tradition in the literature. Brubaker (1992) compared the citizenship models of France and Germany, and explained their different approaches ('differentialist' in Germany and 'assimilitationist' in France) based on the institutional traditions of those countries. Joppke (1999) assumed the existence of these models when comparing the United States, France and Germany, although he acknowledged in a later article (2007) that national models in Europe are converging. Bourhis et al. (1997) argued in favour of the existence of four state ideologies (pluralism, civic, assimilation and ethnist) and made them an essential part of their acculturation model. In other words: they claimed that a state's policy ideology has a profound effect on the integration of immigrants. As a final example, Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2012) argued based on statistical data from 1980 to 2008 that West European states were 'path dependent' concerning their integration policies, thus reaffirming the importance of national models. However, the national model approach has been criticised extensively by other scholars. Either its relevance is deemed diminished on empirical grounds (e.g. Joppke 2007, Green 2007), or the notion of national models itself has been called into question (e.g. Bertossi, Duyvendak and Scholten 2015).

These 'national models' are mostly ideal-types, and are mainly treated as such by scholars. They also provide potentially useful tools to clarify certain differences between countries. However, when specifically analysing certain aspects of states' linguistic integration policy for immigrants, it is questionable whether the national model approach and the state tradition approach offer the most useful lens to understand why and how these policies have been put in place.

It was concluded in the chapter on the Netherlands that the Dutch approach could be best characterised as one of 'pragmatic multiculturalism', and not as one that has ever been fully committed to a multicultural approach. Multiculturalism as a policy ideology assumes that all cultures, thus including minority cultures, have intrinsic value and that citizens have the fundamental right to maintain their 'own' cultural identity (Taylor 1994). The Dutch government has never expressed these ideas in official documentation. Language policy towards immigrants has always been inspired by pragmatism. In the guest worker period migrants did not receive Dutch language training and their children received a limited form of mother-tongue education, since it was assumed that these families would return to their countries of origin once their labour contracts ran out. Then in the 1980s, mother-tongue education was introduced, primarily to function as a

bridge to learning Dutch. The Dutch government at most expressed that 'integration is a reciprocal process', but never stated that the immigrant languages have intrinsic value. Mother-tongue education should thus not be seen as full support for the immigrant languages, but as an indirect way to hasten the integration process of immigrant children. The fact that the policy was set up in a laissez-faire way (i.e. immigrants were mainly themselves responsible for the organisation) and only provided for a limited amount of teaching hours per week does not seem to indicate a full commitment to the 'multicultural' and 'multilingual' cause. The policy was slowly dismantled and eventually abolished, for pragmatic reasons: the 'bridge function' was not empirically confirmed by researchers, thus the policy ceased to have a purpose. At the same time, Dutch language acquisition took an ever more prominent place on the political agenda, ending with the current state of affairs where migrants should 'take responsibility' and fund their own Dutch language acquisition classes. This short summary of the policy's history indicates that regarding language policy vis-à-vis migrants, the Netherlands could at no point in history be categorised as a country with a true 'multicultural' policy tradition. Dutch policy is furthermore not conducive to enhancing the motility of its citizens with a migrant background, with regard to the three factors access, competence and appropriation. The linguistic infrastructure (access) is, especially in the present day, not very well developed, whether regarding Dutch language acquisition, or mother-tongue education.

The Dutch experience becomes even more interesting when comparing it to France, a country usually firmly classified in either the 'republican' or 'assimilationist' policy tradition. It could thus be expected that France would solely focus on French language acquisition. After all, assimilation in its classical meaning requires immigrants' full adaptation to the host society culture, whilst virtually abandoning their heritage culture. The works of Georges Mauco seemed to indicate a move in this direction. He claimed for example that migrants' mother tongue, and thus by extension mother-tongue education, is one of the greatest threats to their 'assimilability'. It became clear however that the influence of his work should not be overstated. The French government's idea of assimilation from a linguistic point of view has remained relatively constant since the post-war period. Assimilation meant simply being able to speak French. There is no mention of requiring migrants to abandon heritage cultures or languages, which means that the French notion of assimilation departs from the scholarly version as expressed for example by Gordon (1964) or Berry (1980). However, with the introduction of ELCO in 1973 and the extension of languages taught within this programme in later years, French governments have arguably even stimulated linguistic diversity to a certain extent (despite being primarily focussed on the French language), by granting certain immigrant languages a place in the official school system. Currently it is even possible to follow a wide array of languages, including many major immigrant languages, as fully fledged courses in secondary education, and even to choose them as a subject for the final exam. At the same time, for new immigrants free or at least affordable French

language acquisition classes are widely available. When compared to the Netherlands, France thus has a much more widely developed linguistic infrastructure, that does not seem to fit at all within an assimilationist framework. Ironically, French policy practice concerning language policy is more multilingual than its Dutch counterpart.

Sweden, lauded as the most liberal and multilingual country of the three states in this study, had a peculiar history. It started in a mainly assimilationist tradition, which had been turned around as a response to its guest worker immigration flows in the 1960s and 1970s, and the advocacy of national minorities around the same time period. Sweden is on paper still the most multilingual-friendly country in this study: any minority language is supposed to have a place in the school system, if certain conditions are met. The motivation to set up the policy was both pragmatic, similar to the Dutch situation, but also contained a certain degree of multicultural ideology. Pragmatically, Swedish politicians wished to avoid accusations of being 'assimilatory'. Ideologically however, the Swedish government stated in 1975 that migrants should have a 'freedom of choice'. whether they wish to adopt a Swedish cultural identity, or retain their own cultural heritage. Even though this statement does not prove that Sweden was a fully fledged multicultural country, which would actively and financially support the preservation of its minority cultures, it does indicate a remarkably high acceptance of cultural diversity in the country, that is rooted in the ideology of 'freedom of choice'. Certain remarks on Swedish multiculturalism need to be made however. The country has been primarily focussed on its existing national minorities, rather than its immigrants. This is not illogical, given that the language rights for minorities seem to be largely the result of the advocacy of national minority groups. Furthermore, the language policy has been slowly dismantled, to the point where well organised minority groups set up their own mother-tongue education institutions. This potentially creates similar issues as in the Dutch case, as immigrants themselves will de facto be primarily responsible for mother-tongue classes, which inevitably leads to differences in content and quality. Concerning Swedish language acquisition however, the SFI system is both competently organised and freely available for every immigrant. Sweden is thus in terms of its tradition a peculiar case: it switched from assimilation to high degrees of multilingualism on paper, to a more hollow form of multilingualism in the present day. Its linguistic infrastructure is still comparatively robust: the facilities for mother-tongue education are still in place, and the SFI system is accessible to all.

In short, when maintaining the notion of national models and policy traditions, the three countries fall mainly into different categories from those envisioned in the literature. The Netherlands is currently in a state of laissez-faire assimilation, or as Van Houdt, Suvavierol and Schinkel (2011) put it, a state of 'neo-liberal communitarianism', where immigrants have very few linguistic rights and are for the most part responsible for their own Dutch language acquisition. The French model offers language rights for immigrants, on the condition that they learn French to a high standard. France is thus

from a language policy perspective not as assimilationist as might be expected based on previous scholarly work, and is in fact pursuing a relatively diversity-friendly linguistic policy, that steers closer towards the multicultural end of the spectrum. Lastly, Sweden is still a country that offers extensive rights to its minority language communities, but the practical organisation of the policy and its under-funding make it questionable exactly how multicultural the country still is in practice.

Table 8.1:

Summary of interview results[21]

Groups / Themes	Turks in NL	Poles in NL	Turks in FR	Poles in FR	Turks in SWE	Poles in SWE
Connection host language & socio-economic integration	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Host language & socio-cultural integration	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Mixed	Positive
Mother tongue & socio-economic integration	Mixed	Negative	Positive	Negative/mixed	Positive	Positive
Mother tongue & socio-cultural integration	Mixed	Negative	Negative/ mixed	Positive	Positive	Positive
Solid quality host- language education facilities	Negative/ mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Positive	Negative/ mixed	Positive/ mixed
Solid quality mother-tongue education facilities	Negative	Negative	Negative/ mixed	Positive (private institutions)	Negative/ mixed	Negative/ mixed
Transnationalism	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Does government policy vis-à-vis migrant languages influence respondents' attitude towards their mother tongue?	Negative	Negative	Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive
Does English improve motility?	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Does mother tongue improve motility?	Negative	Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive	Negative
Does socio-economic status influence attitude towards mother tongue?	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive

Source: interview data Appendix II.

[21] **Table 8.1.** summarises the interview results by categorising the main interview themes. It shows the general sentiment of the interviewees regarding each topic. For example: the data show that the Turks interviewed in the Netherlands generally agreed there is a connection between mastery of the host language and socio-economic integration, hence that cell states 'positive'.

For all the differences between the three countries however, there are also several similarities. First of all, all three countries responded in a similar way to their stream of guest workers in the 1970s: they all set up limited provisions for mother-tongue education to anticipate the return of the guest workers. All three states went through a state of diversity-friendly policy (regardless of motivations) in the 1980s. Starting in the 1990s all three shifted their focus even more to their national (i.e. French, Dutch and Swedish) language, at least rhetorically. These fundamental similarities beg the question how relevant the theoretical classification in national models of integration is in practice, at least concerning language policy vis-à-vis immigrants. This question will partially be answered in a later section of this chapter.

Migrants

The main reason for interviewing both Turks and Poles within the three countries mentioned was to compare an EU migrant group with a non-EU one, to see if some group-based differences could be found. In addition, both groups have a sizeable presence in all three countries studied, and also in other EU countries that are outside the scope of this research, which allows us to study whether processes of 'transnationalism' take place within these communities. In this section the main similarities and differences within and between groups will be listed.

The first, perhaps obvious, similarity between all groups is the importance they attach to learning the host language (i.e. Dutch, Swedish or French) for their socio-economic opportunities within their countries of residence. Virtually all interviewees deemed this of the utmost importance. The ones that had a poor understanding of the host language regretted that this was the case and pointed usually to external circumstances, such as a very busy job, that forced them to neglect their language studies. A similar trend could be seen for socio-cultural opportunities, which in practice means the ability to connect to 'natives' in the country of residents. However, a notable exception in this case are the Turks in Sweden. Speculatively, the Turks in Sweden interviewed were part of a largely self-sufficient community, that experienced little need to connect to native Swedes.

The second similarity concerns the extensive discontent about the practical organisation of linguistic facilities in the countries of residence, both concerning mother-tongue education and host-language acquisition. Usually the courses were deemed too theoretical with little emphasis on practical conversation, the teaching quality was poor, or there was too little time for the courses to be effective. France is a remarkably positive exception, with the Poles in France being very positive, and the Turks in France moderately so, especially about the facilities in the past.

Thirdly, it is obvious that there is a high degree of transnationalism among Turkish and Polish immigrants and their descendants in all three countries. They are often in contact with friends and relatives in their country of origin, or ethnic peers in other EU

countries. This means obviously that they all use their mother tongues on a frequent basis. These extensive transnational contacts do not lead all groups to believe that their mother tongues improve their motility within Europe. It could be argued that, especially given the major presence of Turks and Poles in many European countries, that the mastery of their mother tongue is an asset in connecting with their co-ethnics when migrating. Only the Turks in France, Poles in France and Turks in Sweden seem to identify this mechanism as such. At the same time however, and perhaps unsurprisingly, English is universally valued as a very significant tool for motility.

A fourth similarity is how the interviewees view 'integration'. They mainly identify it in the 'Berryan sense', namely as a reciprocal process where there should be room for their heritage language and culture and the host society language and culture simultaneously. None of the interviewees expressed a desire to assimilate. This result confirms earlier studies, where it was found that in general migrants prefer the 'integration' acculturation strategy (Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2003, Hehman et al. 2011, Rojas et al. 2014).
The main differences between the groups lie mainly in the values they attach to mother-tongue education, and the way government policy influences their attitudes towards the mother tongue. Only the Turks in Sweden and Poles and Turks in France see a positive effect of their mother tongues on their socio-economic and socio-cultural integration. It can be speculated that Swedish policy in practice is more positive towards bilingualism and mother tongues than in the other countries. However, that does not explain why the Turks in France and not the Poles in France value their mother tongues in a similar fashion.

A final difference that emerged is the importance of socio-economic status (SES) for the attitudes of the interviewees towards language in general. Low SES interviewees in general placed a much higher emphasis on the economic aspects of language, which in general made them value the host language over their mother tongue. Sometimes they either opposed mother-tongue education, or even transmitting their language to their children at all for this reason. High SES interviewees placed more emphasis on the cultural aspects of language, alongside the economic ones. They were usually also well informed on the advantages of bilingualism and raised their children bilingually, regardless of the policy of their country of residence.

Documents and interviews: how do 'national models' affect migrants' appropriation and competence?

The study of national models led to two provisional conclusions. Firstly, assuming the national model approach is valid, the categories that are often attributed to France, Sweden and the Netherlands are disputable. Secondly, given some fundamental similarities between the countries, it could be questioned whether in the case of language policy vis à vis migrants, the national model approach is valid at all.

However, after examining the theoretical discussions on national models, several possible hypotheses can be formulated based on the policy practices observed in this research, regarding the effects of the respective policies on migrants' motility. In the Netherlands immigrants would score relatively low on both host-language acquisition and mother-tongue education, given the state of the linguistic infrastructure (access) and the low support for multilingualism amongst policy makers. This might be slightly different for older migrants, who mainly experienced the Dutch system in the 1980s. For France and Sweden, the evaluation should be markedly more positive, since both countries on paper value multilingualism more than the Netherlands and have a more developed linguistic infrastructure. When analysing the interviews in this research these hypotheses are only partially confirmed. Swedish language policy for instance seems to have had a significant trickle-down effect on individual migrant families. It was often mentioned that teachers played a significant role when migrant families decided whether to enrol their children for mother-tongue education classes and whether they should raise them bilingually. For the Poles in France the situation is similar, however not so for the Turks in France. This difference could perhaps be explained due to differences in language hierarchy (Polish as a European language is perhaps easier to promote than Turkish), or a difference in region (most Poles were interviewed in the Paris region, a significant number of Turks in the Alsace around Mulhouse). These are just examples of the positive effects policy may have, but it is just as interesting that the policy climate does not have any negative effects. Even though in the Dutch case, for instance, the migrants reported very little support for their mother tongues, this barely influenced their view on their mother tongues in a negative way. Similar to other countries, support for bilingualism was dependent on socio-economic status, with the only difference being that there was no teacher to raise support for mother-tongue transmission amongst low SES parents, as there was in Sweden.

This also leads to one of the most important trends observed when comparing the documents with the interview data: the effects of language policy on competence and appropriation should not be overestimated. The economic and cultural capital of the family in which one is born is much more relevant than a country's language policy. The former determines whether a child is raised bilingually at all, and if it is raised bilingually, the quality of the education. Perhaps unsurprisingly, high SES families have a better command of the language compared to low SES families, have more access to information and have the resources to supplement sparse government provision and find extra-curricular education. Especially if these high SES families are supported by a relatively powerful kin-state (i.e. Poland and Turkey) that is willing to set up facilities in the country of residence, the governmental language policy of their country of residence declines in relevance. This development however serves to widen the rift that exists between high and low SES families. Since high SES families have better access to good linguistic facilities, their children will have a better command of the mother tongue, which increases their linguistic competence. Their increased linguistic competence means they possess a higher amount of human capital, and thus also a much higher degree

of motility. Government policy that guarantees at least a minimum standard of competence in the mother tongue could perhaps somewhat mitigate these differences.

Chapter 9

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In the scientific literature, starting as early as the nineteenth century, migration scholars have attempted to design a comprehensive theory that explains the origin of migration flows. The scholarly road starts with the demographers, who primarily looked at population density as an explanation for migration. Later, especially from the 1950s onwards, other disciplines such as economics, psychology and sociology contributed to the discussion. The list of explanatory factors grew quite extensive. Economic inequality, both at the individual and country level, approached from classical economics or Marxist perspectives, and psychological issues such as relative deprivation and social networks, are some of the major factors studied to explain the existence and growth of migration flows. Against the backdrop of continuing technological developments in transportation and communications, the fact that these ingredients for migration are still very much present in current times renders the assumption valid that migration flows will persist in the decades to come. This broad array of existing theories on migration has however paid little attention to one other possible factor, one that plays an important role in the everyday life of virtually every individual: language. Language is at best seen as an afterthought, or a small component of the wider theory. For instance, language is part of an individual's human capital, the latter concept being central in the economists' explanation of migration. Language is also relevant in the social networks explanation: obviously, without a common language, maintaining such networks becomes a complicated endeavour. One of the main goals of this research was to explore whether and how language can be integrated as an explaining factor in migration theory. This integration however needs to take place in a different way. Existing theories all, to a large extent, have been concerned with direct explanations for migration. The relationship between language and migration is necessarily indirect. Obtaining a high-level language certificate, as proof of good mastery of a language, would in many cases not directly lead to migration. The hypothesised indirect relationship between language and migration thus renders it complex to integrate language as an explanation in existing migration theory frameworks. It is for this reason this research first turned to the mobility theories as laid out by John Urry, which eventually led us to the motility framework (Kaufmann et al. 2005, Houtkamp 2014, 2018). John Urry's framework's major advantage is that it allows for a fluid understanding of mobility. Migration in its classic meaning involves 'uprootment'. This is what differentiated the concept from its counterpart 'residential mobility', moving without cutting economic and social ties with one's previous space of living. The assumption that migration and uprootment go hand in hand has been challenged due to technological advancements. Increased ease of travel and communication via internet services render it relatively simple to remain in touch with the country of origin. Urry's mobility framework not only acknowledges that 'uprootment' rarely takes place in the present day; it also expands the scope of mobility to

entail not just physical displacement. Ideas such as virtual mobility (i.e. being 'mobile' by for example skyping with family and friends in the country of origin) are not merely fitting analytical concepts for the current age, but also allow for a more relevant role for language when discussing mobility. However, one final theoretical component was still required to make language and mobility/migration fit logically in a theoretical sense, namely a concept that emphasises the indirect nature of the relationship. For these purposes, the biological, and later urban geographical concept of motility played a pivotal role in this study. Motility was developed to be applied not only to the local, but also the global level. Attempts have been made as well to integrate it within existing socio-linguistic models, such as the EGIDS (Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale) of Fishman, and Lewis and Simon (Lewis and Simon 2010). Socio-linguistic research and migration research have been connected through the motility framework. The three components of motility (access, competence and appropriation) were the recurring themes of this research. In step with a deeper understanding of the distinctions between assimilation, integration, segregation and inclusion, which has been extensively developed in this research, the motility framework offers a lens through which the linguistic aspects of both inclusion and mobility can be studied.

It has been stated many times over the course of this study that motility is still a fledgling concept, in need of further development, especially when applied to the global level. Thus, this research has had a strong explorative character. Through studying policy documents and secondary sources about linguistic policy vis-à-vis migrants, and using in-depth interviews with immigrants, the goal of this analysis was to gain a solid understanding of how motility and language policy are related to one another, and how that might eventually provide avenues for further research. The policy documents were selected based on their relevance for the language policy towards migrants, in order to comprehend whether from a language policy perspective the countries studied fit into the ideal-types, or 'national models', in which they are usually categorised, and secondly whether the linguistic infrastructure as put forward in the documents can potentially increase or decrease the motility of the targets of the policy, namely the migrants and their descendants. It was assumed that the two most relevant parts of the linguistic infrastructure were host-language and mother-tongue education facilities. The analysis showed that France, the Netherlands and Sweden barely fit into the ideal-types in which they are often classified. France, with its ELCO policy that is integrated in the secondary school system, can hardly be considered a linguistically assimilationist state; the Netherlands has never been a consistent defender of multiculturalism or multilingualism and instead approached diversity very much from a pragmatic angle, with the primary goal to let mother-tongue education be a bridge towards Dutch language acquisition. Sweden meanwhile offered generous multicultural facilities on paper, but in practice especially its mother-tongue education policy for immigrants suffers from several organisational and financial problems. For all the differences, the policy trajectories of these three ideal-typically different countries are remarkably similar in many fundamental aspects, which could be considered an argument against the idea of 'path-dependency'.

However, some exploration of the practical policy effects has been conducted, through the in-depth interviews among the Turkish and Polish communities in the three countries. This research is one of the few studies that has attempted to incorporate into the analysis the views of those at whom the language policy is targeted. The interviews are therefore truly the backbone of the work. The Turks and Poles, being a non-EU and an EU migrant group, did not display any different attitudes based on ethnicity. However, the policy of their country of residence did seem to affect their perspectives on their mother tongue in particular: policy promoting bilingualism affects the rate of language transmission positively, whilst negative or 'no' policy seems to have little effect at all. External factors, such as transnationalism and especially the socio-economic status of the migrants, have a remarkably stronger influence on attitudes towards language than the policy in place at a given time. To embroider Brecht's famous aphorism, one could argue: 'Erst das Fressen, und dann die Kultur'. Less affluent migrants put more emphasis on the economic aspects of language, combined with a lack of information on the positive effects of bilingualism on a child's human capital, which can lead them to oppose mother-tongue education facilities, and sometimes even inspires them to decide not to transmit their mother tongue. This attitude can relatively easily be countered with positive policy, as the examples of Swedish teachers informing migrant parents show. At the same time, the interviews confirm the large influence of transnationalism, as migrants are very frequently in contact with their family and friends in the country of origin, or even their ethnic peers in other European countries.

Due to transnationalism, policies steering towards linguistic assimilation are practically impossible to render successful. Immigrants and their descendants will use their mother tongue whenever they wish, regardless of any policy. The interviews, in line with previous empirical studies, showed that migrants have very little desire to assimilate completely in their host country. The absence of policy can potentially widen the gap between high SES and low SES migrants. They are capable themselves of transmitting a high level of their mother tongue to their children or have the resources to find private education for them. Low SES migrants either erroneously assume that bilingualism hinders the development of their children, or pass on a lower level of their mother tongue. Multilingualism, and by extension motility, is a tool for the rich, a situation that is bound to persevere when an adequate policy framework is absent.

Furthermore, mother-tongue skills can increase motility. For some groups interviewed, it was clear that they use their Turkish and Polish to migrate between EU countries, so they can connect with their ethnic peers before making the leap to the wider host society, a process that has been aptly described by Putnam as 'bonding' versus 'bridging'(Putnam 2007). Even though the English language was, perhaps unsurprisingly, considered a far more potent tool for motility, the mother tongue plays a very important role as well.

Taking the document analysis and the interviews together, the essence can be summarised as follows, along the lines of the three components of motility.

In terms of *access,* the linguistic infrastructure in the countries studied is deficient, although not to the same degree. The Netherlands is lacking in the areas of host-language and mother-tongue education, since the former is not accessible due to its financial and organisational costs, and the latter has been practically non-existent since 2004. This is a sentiment that is confirmed by the interviews among Turks in the Netherlands and Poles in the Netherlands. Sweden's host-language facilities are deemed, both on paper and by the interviewees, of very decent quality; however its mother-tongue facilities are generous but not always well delivered. France's facilities are in both areas well organised, and regarded as such by the interviewees.

Competence is difficult to evaluate, since this conclusion relies mostly on the self-reported linguistic competence of the interviewees. Based on those self-estimates however, the interviewees in general are at best moderately satisfied with the results of their education, both in their mother tongue and the host language. Some have suggested practical reforms to remedy this problem, such as an increased focus on practical language application or diversifying the levels both in host-language and mother-tongue education classes.

Appropriation, or the migrants' perspective on the value of their language in relation to their mobility opportunities, shows a diverse palette. It shows how little policy matters for their perspective, with the exception of positive policy for some low SES migrants.

In conclusion, this study has achieved most of its main goals. It has managed to integrate language and migration into a theoretical framework, unlike other attempts made before, connecting some socio-linguistic theory with migration theory. It did so by developing an existing concept, 'motility', to make it fit for analysis on the global level rather than just the local. Furthermore, it managed to gain valuable perspectives based on the policy documents and the interviews with migrants on the state of present- day integration policy, focussing primarily on language. These insights also provide both theoretical and practical avenues on language policies vis-à-vis migrants. The study explored the relevant factors for motility and has therefore laid the groundwork for future empirical work.

Future research

This study, due to its explorative nature, provides a number of building blocks for future research. Firstly, the concept of motility inevitably raises important normative questions: do individuals have a right to mobility capital and should it be provided by the state? Should states strive to balance motility and inclusion for their citizens, or is one of the two more important than the other? This study assumed firstly, that individuals have a right to mobility capital and secondly, that motility and inclusion need to be as balanced as possible (in the instance where such a trade-off actually exists), but these assumptions are not beyond normative scrutiny.

Secondly, integration of socio-linguistic studies and motility can be further developed, either by continuing on the path of this study, namely making the connection with EGIDS and Fishman's work (Fishman 1991), or by opening other, new avenues. One of the main achievements of this study is the solidification of the new motility concept into existing theoretical frameworks, but its theoretical integration need not end here. A second theoretical line of inquiry would be to continue to develop the concept of 'transnational inclusion'. In this study, transnational inclusion was carefully raised as a possibility to make the concept of inclusion fit for the current globalising world, by 'freeing' it from the confinements of the nation state. It lay beyond the scope of this study, which was still in essence nation-state focussed, to expand further upon this idea.

