Multilingual moves

Language and motility of migrant communities in Europe

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Chapter 5.1

LANGUAGE POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS:
A POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

In this chapter the development of Dutch minorities policy, in particular the language policy component, will be analysed. The Dutch policy has been classically categorised as being ‘pluralistic’ and ‘multicultural’, whilst since the early 1990s it has allegedly been steering towards assimilation. However, it needs to be noted that in both the political and the academic arenas, opinions on the topic of integration of minorities in the Netherlands and the nature of the policy in both past and present differ. This chapter will not particularly focus on the practical policy and its consequences, but rather on the discursive representation of key concepts and key policy proposals. The goal of this exercise is twofold: first to gain a deeper understanding of the Dutch minority policy tradition vis-à-vis its immigrants, and secondly to pinpoint how, when and why exactly the turning point in policy from ‘pluralistic’ to ‘assimilationist’ occurred.

For the analysis, key government texts spanning the period between 1970 (the year of the first comprehensive government policy paper on foreign workers) and 2011 have been studied. Texts include government commentary to the Dutch parliament to defend newly proposed laws, and studies drafted by influential advisory organs such as the WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) and the SCP (The Netherlands Institute for Social Science Research). The chapter will focus primarily on the linguistic component of minorities policy. In the Dutch case, there are two main policy areas of interest in that respect: OETC/OALT (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur/Onderwijs in Allochthone Levende Talen) (Heritage Language and Culture Education/ Education in ‘Allochthonous’ Living Languages), which was a government-supported initiative to support mother-tongue education for immigrants in primary and in some cases secondary education, and secondly the citizenship course regime which has a strong linguistic focus. Furthermore, the development of general definitions and of goals on ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ is of interest, due to its obvious implications for the more specific linguistic aspects of minorities policy.

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9 The present author and Marácz contributed equally to this paper. The fragments cited here are part of the contribution of the present author.
1960-1970s: guest worker regime

It has been observed in Houtkamp & Marácz (2018)\(^1\) that due to the rapid growth of the post-war economy and the increasing disinterest of the Dutch population in accepting work at the lower end of the job market, the Dutch government actively recruited temporary foreign workers from the 1950s to the middle of the 1970s. In the early periods most workers originated from southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, but in the 1960s and 1970s the majority came from states such as Morocco and Turkey. Among government officials the question rose of the appropriate policy response to this newfound ethnic diversity in the Netherlands. One of the first documents that sought to formulate the beginnings of an answer was the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* (Note on foreign workers), drafted in 1970. The document emphasises the economic nature of the foreign migration flow and discusses potential problems regarding recruitment (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 4). In Houtkamp & Marácz (2018) it is further argued that Dutch policy at the time emphasised the temporary nature of these migration flows, assuming that most foreign workers would return to their countries of origin once their labour contracts had ended. In this document however, some allusions to a possible longer stay of the foreign workers were also made. For instance, on the topic of the likelihood that the migrants would opt for family reunification:

> It is more likely that this thought will occur to him after he himself has adapted to Dutch society, and has become convinced that a longer stay in this country offers him perspectives as head of the family. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 9).

There are two relevant notions in this extract: first, it seems that the migrant himself, rather than the government, determines the degree of ‘being adapted’ to Dutch society. Secondly, when discussing the issue of the adaptability of migrants, it begs the question what kind of criteria would be relevant. The document expands upon this latter notion in ensuing sections. For instance, it comments on the relationship between the autochthonous (i.e. native) Dutch and the migrants regarding adaptability:

> Inclusion of the group of foreign workers in Dutch society implies mutual adaptation. The foreigner must be able to adapt to some extent to the new situation, i.e. the Dutch way of life, the Dutch population will need to be prepared to accept an unfamiliar group with different customs, etc. This will help with the avoidance of conflicts, whilst contributing to the personal wellbeing of foreigners. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 10).

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\(^{10}\) The present author and Marácz contributed equally to this paper. The fragments cited here are part of the contribution of the present author.
Here the notion of ‘mutual adaptability’ is explicitly mentioned: both the migrants and the majority population have to adapt to the ‘new situation’. This ‘mutual adaptability’ remains a vague concept however. It can be argued that in practice it can be difficult to imagine how the majority population would adapt to the minority, and to what degree it needs to accept ‘different customs’. It seems unlikely that this process would happen automatically. This ambition of ‘mutual adaptability’ is present in most of the documents in the 1970s, 1980s and to a certain degree also in the 1990s, but is virtually never translated into concrete policy measures.

In an ensuing extract, the positive contribution of the foreign workers’ culture is emphasised:

> It is a question of providing information to the Dutch population about the character of ‘unfamiliar groups’, and the implications their presence can have for Dutch society. Whereas the positive influence of other cultures on our society should absolutely not be disregarded, on the other hand it is about providing information to the foreign workers regarding the country and region where they are welcomed, and the difficulties that may occur during their adaptation. In this regard it is important that the biggest obstacle to mutual contact, the language barrier, should be removed. (ibid.: 10).

A third extract makes the connection between the need for migrants to adapt and the duration of their stay:

> In the process of adaptation the length of stay is an important factor. Regarding the foreign workers, who will usually stay short-term, the focus may even primarily lie on preserving their own identity. Readaptation difficulties upon return to their own country will then be as few as possible. (ibid: 10).

These extracts therefore speak about the question of adaptability but remain vague on its practical applications, using general terms such as adapting to the ‘Dutch way of life’, the need to accept a group with ‘different customs’ and the importance of ‘mutual relations’ between the migrants and the autochthonous population. The one exception is when it comes to the role of language: it is explicitly stated that the language barrier needs to be broken, for it is the biggest barrier to establishing mutual relations. The question of linguistic competence is also addressed in the section on education for foreign workers’ children:

> The question arises of what type of education is necessary:- purely their own national education in order to anticipate the possible return of the parents to their home country, so the connection with education there does not raise difficulties; or purely Dutch education to facilitate the integration
of the children in the Netherlands and allow them to seize all educational opportunities here; in the latter case it is required to provide additional education with the goal of teaching the children about their native language and culture, in order to bridge the gap as far as possible created between parents and children after their emigration. Moreover, in most cases a transition period from national to Dutch education will be needed. (*Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1970: 12).

This dilemma is interesting mainly in that it foreshadows the introduction of mother-tongue education. A clear distinction is made between ‘purely Dutch education’ that ‘speeds up the integration of children in the Netherlands’ and ‘exclusive minority culture and language education’, justified by the possible return of these children to their countries of origin. The concept of ‘integration’ is not clearly defined in this document, but judging by this extract it seems to be largely connected to and/or facilitated by a knowledge of Dutch and, more importantly, it is explicitly not facilitated by mother-tongue education. This suggests that the notion of integration expressed in this document is monolingual.

A different government reacted in 1974 to the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* in a so-called ‘memorie van antwoord’ (i.e. the official response of the government to the WRR report). Agreement with several statements of the *Nota buitenlandse werknemers* is expressed. The 1970s observation that the Netherlands ‘is not an immigration country and should not become one’ is met with approval. Furthermore, the government’s response has some interesting assumptions on the integration and language-learning practices of immigrants. It formulates an expectation of what kind of immigrants are most likely to stay permanently in the Netherlands:

> It also needs to be taken into account that those showing adaptability will stay the longest period of time. This means that time is a decisive factor in the selection process of the group of foreign workers. If the foreign worker wishes to transfer his family after some time has passed, then this is an indication that he has clearly chosen to settle in the Netherlands. (*Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers* 1974: 4).

The government speaks of ‘adaptation capability’, without formulating a precise definition. However, even though the term lacks a clear definition, it can be inferred that ‘adaptation capability’ is a quality possessed by the migrants which has very little connection to government policy. The government thus assumed that a distinction between the ‘desirable’(i.e. probably working, Dutch-speaking, ‘adapted’) migrants and the undesirable ones would come about in a natural way with little need for policy intervention in that respect.
However, despite the self-selection mechanism of ‘adaptation capability’, the government also expresses its wish actively to reduce migration flows. This is based on a different idea of the value of economic growth (economic growth is not always the utmost goal to strive for), demographic pressure and the ‘ensuing damage to the social environment (Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1974: 6).

Furthermore, the document states that migrants will have difficulty finding their way within Dutch society if they are ‘uprooted’ from their own cultural norms and practices. The government proposes a solution:

Finally, one has to take care to provide foreign workers with their own community centres, where their personal values and customs may give them some support, because people who are uprooted and under threat of losing their own self-worth cannot be expected to uphold good relations with their social environment. (ibid.: 14).

