Spectral forces, time, and excess in Southern Chile

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Chapter 8

Spectral forces, time and excess in Southern Chile

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Abstract

This chapter sheds light on how embracing *The World Multiple* in our thinking necessarily entails the careful ethnographic exploration of socio-material entanglements expressing ‘more than one’ temporalities. In order to do so, and as a heuristic to ethnographically attend to the temporal socio-material singularities emerging within environments strongly affected by State terrorism, I mobilize a kind of politics I term as *the politics of when*. By so doing, and through an ethnographic exploration on the excess that emerges from the material inclination of humans and non-humans to continue to co-exist and enhance themselves, I aim to demonstrate how different processes of *worlding* are predicated upon spectral socio-material forces that
do not share a pre-established temporal dimension that allows for the secular coexistence of different practical achievements.

To start pondering some of the guiding questions raised by the editors of this volume, I choose to focus on one of the inspirational conceptual sources at stake. The editors of *The World Multiple: Everyday Politics of Knowing and Generating Entangled Worlds* invite us to think about multiplicity through the substitution of the word ‘body’ with the word ‘world’. This substitution is possible, I think, because both words, ‘body’ and ‘world’, are presented to us as sharing a similar logical level: Both words work as ‘classes of things’, as generic abstractions that we can mobilize to think about situated socio-material realities. Moreover, the substitution of these words spectrally echoes the book *The body multiple* by Annemarie Mol (2002) -- work that has experimented in tracing, or following, the multiple ways in which an object is relationally practiced. Indeed, and from the heart of Western biomedical technoscience, *The body multiple* has invited us to realize how the body at stake in those practices is not pre-defined by its (coherent) form. Rather, we have learned with Mol that the body’s ontological status depends upon heterogeneous practices, insofar as such body is enacted in multiple ways through and in different epistemic practices. Following from this realization, one might wonder: What is at stake when we are invited to substitute the word ‘body’ with the generic word ‘world’? The most obvious answer is in this book’s invitation to a particular way of thinking: Whatever we decide to call ‘world’ should not be considered a coherent place *out-there* that precedes different practices, but it should rather be understood as a highly contingent, conceptual and empirical place where the juxtaposition of different ‘practical achievements’ (cf. Stengers 2011, Woolgar and Lezaun 2013) generates unpredictable ontological configurations between humans and non-humans. Therefore, taking the challenge to think about the unpredictable ontological configurations of *The World Multiple* entails analytically reconsidering what counts as being political, and thus, reconsidering the relation, rather than the final and absolute substitution, between the ‘politics of what’ and ‘the politics of who’ -- the ‘politics of what’, with its cardinal question about what kind of reality is produced through the coexistence of humans and non-humans, and the ‘politics of who’ with its analytical interests concerning issues of who has, or does not have, the right to speak and act (See Mol 1999).

Reconsidering, rethinking about, or somehow analytically refreshing the imbricated relation between the ‘politics of who’ and the ‘politics of what’ becomes particularly relevant if we consider contexts characterized by violence and authoritarianism. My concern in this
chapter will be to meditate about violent situations involving not only realities that have been produced through different practices – the politics of what – but also the authoritarian imposition of who has had, or has not had, the right to speak and act – the politics of who. In my home country of Chile, one of the cruellest military dictatorships in Latin America prevailed between 1973 and 1990 under the leadership of Augusto Pinochet. I consider the deployment of this dictatorship as a series of cruel and violent attempts to enact the modern ‘one-world world’ project (see Law 2015) – a project that inherently implied attempts to impose a ‘one-time-temporality’. Indeed, I will consider the deployment of this (ontological?) dictatorship as a failed attempt to have done with the juxtaposition of heterogeneous ‘practical achievements’. Put differently, I show how the practical achievements of such a ‘one-world world’ project could not fully delete the singular socio-material traces of previous co-existences between humans and non-humans. In this respect, I will suggest, the singularities of human practices really matter when thinking about The World Multiple because they resist any kind of substitution or epistemic abstraction: Human singularities are not ‘classes of things’; they resist being turned into generic abstractions to be mobilized when thinking about situated socio-material realities.