Empirically, future studies could gain significantly from the explorative insights presented in this study. This study has elaborated on existing work and identified new relevant factors, which could be implemented in a quantitative study in order to solidify the motility concept with more empirical material. Testing motility, and especially when focussing on its linguistic components quantitatively, would require a longitudinal approach, that, for example, tracks the migration patterns of individuals based on their (newly acquired) linguistic skills. A second important empirical test could be to expand the scope of countries and/or immigrant communities studied. In this research Turks and Poles were chosen because of their relatively high presence in many EU countries. This fact alone however greatly impacts their motility: their mother tongues are widely spoken both in their relatively large kin-states and among ethnic peers in other states. For this study that was an asset, as it allowed us to study the effects of transnationalism, but it is also relevant to investigate the effects on motility of smaller mother tongues. On the country level it might be interesting to study the policy of other larger European countries, such as Germany. Incorporating 'sending' countries such as Poland or Turkey, to analyse the effects of their linguistic policies on motility, or to study their involvement in the migrants' country of origin regarding language training, would also be rich avenues to consider for further research.

Finally there is the involvement of the emigration countries with their diasporas, concerning their integration in general but also language education in particular. It is unquestionable from the interviews and scholarly work that both the Polish and Turkish governments are exercising a degree of influence on their (former) citizens in other European countries. The Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (HCI) in France even explicitly states that the Turkish influence in France is a major argument for organising Turkish language education within the French education system. Otherwise, the HCI argues, French-Turkish children may instead enrol in extra-curricular education organised by institutes such as Diyanet, which would also submit them to ideologies that run counter to the French republican values. A longitudinal study of the effects of such education on diaspora children could shed light on the degree of (undesirable) influence such extra-curricular education may have. This in turn could lead to an important shift in thinking about migrant language policy: the shift from a national to a global, geopolitical perspective.

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Appendix I

ORIGINAL EXTRACTS FROM TEXTS IN THE POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS[22]

1.1 Nota buitenlandse werknemers (1970). Kamerstuk 10504.

Waarschijnlijker is, dat bij hem deze gedachte eerst zal postvatten, nadat hij zelf aan de Nederlandse samenleving is aangepast en tot de overtuiging is gekomen dat een langer verblijf hier voor hem als hoofd van het gezin perspectieven biedt (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 9).

Bij de inpassing van de groep van buitenlandse werknemers in de Nederlandse samenleving is sprake van wederzijdse aanpassing. De buitenlander moet zich enigermate aan de nieuwe situatie, d.i. het Nederlands leefpatroon, weten aan te passen, de Nederlandse bevolking zal bereid dienen te zijn een voor haar vreemde groep met afwijkende gewoonten etc. te aanvaarden. Hierdoor zullen conflicten worden vermeden terwijl het persoonlijk welbevinden van de buitenlanders wordt bevorderd. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 10).

Hierbij gaat het om voorlichting aan de Nederlandse bevolking omtrent de aard van de „vreemde groepen" en de implicaties die hun aanwezigheid kan hebben voor de Nederlandse samenleving, waarbij vooral ook de positieve beïnvloeding van andere culturen op onze samenleving niet uit het oog mag worden verloren, anderzijds voorlichting aan de buitenlandse werknemers over het land en de streek welke hen ontvangen en de moeilijkheden die zich bij de aanpassing kunnen voordoen. In dit verband is het van belang dat de grootste hindernis van wederzijds contact, de taalbarrière wordt doorbroken. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 10).

In het aanpassingsproces is de verblijfsduur een belangrijke factor. Ten aanzien van de buitenlandse werknemers, die doorgaans slechts korte tijd in ons land zullen verblijven, zal het accent zelfs voornamelijk op het behoud van eigen identiteit worden gelegd. Heraanpassingsmoeilijkheden bij terugkeer naar eigen land zullen dan zo gering mogelijk zijn (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 10)

[22] The extracts are featured in the same order as in the dissertation.

Hier rijst de vraag welk soort onderwijs nodig is: - zuiver eigen nationaal onderwijs met het oog op een mogelijke terugkeer van de ouders naar hun eigen land, zodat de aansluiting op het onderwijs daar geen moeilijkheden oplevert; - zuiver Nederlands onderwijs ten einde de integratie van de kinderen in Nederland te bespoedigen en hen alle kansen op onderwijsgebied hier aanwezig te doen benutten; in dit laatste geval moet dan zeker aanvullend onderwijs worden gegeven dat ten doel heeft de kinderen de nodige kennis van hun eigen taal en cultuur bij te brengen om de kloof, die tussen ouders en kinderen bij emigratie te ontstaan, zo klein mogelijk te doen zijn. Bovendien zal in de meeste gevallen een overbrugging als overgang van nationaal naar Nederland onderwijs noodzakelijk zijn. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 12).

1.2 Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers (1974). Kamerstuk 10504.

Ook moet ermee rekening worden gehouden, dat degenen die het beste aanpassingsvermogen hebben, het langst zullen blijven. Dit betekent dat de groep buitenlandse werknemers door de tijd een selectieproces ondergaat. Wenst de buitenlandse werknemer na enige tijd de overkomst van zijn gezin, dan ligt hierin een aanwijzing dat de man een positieve keuze heeft gedaan voor vestiging in Nederland. (Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1974: 4).

Het streven naar een vermindering van de toelating is gebaseerd op een veranderd inzicht in de waarde van economische groei op zich en op de problemen die daarmee samenhangen (...). Daarnaast spelen factoren als een toenemende bevolkingsdruk en de daaruit voortvloeiende aantasting van het sociale milieu een rol. (Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1974: 6).

Ten slotte zal er zorg voor gedragen moeten worden, dat buitenlandse werknemers een eigen ontmoetingsmogelijkheid wordt geboden, waar zij enige houvast vinden in eigen waarden en gewoonten, omdat goede relaties met de omringende samenleving niet te verwachten zijn van mensen die ontworteld raken en het besef van eigen waarde dreigen te verliezen. (Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1974: 14).

Wat betreft de mogelijke tegenspraak tussen de gewenste redelijke inpassing in de Nederlandse samenleving enerzijds en behoud van de eigen identiteit anderzijds, zijn de ondergetekenden van mening, dat deze doelstellingen elkaar zeker niet uitsluiten, zelfs elkaar eerder aanvullen. (...)

In het kader van de milieu-opbouw - het bevorderen van eigen identiteit en groepsleven - hebben de buitenlandse werknemers met hun gezinnen voldoende gelegenheid tot het samen beleven van eigen godsdienstige en culturele waarden. Ook komt dit tot uiting in het aanvullend onderwijs aan kinderen van buitenlandse werknemers. (Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1974: 19).

De eerstgenoemden dienen zo kort mogelijk in een opvangklas te worden geplaatst, ten einde hen zo snel mogelijk met de Nederlandse taal vertrouwd te maken, waarna volledige integratie in het Nederlandse onderwijs kan plaatsvinden. Dit betekent echter niet, dat deze kinderen geen onderwijs zouden kunnen ontvangen in de taal en de cultuur van het land van herkomst indien hun ouders zulks zouden verlangen. De leerlingen, waarvan vaststaat, dat zij na enkele jaren Nederland weer zullen verlaten, zouden in ieder geval naast het Nederlandse onderwijs dit aanvullend onderwijs behoren te ontvangen. (*Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1974: 21).

1.3. Minderhedenbeleid (1981). Kamerstuk 16102.

Met de raad is de Regering van mening, dat Nederland een multi-etnische en multi-culturele samenleving is geworden, waarin minderheden op een gelijkwaardige plaats recht hebben. Waar het om gaat is, welke betekenis we hieraan moeten toekennen. Voor de Regering sluit dit twee soorten verhoudingen uit nl. de gedwongen assimilatie en segregatie. (*Minderhedenbeleid* 1981: 5).

Het streven de minderheden een gelijkwaardige plaats in de Nederlandse samenleving te geven veronderstelt het eerbiedigen van de eigenwaarde van deze groeperingen. Maar cultuur of identiteit zijn geen statische zaken. De immigranten zullen op een andere manier in Nederland zich zelf zijn dan het geval was in het land van herkomst.

(...)Wat geldt voor minderheden geldt ook voor alle geledingen van de meerderheid. Door de komst van de etnische minderheden is de samenleving veranderd. Van de hier geboren en getogen Nederlanders vraagt dit eveneens om aanpassing aan een nieuwe situatie.

(...)Tegenover de eerdere afwijzing van een geïsoleerde positie van minderheden (segregatie) stelt de Regering de mogelijkheid van een volwaardige deelname aan onze samenleving. Er moet een open communicatie mogelijk zijn tussen autochtonen en allochtonen om zo van elkaars opvattingen kennis te kunnen nemen en zich aan elkaar aan te passen.

Deze drie punten laten zich het best samenvatten in de formule: «wederzijdse aanpassing in een multiculturele samenleving met gelijke kansen voor autochtonen en allochtonen». (*Minderhedenbeleid* 1981: 6).

1.4. Minderhedennota (1983). Kamerstuk 16102.

Het minderheden beleid is erop gericht voor minderheidsgroepen die voorwaarden te scheppen, die noodzakelijk zijn om te kunnen emanciperen in en te kunnen deelnemen aan de samenleving. Bevorderd moet worden dat wederzijdse aanpassingen en aanvaarding van alle bevolkingsroepen plaats kan hebben. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 10).

Dit betekent enerzijds dat de Nederlandse samenleving ruimte moet bieden aan minderheden om zich te ontplooien. Anderzijds betekent dit dat van minderheden mag worden verwacht dat zij zich instellen op het deelnemen aan de Nederlandse samenleving en dat zij zich inspannen om zich de sociale vaardigheden eigen te maken- inclusief een voldoende beheersing van de Nederlandse taal- die daarvoor noodzakelijk zijn. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 11).

Zo zal de gebrekkige beheersing van de Nederlandse taal voor veel leden van etnische groepen een evenredige deelname aan tal van voorzieningen in de weg staan. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 18).

1. Het onderwijs dient leden van minderheidsgroepen voor te bereiden op en in staat te stellen tot volwaardig sociaal-economisch, maatschappelijk en democratisch functioneren en participeren in de Nederlandse samenleving, met de mogelijkheid dat te doen vanuit de eigen culturele achtergrond;
2. Het onderwijs dient, onder meer via intercultureel onderwijs, de acculturatie van minderheden en overige leden van de Nederlandse samenleving te bevorderen. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 19-20).

De visie op dit (ETC)-onderwijs is de laatste jaren aan verandering onderhevig. In eerste instantie was dit onderwijs bedoeld voor kinderen van buitenlandse werknemers waarvan men aannam dat zij op een zeker moment zouden remigreren. Na het uitbrengen van het advies van de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [the WRR, my addition CH] in 1979, waarin werd gesteld dat het beleid ten aanzien van de minderheden zou moeten uitgaan van een permanent verblijf van deze groepen in Nederland, is ook de visie op ETC-onderwijs veranderd. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 28).

1. het kan een bijdrage leveren aan de ontwikkeling van het zelfconcept en het zelfbewustzijn van de leerling.
2. het verschaft een betere kennis van en toegang tot de cultuur van hun land van herkomst, waardoor contacten met familieleden, vrienden en kennis uit en in het moederland kunnen blijven gehandhaafd.
3. het maakt bij remigratie inpassing in het schoolsysteem dáár gemakkelijker. (*Minderhedennota* 1983: 28).

1.5. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) (1989). ***Allochtonenbeleid.***

In dit rapport verstaat de raad onder ‘allochtoon’: van niet-Nederlandse herkomst.

‘Allochtonen’ zijn dus vreemdelingen in juridische zin, ex-vreemdelingen die tot Nederlander zijn genaturaliseerd, Nederlanders afkomstig uit de (voormalige) overzeese gebiedsdelen, alsmede hun nakomelingen tot in de derde generatie voor zover die zich

als allochtoon wensen te zien. Een ‘minderheid’ is een allochtone groepering in een achterstandspositie. (WRR 1989: 15).

De term ‘integratie’ wordt hierna gebruikt in de zin van gelijkwaardige deelname in de belangrijkste maatschappelijke sectoren en instituties. (WRR 1989: 15).

In het onderwijs moeten volgens de raad betere voorzieningen worden gecreëerd voor de opvang van niet-Nederlandstalige leerlingen. De raad pleit voor (...) voor invoering van taalklassen voor allochtone kleuters die aan het begin van het basisonderwijs het Nederlands onvoldoende beheersen. Ook in de voorschoolse periode dienen betere opvangvoorzieningen voor allochtone kinderen te komen. (WRR 1989: 12).

Ook voor de volwasseneneducatie dienen veel betere voorzieningen te komen.
(...) De raad is voorstander van invoering van een leerrecht voor volwassen leden van minderheden. Zij zouden ten minste een basiscursus Nederlands en een cursus oriëntatie op de Nederlandse samenleving moeten kunnen volgen. (WRR 1989: 12).

Voor het welslagen van deze aanpak dienen op uitgebreide schaal nieuwe
methoden te worden ingezet voor het onderwijs in het Nederlands als tweede
taal. (...) De vraag of de moedertaal bij dit taalonderwijs een rol dient te spelen, en zo ja welke, kan dan ook aan de orde komen. (WRR 1989: 40).

In Nederland is hiermee op beperkte schaal geëxperimenteerd, met name onder Turken en Marokkanen. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat deze experimenten vooral in het niet-cognitieve ontwikkelingsdomein leiden tot betere resultaten dan eentalig onderwijs. In het cognitieve domein bleek niet of nauwelijks sprake van zo’n verschil. De sterkere nadruk op de eigen taal bleek niet ten koste te gaan van de kennis van het Nederlands. (WRR 1989: 149).

In paragraaf 1.4.2.2 adviseerde de raad het onderwijs in eigen taal en cultuur voor zover dit thans op de basisscholen wordt gegeven te handhaven, doch het voortaan buiten het reguliere curriculum aan te bieden. Hiermee zou het nemen van initiatieven inzake deze onderwijsvorm duidelijker dan thans bij de allochtone groepen zelf komen liggen. (...) Allochtone groepen aan wie het basisonderwijs op dit punt geen faciliteiten biedt, kunnen desgevraagd in beginsel in aanmerking komen voor een tegemoetkoming in de kosten van het onderwijs in eigen taal en cultuur, voor zover dit het Nederlands onderwijs niet in de weg staat. (WRR 1989: 51).

Het onderwijs in eigen taal en cultuur zal echter niet ten koste mogen gaan van de verwerving van kennis, inzicht en vaardigheden die van belang zijn voor het later functioneren in de Nederlandse samenleving. (WRR 1989: 161).

1.6. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1990), *Voorlopige reactie op het WRR rapport 'Allochtonenbeleid'*.

Zo zal naar het oordeel van het kabinet de komende jaren alle bestuurlijke aandacht uit moeten gaan naar die routes die werkelijk toegang verschaffen tot de samenleving. Integratie van allochtonen is dan zo te verstaan dat het er op aan komt mensen zo toe te rusten dat zij zelfstandig hun maatschappelijke positie kunnen bepalen. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990: 1).

Integratie staat niet tegenover identiteit; het voegt er een dimensie aan toe. Alleen wie voldoende Nederlands spreekt, wie een voldoende beroepsgerichte scholing heeft gekregen, wie heeft geleerd zich staande te houden in een vrij harde en competitieve samenleving kan met behoud van eigen identiteit werkelijk voluit participeren. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990: 2).

1.7. Contouren Nota integratiebeleid (1994). Kamerstuk 23684.

Als leidend beginsel voor een nieuwe visie op de aanwezigheid van personen uit diverse culturen in Nederland - of zij nu nieuwkomer zijn of al langer in Nederland verblijven - hanteert het kabinet het begrip burgerschap. De notie van burgerschap is vanzelfsprekend en vindt haar fundament in de gelijkwaardigheid van elke ingezetene. (...) Burgerschap impliceert voor alle bij het integratieproces betrokkenen een keuze voor een blijvende deelname aan de Nederlandse samenleving met alle daaraan verbonden rechten en plichten. Burgerschap impliceert daarnaast ook het dragen van verantwoordelijkheid van burgers voor elkaar en de bereidheid daaraan daadwerkelijk vorm te geven. (...) Meer dan vroeger het geval was is de wil en inzet van personen uit etnische groepen zich een gelijkwaardige plaats in de Nederlandse samenleving te verwerven van doorslaggevend belang. (Contouren Nota 1994: 5).

Het kabinet kiest voor burgerschap en legt het accent op de integratie van leden van minderheidsgroepen in de samenleving. Daarom wordt niet meer gesproken van «minderhedenbeleid», maar van «integratiebeleid» van minderheidsgroepen. (...) De term integratiebeleid brengt beter tot uitdrukking dat de sociale integratie van minderheidsgroepen en van de daartoe behorende personen een wederkerig proces van acceptatie is. Daarbij moeten zowel door de integrerenden als door de samenleving waarin zij zich vestigen, inspanningen geleverd worden. (Contouren Nota 1994: 6).

1.8. Memorie van toelichting wet inburgering nieuwkomers (1997). Kamerstuk 25114.

Het gegeven van een permanente immigratie op een relatief hoog niveau heeft consequenties voor het integratiebeleid. Het is voor de samenleving en de betrokken nieuwkomers van het grootste belang dat zij zich zo snel mogelijk zelfstandig in die samenleving kunnen redden (...) Inburgering moet in dit verband worden gezien als een eerste stap in het integratieproces: door inburgering worden nieuwkomers in de

gelegenheid gesteld aansluiting te vinden op educatie en arbeidsmarkt. Bij inburgering gaat het om het leren van de Nederlandse taal en het verwerven van een eerste inzicht in de maatschappelijke en staatkundige verhoudingen in onze samenleving en het verwerven van een eerste inzicht in de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt. (Memorie van Toelichting 1997: 1).

1.9. Regeerakkoord Balkenende I (2002). Kamerstuk 28375.

Om integratie een kans van slagen te geven dient de toelating van vreemdelingen die bijdragen aan de integratieproblematiek zo veel mogelijk te worden beperkt. (...) de integratie van kinderen die op latere leeftijd naar Nederland komen verloopt vaak moeizaam. (...) Om rekening te houden met de afnemende kansen op succesvolle integratie wordt de maximumleeftijd voor gezinshereniging, in lijn met het beleid in omliggende landen, aan voorwaarden gekoppeld en verlaagd. (Regeerakkoord Balkenende I 2002: 16).

1.10. Turkenburg, M. (2001). *Onderwijs in allochtone levende talen: Een verkenning in zeven gemeenten.*

Volgens Broeder en Extra (1999) is het opmerkelijk dat evaluatie-onderzoek doorgaans niet was gericht op de vorderingen in de eigen taal, maar zich beperkt heeft tot de effecten van de eigen taal op de Nederlandse taal en op schoolsucces (Broeder en Extra 1999: 5 in Turkenburg 2001: 5).

De indruk die ontstaat uit de gesprekken is dat de gemeenten en ook de schoolbesturen over het algemeen maar weinig affiniteit hebben met het eigentaalonderwijs als cultuureducatie. (Turkenburg 2001: 108).

1.11. Mauco, G. (1932). Les étrangers en France: Etude géographique sur leur rôle dans l'activité économique.

La France es devenue depuis quelques années un des premiers pays d'immigration et le problème de la main-d'œuvre étrangère y apparaît comme un des plus importants de l'heure actuelle. Problème relativement nouveau, au moins par son ampleur, qui a entraîné vers la France une population de près de trois millions d'étrangers. Problème difficile, qui pose une multitude de questions : recrutement, sélection, contrôles sanitaire et professionnel, concurrence, adaptation, assimilation, transfert des épargnes, dangers des minorités, sans oublier toutes les questions d'ordre social, scolaire religieux et moral que soulèvent toujours les grands déplacements de masses humains et qui ne se posaient pas quand les étrangers pénétraient lentement, par une sorte d'osmose permettant une rapide fusion. (Mauco 1932 : I).

Pour qu'une assimilation soit possible, il faut avant tout que l'immigré soit adapté, accoutumé au pays. Il faut qu'il y trouve un bien-être matériel et moral suffisant pour se plaire dans son niveau milieu et être incité à y rester. (Mauco 1932 : 523).

L'un des facteurs les plus importants de l'assimilation est, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, le degré de parenté entre l'immigré et la population indigène. Plus il s'en rapproche au point de vue ethnique et linguistique, plus l'étranger « s'intégrera » facilement dans son nouveau milieu (...) Une grande partie de l'immigration est, d'ailleurs, une immigration frontière , immigration d'osmose, à tous égards la meilleure et la plus saine. Les seuls éléments important dont l'assimilation se trouve gênée, par des différences trop accentuées sont les éléments Slaves : Russes, Polonais, etc. Mais il convient de remarquer que ces différences ne sont pas irréductibles et que la fusion reste possible avec la population française (...) De sorte qu'en dernière analyse, il n'y a guère que les éléments africains ou asiatiques, heureusement pas nombreux, que des différences ethniques et de civilisation rendent presque inassimilables. (Mauco 1932 : 523).

La langue joue un rôle extrêmement important dans l'assimilation. Elle est le véhicule de la pensée et par conséquent de toute influence profonde. Suivant que la langue de l'immigré présentera ou non des analogies avec la nôtre, celui-ci se trouvera plus ou moins isolé, plus ou moins soumis à l'influence de la vie et de la culture françaises. De là, en grande partie, l'adaptation aisée et l'assimilation rapide des éléments venu s des pays voisins : Belges, Italiens, Espagnols, et celles si difficiles et si lentes des Polonais, Tchécoslovaques, Russes, etc… L'importance de la langue est d'autant plus grande, que l'immigré la conserve très longtemps et que, sauf le cas où il est noyé dans la masse française un étranger adulte ne parvient que très difficilement à utiliser la langue française. Pour certains immigrés slaves, asiatiques, l'impossibilité d'acquérir suffisamment notre langue constitue même un obstacle insurmontable à l'assimilation. L'enfant lui-même, malgré l'école et sa nature malléable subit l'influence anti-assimilatrice de sa langue nationale. Ceci est surtout vrai pour les colonies ou groupements autonomes de population étrangère où il y a une sorte de veto des adultes qui empêche l'enfant de subir complètement l'influence de la langue française et de perdre sa langue maternelle. Il la retrouve dès qu'il rentre à la maison ou qu'il parle à des compatriotes et, s'il a des habitudes de piété, c'est elle qu'il utilise toujours pour prier ou chanter et cela quelle que soit sa connaissance du français, car la langue de l'enfance reste la langue de l'âme. (Mauco 1932: 518).

L'Ecole est le facteur d'assimilation le plus important dont dispose le pays. On peut dire que c'est par elle que s'effectue la véritable assimilation : celle de la 2e génération (...) Seuls, les Polonais ont obtenu des employeurs la construction d'écoles privées avec moniteurs polonais enseignant pendant la moitié de l'horaire la langue, l'histoire et la géographie polonaises (...) Mais la Pologne est le seul pays qui ait obtenu ces concessions dangereuses de la part des employeurs, concessions que s'expliquent toutefois par le caractère massif de l'immigration polonaise, la concentration des immigrés et leur attachement à la langue nationale sans analogie avec la nôtre. (Mauco 1932 : 537-538).

1.12. Assemblée Nationale 2e séance du 4 novembre (1974).

Se préoccuper de leur avenir, enfin, ce n'est pas seulement déclarer qu'ils sont libres de choisir entre une assimilation durable et un retour au pays d'origine; c'est aussi, et surtout, leur donner effectivement les moyens d'une assimilation en veillant à préserver, dans la mesure du possible, leurs liens avec leur culture et leur pays d'origine. (...)

Achevant ce panorama de l'évolution du travailleur étranger vivant en France, nous en arrivons à cet instant de son destin où il doit pouvoir choisir librement entre une assimilation plus durable et un retour au pays d'origine. Quelle politique pratique? La solution la plus raisonnable parait finalement de maintenir, dans certaines limites, une politique d'assimilation débouchant normalement sur une pratique plus libérale des naturalisations, tout en jetant les bases d'une politique que je qualifierai de bascule, fondée sur le retour d'une partie des travailleurs étrangers dans leur pays d'origine, dès le moment où ils le souhaitent. (...) Deux séries de mesures devront être prises. D'une part, nous voulons permettre à ceux qui désirent réserver à leur séjour en France un caractère temporaire, de sauvegarder leurs liens avec leur culture d'origine en facilitant le plus possible le maintien des traditions religieuses, des liens culturels, voire l'expression dans la langue maternelle. Cela parait équitable. (...) Enfin, le devoir de la France est d'assurer à tous les travailleurs étrangers qui contribuent à notre prospérité des droits aussi proches que possible de ceux des Français dans le domaine social.

1.13. Haut conseil à l'intégration (2011a). Les défis de l'intégration à l'école et Recommandations du Haut Conseil à l'intégration au Premier ministre relatives à l'expression religieuse dans les espaces publics de la République.