The notion that the 1974 government was asserting the importance of the heritage ethnic community in the integration process is remarkable. It also paves the way for the later policy philosophy of ‘integration whilst maintaining the heritage identity’, which will be discussed later in this chapter. This extract also implicitly shows that the political framework of the time seems akin to Berry’s definition of integration as reciprocal adaptation between minorities and majorities. Cultivating the heritage ethnic identity on the one hand and adaptation to Dutch society on the other hand are not seen as mutually exclusive:

Where it concerns the possible contradiction between the desired reasonable adaptation to Dutch society on the one hand, and the maintenance of their own heritage on the other, the undersigned are of the opinion that these aims certainly do not exclude one another, rather even that they complement each other.

Within the framework of building the social environment - promoting heritage and community life - the foreign workers with their families have sufficient opportunities to experience together their own religious and cultural values. This is also expressed by the additional education for the children of foreign workers. (ibid: 19).

The last sentence emphasises the education targeted at the migrants’ children. There is very little ambition expressed to organise an extensive language acquisition programme for their parents. It is stated, though, that ‘Simple Dutch language acquisition courses could contribute as well [to help them settle in the Netherlands]’ (Memorie van antwoord Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1974: 17) in the early stages after their arrival in the
Netherlands, but plans did not reach further than this. The children should however be integrated in the Dutch education system as soon as possible:

The former have to be placed for as short a time as possible into a separate class, to familiarise them as quickly as possible with the Dutch language, after which full integration in Dutch education can start. However, this does not imply that these children could not be taught in their heritage language and culture, if their parents would like it. The pupils who will certainly leave the Netherlands after several years should receive this additional education alongside Dutch education in any case. (ibid.: 21).

Considering these two key documents of the 1970s period, the Nota buitenlandse werknemers and the Memorie van antwoord, we can draw several conclusions. First of all, it is often stated that integration policy in this period had little substance, due to the dominant philosophy that the migrants’ stay would be temporary. Some extracts justify this conclusion, such as the repeated observations that the Netherlands is not an immigration country. However other extracts show that policy makers were reflecting upon measures to facilitate the adaptation of those who did stay. The idea that migrants should be allowed to cultivate their heritage identity was not just seen as a method to facilitate their return to the country of origin, but also considered a viable strategy to ease their adaptation to Dutch society. Regarding language policy, the documents show a particular concern for the integration of the migrants’ children in the Dutch education system. Teaching them Dutch was the primary objective so they could participate in regular classes. The government barely touched upon the subject of adult education for their parents.

WRR Etnische Minderheden (1979)\(^\text{11}\)

During the 1980s the Dutch government, consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the right-of-centre liberal party (VVD), made the shift towards a more active integration policy, both for migrants’ children and their parents. The 1979 report Etnische Minderheden (Ethnic Minorities) by the WRR was key to this changing perspective. The WRR concluded that the adaptation process of immigrants in the Netherlands was problematic, due to three major reasons:

(i) problems of social backwardness: to what extent is the ability of the members of these groups to participate in society on equal terms restricted by their socio-economic position; these problems of social backwardness are often shared by ethnic minorities - admittedly often to a greater degree - with disadvantaged groups within society generally;

\(^{11}\) The extracts from ‘Etnische minderheden’ are directly quoted from its English version, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) (1979). Ethnic Minorities. The extracts from all the other documents have been translated by the present author.
(ii) cultural or identity problems: to what extent are these groups or their individual members prepared and able to adapt to the dominant culture, or else to preserve and experience a sense of independent identity;

(iii) ‘majority problems’: to what extent is the host society prepared to develop towards a society in which people of diverse ethnic backgrounds can live together harmoniously. In principle, these also form three separate areas for government policy formulation. (WRR 1979: VII).

In this extract it is unclear whether it is desirable that the migrants choose between the majority culture and their own group identity, or develop them simultaneously. What is clear however, is that the trend set in 1974, when the minority culture played an important role in the cultural adaptation process, is continued here by the WRR. The fact that the report also mentions ‘majority problems’, namely the willingness of the country of destination to adapt to a society where different ethnicities can live together in harmony, is also interesting. It shows that the WRR realised Dutch society had to change if it were to accommodate the advent of newcomers, but is also another sign that the adaptation process was supposed to be mutual: both immigrants and autochthonous Dutch would need to accommodate to each other. The WRR acknowledged that the Netherlands had become an immigration country, contrary to the earlier reports of the 1970s:

Official policy in the past was strongly influenced by the belief that immigrants intended to remain in the Netherlands only temporarily. This assumption was not only consistent with the objective that the Netherlands should not become an immigration country, but many migrants themselves anticipated temporary residence. (WRR 1979: XVII).

The point at issue, however, is that the possibility of permanent residence by minority groups should be taken as a basis for official policy and should determine the nature of the facilities offered as long as immigrants wish to remain in the Netherlands. The possibility of individual return migration should not be used as an alibi for evading a policy that would improve the minorities’ opportunities to participate in Dutch society. Equally the desire to return must not be used as a weapon to encourage remigration. (WRR 1979: XVIII).

The WRR presented here a thorough reflection on the migrants’ orientation towards their own culture versus orientation towards the Dutch society. It is in particular interesting how ‘Dutch culture’ is defined and what the effects are of a particular form of cultural orientation on different generations:
All in all it must therefore be expected that the disadvantages experienced by many members of minority groups currently living in the Netherlands will have effects in coming generations. By disadvantage is understood disadvantage in terms of Dutch culture, that is being relatively poorly placed to acquire things to which value is attached by the indigenous Dutch community (education, income, housing, status, power, quality of work, and so on). (WRR 1979: XII-XIII).

Adapting to Dutch culture is here thus defined as ‘acquiring things to which value is attached by the indigenous Dutch community’. These attributes are mostly material: income, housing, status, power and good working conditions. By contrast it is assumed that those who opt to focus on their own ethnic culture might value these attributes less. Orientation towards one’s ethnic culture is thus seen as a (more or less) deliberate choice to opt out of these material values.

The WRR was, in line with the other 1970s documents, not an advocate of assimilation and instead desired that both cultures adapt to each other. However, the foundation for its argument is quite different:

In principle, the constitutionally guaranteed liberties rule out enforced assimilation; occasionally other objectives of equal significance for society are even required to take second place to guaranteed liberties. The guaranteed liberties also mean that the government must implement any positive cultural policies with restraint. (WRR 1979: XX)

Solutions for these problems must not be drawn up by the host society alone but should be arrived at through a process of communication with the minorities themselves, who must be provided with adequate opportunity for such a dialogue. With good minority participation in policy formulation the nature and scope of cultural reorientation not only become the subject of decision-making by those affected, but at the same time demands may be made concerning various aspects of Dutch society. (ibid.: XXI).

It needs to be remembered that the WRR in 1979 accepted the premise that the Netherlands is an immigration country and also assumed that a significant number of migrants would stay on a permanent basis. The argumentation predominantly used in the other 1970s documents against any form of assimilation, namely that it would hinder the prospects of immigrants were they to return to their home country, is thus not validated in this document. Instead, the WRR pointed to the freedoms guaranteed by the Dutch constitution, which urge the government not to intervene in the cultural lives of its citizens. A second line of argumentation is more of a practical nature. The WRR stated that optimal participation of minorities demands change from both the majority
and minority cultures. If this change does not occur, there is a good chance that minorities fall into cultural isolation and loss of identity, but also into a backward social-economic position. As could already be seen in a previous extract, where Dutch culture was defined in economic terms, the WRR was here making a strong connection between culture and socio-economic position. It is thus clear that the WRR advocated strongly in favour of an intercultural dialogue which should result in adaptation by all the cultures involved.

Therefore it is not surprising that the WRR acted against the concept of ‘integration whilst preserving one’s own identity’, since it assumes that migrant identities do not need to change:

The objectives relating to the social position of foreign workers in Dutch society stem directly from the point of view that labour migration is and should be temporary in nature. Limiting the number of foreign workers and the length of their stay is therefore a major objective. As long as foreign workers and their families remain in the Netherlands the government aims at ‘integration with the preservation of separate identity’, but the two concepts are scarcely defined, and in practice the content of these aims is coloured by the expectation of temporary residence. There is no question of there being any long-term conception and objectives, or of these objectives being broken down into specific phases. (WRR 1979: 150).