Therefore, considering the incapacity of the ‘one-world world’ project to fully delete the singular socio-material traces of previous co-existences, in what follows I want to shed light on how embracing The World Multiple in our thinking necessarily entails the careful ethnographic exploration of socio-material entanglements expressing ‘more than one’ temporalities. In order to do so, I propose a third kind of politics, the politics of when, as a heuristic to ethnographically attend to the temporal socio-material singularities emerging within environments strongly affected by State terrorism. By so doing, I aim to demonstrate how different processes of worlding do not share a pre-established temporal dimension that allows for the secular co-existence of different practical achievements, prone to be coordinated or even assembled into a common world (see Latour 2007 for an example). Moreover, I want to shed light on how the unpredictable ontological configurations between humans and non-humans taking part of The World Multiple might also be predicated upon spectral socio-material forces.
Inscriptions-time-excess

The stories I mobilize can be captured in two ethnographic snapshots based on long-term fieldwork in Southern Chile:

Image One. Consider a woman who wishes to *inscribe* the name of her husband, *Miguel Cuevas Pincheira*, on the bridge where *Miguel* was killed before being thrown to the river -- the same bridge where the human body of *Miguel* disappeared more than 40 years ago.

Image Two. Consider the inscription of the dictator’s name *Augusto Pinochet* upon a massive rock located in a Pewenche indigenous community in the same region -- a rock that is considered by many local inhabitants to be a ‘sacred rock’ -- a rock that, as we will see, resisted destruction. In order to think about temporalities stemming from the violent attempt to enact ‘one-world world’ realities, I will contrast the name of one of the dictatorship’s victims, *Miguel Cuevas Pincheira* – a name that persists as an expression of the singularity of a disappeared human person – with the name of the dictator *Augusto Pinochet* – a name that insists on deleting a communal indigenous singularity. What I want to foreground in this chapter is how violent practices that attempt to impose ‘one-world realities/one-world temporalities’ encounter socio-material expressions of resistance. More particularly, I consider how personal names and things are related and thus explore how it is that the configuration between names and things expresses not only a multiple topological time ‘folded’ into things (Serres and Latour 1995), but also the singular *excess* latent in every being. My aim here is to explore further these processes of socio-material resistance, particularly by considering the analytical challenges at stake when the relation between a name’s inscription and *excess* is considered. As some readers may have noticed, my use of *excess* here resonates with Marisol de la Cadena’s (2015) definition of *excess* as that which overcomes the limit of what can be understood and thought by modern knowledge practices (see also de la Cadena’s chapter in this book). While focusing on the State as a quintessential guarantee of such modern practices, de la Cadena (2015) has suggested that engaging with that which *exceeds* modern knowledge would imply the transformation of the State itself, and therefore the disruption of history -- and historical time -- as the main register of the real.

Inspired by these ideas, I understand excess not only as that which overcomes the limit of what can be understood and thought by modern knowledge practices, but also as that which emerges from the material *inclination* of humans and non-humans to continue to co-exist and enhance themselves. Somehow, this *inclination* has been the subject of longstanding philosophical discussions and has been conveyed in western philosophy with the word
To put it in Spinoza’s words, conatus indexes the way in which ‘each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being’ (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6). More particularly, I show how this insistence on existing inherent in different beings exceeds and resists the cruel and violent attempts of the modern ‘one-world world’ project (see Law 2015) and its imposition of a ‘one-time-temporality’. I also show, however, that the ways through which the co-existence between humans and non-humans perseverates strongly depends on the enduring relevance of relations -- on the emergent outcome of a situated relational materialism (see Abrahamsson et al. 2015) for which human practices are pivotal. Indeed, I am also interested here in resisting a certain conceptual post-human rhetoric that, in attempting to destabilize human exceptionalism and its subsequent understanding of human politics, runs the risk of ‘concealing’ the human. What can we learn about the human in places where human lives have been literally interrupted and anonymized? Which politics of when spring from socio-material entanglements in places strongly affected by State terrorism? Through an ethnographic examination of different ‘life times’, I would like to suggest that The World Multiple, understood as the intersections and overlapping of different practical achievements, always entails a socio-material spectral dimension that exceeds the practical achievements of the ‘one-world world’ project and its ‘one-world temporalities’.

