Worrying about Migration

Episodes in Western European History since 1945

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door

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Deze oratie gaat over migratie. (En nu ga ik verder in het Engels!) Of the
many transformations that have remade Europe in modern times, migration
surely counts as one of the most central. Even leaving aside far longer his-
tories of European movements outwards and inwards to and from other con-
tinents together with transnational flows within Europe itself, intense mobil-
ity has been a marked feature of European history in the decades since 1945
alone. It took countless forms, encompassing the millions of refugees and dis-
placed persons set in motion by the tragic circumstances caused by the Sec-
ond World War, its ending, the collapse of the Third Reich, and the consoli-
dation of the Eastern bloc, for example.\footnote{Postwar expellees, refugees, political
exiles and labour migrants from poorer, less developed, or authoritarian states
might move to neighbouring countries; others covered much longer dis-
tances. Western European countries might well have been nations of inward
and outward migration at the same time, not least those that still had overseas
empires after the war.}

Today I want to look back at several specific junctures across the postwar
era in the hopes of achieving several things. First, I’d like to provide some-
thing of a longer historical perspective on today’s current events as Europe
encounters a mass migration phenomenon of a distinct kind – a ‘crisis’ that,
whatever its specific form and numerical levels, tends to remain subjected to
very ‘presentist’ styles of analysis. Depending on whose perspectives you con-
sider, migration has meant a literal lifeline, political freedoms, the chance for
a better life and higher standards of living; it could be an everyday and per-
haps even unremarkable reality of living with diversity, or a source of intense
worry. Worrying about migration is a very popular – indeed, \textit{populist} – activ-
ity these days – but one that tends to neglect longer-term histories and pre-
cedents which paint a more complicated picture, something that historians
often make a pesky habit of wanting to do.

Second, I want to bring migrations coming from outside Europe into the
same analytic frame as those occurring \textit{within} Europe, rather than isolating
them into different categories, as they so often are in academic study and in the public imagination alike. Non-European migration into Europe – especially northwestern Europe – was far from simply a late- or postcolonial phenomenon. This is clearly seen if we were to consider the transnational story of Turkish ‘guest workers’ in Germany and other countries, or Moroccan labour migrants who went not just to France, which had once governed Morocco, but also to Belgium and the Netherlands. But arrivals into Western European countries from empires and former empires were indeed a central aspect of this wider story – cases where ‘empires struck back’ as they were in a state first of reinvention and then of decline and fall after 1945. Imperial and postcolonial migration and forms of ethnic diversity not only coexisted with the increased presence of European foreigners: this co-presence in fact accounted in no small measure for the ways different groups were viewed by native populations as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for their nations’ future, as well as for the changing reputation of different communities of non-native origins.

Continental European mobilities as Europe inched towards integration processes cannot be separated from global and postcolonial ones: they are densely entangled, and have a strong bearing on today’s debates about both the European Union’s internal divisions and its relationship with the wider world beyond it. Specific episodes illuminate this co-history of intra- and extra-European arrivals and settlements and responses in receiving countries – and they show how various groups, at distinct moments, became differently imagined as a source of worry (or not). Let me start with some British cases, debates that escalated but simultaneously changed in their points of emphasis during the 1960s.

Early postwar Britain experienced a striking level of inward-bound traffic. Much of it came thanks to a combination of state nationality and labour recruitment policies in times of imperial tensions and on account of a demand for new workers in a recovering domestic economy. European Voluntary Worker schemes drew Poles and other Eastern Europeans whom the war had turned into displaced persons or refugees. Despite their numbers and the anti-‘alien’ sentiments they often suffered, it was not long before European foreigners became less visible in public discussions – because of what one scholar aptly describes as a ‘characteristic opposition between Britishness as white, and “immigrants” as “coloured”’.  

Over the course of the 1950s, attention settled on the colonial and Commonwealth migration that was facilitated by the 1948 British Nationality Act. This aimed to strengthen Britain’s relations with its colonies and ex-colonies within the Commonwealth by formalizing migration and settlement rights for all subjects, regardless of race. Colonial and Commonwealth subjects were
British citizens by law. As such, although commonly referred to as ‘immigrants’ both then and now, in fact they were internal migrants.\(^3\) The growing numbers of West Indians, Indians, Pakistanis and others arriving in Britain were not foreigners – they were circulating within empire and Commonwealth. But a combination of colour and culture set them apart, subjecting many to racism – racism at work, in the neighbourhoods where they lived, or in political and media portrayals that often seemed determined to depict them as a ‘problem’. Anti-‘immigrant’ rhetoric finally led to the first of a series of Commonwealth immigration restriction acts starting in 1962.

No longer guaranteed free circulation and re-entry if they went back home, many West Indian and South Asian men not only settled permanently but sent for their wives and children. As was the case with other labour migrants in Western Europe, what had started as a largely male migration that many initially envisioned as a temporary or cyclical one evolved into more settled and familial communities that put down roots. It was in this context that South Asian arrivals increased markedly in the 1960s, as growing numbers sought to ‘beat the ban’ before it was implemented – or before further new laws made entry even harder. While black West Indians had previously been the main target of white racist hostility, Indians and Pakistanis now assumed a more central role in public discussions of immigration and integration, and the disputed right – or ability – to belong.

