Multilingual moves
Language and motility of migrant communities in Europe
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Chapter 7.1

LANGUAGE POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS IN SWEDEN: A POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

Swedish immigration and integration policy has a remarkably different history compared to France and the Netherlands. Sweden’s experience with relatively large migration is fairly recent. It was only in the 1930s that the country became a fully-fledged migration country. At the time, immigration flows consisted mainly of Swedish Americans returning to their home country. In the 1940s, Sweden welcomed many political refugees. Guest worker recruiting started in the 1950s and 1960s. At first the guest workers originated primarily from other Nordic countries, but following similar trends in other North and West European countries, the flow of non-Nordic guest workers also grew steadily in the 1960s. Another similarity between Sweden and its European neighbours is the fact that the guest worker system was all but dismantled in the 1970s, in Sweden’s case due to labour unions being much more restrictive about work permits. However, due to family reunification and a steady flow of political refugees, the number of non-Nordic migrants in the country kept increasing. Before the arrival of the guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden could be considered a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation, that attempted to assimilate the few immigrants it received into Swedish culture. There was no concept of multicultural policy on the policy agenda in the 1960s (Tawat 2019). The ruling Social Democratic Party combined a tentative support for labour migration with a strong opposition to multiculturalism. The Prime Minister Tage Erlander stated in a speech to Parliament in 1965, ‘We Swedes live in an infinitely happier condition [in comparison to the Americans]. The population of our country is homogenous, not only in regards to race but also in many other aspects’ (translated by Wickström 2015: 516). The anti-multicultural sentiment could be considered a remnant of Sweden’s pre-war assimilationist tradition. In the post-war period some ethnic and cultural diversity was tolerated, even though it was explicitly expected that these differences would not continue past the first generation (Wickström 2015).

A turning point in the Swedish debate is the publication of a newspaper article written by holocaust survivor David Schwarz in 1964, addressing the poor conditions of immigrants living in Sweden (Schwarz 1964). He argued in favour of government-supported facilities to promote Sweden’s different minority cultures. Schwarz was a public intellectual with very little capacity to put the immigrant issue on the political agenda by himself, but he did pave the way for other actors, such Finnish and Estonian activists (Román 1994).
Scholars have offered different explanations, aside from the importance of individual actors such as Schwarz, for the transition from an assimilationist to a multicultural policy. Some point towards supranational factors (Demker and Mälmström 1999). The policy for Swedes abroad was aimed at preserving their Swedish identity to ease their potential return, and by way of reciprocity immigrants living in Sweden were treated similarly. A second explanation revolves around Swedish prestige in the international arena (Hansen 2001). Sweden’s ethnic policies shifted, starting with the invasion of Denmark by Nazi Germany in 1940, towards an internationalist foreign policy approach, supporting minority rights in South Africa and the United States. In that context, it followed logically that minorities in Sweden itself should be granted cultural rights as well. Thirdly, many scholars point to various other actors on the national level, be it the trade unions pressuring the ruling Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) to grant more rights to foreign workers (Johansson 2008), civil servants advocating that the state abandon its *laissez-faire* integration policy (Hammar 1985), or the pivotal role Olof Palme played in transforming the assimilationist ideology of his own Social Democratic Party (Tawat 2019).

In 1975, the ruling Social Democratic Party showed a shift in ideology, and a new immigration and integration policy was adopted following three principles:

1. equality (the same rights and living standard for the native population and immigrants alike);
2. freedom of choice (offering minorities a genuine choice between retaining and developing their original cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity);
3. partnership (reciprocal solidarity and tolerance between the native population and immigrants).

This policy passed parliament without any notable problems. Brännström notes, however, that this policy was considered unimportant in Swedish politics, and was mainly instituted as a response to the accusations of assimilationism coming from Swedish national minorities and international partners (Brännström 2015).

In this chapter the policy history of Swedish language policy vis-à-vis its immigrants will be analysed, using original documents and secondary sources. The focus will lie specifically on mother-tongue education (which was called ‘home language education’ by the Swedish government prior to the 1990s) and Swedish language acquisition programmes. Furthermore, there will be a discussion of how Sweden’s policy tradition has been shaped since the 1960s and how it fits into the theoretical frameworks of motility and inclusion. Prime attention will be paid to the facilities offered (on paper), and the justifications presented to mark various changes in policy.
Swedish mother-tongue education: exceptionally generous?

In many typologies, Sweden’s minority policy is often characterised as being firmly multicultural (Joppke 2007). One element that certainly contributes to this characterisation is its mother-tongue education policy. Currently, Swedish schools are obliged to facilitate mother-tongue education if (1) there are at least 5 interested pupils, and (2), a qualified teacher to teach the language is available. The root of this generous policy can be traced back to the 1960s, more specifically to the report ‘Skolgang burta och hemma’ (Schooling Home and Abroad) of 1966. In this document, the Swedish government outlined the organisation of Swedish language acquisition classes for Swedes living abroad, but also stated that minorities living within the country were entitled to mother-tongue education. Furthermore, the report claims that parents and pupils should decide for themselves to what extent they wished to assimilate to Swedish language and culture, which is a clear indicator that Sweden was taking several steps on the path of multiculturalism. It needs to be noted however that at the start of the mother-tongue education regime, the vast majority of minority pupils were Finnish, thus originating from a Nordic country. It is safe to assume that the initial mother-tongue education regime was set up mainly to incorporate these pupils, and not necessarily for cultures and languages that originate much further from the Swedish border.

In this context it is relevant to outline briefly the political and academic context in which debates surrounding mother-tongue education took place in the 1960s and 1970s. As mentioned before, general Swedish integration policy was in the process of transitioning from a assimilationist towards a more multicultural approach. Language policy, regarding both the role of Swedish (which will be discussed in a later section), but also the role of the immigrant and national minority languages were a central element of public debate. A prime illustration of this fact is the notion, now considered controversial, of so-called ‘semilingualism’ (Milani 2007). Semilingualism refers to the idea that individuals who are confronted with more than one language in their youth will struggle to master all of them proficiently. Instead, they will speak both languages ‘half-way’. In the 1970s this debate centred around Sweden’s Finnish population, but it would resurface again in 2006 in the context of mother-tongue education (ibid.). Implicitly ‘semilingualism’ was mentioned in the present study in some of the interviews, when parents expressed their doubts about raising their children bilingually and/or sending them to mother-tongue education classes, precisely because they feared the children would struggle mastering several languages at once.