I am grateful to Andrés Haye for having brought this to my attention.
On the 20th of September of 1973 around 10pm, Miguel Cuevas Pincheira, 41-year-old shoemaker, agricultural worker, father of five, and member – at the time – of the Chilean Socialist Party, was violently arrested at his home in Santa Bárbara, Southern Chile. That night, a group of more than ten people (amongst whom custom officers and local civilians) forcefully entered Miguel’s house, finding him in bed. That night, Miguel was brutally removed from his home in the sight of all of his family members.

Since then, Miguel’s wife, Norma Panes, has been searching for him -- or at least searching for his body -- as that night Miguel was arrested and became ‘a disappeared one’³. According to reports given by witnesses to the Chilean Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación), which was created in the 90s during the first democratic government after Pinochet, Miguel and other people arrested that night were


³ The word desaparecido (‘disappeared’) in Chile and other Latin-American countries is a noun used to denote people kidnapped by government agents for political reasons, generally tortured and then killed (see Sluzki 1990).
tortured, killed and finally thrown to the waters of the Bío Bío River from the bridge that connects Santa Bárbara and the province of Quilaco.⁴

Thirty-seven years later, I met Miguel’s wife, Norma, at her home in Santa Bárbara. Having spent many months carrying out fieldwork within rural Pewenche indigenous communities, I wanted to learn more about how Pinochet’s dictatorship had been deployed in the region. Many people from the Queko Valley where I used to live had referred to Pinochet’s dictatorship as the ‘cruellest period ever’. What’s more, some people had told me that in their communities they were still living in a ‘curfew’ period (Sp. ‘Acá todavía vivimos en toque de queda’), evoking in this way the times of Pinochet’s dictatorship, which I, as a member of the Chilean community, had thought to be over.⁵ In the Queko Valley, moreover, recent processes of land reclamation had been violently interrupted; controversial executions had occurred in the early 2000s, and many people were or had been in prison because of these reclaims.

During my visit, Norma told me how traumatically violent the first months of the dictatorship had been in the region and provided me with details about how the perpetrators ‘came together in a caravan of death to carry out the worst atrocities ever’.⁶ She also told me that some Pewenche families had never reported the crimes committed against them because, as she said, ‘fear still persists, and people have not been able to break those internal repressive fences they have within themselves’.⁷

Norma doesn’t know what happened with Miguel’s body: ‘I have been fighting for 37 years, trying to know what they did with Miguel… If they threw him into the river, we will never find his body. Even God was against us that night because there were heavy rains and terrible winds. I don’t know where they killed Miguel. Probably they killed him on the Quilaco Bridge’.

Even though Norma is not certain about the exact place where Miguel was killed, she and other families decided to build a memorial at the Quilaco Bridge several years ago.

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⁵ For a critical reflection on temporality and imperial formations, see Stoler (2008).


⁷ All interviews were originally held in Spanish. The translation are my own.
With a shaky voice, Norma adds: ‘That memorial is dead, and I want to fix it. We have a cross but the memorial does not have the names; the memorial is dead because it does not have the name of Miguel… and this allows his murderers to go about freely’.

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What can the name Miguel Cuevas Pincheira do when inscribed upon the place of Miguel’s death? How can we understand the vital relevance of the inscription Norma refers to? How can we conceptually foreground that vital dignity at stake in Norma’s inscription? And what can we learn about temporalities when accounting for these intimate, ethnographic moments occurring in places where different worldings were violently interrupted? What kind of intimate worlding does this inscription entail?