The question of providing facilities for minorities to preserve their own culture, including mother-tongue education, was also addressed. The WRR claimed that providing these facilities does not require a major sacrifice from the majority, but has a significant value for the minorities. Minorities should thus be given plenty of opportunities by the Dutch government to design and maintain their own cultural activities. Mother-tongue education should therefore be generously provided as well. However, again, the primary goal of every policy should be to foster an engaging intercultural dialogue, meaning that these facilities should not in any way lead to segregation. A strong concentration of facilities could be a barrier to intercultural contact:

Provisions for such matters as religious worship, education in the immigrants’ own language, adapted services (e.g. maternity care by women, doctors) do not present the host society with insuperable problems, while they are of great significance to the minorities. By offering instruction in the immigrants’ own language alongside education in Dutch, for example, access to their own culture is maintained. Such provisions do, however, require a certain degree of geographical concentration on the part of members of minority groups. Moreover, where a certain degree of concentration exists, facilities arise ‘spontaneously’, for example in relation to special eating habits. Concentration of this kind should not however reach the point where contact with other community groups becomes restricted. (WRR 1979: XX).
In conclusion, the WRR’s definition of integration is primarily economically driven: it advocates cultural adaptation from both sides, but mostly because it would otherwise lead to cultural isolation of minorities, which in turn leads to perpetuating the social inequality of those minorities. Culture and socio-economics are clearly connected. Whether culture should also be valued intrinsically is unclear. The WRR seems to have contradicting positions with respect to the degree of government intervention required or allowed in the cultural make-up of society. On the one hand it nuances the effects of government policy and, more importantly, claims that both a negative (assimilationist) and positive cultural policy go against the freedoms guaranteed in the constitution. On the other hand the document explains why the government should provide facilities to minorities which help them gain access to their own culture, such as mother-tongue education. These two analyses are difficult to reconcile. A possible interpretation is that the WRR’s argument should be disentangled into two distinct positions: one based on principle and one based on practical considerations. Principally, the government should be very reluctant to intervene in cultural matters, but practically a certain degree of intervention is desirable, since it is otherwise likely that minorities will be locked into a position of lasting social inequality. Considering the remainder of the document, it is safe to note that the WRR’s practical considerations supercede its principled reservation.

The WRR’s document marks a shift in the thinking about integration and the role of the government in governing the process of cultural adaptation. It presents a sharper definition of integration, clearly differentiating it from assimilation but also warning against the effects of prolonged segregation.

**Government reaction to the WRR rapport (Minderhedenbeleid 1981)**

Two years after the publication of *Etnische Minderheden* in 1981 the Dutch government gave a provisional reaction. This document is interesting for it contains a rather detailed vision of how the government planned to deal with questions of identity, and how it saw the relationship between the majority and the minority cultures. Similar to the WRR, the government acknowledged the limitations of its own agency and attributed the success and failure of any policy to how groups in society ‘avoid discrimination and foster mutual respect’ (*Minderhedenbeleid* 1981: 3). The government followed the WRR with respect to its main integration goal:

> The Government agrees with the Council that the Netherlands has become a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, where minorities have the right to equal treatment. The question is what it actually involves. The Government deems this excludes two types of relations, namely forced assimilation and segregation. (ibid.: 5).

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12 Provisional, because the topic is very complex and requires more time for reflection (Minderhedenbeleid 1981: 2)
So both assimilation and segregation were considered undesirable. The government then formulated three main principles which define the relationship between majority and minority:

The ambition to give minorities an equal position in Dutch society assumes respecting the self-worth of these groups. However, culture and identity are not static concepts. These immigrants will be themselves differently in the Netherlands from when they were still living in their countries of origin.

(...). What applies to minorities also applies to all members of the majority population. The arrival of ethnic minorities has changed society. It also requires the Dutch people who are born and raised here to adapt to the new situation.

(...). After rejecting the isolated position of minorities (segregation) the Government offers the possibility to participate fully in our society. Open communication between the autochtonous and allochtonous population needs to be possible in order to learn each other’s perspectives and adapt to each other.

These three points are best summarised in the formula: ‘mutual adaptation in a multicultural society with equal opportunities for the autochtonous and allochtonous population’. (Minderhedenbeleid 1981: 6).

These three policy goals are similar to what the WRR had proposed, again marking the strong influence of the Etnische minderheden report. But, also similar to the previous report, it remains unclear how exactly the Dutch population should ‘adapt to the new situation’. It called for respect of the minorities’ cultural identity, but also urged that identity is not static and that immigrants will ‘be themselves differently’ in the Netherlands. Regarding linguistic issues, the document announces the introduction of translation centres, which should ease communication between immigrants and government institutions (Minderhedenbeleid 1981: 12). It needs to be emphasised however that this reaction was provisory and of a general nature. Two years later in 1983, the Dutch government presented a comprehensive policy ambition regarding its minorities.

Minderhedennota 1983
The Minderhedennota (1983) (Minorities policy document) is an extensive document that covers many different aspects of Dutch minority policy, with themes ranging from housing, to minorities’ position on the labour market, to education. As has been stated in the introduction of this analysis, we will predominantly focus on both the general definition of ‘integration’ used and the linguistic aspects of the policy. The general policy goal is as follows: ‘The minority policy is aimed at minority groups to create the conditions necessary to emancipate and participate in society. The mutual adaptations and acceptance of all population groups needs to be promoted.’ (Minderhedennota 1983: 10).
The general policy trend thus remains largely similar: the general premise is that both majority and minority groups have a relationship based on mutual adaptation. The adaptation required of society to include migrants is even an intrinsic part of the advocated ‘emancipation’. The next extract more specifically addresses the issue of mutual adaptation, and its connection to the Dutch language:

This means on the one hand that Dutch society has to offer minorities the possibilities to develop themselves. On the other hand it means that minorities can be expected to participate willingly in Dutch society and that they make the effort to acquire social skills that are necessary, including a sufficient mastery of the Dutch language. (ibid.: 11).

This extract once again emphasises the importance of mutual adaptation of majority and minority. However, it also outlines at least one effort that can be expected of the minority groups: namely learning the Dutch language. This is the first time in the whole range of documents discussed that Dutch language acquisition is explicitly mentioned as a prerequisite to participating in the Netherlands. The importance of the Dutch language is repeated throughout the remainder of the document, for instance when the accessibility of facilities in society is discussed: ‘As such, many ethnic groups’ poor mastery of the Dutch language will hinder equal participation in many facilities.’ (Minderhedennota 1983: 18).

The fact that migrants have to learn Dutch to fit into society is thus explicitly recognised. The Minderhedennota is however also addressing the linguistic obligations of the government and the majority society vis-à-vis the minorities. First the general goals of the education policy are outlined:

1. Education needs to prepare members of minority groups and give them the opportunities to participate fully in Dutch society, socio-economically, societally and democratically.
2. Education needs to promote the acculturation of minorities and other members of Dutch society, amongst other things through inter-cultural education. (ibid.: 19-20).

The goals for education are in line with the general ambitions of the new minority policy. It should prepare minorities to participate fully in Dutch society, whilst giving them the option to do so within their own cultural framework. Furthermore through ‘inter-cultural education’ (which refers to all non-language-related education in OETC), the acculturation of minorities and other members of Dutch society needs to be realised.

Mother-tongue education plays a prominent role in the Minderhedennota (1983). The vision on the goal of mother-tongue education had changed since the 1970s, and was explained as such:
The perspective on this type of education has been shifting in the last few years. Initially mother-tongue education was intended for children of foreign workers, who were supposed to remigrate at a certain point in time. After the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy [WRR] published its report in 1979, which argued in favour of a minority policy framework that assumed permanent residency of these groups, the perspective on mother-tongue education changed as well. (Minderhedennota 1983: 28).

It is thus explicitly mentioned that the WRR report of 1979 directly influenced the government’s stance on mother-tongue education. It reformulated the policy goals in three points:

1. it could contribute to the development of the self-image and the self-awareness of the pupil.
2. it offers better knowledge of and access to the culture of their country of origin, which will help maintain contacts with family members, friends and acquaintances in the heritage country.
3. in the event of remigration, it facilitates inclusion in the school system in the heritage country. (Minderhedennota 1983: 28).

The argument that mother-tongue education can help the children when they potentially return to their parents’ (or their own) country of origin is thus still maintained. However, the justification for the mother-tongue policy has been broadened by two other, completely different arguments. The argument concerning the ‘self-image and self-awareness’ of the children reveals how the 1983 government thought about the role of minority cultures. It is assumed that the minority culture and language would have an intrinsic value for the children involved. The second argument, which emphasises the ease of access into the ‘own’ ethnic culture which knowledge of the mother tongue can bring, is quite interesting for it acknowledges the role and importance of transnational contacts. It needs to be noted however that both arguments are actually quite poorly explained. The document does not explicitly state exactly for what reason the self-image, or the identity, of the children should be improved, or why their transnational contacts should be facilitated. Speculating, there are probably three possible interpretations. Firstly, the government could assume that both the children’s identity and their access to their own ethnic culture have intrinsic value, promoting the ideals of multiculturalism. Secondly, they could in fact still be connected to the argument of remigration, in the sense that a stronger (cultural) sense of identity combined with a better knowledge of the own culture might stimulate remigration. Thirdly, the government may deem the children’s identity and their embedding in their heritage culture instrumental to their successful integration in Dutch society.
1990s

The 1990s marked yet another shift in the policy thinking on the integration of minorities, presided over by a government of Christian Democrats (CDA) and Social Democrats (PvdA). Whereas the 1980s can be characterised as a period where the government clearly emphasised the importance of both the heritage and the Dutch culture, this changed in the 1990s. Government documents shift their focus predominantly to the importance of the integration of minorities in the Dutch culture, and the need to set up Dutch language acquisition programmes, whilst the minority cultures receive less attention. It is again, similar to the 1980s, a report by the WRR that arguably had a strong influence on the political thinking of the decade. In 1989 the WRR published a study entitled ‘Allochtonenbeleid’ (Policy for Allochthons). Extracts from this study will be analysed first.