Swedish mother-tongue education was solidly formalised in the Home Language Reform act of 1977, in which this education provision was seen as a right for all Sweden’s minorities. This policy’s practical implementation was not an entirely smooth process. According to estimates, the number of pupils taking mother-tongue classes increased elevenfold between 1970 and 1982 (Opper 1983). This sharp increase urged the Swedish government to take both short and long-term measures to improve the rate at which
teachers could be recruited. In 1976 programmes were launched to train teachers who were bilingual in Swedish as a first language, and in Finnish, Turkish, Spanish, Greek or Spanish as a second. This did not resolve the immediate quantity problems however, so in 1977 bilingual teachers who did not have the official Swedish teaching qualifications, but usually had qualifications from their country of origin, were allowed to give mother-tongue education classes. In 1982 the government expanded the range of languages, adding Serbo-Croat, Danish, Arabic, Syriac, Polish and Macedonian to the curriculum. Susan Opper (1983) argued that at the time of writing her paper, even though there had been overwhelming political support for mother-tongue education, it was by no means guaranteed that the policy would survive in the long term. This is a notion that was later echoed by Hyltenstam and Tunoela (1996), who argued that Sweden’s mother-tongue education system started off as a rather revolutionary and ambitious project, but was in the end bogged down due to a decrease in political will and economic support. Opper noted that some Swedish academics did not fully agree with the direction of the mother-tongue education regime. Ekstrand, a leading Swedish socio-linguist in the 1980s, summarised the conclusions of several research projects in the 1970s and 1980s concisely in eleven points. The following overview offers a concise summary of the Swedish academic debate on multilingualism at the time, and helps a better understanding of the policy context as well.

(1) It is possible for children from all social classes to become bilingual. If they have problems in language development, reasons should be sought in situational and social factors, rather than in bilingualism per se. (2) It is possible for immigrant children from all social classes to do well in school, although usual SES [socio-economic status] differences may be expected. If problems arise, reasons should not be looked for in bilingualism, but elsewhere. Do not overlook the fact that immigrant children as well as native children may have all sorts of problems such as dyslexia, learning disabilities, etc. (3) It is essential to keep up the mother tongue development in immigrant children, although a fully native-like level cannot be expected. (4) It is equally important that immigrant children obtain early command of the language and culture of the host country. (5) There can actually be too much mother tongue teaching in certain situations, for instance if the language of the host country is not allowed to enter education for several grades, or when the child does not have good opportunities for interaction with the host society. (6) There is a cost attached to being different [from the norm]. (7) Early bilingualism is not harmful. On the contrary, it is highly advantageous. (8) Although the educational model in many cases is not as crucial for school achievement as may appear from the debate, a truly bilingual/bicultural education should be the objective. Segregated education may contribute to tensions among different minority groups as well as between minorities and the majority. (9) It is perfectly possible to find school models that involve
majority and minority children as in the composite classes in Sweden. Thus, a truly multicultural education is no Utopia, but perfectly feasible.

(10) It takes several years to automatise language to a high level of rapid functioning, as is true for other cognitive functions. (11) Language functions are dependent on the socio-cultural support. If this is weak, language does not develop maximally, or deteriorates. If it changes, language dominance also changes. (Ekstrand 1983 cited in Opper 1983: 207-208).

These points are highly interesting in light of future developments, both within Sweden and in the other countries discussed in this thesis. They show the importance of socio-economic factors in bilingualism and suggest that pupils in the lower social classes might have more difficulty becoming fully bilingual. At the same time however, it was argued that even though it may be difficult, it is not impossible, and if children are faced with difficulties at school, one ought to first look at ‘situational and social factors’ before concluding that bilingualism is the main issue. The idea that ‘there can be too much mother-tongue teaching’ seems to reflect the fear of mother-tongue education leading to the pupil not connecting properly with Swedish majority culture, which is a point raised in some of the previous interviews in this study as well. The idea that ‘early bilingualism is not harmful’ currently represents a majority of socio-linguists, but is nonetheless an interesting statement given the idea of ‘semilingualism’ that was briefly discussed in a previous section.

The eleven conclusions summarised by Ekstrand fit very well in the motility framework. For example, the ‘access’ and ‘competence’ aspects of motility are discussed in the fifth conclusion, where it is stated that there can be too much mother-tongue education. This statement might not be accurate, from the perspective of increasing the pupils’ motility. Purely from a linguistic competence point of view, all other factors being equal, a higher degree of language skills would lead to a higher degree of motility. However if indeed the access to mother-tongue education is so great that it interferes with access to host society language education, the picture may look completely different, especially considering the need to speak the host society language for socio-economic mobility. As such, motility in itself presupposes a certain degree of inclusion. Furthermore, Ekstrand’s conclusion 11 stresses the connection between access and appropriation, by emphasising the importance of the support of external actors in society on the perceived status of their mother tongue among migrants.

In the 1990s and early 2000s a renewed debate took place on Swedish language policy, which also affected the policy and practice of mother-tongue education. Arguably though, despite Swedish not being explicitly on the policy agenda, it always had a covert presence, meaning that the relevance and primacy of Swedish was implicit in every policy, even as early as in the 1970s when the shift to multiculturalism was all but complete (Milani 2007). Coinciding with the resurgence of Swedish national identity politics, the importance of the
language was put at the forefront again from the early 2000s. English at the time was rising to prominence in the higher echelons of society, and the prominence of that language was further reinforced in the new language policy enacted in 2005 (Cabau 2014), or as Lindberg (2007) would argue: ‘The position of English in the Swedish speech community has actually become comparable to that of a second language rather than a foreign language, since many people in Sweden today use English on a daily basis in different contexts.’ (Lindberg 2007: 72). The official guidelines of the new policy, *Best language- a concerted language policy for Sweden (Bästa språket - en samlad svensk språk politik)* were the following:

- Swedish is to be the main language in Sweden.
- Swedish is to be a complete language, serving and uniting society.
- Public Swedish is to be cultivated, simple and comprehensible.
- Everyone is to have a right to language: to develop and learn Swedish, to develop and use their own mother tongue and national minority language, and to have the opportunity to learn foreign languages. (Prop. 2005/06:2, translation by Lindberg 2007: 74).

This was a clear official marker to protect and, above all, underline the status of Swedish, considering the rising prominence of English on the one hand, and the relatively high number of minority and migrant language speakers on the other. Still, the Swedish official policy could by no means considered a return to assimilation, given its emphasis on a ‘right to language’, that language not being *just* Swedish.

English had been the most important compulsory foreign language since 1962. In addition, in the 1990s the Swedish government allowed for the existence of partially (usually 75%) state-funded independent schools, which could also have their own linguistic and cultural profile.