Echoing the concepts discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the inscription of Miguel’s name upon the bridge can be considered a ‘practical achievement’ triggered by Norma. For her, anonymising Miguel in the memorial entails in some way the risk of supporting a certain kind of impunity -- considering that, within modern liberal democracies, justice depends on the epistemic practices performed by the bureaucratic machinery of tribunals whose decisions are based on written texts. What I would like to attend to here, however, is that particular

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8 If we recall the old Spinozian concern about ‘what a body can do’ – and how bodies can be defined by their persevering sociomaterial capacities for affecting and being affected (see Deleuze 1992), we could suggest that names can be considered to be bodies with the capacity to affect and be affected. Even though the human, physical body of Miguel disappeared, his name is still a body insofar as it is capable of affecting the place, turning the memorial into a sociomaterial witness.
‘minor gesture’ (see Manning 2016) in which the singular name of Miguel is socio-materi ally inscribed by Norma upon socio-material surroundings – that is, upon the memorial. From that moment on, Miguel’s life-time immanently resists and is capable of destabilizing the period of ‘curfew’ implied by a memorial without names.

**Inscription - Exscription - Excess**

I have just written that this inscription of Miguel’s name is a practical achievement triggered by Norma. But this practical achievement, I suggest, is also possible because of the capacities of a singular and personal name in forced exile from its own physical body. Resonating with what Harrison (2003) has already suggested when analysing the inscriptions of the names of the American victims of the Vietnam War, the inscription of Miguel’s name in the memorial is not a symbol of Miguel or a symbolic abstraction, but an instantiation of his lyric and irreplaceable singularity. This practical achievement initiated by Norma can be seen not only as an expression of Miguel’s inclination to persevere in his existence, but also as a socio-material resistance against the dominant-colonialist process of signification, resistance triggered by Norma’s perseverance in finding a place for his husband. What is more, the inscription of his name, I suggest, entails a particular relational process of *exscription* (Nancy 1991, 2001) that reveals a dimension of Miguel’s name that exceeds language, considering that signs are not always closed to the inscription of their meanings: Processes of *exscription* emerge in relation to what is inscribed as meaning and allow us to think about a dimension of signs that is beyond the possibility of equivocal interpretation, indexing thus an extra-linguistic domain that exceeds language. That which emerges as the place from which every inscription is possible is referred to by Nancy as *sense*. With these ideas in mind, it might be plausible to think about excess as not only that which overcomes the limit of what can be understood and thought by modern knowledge practices, but also as an ontological dimension that exceeds language. This particular understanding of excess as an expression of sense is relevant here because it can potentially expropriate the inscriptions enacted from the ‘one-world-world’ practices, as sense not only exceeds the historical register of the State, but also allows us to think about a dimension that is not governed by equivocal processes of

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9 In relation to the concept of exscription used by Nancy, I took inspiration from the Marcelo Pakman’s (2014) work on psychotherapy and imagination.

10 This elaboration of sense resonates with Deleuze’s (1969) immanent understandings of sense as a virtual dimension that exceeds language and affords the actualization of what exists.
signification. Indeed, in the moment of its inscription, Miguel’s name expresses a constitutive part of his singularity that resists any generic abstraction and overcomes any analogy. But this is possible, I would suggest, because there is a spectral dimension of Miguel that cannot be deleted by those violent practices of the ‘one-world-world’ project -- the corporeality of a ghost with whom Norma has coexisted for decades, a corporeality that is ‘neither present nor absent, but spectral’ (Derrida, 1994: xix). In this sense, the inscription of the name upon the memorial can be considered a spectral practical achievement. By making this statement, I cautiously ponder how it is that each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being -- despite the violent interruption of worldings. In fact, the name Miguel Cuevas Pincheira allows the apparition of a singular space that precedes symbolic dimensions, a spacing ‘without which any symbol could symbolize’ (Nancy 2001, p 54). Thus, the inscription of Miguel’s name makes it possible not only for Norma to remember Miguel without being pervaded by destructive memories, as clinical psychologists have taught us (see Castillo 2013), but it also operates, to echo Nancy, as an exscription of sense of Miguel’s extra-linguistic singularity.