One of the striking features of the report is its title. It introduces a concept that we have barely seen before in the previous documents: ‘Allochtoon’. The other documents preferred to speak about ‘minorities’. ‘Allochtoon’ is not meant as a substitute for this concept, but rather as an addition. The WRR explains the difference between ‘Allochtoon’ and ‘Minderheden’ (minorities) as follows:

In this report the Council defines ‘allochtonous’ as: of non-Dutch heritage. ‘Allochtonen’ are thus foreigners from a legal perspective, ex-foreigners who are naturalised, Dutch people who originate from the (former) overseas areas, including their offspring until the third generation to the extent they wish to consider themselves allochtonous. A ‘minority’ is an allochtonous group in a disadvantaged position. (WRR 1989: 15).

‘Allochtoon’ is thus an umbrella concept that covers all migrants in the Netherlands and their descendants until the third generation. Minorities are used as a sub-concept to identify those groups within the ‘Allochtoon’ population that are in a disadvantaged position. The WRR also provides a concise definition of ‘integration’: ‘The concept of ‘integration’ is used henceforth in the sense of equal participation in the most important societal sectors and institutions.’ (ibid.).

If we compare this definition of integration to the one that was dominant in the 1980s document, there is a clear difference, or to put it more simply, a clear omission. Participation in Dutch society, or ‘participation in the most important societal sectors and institutions’, was always a core policy goal. What has changed however, is the 1980s notion that integration is a process of reciprocity and mutual adaptation between majority and minority groups. It cannot be inferred from this omission that the WRR in 1989 had completely abandoned the idea that minority cultures are of importance in the integration process.
However, the fact that the role of minority cultures does not feature anymore in the core definition of integration could be a sign of its diminishing importance in political thinking of the time.

That diminishing importance of minority cultures also becomes clear when studying the paragraphs on education. The WRR makes the following general proposals on education for children and adults:

The Council is of the opinion that better facilities to accommodate non-Dutch-speaking pupils need to be created in education. The Council argues in favour of (...) introducing language classes for allochtonous pre-schoolers who have an insufficient mastery of the Dutch language upon entering primary education. In the period before entering primary education better accommodation facilities for allochtonous children need to be created.

Much better facilities for adult education need to be created as well. (...) The Council advocates introducing a right to education for adult members of minority communities. They should at least have the opportunity to enrol in a basic Dutch language acquisition course, as well as a course covering orientation in Dutch society. (WRR 1989: 12).

The WRR calls for policy measures to improve significantly the Dutch language acquisition of youth and adult migrants. There are more passages that illustrate this strong emphasis, such as the worrying trend that infants have too little contact with the Dutch language (ibid.: 17), the importance of Dutch for immigrant children in their school career (ibid.: 39), the problems observed for minorities on the labour market connected to the Dutch language (ibid.: 115), a proposed connection between Dutch citizenship and Dutch language acquisition (ibid.: 96), and the analysis that education in the Dutch language is significantly more important than mother-tongue education (ibid.: 42-43). Looking specifically at the proposals for adult education, it can be argued that the WRR was laying the foundations in these extracts for the citizenship courses which were implemented in the 1990s and 2000s. These courses have two main pillars: Dutch language acquisition and orientation in Dutch society and culture, which are exactly the components of the adult migrant curriculum proposed by the WRR.

The role of the mother tongue in classes on Dutch language acquisition is deemed uncertain:

To ensure success of this approach, new teaching methods need to be implemented on a wider scale to improve Dutch second language education. (...) The question whether mother-tongue education needs to play a role in this language education system, and if so, which role, could then be discussed as well. (ibid.: 40).
The WRR then briefly evaluates the success of OETC (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur), the mother-tongue education programme that was introduced in the 1980s. The evaluation focusses on the practical aspects and implications of OETC. It points out that ‘the practical realisation of this form of education is not perfect’ (ibid.: 42). According to the WRR the results of OETC are difficult to evaluate. However, a possible argument to preserve OETC would be the role its teachers fulfil as a bridge between the school and the parents of minority children. The WRR eventually advises not abandoning OETC altogether, but not to teach these classes during regular school hours. In a later section of the report, the WRR mentions a brief pilot study on the connection between Dutch language acquisition and the mother tongue:

The Netherlands has run experiments on a limited scale, especially amongst Turks and Moroccans. Research shows these experiments lead to better results than monolingual education, especially in the domain of non-cognitive development. In the cognitive domain there was no, or a limited, difference. A larger emphasis on the heritage language appeared not to be to the detriment of knowledge of the Dutch language. (WRR 1989: 149).

Furthermore it questions whether the organisation of mother-tongue education is a task for the government, or should instead be provided by the allochtonous communities. In that respect, the WRR made the following proposition:

In the paragraph 1.4.2.2. the Council advised to maintain heritage language and culture education, insofar as it is currently provided by primary education, but to offer it outside of the standard curriculum. As such the initiative regarding this form of education would shift more clearly than in the present to the allochtonous groups themselves. (...) Allochtonous groups for whom primary education does not offer facilities on this issue are, if required, in principle eligible for a compensation of the costs of heritage language and culture education, in so far as Dutch language education is not hindered. (ibid.: 51).

The two interesting aspects of this extracts are the partial delegation of responsibility for OETC to the allochtonous communities, but also in particular the last part of the final sentence: ‘insofar this [OETC] does not hinder Dutch education’. This reservation is made several times in the report, for instance: ‘Heritage language and culture education cannot be to the detriment of acquiring knowledge, insight and competences that are important to function in Dutch society’. (ibid.: 161).

The Dutch government wrote a response to the WRR’s 1989 Allochtonenbeleid in 1990, entitled Voorlopige Kabinetsreactie op WRR rapport ‘Allochtonenbeleid’ [Provisional cabinet reaction to the WRR report ‘Allochtonenbeleid’] (Ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken 1990). In this response, the government expressed its general agreement with the WRR. Several extracts are interesting, since they reveal parts of the definition of integration the government wishes to employ:

The cabinet finds that in the ensuing years all governmental attention should be directed to those routes that truly offer access to society. The integration of allochthones must then be seen in terms of the importance of offering people the opportunities so they can determine independently their own societal position. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990: 1).

Integration is not opposed to identity; it adds a new dimension. Only those who have sufficiently mastered the Dutch language, those who have received a sufficient profession-oriented education, those who have learned to hold their own in a rather harsh and competitive society can fully participate whilst maintaining their own identity. (ibid.: 2).

The goal of integration is thus defined as granting minorities the capability to find their own way in Dutch society. In addition, the tension between integration on the one hand, and preservation of their own identity on the other, should not be overestimated. In fact it is argued that integration, defined as Dutch language acquisition and having a proper education, is a prerequisite to be even capable of preserving their own identity. The role of the minority culture and language has therefore shifted from being an integral part of the integration process (as in the Minderhedennota 1983) to either being relegated to an auxiliary position (in the case of mother-tongue education) or being of little importance to integration at all. The argumentation given for this shift in the government’s thinking is actually quite clear. The main reason given in the beginning of the 1980s to strengthen the role of minority cultures was also of an auxiliary nature: it was believed that minorities’ adaptation to Dutch culture could only succeed if proper respect and attention was given to their own ethnic culture. The intrinsic value of minority cultures played a subordinate role, if any at all. In the later report by the WRR, save for a few exceptions, it was concluded that the connection between preservation of the minority culture and accelerated adaptation to Dutch culture could barely be proven. The instrumental, and only, argument for actively preserving minority cultures and languages was proven false, which prompted the government to reconsider its language policy towards migrants. However, this reconsideration did not lead to radical change, for the government still believed in the useful role mother-tongue education could play in bridging the gap between minorities and the Dutch society (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990: 21).