Thus, the English language was promoted further, whilst at the same time the other languages, especially those in the mother-tongue education programme, were pushed to the background. In the 1990s the government decided to decentralise the mother-tongue education policy whilst at the same time cutting its budget (Cabau 2014). The local municipalities now had the authority to decide how much they wanted to spend on mother-tongue education. The organisational aspects of mother-tongue policy left something to be desired, as there were severe time restrictions (40 to 120 minutes per week, usually). Furthermore, national minorities complained about the lack of dissemination to parents. The decline of mother-tongue education policies made national minorities decide to make use of their recently granted right to establish their own schools, a development which had been deemed unacceptable by earlier policy makers in the 1970s. The responsibility for organising mother-tongue education thus slowly transferred from the state to the community level.
In 2002 a state commission published a report, based on survey research among mother-tongue actors, aiming to bridge the gap between the policy intentions and policy practice:

These included measures for the integration of mother-tongue instruction into the daily school schedule by providing instruction in different school subjects in the students’ mother tongues. To bring about a necessary change in attitudes, the Agency proposed measures for the dissemination of knowledge about the value of mother-tongue education to civil servants and decision-makers. Moreover, the need for new techniques and teaching methods and continued work in support of the development and production of teaching aids in different languages was emphasised. Other prerequisites for successful mother-tongue education, according to the National Agency, were increased actions for the training and integration of multilingual teachers. The proposals focussed on mother-tongue instruction and its important role in the fulfilment of educational goals in multicultural and multilingual Sweden’s knowledge development. (National Agency for Education 2003, cited in Lindberg 2007: 77-78).

Swedish mother-tongue education policies are generous and are deemed by some to be an example to be repeated in other West European countries, for they seem to run counter to the trend of ‘assimilation’ that is omni-present in current-day policies.

It is clear that the linguistic infrastructure, even though it is generously present on paper, is faced with several practical difficulties. The fact that due to a lack of funding the ethnic communities are increasingly responsible themselves for setting up their own schools can lead to a difference in quality between the mother-tongue education programmes. In addition, official national and ethnic minorities (i.e. the Fins, Jews, Saami, Roma) have had a special status on paper ever since they were officially recognised as such. For instance, they are exempt from the ‘5 pupil rule’ and from the rule that pupils are only eligible to enrol in mother-tongue education classes if the target language of education is the same as the language they speak at home. A recent report by the Swedish Language Council (2017) made a thorough study of mother-tongue education, but focussed mostly on the officially recognised national minorities. There is thus a clear rift between migrants and their descendants on the one hand, and national minorities on the other, which runs counter to the ambition of the Swedish governments in the 1970s to treat all minorities equally from a legal and rights perspective. Yet it can also be argued that the advocacy of minority groups, in particular the Swedish-Finnish minority, has also strengthened the position of migrant languages in Swedish education.

Given the context of the implementation of mother-tongue education, namely primarily as a means to avoid accusations of ‘assimilation’, it could be assumed that also in Sweden, similar to France and the Netherlands, the policy was primarily implemented to achieve an external
goal, not because of its own merits. Currently, the policy is still in place but its organisation and standards, in the case of migrant languages, are in many cases of questionable quality. Pupils are not to the full extent benefitting from the facilities they have on paper.

**Swedish for Immigrants (SFI)**
Currently, SFI (Svenskundervisning för invandrare) is a system of free language courses for immigrants who are older than 16. Courses are offered in three levels (SFI 1, SFI 2, SFI 3). SFI 1 is targeted at the illiterate, SFI 2 at students who have undergone schooling in their country of origin, but are unfamiliar with the latin script, whilst SFI 3 is aimed at those who can read latin script and wish to attain a somewhat higher understanding of the Swedish level. The government summarises the role of SFI as follows in a fact sheet document:

SFI forms part of the school system and aims to provide basic knowledge of the Swedish language. SFI also aims to provide adult immigrants who cannot read or write the opportunity to acquire these skills. The individual is to be given the opportunity to develop his or her ability to communicate orally and in writing in Swedish in everyday, social and working life situations. SFI is also intended as preparation for further study. Municipalities are obliged to offer SFI to adult immigrants who lack basic knowledge of the Swedish language. Courses should normally be available within three months of the individual’s registration as a resident of a municipality. Depending on his or her educational background and prior knowledge, the student is placed in one of three study programmes with varying degrees of intensity and speed. Regardless of the study programme begun by a student, he or she is entitled to continue studies until completion of the highest course. (SFI fact sheet U13.012).

![Figure 7.1.1 Number of SFI enrolled students 2003-2013.](image)
*Source: Statistics Sweden, Yearbook of Educational Statistics 2015: 229*
When passing the final test of SFI 3 (‘Kurs D’), the student should have a B1 level in the Swedish language. There has been a steady increase in demand for SFI courses, even though immigrants are not obligated to enrol.

The first SFI programmes were set up in the 1960s, with the first official curriculum released in 1971. The programme focussed primarily on guest worker immigration, given that they composed the majority of the Swedish migration flow in that period. The explicit aim of the document was ‘to give the immigrant such language skills and information that he can live and function in the Swedish society’ (Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015, their translation). An interesting difference between Sweden and a country such as the Netherlands, in the same time period, was that Sweden did not seem to tailor its policy to the assumption that the immigrants would eventually leave the country again. In the Netherlands in the early 1970s a language policy to help integrate the immigrants was virtually non-existent, whilst in Sweden it was being put in place. In 1986 Sweden reformulated its education policy for adult migrants, stating as its main goal: ‘the immigrants’ relevant knowledge in the Swedish language as well as about Swedish society and working life so that the immigrants will use his/her rights, influence his/her own situation and fulfil the demands and obligations that daily life offers’ (Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015, their translation). Rosén and Bagga-Gupta argue that this policy indicates a shift from the bare ‘worker-approach’ in the 1970s to a pluralistic approach in the 1980s. The document also discusses many differences that were introduced due to migration (e.g. differences in terms of life-style and understanding the nature of society), but these were not put in a negative light. Instead, the document states the following: ‘The basic education should be founded upon a democratic view of society and human beings: human beings are active, creative, can and should take responsibility and search for knowledge, in order to, in cooperation with others, understand and improve their own and others’ standards of living.’ (National Board of Education 1986, cited in Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015: 76). In this context it could be argued that learning Swedish was not part of a goal to assimilate the migrants, but to integrate them in the Berryan sense of the concept: providing Swedish language education to immigrants is a necessary condition to allow mutual reciprocity to occur. Furthermore, it is mentioned in the 1986 document that migrants who have recently arrived may experience feelings of ‘identity threat’ that may evolve into ‘feelings of frustration’, a statement that was in line with the notion of ‘acculturative stress’ often mentioned by socio-psychological studies of integration (Berry 2006, Sirin et al. 2013, Goforth et al. 2014, Yoon et al. 2013).

The role of SFI was perceived differently again by the centre-right government at the start of the 1990s, as the lack of Swedish language skills on the part of the migrants became a central point of debate. Ever since then, the idea of cultural and linguistic diversity as a sign of strength in the country has been under pressure. The following text is derived from a proposed law of 1993:
Good command of Swedish and knowledge about Swedish society is of major importance for the integration of the immigrant in Sweden. There are alarming signs of inadequate skills among immigrants (...). The competition in today’s labor market highlights further the requirement of good skills in Swedish and knowledge about Swedish circumstances. (Proposition 1993: 9, translated by Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015).