In providing an account of this dramatic situation affecting Norma and Miguel, I highlight the relevance of developing conceptual tools that allow us to think about how the juxtaposition of ‘practical achievements’ entails unpredictable ontological configurations that resist the univocal temporalities imposed by the dictatorship of the ‘one-world world’ project. Indeed, Norma’s writing the name of her disappeared husband upon the bridge invites us to reflect on how the materiality of the name can be understood as a body with the capacity to affect (see Deleuze 1992) -- in this case, to exscribe -- the singularity of Miguel. This capacity makes explicit how temporalities are never pre-defined but rather strongly depend upon the insistence on existing of different spectral forces that exceeds and resists the cruel and violent attempts of the modern ‘one-world world’ project. This capacity also makes explicit how The World Multiple can be seen as the practical outcome of heterogeneous practices involving, as well, a certain kind of undeletable spectrality.

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11 For an analysis of Derrida’s concepts in relation to political violence in Argentinean literature, see Mandolessi (2016). For an exploration of techno-science experiments and the temporalization of scientific objects in relation to Derrida’s spectral logic of time, see Schrader (2010).
In order to better contemplate *The World Multiple* as the juxtaposition of practical achievements without losing sight of how material things persevere in their being, I now focus on the name of *Augusto Pinochet* and, in particular, on the way in which this name was inscribed in one of the valleys of Alto Bío Bío as an instantiation of dominant-colonialist processes of signification. In so doing, I not only think about processes of inscription at stake in any juxtaposition; I also consider the ethical relevance of thinking in terms of *conatus* and *exscription* in places where ‘one-world world’ realities have been violently enacted.

During Pinochet’s violent dictatorship, many roads were built -- roads that afforded the exploration and subsequent extraction of ‘natural resources’ and the construction of hydroelectric dams. Recently, I have explored the particular ways in which these roads transformed social and material relations (Bonelli and Gonzalez, 2017; see also Dalakoglou and Harvey, 2012; Pedersen and Bunckenborg, 2012). Here my focus in on how this infrastructural unfolding also implied the killing of people like Miguel, as well as the deployment of a dominant-colonialist process of signification.

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12 [https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=27406280](https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=27406280)
Consider the image below:

The rock in the photograph is situated alongside the rural road that connects the Queuko Valley with Ralco, about 70 kilometres from the Quilako Bridge where Miguel was killed. Valley residents know this rock as possessing a great force or *newen*, and as a powerful shamanic meeting-place or *renü*, a place where people used to establish communication with beings from other dimensions. In Pewenche analytics, *newen* is the force immanent to all beings inhabiting the indigenous world (Course 2013; Bonelli 2015). Different entities can manifest this intrinsic earthly force: a place or a person, a tree or a river, or even a rock. This characterization will likely seem strange to a standard modern geologist, for whom rocks are inert, anonymous objects: They do not have force; they cannot have agency; and surely, they are completely separate from the human capacity to perceive the world. In Pewenche analytics, this force also expresses particular immanent capacities that vary from entity to entity. Each being manifests this *newen* with a different intensity. There are entities whose force is practically imperceptible to others, making it difficult to interact with them. Other entities, such as the rock in the photograph, possess such force that their presence never goes unperceived. Specifically, the rock's *newen* permitted the inhabitants' ancestors—probably those with certain shamanic qualities—to "see the future, to obtain visions" relevant to the Valley communities.

In recent decades, however, the force or *newen* of this rock has been altered. In fact, this rock is no longer known only as a place with *newen* where those with shamanic abilities access other dimensions and "visualize" the future. No longer a *renü*, this rock is now known

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13 As Povinelli (1995) discusses in a similar case, the Pewenche description is in this sense fully converted into belief, and as such subordinated to discourses that can only evaluate it in the expression of patrimonial value, but never as a description adjusted to "reality".