In 1994, a new redefining policy document entitled Contouren Nota (1994) [Outlines Note] was released by the Dutch government. It introduced to the debate the concept of ‘citizenship’:
As a guiding principle for a new vision on the presence of people with a diverse cultural heritage in the Netherlands—whether they are newcomers or are staying in the Netherlands for a longer period of time—the cabinet uses the concept of citizenship. The notion of citizenship is evident and is based on the equality of every resident. (...) Citizenship implies that all individuals involved in the integration process choose to permanently participate in Dutch society, with all rights and duties that come with it. Citizenship also implies that citizens carry the responsibility for each other and the preparedness to make this a reality. (...) The willingness and efforts of people from ethnic communities to acquire an equal position in Dutch society for themselves is, more than in the past, of crucial importance. (Contouren Nota 1994: 5)

‘Citizenship’ is thus composed of two main elements: a non-discrimination principle (i.e. ‘the fundamental equality of every inhabitant’) and the duty of every citizen to participate in society. The latter element was not entirely new, but the fact that the document emphasises the personal responsibility of all Dutch citizens can be considered a change in perspective. Citizens are asked to make a conscious decision to participate in Dutch society, and be fully aware of the rights and duties that this decision would bring them. They would have to ‘seize their opportunities’ in society themselves. The conclusion of this extract symbolises the change in discourse in this document as compared to previous ones. It declares that ‘more than in the past’ the willingness and effort of people from ethnic groups to obtain their place in society is of ‘decisive importance’. More so than in the 1970s and 1980s, immigrants’ and their descendants’ adaptation to the Dutch society was now a matter of individual responsibility, instead of a process that is also largely influenced by state policy.

This individualisation of the cultural adaptation process can also be seen in the second major discourse shift made in the Contouren Nota. Regarding ‘minority policy’, which had been a central concept since the Minderhedennota (1983), the government stated the following:

The cabinet opts for citizenship and emphasises the integration of minorities in society. As such, instead of ‘minority policy’, this cabinet speaks of ‘integration policy’ of minority groups. (...) The concept of integration policy better expresses that social integration of minority groups and their members is a process of mutual acceptance. This implies that both the ‘integrated’ and the society where they reside, need to make an effort. (Contouren Nota 1994: 6).

The shift from ‘minority policy’ towards ‘integration policy of minorities’ reveals an interesting assumption. It is implied that the previous ‘minority policy’ was not to the benefit of the ‘Dutch society’ as a whole, for the policy was mostly targeted at the
minority groups. Minority policy in the 1980s contained two main elements: education in the heritage culture and language, and facilitating the adaptation process to Dutch society. Adaptation to the Netherlands was always considered of prime importance, but some form of heritage language and culture education was deemed necessary to achieve this goal. It can be reasonably assumed that when the Contouren Nota claimed that the policy was targeted too much towards minorities, it primarily referred to those policies dealing with heritage language and culture education. Thus, by its increased emphasis on ‘Dutch’ language and culture at the cost of minority variances, this extract can be seen as a redefinition of what ‘Dutch society’ is: namely, increasingly one that is monolingual and monocultural.

The combination of the increased individualisation and monolingual/cultural focus of the integration policy is important to consider when analysing subsequent policy initiatives. In 1997 the government published the Memorie van Toelichting: Wet Inburgering [Explanatory Statement: Civic Integration Law], explaining the necessities of introducing a new citizenship regime. It calls for the introduction of citizenship courses which were meant to help immigrants participate in Dutch society, by teaching them basic knowledge of the Dutch language and some insight in Dutch culture. It explained:

The permanent immigration at a relatively high level has consequences for integration policy. It is for both society and the newcomers of the utmost importance that they can hold their own in society as soon as possible (...). Civic integration should be seen in this respect as a first step in the integration process: through civic integration newcomers have the opportunity to secure their position in education and the labour market. Civic integration refers to learning the Dutch language and acquiring the initial insights in the societal and institutional relations in our society and the acquisition of an initial insight in the Dutch labour market. (Memorie van Toelichting 1997: 1).

It thus becomes clear that the notion of civic integration is in line with the trend of individualisation and the monocultural focus of Dutch integration policies. An interesting additional point is the fact that civic integration is the first step in the integration process, since it enables access to the education system and labour market, whereas the steps that are supposed to follow afterwards are not made explicit. A few years later, in 2001, the Balkenende-I government, which included the right-wing populist party LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), attempted to expand further upon the differences between citizenship courses and integration:

To give integration a chance to succeed, the admission of foreigners who contribute to the problems of integration needs to be restricted as much as possible (...) the integration of children who arrive in the Netherlands when they are older is often problematic. (...) Taking into account the
reduced opportunities to integrate successfully, the maximum age for family reunification, in line with the policy of our surrounding countries, needs to be linked to conditions and lowered. (Regeerakkoord Balkenende I 2002: 16)

This extract shows a slight reformulation of the integration policy doctrine: strict immigration policy with respect to ‘the groups that contribute to worsening the integration problems’ (i.e. these groups are recently more commonly referred to as ‘non-western immigrants’) and (mostly) punitive domestic measures to accelerate the integration process. In 2001, the SCP (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, The Netherlands Institute for Social Research) published a report on OALT. The SCP cited the researchers Broeder and Extra on the role of minority language education in the Dutch education system as follows:

According to Broeder and Extra (1999) it is remarkable that policy evaluation was generally often not focussed on progress in mother tongue acquisition, but was restricted to the effects of the mother tongue on the Dutch language and success in education. (Broeder en Extra 1999: 5, cited in Turkenburg 2001: 5).

Broeder and Extra’s conclusion is not surprising. The analysis presented in this chapter shows that minority language education was barely perceived as a value in itself by the Dutch government. It was always seen as an instrument towards more successful Dutch language acquisition. In the 1990s the bridging function of mother-tongue education was seriously called into question. These doubts culminated in this extensive 2001 SCP report, which focussed on the practical implementation and evaluation of OALT on the local level. The SCP researchers conducted several interviews with local politicians and with high-school officials. Based on these interviews, the researchers concluded the following: ‘The impression that arises after the interviews is that in general municipalities and school management have little affinity with mother-tongue education and cultural education.’ (Turkenburg 2001: 108).

OALT could thus not count on the enthusiastic support of the very actors who are most directly concerned with its implementation. A combination of this observation, the increased focus on Dutch language acquisition due to a shift in policy doctrine in the 1990s, and the presumed lack of scientific consensus on the positive effects of mother-tongue education, contributed to the definitive abolition of OALT in 2004.

In the period between the early 2000s and the present time the integration policy philosophy has not changed significantly. Dutch government expanded the citizenship regime in 2005 (Memorie van Toelichting Wet Inburgering 2005) and 2011 (Memorie van Toelichting Wet Inburgering 2011). Since 2011 immigrants have to pay for their own citizenship courses, whilst those who lack the means to do so, can make use of a government-sponsored ‘social loaning system’, similar to the one Dutch students use to fund their studies (DUO 2019).
Conclusion

The Netherlands is a very interesting case in this research as a whole, due to its numerous policy shifts since the coming of the guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s. A common popular opinion is that pre-1990s Dutch governments advocated a policy of multiculturalism. While this statement may be true to a certain extent, it has become apparent in this analysis that the underlying motivations for Dutch integration policy, and especially its linguistic component, have remained remarkably constant. In the first document discussed in this chapter, namely the note on foreign workers (that was drafted in the 1970s, the government already acknowledges that migrants wanting to stay need to learn Dutch (Nota buitenlandse werknemers 1970). Mother-tongue education was to be stimulated, but only to ease the assumed inevitable return of the guestworkers to their countries of origin. In other words: Dutch language acquisition was unsurprisingly the norm, and mother-tongue education only had instrumental value. These two core assumptions have not changed from the 1960s until the present, but their execution has. In the 1980s, when the Dutch government came to terms with the fact that the Netherlands had become an immigrant nation, mother-tongue education was deemed a useful auxiliary for Dutch language acquisition. Following the recommendations of several academics, it was believed that migrant children who have a solid understanding of their mother tongue would be much better equipped to learn a second language (i.e. Dutch) afterwards. Thus, OETC and its later incarnation OALT were being implemented. When doubt was raised on the effectiveness of the bridging function of mother-tongue education, coupled with several practical problems, it was logical from the government’s point of view eventually to abolish mother-tongue education altogether. Very rarely has the Dutch government based its justification of OALT on the intrinsic value of mother-tongue education. So when its instrumental argument crumbled, so did the entire policy. Instead the government opted to have an exclusive focus on Dutch language acquisition for immigrants’ children.

While the core assumptions on the different roles of Dutch and mother-tongue education have remained constant, the different governments have over time redefined their meaning of ‘integration’. Integration was in the 1970s deemed largely unnecessary, since most guest workers were supposed to return to their countries of origin. Moreover, it was believed that only the migrants who had the most affinity with Dutch language and culture would opt to stay, implying that their adaptation to the Netherlands would inevitably be very smooth. In the 1980s, the emphasis was on the joint efforts of the majority and minorities to adapt to one another. Integration was seen as a two-way street, where both actors had to make sacrifices in order to forge a harmonious society.