This indicates, as Rosén and Bagga-Gupta also state, a shift from valuing language for its effects on social cohesion and cultural exchange, to its usage in pure economic terms. The Swedish language has, since the 1990s, been considered primarily as a necessary tool for migrants to be economically self-sufficient, because good command of the language was held to be absolutely necessary for success on the labour market, and by proxy for successful integration. In 2006 the Swedish National Board of Education published a report that continued the focus on economics, and stated:

SFI gives people with a first language other than Swedish the opportunity to learn and develop a functional new language. This also includes good pronunciation, since this is closely related to communicative competence. (...) The education must provide the prerequisites for such mastery of the language that pupils can profit from their studies and become involved in social and working life. (Swedish National Board of Education 2006, translated by Rosén and Bagga-Gupta 2015).

An interesting detail is the explicit mention of ‘pronunciation’ of the language. The importance of not only being able to speak the host language, but also to sound something like a native speaker, has been researched in the Netherlands by Ghorashi and Van Tilburg (2006). They concluded that even having the highest language certificates (C1-C2 level, which SFI does not even provide) is not enough to be relatively successful on the labour market, if the immigrant does not possess a good Dutch accent. Despite the growing importance the Swedish governments has attached to SFI, it is still not compulsory for migrants to follow the courses. However, in recent elections the Social-Democratic Party proposed to change this, and even to tie access to the welfare state to the migrants’ attendance rates at the SFI courses.

**Conclusion**

Swedish integration policy, with its language policy as a central component, has been a much contested topic in academia. Some scholars have argued that Sweden’s approach has led to it being the least successful in producing labour market success for its immigrant population (Koopmans 2010). These studies confirm the stance of Swedish politics since the 1990s and also justify the policy shifts towards treating language mainly as an economic tool for the newcomers, whilst driving the social cohesion and cultural aspects to the background. On the other hand, Sweden has performed relatively well on the
social-psychological front. The ability of immigrants to cultivate their heritage language and culture resulted in less acculturative stress and therefore reasonable psychological wellbeing (Berry 2006, Sirin et al. 2013, Goforth et al. 2014, Yoon et al. 2013).

This brief analysis of the development of Swedish mother-tongue education and SFI leads to three relevant motility-related questions. First of all, given the government shift to an economic approach to integration, and the different perspectives on the results of Swedish policy, the question arises which of the two is more valuable: the migrants’ economic or social-psychological wellbeing? In the end this is a normative discussion. The second important question concerns the actual importance of the language policy for (1) the willingness of immigrant parents to transmit their mother tongue to their children, and (2) the perception the migrants have regarding the value of their mother tongue (‘appropriation’ in terms of motility). The Swedish linguistic infrastructure, especially concerning mother-tongue education, is at present disadvantageous for unorganised ethnic communities, that lack the organisational skills and perhaps the social network to set up solid mother-tongue education classes for their children. The strength of the kin-state and its willingness to step in when the host-country government fails to provide adequate facilities is also very important in this regard. This situation might however be relatively irrelevant, if migrants are barely influenced by government policy. As such, government policy may be an overestimated component of motility.

The third question is closely related to the previous one, namely, the comparison between the effects of official mother-tongue education (and its quality) and the language situation at the family home. The fact that some minorities (e.g. the Finnish) have the financial and organisational power to set up their own mother-tongue education programmes, while other minorities do not, points to a discrepancy on the group level. However, these discrepancies obviously also exist on the individual level. The linguistic skills that are being transmitted to a migrant child depend greatly on the language mastery of the parents. In other words: the average child growing up in a household with parents who are university graduates will probably enter the mother-tongue classes having a much higher level of linguistic mastery, compared to the child of the average blue collar worker. The question is whether it is at all possible for government education programmes, especially when they provide merely a few hours per week of mother-tongue education, to bridge the gap created by the social location of a pupil.

These three questions will be addressed in reviewing the interviews that were held with Poles and Turks in Sweden for the purposes of this research.
Chapter 7.2: Interviews Poles in Sweden

Polish migration to Sweden can be roughly categorised in six waves (Lubínska 2013, see table 7.3.1.); however the current presence of citizens with a Polish background has its roots in the post-war period and beyond. A significant number of Polish migrants left, or fled, the country during World War II and the Communist period (1947-1989). An interview-based study from the 1990s showed that, compared to migrants from Chile, Iran and Turkey, Polish migrants in Sweden had a higher socio-economic status (SOS 1999). Most Polish migrants settled in Sweden’s big cities: Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg (SCB 2010). They originated primarily from the regions of Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie and Mazowieckie.

After Polish EU accession in 2004, Polish migration to Sweden increased, even when compared to the other new Member States. However, it is also argued by some scholars that EU accession has not had a large impact on migration from Poland to Sweden, when compared to other countries (Kindler 2013), due to the existing large Polish diaspora present in Sweden before 2004, and to Swedish recruitment agencies being very selective.

In 2018 Statistics Sweden estimated the number of Polish immigrants to be 92,759 people (Statistics Sweden Poles 2019). However, similar to the situation of the Turks in Sweden, this does not include second and third-generation immigrants, so the actual number of Swedish residents with a Polish background is most likely significantly higher.

A total of ten Poles in Sweden were interviewed in Stockholm and in Umea (Northern Sweden) in November 2017. All interviewees were first-generation Polish immigrants. Furthermore, while there is strong variation in the sample in terms of age (ranging from 22 to 65) and gender (6 females, 4 males), the sample is not without its biases. Most respondents had either benefited from higher education or were in the process of obtaining it. Furthermore, all interviews were conducted in English, as all interviewees had mastered the language sufficiently for basic communication purposes.

Swedish vs Polish

Similar to the other groups interviewed, the Poles in Sweden in the sample acknowledge the importance of learning the language of the country they are residing in, at least for its instrumental usage. One interviewee, an architect who came to Sweden in 2013, cites her reasoning: ‘You need Swedish for your work. You also need it to make Swedish friends.’ (Appendix 2.5.5). However, when asked specifically about how she weighs these two motivations (work and establishing a connection with native Swedes) she mentions the following about making Swedish friends: ‘I think connecting to the Swedish society is not very important. Swedish people are not very welcoming.’ (ibid.).
Interviews Poles in Sweden

The difficulty of connecting to Swedish people is observed by other interviewees. It drove them to emphasise the economic value of learning Swedish even more than they would have otherwise. Another interviewee, who migrated to Sweden in 2014, stated that she aimed to reach the ‘heart of the Swedes’ (Appendix 2.5.2), but mentioned at the same time that she feels Swedes are ‘very closed to foreigners’ (ibid.). For this reason, she emphasised that alongside her Swedish language skills, she also greatly values her skills in Polish to build up a social network in Sweden, saying that she is ‘very strongly involved with the Polish community.’ (ibid.).