14 For a deeper analysis regarding these prophetic visions, see Bonelli (2016).
“Pinochet's Rock”. In daily life, "Pinochet's Rock" serves as a reference point for Pitril's residents, and it separates what are now known as Lower and Upper Pitril. But the rock also expresses the Valley's history and its drastic socio-material alterations. In the words of Renato, one of Pitril's residents:

This rock has a history; it's not just another rock. It's a sacred rock where there was newen…. It's a really big rock, two machines couldn't move it…. It remained on the side of the road, they couldn't move it, because that rock was a renü where there was a lot of newen, where those with a lot of spiritual knowledge would go to learn how we were going to be in fifty years, in sixty, or today…. When they built the road there, the machines started to break it, break it, break it, and trucks flipped over and people died, and they couldn't move it. The rock stayed so pretty, and it stayed there [in place]…. And they made Pinochet's thing, the inscription that says:

‘Opening of the road. President Augusto Pinochet’

It's like a monument that they made to Pinochet for everything he did, for the road, for the minimum wage he paid the people to build the road…. The reference to Pinochet, the road, and the rock can be considered the mode in which infrastructures express, visibly, wider political projects (see Larkin, 2013). However, it seems to me that the persistence of the rock tell us more than the mere infrastructural expression of the state's power. Rather, the rock persists as an expression of a sort of Pewenche material
force that resists in its being: The rock perseveres there thanks to its *newen*. This situation evokes Marisol de Cadena's (2010) description of indigenous protests over mining projects at Ausangate Mountain in Peru, a mountain considered by the indigenous to constitute a non-human entity—an earth-being known as *tirakuna*—with the capacity to "drive people crazy, and even to kill them" (p. 339). In Peru, as in Southern Chile, we are in the presence of entities that are far from mere "nature" without power or agency, entities that exceed the modern one-world ‘nature-culture’ division *tout court*. That said, while Ausangate Mountain has the agency and power of any human person, the *renü* empowers visionary agency, namely, the capacity to see the future. Yet the point I wish to emphasize here is that the rock's materiality indicates a distinct ethnographic event, insofar as it shows us something about the immanent inclination of the rock to continue to exist and enhance itself, without necessarily invoking indigenous mobilizations that call into question the univocality and objectivity of modern politics (for which rocks are inert rocks and mountains inert mountains).

At first glance and within a linear logic, one could think that the temporality of the *renü* or sacred rock was fully deleted "by reason or force" (to use the motto on the Chilean coat of arms); that is, by the chronologic temporality brought by the roads of development. However, what I suggest here is that the enduring qualities of the rock in its continuing existence—its material resistance—in one way or another *exscribes* the name of the dictator, resisting in this way full encapsulation and appropriation by the logocentric, possessive desire of Pinochet. In other words, the exposure of Pinochet’s name to the *newen* of the rock exceeds the inscription itself of the dictator’s name, and potentially expropriates the inscription enacted from ‘one-world-world’ practices and ‘one-world temporalities’. By resisting destruction, the rock fights back against the geological naturalism in which a rock can be substituted by any other rock. Through its mere presence, the rock demonstrates how the name of Pinochet does not travel as an ‘immutable mobile’ (Latour 1987)—as a body that moves around but also holds its shape. What the rock teaches us is that a certain material force of the rock --its *newen*-- somehow always escapes from the brutal attempt at appropriation enacted by the geological, logocentric, and extractivistic ‘one-world-world’

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15 For a productive ethnographic contrast regarding the patrimonialization practices of a stone in Coatlinchan, Mexico, see Rozental 2016. In that place, the removal of a similar stone from a local context has triggered ecological consequences, making apparent how pre-Hispanic objects are ‘actors within interdependent social, environmental, and material relationships that might better be described through ecological frameworks’ (op cit, 183).
empire of the dictatorship. In fact, similar to the persistence of Miguel’s name at the bridge, the singularity of the rock as newen cannot be fully deleted, having as a result a particular politics of when, strongly predicated upon the spectral socio-material qualities of the rock. I need to make explicit that this spectral socio-material quality of the rock does not presuppose an everlasting essence of the rock that is withdrawn from all relations. Some proponents of the ‘object-oriented Ontology’ project might make such a claim when proposing that “the science of geology does not exhaust the being of rocks, which always have a surplus of reality deeper than our most complete knowledge of rocks but our practical use of rocks at construction sites and in street brawls also does not exhaust them…rocks themselves are not fully deployed or exhausted by any of their actions or relations” (Harman, 2013: 32). Such a claim would imply the deletion of Renato from the scene along with all those Pewenche inhabitants who insist on speaking about the enduring newen of different entities. Indeed, when considering how this rock perseverates in its being, we cannot help taking into account a form of The World Multiple that entails multiple heterogeneous relations with people like Renato. Moreover, the material resistance of the rock also teaches us how the practical achievements of the ‘one-world world’ project could not fully delete the singular socio-material traces of previous co-existences between humans and non-humans.