Recommandation: Depuis son premier rapport de 1991, le HCI a toujours préconisé la suppression des enseignements des langues et cultures d'origines tant ils lui paraissent contraires à l'objectif d'intégration. Il renouvelle ici cette recommandation qu'il considère comme l'expression d'une volonté forte d'intégrer les populations immigrées à la société française et de développer l'enseignement de ces langues inscrites dans le cursus commun d'enseignement des langues vivantes, singulièrement en langue vivante 2 et langue vivante 3. (HCI 2011a: 29).

Les contenus et objets d'enseignement sont trop rarement expertisés et validés (HCI 2011a: 27).

Le maintien des ELCO, notamment en enseignement différé, ne stigmatise-t-il pas des cultures alors que d'autres concentrent l'intérêt et ont pris une place de choix dans l'enseignement des langues vivantes ces dernières années comme le chinois et le japonais? (HCI 2011a: 28).

1.14. Haut conseil à l'intégration (2013). Etude relative à l'avenir de l'enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine (ELCO).

Au terme de cette étude, nous ne saurions trop insister sur le fait que la réussite des enfants de l'immigration passe principalement par la maîtrise de la langue française.

S'agissant du dispositif ELCO, le supprimer ou le laisser s'éteindre n'aurait pas pour objectif de renoncer à l'enseignement des langues étrangères portées par les familles immigrées et leurs enfants. Cependant, cela supposerait de reconnaître d'autres langues de l'immigration actuelle comme le chinois, certaines langues africaines (bambara, soninké), le russe voire le tamoul. Compte tenu de leur multiplicité, leur enseignement ne pourrait être envisagé que par rapport à des demandes locales.

A cet effet, la mise en place de la réforme des rythmes scolaires avec la création d'activités péri-scolaires optionnelles pourrait être une opportunité à saisir pour expérimenter une initiation à ces langues à l'école élémentaire, sans les réserver d'ailleurs aux seuls enfants issus de l'immigration. Le recours à des associations et à des assistants disposant d'un diplôme linguistique permettrait d'offrir un enseignement adapté soumis au contrôle de l'Éducation nationale et indépendant des pays d'origine.

En outre, des initiatives privées fleurissent. Si l'implication des associations peut être encouragée, il nous semble néanmoins utile d'exercer une certaine vigilance. En effet, il nous a été déjà signalé que, sous couvert d'aide aux devoirs ou d'apprentissage linguistique, certaines associations se livraient à un prosélytisme peu favorable à l'intégration.

Dans tous les cas de figure, ces enseignements devraient être encadrés par des conventions assurant la qualité des contenus et des méthodes pédagogiques dans le respect des valeurs de la République. (HCI 2013).

Très majoritairement dispensés en différé, ces enseignements qui relèvent pourtant de l'autorité académique, sont peu contrôlés sauf quand des dérives sont signalées. Ici ou là, l'autorité académique a dû intervenir pour réfuter une enseignante portant un signe religieux ostensible en contradiction avec les lois relatives à la laïcité dans la sphère scolaire. (HCI 2013)

La Turquie, en l'occurrence, est aujourd'hui agitée par un mouvement de rejet du kémalisme, de la laïcité et de l'Europe. Connu pour son entrisme à l'étranger, le gouvernement turc est particulièrement actif en France, notamment à travers les ELCO. De fait, lorsqu'un ELCO n'est pas reconduit, en cycle primaire par exemple, les élèves sont facilement pris en charge par des associations ou des écoles coraniques. Le secteur d'enseignement et culturel privé turc connaît une forte expansion sur le territoire français, soutenue par d'importants moyens financiers. (HCI 2013).

1.15. Eduscol.fr (2019)

Ils sont mis en œuvre sur la base d'accords bilatéraux prenant appui sur une directive européenne du 25 juillet 1977 visant à la scolarisation des enfants des travailleurs migrants.

- Les objectifs poursuivis étaient complémentaires :
- structurer la langue parlée dans le milieu familial,
- favoriser l'épanouissement personnel des jeunes issus d'autres cultures,
- valoriser la diversification des langues à l'école.

Aujourd'hui, ils concernent aussi des enfants qui ne sont pas locuteurs natifs de la langue concernée et s'intègrent progressivement dans l'offre d'enseignement linguistique.

Les enseignements de langue et de culture d'origine concernent principalement le premier degré. Ils sont organisés, dans la mesure du possible, dans les écoles, les établissements où une demande des familles existe. Ils sont ouverts à tout enfant dont la famille souhaite l'inscription, dans la limite des places disponibles.

1.16. LOI n° 2005-32 (2005). LOI n° 2005-32 du 18 janvier 2005 de programmation pour la cohésion sociale (1).

Art. L. 117-1. - Il est proposé, dans une langue qu'il comprend, à tout étranger admis pour la première fois au séjour en France en vue d'une installation durable de conclure, individuellement, avec l'Etat un contrat d'accueil et d'intégration. Ce contrat a pour objet de préciser les conditions dans lesquelles l'étranger signataire bénéficie d'actions, tenant compte de sa situation et de son parcours personnel et destinées à favoriser son intégration dans le respect des lois et des valeurs fondamentales de la République française. Ces actions comprennent notamment, lorsque le besoin en est établi, une formation linguistique (...).

1.17. Contrat d'intégration républicaine (2016).

La langue française est un des fondements de l'unité nationale. La connaissance du français est donc indispensable à votre intégration et favorisera le contact avec l'ensemble de la population. (...) L'inscription à cette formation gratuite est faite par l'Offi ce Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration. (...)

Article 1 : Engagements de l'État

L 'Etat assure l'ensemble des prestations suivantes: (...)

Si nécessaire, une formation linguistique dont la durée est fixée en fonction des besoins et capacités d'apprentissage de la personne. Cette formation est destinée à permettre d'atteindre un niveau de langue correspondant à celui exigé pour le diplôme initial de langue française (DILF).

Appendix II

INTERVIEW DATA

Notes on the data

The interviews were recorded by hand, on a tablet or laptop. After each set of interviews, the documents were lightly edited by the researcher, for purposes of readability and formatting. However, the data remain as raw as possible, including the telegram-style reporting. The interviews were conducted in several different languages (Dutch, English and French) or with the help of a translator in Polish or Turkish. The language originally used to record each particular interview remains unchanged (i.e. interview data recorded in Dutch have not been translated in this appendix), to stay faithful to the original data as much as possible. In some interviews the notes were written in a mixture of several languages. Any particular language choice concerning the notes was made with ease and practicality in mind. Not every interview followed the interview structure to the letter (for example, some respondents unknowingly answered several questions in the course of one answer). This explains why in some interviews certain questions might be missing. The questions/themes are printed in italics.

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2.1. Poles in the Netherlands

Interview 1 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ben gemigreerd in 2012, voor werk. Werk nu in kassen.

How long will he/she stay?
Vraag me elk jaar af hoe lang ik nog blijf. Ben er nu vier jaar. Zolang er werk is blijf ik, als ik hier een gezin vorm blijf ik veel langer.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee, heel klein beetje Engels.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Ik werk alleen maar met Polen, dus spreek nooit Nederlands. Ik werk 40 uur per week en ga 4 avonden naar Nederlandse les. Is heel erg zwaar, veel van mijn collega's houden dit niet vol. Volg nu lessen om Nederlands goed te leren [bij een privaat taalbureau, waar interview plaatsvindt]. Wil goed genoeg Nederlands leren om gesprekken te kunnen voeren en een betere baan te krijgen.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Voor de arbeidsmarkt en contacten met Nederlanders.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, bel heel vaak en spreek ook veel familie via facebook.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Weet ik niet. Ik zou niet willen dat ze in de war raken. Als ze in Nederland wonen moeten ze Nederlands spreken, hier hebben ze weinig aan Pools.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Misschien terug naar Polen. Engeland voor werk eventueel. Anders niks.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, en in mijn geval ook Nederlands. Pools niet zo zinvol: ons land is arm.

Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Ik heb geen idee, geen ervaring mee.

Value of mother tongue education
Ik twijfel eraan of het op school moet. Op school moeten kinderen Nederlands leren. Aandacht voor Pools kan ten koste gaan van Nederlands. Als ik wil dat kinderen Pools leren leer ik het ze zelf wel. Poolse grammatica vind ik niet zo belangrijk.

Interview 2 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ben hier sinds 2014, twee jaar geleden. Ben gekomen om te werken [in de bouw]

How long will he/she stay?
Verwacht hier heel lang te blijven, maar weet niet zeker. Hangt af van arbeidsmarkt.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Zo goed mogelijk. Nederlands is belangrijk in dit land. Is wel heel moeilijk om taal goed te leren: werk nu alleen maar met Polen. Heb naast full-time werk vaak niet de tijd en energie om nog lessen te volgen. Lessen zijn ook duur. Ik kom hier [bij privaat lesbureau] omdat lessen van de gemeente niet helpen. Die waren veel te theoretisch. Er is te weinig aandacht voor de praktijk [spreken met name]. Hier spreken we 80% van de tijd.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Ik wil hier een betere baan, promotie maken. Kan niet zonder Nederlands te leren.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, bijna dagelijks. Heel veel whatsapp en skype. Ben afgelopen twee jaar 5 keer terug geweest.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Denk het wel. Als ik nu kinderen krijg kan ik geen Nederlands tegen ze praten, dus is onvermijdelijk. Lijkt me ook niet slecht als kinderen Pools en Nederlands leren.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Ga misschien terug naar Polen, maar wil nu graag hier in Nederland blijven. Ga alleen weg als hier geen werk meer is.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels. Pools is niet zo nuttig. Geen werk dat zoveel betaalt als hier in Polen. Ken ook geen Polen in andere Europese landen, dus kan daar niet heen.

Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Weet ik niet.

Value of mother tongue education
Ik denk dat moeder-taal onderwijs niet op school moet worden gegeven. Spreek waarschijnlijk al thuis Pools met kind: op school moeten ze Nederlands leren. Anders krijgen ze taalachterstand. Grammatica is niet belangrijk: leren ze wel in de praktijk, anders maakt het ook niet uit. Heb zelf slechte ervaringen met theoretisch taalonderwijs, hoeft ook niet voor mijn kinderen.

Interview 3 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Gekomen in 2011. Om te werken in de bouw. Sindsdien Nederlandse vrouw ontmoet.

How long will he/she stay?
Hele leven, heb hier gezin. Ga niet weg voor de kinderen.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Beetje Engels, maar niet genoeg.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Vloeiend. Ik wil hier blijven wonen dus moet de taal heel goed spreken. Wist lange tijd niet of ik wilde blijven, dus deed geen moeite om taal te leren. Heb sinds drie jaar Nederlandse vrouw en heb 1 klein kind, dus nu doe ik moeite en volg ik taallessen[bij privaat taalbureau].

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Wil communiceren met Nederlandse schoonfamilie, en wil Nederlands kunnen praten met kind. Is ook nodig om een betere baan te krijgen. Wil niet hele leven hard fysiek werk blijven doen en wil meer geld verdienen voor gezin.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, paar keer per week. Spreek veel met ouders via telefoon. Lees soms Poolse krant via internet.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Weet ik niet zeker. Ze wonen in Nederland dus Nederlands is het belangrijkst. Misschien als Pools ze niet hindert bij leren van Nederlands. Ik praat nu weinig Pools tegen haar, probeer het met Nederlands.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, totdat kinderen groot zijn ga ik zeker niet weg.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is allerbelangrijkst. Pools zou kunnen, als Polen een betere economie heeft. Kan ook helpen om makkelijker naar andere Europese landen te gaan, maar ken zelf daar geen Polen.

Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Weet ik niet, heb ik geen ervaring mee.

Value of mother tongue education
Ik twijfel. Op school moet kind Nederlands leren. Mijn Nederlands is te slecht om kind de taal goed te leren, school moet compenseren. Als ik zeker zou weten dat Pools en Nederlands goed samengaan, ben ik ervoor. Meer talen spreken is altijd beter.

Interview 4 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Gekomen in 2008, om te werken in kassen. Sindsdien verschillend werk hier gehad, ook paar keer teruggegaan naar Polen. Blijf nu waarschijnlijk hier.

How long will he/she stay?
Verwacht nog hele tijd, daarom volg ik hier [privaat taalbureau] lessen Nederlands. Volg ik pas sinds paar maanden: daarvoor wist ik het niet zeker. Wilde daarvoor geen tijd en energie steken in leren van Nederlands naast mijn werk. Is vermoeiend en tijdrovend.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Goed genoeg om te kunnen praten. Wil eventueel carrière maken in Nederland. Kan niet zonder Nederlands.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Voor het praten met Nederlanders, en dus voor werk. Nederlanders spreken wel goed Engels, maar die taal spreek ik ook niet goed. Ben niet tevreden over taallessen bij gemeenten. We spraken daar te weinig. Daarom kom ik hier [bij privaat taalbureau], hier is focus op de praktijk en snelle vooruitgang.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ben afgelopen 8 jaar heel vaak teruggeweest als er geen werk meer was. Spreek ook ouders en vrienden paar keer per week, meestal via skype en whatsapp.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Denk het wel, onder voorwaarde dat ze eerst Nederlands leren. Als kinderen hier wonen moeten ze deze taal spreken. Anders maken ze geen kans. Pools komt misschien later. Zou thuis alleen Pools tegen ze praten als mijn

Nederlands niet goed is. Of als ik zeker weet dat ze beide talen goed tegelijk kunnen leren. Zou met lerares op basisschool praten.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik wil echt hier blijven.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, Duits. Grote talen met grote economieën. Pools alleen nuttig voor familiebezoeken, verder niet. Heb niet zoveel met Poolse cultuur of identiteit, taal is voor mij praktisch om te communiceren.

Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Weet ik niet, heb geen kinderen. Begrijp van mijn vrienden dat ze naar weekendscholen moeten. Vind ik begrijpelijk: waarom zou Nederland betalen voor Pools onderwijs? Hier in Nederland moeten kinderen Nederlands leren. Zou mijn kind niet naar Poolse lessen op school sturen, ook als ze er zouden zijn.

Interview 5 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Gekomen in 2010. Heb Nederlandse vrouw leren kennen, daarom woon ik nu hier.

How long will he/she stay?
Hele leven. We hebben kleine kinderen, gaan sowieso niet weg totdat ze ouder zijn. Waarschijnlijk blijven we daarna ook hier, maar weet niet wat toekomst brengt.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Ja, mijn uiteindelijke vrouw.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Engels op B1-B2 niveau. Verder niks.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Vloeiend. Ben heel eind gekomen in praktijk, met mijn vrouw. Vond uiteindelijk extra lessen toch nodig, daarom ben ik hier [bij privaat taalbureau].

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Voor praten met mijn gezin en schoonfamilie. En voor werk. Wil gewoon betere baan, moet je heel goed Nederlands voor spreken. Gebrekkig Nederlands is niet voldoende, behalve voor laagbetaald werk. Mensen hier zijn heel kritisch.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik bel vaak met mijn ouders en broers. Whatsapp en skype niet zovaak, kan ik meer gaan doen. Lees soms Pools nieuws.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja, ze worden tweetalig opgevoed. Op aandringen van mijn vrouw, zij hoorde dat tweetalige opvoeding alleen maar voordelen heeft. Onze kinderen lijken beide talen voor hun leeftijd vrij goed te gaan spreken. Ben ik blij mee: hoe meer talen zij spreken hoe beter. Kunnen ze ook met mijn familie praten.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, voorlopig niet.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is belangrijkst. Frans misschien. Pools niet zo, Poolse economie is nog niet zo sterk. Als dat verandert wordt Pools ook nuttig. Contacten met Polen in andere EU-landen lijkt me economisch niet zinvol. Doen vaak laagbetaald werk, netwerk waar je weinig aan hebt.

Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Nee, er zijn bijna geen mogelijkheden in regulier onderwijs. Moeten naar aparte scholen. Daar zijn we wel tevreden over: bieden lessen in Poolse taal en cultuur zonder nationalistische inslag. Bieden ook lessen in schrijven, die ik niet kan bieden. Is wel belasting voor kinderen: zitten ook zaterdag halve dag op school, is vermoeiend. Ze hebben ook nooit zin. Hopen dat ze later ons dankbaar zijn.

Interview 6 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Gekomen in 2015, jaar geleden. Om te werken.

How long will he/she stay?
Weet ik niet. Hoop lange tijd. Daarom leer ik ook Nederlands.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee, alleen mensen van uitzendbureau.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Zo goed mogelijk. Hangt er vanaf hoelang ik hier blijf, als ik weg moet krijg ik de kans niet om taal goed te leren.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Werk. En contact met Nederlanders. Zijn hier veel meer kansen dan in Polen, Nederlands is goede investering. Is wel moeilijke taal, kost heel veel tijd en energie.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, elke dag. Woon samen met 6 andere Polen. Ben enige die taallessen volgt. Verder veel contact met familie in Polen. Ben nog maar 1x teruggeweest, toen arbeidscontract afliep.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Weet ik niet. Hangt ervanaf waar ze wonen. Als ze in Nederland wonen: misschien. Weet niet of ze twee talen tegelijk kunnen leren, zonder dat Nederlands eronder lijdt. Zou waarschijnlijk gok niet nemen.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Moet misschien uiteindelijk terug naar Polen. Anders niet.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels. Voor mij persoonlijk Nederlands omdat ik hier wil wonen. Pools zou kunnen, weet ik niet.

Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Weet ik niet, heb ik geen ervaring mee.

Value of mother tongue education
Ik twijfel daar sterk aan. Een land moet zijn eigen taal promoten. Waarom zou Polen migranten iets anders leren dan Pools? Slecht voor integratie en samenleving. Veel beter als iedereen gewoon Nederlands leert. Thuis de migrantentaal spreken is prima, niet op school.

Interview 7 (The Hague, 6 Oct. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Gekomen in 2013, om te werken.

How long will he/she stay?
Denk zeker 10 jaar.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee, alleen klein beetje Engels.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Het liefst vloeiend. Ik hou van Nederland en wil hier graag blijven. Wil hier vaste baan krijgen en niet tijdelijk, laag betaald werk.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Werk. Eventueel later ook contact met Nederlanders, maar is niet het belangrijkst.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, vrouw en kinderen wonen daar. Wil ze laten overkomen als ik hier goed werk heb. Spreek ze elke dag via whatsapp, paar keer per week via skype. Is moeilijk om gezin niet te zien, skype verzacht pijn. Ga paar keer per jaar terug naar Polen, soms gedwongen als contract afloopt, soms vrijwillig.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja, ze wonen in Polen dus ze leren Pools. Blijf ook Pools met ze praten als ze hier zouden komen. Polen blijft hun land, hun familie woont daar en hun cultuur is en blijft Pools. Als ze hier komen moeten ze ook Nederlands leren. Dat kan op school.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Moet misschien terug naar Polen. Engeland is moeilijk, want spreek ook niet goed Engels.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is belangrijkst. Als ik goed Engels zou spreken hoefde ik misschien geen Nederlands te leren om hier te leven. Pools is voor mij persoonlijk erg belangrijk, maar in algemeen niet zo nuttige taal. Heb geen contact met Polen in andere EU-landen, weet niet hoe dat zit met andere Polen.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Weet ik niet.

Value of mother tongue education
Zou willen dat er faciliteiten zijn. Erg belangrijk: ik kan mijn kinderen leren praten, veel moeilijker leren schrijven. Moeten ze op school leren. Aparte weekendscholen zijn waarschijnlijk duur en belastend voor kinderen. Zou ik wel naar toe gaan als het niet anders kan.

Interview 8 (Amsterdam, 10 May 2016)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
In 2014, om te werken in bouw.

How long will he/she stay?
Hoop lange tijd, weet niet zeker.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Zo goed mogelijk. Wil hier graag blijven. Ben nu afhankelijk van tijdelijke contracten. Wil vaste baan, daarvoor moet ik Nederlands leren.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Werk, en hier integreren.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, spreek mijn ouders meerdere keren per week, vaak via whatsapp, 1 keer per week via skype. Ik schrijf vaak met familie via facebook, instagram, etc.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Denk het niet. Als ze hier wonen moeten ze Nederlands leren. Als ik nog geen Nederlands spreek als ik kinderen krijg, dan moet ik wel Pools met ze praten. Maar als ik vloeiend Nederlands spreek, dan leer ik ze Nederlands. Wil niet dat ze in de war raken. Wel jammer dat ze niet met mijn familie kunnen praten. Maak misschien uitzondering als mijn vrouw ook Pools is.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Misschien ga ik terug naar Polen. Verder heb ik geen concrete plannen.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is het allerbelangrijkst. Als ik goed Engels zou spreken zou ik waarschijnlijk proberen naar Engeland te gaan, en misschien ook geen Nederlands leren.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Geen idee.

Value of mother tongue education
Ben tegen moedertaalonderwijs. School is de plek waar kinderen Nederlands moeten leren. Alle kinderen zijn gelijk, moeten zelfde onderwijs krijgen. In Polen wil ik ook geen onderwijs in migrantentalen. Slecht voor integratie. Ouders kunnen hun cultuur beste privé houden, leer ze thuis hun eigen taal. Heb geen bezwaar tegen weekendscholen, alleen mijn kind zou er niet naar toe gaan.

Interview 9 (Amsterdam, 10 May 2016)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
In 2009 om te werken in bouw. Heb daarna gezin hier gekregen. Getrouwd met Nederlandse vrouw.

How long will he/she stay?
Hele leven.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Engels.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Vloeiend. Ben te laat begonnen met leren van Nederlands, probeer nu goed te maken. Wil niet alleen met vrouw in Engels kunnen praten.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Hier integreren, met mijn familie kunnen praten en ik wil betere baan krijgen.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ik spreek mijn familie paar keer per week, vaak via korte whatsapp berichten, soms skype. Ga in vakanties vaak terug naar Polen, 2-3 keer per jaar.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Kinderen leren Pools en Nederlands thuis. Gaat vrij goed. We hebben wat informatie opgezocht op internet en hadden idee dat kinderen wel twee talen konden leren. Hebben ook met lerares gepraat op basisschool. Was niet goed op de hoogte, hebben toen maar besloten beide talen te leren. Is goed gegaan, ze spreken nu Pools en Nederlands behoorlijk goed. Zien geen taalachterstand.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, we blijven hier wonen.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels. Heb me heel lang hier in Nederland kunnen redden met mijn Engels, zegt heel veel. Verder Duits en Spaans. Grote talen.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Nee, er zijn helemaal geen mogelijkheden voor onze kinderen. Alleen weekendscholen. Vinden we te belastend voor hen en te duur, dus doen we niet.

Value of mother tongue education
Ben ik erg voor. In deze tijd is het moeilijk om mensen te verbieden hun eigen taal te spreken. Kunnen ze altijd doen via internet etc. Zie ook niet hoe het integratie hindert: Nederlands blijft toch altijd belangrijkst, en terecht. Als kind Nederlands spreekt maakt het verder niks uit of ze 2,3 of 6 talen ernaast spreken: dan zijn ze geïntegreerd.

Interview 10 (Amsterdam, 10 May 2016)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
In 2016, ben hier paar maanden.

How long will he/she stay?
Weet ik niet, hangt van werk af.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Zo goed mogelijk. Ben meteen taallessen gaan volgen toen ik hier kwam.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Ga proberen hier betere baan te krijgen, moet ik Nederlands voor spreken. Anders geen kans, heb ik van vrienden in Polen gehoord die hier ook geweest zijn. Verder sowieso nuttig om nieuwe taal te leren: maakt je altijd aantrekkelijker op arbeidsmarkt.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Dagelijks, via whatsapp. Wekelijks via skype, soms facebook. Volg Pools nieuws via internet elke dag.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Heb geen kinderen. Denk dat ik ze hier wel Pools zou leren, weet niet zeker. Als ik zelf alleen maar Pools zou praten moet ik wel. Als ik Nederlands spreek, leer ik ze misschien alleen Nederlands. Als ik met Poolse vrouw trouw leer ik ze sowieso Pools. Weet niet of tweetalige opvoeding goed is voor kind. Zou ik met leraren op school over praten. Ben niet op de hoogte.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Moet misschien terug naar Polen, en daarna naar ander land. Hangt van werk af.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, zou willen dat ik in Polen beter Engels had geleerd. Had ik veel meer kansen gehad. Duits kan, maar is stuk minder nuttig.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Weet ik niet, ben hier pas kort. Ken ook niemand die ervaring ermee heeft.

Value of mother tongue education
Weet ik niet. Hadden het al over tweetalige opvoeding. Als ik thuis Pools zou praten met kind, dan wil ik misschien dat ze op school alleen Nederlands leren, om balans te bieden. Nederlands is toch het belangrijkst.

Interview 11 (Amsterdam 6 April 2016)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ben hier geboren, heb twee Poolse ouders

How long will he/she stay?
Hele leven, maar hangt er vanaf of ik in buitenland goede arbeidsperspectieven heb. Ik weet niet hoe de economie hier in Nederland zich ontwikkelt. Heb hier wel groot deel van mijn familie en vrienden, dus ga niet zo snel weg.