These responses are representative of the total body of the interviews, and thus two major observations can be made. Firstly, learning Swedish is primarily seen as a vehicle for economic success, and secondly, the respondents in general do not prioritise establishing strong cultural and social connections with the Swedish native population. The latter can partly be explained by the respondents’ attitude, and partly by the perceived closedness of the Swedish population towards newcomers.

**Mother-tongue education**

The interviewees’ view on mother-tongue education (i.e. should the Swedish school system provide Polish language acquisition courses for their children? Are the parents willing to raise their child bilingually?) are closely related to their attitudes towards both the Polish and Swedish language in general. In previous interviews it has been noted that the way language is viewed, and attitudes regarding language transmission from parents to children, seem to be closely related to the social-economic status (SES) of the respondent. Because the sample of interviews in Sweden is strongly biased towards high SES respondents, the cross-class comparison cannot be made in this section. However, these high SES Poles in Sweden have very similar views to the other high SES

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Table 7.3.1
Waves of Polish migration to Sweden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration period</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Description of migration type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>from the late 19th century to 1939</td>
<td>for the most part economically motivated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>1939-1944</td>
<td>forced population displacements, closely related to wartime developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>1944-1980</td>
<td>- repatriation of Poles from the USSR - the migration of ethnic Germans from Poland under intergovernmental agreements - migration by people of Jewish origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>the migrations of the 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>the transition period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>after 2004</td>
<td>post-accession Polish migration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lubińska (2013:74).
respondents from other groups and countries. For instance, they all support some form of multilingual education, both in the school system and when raising their children: ‘Yes, I am Polish, so I want my children to feel Polish. Later [when they grow older] I want them to pick between the Swedish and Polish identity.’ (Appendix 2.5.6).

An interesting aspect of this response is the dichotomy made between the Swedish and Polish society, and the notion this interviewee felt his children must ‘pick’ between the two. When prompted about this issue and whether a bilingual education might thus eventually lead his children to pick the Polish society, and thus be segregated, this interviewee responded: ‘I do not think raising my children bilingually hinders their integration; they speak Swedish and Polish fluently. It is impossible for them to just stay in their Polish community.’ (ibid.).

Another interviewee showed scepticism towards the effects of mother-tongue education, even though she was generally in favour of the policy: ‘Bilingual education might risk a little that the children stay entrenched within the Polish community. It can be challenging for a parent and the school to avoid this from happening.’ (Appendix 2.5.8).

However, other interviewees do not see this risk: ‘Raising children trilingual does not disturb their integration. There are studies proving this. If you are a child, you can learn the languages with relative ease. Mother-tongue education does not let children be closed off. This type of risk only exists if the parents push it.’ (Appendix 2.5.7).

An IT professional, who migrated to Sweden in 2013, had mixed views about the effects of official mother-tongue education policies at Swedish schools, and parents raising their children bilingually:

I want my children to learn how to read and write in Polish. Two or three hours per week at school is however not enough. I think mother-tongue education policies influence integration. It might go slower, but it is not dangerous. I think that if you force people to use one language, their integration will go much faster. Mother-tongue education can increase the probability of stopping integration. However, at the same time cultural diversity enriches a country. In the end, it is the responsibility of the parents how the integration process will go. (Appendix 2.5.3).

The interesting aspect of this extract lies in how this interviewee tries to weigh both the positive aspects of Swedish mother-tongue education policy, namely the cultural enrichment for the country and the bilingual skills for the individual child, and the negative, namely higher chance of stopping integration. His conclusion that in the end the parents are responsible corresponds to the analyses made by Fishman (1991), who also emphasised the crucial role of parents in the linguistic development of their children, as opposed to government policy.
Some of the respondents had children who were currently enrolled in a mother-tongue education class at Swedish primary schools. The choices that some of these parents made concerning which language they wanted them to learn there, and the parents’ perspective on the practical value of these classes, can be called quite unexpected, as they sometimes forsake Polish language acquisition for other, ‘bigger’ languages. In the previous extract, the respondent argued that two to three hours per week of language classes is not enough to be effective. The effectiveness of the courses is universally disputed by all the respondents. Most of them state that the mother-tongue education classes are ‘not helpful’ but ‘better than nothing’, since they at least give the children a very small basis in Polish grammar and literature. An interesting exception is a first-generation immigrant who came to Sweden in 1981 at a very young age with her parents. Her school career was entirely in Sweden and she had both Swedish and Polish language classes. She comments:

Sweden at the time had a fantastic school system for foreigners. Not anymore though, foreigners are now simply thrown into a Swedish-speaking class. Now they experience a lot of stress. (...). I followed Polish mother-tongue education and the courses were very good. It helped me a lot with my education and to learn Swedish and helped me stay in touch with my Polish language. (Appendix 2.5.9).

Two crucial differences between the last-cited interviewee and the other respondents are firstly that she followed mother-tongue education herself and can now make a comparison between her own experiences and her children’s, and secondly that she followed these courses in the 1980s, when the Swedish mother-tongue education facilities were more extensive than in 2017. Over the decades the Swedish government has shrunk the facilities available and this has had ramifications for the policy’s effectiveness.

A first-generation Polish immigrant observed that the Polish government has attempted to compensate for the lack of good mother-tongue education facilities in Sweden:

Sweden used to have a decent organisation. It went downhill these last few years. Polish embassy is now organising a lot of courses for children as young as four years old. There the children learn both about the Polish language and culture. A lot of Poles are sending their children there. The Polish government fills the void left by the Swedish government. (Appendix 2.5.11).

Thus, she stated how the Polish government aims to fill the void that is seemingly left by the Swedish language system. This illustrates the extent to which a sizeable heritage country such as Poland can exert its influence over its diaspora.
Swedish language training

As mentioned in the section on Swedish vs Polish, all respondents expressed the view that learning Swedish is very important, at least for their labour market success. Many of them followed Swedish language courses, but they chose different programmes. For instance, one interviewee mentioned:

I followed a SFI course for working people. It was two hours per week, which was very little. (...) I quit after three months. The courses were focussed too much on grammar. I just wanted to speak. I did not need the grammar lessons. They insisted to keep using this method despite my and other people’s complaints. (Appendix 2.5.6).

However, another recent (2016) first-generation migrant followed a different programme: ‘I am still learning Swedish very intensively. I want to work. I enrolled in a programme for academics to learn the language. The Swedish government provides it. It was 8 hours a day. I now speak Swedish at a B2 level.’ (Appendix 2.5.4). A final interviewee did not have the opportunity to go to classes: ‘I learn Swedish at home now, I do not have the time to go to classes. I need to know Swedish to read official documents and for the kindergarten. Right now, I can understand Swedish but cannot speak it.’ (Appendix 2.5.3).