13 For a discussion on the differences between 'liberal', 'corporatist' and 'social-democratic' welfare states, see Esping-Anderssen (1990). The Netherlands has always been difficult to classify in this typology, traditionally having characteristics of all three in its policy system, but from the 1990s onwards there is a clear shift noticeable (Goodin and Smitsman 2000).
This implied that immigrants should integrate whilst ‘maintaining their own identity’. Assimilation was explicitly labeled as being unneeded and sometimes even seen as undesirable. In the 1990s integration was slowly being redefined, with a larger focus on Dutch culture and a shrinking emphasis on the minority’s culture and language. This redefinition co-incided with a Dutch policy shift towards a ‘liberal’ welfare state, with a greater emphasis on the responsibility of the individual. The introduction of citizenship courses and exams fits this shifting narrative. Integration was also seen more and more as the responsibility of the immigrants themselves, as opposed to the joint approach that was advocated a decade earlier. The fact that since 2011 immigrants have had to pay for their own citizenship courses and exams could be seen as the symbolic culmination of this trend.

Dutch governments over the years may have never been ‘multicultural’ in the purest sense, particularly concerning the linguistic aspects of integration. The different incarnations of multicultural political theory usually assume that there is at least some intrinsic value to maintaining minority cultures. A diverse society is heralded as a value in itself, rather than as an instrument to achieve other policy goals. The Dutch governments have always treated minority languages predominantly as an instrument. Once that instrument was deemed to be ineffective, the government started looking for a new one. Perhaps it can be argued that the Dutch have a tradition of ‘pragmatic multiculturalism’ and, by proxy, ‘pragmatic multilingualism’: once the practical arguments had disappeared, so did their underlying ideals.
Chapter 5.2: Interviews Poles in the Netherlands

Polish migration to the Netherlands has a long history that predates Polish accession to the EU in 2004. In 2002, 10,000 Polish citizens were staying temporarily in the Netherlands (Kindler 2018). After Poland joined the EU, Dutch policy makers expected 20,000 people to arrive, but the number of migrants proved to be significantly greater: 105,000. In similar fashion to other West European countries, post-2004 Polish labour migration occurred primarily through labour recruitment agencies. In 2013, around 90% of Poles staying in the Netherlands were short-term (3-12 months) labour migrants. In 2018, a total of 173,050 individuals with a Polish background, in first and second generation, were present in the Netherlands (see table 5.2.1).

Table 5.2.1

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>29180</td>
<td>39815</td>
<td>77178</td>
<td>149831</td>
<td>161158</td>
<td>173050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>First-generation foreign background</td>
<td>16015</td>
<td>24566</td>
<td>57496</td>
<td>117269</td>
<td>125978</td>
<td>134999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Total second-generation foreign background</td>
<td>13165</td>
<td>15249</td>
<td>19682</td>
<td>32562</td>
<td>35180</td>
<td>38051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>One parent born outside of the Netherlands</td>
<td>11412</td>
<td>12959</td>
<td>15086</td>
<td>18542</td>
<td>19184</td>
<td>19824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Both parents born outside of the Netherlands</td>
<td>1753</td>
<td>2290</td>
<td>4596</td>
<td>14020</td>
<td>15996</td>
<td>18227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS population figures 2018.

In total 12 Poles in the Netherlands were interviewed in Amsterdam and The Hague in 2015 and 2016. The interviewees were mostly first-generation immigrants (10), whilst four were second-generation. All first-generation immigrants worked either in construction or fruit harvesting. Most interviews were conducted either with the help of a translator, or in Dutch, or in English, depending on the preference of the respondent.

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14 In the remainder of this study the groups interviewed will be referred to as ‘Turks in the Netherlands, Poles in the Netherlands, Turks in France’, etc., incorporating first, second and third generation migrants.
15 Statistics were compiled using data from the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, Statistics Netherlands) website and applying the necessary demographic filters. https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/37325/table?ts=1571081420820
Dutch vs Polish

All interviewees either spoke Dutch, or were actively learning the language by enrolling in a course. Also, many interviewees planned to stay in the Netherlands in the long term, or were second-generation immigrants and thus were born in the Netherlands, which might influence their perspective on the Dutch language. Dutch is seen as a necessary language to learn for practical purposes, mostly to improve their economic prospects (Appendix 2.1. Interviews 1-10).16

The Polish language is treated with the same degree of pragmatism, albeit with a slight sense of cultural attachment. Polish, being the interviewees’ mother tongue, is naturally important for them in order to communicate and stay in touch with their country of birth. Also for the second-generation Poles, Polish is most of all important to communicate with relatives in Poland: ‘I skype every week with my parents and quite often write with my family through social media. Knowing the Polish language is indispensable to stay in touch.’ (Appendix 2.1.8). There is however not always a positive reaction about how important it is to stay in touch with Polish culture: ‘Polish is only useful for family visits. I do not care so much about Polish culture or identity. Language is just a practical tool for me to communicate.’ (Appendix 2.1.4). The sentiment that language is primarily a tool for communication is echoed by many interviewees.

The Poles who were still in the process of learning Dutch, actually argued that Dutch is just as important to them as Polish, sometimes even more so. Considering the fact that most of these respondents fall into the lower categories of social-economic status (SES), this may not come as a surprise: as mentioned previously, Dutch is seen as the best language to improve their economic prospects. These same respondents had split opinions on transmitting their Polish language to their children:

I don’t want to teach my children Polish. I am afraid that they will not learn Dutch as effectively, and Dutch is much more important for them here than Polish. I would make an exception if I can’t speak Dutch well enough whenever I get children, then I am of course forced to speak Polish with them (Appendix 2.1.8).

At the same time, other interviewees argued that learning the two languages simultaneously is certainly possible, and raise their children bilingually as a result. These interviewees often actively sought outside sources, such as teachers or academic papers. To cite an example:

My children speak both Polish and Dutch at home. It goes quite well. We looked for some information on the internet and eventually assumed that children can learn two languages at the same time. We also talked to the teacher at their primary school. She was not very knowledgeable on the
topic, so in the end we decided to teach the children both languages. Right now they speak both languages very well, and they did not suffer any linguistic setbacks. (Appendix 2.1.9).

**Mother-tongue education**

None of the respondents had any experience with the OALT/OETC mother-tongue education regime in the Netherlands, that was abolished in 2004. Some second-generation Poles attended weekend schools to learn Polish. The interviews in this section were thus mainly about perspectives of the immigrants on how mother-tongue education should be organised in the Netherlands. These perspectives among the first-generation immigrants were equally as split as on the issue of transmitting their mother tongue. Those who were in favour of bilingual education also favoured mother-tongue education at school, whilst the others were quite strongly against such a policy: ‘I want my children to just learn Dutch at school. I do not want them to be confused. Dutch is by far the most important language for them to learn. I can teach them Polish at home if want. I do not care if they know Polish grammar or not.’ (Appendix 2.1.1).

I do not know if my children should learn Polish at school. My Dutch is not good enough to teach my children, so school should compensate for that. If I would know for sure that Dutch and Polish can be taught at the same time, I would be in favour of teaching Polish at school (Appendix 2.1.2).

This fear of being ‘confused’ when learning two or more languages simultaneously is a common phenomenon especially among immigrants not educated beyond the secondary level, and the Poles in the Netherlands interviewed here are no exception. However, the tertiary educated respondents were arguing strongly against this form of linguistic assimilation. One such respondent states: ‘Mother-tongue education does not hinder the integration of Polish children. Parents should, especially when they are not fluent in Dutch, only speak Polish at home to their children. The children can then learn Dutch at school.’ (Appendix 2.1.12). An interesting difference between them and several other groups, such as the Turks in Sweden and the Poles in France, is that very few mention any teacher involvement, or at least by one who is informed on the subject matter. The Dutch Polish group can thus be an example of how a ‘laissez-faire’ or discouraging teaching regime can influence the immigrants with only secondary education regarding bilingualism and bilingual education. In addition, another aspect to emphasise once more is how much this particular group is basing decisions in terms of economic costs and benefits.

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16 In the remainder of this chapter, and the other interview chapters, the interviews will be referred to using their chapter and interview number in Appendix II (Interview Data). For example: Interview number four in the appendix under chapter 2.1 will be referred to as: 2.1.4.
Their attitude towards language and school is heavily influenced by a rational-choice, economic logic, in which the cultural arguments play a clear secondary role. Some interviewees also mentioned the involvement of the Polish government in setting up Polish language schools in the Netherlands:

It is really bad if the Dutch government does not organise mother-tongue education, and lets the Polish government do it. The current Polish government is very conservative. Those conservative values are not compatible with liberal Dutch values. We should not want a generation of Polish children to grow up with those values (Appendix 2.1.11).