Language classes

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik skype vaak met opa en oma. Hebben ze met veel moeite geleerd om met mijn ouders en mij contact te houden. Daarvoor belden we vaker.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja absoluut. Ik ben zelf tweetalig opgevoed. Mijn ouders spraken al redelijk Nederlands toen ze mij kregen en hebben Pools en Nederlands tegen mij gesproken. Ik begon wat later met praten, maar die achterstand heb ik al vrij snel ingehaald. Ik spreek nu beide talen vloeiend en dat was veel moeilijker geweest als ik op latere leeftijd Pools had moeten leren. Ben nog steeds ongelofelijk dankbaar dat mijn ouders me die kans hebben gegeven. Ik zou mijn kinderen hetzelfde lot gunnen. Als mijn echtgenoot zelf nóg een andere taal zou spreken dan Pools en Nederlands zou ik zelfs overwegen de kinderen drietalig op te voeden, als dat kan. Ik zou me verdiepen in academische literatuur over taal en proberen met experts in contact te komen voor we een besluit nemen.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Misschien. Duitsland, Frankrijk en Italië vind ik mooie landen, maar ik spreek de talen niet. Engeland zou kunnen, maar economie daar is na Brexit veel slechter dan hier. Ook onzeker of EU-burgers daar kunnen blijven. Heb Brussel overwogen om bij een EU-instelling te werken. Lijkt erop dat ik toch hier blijf.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is het belangrijkst, daarna Duits en Frans, althans voor Europa. Chinees is in de toekomst misschien wel even belangrijk als Engels, maar heel erg moeilijk om te leren. Pools is ook niet slecht: Polen begint economisch beter te draaien. Politiek bevalt het land me nu niet, maar dat kan veranderen. Als ik Polen zou kennen in Duitsland/Frankrijk zou dat een eventuele migratie wel makkelijker maken, dan kan ik met mijn Pools alvast wat informatie inwinnen en wat hulp aan hen vragen. Maar helaas ken ik niemand.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Nee. Op school had ik geen enkele mogelijkheid. Moest uitwijken naar weekendscholen. School waar ik heen ging was goed. Vrees er wel voor dat Poolse regering hier scholen gaat sponsoren, zou kunnen betekenen dat ze de rechtste ideologie ook exporteren. Lijkt me slecht voor Poolse gemeenschap hier. Vind het veel beter als Nederland probeert grip te krijgen op Pools onderwijs. Polen gaan toch wel lessen voor hun kinderen opzoeken als ze willen, dan is het maar beter als Nederland er zicht op heeft.

Het is veel slechter voor integratie als Nederland lessen niet organiseert, en het over laat aan Poolse regering. Polen is erg conservatief, zijn waarden die niet altijd passen bij vrijere Nederlandse waarden. We moeten niet willen dat een generatie Poolse kinderen opgroeit met die waarden.

Interview 12 (Amsterdam 10 Aug 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Geïmmigreerd voor studie. Was 20 jaar. 1 jaar studeren. 2e jaar studeren. Hier afgestudeerd. Drie jaar in Nederland gebleven. 2 jaar gewerkt in London. Drie jaar in Amerika gewoond en gewerkt. Echtgenoot is Engels. Twee jaar in Polen. Drie jaar in Duitsland. Daarna toch besloten in Amsterdam te wonen. Veel vrijheden, vrijheid van meningsuiting. Geen auto nodig. Amsterdam is klein maar heeft wel veel cultuur en geschiedenis.

How long will he/she stay?
Ik zou hier altijd kunnen blijven, maar ik hou zeker de optie open om tijd in Australië te gaan wonen.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Kende geen Polen, maar wel Nederlanders. Een vriend heeft mij erg geholpen, vooral met de taal.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Pools en Russisch, en wat Engels. Spreekt nu ook Duits en Nederlands.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
In begin had ik het nodig voor het lesgeven en voor het eindexamen op het conservatorium. Als je hier wil wonen moet je de taal leren. Ik mis anders alle cultuur. Je redt het ook alleen niet met Pools. Poolse gemeenschap is verspreid en zijn veelal expats. Hebben ook geen tijd om samen te klitten.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Nee, ouders zijn allebei overleden. Broer woont in Amerika of Frankrijk. Familie in Gdansk, niet dagelijks of wekelijks.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Kind is drietalig opgevoed. Pools, Nederlands, Engels. Ik zou mijn kind nooit goed Nederlands kunnen leren, want mijn woordenschat is niet groot genoeg.

Pools-Engels-Nederlandse identiteit. Is nu 15 en 16. Hij is zich nu bewust van zijn eigen identiteit. Identiteit uit zich pragmatisch. Gedraagt zichzelf anders als hij Nederlands spreekt. Kind kan makkelijk 5 talen leren tot z'n 12e. Hersenonderzoek toont dat aan. Na 12e en 13e wordt het moeilijker om de nieuwe taal te leren.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Misschien Italië (vanwege weer en eten), Engeland (natuur), Zuid-Frankrijk, Griekenland.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Italiaans, Frans. Grieks. Maar ik pas me vooral taalkundig aan aan het land waar ik ben.
Language Policy in the Netherlands:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Absoluut niet voldoende. In de klas kennismaken met verschillende nationaliteiten. Kinderen kunnen zich dan bewust worden van de aanwezigheid van verschillende talen. Zou moeten worden aangeboden als onderdeel van de moderne vreemde talen.

Kennis van moedertaalonderwijs bij ouders is vaak gebrekkig. Er zou veel meer voorlichting gegeven moeten worden. Overheid zou meer kennis bij de Poolse gemeenschap moeten halen.

Vindt niet dat moedertaalonderwijs voor het Pools de integratie in de weg staat. Geeft ook zelf altijd advies aan ouders dat kinderen Nederlands moeten leren. Beste is een scheiding tussen thuis de moedertaal spreken (zeker als ouders niet goed genoeg Nederlands spreken). In Nederlands onderwijs is er gewoon te weinig kennis over meertaligheid. Pools taalonderwijs moet ook openstaan voor mensen die geen Poolse achtergrond hebben.

Pools moet aangeboden worden vanwege de economische logica. Gaat met Nederlands onderwijs niet zo goed. Internationale scholen bieden taallessen aan op verschillende niveau's. Ik vind wel dat moedertaal altijd gestimuleerd moet worden, maar het is heel lastig om ook alle faciliteiten voor de kleine taal aan te bieden

Value of mother tongue education

Is de Poolse taalschool waar u werkt een goede vervanger van moedertaalonderwijs dat door de overheid is georganiseerd?
Nee, geen enkel kind heeft een Nederlandse achterstand op onze school. Poolse taal helpt ook met de ontwikkeling van andere talen.

Beleid van assimilatie stopzetten.

Assimilatie is het vergeten van de achtergrond, en de taal en cultuur.
Integratie is thuisvoelen in twee culturen.

Voorbeelden: docenten die Poolse ouders vragen om thuis met de kinderen Nederlands te spreken.
Allerlei opmerkingen (o.a.: doe niet zo raar in het Pools, je bent hier in Nederland).
Gesprek gehad met ambtenaar van de inburgering vertelde haar: “eigenlijk geeft u les in nationalisme”. (Vijf jaar geleden). Dat doen wij echt niet, we leggen juist de nadruk op de connecties tussen Polen en Nederland.

Er is een trendbreuk sinds de afgelopen jaren.

Oost-Europeanen zijn niet allemaal hetzelfde. Zou ook in het beleid tot uiting moeten komen.

2.2. Turks in the Netherlands

Interview 1 (Amsterdam 10 Sept. 2015)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate
Ik ben hier [in Nederland] gekomen in 1988, via gezinshereniging.

How long will he/she stay?
Ik weet dat nog niet. Als de omstandigheden hetzelfde blijven als nu, blijf ik hier

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey in the Netherlands prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Heeft Nederlands geleerd via communicatie. Is zelfredzaam.

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Ik run een bar en heb daarvoor Nederlands nodig. Was daarvoor vrachtwagenchauffeur. Had diploma nodig. Is niet naar cursus geweest. Kon diploma halen door de praktijk. Ging afwassen, en heb door het werk binnen de horeca de ervaring opgedaan om mijn eigen bar te beginnen.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Regelmatig contact via whatsapp.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Hoe meer talen ze spreken hoe beter het is, mijn kinderen hebben Turks geleerd.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik wil hier in Nederland blijven.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels.

Language policy Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
1x per week paar uur.

Value of mother tongue education?
Werkt volstrekt niet tegen de integratie. Hoe meer talen de mensen spreken hoe beter het is in elk opzicht.

Interview 2 (Amsterdam 11 July 2016)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ik ben niet in Nederland geboren, ben in 1978 gekomen vanwege gezinshereniging.

How long will he/she stay?
Nog vijf jaar. Mijn familie woont niet meer hier [in Nederland]. Ik ga daarna terug naar Turkije.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving here?
Alleen met mijn vader.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Ik ben als kind van 9 hier naar de basisschool gegaan. Ik spreek nu goed Nederlands. [Klopt]

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Communicatie in het algemeen, ik wilde vrienden maken en had Nederlands nodig op school.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Skype, facebook, internet, fysieke reis.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Mijn kinderen zijn tweetalig opgevoed. Ik heb niet van tevoren informatie ingewonnen [of een tweetalige opvoeding positieve of negatieve effecten heeft]. Ik heb veel Nederlandse kennissen, maar ben een uitzondering. Mijn kinderen gingen daardoor meer om met Nederlandse kinderen. Mijn eigen Turks is ook achteruit gegaan.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, alleen om toeristische redenen naar Japan [Geen Europa] en Zwitserland vanwege het landschap

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels. Duits.

Language policy Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Heb zelf moedertaalonderwijs gevolgd. Niveau was te laag, heb er niet veel aan gehad. Ik had lessen net zo goed niet kunnen volgen.
2/3 uur per week. Ik weet niet hoe de organisatie beter zou kunnen. Zou ook door moeten gaan op middelbare school. Jammer dat de focus lag op spreken, schrijven was beter geweest.

Value of mother tongue education?
Is zeer waardevol. As je moedertaal goed beheerst kan je ook goed Nederlands leren. Heb dat gehoord van experts, uit studies.

Niet slecht voor integratie. Ik zie integratie als participeren met behoud van eigen cultuur. Mijn eigen Nederlandse en Turkse identiteit kunnen samengaan. Moedertaalonderwijs zien we ook als een manier om op lange termijn de remigratie makkelijker te maken. Alle Turken willen graag terug naar Turkije. Communiceren is allerbelangrijkste wat er in de wereld is.

Interview 3 (Veendam 10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ben in Nederland geboren, mijn ouders komen uit Turkije.

How long will he/she stay?
Ik ga misschien naar het buitenland. Engels gestudeerd. Om taal goed te leren vind ik het belangrijk om ook een tijdje in een Engelstalig land te wonen.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nederlands, Engels, Turks. Versta Duits. Ben in Groningen opgegroeid, dus had altijd een positief gevoel met Duitsland. Duits is makkelijker om te leren. Heb ook basis opgebouwd op middelbare school. Ik heb geleerd in mijn opvoeding om zoveel mogelijk talen te leren. Ik ben taalkundige en houd van de Germaanse talen. Als ik Duits spreek kan ik de ontwikkeling van andere talen begrijpen. Ik heb een tandem met een Oostenrijks meisje, ik merk hoe fascinerend het Duits is.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Nederlands is behoorlijk goed. Heb af en toe problemen met ‘de’ en ‘het’, maar dat komt ook doordat ik Engels gestudeerd heb. Ik moet af en toe kleine grammaticale zaken opzoeken in het Nederlands.

Are you staying in touch with people in Turkey?
Ga 1 keer per 2 jaar naar Turkije. Deel van mijn familie woont in Turkije. Heb veel contact met de familie via whatsapp, facebook, instagram. Internet heeft de wereld een stuk kleiner gemaakt.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ik zou ze drietalig willen opvoeden. Kinderen zijn zeer vormbaar. Tot op bepaalde leeftijd (8-9 jaar) kan je nog native speaker worden. Zelf wilde ik Russisch leren , maar had ik na 3 weken opgegeven. Ik merkte hoe moeilijk het is om op mijn leeftijd bepaalde klanken te leren. Zelfs mijn Turks (dat is niet zo goed), heb ik een basis in. Je moet die meertalige opvoeding wel goed doen. Ik ken mensen die op hun 8e geen enkele taal goed spreken. Ik zou een strategie bedenken waarin bijvoorbeeld mijn partner Turks spreekt, ik Nederlands, en dat ze naar een Engelstalige heel. De kritische grens heb ik geleerd uit wetenschappelijke artikelen.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Zweden, want ik vind het Zweeds een hele mooie taal. Zweden is ook een sociaal goed georganiseerd land, net als Nederland. Zweden heeft ook gratis onderwijs.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Zweeds is niet nodig, want in Zweden spreekt men goed Engels. Wil ook graag Irish Gaelic leren.

Als je als Expat weggaat, dan ga je anders weg dan als migrant. Er is eigenlijk geen verschil, maar ik wil niet in een internationale bubbel zitten.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
In groep 1 en 2 heb ik moedertaalonderwijs gevolgd. Ik ging daarna naar een andere school waar ze het niet hadden. Ik weet niet of het slecht is dat ik het niet verder heb gevolgd. Schrijven in het Turks is niet zo lastig omdat het een fonetische taal is. Ik kon later makkelijk doorgaan in het Nederlands omdat mijn moeder Nederlands spreekt. Ik heb liever dat het vaker dan 1 uur per week is. Het hoeft niet binnen schooltijd. De Turkse taal heeft elementen die het Nederlands niet heeft. Turkse kinderen hebben een twee jaar taalachterstand die ze niet inhalen. Ik zou ook graag zien dat in het moedertaalonderwijs de brug wordt geslagen tussen het Nederlands en het Turks. Bijvoorbeeld: beter begrip van lidwoorden.

Value of mother tongue education?
In principe geen taak van de overheid. Het is begrijpelijk dat de overheid de eigen taal belangrijker vindt. Maar als je denkt dat migranten een thuis krijgen, dan is het een goed advies aan de overheid om het wel te organiseren. Dat kan positieve effecten hebben. Ze zijn meer geïncludeerd als er ook ruimte is voor de eigen taal.

Mogelijke nadelige kanten: moet niet ten koste gaan van het Nederlands. De brugfunctie moet er wel zijn. In Groningen bestaat het gevaar minder dat migranten zich terugtrekken in hun eigen gemeenschap. Maar bijvoorbeeld in Amsterdam is er een hele andere dynamiek, in die steden kan je je makkelijk redden met alleen Turks of Arabisch. Daar is het gevaar op segregatie veel groter.

In Friesland is er bijvoorbeeld inclusive education. Daar wordt heel erg de nadruk gelegd op het bewustzijn onderling dat er meer talen zijn dat het een

meerwaarde is en geen handicap. Kinderen moeten trots zijn dat ze meer talen spreken en geconfronteerd worden dat zee en taalachterstand is.

Ben tweetalig opgevoed. Ik vind mijn Turks rampzalig. Het heeft even geduurd voordat ik de waarde van het Turks erkende. Ik merkte aan de mensen om mij heen dat het Turks geen hoge status heeft**.** Als ik op de universiteit Engels spreek dan kijken mensen niet raar om, bij het Turks wel. Ik zie taal als onderdeel van identiteit. Ik verborg vroeger mijn Turkse identiteit meer. Ik wilde niet gezien worden als het ‘ Turkse meisje’.

Dat is veranderd sinds ik op mijn 25e een keuzevak volgde: European languages and contact. Het was een zeer meertalige klas. De docent vroeg welke talen gesproken werden. De docent ging heel goed om met de verschillende talen en het werd mij duidelijk dat meertaligheid echt een meerwaarde heeft.

Ik lees nu meer in het Turks. Ben op zoek naar een leuke Turkse serie. Ik heb een regel opgesteld dat ik elk jaar minimaal 1 Nederlands en 1 Turks boek wil lezen. Als ik geen Nederlands lees heb ik het idee dat ik mijn connectie met het Nederlands verlies als ik in mijn Engelse bubbel blijf.

Interview 4 (Veendam 10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Niet in Nederland geboren. In 1978 , was bijna 8, gekomen. Mijn vader was hier, gezinshereniging.

How long will he/she stay?
Hooguit nog 10 jaar, dan terug naar Turkije. Ik verlang altijd terug naar het vaderland. Ik zie Nederland toch niet als mijn vaderland. Er blijft altijd een stuk geschiedenis in Turkije.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
Alleen vader.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Alleen Turks.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Spreekt voldoende Nederlands, geen enkel probleem met dagelijkse activiteiten.
Kwam op lagere school, heeft daar Nederlands geleerd. Ik kwam direct op een school waar weinig allochtonen waren. Het was moeilijk om de woorden te plaatsen in de eigen taal. Uiteindelijk is het toch gelukt door naar school te blijven gaan. Ik moest wat ik zag terugbrengen naar de eigen taal. Ik hoefde geen extra lessen.

Ik had ook Turkse les, en die heeft goed geholpen bij het leren van het Nederlands. Tijdens de lessen werd een brug geslagen tussen het Turks en het Nederlands. Soms werd er een leraar bij gehaald om te tolken. Ik had een half dagdeel per week Turkse les. Ik ben zeer positief dat het op school werd gegeven. Ik zie weinig in de lessen van de buurtvereniging. Op school ben je verplicht om te gaan. Er was ook een kwaliteitsverschil. Op school kwam er een leraar van het Turkse Ministerie van Onderwijs. Bij de vereniging kwam er een onervaren docent. De structuur van de lessen was daardoor veel beter op school. De kinderen lopen er de kantjes vanaf op de vereniging. Ook de ouders zijn veel soepeler bij de vereniging.

Op die manier beheersen de kinderen noch het Nederlands noch het Turks. Als ik terugdenk aan mezelf vertaalde ik alles terug naar de taal die ik het beste beheers (Turks). Dat geldt voor elke taal, daarom is het belangrijk dat ze de Turkse taal beheersen voor de beheersing van het Nederlands. Als je het Turkse woord voor ‘ pasta; weet, dan kan je dat terugkoppelen naar het Nederlands.

Are you staying in touch with people in Turkey?
Ja, via het internet en reizen naar Turkije

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ik praat thuis met Turks met mijn kinderen. Ze spreken redelijk goed Turks en uitstekend Nederlands (hebben ze op school geleerd). Als de allochtone ouders hun moedertaal niet beheersen dan is het wel een probleem. Ik zie dit wel veel bij mijn familie in Duitsland. Die beheersen de Turkse taal niet goed, en daardoor spreken ze niet goed Duits. Rol van de overheid is het Turks bij te spijkeren op school via meertalig onderwijs.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nederland en Turkije.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Spreek nu Nederlands, Turks, beetje Duits, beetje Engels. Duits is de belangrijkste taal.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother-tongue education?
In Nederland is het nu slecht geregeld. In Veendam is er zelfs helemaal niks meer, niet eens meer een buurtvereniging. Er zijn nu minieme faciliteiten. Het liefste alleen op de basisschool weer Turks onderwijs introduceren en zich daarbij richten op het schrijven. Op de middelbare school is het niet meer nodig, dan is de basis al gelegd.

Does offering mother-tongue eucation lead to segregation?
Migranten trekken zich nu ook al terug, maar op basis van cultuur en niet op de taal. Het is ook belangrijk hoe de Nederlandse gemeenschap de Turkse gemeenschap accepteert. Dan ga je kijken in welke gemeenschap je meer geaccepteerd wordt. Als ik op mijn werk al niet geaccepteerd wordt dan word ik buiten zeker niet geaccepteerd.

Allochtonen willen graag hun eigen cultuur behouden. Terugtrekken van allochtonen is onvermijdelijk. Maar: als je eigen taal en cultuur niet kent, dan ken je de cultuur en taal van anderen ook niet accepteren. Nederlanders geven allochtonen vaak geen warm gevoel in hun thuis. De mensen die net rond de armoede grens zitten (Nederlanders) gaan zich ergeren aan allochtonen. Ik heb het idee dat Nederlanders in de bijstand boos naar mij kijken. Die denken dat ik hun werk heb ingepikt.

Ik zou moedertaalonderwijs ook als een symbolisch gebaar zien om die warmte weer terug te brengen.

Interview 5 (Veendam 10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ik ben in Nederland geboren.

How long will he/she stay?
Mijn hele leven. Prettig om hier te wonen. Maar in Turkije vind ik het ook prettig. Ik voel me in Turkije buitenlander. Hier voel ik dat niet , maar andere Nederlanders proberen me soms wel dat gevoel te geven.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Spreek Turks, Nederlands, Engels, Duits wel gehad maar spreek ik vrijwel niet. Dat is raar voor een Turk, veel Turken spreken vloeiend Duits.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Mijn Nederlands was een paar jaar geleden heel goed. Maar sinds ik omga met een aantal Nederlandse collega's die minder goed Nederlands spreken gaat mijn Nederlands achteruit. Bedenk wel dat we in Groningen wonen en mensen thuis Gronings spreken. Is wel jammer.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Social media en face time, paar keer per week.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ik zou kinderen tweetalig opvoeden. Als ik een Turks liedje hoor samen met mijn Nederlandse vrienden. Met Engels red je je ook in Turkije. Ik zie niet hoe een tweetalige opvoeding kan leiden tot segregatie. Ik heb een jaartje in Turkije gewoond en heb daar Turks geleerd.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Duitsland. Duitsers discrimineren minder. Ik kan niet de eerste jaren overbruggen met mijn Turks bij de Turkse gemeenschappen in Duitsland. Duitse Turken spreken vreemd Turks. Ik spreek ook zelf nooit alleen Turks, altijd gemixt met Nederlands. Duitse Turken zijn ook anders. Ze zijn wat meer Turks, hebben andere gewoonten. Ze zijn ook wat meer gesegregeerd.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Duits. Er wordt veel Duits gesproken in Europa.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Twee jaar Turks gehad op de basisschool. Had les in groep 3 en 4. Kan me niet goed herinneren of ik er iets aan heb gehad. Ik vond het niet vervelend om te gaan. Destijds kon ik wel goed de Turkse krant lezen.

Ik vind het bestaan van moedertaalonderwijs wat twijfelachtig maar wel mooi. Ik vind dat Turken zich in Nederland moeten aanpassen. Het is onnodig. Ik zie in Veendam veel Turken die alleen maar Nederlands spreken. Moedertaalonderwij***s*** geeft mensen meer de prikkel zich terug te trekken. Ik zou mijn eigen kinderen wel naar moedertaalonderwijs sturen, maar ik zorg ervoor dat ze zich niet terugtrekken. Andere Turken zullen zich wel terugtrekken, zeker als de kinderen op school komen en helemaal geen Nederlands.

Nu verandert het wel. Onze generatie (3e) is wel iets anders, maar daar zijn ook mensen die zich alleen maar terugtrekken.

Integratie: ik vind het belangrijk om je aan te passen. Je moet de Nederlandse regels volgen, de Nederlandse taal leren. Je hoeft niet je Turkse identiteit op te geven. Ik ben geen voorstander ervan om de Turkse identiteit op te geven. Ik schreeuw niet van de daken dat ik Turks ben, maar ik zal nooit vergeten hoe mijn ouders hebben geleefd.

Ik sprak ooit met een leraar die vroeg: word jij ook uitgehuwelijkt? Als dat soort vragen worden gesteld dan merk je dat ik toch enigszins anders ben.

Interview 6 (10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Niet geboren, 1976. Gezinshereniging.

How long will he/she stay?
Voor altijd. Voor de kinderen. Niet veel familie meer in Turkije, slechts twee zussen.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
Had contact met mijn man, verder met niemand.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee, alleen Turks.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Spreken is niet goed. Nederlands. Twee maanden thuisgebleven en daarna gaan werken. Meer dan 15 Turkse mensen werkten daar dus ik sprak alleen maar Turks. Ik las wel het Nederlands Turkse woordenboek om woordjes te leren. In de jaren ‘ 80 zat ze in het vrouwenbestuur om dingen te organiseren. O.a. Nederlandse taallessen. Ze heeft wel taallessen gevolgd, maar omdat ze huisvrouw was en nooit met een Nederlander sprak vergat ze het weer. De [Turkse en Nederlandse] gemeenschappen leefden gescheiden en haar man vonden het niet goed dat zij naar school zou gaan. Ze vindt het heel erg jammer dat ze niet de kans had gekregen om naar school te gaan. Ze had van de wethouder een aanbod gekregen om te werken, en haar werkgever zou dan zelfs een tolk inhuren. In 2010 kooklessen gegeven voor de hele high society van Veendam. De vrouwengemeenschap reikt via eten de hand uit naar de rest van de gemeenschap.
Lessen zijn belangrijk, maar de praktijk is nog belangrijker.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Telefoon, whatsapp en facebook.

Vereniging IOT. Houdt bij wat de gemeenschap hier doet. Gezinshereniging was moeilijk gemaakt, de IOT kwam bij elkaar en die maakt dan duidelijk aan de overheid dat de gemeenschap het er niet mee eens is.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Oudste dochter is politieagent in Turkije. Ontslag genomen. Eentalig opgevoed, en ze hebben Nederlands bijgeleerd op school en via bijles. Ze zaten op school met veel Turkse kinderen. Ze spreken ook heel goed Turks.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Ik houd erg van Nederland en erg van Veendam. Ben ook in meerdere plekken geweest (Duitsland, Turkije). Grote stad is niet comfortabel.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, Duitsland over de grens is Nederlands ook zeer belangrijk. Met onze kinderen is het anders dan voor ons, zij spreken meerdere talen.
Ja, ik kan zeer makkelijk contact maken en migreren naar gemeenschappen in andere landen met een Turkse gemeenschap.