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Conclusions

I am aware that my ethnographic writing so far has unavoidably implied the redisposition of different narratives, names, things, and images, a redisposition that, in one way or another, resonates with the Deleuzian understanding of ethics as nothing but experimentation. Consequently, this text itself can be considered an inherent and partial part of The World Multiple (see Jensen in this volume, also 2017), inasmuch as it produces its singular intersections and overlapping of different spectral practical achievements and their singular temporalities. Thus, I conclude this chapter by thinking through the following bricolage, which is no more than a practical achievement enacted by this text.

What does this visual bricolage do? What are its capacities for affecting the ways we think about politics, time and processes of *worlding*? Surely, this bricolage invites us to think about
how *The World Multiple* can be thought of as a partial and never-ending entanglement of different ‘practical achievements’. When considering the name inscriptions of Augusto Pinochet and Miguel Cuevas Pincheira, the rock and the memorial, this bricolage allow us to think about the limitations of the ‘one-world world’ project as a project that attempts to impose dominant-colonialist temporalities and processes of signification. Indeed, this bricolage could rather be thought of as expressing the complexities of how *The World Multiple* entails material entanglements of different temporalities emerging upon bodies that persevere in their being.

However, if we look carefully to this bricolage -- while remaining aware of how our ethnographic accounts cannot help but inscribe different kinds of concealment -- we can easily notice that which is conspicuous by its absence. Indeed, this bricolage runs the risk of ‘concealing’ Norma and Renato, whose practices are pivotal when considering the ways in which entities insist on existing and resist any kind of substitution or epistemic abstraction. In my ethnographic account, the presences and actions of Norma and Renato are crucial for thinking about the ‘politics of who’, namely those issues concerning who has, or does not have, the right to speak and act. Without Norma, Miguel cannot speak; without Renato, we would not have known about the *newen* of the rock. Moreover, their presences and actions are also quintessential elements for pondering the ‘politics of what’ and its cardinal question about what kind of reality is produced through the coexistence of humans and non-humans. Further, what I emphasize in this text is how their presences and actions are also in relation to the *politics of when*, that is, those socio-material qualities affording the multiple temporalities inherent in any process of *worlding*. However, these temporalities, and the particular ways in which Miguel and the rock perseverate in their being, are also different. Indeed, at this point the analytical contrast that seems to be more suitable for thinking about how things persevere in their beings is a contrast between the name of Miguel and the *newen* of the rock. Even if the name and the *newen* are, somehow, spectral socio-material forces that insist on existing, the name of Miguel is inherently human, and it indexes a human singularity in intimate relation to Norma and her practices. The practices around the name and the *newen* are different too; how the name and *newen* are involved in political issues strongly depends upon the relations they take part in; as their materialities work in concert and are relational (see Abrahamsson et al, 2015). Let us remember that, as Renato told me, Pinochet himself is not univocally remembered as an instantiation of a banality of evil, so to speak. Some people are also grateful to him, as his dictatorship brought to their communities salaried jobs and
‘comfort’. Pewenche people living around the rock are not persevering with those practices that allowed the rock to be a shamanic place where the future could be foreseen. Nevertheless, as I have been trying to establish in this text, ethnographic attentiveness to the socio-material perseverance of the rock through its *newen* allows us to destabilize the practical achievements of the ‘one-world world’ project and to imagine another existence potentially prone to being re-enacted. Indeed, paying ethnographic attention to the singular *excess* latent in every being is not only a way to explore how different *worldings* entail different temporalities, but is also a way to verify, as Jorge Luis Borges wanted, that “there is a dignity that the victor cannot reach.” For that reason, in contexts strongly affected by State terrorism, I choose to embrace the spectre’s socio-material dignity, as it is one of the places from which we are able to make time differently and from which we can give due respect to the singularity of human lives.

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