The examples given here do not show a clear pattern, as can be seen with the other groups that were being interviewed. This can be explained by the fact that the respondents did not all follow the same programme. Some followed a SFI course, which is part of the official Swedish citizenship regime and the most common course chosen by recent immigrants, while others had more specialised courses tied to their profession, and others again had no opportunity to follow any course and can as EU citizens who fall under the regime of freedom of movement opt out of following an official language acquisition programme altogether.

Despite this lack of a pattern, several tentative observations can be made when analysing this interview material. The first is the importance the respondents explicitly and implicitly attribute to the practical organisation of the courses. For example, the academic course had a much better structure that allowed for better language acquisition, indicating the importance of solid organisation.

The second observation concerns the problem of time constraints. This is part of the problem with the SFI courses, as they are only given for a few hours per week, since its participants usually have full-time jobs. They cannot commit the time to an academic course that takes eight hours per day. Some respondents decided not to follow a course at all, which contributes to the fact that they currently only have a passive understanding of Swedish. There was also a interviewee who enrolled in an on-line course: ‘I follow state sponsored on-line courses because I lack the time to go
to class myself. My results depend a lot on my self-discipline. I can understand and speak a little bit of Swedish now.’ (Appendix 2.5.5).

**Language and motility in Europe**

As opposed to the Turks in Sweden for instance, many of the Swedish-Polish respondents have the ambition to leave Sweden at some time in the future. This is not very surprising considering the sample bias of the interviews: many respondents are highly educated and came to Sweden either to take an academic position or as part of an extended labour contract. They often cite as reasons for leaving that they want their children to go to a Polish school, or that they simply go to where they have opportunities on the labour market. This group of people thus already had a considerable amount of motility even before they came to Sweden, for both language and non-language related reasons.

This group of interviewees thus requires little ‘help’ from government policy to enhance their own motility and that of their children. The children are usually speak at least two languages at home and are well equipped from a linguistic point of view to migrate to a range of different European countries. These considerations also lead to the respondents favouring other languages over English (since they usually speak that language already) when reflecting upon which new language would increase their mobility options in the EU the most. To quote a few examples:

‘German would help me the most, but I will never learn it. I don’t like the sound of the language’. (Appendix 2.5.5).

‘German. German has the biggest labour market in Europe’. (Appendix 2.5.7).

‘German, it is the biggest European language after English’. (Appendix 2.5.8).

‘French and Italian, a lot of people speak French and I love Italy. German and Russian would help as well, but I do not want to learn those languages because of history.’ (Appendix 2.5.1).

**Conclusion**

The interviewees in this sample proved themselves in many aspects to be similar to all the other migrant community members interviewed in this research. They considered Swedish a necessary language to learn, for economic reasons first and (sometimes) social reasons too. There were differing opinions on mother-tongue education, with some valuing it, others being critical, but there was widespread agreement on the need to improve vastly its current practical organisation. The respondents presented similar perspectives on the Swedish language courses offered by the government, mostly criticising the practical structure of the courses.
There are two notable observations made by some respondents in the sample. Firstly, there is the impression that the Polish government, through its embassy in Sweden, is organising language courses for its diaspora, hereby partially replacing the role of the Swedish government in the education of Polish immigrants. This development fits well in the model of the quadratic nexus (Marácz 2014), in which national minorities, national states, kin-states and the ‘Euro-Atlantic space’ are interwoven. The national state scaling down its involvement in minority language education, a development that was noted in chapter 7.1, has created more room for the Polish embassy to exert influence over its diaspora.

The respondents’ motility was already substantial, by virtue of their higher education degrees and mastery of the English language. However, even though demographically this group is different from the Turks in Sweden discussed previously, two core observations regarding the effects of government policy on their motility are remarkably similar. Briefly to reiterate: firstly, they see a clear connection between their language skills (be it Polish, English, German or another major European language) and mobility potential. Secondly, the organisational structure of both mother-tongue and Swedish language education is criticised. The only major difference is that the Swedish-Polish interviewees did not think mother-tongue education was a potential catalyst for segregation, rather laying the responsibility with the parents.
Chapter 7.3: Interviews Turks in Sweden

Turkish migration to Sweden was initiated by Swedish companies recruiting guest workers to satisfy demand for labour in the 1960s. Many Turkish migrants originated from central Anatolia, to be exact from the towns of Kulu and Cihanbeyli, and predominantly had a ‘low education’ background (Baser and Levin 2017). A smaller number came from urban areas such as Istanbul, but those were ‘high-skilled’ and thus were not recruited as part of the guest worker programme. Labour migration continued until 1973, when due to economic downturn these programmes were terminated and a stricter migration policy was adopted. Migration from Turkey continued at that point through family reunification policies. After the 1970s Sweden welcomed Syriac and Kurdish refugees, who fled Turkey after the military intervention in 1971.

In 2018 there were officially 49,948 first-generation Turkish migrants in Sweden. However, when including the children and grandchildren of the first-generation migrants, who are not categorised by ethnic background in Swedish statistics, it can be assumed that number of Swedish residents with a Turkish background exceeds 100,000 (Baser and Levin 2017).

In total, 11 Turks in Sweden were interviewed in Stockholm and in Fittja. Fittja is a municipality close to Stockholm, with a relatively large share of immigrants of non-Western origin. 7 of the interviewees were first-generation immigrants, one was of the second generation and three from the third. The interviewees from the second and third generations were either still studying or had finished tertiary education, whilst most of the first-generation migrants had a history of doing manual work. Some of the latter group did finish managerial education programmes tailored towards their work. Most first-generation migrants were interviewed with the help of a translator, whilst the second and third generations were interviewed in English.

Swedish vs Turkish

All first-generation immigrant interviewees, who planned to stay in Sweden long-term, acknowledged the benefits of learning Swedish as a second language, and said they had this already held this view upon arrival in the country. One interviewee, who migrated to Sweden in 1972, stated: ‘When I came to Sweden I followed SFI courses for 1.5 years. I was a bus driver, and the courses taught me the vocabulary needed to perform my job.’ (Appendix 2.5.2). This statement is exemplary for all first-generation Turkish migrants in this interview sample: they all realised immediately that learning the language was an absolute requirement for them. The newly arrived migrants proceeded to learn Swedish, either by means of a course, by consuming Swedish media, by connecting with native Swedes, or a combination.
Length of stay is however a determining factor for the willingness of migrants to learn the language. Another interviewee, a recent first-generation immigrant who benefited from higher education, had a different view about learning Swedish: ‘I came here in 2014 and will go back in 5 years. I can speak Turkish, English, Arabic and Persian but only have a basic knowledge of Swedish. I don’t need to learn Swedish because I will go back to Turkey in a few years.’ (Appendix 2.5.5).