Rijbewijs kan niet meer in het Turks worden behaald in Nederland. Is een duidelijke barrière voor mensen met een Turkse afkomst om af te rijden.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Kinderen hebben Turks onderwijs gehad op basisschool. Oudste dochter drie jaar educatie gehad in Turkije van 6-9 jaar. Ze hadden het plan terug te keren naar Turkije, daarom stuurden ze haar dochter alvast naar Turkije.

Ze is er tevreden over. Als ze het Turks niet kennen dan kennen ze het Nederlands ook niet.

Moedertaalonderwijs kan het beste terugkomen. Voor sommige kinderen is het genoeg, en voor sommigen is 1 uur per week niet genoeg.

Kinderen hebben goed Turks geleerd, maar leven in twee werelden. Weet niet met generaties van nu hoe dat in elkaar zit.

Terugtrekken van de Turkse gemeenschap heeft vooral te maken met de eerste generatie. Met de tweede en de derde generatie is het helemaal geen probleem, die spreken gewoon Nederlands.

Interview 7 (Veendam 10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
1988, gezinshereniging.

How long will he/she stay?
Geen idee. Als omstandigheden onveranderd blijven, blijft hij hier.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Turks.

At what level would you want to learn Dutch?
Heeft Nederlands geleerd via communicatie. Is zelfredzaam

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Voor de horeca. Was vrachtwagenchauffeur. Had diploma nodig. Is niet naar cursus geweest. Kon diploma halen door de praktijk. Ging afwassen

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
In contact via whatsapp.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Hoe meer talen ze spreken hoe beter, ik zou ze zeker Turks leren.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik wil in Nederland blijven.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
1x per week paar uur, dat is veel te weinig om het Turks goed te leren.

Value of mother tongue education?
Werkt volstrekt niet tegen de integratie. Hoe meer talen de mensen spreken hoe beter het is.

Interview 8

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ik ben geboren in Nederland.

How long will he/she stay?
Weet ik niet, waarschijnlijk de rest van mijn leven.

Language classes

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Ik leerde het op school, en wilde de taal natuurlijk leren om hier [in Nederland] te functioneren. Thuis spraken mijn ouders bijna alleen maar Turks, dus ik moest het echt hebben van school.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik skype bijna elke week met familie in Turkije en chat vaak met hen via whatsapp en facebook.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ja, ik zou ze tweetalig opvoeden, hoe meer talen ze spreken hoe beter het is. Ik zou ook graag willen dat ze kunnen praten met mijn ouders en andere familie in Turkije.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik wil in Nederland blijven.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Met name Engels, Turks helpt voor mij ook enorm, met name als ik op familiebezoek ga.
Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Nee, het moedertaalonderwijs dat ik heb gevolgd was niet goed georganiseerd en het was erg weinig (een paar uur per week buiten schooltijd).

Value of mother tongue education?
Ik denk dat het heel waardevol kan zijn, maar alleen als de organisatie goed is. Ik zie geen gevaar voor de integratie, Turkse Nederlanders zijn echt wel in staat om Nederlands én Turks te zijn.

Interview 9 (Veendam 10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ik ben in 1972 naar Nederland gekomen om te werken.

How long will he/she stay?
De rest van mijn leven. Ik heb overwogen terug te gaan naar Turkije, maar ik heb teveel familie en vrienden hier.

Language classes

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Ik wilde graag contact hebben met Nederlanders en had het ook nodig om carrière te maken voor mijn werk. Ik vind dat ik de taal niet goed genoeg heb geleerd: er waren weinig mogelijkheden om Nederlands te leren.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik bel regelmatig en skype ook vaak met mijn familie in Turkije.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ik sprak thuis Turks met mijn kinderen. Ze hebben op school Nederlands geleerd en spreken nu beide talen vloeiend.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, alleen voor vakantie. Ik blijf hier wonen.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels zou natuurlijk het meeste helpen. Mijn Turks helpt heel veel als ik mijn vrienden in Turkije en Duitsland bezoek. Waarschijnlijk zou ik met mijn Turks tijdelijk kunnen verhuizen naar mijn vrienden in Duitsland en daar werk vinden.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Mijn kinderen hebben nog moedertaalonderwijs gehad. Ik was blij dat het bestond, maar vond het niveau niet hoog. De leraren waren niet altijd goed en er was vaak niet genoeg lesmateriaal.

Value of mother tongue education?

Het zou mooi zijn als het weer ingevoerd zou worden, maar dan beter georganiseerd. Ik denk niet dat het tot segregatie zou leiden, als de kinderen ook goed Nederlands leren.

Interview 10 (Veendam 10 Dec. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
Ik ben gekomen in 1986 vanwege gezinshereniging.

How long will he/she stay?
Mijn gezin is hier, dus ik blijf de rest van mijn leven.

Language classes

What are your main reasons for learning Dutch?
Ik heb een cursus Nederlands gevolgd omdat ik meer contact wilde met mijn collega's en buren. Ik vind het belangrijk om de taal te spreken van het land waar je woont.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik whatsapp en skype meerdere keren per week met mijn ouders en broer in Turkije.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Mijn kinderen zijn tweetalig opgevoed. Ze spreken nu vloeiend Nederlands en Turks

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels en Duits, dat zijn de twee belangrijkste Europese talen. Turks helpt mij alleen in Turkije, maar ik kan me voorstellen dat het kan helpen als ik zou willen verhuizen naar Turkse familie in Duitsland of Zweden.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Ik was redelijk tevreden over het moedertaalonderwijs dat mijn kinderen gehad hebben. Ze spraken de taal al goed omdat ik thuis Turks met ze sprak, maar hebben op school nog wat dingen geleerd over grammatica. Meer Turks onderwijs zou beter zijn, maar ben niet ontevreden.

Value of mother tongue education?
Moedertaalonderwijs leidt niet tot segregatie.

Interview 11 (Amsterdam 12 Jan. 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to the Netherlands?
In Nederland geboren. Tweede generatie.

How long will he/she stay?
Denkt erover naar het buitenland te verhuizen. Niet meer naar Turkije, aangepast aan Westerse cultuur.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Turks, Nederlands, Engels, Duits. Spreek geen vloeiend Turks, maar wel zeer dichtbij naar het Turks.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Met neven, facetime, skype, facebook, skype, whatsapp. 1 keer per jaar naar Turkije. Kies speciale gelegenheid uit, bijvoorbeeld bruiloft.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ik heb nu geen kinderen, wil graag kinderen tweetalig opvoeden. Wil graag kinderen iets van de Turkse cultuur meegeven. Ze moeten kunnen communiceren met familie.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Kan elk land zijn, als ik mijn draai zou kunnen vinden. Het heeft met gevoel te maken, ook of het land je aanspreekt op andere punten.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Spaans. Turks helpt heel erg om naar Turkse gemeenschappen in Europa te gaan. Maar ik zou wel de brug blijven slaan naar bijvoorbeeld Zweden.

Language Policy in the Netherlands

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Heb Turks gehad op de basisschool. Turkse kinderboeken mee naar huis. Geen idee of dat vanuit school was. Ik stuur mijn kinderen niet naar moedertaalonderwijs. Vraag is of het te zeer een grote belasting is. Als ik zelf een taal zou mogen kiezen zou het Engels worden. Niet Turks kunnen schrijven zie ik niet als een probleem, zeker met de huidige technologie waarmee je spraak e-mails kan sturen naar mensen.

Moedertaalonderwijs is geen slecht idee. Het leidt niet tot segregatie, het heeft puur te maken met ouders en opvoeding.

2.3. Poles in France

Interview 1 (Paris 20 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France? (Quand vous avez migré en France? Et quelle était votre raison?)
Geboren in Polen, heeft in Frankrijk gestudeerd,

How long will he/she stay? (combien de temps vous comptez rester en France?
Weet niet, waarschijnlijk mijn hele leven

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving? (Aviez-vous des contacts avec famille ou amies Polonais en France, avant vous avez migré?)
Ja, met mijn Poolse echtgenoot.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here? (vous connaissiez des autres langues que le Polonais, avant votre migration?)
Engels en Frans, geleerd op school.

At what level would you want to learn French? (A quelle niveau vous voudrez apprendre le Français?)
B2. Ik volg nu een inburgeringscursus om mijn niveau te verbeteren.

What are your main reasons to learn French? (Quelle sont vos raisons primaires pour apprendre le français?)
Ik leef in Frankrijk. Mijn echtgenoot is Frans. Vooral voor sociale contacten. Wil onafhankelijk zijn, en alle zaken zelf regelen. Is Poolse lerares.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?) (Avez vous du contact avec des personnes en Pologne (par example via skype, ou par visiter la Pologne?)
Ja, hele familie. Spreekt regelmatig Pools met hen.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish? (Voulez-vous que vos enfants apprendre le Polonais?)
Ja, ik ben Pools, mijn man is ook Pools. Poolse cultuur doorgeven, extra taal altijd nuttig. Met familie spreken. Wil drietalige opvoeding. Echtgenoot is

tweetalig. Had wel problemen met identiteit etc. Manier van denken is anders in het Frans en het Pools. Is onvermijdelijk, maar voordelen zijn groter dan nadelen. Ook elk kind is anders. Bijvoorbeeld: moeder was Frans.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe? (Voulez-vous migrer en Europe dans la future?)
Misschien terug naar Polen, Canada, Engeland, België

Languages to learn to enhance mobility? (Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?)
Engels. Russisch.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education? (Est-ce qu'Il y a beaucoup de facilités pour apprendre la langue maternelle en France?)
In Frankrijk: goed dat er cursussen bij het gemeentehuis zijn. Veel niveau's. Iedereen die Frans wil leren kan dat goed doen tegen een goedkope prijs. Moedertaal is lastiger, er is geen steun voor moedertaalonderwijs. Eén lyceum in Parijs biedt het aan [Louis le Grand].

Ik geloof dat het bijna onmogelijk is om alle talen te behouden, dus kan je beter je alleen maar op Frans richten. Beter is het als de overheid gemeenschappen steunt die privé scholen voor meertaligheid opricht. Financiële barrières wegnemen. Op onze school zijn er veel gemixte klassen. Dat komt doordat de Poolse families niet het geld hebben om de kinderen naar de Poolse school te sturen. Sommige scholen profiteren van steun van de Poolse overheid.

Value of mother tongue education? (Que pensez-vous de l'éducation de la langue maternelle? Vous pensez que ça cause de segregation?)
Ik ben hier niet zo lang. Moet concours doen, om ambtenaar te worden, maar dat wordt niet ieder jaar gehouden. Ik geloof niet dat moedertaalonderwijs leidt tot segregatie.
3e en 4e generatie spreken geen moedertaal, en spreken alleen Frans. Dat heeft geleid tot een nationalistische renaissance. Monolinguisme werkt niet: men reist veel, er is internet, het kan niet werken. Assimilatie is gewoon niet mogelijk in deze tijd.

Anekdote: er was een Marokkaanse dame die tijdens het uitleggen van de rechten bezwaar maakte tegen het homohuwelijk. De uitlegger reageerde agressief. Dat werkt niet: geforceerd assimileren werkt contraproductief.

Ik kan niet evalueren of cursus effectief is.

De cursus werd 3x per week gegeven, 2 uur per keer. ‘C’est pas très vite. Les cours de mairies sont pas organisés bien.’ Leraren zijn niet allemaal capabel, ze verdienen veel te weinig. De groep cursisten is zeer divers, veel verschillende etniciteiten, maakt de cursus ook erg lastig. Bijvoorbeeld: mensen die al 20 jaar in Frankrijk wonen, mensen hebben moeite met schrijven, en kunnen goed spreken, anderen hebben omgekeerde probleem.

De cursus kan beter door betere leraren, met een beter salaris, aan te stellen. Geef de cursisten meer tijd om aan de lessen te besteden, bij wijze van spreken 6x per week. Voor mensen [cursisten] die werken is het lastiger.

Ik zou graag cultuurlessen over Frankrijk willen zien, die zijn er nu niet. Helpt om te assimileren. Voor mensen uit Afrika of Egypte is de Franse cultuur niet evident.

Interview 2 (Paris 20 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Ik ben hier geboren, mijn moeder is Poolse en mijn vader is een Fransman.

How long will he/she stay?
Mijn hele leven.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Russisch, Italiaans, Pools. Frans, Engels, en Spaans (klein beetje). Allemaal geleerd op Franse scholen.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Gaat 1 keer, 2 keer per jaar. Spreekt vaak Pools , via social media.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja, is niet evident voor de derde generatie. Ze is slechts een kwart Poolse, dus is niet evident voor haar. Mijn man [hij is een Fransman] moedigt mij aan om haar Pools te leren. Ik was vorig jaar bij een conferentie over tweetaligheid. Zij bevelen tweetaligheid vanaf een jonge leeftijd aan. Bevordert bredere blik op de wereld. Is goed voor de hersenontwikkeling en voor openstelling aan meerdere culturen.

Ze heeft een kleine achterstand omdat ze twee talen leert. Mixt beetje Pools en Frans, vocabulaire is niet goed ontwikkeld.
Zelf begon ik ook wat later met praten toen ik een kind was, en mixte ook de twee talen.

Frans schoolsysteem begrijpt tweetaligheid niet goed (zie weigering van haarzelf in eerste jaar).

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Het hangt er vanaf waar mijn arbeidskansen liggen. Ik hou van een internationale omgeving. Nu werk ik directeur voor kunstexposities, maar mijn man heeft geen werk waardoor je makkelijk kan migreren. Heeft vroeger veel gereisd, maar kan nu niet meer. Voor haar werk moet ze altijd ter plekke zijn. Migratie is daarom geen optie. Heeft toch internationale baan, komen veel internationale mensen naar Frans.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility? (Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?)
Engels. Spaans. Pools niet, heb je niks aan. Ik hou helemaal niet van Polen. Polen accepteert geen vreemdelingen, ik zal er niet heengaan en kan er weinig mee. Is geen aantrekkelijk land, er is totaal geen multiculturele traditie.

Language Policy in France:

Value of mother tongue education?
BAC met Pools als eerste taal. Slechts culturele lessen op school. Slechts Pools gesproken thuis. Is niet geaccepteerd op school daardoor, in tweede jaar geaccepteerd.

Er waren twee groepen: zij kon niet goed schrijven, maar heeft dat zelf geleerd. Gold ook voor haar klasgenoten. Spreekt nu ook vloeiend Frans en Pools.

Ik ken niet alle taalsystemen. Mijn lyceum bood dit wel aan. Frankrijk heeft geen traditie van leren van vreemde talen. Verbaas ik me over. Weet niet waarom. Zelfs Engels lukt niet.

Ze is op haar werk de enige geweest die vreemde talen spreekt.

Arabisch wordt nauwelijks onderwezen, wordt gelinkt aan terrorisme. Beter om onderwijs te controleren en zelf te organiseren, dat leidt tot betere integratie. Stimuleert ook een positief onderhoud met de Franse cultuur. Migratie geschiedenis wordt dan niet gezien als een bron van schaamte.

Interview 3 (Skype chat interview, (Paris 20 April 2018))

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France? (Quand vous avez migré en France? Et quelle était votre raison?)
Geboren in Wit-Rusland, met Poolse ouders, gemigreerd naar Frankrijk 6 jaar geleden. Getrouwd met een Fransman (van Poolse origine) in Polen, elkaar ontmoet tijdens werk. Werkten voor zelfde bedrijf: Warschau en Parijs.

How long will he/she stay?
Voor altijd. Beslissing wordt alleen anders in samenspraak met echtgenoot. Leven is nu hier.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Ja, moedertaal is Russich, tweede taal is Pools. Sprak ook Engels en Wit-Russisch. Sprak geen Frans.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Heeft online Franse cursussen gevolgd (télélangue). Cursussen waren ok. Ze is goed in talen maar met een betere leraar had ze meer vooruitgang geboekt. Ze weet niet waarom ze geen lessen bij het stadhuis heeft genomen. Haar echtgenoot stelde de online cursus voor: wilde misschien niet dat ze zwanger naar het stadhuis zou lopen. Online cursus was veel makkelijker om toe te passen in haar leefpatroon. Heeft meest geleerd van de cursus ipv dagelijks gebruik Frans. Spreekt Engels met haar echtgenoot en als fulltime moeder leer je alleen maar eenvoudige taal als 'bonjour' 'au revoir' 'merci', 'bonne journée' etc. Maar ze leerde ook Frans via grammatica websites. Ze heeft een visueel geheugen, voor haar is het effectiever om de woorden te zien, dan om ze te horen.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Integreren, communiceren met Franse kinderen en om de nationaliteit te krijgen. Het sociale aspect van integratie is voor nu het meest belangrijk, ik weet niet wanneer ik weer kan gaan werken.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Kinderen worden drietalig opgevoed. Oudste meerdere dingen geprobeerd, maar ze spreekt nu tenminste moedertaal met hen. Ik spreek nu Russisch wanneer we alleen zijn, Frans in het openbaar, en Pools met de Poolse grootouders. Daarvoor sprak ik ook nog Engels waar de vader bij was, maar dat kan nu niet meer. Dus nu slechts drie talen.

Mijn Frans is niet goed genoeg om alleen Frans met hen te spreken: ik heb een accent en maak teveel fouten. Het Frans dat zij leren is dan ook slecht. Zelfs als ik geen fouten zou maken, zouden ze slechts een beperkte woordenschat hebben. Ik moet vaak rephrasen omdat ik een woord niet ken dat precies uitdrukt wat ik bedoel. Mijn kinderen moeten die woorden wél leren zodat ze vrijer kunnen denken en zich vrijer kunnen uitdrukken. Tweede reden: als ik nooit mijn moedertaal spreek, dan denken ze dat ik me schaam voor mijn taal en dat het een slechte taal is.

Schoonouders kozen ervoor hun gebroken immigranten Frans met haar kinderen te spreken. Ik kon daardoor een half jaar lang mijn dochter niet horen spreken omdat ze in élke zin een fout maakte. Ik sprak toen geen Russisch meer omdat ik haar Frans wilde fixen. Toen trok mijn dochter de conclusie dat elke andere taal verkeerd is, en dat iedereen Frans moet spreken. Uiteindelijk moest ze naar een psychotherapeut omdat ze twee mensen in een restaurant die Engels spraken verbood om Engels te spreken. Ik realiseerde me toen dat ze nu al drie talen had kunnen spreken (Russisch, Frans en Pools), maar dat haar Frans zó slecht was dat ze eigenlijk geen enkele taal sprak. Bovendien had ze een totale fobie ten opzichte van andere talen. Nu vecht ik heel erg hard voor elke andere taal, en zien we de grootouders zelfs minder omdat ze weigeren alleen Pools met haar te spreken.

“I would also add, for parents who have doubts. Whatever you choose never say in from of kids even if they are in the next room that N languages is too many, too hard, and that you are scared and don’t know what to do. Never. As long as they don’t know that their situation is exceptional they are doing quite fine in it. They take it as given that they have to understand a few languages As soon as you show it’s a choice and not an obvious one it can seriously break them.”

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe? (Voulez-vous migrer en Europe dans la future?)
Dachten aan Polen: maar is volgens echtgenoot te nationalistisch. Amerika valt ook af, zien we ons niet hele leven wonen. Na Frankrijk wil je eigenlijk nergens anders meer heen. We zien onszelf als Franse patriotten, hoewel we ook wel zien dat Frankrijk verre van perfect is.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility? (Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?)
Engels, Pools (omdat de Slavische talen zo erg op elkaar lijken, ik kan ook Tsjechisch spreken in Tsjechië). Een Slavische taal spreken helpt enorm in het geheel van Oost-Europa. Ik zou graag Russisch zeggen vanwege de grootte van het land en de kracht van de taal, maar als we het hebben over vocabulaire kan je beter een Midden-Europees land nemen. Dat heeft meer vertakkingen naar de rest van de regio. Tsjechisch zou daarom ook goed kunnen helpen. In de niet Slavische landen is Engels het belangrijkst.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Geen idee. Oudste dochter gaat alleen nog naar kleuterschool. Daar leert ze nog niets. Zeker geen vreemde talen. In het algemeen biedt Frankrijk meer mogelijkheden dan Wit-Rusland. Veel eenvoudiger om een private onderneming op te zetten: de Franse overheid houdt de Poolse en Russische scholen dan ook niet tegen. Ik heb niks te klagen over de Franse overheid, zeker aangezien ik uit Wit-Rusland kom.

Interview 4 (Paris 20 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
10 jaar geleden [2008]. Heeft echtgenoot ontmoet tijdens werk in Polen.

How long will he/she stay? (combien de temps vous comptez rester en France?
Definitief.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving? (Aviez-vous des contacts avec famille ou amies Polonais en France, avant vous avez migré?)
Had Poolse en Franse vrienden voordat ik migreerde.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here? (vous connaissiez des autres langues que le Polonais, avant votre migration?)
Russisch, Frans op de universiteit.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish? (Voulez-vous que vos enfants apprendre le Polonais?)
Ja, Frans en Pools. Hebben besloten kinderen in te schrijven op de Poolse school. Thuis spreekt de vader Frans en de moeder spreekt Pools. Poolse familie spreekt geen Frans. Garder la langue et la culture, en de religie. Zij moeten kunnen meedoen met Poolse religieuze activiteiten. Het is belangrijk want de kinderen hebben ook ontzettend veel Poolse familie.

Ze spreken beiden zowel Pools als Frans. Kinderen mixen nu vaak Frans en Pools. Maar dat verdwijnt nu al. We hebben specialisten gevraagd, en die zeiden dat het geen probleem was. Leraren op school Nova Polska zeggen dat tweetalige opvoeding heel goed is. Op de Franse scholen zei men dat ook.

Misschien heb ik geluk gehad dat ik op de juiste leraren ben gestuit.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe? (Voulez-vous migrer en Europe dans la future?)
Nee, geen enkele. We zijn totaal geworteld.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility? (Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?)
Spaans, die taal geeft je toegang tot heel Zuid-Amerika.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education? (Il y a beaucoup de facilités pour apprendre la langue maternelle en France?)
Op school (kind is zes jaar), volgend jaar begint ze al met Engels op het zevende jaar. Franse school is te theoretisch. Pools heb ik zelf gedaan, zelf georganiseerd. Geen overheid nodig gehad. Dus geen idee. Het is een persoonlijke beslissing om dit te doen: de overheid kan dit niet organiseren.

Value of mother tongue education? (Que pensez-vous de l'éducation de la langue maternelle? Vous pensez que ça cause de la segregation?)
Voor het Pools geldt dit niet. Ik ken die situatie niet. We zijn wel een gemixt huwelijk. Dit kan anders zijn voor andere culturen.

Interview 5 (Paris 20 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France? (Quand vous avez migré en France? Et quelle était votre raison?)
En Pologne. Was 19, 1995.

How long will he/she stay?
Voorlopig, misschien tot pensioen.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Had contact met familie, maar die heeft mij helemaal niet geholpen toen ik migreerde.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Le français. Et l'anglais, très bien. Heeft BAC trilingue in Polen (Pools, Frans, Engels)

At what level would you want to learn French?
Ging van nature, had contact met de taal en dat verbeterde het niveau. Deed ook Talen studies, en vertaalstudies. Dat hielp enorm om het van nature te doen.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Oui, souvent. Spreekt nog heel veel Pools met Poolse families.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish? (Voulez-vous que vos enfants apprendre le Polonais?)
Ja. Eerste reden is contact met de familie in Polen. Verder spreek ik ook Pools als tweede taal. Ik spreek thuis alleen Pools, vader spreekt Frans. Tweetaligheid ging goed voor de oudste. Er is geen enkele taalachterstand opgetreden.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Wilde eerst naar warm land, maar nu geen enkele animo. Slechts naar Polen met pensioen.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility? (Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?)
Espagnol. Polonais. Ik ontmoet weinig Polen, dus ik heb heel erg weinig aan die taal.
Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Is helemaal niet goed. De staat doet niks. Zou graag willen dat de staat wat meer zou doen.

Value of mother tongue education?
Dat [segregatie] gebeurt niet binnen de Poolse gemeenschap. De Poolse lerares heeft gezegd dat het heel goed gaat.

Interview 6 (Paris 20 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
In Polen geboren, 1985. Politieke vluchteling.

How long will he/she stay?
Voorgoed, we gaan niet terug naar Polen.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Familie uit Frankrijk en oom woonden al hier. Hebben actief geholpen met migratie.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Ik kwam in Frankrijk toen ik 9 was, dus kende geen andere talen.

How did you learn French after you arrived?
Was meteen naar een normale basisschool gestuurd in een klein dorp. Op 9de stroomde ze meteen in het reguliere onderwijs (école primare de preparation, had slechts 1 jaar achterstand). Duurde lang voordat ze wilde praten, maar begreep wel veel. Daarna is ze op advies van de school naar een zomerkamp gegaan waar ze gedwongen werd Frans te praten. Methode was zeer effectief om Frans te spreken. Het volgende jaar heeft ze twee klassen gedaan, en daarna had ze slechts 1 jaar achterstand.