One interviewee, who works at a Polish school in Amsterdam, outlined how unpleasant her encounters were with the municipality:

Five years ago, a civil servant from Amsterdam visited us [at the school]. He said: “in fact, you are all teaching the children about Polish nationalism”. I was shocked. Of course I fundamentally disagreed with him. We are doing the opposite in fact, we emphasise the connection between Poland and the Netherlands. The Polish people have a long history here in Amsterdam and we make sure the children here are fully aware of that. (Appendix 2.1.12).

Dutch language acquisition
Most respondents have significant experience with following different types of Dutch language programmes, both private and (semi-)organised by the government. Their experiences with the government-run programmes are quite poor: ‘the Dutch language classes at the municipality did not help me at all. They were too theoretical. I only need the language to speak, I wish they focussed more on that.’ (Appendix 2.1.2). ‘I learned very little when following the Dutch language programmes, that’s why I came here [to a private language school].’ (Appendix 2.1.4). Again, many of the Poles interviewed had plans to stay in the Netherlands long-term, so they sought new opportunities by themselves to learn the language. One particular private school, where some of the interviews were conducted, was cited as being ‘very effective’ because it focussed almost exclusively on ‘using the language in practice’. This clearly points to a desire among the interviewed Poles in the Netherlands to follow courses that teach them relatively quickly how to speak, as opposed to grammar lessons. A major problem that was mentioned often, though, is how difficult it is to combine following the lessons with a full-time job:

At my job [as a fruit harvester], I only have colleagues from Poland, so I cannot speak Dutch there. I work more than 40 hours a week, and I follow Dutch courses four times a week during the evenings. It is very tough for me to keep this up, and I know many of my colleagues cannot do it. (Appendix 2.1.1).
Thus, the combination of language training not being required for staying and working in the Netherlands, and the long working hours of Polish workers, seems to influence negatively the attractiveness of following a Dutch language training course.

**Mobility in Europe**

Most respondents had no concrete plans to move to another European country, except if they were forced to move back to Poland due to their labour contracts ending, as their intention is to stay in the Netherlands for the foreseeable future. When asked which language would most increase their mobility potential, thus their motility, they all gave the same initial answer: English. Using the same rational choice logic as with the other answers, they mentioned that ‘English is the global language’, that ‘in many countries you can get by with English’. When specifically asked whether Polish could help as well, since the migration process could be facilitated if one can make contact with one’s ‘ethnic peers’, the responses were split. One interviewee argued for instance that: ‘I do not think having connection with Poles in other European countries is very useful. Poles who have migrated are often doing low-paid work, those connections are not viable from an economic perspective’ (Appendix 2.1.5). Others expressed a more nuanced opinion: ‘If the Polish economy would grow, I can imagine Polish being a very useful language for migration.’ (Appendix 2.1.3).

**Conclusion**

The Poles in the Netherlands in this sample evaluate language and language education mainly on their economic merits. This is an interesting development, as it deviates quite strongly from all the other groups interviewed in this research, who to varying degrees also value the cultural dimension of their languages. Given the nature and composition of the sample, there are at least three possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations. Firstly, many respondents have to do low-paid work in the Netherlands (e.g. harvesting fruit or working in construction). It can be argued that for this particular group of immigrants, improving their economic wellbeing is very high on their priority list. It logically follows that when deciding whether to learn a new language, which requires a significant time and effort investment, the economic argument plays a very major role. Secondly, the immigrants with only secondary education generally have less access to academic studies on socio-linguistics, and bilingualism in particular. More highly educated immigrants in this research often argued in favour of bilingualism on the basis of scientific papers, or after having visited an academic conference.

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17 These sentiments where echoed by all the interviewees in Appendix 2.1, except interviewee 12.
These resources are more difficult to access for lower-educated immigrants, meaning that they also lack ‘access’ to these arguments. Thirdly, apparently the Poles in the Netherlands in this sample had little support from native Dutch teachers for bilingualism for their children, while examples from the interviews conducted in Sweden showed how essential the role of the teacher can be for immigrants with lower education levels when deciding how to raise their children linguistically.

These interviews show how relevant perception (‘appropriation’) is when assessing motility. The negative perception of the practical usefulness of their Polish mother tongue is a quite considerable driver for monolingualism (Dutch only) or very careful bilingualism (as long as it does not interfere with Dutch). The interviewees also thus saw very little value in Polish as a language that can enhance their motility. The school system (part of the linguistic infrastructure) seemed not actively to promote bilingualism as it did in Sweden and even in France, meaning that the Dutch Poles’ perspective on this matter did not change. The logic of these interviewees can be quite adequately summarised as follows: Erst das Fressen, und dann die Kultur.
Chapter 5.3: Interviews Turks in the Netherlands

Post-war Turkish migration to the Netherlands was primarily related to the guest worker recruitment, similar to other West European countries. Between 1964 and 1974, a significant number of Turks migrated to the Netherlands on temporary labour contracts to fill voids in the Dutch labour market, usually in the textile industry and road construction. They predominantly settled in the larger cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, or in smaller cities where the textile industry had a large presence. The Turkish government facilitated emigration to mitigate the repercussions of unemployment in its own state and banked on the remittances from its diaspora to help boost the Turkish economy. The Dutch-Turkish immigrants originated mostly from Central Anatolia and villages around the Black Sea (Azak 2008). After the guest worker programmes were terminated in 1974, in the context of the oil crisis, Turkish migration continued through family reunification laws. In 2018 it was estimated that 404,459 individuals with a Turkish background were living in the Netherlands, measured up to the second generation (see table 5.3.1.).

Table 5.3.1.

<table>
<thead>
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Source: CBS Population figures 2018.18

In total 11 Turks in the Netherlands were interviewed Amsterdam and Veendam (a small town in the north of the Netherlands) between 2015 and 2017. The interviewees had a varied migration history, so the sample is not without its biases. Most respondents had experienced or were in the process of obtaining higher education. Furthermore, all interviews were conducted in English, as all respondents had mastered the language sufficiently for basic communication purposes. The interviews were semi-structured.

18 Statistics were compiled using data from the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, Statistics Netherlands) website and applying the appropriate demographic filters. https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/37325/table?ts=1571081420820
Dutch vs Turkish

The interviewed Turks in the Netherlands all considered the Dutch language at least to be of instrumental value, despite many of the first-generation migrants in particular having a limited mastery of the language. For instance, one first-generation migrant mentions: ‘I learned Dutch because I wanted to work in and run a bar here. Speaking Dutch is crucial for that kind of work’ (Appendix 2.2.1). This attitude is, perhaps unsurprisingly, present in every other sample group that is discussed in this research. The second and third-generation migrants usually also emphasise the social aspect of learning Dutch: they need the language to remain in touch with their Dutch friends and acquaintances.

On the role of Turkish, however, opinions start to differ, both across and within generations. Some interviewees mention that Turkish has a very great instrumental value in the Netherlands for the Turkish community. For instance, a first-generation interviewee claims: ‘In the past we could obtain our Dutch driving license in Turkish. We cannot do that anymore, and it hinders a lot of Turkish people to gain their license’ (Appendix 2.2.6). Another often cited argument, especially among the first-generation guest workers in the sample, is that mastery of the Turkish language grants them the option to remigrate to Turkey. ‘Turkey is my homeland, in the end it is not the Netherlands’ (Appendix 2.2.4). ‘I will stay just five more years and then I will go back to Turkey’ (Appendix 2.2.2). Many of the first-generation immigrants, who came to the Netherlands when they were very young (between 6 and 10 years) experience a stronger connection with Turkey than with the Netherlands. This is an interesting observation in the light of Berry’s acculturation strategies. These respondents would according to his scheme be ‘integrated’ (they feel to some degree at home in both their heritage culture and their host society culture), but it is clear that their emotional connection is stronger with their heritage culture, even if they migrated at a very young age. Interestingly, among the interviewed third-generation Turks, who are usually in their twenties or early thirties, the ‘remigration’ argument plays no role at all, even though they do see the importance of learning Turkish to communicate with their friends and family in Turkey.

Even though the perspectives on the role of Turkish differ among the respondents, they do agree on the importance of bilingual education for their (future) children. Albeit for mostly practical, or cultural or emotional reasons, they find it important that their children can communicate well in Turkish: ‘I want them to learn Turkish so they can communicate with their family in Turkey’ (Appendix 2.2.8); ‘even though I believe you can get by with English in Turkey, I would still prefer my children to also learn Turkish’ (Appendix 2.2.5). One second-generation respondent was raised bilingually by her parents, but initially had no interest in the Turkish language, mostly due to societal factors:

My parents raised me bilingually, but my Turkish was disastrous (...) I did not want to speak Turkish at school and focussed exclusively on Dutch, because I did not want to be seen as ‘that Turkish girl’. (...) My opinion
on the value of Turkish changed when I was 25, and I followed a course on multilingualism at the university. The teacher made it clear to me that multilingualism really is of great value in itself. (Appendix 2.2.3).