He thus mentions that due to the fact he is only staying in Sweden for seven years, it is not worth the effort for him to learn the language. Furthermore, the sizeable network of Swedish Turks gave him the opportunity to associate himself mainly with the Turkish community, thus essentially reducing the incentive to learn Swedish. The potential reward for learning Swedish did not weigh up against the opportunity costs.

The last interviewee quoted was the only one of the respondents who was not planning to stay in Sweden long-term. All the other respondents were either born in Sweden and were not planning to leave, or had lived in Sweden for several decades already. They had all learned Swedish and acknowledged the practical and economic value that learning the language brings them. This observation on its own may be unsurprising, but becomes more interesting when looking at it in conjunction with the respondents’ attitudes towards Turkish. Given the fact that most respondents aim to build a future and family life in Sweden, or have already done so, the question of language transmission towards their children becomes relevant. In the socio-linguistic literature the willingness of parents to transmit their mother tongue to their children is considered a very significant predictor for the survival of a language (Fishman 1991). The views and attitudes of the respondents differed greatly in this respect for varying reasons.

For instance, a first-generation immigrant stated:

I mostly spoke Turkish and Kurdish and just a little bit of Swedish with my children at home. They only learned Swedish after they were three years old at primary school. I sent them to a Turkish school where most teachers and class-mates spoke Turkish. They haven’t been able to continue their education because their level of Swedish wasn’t high enough. I sometimes regret that. (...) If I had to pick between my children not knowing Turkish and Kurdish or Swedish, I would prefer them not to know Swedish. Our community is tightknit and they need to able to communicate with other Turks. (Appendix 2.5.4).

He expressed an ambivalence regarding the linguistic education of his children. He considered Swedish the more economically productive language, as it is a necessity for receiving a decent education, but values the connectivity of his children to Turkish co-ethnics and Turkish culture even more.
Another interviewee had five children who, according to him, speak five languages (Turkish, Swedish, German, English, Italian). He is very content that they have a fluent command of Swedish, but also points out the importance of Turkish: ‘Just focussing on learning Swedish [for his children] may help them to adapt to Sweden in the short term. In the long term them not speaking their mother tongue might cause identity issues.’ (Appendix 2.5.2).

He expressed his satisfaction with the linguistic competences of his children and valued the economic importance of the Swedish language. At the same time he indicated the importance of the Turkish language, as a vehicle for their Turkish identity. It is interesting to note that he sees the Turkish identity as something completely separate from the Swedish identity, thinks this separation needs to be acknowledged and respected by his children, and believes that not being sufficiently immersed in the Turkish heritage culture can cause identity issues.

One of the interviewees was a second-generation Swedish Turk who is currently attending university. He expressed the following sentiment regarding his connection to the Swedish and Turkish languages:

At home, I spoke in a Turkish dialect with my parents. Most Turks would be able to understand me when I speak it. I went to a school with many immigrants, and I had a lot of Turkish friends with whom I spoke Turkish. (...) I taught myself Turkish, especially after my mother passed away, but at the same time also wanted to immerse myself in Swedish culture. (...) I felt different because of my background and wanted to belong with the Swedes. I didn’t want to meet any more Turks. (...) As I reached my late teenage years, I started to also see the importance of learning Turkish. I perfected the language on my own through self-study. Right now I have written several academic papers in Turkish and published a book about a Turkish poet [in Turkish]. The Turkish language is the link to my heritage, but I only started seeing that when my socio-economic conditions improved. I feel a calling to solve the problems with my cultural heritage. (Appendix 2.5.10).

This quote mentions several interesting developments. As a young child this interviewee only knew how to speak a specific Turkish dialect. Then he realised at the still relatively early age of eight that he needed to have a good command of the Swedish language in order to succeed in Sweden, and thus he took many steps to build up a ‘native Swede’ circle of friends. Then during his late teenage years he re-evaluated the Turkish language for his cultural and intellectual development, and brought his skills to an academic level. There are at least two factors worthy of note in this interviewee’s history. Firstly, he clearly went from a perspective of ‘segregation’ (when he was very young) to one of ‘assimilation’ (from his eighth until his late teenage years), to one of ‘integration’ (from...
his late teenage years onwards). Secondly, these phases seem to be connected to his socio-economic wellbeing. He comes from a relatively poor background and his initial assimilation into Swedish language and culture gave him the opportunity to advance on the social ladder. Consequently, after alleviating his immediate economic problems he had the opportunity and the will to perfect his level of Turkish and study his cultural heritage. For this interviewee, bilingualism and bi-culturalism have proven to be a form of luxury. After having lived through these three different phases of linguistic upbringing, he presents the following reflection on how he defines ‘integration’:

Right now, I see integration as having a dual identity. However, immigrants need to find their own place and purpose in the country they live in, and that will always require a great degree of adaptation to the mainstream society. (…) I don’t like the Turkish associations here. They preserve conservative values. It is impossible to be integrated if you are active in them. (Appendix 2.5.10).

**Mother-tongue education**

The respondents’ perspective on mother-tongue education, either for themselves or for their children, is often connected to how they perceive the value of the Turkish language. However, when focussing on the question whether the Turkish mother tongue needs to be taught at school, the perspectives of the respondents differed strongly. For instance, one was clearly in favour of monolingual Swedish education:

I purposefully sent my children to a Swedish school, without other Turkish students. They needed to be immersed in Swedish culture and language. (…) I spoke Turkish with them at home, and that was sufficient for me. (…) My children speak four languages, and can speak both Turkish and Swedish at the native level. (Appendix 2.5.9).

Three others claimed instead that learning the mother tongue at school is beneficial for several reasons: ‘I think learning the mother tongue first helps with learning a second language. Learning the mother tongue helps teach basic grammar rules.’ (Appendix 2.5.7).

Swedish teachers encourage mother-tongue education. They explained raising a child bilingually has many benefits for his development. A good foundation of my child in Turkish will only help him to learn Swedish afterwards. (Appendix 2.5.1).

Turkey is our mother land, and mother-tongue education is my right. It is my right that my children can learn Turkish at school. The more languages they know the better it is. (Appendix 2.5.8).
The statements above were all from first-generation migrants. However, the interviewees belonging to the second and third generation expressed a different view on the matter of mother-tongue education. A third-generation young Turkish girl, who was to attend university in 2017, received mother-tongue education at a Swedish school and expressed a strong view on the matter:

I would raise my children bilingually. Turkish is in my heart and it is part of my culture. Not learning Turkish is not a viable option at all. At school there need to be facilities for mother-tongue education. If children don’t learn the language when they are young they might not be able to learn the language at all. (...) The Turkish language gives us a foundation to understand what is right and what is wrong, if we don’t know our language anymore we don’t know what it means to be a Turk. (Appendix 2.5.6).