Methode was echt goed, ik werd heel erg goed verwelkomd. Er was echt heel veel aandacht voor mij, de leraren waren zeer actief om mij te helpen. Idee dat de Franse overheid niet helpt gold zeker niet voor mij. Ik ben door alle moeilijke taalmomenten zeer goed geholpen.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja, het is een sleutel om toegang te hebben tot hun cultuur. Ze zijn via mij verbonden aan de cultuur. Er zijn veel studies die zeggen dat tweetaligheid zeer goed is. In mijn jonge jaren werd tweetaligheid absoluut niet aangemoedigd. (Woont in Menton (???) rijke voorstad). Bij de crèche wordt aanbevolen om thuis alléén Pools te spreken. Elke moeder wordt geadviseerd in moedertaal te spreken. Wordt geïnformeerd dat kinderen in het begin een achterstand hebben, maar dat ze die snel zullen inhalen.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Geen enkel idee. Misschien Engeland, Verenigde Staten.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels. Pools kan helpen in Oost-Europa. Maar is vooral voor vakantie. Is ook heel nuttig om in contact te treden aan het begin van de migratie.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Poolse school is een initiatief van mezelf geweest, heb die zelf moeten zoeken. In de Franse scholen worden andere scholen ook al geïntroduceerd, maar vooral grote talen zoals het Engels. Maar ook Turks, Arabisch, Italiaans. Moedertaalonderwijs is een erg goed idee en helpt de kinderen ontzettend.

Ikzelf had al zo'n grote kennis van het Pools. Is groot verschil of je als kind in Frankrijk geboren wordt of migreert uit andere land.

Value of mother tongue education?
Er zijn ook ouders die helemaal geen Frans spreken. Daar is het een probleem. Als dat niet zo
is (zoals in mijn geval), dan is het geen enkel probleem.

Interview 7 (Paris 21 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Went to Paris first time when I was 15.Loved Paris and her parents encouraged her to study abroad. Liked French people very much. Quit a few studies before going to INALCO, found a French boyfriend. Lives in France for 2 years. France is like my father, Poland is my mother.

How long will he/she stay?
Plans to stay in France, even though she doesn't like how close minded France is going to be. It is understandable though, she works a lot with immigrants on social media and some are abusing the hospitality.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Spoke English and French, fluently. Had a private teacher for French, and English. Wanted to learn the basics before coming here. My mother paid for the courses.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Calls mother once a week. Lost part of her friends in Poland. No time for skype. She went to Poland every month. Stopped doing it because she wanted to focus on building up a life in France. Investing in both identities is difficult, I need to focus on one aspect.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
I would raise them with both Polish and French. Bilingual education is good for the children's development. Furthermore, I am Polish so I want my children to be able to communicate in my language.

I know some people with a Polish origin who don' t speak Polish, and they are very sad because of it. Children are happier when they can connect to their origin.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
No, I didn't think about moving. I am focussing mostly on languages

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
English. I never thought about the effect of Polish language. Perhaps Russian, for Eastern Europe. I refuse to learn Russian.

Immigrants should never forget their heritage, to form their vision on the world. Immigration means you are somewhat attracted to the culture of the country you are living in. You will never become totally French, but you should try to adopt the cultural practices. You need to have a strong character to maintain the balance.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
No, I would prefer English. French foreign language education is really bad. I don't like the school system at all, neither in Poland or in France. School is very subjective. Learning foreign languages is really catastrophic. There was no attention at all for speaking.

Interview 8 (Paris 22 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Born in Poland, migrated in 2010. Got a permanent research position. Tenured job. Partner also got a tenured job, so decided to come here.

How long will he/she stay?
Not looking to move, had offers to move elsewhere. Paris is a very attractive city, an attractive place to do science.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Not directly. Wife of a colleague happened to be Polish, but then they moved to the United States shortly before I arrived.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Grew up in UK, so English. German. Some Spanish and Russian. Didn' t know any French.

At what level would you want to learn French?
No job requirement to learn French. Employer paid for some French lessons, mostly to have a social life. Paris is a place where you can get by with English. Made a point of making work the main driver, took French like other people take yoga classes.

Speaks fluent French now, can read anything, writing a long report she prefers to do it in English with google translate. I feel a lack in written French, if I had taken French lessons.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Goes to Poland regularly, skypes and calls.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Raising children bilingually (Polish, French). Parents speak English with each other.
I found bilingual education very useful for myself, and it helped me learn other languages afterwards. It is also easier for her to learn the language at a young age. I also want her to communicate with her parents.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Had offer to be the director of the Max Planck Institute. So yes, I consider moving within Europe. Weighs both scientific and life' s pros and cons. Would prefer to move within Europe. Lived in US for eight years, never wanted to go there in the first place. Realised while I was there that I could live anywhere in Europe.

Language doesn't influence my decision. I proofed that I could learn French easily, so I am convinced I could learn any language fairly fast.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Only language left would be Chinese or Japanese. If you speak English in my work the rest is secondary.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Don't have much experience with it. It is so far rather positive. This school (bilingual French-Polish school) allows us to claim a tax rebate, even though the French government is very much concerned with Francophonie. This school also allows us very liberally to move to Poland if we have to for a few months for work, because it will be good for her (daughter's Polish).

Prestigious high school offers bilingual education Montaigne, also in Polish. The French actually do not stop bilingualism as much as their stereotype suggests.

Value of mother tongue education?
Very much disagree with perspective that bilingual education and mother tongue education fosters segregation. Scientific research we don' t know if it is harmful for the children. From the social perspective, any kind of cultural and linguistic diversity is positive. It is good if from an early life the children leave their own microcosmos. Any kind of ghettoization is negative, but I don' t see it existing here. Important wherever you come from you should learn the country of the language. But I don' t think that having another culture hinders anything. There is no such thing as a singular Polish identity, it is much more complex than the government tells us. There is a danger that typical immigrant communities accentuate differences when they are in another country. Ghetto is based on nationality, language, whatever cultural discriminant you want.

Interview 9 (Paris 23 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
In Polen geboren. In 2011 gemigreerd. Echtgenoot woonde in Frankrijk, is ook Pools.

How long will he/she stay?
Weet niet.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Alleen echtgenoot.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Een beetje Russisch.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Oui. Alliance Française. Is erg duur (privaat). De stadhuis cursus was vol. Nu is de cursus effectief. Alliance Française was niet effectief, tijdens de lessen vertaalde de docenten alles in het Engels, in plaats van ons helemaal onder te dompelen in de Franse taal. Geen idee of overheid genoeg steun biedt.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Pour le travail. Sociale aspect is ook belangrijk.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Veel contact met mensen in Polen. Elke dag, spreekt Pools elke dag.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja. Ze moeten de taal van hun origine leren. Thuis spreek ik Pools met hen, Frans op school. Bij grootouders wordt Frans gesproken, opa is Frans.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Polen, als de arbeidsomstandigheden beter zouden zijn. Elk land met werk is een optie. Mijn Pools zou me helpen om te migreren naar landen met een Poolse gemeenschap.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Anglais. Is een universele taal.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
De kinderen moeten het Pools vooral thuis leren, als ze het alleen op school leren is het niet mogelijk.

Value of mother tongue education?
Gemixt huwelijk is het sowieso geen probleem. Bij puur Poolse huwelijken blijven de Polen op zichzelf. Ze merkt dat het feit dat zij slecht Frans kent haar hindert met het communiceren van Franse ouders. Poolse gemeenschap is zeer gesloten.

Interview 10 (Paris 23 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Ik ben gemigreerd in 2016, omdat ik een baan kon krijgen in Frankrijk [als wetenschapper]

How long will he/she stay?
Weet niet, mijn contract loopt nog 1 jaar door, er bestaat een kans dat ik nog een paar jaar kan meedraaien bij een ander project.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Ja, Engels en wat Frans van de middelbare school.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Ik weet dat niet, omdat ik niet zeker weet hoe lang ik hier kan/wil blijven. Ik volg een cursus en spreek Frans nu op een B1 niveau en doe mijn best om echt vloeiend te worden.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Met name om contacten in Frankrijk te leggen. Is wel moeilijk, Fransen staan in mijn ervaring niet snel open voor nieuwe contacten. Voor mijn werk is het onbelangrijk, voertaal is Engels

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik whatsapp bijna elke dag en ga 2-3x per jaar terug naar Polen.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja, ik zou ze zeker tweetalig opvoeden. Wat de tweede taal is, hangt af van wie dan mijn echtgenoot is, en in welk land ik woon. Als ik in Frankrijk woon is het Frans.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Niet concreet, het hangt erg af van mijn mogelijkheden. Ik ben post-doc en daarvoor moet je bijna wel mobiel zijn.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, maar voor de talen die ik niet spreek: Duits. Grootste Europese taal en Duitsland is de sterkste economie.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Geen idee, ik heb er geen ervaring mee.

Value of mother tongue education?
Ik denk dat het goed is om de faciliteiten te hebben. Je moet alleen uitkijken dat de migrantengemeenschappen niet gescheiden leven. Maar als de kinderen Frans en hun moedertaal op school leren zie ik geen probleem.

Interview 11 (Paris 24 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Ik ben gemigreerd in 1995. Mijn echtgenoot kreeg een goede baan in Frankrijk en ben meegekomen.

How long will he/she stay?
Mijn hele leven, we hebben hier een gezin en geen reden om weg te gaan.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Nee.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Een beetje Engels en wat Frans van school.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Spreek het nu vloeiend. Ik heb een cursus gevolgd betaald door de gemeente toen ik hier kwam. Was redelijk effectief. Had het meeste aan het dagelijks spreken van Frans op mijn werk en later met Franse vrienden.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Voor op het werk en om te integreren in Frankrijk.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, ik ga zo vaak als ik kan (4-5x per jaar) terug naar mijn familie in Polen. Ik skype, whatsapp en bel vaak. Merk dat ik nu veel meer contact heb met Polen dan vroeger: is nu veel makkelijker en goedkoper dan 20 jaar geleden.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Ja, we hebben ze tweetalig opgevoed. Ze spreken nu beide talen vloeiend. Ze begonnen iets later met praten omdat we Frans en Pools tegen ze spraken, maar die achterstand hebben ze later ingehaald. Werd geadviseerd door vriendin die lerares Frans was op een middelbare school om ze tweetalig op te voeden.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is allerbelangrijkst. Daarna Duits of Spaans: dat zijn grote taalgebieden met sterke economieën. Chinees zou heel goed zijn, maar is moeilijk om te leren.
Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Mijn kinderen konden wat Pools volgen op de middelbare school. Niveau was vrij redelijk, ben blij dat ze die kans gekregen hebben.

Value of mother tongue education?
Heel goed om die faciliteiten te hebben. Heb gelezen in de krant dat er ook veel buitenschoolse taalcursussen gegeven worden, dan is er geen controle van Frankrijk op het lesmateriaal. Beter om alles te integreren in regulier onderwijs. Op die manier zullen de Poolse kinderen ook een betere connectie voelen met Frankrijk, omdat ze het idee hebben dat hun cultuur ook gerespecteerd wordt.

2.4. Turks in Sweden

Interview 1 (Stockholm 30 May 2017)

Migration history

When did you move to Sweden?
7 years ago.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Basic English, no Swedish. Afterwards he learned Swedish.

Learned Swedish through SFE (Swedish Foreign Education, Swedish as a second language). Completed SFE (1-1.5 years). Swedish government wanted him to go into construction or restaurant branche. Didn' t complete both of them. Afterwards he tried to go into the hotel branche.

After SFE I did not follow any courses. Learned Swedish by talking to his Swedish wife. Native Swedish very difficult to understand for him. Immigrant Swedish much easier to understand. When they speak to native Swedes, he only understands 50%. Native Swedes understand him quite well. Swedes are very gentle and open minded.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
It' s hard to move to another European country. Didn't think about it. Perhaps I wish to move back to Turkey. However, child would stay in Sweden. Brother and sister moved to Canada and Norway, to Germany**.** They first came to Sweden 25 years ago.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
English.
Learned Finnish.

Language Policy in Sweden

I am a first generation migrant (7 years ago)
Child is raised in Swedish. Speaking Swedish much more useful than Turkish. But child is raised virtually bilingually. Swedish teachers encourage mother tongue education , because it also benefits learning Swedish.

Thinks bilingual education is very beneficial.

Every week 3 hours of Turkish lessons a week. It' s very valuable.

Interview 2 (Stockholm 1 June 2017)

Migration history

When did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
1972 migrated to Sweden.
Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Learned a little bit English before high school. Participated in three separate courses of SFE. Then learned specific vocabulary for his job as a bus driver. Swedish language 90%. He knows how to read write and speak. Have made lots of Swedish friends and learned the language that way. Regularly reads Swedish newspapers. Watching Swedish tv is very important. Made the conscious effort to connect to native Swedes.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
No. Specifically not to Germany and Sweden due to the relations with Turkey. Turkey.
Firstly French, and then German would enhance my mobility the most. English first still.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?

Value of mother tongue education?
5 children, all graduated university. Speak Turkish at home (70% Turkish, 30% Swedish). Children know Turkish, Swedish, English, German, Italian.

Learned Turkish 3 hours per week. Very valuable. Turkish teaching stopped in schools, it' s voluntarily now.

His children must continue in Swedish. Original language is Turkish. The system used to be better 15 years ago, much more structured. Teachers were better in the past. Sweden changed its education policy, so the teachers are less qualified. Education budget was cut, so the quality goes down. It's not just government policy, but it' s also an economic problem, it forced the budgets to be cut.

In short term it might facilitate adaptation. But on the long term it may cause problems. Not speaking the mother tongue may cause identity issues. Knowing the mother tongue helps separate the Swedish from the Turkish identity. People wonder why they don' t know their mother tongue.

Interview 3 (Stockholm 1 June 2017)

Migration history

When did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Migrated 1969, 17 years old.

Language classes

Didn't go to language school. Immediately went to work in a restaurant. Evening and in holidays, he went to a Swedish language course, similar to SFE, but not exactly the same. Education lasts whole life. He thinks that finding a job and finding a partner is the best way to learn the language. Course is completed in 3 to 5 months. Around the restaurant and speaking with customers**.** I speak Swedish about 60% from perfection.

When coming to Sweden, he firstly contacted his Turkish friends. Afterwards he tried to make Swedish friends. Most people in the restaurant are Turkish. Lots of single Turkish men were renting.

Sometimes Turkish nationality becomes a problem here. Swedish community offers a lot of education , but these Turkish men cannot attend because they immediately have to make money. Turkish men weren't interested in learning the language.

If government forces them, then the migrants should know their rights. Lots of immigrants were illiterate, so language schools are ineffective.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
No plans to move within Europe.
English is the only language. Turkish is also valuable, because the Turkish community is so big. Right now I didn't need English or any other language, because there are so many Turkish people living all over Europe.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?

Value of mother tongue education?

Four children. In our home we speak Turkish, and they speak Swedish at school. Their Swedish is quite good, but not perfect. His children mostly spoke Turkish at school.

I have two boys and two girls, didn't continue university. If they would have better learned Swedish, they might have been able to go to university.

Interview 4 (Stockholm 1 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
I migrated after completing military service, in 1966. I was 24 years old. Knows Swedish, Turkish and Kurdish.

Language classes

Immediately started working. After 11 years he went to school. Not a SFE course. He is a mechanic, the company offered him the courses after 11 years. The courses were just tailored towards the mechanic business. Mechanics course also included 240 hours of general Swedish.

First generation mentality: only came here to make money. But in hindsight, he wanted to go to a language school much sooner. But he was poor and needed a lot of money. He wanted to make money and go back to Turkey.

Followed a general language course afterwards. Swedish language skills are about 60%. He met a Swedish men (neighbour, who was old and retired), who taught him Swedish. Helped friends with filing out taxes in Swedish.

The Swedish man was interesting. They invited them to dinner and lunch, called them mama and papa and they had a very deep relationship. He was much more effective than the courses. The man helped him and his friends file out official paperwork. In exchange, the interviewee helped him with math problems.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
No.
English is the most valuable language to be mobile. Turkish and Kurdish are very valuable for traveling around Europe, makes it very easy to connect to those communities.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
I have 6 children, 3 girls and 3 boys.

At home we speak mostly Turkish and Kurdish, sometimes Swedish. They went to a Turkish school, after 3 years they learned Swedish at a decent, but not great level.
2 children are mentally and physically challenged. Other 4 stopped school at 15-16 years. I wish they would complete their education, but life is hard, and I regret it very often that they weren't able to do it.

Perhaps it would have been better to send them to a Swedish schools, then they would have been able to go to university. Right now they don't speak Swedish enough and their mastery of the language is poor.

Value of mother tongue education?
This is a major part of the immigration problem. I would strongly prefer our children to go to a Swedish school. Turkish community is very tight knit. Although, if I had to pick between my children not knowing Turkish/Kurdish and not knowing Swedish, I would prefer them to not know Swedish.

Interview 5 (Stockholm 1 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did you migrate to Sweden?
2014, I will go back in 5 years. I know Swedish at a very basic level, because I will go back very soon. Also knows Arabic and Persian.

Turkish community connects easily to countries in host societies. System of two language education is very good. Turkish people need to learn their mother tongue, to visit their mother country. Strongly in favour of assimilation and not integration. Turkish and Swedish community needs to bridge, and the younger bilingual generation can be the bridge for them.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
After moving to Turkey, I won't move to another country. I want to learn French to expand my linguistic skills. France has given our world a lot of modern expressions, so I would like to learn French for cultural and historical reasons.
Language is not just about communication, it also embodies culture and knowledge. Didn't just learn English for communication, but also to understand the USA and European systems.

Interview 6 (Stockholm 1 June 2017)

Migration history

I was born in Sweden in 1992.
I followed Turkish education in high school. It helped with learning Turkish grammar. Courses also include Turkish state affairs. Teachers were mostly good. Using Turkish to communicate on social media, especially with my family in Turkey.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
I would like to move to US/Japan/Turkey/England. I mostly judge countries based on other factors than language (the amount of racism/discrimination present in the country).
Language Policy in Sweden:

I would raise my children bilingually. Turkish is in my heart and it is part of my culture. Not learning Turkish is not a viable option at all. At school there need to be facilities for mother-tongue education. If children don't learn the language when they are young they might not be able to learn the language at all.

The Turkish language gives us a foundation to understand what is right and what is wrong, if we don't know our language anymore we don't know what it means to be a Turk.

I am happy with what Sweden offers us Turks, but I think following extra lessons at the Mosque is still necessary. You need as much time as possible to learn the language properly.

Interview 7 (Stockholm 1 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?

How long will you stay?

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
1994. Came to Sweden for Imam education, planning to stay in Sweden, but also sometimes longs to go back to Turkey. Will go back to Turkey once conditions there improve. I had family living here in Sweden, who helped me a bit when I arrived.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
1 year after arrival, he started doing Swedish courses. Courses (SFE) were effective, he thinks learning Swedish is very important. I think my level is about 50% from perfection. Has no Swedish friends, but regularly follows media with Swedish subtitles. Feels a bit ashamed during the courses, also due to his age. Lots of Turkish men feel this way.

Swedish courses need to be more about practical conversation. Compared two men: one followed the course, other just started working in a shop. The latter men made much more progress.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
No.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
English. Turkish also really helpful to migrate within Europe.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
3 children. Two were born in Turkey and one in Sweden. Oldest child is 17 years. She started to learn Swedish and got a job in the hospital. She went to high school and managed to learn Swedish.

He thinks it's better to learn the mother tongue first before learning a second language. Learning mother tongue first allows for gaining a better understanding of basic grammar rules.

He graduated University and has a high level of Turkish language.

Value of mother tongue education?
3rd child went to University. Last child only got 1 hour a week Turkish classes. 1 hour a week is too little time and the teacher didn't speak Turkish fluently. He wants mother tongue education to be organised more effectively.

He teaches them a lot of Turkish at home, by letting his children read Turkish books and newspapers.

Turkish mother tongue education is related to religion. He needs to learn the language to learn more about his religion.

Interview 8 (Stockholm 2 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Migrated to Sweden in 1972, for work.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
Started to work immediately. The employer wanted him to learn Swedish, general Swedish. He worked at a railroad company. The biggest in Sweden. Labour union demanded him to learn Swedish. Courses were very effective, he was the labour union representative. Course finished in 1 year, and he was interested in developing his Swedish further. Read a lot of newspapers, watched a lot of Swedish tv, and made a lot of Swedish friends in the company. This method was very more effective than the course. He was very interested what was happening in Turkey.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
No plans to move. German might be most important, because Germany is an important economic powerhouse in Europe. Perhaps I can move to Turkey, that would be my first option. Knowledge of Turkish really helpful when visiting other European countries. Turkish helped me travel a lot, because the Turkish community is very strong.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?

Value of mother tongue education?
He has children. Mostly raised them using Swedish, some Kurdish and a little bit of Turkish. Children speak all three languages.

Children had 1 hour of Turkish at school. It wasn't enough to learn Turkish. Germany and The Netherlands have agreement with Turkey regarding labour migration. In Germany and the Netherlands Turkish teachers came to learn the migrants Turkish. Sweden did not have such an agreement, so it was more difficult to get good Turkish teachers from Turkey. In Germany and The Netherlands it is thus easier to learn Turkish than in Sweden.

Mother tongue education is very important. Turkey is our mother land. It' s my right to learn my children my mother tongue. The more languages the better it is.

Interview 9 (Stockholm 2 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Migrated 1973 to work.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
Immediately started working. After 5 years he started following Swedish language courses during four years. SG railroad company (where he worked) let him learn Swedish. He became a foreman so that is why his company made him go to these courses.
Before migration, the SG company didn't select based on skill (language and otherwise). Company noticed he was talented and made him go to language school. Five years later everyone had to go to language school.

In my job he had to check whether some train compartments and made people repair it. (Middle manager).

Language course was very useful. Would have liked to do more advanced courses, to enrol advanced education (he needed to learn to write in Swedish for that, for instance), but he needed to keep working to make money. Swedish level is about 70% now.

Didn't just learn Swedish in class. Reads a lot of newspapers, watches a lot of tv, talking to native Swedish friends.

Course was very effective, because it gave him a basic understanding of Swedish. You need both.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
No, I only want to go my beautiful Turkey, not to another European country. English. Turkish has helped me a lot in other European countries. It makes it easy to connect with them.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
One child was born in Turkey and two were born in Sweden. I first taught them my mother language (Turkish), we spoke a lot of Turkish at home. However his children went to a school where they only spoke Swedish. He wants his children to learn about Swedish culture, but at home he didn't want to forget Turkish culture. My children speak Swedish and Turkish at a native level.

I purposefully sent my children to a Swedish school, without other Turkish students, because I want them to be immersed in Swedish culture and language. Children speak 4 languages now.

Value of mother tongue education?
In Turkish schools the government forces teachers to teach the evolution theory. In his Swedish schools, the Swedish teacher was prepared to accept his wishes of not teaching his children about Darwin.

This wasn't the only reason: even without Darwin I still would have sent them to the Swedish school to learn about the Swedish language and culture.

Interview 10 (Stockholm 2 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Sweden 1985, Turkish parents.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
Raised with Turkish dialect. Only oral. Dialect is understandable when speaking to other people who speak official Turkish. Went to a school with many immigrants. Spoke Turkish with friends in his free time. No Turkish mother tongue education. Didn't want to go to mother tongue education, facilities were poor. Teachers were bad. Starting level was bad, already spoke Turkish much better at home. When he was 7-8 years old he didn't want to be segregated. Went to a soccer club with just native Swedes. Immersed in Swedish culture. Didn't need to meet other Turkish people. Wanted to belong to Swedes, felt different.

Learned Turkish on his own. Publishes academic papers in Turkish. Developed quickly when his mother passed away, read a lot of Turkish books back then. Wrote a book in Turkish about a Turkish poet.

Turkish language is the link to his heritage, very important to him. Need to understand poems in mother tongue to understand emotions. Started to see the value of his Turkish roots when his social conditions improved. Felt a calling to solve the problems with his cultural heritage.

Integration seen as a dual identity. It' s a mutual process, but immigrants need to find their own identity and purpose.

Turkish associations are a hindrance to his kind of integration. Preserve conservative values, and it' s impossible to be integrated then. Being active in those groups means in practice that you are not part of the Swedish majority society.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Would move to any European country with a good university if he would get a research job position. Even to a Turkish university.

English and Swedish most useful to be mobile. Turkish sparsely useful, maybe only if the university work involves researching Turkish networks. No desire at all to associate with Turkish groups.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?

Value of mother tongue education?
1976: law of mother tongue education adopted in Swedish Parliament. It was useful back then, but right now Turkish children just go there for easy points. Teachers in Sweden just do it because they cannot do anything else. Predicts there will be no more interest for mother tongue education in the future.

Turkish group has no common aim or common interest.

Objects against the principle of mother tongue education. Language has a low status, children perceive it as such. No-one wants to go there.

Dilemma between mother tongue transitioning into Swedish, and the segregating effect of Swedish society.

Traditional Turkish mother tongue education was not creative. For him, reading poems and being an autodidact was much more effective.