This last account is an example of the importance of the most elusive, yet arguably most important, component of motility, namely ‘appropriation’. This respondent did not think her skills in Turkish would be valuable for her success in the Netherlands. In fact, she thought it would hinder her success. So, consequently, she did not develop these skills any further. Only due to an external actor (her lecturer at university) providing a different perspective on the value of multilingualism, did she shift her attitude towards Turkish and make a valiant attempt to perfect her skills in the language.

**Mother-tongue education**

All the respondents interviewed had been enrolled in some type of mother-tongue education classes in the Netherlands, be it in the early 1980s, or in the early 2000s. In general the respondents were positive about the fact that these facilities existed, except for one: ‘I wonder if sending children to mother-tongue education on top of regular school is not too much of a burden for them’ (Appendix 2.2.11). The effectiveness of the courses is nonetheless questioned. The third-generation Turks in the Netherlands, who all had an excellent command of the Turkish language, only remembered that they followed the courses only after they were probed in the interview. For instance one interviewee mentioned, ‘I remember now that I had Turkish lessons for two or three hours per week, but I cannot remember if they were effective at all’ (ibid.). But afterwards all of them mentioned that the time spent on the courses was very little (varying between one to three hours per week). Also, one third-generation Dutch Turk mentioned:

> The Turkish language has certain linguistic elements that are not present in Dutch. Currently many Turkish children have a two years gap in their Dutch linguistic development when they go to primary school. It would be nice if mother-tongue education courses could be a bridge between Turkish and Dutch for those children. (Appendix 2.2.3).

The older immigrants interviewed had more vivid memories of their courses, but again often disputed their effectiveness. They also mentioned the lack of time as a major factor. However, there were also some positive aspects about the Dutch policy in the 1980s. One first-generation migrant claims:

> I followed Turkish lessons and those helped me tremendously when learning Dutch. It was one half a day per week. The lessons at school were much better than those organised in community centres, for two reasons. First of all, at school you are forced to attend the lessons. Secondly, at school a certified teacher from the Turkish ministry was teaching the classes, whilst at the
community centres there are only uncertified, inexperienced teachers. The lessons focussed explicitly on connecting the Dutch and Turkish languages. (Appendix 2.2.4).

The respondents had very differing opinions on whether mother-tongue education is beneficial or harmful for the integration of Turks in the Netherlands. Perspectives varied from: ‘I don’t think it [mother-tongue education] hinders integration. The more languages people speak the better’ (Appendix 2.2.1), to ‘I believe mother-tongue education can give people the incentive to retreat within their own communities’ (Appendix 2.2.5). These perspectives represent polar opposite positions, but the respondents do seem to agree on one important thing: the relative unimportance of the policy itself. Even though mother-tongue education can help or hinder the integration process slightly, the main determining factor lies with the parents, and how they prepare their children for life in the Netherlands: ‘Mother-tongue education on its own does not lead to segregation, the parents and how they raise their children is much more important’ (Appendix 2.2.11). Another factor that is considered of great importance is the attitude of the native Dutch. Some respondents experienced that they were implicitly or explicitly being excluded by Dutch people: ‘A teacher once asked me “will you also be forced to marry someone by your parents?” I immediately understood that I did not entirely belong in that classroom’ (ibid.); ‘Dutch people often don’t give the allochtonous population a “warm feeling of home” (...) mother-tongue education could be a symbol of bringing back that warmth for us’ (Appendix 2.2.4). A last factor mentioned is the size of the different Turkish communities across the Netherlands: ‘Here in Groningen I believe the danger of us ‘retreating’ does not exist. That is different in big cities such as Amsterdam or Rotterdam.’ (Appendix 2.2.3). In other words: in communities with a larger migrant population the likelihood of segregation is much higher than in cities with a lower percentage of migrants.

The main conclusions of the effects of mother-tongue education are twofold. Firstly, even though most respondents appreciated the idea of these types of facilities existing, their practical effectiveness is called into question if the policy is not organised properly. In that case, the courses are ineffective and contribute very little to improving the Turks in the Netherlands’ mastery of the Turkish language, hence also not increasing their motility via Turkish. Secondly, in terms of inclusion mother-tongue education does not seem to play a vital role according to the respondents, being at the most an auxiliary factor for the success or failure of integration. These two conclusions taken together thus show that the mother-tongue education programme as organised by the Dutch authorities in the past is of very little consequence whatsoever, whether positive or negative. Thus, if mother-tongue education is to have any effect on the motility of this community, it needs to be organised in a very different way from in the past.
Dutch language acquisition
The second and third-generation respondents were all fluent in Dutch and had learned the language in the regular Dutch school system, even in those cases when their parents did not speak Dutch at home. The sample is biased in the sense that most respondents were either born in the Netherlands, or came to the Netherlands at such a young age that they could still partially attend primary school in the Netherlands. The mastery of Dutch for the first generation varied significantly. Some were enrolled in some kind of Dutch language acquisition programme, whilst others did not have the opportunity:

I came here in 1976 (...) I do not speak Dutch very well. When I came here, I worked at a company with 15 other Turkish people, so we only spoke Turkish. I followed some Dutch lessons, but since I did not know any Dutch people I could not use the language daily and I forgot it again. (...) Later on I had the opportunity again to enrol in a Dutch course, but my husband disagreed with me going to school. So I never learned Dutch properly, and I deeply regret that. (Appendix 2.2.6).

An issue pointed out by this respondent, namely the importance of being able to practise the language with native Dutch, is also identified by other respondents: ‘the lessons are not that important, communication in practice is key for learning the language’ (Appendix 2.2.6), or ‘I never followed any lessons, I only learned the language through communication.’ (Appendix 2.2.7).

It is thus complicated to evaluate Dutch language acquisition policy based on these accounts. However, one aspect present in every other sample group so far, is the much greater relevance of communication in practice, compared to the courses. Again, this nuances the importance of the effects of policy on language acquisition, and so by proxy on the motility of the Turks in the Netherlands.

Mobility in Europe
As mentioned previously, the first-generation Turks in the Netherlands in particular see a clear connection between learning and maintaining their language, and the possibility of remigrating to Turkey. There is however also a perhaps less obvious relation between mastery of Turkish and mobility in the EU. Namely, some respondents argue that their Turkish helps them to connect to other Turkish communities in the EU, and can in that way increase their migration opportunities: ‘Turkish helps me a lot to migrate to other countries in the EU, since I can connect with the Turkish community. I would for example very much like to go to Sweden, and my Turkish will certainly help with that’ (Appendix 2.2.3). ‘I can very easily make contact with other Turkish communities in Europe and migrate to those countries’ (Appendix 2.2.6). However, others claim connecting to other Turkish communities is not straightforward: ‘Germans Turks are for example much different than we are. They come from a different region in Turkey and have
different traditions. However I would like to go to Germany: Germans discriminate less.’ (Appendix 2.2. Interview 5). Other than Turkish, languages that increase the respondents’ mobility are mostly the ‘big’ European languages such as English, German and Spanish.

The fact that the respondents’ mother tongue, Turkish, seems actively to help their mobility in Europe, thus clearly increasing their motility, is an interesting observation. Couple this with the fact that all respondents communicate at least weekly in Turkish via internet services such as Whatsapp or Facebook, and the importance of transnational connections for migration processes becomes clear.

**Conclusion**

When evaluating the accounts of the Turks in the Netherlands alongside the motility criteria (access, competence and appropriation), several tentative conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the linguistic infrastructure as organised (in the past) by the Dutch authorities, both relating to mother-tongue education and Dutch language acquisition, have very little perceived effect on the respondents’ linguistic competence. This means that the ‘objective’ effect of language policy on migration opportunities is very low, or perhaps even non-existent. However, when it comes to ‘appropriation’, especially the mother-tongue education can still play a significant role. That policy could encourage the Turks in the Netherlands also to focus on improving their Turkish outside the classroom, since they might experience a decreased stigmatisation of their mother tongue. However, one should be careful when drawing this conclusion, since the respondents also made it very clear that successful integration and acceptance in Dutch society is dependent on more important factors than the linguistic policy, such as the attitude of the native Dutch, and the way Dutch Turkish parents raise their children. In short, linguistic infrastructure for the Turks in the Netherlands is at best a small cog in the machinery of their overall motility and inclusion.