However a second-generation Swedish Turk had a diametrically opposed opinion:

When I was 7-8, I purposefully refused to go to Turkish mother-tongue education. The teachers were bad, the starting level was very poor. I already spoke much better Turkish at home. The courses were also stigmatising. The Turkish language has a very low status in Sweden, so if you take those courses you will have a low status as well. (...) Traditional mother-tongue education is not creative. I read Turkish poems and taught myself the Turkish language that way, that was way more effective. (...) When the law of mother-tongue education was adopted in Swedish Parliament in 1976, it was useful, because immigration was recent then. Right now, Turkish children just attend these classes for easy points. Teachers of Turkish origin in Sweden only teach those classes because they are incapable of teaching other subjects. I think there will be no more interest in mother-tongue education at school in the future. The Turkish community in Sweden has no common aim or common interest. (Appendix 2.5.10).

The strongly differing opinions of these two interviewees show a glimpse of the rift that seemingly exists in the Swedish Turk community, with one group aiming for the institutionalisation of Turkish culture whilst the other points out several principled and practical objections. The practical organisation of mother-tongue education is also criticised by those who support its principle. For instance:
My child had one hour of Turkish every week. This was not enough at all for him to learn the language. Germany and the Netherlands had an agreement with Turkey on labour migration. There Turkish teachers from Turkey came to teach the migrant children. Sweden did not have such an agreement, so it was more difficult to get good teachers from Turkey. In Germany and the Netherlands it is a lot easier to learn Turkish than here. (Appendix 2.5. Interview 7).

**Language training courses**
As noted in the previous paragraph, most first-generation respondents have taken a Swedish language training course and recognise the benefits of learning Swedish upon arrival. The effectiveness of the courses however varied for the different respondents.

One interviewee recalled:

When I came here I did not go to language school. I immediately went to work in a restaurant. During the evenings and the holidays I went to a language course called SFE [Swedish Foreign Education, a similar course to SFI but not exactly the same]. I think you need to keep on educating yourself your whole life. Finding a Swedish partner and a job are by far the best ways to learn the language, rather than the courses. (...) Most Turkish men around me did not go to a language course. They did not have time to go, because they had to make money. The tight Turkish network and strong Turkish identity are then becoming a problem. They did not need to learn the language, did not have the time to do it, so they did not. (Appendix 2.5.1).

This account mentioned several factors that were alluded to by other respondents as well. Firstly, effectiveness of the language training courses is uneven and it is argued that learning the language by practising it yields better results. Secondly, it was pointed out that poorer immigrants often lack the time to attend the courses. Furthermore, due to the presence of a large Turkish community in Sweden, the incentive to make an effort to learn Swedish is either significantly reduced or completely absent. Other respondents shared similar experiences.

These sentiments are representative of the views of the first-generation respondents. They see the importance of Swedish language acquisition, sometimes regret that they didn’t learn the language immediately upon arrival and question the practical effectiveness of the courses. It is also interesting to note that many were incentivised to learn Swedish by their employers. Following a Swedish language course was often a prerequisite for obtaining a promotion, thus presenting the immigrants with a clear economic incentive. 

Language and mobility in Europe
When confronted with the question of which language is most useful in order to be mobile within Europe, there is one clear front-runner, namely English. When requested to reflect upon different languages they would like to learn and/or use, in order to improve their mobility in Europe, many also acknowledged the value of Turkish and sometimes other European languages:

Turkish and Kurdish are very valuable languages for me to travel around Europe. It makes it very easy for me to connect to communities in different countries. (Appendix 2.5.4).

Turkish gives me a lot of options to visit/move to other countries. For instance: Denmark. (Appendix 2.5.6).

German is a very useful language for me. Germany is a big country with a big Turkish community. Turkish also helps me a lot when migrating within Europe. (Appendix 2.5.8).

French and German would benefit me most. Turkish is also very useful when moving to other countries. (Appendix 2.5.2).

The respondents often refer to the sizeable Turkish networks all over Europe, that they can easily connect with when moving to another European country. Furthermore they unsurprisingly mention most often the three big European economic languages, English, French and German, as being very useful. A second-generation interviewee had a slightly different perspective on the role of Turkish:

I would move to any European university that offers me a research job. English and Swedish are for me the most useful language in terms of mobility options. I won’t need Turkish at all, unless my job would involve studying Turkish networks. If I go to another European country, I have no desire at all to connect with the local Turks. (Appendix 2.5.10).

Conclusion
Most respondents considered Swedish a language they primarily need to learn for their economic benefit, and saw Turkish as the vehicle for their cultural heritage. Some expressed very strong views on the need to keep Turkish alive within the Swedish-Turk community. Several respondents even claimed that knowledge of Turkish, despite it being an economically less beneficial language when compared to Swedish, is much more important than knowledge of Swedish. There is a clear separation felt between the Swedish and Turkish identities, and the respective languages are seen as the vehicles of these identities.
Both mother-tongue education and the citizenship courses were evaluated moderately positively in principle, but criticised on practice. The facilities were either not sufficient or poorly organised (in the case of mother-tongue education) or did not focus enough on practical conversation skills (in the case of citizenship courses). When it comes to the citizenship regime, it was also often mentioned that especially the first-generation immigrants lacked both the time and the incentive to learn Swedish. Their poor socio-economic situation, the presence of a sizeable Turkish community and the fact that the migrants were not obligated by the government to pass a language test were reasons that many of them initially were not interested in learning Swedish, often to their regret.

Turkish was often cited as a very useful language to know when migrating within Europe, thus enhancing the respondents’ motility. Many respondents have connections with other European Turks, which opens up the possibility to bond in a community of their ethnic peers if they decide to migrate.

The question thus remains: how are language and motility connected in the situation of Turks in Sweden? The results above have shown that this connection very much exists. There is a fairly favourable, albeit not perfect, linguistic infrastructure present that helps Turks in Sweden gain the necessary linguistic skills. Furthermore they see a clear connection between the languages they speak (especially Turkish) and their mobility opportunities within Europe. Several additional remarks need to be made, however. Firstly, it can potentially be argued that the Swedish linguistic infrastructure’s balance might be too much in favour of the minority languages. Despite Swedish language courses being free of charge migrants sometimes still do not feel incentivised to attend them, since they think they can live satisfactorily just within the Turkish communities. Years later they often regret this decision. Secondly, the interviews give ample reason to reconsider the structure of both Swedish and Turkish language courses, as their effectiveness has come under scrutiny. Thirdly, the complicated question needs to be addressed of whether state-sponsored minority language training will not lead to a segregation instead of inclusion of the immigrant communities. Given the very strong feelings both older and younger Turks in Sweden express when discussing Turkish language and culture, and the sharp distinction some make between Swedish and Turkish identity, this is a potentially valid concern that requires reflection. At the same time, a policy of assimilation seems doomed to fail, given the strong transnational connections many Turks in Sweden maintain in the present day.