Interview 11 (Stockholm 2 June 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Sweden in 1991. Both my parents are Turkish

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
I spoke Turkish at home and Swedish at school. My parents didn't speak Swedish very well. Teacher recommended them to only speak Turkish with me, so I wouldn't learn 'bad' Swedish. I think now that was a good decision. I speak both languages quite well. I had Turkish education in primary school. It was a mixed experience: some teachers were good, others bad. The classes were outside of normal school hours, which was demotivating for me. I learned a few things about grammar and Turkish culture. I still cannot write Turkish very well.

Language and Mobility

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Yes, might move to Germany or UK to study. For me, English and German are the most important. Turkish is very useful when visiting my Turkish friends in Sweden and France, I don't think it would help me finding a job in Europe though. Turkish people often work in low-level jobs, I aim for one at an academic level. For those jobs English is much more valuable than Turkish.
If I have children I would teach them Turkish to talk with their family. The second language we speak depends on where I live: if it is Sweden, it would be Swedish. Also if my partner speaks another language we will teach the child that one as well.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?

Value of mother tongue education?
Yes, for me the amount of mother tongue education was enough. I would like it if the quality of the teachers was more consistent, it would have made the lessons more beneficial for me. I would send my children to mother tongue education if it still exists in the future.

2.5. Poles in Sweden

Interview 1 (Stockholm 7 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Came when she was 27, in 2002
Came to Sweden for economic reasons.

How long will he/she stay?
Planning to stay in Sweden.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Brother-in-law was living in Sweden. He helped a lot with the official paperwork, and finding housing before I arrived.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Spanish and some English

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
Speaks fluent. She did SFI and got a C1 degree afterwards

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
She needed it primarily to function properly at her job.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
No, I probably won't move anytime in the near future.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
French and Italian. A lot of people in the world speak French. Love Italy. Don't like Germany and Russian. Don' t want to learn German, because of history.

English is obviously very helpful. I never thought about the effect of Polish language but I don't think it would help that much. Perhaps Russian to travel in Eastern-Europe, but I also refuse to learn Russian for historical reasons.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Two children, one going to university. Other to primary school. Both are enrolled in mother tongue education. Teacher is from Latin-America, preferred one from Spain [her partner is Spanish, and that is the language their children learn at the mother-tongue education programme].

Children are raised tri-lingually, Polish, Swedish and Spanish. They know all three languages quite well.

I think Spanish and Polish are of equal importance.

Value of mother tongue education?
Mother tongue education does not hinder integration. At home we are Spanish and Polish. Being culturally diverse is beneficial, not a detriment. The teacher in primary school told me I shouldn't speak 'bad' Swedish to my child

Interview 2 (Stockholm 7 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Was born in Poland and came here when she was 19 years old. Lives here for 3 years.

How long will he/she stay?
When she was younger she wanted to stay in Sweden. Now she is in doubt. Sweden was my dream country. Right now I realise that Sweden also has its own problems. Sweden' s multiculturalism has two sides. Love being able to meet people from other cultures, but the diversity also has its downsides.

I loved the Swedish culture and landscape. Sweden has a very special atmosphere.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
My sister and her entourage. Very strongly involved with Polish community. Swedes are very reluctant to be in touch with foreigners, hard to make connections with them.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Tried to learn myself Swedish, Sweden was my dream country.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
SFI and afterwards and I got all the possible certificates. I think my Swedish is not native. My vocabulary is still limited.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
I want to be able to speak Swedish. I need Swedish to reach the heart of the Swedes. Also I can' t find a good job if I only speak English. Swedish is vital on the labour market.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Using the internet to stay in touch

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes, I want to raise them bilingually.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
I will either stay in Sweden or go to Poland. Don' t want to move to a country that is too far away from Poland for practical reasons [family visits].

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Spanish. My family speaks Spanish, plus it gives a lot of travel opportunities. Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
I don't know, I don't have any practical experience with it. I think it depends on the individual child. I wouldn't want to submit them to long evening schools. Swedish is still more important than Polish, since they live in Sweden.

Value of mother tongue education?
I think it is good that it exists. But the danger is that this system is not good for Swedish culture. There are too many ethnic niches where people can retreat within their own communities. I see this happening around me. The government can influence it. Political correctness is preventing us from addressing the problems.

Interview 3 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland, came to Sweden in 2013. Came here because wife got the opportunity to study here, and he got a good job here.

How long will he/she stay?
Won' t stay long. Will probably stay 2 years. Deadline is when child goes to primary school.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
No.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Just English

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
Understands Swedish. Is learning Swedish by himself. I learn Swedish

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
I need to know Swedish for the kindergarten and official documents. It' s hard to get in touch with Swedish people. I learn Swedish at home due to time constraints.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Goes to Poland 4 times per year.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes, I want them to learn how to write and read. 2-3 hours per week is not enough. It influences integration, but it is not dangerous. If you force people to use only one language, the integration will go much faster. The integration can go slower with mother tongue education. However, mother tongue education can increase the probability to stop the integration. However on the other side, cultural diversity enrichens a country. It is also the individual responsibility of the parent.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
I want to go to Poland in 2-3 years. I don' t rule out other options, if there are interesting projects somewhere I will consider everywhere.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
German, Spanish

Interview 4 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland, came to Sweden in beginning of 2016. Wife got a post-doc in Umea university.

How long will he/she stay?
There is a 50/50 chance I will choose either of these two options: it is either 10/20 years in Sweden or go back in half a year. I want my children to finish school here or in Poland.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
No. We wanted our children to have contact with Polish children. I think it is important

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Polish and English.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
I am still learning Swedish very intensively. I want to work. I enrolled in a programme for academics to learn the language. The Swedish government provides it. It was 8 hours a day. I now speak Swedish at a B2 level.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
Work, but also to make friends.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Yes, via e-mail, skype, and I go to Poland 3 times a year.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes. Children learn Polish at school. Hard to know if the programme is effective, my son's Polish is already fluent. It is important to me that they know Polish. I want them to feel that they are Polish. I want them to know our traditions, history, etc. I will do my best for them to feel Polish, but I won' t force them. If you come to a country you need to respect rules in the country. It's easier for Polish people to adapt 95% is the same. We also wanted our children to have contact with Polish children.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Probably want to go Great-Britain and Spain. But I won't do it because of the children. Like Great-Britain because I want to improve English and work in a British hospital.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
German, perhaps Spanish but the economic situation isn't very good in Spain. Of course English is number one.

Interview 5 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Was born in Poland, came here in 2013. Erasmus programme.

How long will he/she stay?
2-3 years. That will be enough time to get enough experience at work. She is an architect, who needs some Swedish for her work. I want my children to go to a Polish school. The early years of kids is important, I'd like them to be familiar with Polish culture from a young age.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
No.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Polish and English, French.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
I am taking classes. They are sponsored. I do the online classes. Have been doing them for 2 years. Effectiveness depends a lot on my self-discipline. Now I speak a little bit of Swedish.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
You need it for your work. Also important to learn Swedish to make Swedish friends. However, connecting to Swedish society is not very important. Swedish people are not very welcoming.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Going to Poland twice a year. Relatives also visit us very often. Skyping once a week.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes, I want them to learn Polish because we are Polish. I don't think raising children bilingually hinders integration. They also won't be disconnected from Swedish society just because they also learn Polish.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
No, I might go to Non-European countries such as the USA or New Zealand, depending on the job opportunities

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
German, but I would never learn it. I don't like the sound of it.

Language Policy in Sweden:

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
I don't know if it is necessary that the government organizes it. For our children we just send them to private classes from the age of 6-7.

Interview 6 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland, 2011. Came here for work. Floor layer.

How long will he/she stay?
I don't know. I'll stay until Sweden doesn't work out.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Polish and English

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
Not speaking Swedish hurts my work opportunities. I enrolled in a SFI course aimed at working people,2 hours per week. I quit after three months. I just wanted to speak. I didn't need the grammar lessons. They insisted to keep using this method despite my and other people's complaints.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
You need it for your work. I don't need it to connect to other Swedish people. People are much nicer if you can speak Swedish. They see it as a big accomplishment that you learned their difficult language.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Yes, both via the internet and I visit Poland a few times per year.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes, I am Polish. I want my children to feel Polish, so they can eventually pick between a Swedish or Polish identity. I don't think raising children bilingually hinders their integration: they speak Swedish and Polish fluently. It is impossible for them to stay just in their Polish community.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Yes, I considered Germany, France. Work Is the most important factor.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
The language is the second option.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
They have 1 hour per week. The sense of community within these classes is more important than language acquisition.

Interview 7 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland. Went to UK, came here for post-doc (2008). Moved to Norway, came back in 2013

How long will he/she stay?
Planning to stay here until we retire.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
No

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Polish and English, Russian, bit of German, and a little bit of Swedish.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
I took classes when I came here in 2008. I don't take classes due to a lack of time. Duo lingo [a language learning application] is too easy. Swedish is around B1/B2.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
It is because I live here. I can speak English with Swedish, but it is much more natural for them to learn Swedish.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Only when I go to Poland, I am barely in touch with my family when I am not in the country.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes, for the communication with the family. And the more languages they know the better. They also stay in touch with their roots. I am a practical person, I don' t attach any emotional values.

Language and Mobility

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
German. Germany has the biggest job opportunities.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
My children learn Russian, learning Russian is more difficult than Polish. The courses are not effective. It is just once per week. The children in the class have different levels. I am here [at the Polish community center] so my child can speak Polish, that is the best way to learn. My children won't need big writing or reading skills, they just need to speak.

I think my children are not Swedish, Polish or Russian. They are European.

Raising children trilingually doesn't hinder their integration. There are studies proving this. If you are a child you can learn the languages with relative ease.

Mother tongue education does stimulate segregation. This type of risk only exists if the parents push it.

Interview 8 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland, came here in 2013. I came here after my PhD in chemistry I came to do a post-doc here.

How long will he/she stay?
Will get a permanent

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
Yes, my boss gave me the contact of a Polish school teacher before I came here.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Polish, English, bit of Russian, bit of German.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
My Swedish is B1, and I followed a Swedish course. The effectiveness of the course depended on the teacher I happened to have, there was a big difference between them. The courses didn't focus too much on writing.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
In Sweden you can get by with English easily. Still, you have better contact with people when you speak their language.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Yes, with my family. I go twice per year, for Christmas and for the vacation. Using social media a lot.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
Yes, I want them to be able to communicate with their family. So they can be attached to the Polish culture. Communication is the most important reason. I was torn whether bilingual education would hamper their acquisition of Swedish. Now they are fluent in both languages.

Bilingual education might risk a little that the children stay entrenched within the Polish community. It can be challenging for a parent and the school to avoid this from happening.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
No, because of the children.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
German, it is after English the most common European language.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Mother tongue education courses are not always extremely effective, but can be good to do for non-linguistic reasons. At the courses the children are taught grammar and Polish history that they cannot learn at home.

Interview 9 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland, came to Sweden in 1983. My mom was married with a Swedish person. In 1981 the borders were closed in Poland.

How long will he/she stay?
All my life. I never felt Polish in Poland either. I was not catholic. Swedish people have more solidarity with each other and foreigners. Polish people are very capitalistic, there is no social mobility possible at all.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
My mother and step father and sister.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Polish and Russian.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
I speak Swedish fluently. Swedish had at that time a fantastic school system. Not anymore though, foreigners are just thrown in the Swedish classes. They experience a lot of stress.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
To be able to function as a citizen. To get a job, connect to Swedish society. If people want to stay in this country it is inevitable that they have to learn the language.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Yes, via skype. I don't visit Poland very often, my close family lives in Sweden.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
I tried to learn them Polish, but it was like I was talking to a wall. I raise them bilingually**,** but in Swedish and English. My children later went to Polish classes, because they wanted to learn Polish. Eventually I was in the queue to enroll them into the Polish courses, but that took so long they lost interest. There was only one teacher in the whole city [Umea]. I regret it, because I fear that if I grow old and go back to just speaking Polish I won't be able to talk to my children. It is not necessary from a cultural perspective, I don't see any reason why they should acquire a Polish identity.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
No, because of the children. They live here and want to keep living here, at least until they finish high school.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
German, it is after English the most common European language.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
No, there was only one teacher in Umea and that is obviously not enough.

Value of mother tongue education?
Yes, I was enrolled in Polish courses myself. It helps me with my own education and it helped me to stay in touch with my language and communicate with my family.

Interview 10 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
Born in Poland, came to Sweden in 2009.

How long will he/she stay?
It depends on the employment opportunities, I might move back to Poland or another European country if I can improve my situation there.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
No.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
No, just a little bit of English.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
I speak Swedish decently, but I would like to be fluent. It is difficult though

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
I want to connect with Swedish society, and I need it for my work.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Yes, via skype. I don't visit Poland very often, my close family lives in Sweden.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
We speak Polish at the home because I don't want to teach my son bad Swedish. The teacher recommended us to do this. At school they learn Swedish and they speak both languages very well now.

Language and Mobility

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
English, but for a language that I don't know: it's German. Germany is the biggest economy in Europe with the most opportunities.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
No, this village [Umea] is very small and there is only one teacher here. There was no room for my son to enroll.

Value of mother tongue education?
I think it would be very beneficial for us, it does not lead to segregation if the parents actively stimulate the children to stay in touch with Swedish society, via Swedish friends, letting them join sport activities with Swedish children, etc.

Interview 11 (Umea 26 Nov. 2017)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to Sweden?
End of the 1970's to study. I met my Swedish husband here so I stayed. Now I am in an international board for female migrants.

How long will he/she stay?
For the rest of my life, I am close to retirement and am very happy here.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Poland prior to moving?
No.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Polish before you came here?
Yes, some high school English. Was good enough for university here at first.

At what level would you want to learn Swedish?
I speak it fluently. At the time I needed to learn it fast for my studies. I followed Swedish courses as part of the university programme, and became fluent over the course of my marriage.

What are your main reasons to learn Swedish?
My family in law are Swedish, so are my children. I also work here so I need it to function.

Are you staying in touch with Poland (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Yes, I used to call and send letters to my family in Poland. Now we skype sometimes. Haven't tried whatsapp yet, I might start doing that.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Polish?
I taught them Polish and Swedish at the same time. I saw no reason at all not to do that. The academic literature at the time (1980's) already said that raising children bilingually is nothing but beneficial. It also just seemed logical to me from a common sense perspective. I am very happy we choose to do it. They speak Swedish and Polish like a native speaker now, gives them plenty of advantages.

Language and Mobility

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Obviously English. Polish is useful for Poles, or for children of Poles, to visit family in Poland. Beyond that, I don't really see a big advantage.

Language Policy in Sweden

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Sweden used to have a decent organisation**.** It went downhill these last few years due to lack of funding. Polish embassy is now organising a lot of courses for children as young as four years old. There the children learn both about the Polish language and culture. A lot of Poles are sending their children there. The Polish government fills the void left by the Swedish government.

Value of mother tongue education?
It would be very good if countries organise their own facilities. It doesn't have to lead to segregation. Courses run by the Polish government are much more likely to lead to segregation than Swedish run courses. I also refuse to believe that in this age with internet, it is possible to cut people of from their cultural roots. Sweden should go with the flow and just make sure the mother tongue courses in the official school system are of good quality.

2.6. Turks in France

Interview 1 (Paris 21 April 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1985. Refugié politique. Heeft daardoor makkelijk Frans paspoort gekregen.

How long will he/she stay?
Pour toute la vie.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
A Paris, hebben geholpen.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee, alleen Turks.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Frans, gemiddeld. In Parijs sprak hij alleen Turks. Werkte 18 uur voor Joden in Parijs, geen tijd om cursus te volgen. Geen vakantiedagen. Franse overheid bood in tweede en derde jaar cursus aan, maar mocht niet gaan van baas. In Elzas kon hij geen cursus meer volgen, hij vond zichzelf te oud. Heeft 3 dagen cursus gevolgd, maar niveau was te gemixt. Had er niks aan. Heeft slechts Frans in de praktijk geleerd.

What are your main reasons to learn French? (Quelle sont vos raisons primaires pour apprendre le français?)
Pour travailler. Sociaal leven.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Gemiddeld 1 tot 2 keer per jaar.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Seulement Turks, en ook Frans. Kinderen spreken vloeiend Turks. Ik zou ze niet naar een Turkse school sturen, ook als de mogelijkheid er was.

Language and Mobility

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Seulement français. Turks heb ik niks aan.

Interview 2 (Mulhouse 28 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Slager.
Zes jaar, 1974. Ouders zijn naar Frankrijk gekomen. Zijn gekomen voor werk.

How long will he/she stay?
Mijn hele leven. Wil ook niet emigreren naar Turkije.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving? (Aviez-vous des contacts avec famille ou amies Polonais en France, avant vous avez migré?)
Vader had contacten in Zwitserland. Zijn contacten hebben hem geholpen met migratieproces.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Slechts Turks en een dialect van Grieks

At what level would you want to learn French?
Is naar Franse school geweest, terwijl hij geen Frans sprak. Geen enkele klassen. Heeft hij gemist, want was heel erg moeilijk om Frans in te halen. Sprak thuis alleen Turks, ouders spraken geen Frans. Sprak alleen Frans met broers.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ik spreek alleen Frans tegen kinderen, geen Turks. Mijn Turks is ook niet zo goed. Erg spijtig. Veel effectiever om ook moedertaal te leren. Publieke scholen bieden dat aan. Mijn broers en Zussen zijn naar Turkse school geweest.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Hij wil in Frankrijk blijven, dus nee.

Languages to enhance mobility?
Voor mij specifiek is het Duits, ik woon dicht bij Duitsland [hij woont in de Elzas]. In het algemeen is het Engels. Turks kan helpen, misschien helpt het maar ik twijfel daar aan. Het is alleen nuttig om met andere Turken te spreken, maar verder niet.

Language Policy in France

Value of mother tongue education?

Geen idee, maar denk dat moedertaalonderwijs een goed idee is. Segregatie ligt wel op de loer. Idee dat ik alleen met Turks uit de voeten zou kunnen is voor mij onbestaanbaar. Ik moet ook Frans leren. Ik ben een open mens, dus alleen Turks spreken is voor mij niet voldoende. Wil graag ideeën kunnen uitwisselen met zoveel mogelijk mensen.

Interview 3 (Mulhouse 28 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1995. 14 jaar. Koerdisch. Woonde dicht bij Kobani. Was geen toekomst daar. Geen werk geen school. Had al contacten in Frankrijk. Hij is alleen gekomen. Is gekomen met een vals paspoort via een mensensmokkelaar.

How long will he/she stay?
Ik verwacht mijn hele leven te blijven.

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
Ja, mijn familie heeft me geholpen met de migratie.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Sprak alleen Koerdisch (moedertaal) en Turks op school. Verder geen andere talen.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Was makkelijker dan nu om Frans te leren. Ging naar een speciale school voor buitenlanders (Espace Alpha). In drie maanden werd een basis gelegd voor het Frans. Hij heeft zes maanden dat traject doorlopen, en kon daarna meteen naar een Franse middelbare school. Sprak misschien niet vloeiend, maar zeer goed. Dit systeem was heel erg goed. Hadden vier leraren. Sarkozy heeft de school gesloten. Heeft hij gedaan om het zo moeilijk mogelijk te maken immigranten toe te laten. Turkse lessen zouden misschien een voordeel geweest zijn.

School zag dat het niet helemaal goed functioneerde bij hem thuis. Leefde met 9 personen op 30 vierkante meter. Iedereen rookte, dus gezondheid ging hard achteruit. School ging onderzoek doen, en concludeerde dat dit niet kon. Is toen overgeplaatst naar gastgezin. Gastgezin sprak alleen Frans. Is vier jaar zonder papieren gebleven, maar ging toch naar school.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Ik wil in Frankrijk blijven. Wil werken. Ik wilde gewoon op nieuw beginnen, alsof ik hier geboren ben.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Spreekt nog veel Turks. Vrouw is Turks. Kinderen worden tweetalig opgevoed, om de wortels niet te verliezen. Maar ze hadden ook net zo goed Chinees kunnen leren, ik ben geen Turkse nationalist. Ze hebben Turks wel nodig om met familie te spreken. Frans is wel het allerbelangrijkst.

Ik weet niet of moedertaal eerst leren het leren van Frans makkelijker maakt. Bij mijzelf ging dat niet zo: toen ik hier kwam heb ik op school alleen maar Frans geleerd zonder dat ooit tegen mij in het Turks werd gesproken. Het leren van het Frans ging toch heel snel.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe? (Voulez-vous migrer en Europe dans la future?)
Geen, ik wil echt graag in Frankrijk blijven. Frankrijk heeft mij een kans gegeven om hier te integreren. Ik word hier als een gelijke behandeld, ik waardeer die politiek zeer.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, uiteraard. Turks heb ik niks aan.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Franse overheid zou ook Turkse taal moeten faciliteren op school. Ik denk niet dat dit segregatie kan veroorzaken. Als gewoon goed uitgelegd wordt dat Frans de hoofdtaal is, dan zie ik echt geen enkel probleem. Ik zie de segregatie ook niet om mij heen.

Interview 4 (Mulhouse 29 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
Ben hier geboren (18 jaar) , vader hier geboren, Moeder uit Turkije. 1998. Heb mijn man ontmoet in Turkije en ben hier getrouwd. Moeder wilde zelf geen nationaliteit. Moeder heeft geen Franse cursus, spreekt nu vloeiend Frans. Het was mijn eigen besluit om geen cursus te volgen.

How long will he/she stay?
Toute la vie

Language classes

At what level would you want to learn French?
Sprak Frans en Turks met vader en moeder, spreekt nu beide talen vloeiend. Familie spreekt Turks, vooral praktische redenen. Voelt zich ook zeer sterk verbonden met Turkse cultuur. Kent ook veel Duitse Turken.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Gaat elk jaar 1 keer naar Turkije. Vooral familie van moeder in Turkije. Grootvader is gekomen om te werken, ook grootmoeder meegenomen. Spreken geen Frans, spreekt alleen Turks met grootouders.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish? (Voulez-vous que vos enfants apprendre le Polonais?)
Ik wil graag dat ze allebei Turks en Frans spreken. Net als ik. Is geen belemmering voor om twee talen te leren. Heeft Turks examen gedaan. Lessen vielen helaas uit, is heel erg spijtig. Geldt ook voor kinderen. Moedertaalonderwijs is geen belemmering voor de integratie.

Het feit dat grootouders geen Frans spreken is geen al te groot nadeel. Waren arbeiders, die ook slechts werkten met andere Turken, ze konden zich prima redden.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Non.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility? (Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?)
Duits. Duitsland is een rijk land met een sterke economie. Turks kan ook zeer goed helpen. Er zijn veel Turken in Duitsland, er is een grote Turkse gemeenschap in Duitsland.

Interview 5 (Mulhouse 28 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
23 ans. 1983. Voor politieke redenen.

How long will he/she stay?
Was niet getrouwd toen ik kwam. Dacht echt dat ik maar een paar jaar kon blijven. Ben nu getrouwd met een andere Turkse vluchteling. Nu zijn we op het punt om hier te blijven. Zeker nadat we een kind kregen. Als de politiek in Turkije grondig verandert zou ik liever graag teruggaan. Turkije is een prachtig land (als je de politiek terzijde schuift).

Did you have any contact with friends/relatives from Turkey prior to moving?
Nee, geen enkele. Ik was student en koos Frankrijk omdat de Franse cultuur mij het meest aansprak. Frankrijk is het meest vrije land van Europa. Atatürk was zeer geïnspireerd door de Franse cultuur.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Turks en Duits. Frankrijk sprak me toch meer aan. Duitsland spreekt me minder aan door de twee wereldoorlogen. Duitsers staan cultureel veel verder af van Turkije dan Frankrijk. Frankrijk is net als Turkije mediterraan.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Kende eerst geen woord Frans. Ik heb Franse cursussen gevolgd in Parijs. De Franse overheid stuurde me naar Besançon (bij Dijon). ‘s ochtends en ‘ s middags deed ik een cursus. Cursus leerde mij lezen, schrijven en de grammatica. In de praktijk was het spreken van Frans toch moeilijk. Toen de kinderen naar de kleuterschool gingen leerde ik de taal werkelijk samen met hen. Tijdens de cursus spraken we wel een beetje, maar dat was niet genoeg. Ik leerde ook langzamer omdat ik al vroeg volwassen was. Ik zat ook met mensen in een groep die veel minder ver waren dan ik (niet konden lezen en schrijven). Daar bereikte ik niks.

What are your main reasons to learn French? (Quelle sont vos raisons primaires pour apprendre le français?)
Travail, sociaal. De taal geeft me ook toegang tot het culturele leven van Frankrijk.

Are you staying in touch with Turkey (e.g. through skype, or by physically going there?)
Ja, met familie, ik ben de enige die hier is gekomen. Tous les jours. Spreekt Turks en Koerdisch elke dag.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Culturele rijkdom, praktische redenen: communiceren met familie. Kinderen mixen de talen niet. Man spreekt Turks, vrouw spreekt Turks, op school leren ze Frans. Geen enkele achterstand. Ben zelf ook tweetalig opgevoed.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels.
Turks kan ook helpen. Ik help voor mijn werk Turkse immigranten en hun kennis van het Turks helpt hen erg goed als ze net in Frankrijk zijn aangekomen.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
In Frankrijk bestaat moedertaalonderwijs. De leraren worden ingevlogen uit Turkije, inclusief hun politieke en religieuze ideeën. Ik wilde niet dat de kinderen om die reden die lessen volgden. Als de leraren geen ambtenaren van de Turkse staat waren dan had ik het wel gedaan.

Value of mother tongue education?
Ik vind moedertaalonderwijs wel een goed principe. Het terugtrekken van de Turken in hun eigen gemeenschappen kan gebeuren. Maar als we het verbieden dan wordt de migrantenidentiteit niet erkend. Is wel een verschil tussen een kind dat hier geboren is en een kind dat hier naartoe migreert, kinderen die hier geboren zijn hebben meer taalrechten. Verbieden kan juist de segregatie bevorderen.

Ik heb ook op scholen gewerkt met veel migranten. Veel kinderen hebben niet het niveau van hun Franse klasgenoten. Die achterstand wordt heel vaak niet ingehaald. Taal is daarbij wel belangrijk, maar er zijn ook veel andere relevante elementen.

Ouders zijn eigenlijk veel belangrijker dan het school systeem. Dat bepaalt heel erg school succes.

Er zijn te weinig middelen (financieel en menselijk) om moedertaalonderwijs goed te organiseren. De strikte normen worden veel te weinig gehandhaafd, er zijn heel veel mensen die nu een Frans paspoort krijgen zonder dat ze echt goed Frans spreken.

Franse overheid moet veel strakker en met meer middelen opereren om de immigranten veel meer druk te geven om de taal te leren.

Interview 6 (Mulhouse 28 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1986, politieke vluchteling.

How long will he/she stay?
Als politieke vluchteling kan je nauwelijks terugkeren. Heb drie kinderen dus ik wil gewoon niet teruggaan en hier blijven.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Sprak geen Frans.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Is naar cursus geweest. Had geen enkel niveau. Heb een verblijfsvergunning gekregen zonder Frans te leren.

Heb weinig geleerd bij cursussen Frans. Kende ook weinig Turken, er waren geen Turkse winkels, geen moskeeën. De basis van de cursus was niet voldoende. Had daarna geen tijd om cursus te volgen. Had winkel en drie kinderen. Was autodidact. Ik kon toen ik hier kwam niet lezen en schrijven.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Ik woon hier, dus ik moet Frans spreken. IK begrijp anders niks van de Franse samenleving. Ik moet ook Frans spreken om een baan te vinden.

Voor mij is het onmogelijk om meer te leren. Internetcursus is de beste manier om een nieuwe taal te leren. Cursussen zouden ook meer financiële middelen moeten krijgen.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Kinderen spreken Turks, Koerdisch, en Frans. Spreekt Turks met kinderen geen Koerdisch. Ze hebben zichzelf Koerdisch geleerd.

Hoe meer talen je leert, hoe beter het is. Mijn kinderen kunnen zich nu redden in Turkije. Verschillende talen geven ook toegang tot verschillende culturen. Ik geloof niet in mono-culturalisme. Als je meer toegang tot culturen hebt. Ik geloof ook dat je verschillende culturen kan verenigen.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik hou heel erg van Frankrijk. Zwitserland is veel te strikt als het gaat om migranten. Duitsland is ook te strikt.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Nee, ik heb totaal geen behoefte om weg te gaan. Zelfs de Turken die met pensioen zijn blijven altijd slechts 3 of 4 maanden in Turkije.

Turks kan me helpen een connectie te maken met de Turken in andere steden.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Kinderen wilden geen Turkse lessen volgen. Geen duidelijke reden. Ze hebben Turks zelf geleerd en dat vonden ze voldoende. De faciliteiten bestonden ook. Onduidelijk. De staat organiseert al Turkse lessen. Turkse moskeeën geven lessen in Turks, daar kunnen de kinderen naar toe gaan. De vrijwilligheid van de kinderen is ook zeer relevant. Zelfs kinderen van vier jaar kunnen al kiezen.

Value of mother tongue education?
Nee, moedertaalonderwijs lijkt me niet zinvol. Het gaat erom dat ze juist Frans leren. De kinderen hebben er niks aan om op school ook nog Turks te leren.

Interview 7 (Written interview, Paris 30 May 2018).

Quand vous avez migré en France? Et quelle était votre raison?
Mon père a migrée en France dans les années 1974.
La raison était économique, essentiellement pour venir travailler.

Combien de temps vous comptez rester en France?
Je compte y rester jusqu'à la fin de mes jours.

Aviez-vous des contacts avec famille ou amies Turcs en France, avant vous avez migré?
Non aucun contact.

Vous connaissiez des autres langues que le Turc, avant votre migration ?
Je connaissait l'Allemand, parce que j'avais aussi migré en Allemagne pendant 7 ans.

Quelle sont vos raisons primaires pour apprendre le français?
Je crois quand on vit dans un pays, il faut maitriser la langue pour s'intégrer.

Avez-vous du contact avec des personnes en Turquie (par example via skype, ou par visiter la Turquie?
Oui bien sur, nous avons beaucoup de la famille, des frères et sœurs , des enfants….
Et nous communiquons souvent par téléphone ou par WhatsApp.

Voulez-vous que vos enfants apprendre le Turc ?
Oui bien sûr, nous avons la chance d'avoir une double culture, pourquoi s'en privé, et nous sommes lié avec les deux pays.

Voulez-vous migrer en Europe dans la future ?
Moi Non, mais peut être mes enfants, par exemple en Allemagne ou en Suisse pour raison économique.

Quelles langues que vous ne parlez pas encore, amélioraient vos chances de mobilités le plus?
C'est l'Allemand.

Il y a suffisament de facilités pour apprendre la langue maternelle en France?
Oui, des cours à partir de la primaire jusqu'au collège.

Que pensez-vous de l'éducation de la langue maternelle? Vous pensez que ça cause de segregation?
Oui défois.

Interview 8 (Mulhouse 31 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1979, gezinshereniging

How long will he/she stay?
Hele leven, mijn familie en vrienden zijn allemaal hier, zie geen reden om weg te gaan.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Ben naar een cursus geweest van de gemeente. Ben blij dat de cursus bestaat, maar heb er niet gigantisch veel aan gehad. Mijn medestudenten hadden een divers niveau: sommigen spraken al vrij goed, anderen waren analfabeet. Heb Frans vooral geleerd in de praktijk: op werk en door om te gaan met Fransen.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Voor mijn werk en sociale leven. Als je hier woont moet je de taal spreken. Je hebt geen kans op goed werk hier als je geen Frans spreekt.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ja, ik heb ze tweetalig opgevoed. Is goed uitgepakt, ze spreken nu beide talen vloeiend. Ik zie niet in hoe dit slecht kan zijn. Ze voelen zich helemaal Frans, maar hebben nu ook het extra'tje dat ze met de familie kunnen praten. En meer kansen hebben eventueel in Turkije als ze wat willen. Zie wel in Frankrijk dat Turks niet erg geliefd is, maar dat negeer ik zoveel mogelijk.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik blijf hier.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels is het belangrijkst. Turks alleen voor de familie, maar misschien later als Turkije een betere economie krijgt. Zie weinig reden om naar Turken in andere Europese landen te gaan: er zijn genoeg kansen hier.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Ja, middelbare school biedt genoeg faciliteiten. Alleen jammer dat Turkse leraren moeten worden ingevlogen uit Turkije. Wisselende kwaliteit, en zou beter zijn als Frankrijk zelf de leraren zou opleiden.

Interview 9 (Mulhouse 31 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1969, voor werk

How long will he/she stay?
Ik ben al oud, ik heb overwogen naar Turkije terug te gaan. Komt er nu niet van. Ben getrouwd met Franse vrouw en zij wil gewoon hier blijven.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Ben op advies van mijn baas naar een cursus gegaan toen ik aankwam. Was heel erg zwaar, werkte vaak 10 uur per dag en moest dan paar keer per week 's avonds naar de cursus. Heeft iets geholpen, maar heb meer gehad aan gewoon Frans spreken op mijn werk. Spreek Frans nu vloeiend, ook doordat ik met een Franse vrouw samenwoon.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Had het nodig voor mijn werk. Wilde ook Franse vrienden maken, is uiteindelijk gelukt.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ja, onze kinderen zijn tweetalig opgevoed. Mijn vrouw sprak Frans tegen hen, ik sprak Turks. Was moeizaam in begin. Ze mengden de talen. Uiteindelijk toen ze naar school gingen begonnen ze de talen beter te scheiden. Hebben het erover gehad met de leraren; sommigen zeiden dat we ze beter geen Turks konden leren vanwege de taalachterstand. Anderen zeiden dat het geen probleem was. Uiteindelijk toch maar gekozen voor tweetalige opvoeding, en het is uiteindelijk goed gekomen: ze spreken nu Turks en Frans vloeiend.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, ik blijf hier.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels, daarmee kan je bijna overal terecht. Verder Duits en Spaans: grote taalgebieden.
Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Ja, de middelbare school biedt Turkse lessen aan. Zijn van een redelijk niveau, al was het iets te laag voor onze kinderen. Toch goed dat ze in contact komen met hun Turkse achtergrond op school. Ik zie niet hoe dit tot segregatie kan leiden. Hangt veel meer af van de keuze van de ouders. Of er moedertaalonderwijs bestaat of niet heeft daar geen invloed op.

Interview 10 (Mulhouse 31 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1989, ben hier geboren. Beide ouders zijn Turks.

How long will he/she stay?
Geen idee, heb universiteit gedaan en werk nu als ambtenaar bij de gemeente. Werk bevalt me. Zolang ik hier een toekomst kan opbouwen blijf ik hier.

Language classes

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
Ja, ben zelf tweetalig opgevoed. Thuis spraken mijn ouders Turks, op school leerde ik Frans. Ik spreek beide talen, dus wil allebei tegen mijn kinderen spreken. Ik had veel moeilijk Turks geleerd als ik er niet meer was opgegroeid. Heb er nog elke dag voordeel van: whatsapp en skype veel met Turkse familie en vrienden in Turkije. Lees Turkse kranten.

Heb ook begrepen van wetenschappers dat tweetaligheid alleen maar voordelen heeft. Zie geen reden om niet mijn beide talen door te geven.

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Misschien. Overweeg soms Engeland, maar niet meer na Brexit. België zou kunnen, de taal maakt het makkelijker. Duitsland kan ook, maar spreek geen Duits.

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Engels en Duits. Turks heb ik waarschijnlijk weinig aan. Ken geen Turken in andere Europese landen, en wil niet naar Turkije.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Heb zelf Turkse lessen gehad op school. Waren vrij goed: had goede leraren en heb daar iets beter leren schrijven. Dat leerde ik thuis niet. Ik vind dat er genoeg faciliteiten zijn, maar kan niet oordelen over de regio buiten Parijs. Het kan tot segregatie leiden, als de Turken zich via hun taal terugtrekken in hun gemeenschap. Maar: beleid heeft daar waarschijnlijk alleen symbolische werking. Als Turken zich willen terugtrekken doen ze dat ook zonder moedertaal onderwijs. Veel beter om het als overheid aan te bieden, anders doet Turkse ambassade het. Dan heeft Frankrijk geen zicht op wat de kinderen leren.

Interview 11 (Mulhouse 31 May 2018)

Migration history

Why did the respondent migrate to France?
1981, gezinshereniging

How long will he/she stay?
Mijn hele leven, mijn man en kinderen wonen hier. Misschien dat we besluiten na pensioen naar Turkije terug te gaan, maar niet waarschijnlijk.

Language classes

Did you know any other languages than Turkish before you came here?
Nee.

At what level would you want to learn French?
Heb pas later echt geprobeerd Frans te leren, toen ik hier al acht jaar woonde. Ben naar een cursus geweest van de gemeente. Had het daarvoor te druk met kinderen. Spreek het niet vloeiend, maar kan me redden. Zou het graag beter leren, maar is moeilijk: ben oud en ken niet heel veel Fransen.

What are your main reasons to learn French?
Ik wilde graag zelf dagelijkse dingen kunnen doen. Boodschappen, kapper, etc. Als het kon wilde ik ook graag Franse vrienden maken.

Would you want your children to be able to learn Turkish?
We spraken Turks thuis tegen hen, ze leerden Frans op school. Ons Frans was niet goed genoeg om het ze te leren. Werkte goed. Nu spreken ze beide talen

Language and Mobility

Plans to be mobile in Europe?
Nee, behalve misschien Turkije

Languages to learn to enhance mobility?
Frans en Engels. Ik spreek te slecht Frans om hier te slagen, zou niet weten hoe ik zou moeten migreren voordat ik dat kan. Engels is logisch, dat is de universele taal.

Language Policy in France

Enough language facilities for mother tongue education?
Ik vond de faciliteiten niet slecht. Het niveau was te laag voor onze kinderen, maar ben blij dat Frankrijk dit regelt. Is beter dan wanneer we gedwongen zouden zijn naar een Turkse Koran-school te gaan. Dat zou pas leiden tot segregatie, niet de lessen op de Franse school.

Summary

Multilingual Moves: Language and the Motility of Migrant Communities in Europe

The connection between language, language policy and mobility is a relatively understudied subject in the academy. This dissertation explores that connection and analyses its intricacies. The study follows a three-part structure: in the first part the necessary theoretical concepts are established and developed, most notably those related to theories of mobility and inclusion. The main objective of these early chapters is to establish a theoretical connection between language (policy) and mobility. This connection is of an *indirect*, rather than a *direct* nature. Language skills, and by extension also language policy, expand individuals' mobility opportunities, but probably do not directly influence their decision to migrate. For that reason, the notion of *motility* is the central concept of this study. Motility, a term that is frequently used in biology and sometimes in urban sociology, is concerned with potential instead of actual mobility. It is argued that this concept can also be used to help explain the dynamics of international mobility, and logically to connect language (policy) and mobility. One of the main features of motility in a language-related context is its concern for the linguistic infrastructure (i.e. language policy) and the potential migrant's language skills. So it also becomes necessary to discuss topics related to integration/inclusion policies, since the degree and manner of an individual's inclusion in society partly determines his/her motility. Therefore theoretical insights regarding these topics, with special attention to 'transnationalism', are also extensively discussed.

The two other parts of the study are of an empirical nature, supporting the theoretical concepts defended in this thesis. The second part analyses the policy documents of three European countries: France, Sweden and the Netherlands. The nature of language policy is an important factor in the study of motility. Thus the goal of this section is to explain the perceived differences between the three systems, through documentation primarily pertaining to language policy targeted towards migrants and their descendants in the second half of the twentieth century. France, Sweden and the Netherlands represent different national models regarding their approach to language policy, France being usually classified as traditionally assimilationist, Sweden as multicultural and the Netherlands as a country that has transitioned from a multicultural to an assimilationist system. The analysis presented here calls this 'model-thinking' into question.

The last part of the study focusses on interviews with one migrant group from the EU and one from outside: the Polish and Turkish communities. In-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of these groups in all three host countries, covering

all the important motility-related questions. These included their perspectives on their transnational identity and how it affects their linguistic experience, their opinions on language policy in their country of residence, and the importance of their mother tongue and whether they were keen to pass it on to their children. The interviews showed, for example, that perspectives on the value of the mother tongue and mother-tongue education are strongly influenced by socio-economic status, that in many cases the linguistic education facilities pertaining to both mother tongue and host language are less than satisfactory and that transnational identities matter for virtually all participants and strongly influence their language usage.

In conclusion, this study manages to integrate language and migration into a new theoretical framework, connecting some socio-linguistic theory with migration theory. It does so by developing the concept of 'motility' to make it fit for analysis on the international level rather than just the local. Furthermore, the study has enabled valuable insights based on the policy documents and the interviews with migrants on the state of present-day integration policy, focussing primarily on language. These insights also provide both theoretical and practical avenues concerning language policies *vis-à-vis* migrants. The study explores relevant factors affecting motility and has therefore laid the groundwork for future empirical work.

Samenvatting in het Nederlands

Multilingual Moves: Taal en Motiliteit van migranten in Europa

Het verband tussen taal en mobiliteit is een relatief onderbelicht thema in de wetenschappelijke wereld. Deze dissertatie onderzoekt dat verband in al zijn nuances. De studie kent een driedelige structuur: het eerste deel bespreekt en ontwikkelt de voor de analyse essentiële concepten, met name die welke gelieerd zijn aan theorieën over taal en mobiliteit. In de eerste hoofdstukken wordt een theoretische connectie verkend en uiteindelijk gelegd tussen taal(beleid) en mobiliteit. Deze connectie is niet *direct,* maar *indirect* van aard. Taalvaardigheid en, indirect dus taalbeleid vergroten de mobiliteitsmogelijkheid van individuen, maar hebben waarschijnlijk geen directe invloed op een migratiebeslissing. Gezien dit gegeven staat het begrip *motiliteit* centraal in deze studie. Motiliteit, een begrip dat zijn oorsprong vindt in de biologie en later is gebruikt in de stadssociologie, betreft potentiële in plaats van daadwerkelijke mobiliteit. De stelling zal worden verdedigd dat dit begrip ook adequaat is om de dynamiek van internationale mobiliteit te analyseren, en om een logisch verband te leggen tussen taal(beleid) en mobiliteit. Binnen het concept motiliteit moet een belangrijke plaats worden toegekend aan de linguïstische infrastructuur (e.g. taalonderwijs) en de taalvaardigheid van de potentiële migrant. Het is noodzakelijk om dieper in te gaan op thema's rondom integratiebeleid, aangezien de mate waarin een individu in de maatschappij is geïntegreerd deels bepalend is voor zijn/haar motiliteit. Om die reden zullen theoretische inzichten over integratie/inclusie, alsmede over het fenomeen 'transnationalisme', uitgebreid worden besproken.

De andere twee delen van de dissertatie zijn empirisch van aard. In het tweede deel worden beleidsdocumenten over taal- en integratiebeleid van drie landen geanalyseerd, te weten Frankrijk, Nederland en Zweden. De aard, het doel en de historische context van taalbeleid zijn belangrijke aspecten die in deze studie aan de orde komen. De analyse van de beleidsdocumenten dient om de gepercipieerde verschillen tussen de systemen van de drie landen uit te leggen. Dat gebeurt door middel van een grondige bestudering van de officiële documentatie uit de tweede helft van de 20e eeuw over taalbeleid voor immigranten en hun nakomelingen. Frankrijk, Zweden en Nederland vertegenwoordigen verschillende nationale modellen wat betreft de wijze waarop zij taalbeleid vormgeven en uitvoeren. Frankrijk wordt doorgaans geclassificeerd als gericht op assimilatie, Zweden als zijnde multicultureel, en Nederland als een land dat de transitie heeft gemaakt van een multicultureel naar een meer assimilationistisch beleid. Deze studie stelt dit 'model-denken' ter discussie.

Het derde en laatste deel van de dissertatie concentreert zich op interviews met een EU- en een niet-EU migrantengroep, te weten de Poolse en Turkse gemeenschappen. Met leden van deze gemeenschappen is een aantal diepte-interviews gehouden in de drie

onderzochte landen, waarbij de relevante motiliteit-gerelateerde vragen aan de orde zijn gekomen. Ook hun visie op hun transnationale identiteit kwam ter sprake en hoe deze van invloed is op hun dagelijks taalgebruik, op hun opvattingen over het taalbeleid in het land waar zij verblijven, en op het belang van hun moedertaal. Daarbij kwam de vraag naar voren of zij bereid zijn deze door te geven aan hun kinderen. Uit de interviews bleek onder meer dat hun standpunt ten aanzien van de waarde van de moedertaal en moedertaalonderwijs sterk beïnvloed wordt door de sociaaleconomische achtergrond. Verder gaven de geïnterviewden te kennen dat de taalfaciliteiten, zowel wat betreft moedertaalonderwijs als de taal van het land waar zij verblijven, niet effectief genoeg zijn. Tenslotte is gebleken dat hun transnationale identiteiten zeer sterk zijn ontwikkeld. Dit gegeven is van grote invloed op de wijze van communiceren in de talen die zij dagelijks spreken.

Concluderend mag gesteld worden dat deze studie erin slaagt taal en migratie te verenigen binnen een nieuw theoretisch raamwerk, door aspecten van een aantal sociolinguïstische theorieën te combineren met bestaande migratietheorieën met name dankzij de introductie van het concept motiliteit. Daarnaast biedt de dissertatie waardevolle inzichten in de hedendaagse staat van het taal- en integratiebeleid in drie West-Europese landen, op basis van de interviews en de documentenanalyse. De studie verkent tenslotte een groot aantal factoren die relevant zijn voor de analyse van motiliteit en legt zodoende een fundament voor toekomstig empirisch onderzoek.

Résumé en français

Démarches multilinguistiques : Langue et Motilité de migrants en Europe

La relation entre langue et mobilité est un thème relativement peu mis en relief dans le domaine scientifique. La présente thèse examine cette relation dans toutes ses nuances. L'étude présente une structure tripartite: la première partie discute et développe les concepts essentiels pour l'analyse, notamment ceux qui sont liés aux théories concernant langue et mobilité. Les premiers chapitres examinent et, finalement, établissent une connexion théorique entre langue, politique linguistique et mobilité. Cette connexion n'est pas de nature *directe*, mais *indirecte*. La compétence linguistique, et donc de manière indirecte la politique linguistique, augmentent les possibilités individuelles de mobilité, mais il est peu probable qu'elles influencent directement la décision de migrer. C'est cette constatation qui confère au concept de *motilité* une place centrale dans cette étude. La motilité, un concept qui trouve son origine dans la biologie, employé plus tard dans la sociologie urbaine, concerne la mobilité *potentielle, réalisable* et non pas *réalisée*. Cette étude se propose de défendre la thèse selon laquelle ce concept est un outil adéquat pour analyser la dynamique de la mobilité internationale et pour établir un rapport logique entre langue, politique linguistique et mobilité. Dans l'emploi du concept de motilité il faut accorder une place importante à l'infrastructure linguistique (par exemple, l'enseignement linguistique) et à la compétence linguistique du migrant potentiel. Il est nécessaire d'approfondir des thèmes concernant la politique d'intégration, étant donné que la motilité de l'individu dépend pour une partie de la mesure dans laquelle il est intégré dans la société. C'est pour cette raison que les vues théoriques au sujet de l'intégration/l'inclusion ainsi que celles concernant le phénomène du 'transnationalisme' seront amplement discutées.

Les deux autres parties de l'étude sont de nature empirique. La deuxième partie analysera les documents politiques concernant la politique de langue(s) et d'intégration, provenant de trois pays, à savoir La France, les Pays-Bas et la Suède. La nature, l'objectif et le contexte historique de la politique linguistique constituent des aspects importants qui seront traités dans cette étude. L'analyse des documents politiques sert à expliquer les différences constatées entre les systèmes des trois pays susdits. La méthode utilisée pour y parvenir est de faire une étude approfondie de la documentation officielle datant de la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle, concernant la politique linguistique destinée aux immigrés et à leurs descendants. La France, la Suède et les Pays-Bas représentent des modèles nationaux différents en ce qui concerne l'élaboration et la réalisation de la politique linguistique. La France est généralement considérée comme un pays orienté vers l'assimilation, la Suède comme étant multiculturelle, et les Pays-Bas comme un pays ayant vécu la transition d'une politique multiculturelle vers une orientation assimilationniste. C'est cette tendance à 'distinguer des modèles' qui est mise en cause dans cette étude.

La troisième et dernière partie de l'étude est consacrée aux interviews avec deux groupes de migrants, faisant partie ou non de l'UE, à savoir les communautés polonaises et turques. Un certain nombre d'interviews en profondeur a été mené avec des membres de ces communautés dans les trois pays examinés. Pendant ces entretiens les questions pertinentes ayant trait au concept de motilité ont été discutées. Les migrants ont aussi exprimé leur point de vue sur l'identité transnationale, ils ont parlé de l'impact qu'elle a sur l'usage de la langue dans la vie quotidienne, sur leurs conceptions de la politique linguistique du pays d'accueil et sur l'intérêt de leur langue maternelle, ce qui amenait la question s'ils sont prêts à passer celle-ci aux enfants. Les interviews démontraient entre autres que l'opinion sur l'intérêt de la langue maternelle et l'enseignement de la langue maternelle est fortement influencée par la condition socio-économique. Ensuite, les personnes interviewées font savoir que les facilités linguistiques, aussi bien concernant l'enseignement de la langue maternelle que celui de la langue du pays d'accueil, ne sont pas assez effectives. Finalement, on a constaté que leurs identités transnationales sont fortement développées, ce qui influence largement leur façon de communiquer dans les langues qu'ils parlent quotidiennement.

En conclusion: on peut dire que la présente étude parvient à réunir langue et migration à l'intérieur d'un nouveau cadre théorique, en combinant des aspects d'un certain nombre de théories sociolinguistiques avec les théories migratoires actuelles, notamment grâce au concept de motilité. En outre, l'étude offre un éclairage précieux sur l'état contemporain de la politique de langue et d'intégration dans trois pays de l'Europe occidentale, sur base des interviews et de l'analyse de documents. Enfin, elle examine un grand nombre de facteurs pertinents pour l'analyse de la motilité, constituant ainsi un fondement pour des recherches empiriques futures.