The ways peoples of different origins were discussed by politicians who favored immigration controls provide revealing signals of how race, culture, and nation were understood in Britain in the 1960s. I’ll limit myself to two examples, both men who played notorious roles in turning local racism into a national political issue: Peter Griffiths and Enoch Powell. While Powell’s reputation is widely known in Britain and among international scholars today, Griffiths is a far less familiar figure, despite being a key precursor who helped make Powellism possible soon after.

Peter Griffiths’ ascent from primary school headmaster to local councillor to Conservative candidate running to be a Member of Parliament was a swift one, taking place in England’s West Midlands in the town of Smethwick outside Birmingham.\(^4\) In an area that had attracted many so-called ‘coloured immigrants’ on account of its industrial jobs, politicians like Griffiths and his supporters fanned the flames of white working-class racism with the help of the local press. Together, they kept the ‘social problems’ migrants supposedly brought with them permanently in the public eye. In 1964, Griffiths pulled off a surprising feat, gaining a parliamentary seat by defeating a long-standing and leading Labour Party MP (Patrick Gordon Walker) who had recently opposed restrictions on immigration. And he did it with a slogan that in-
stantly became infamous: ‘If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour’. Griffiths disclaimed responsibility for it, but refused to condemn his supporters who chanted these words, saying that their attitude was common and deserved to be taken seriously.

Using a racial epithet conventionally reserved for blacks – largely West Indians, in this case – implied that it was this group that generated the most hostility in Smethwick. Yet the situation was more complicated than this, and certainly much less ‘black and white’. In national and local press coverage, some racist stereotypes were applied to all non-white Commonwealth newcomers irrespective of their origins. Examples include accusations of sexual immorality, crime, poor hygiene, and increasing the level of overcrowding and squalor in neighbourhoods that were already poor and run-down but which ‘immigrants’ supposedly made even worse than before. A closer look, however, reveals that South Asians had become a particular target of dislike and anxiety. By the early 1960s, Smethwick’s ‘coloured’ population was two-thirds Indian, one-quarter Jamaican, and 10 per cent Pakistani. Echoing broader national tendencies, local commentators insisted that Indians posed a special dilemma. Some critics neglected the discrimination suffered by West Indians and used them instead to justify their belief that South Asians were much worse. Indians and Pakistanis were accused to having fewer job skills, but even more importantly less English and lacking the potential (or ability) to culturally assimilate.5

Some people insisted that they were free from ‘colour prejudice’ per se and that they objected to immigrants on account of their conduct. Peter Griffiths, for one, claimed that it did not matter ‘what colour a man’s skin was’; rather, the main problems were noise, dirt, ‘insanitary conditions’, and the failure to behave ‘decently’.6 And although the mud-slinging campaign that saw him elected to Parliament foregrounded a dislike of ‘nigger neighbours’, the book Griffiths published in 1966 provided a somewhat different assessment of West Indians as ‘English-speaking Christians’. Entitled A Question of Colour?, the question mark following the title was highly significant. To quote him, ‘West Indians will probably be assimilated culturally and separated only by the barrier of colour. Indians and Pakistanis will remain more isolated by religious and cultural barriers.’ This was ‘likely to make assimilation for them a very slow process indeed’ as they clearly ‘had no intention of integrating.’7 Within this cultural framework, religion was paramount – and not just any religion, but Sikhism above all, which was surely a reflection of the predominance of Indian Sikhs from Punjab in his own community.8

Lest we be tempted to take claims of non-racism by people like Griffiths at face value, however, it is important to recall that neither West Indians nor
South Asians could compare well with other immigrants, namely Eastern and Southern Europeans who had settled in the late 1940s. ‘As European Christians the Poles have found little difficulty in settling into the British community’, Griffiths insisted. And when it came to Ukrainians and peoples from the Baltic states, ‘the second generation is completely British’ and ‘absorption is only a matter of time’. Britain’s Hungarian and Italian populations also appeared likely to travel the same path towards unproblematic integration.\(^9\)

Other Europeans certainly were not free from discrimination as foreigners who were culturally distinct: they lacked citizenship rights and were economically disadvantaged, but nonetheless were viewed time and again more favourably than racialized colonial and postcolonial populations. At least, that is how they were discussed when they even entered into the conversation in the first place: more often than not they were ignored altogether. Such was the case with Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch Powell, who had nothing to say about Europeans, good or ill, in his diatribes against those he labelled ‘Commonwealth immigrants’, ‘blacks’, or ‘negroes’. But in Powell too we find pronounced attention to the issue of religious distinction as a source of concern. In his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech of April 1968, he stressed ‘religious differences’ as ‘acting against integration’ before immediately highlighting ‘[t]he Sikh communities’ campaign to maintain customs inappropriate in Britain’, presumably a reference to Sikh men’s fight to be allowed to wear their turbans at work.\(^10\)

To me, reading Powell’s and Griffiths’ words today through the prism of subsequent histories as well as today’s most prevalent migration worries, what is instantly striking is both what they did say as well as what they didn’t. While never neglecting the ‘problems’ they associated with black West Indians, there nonetheless remains a discernible shift towards highlighting cultural differences associated with other groups. Racism and migration anxiety became justified not by ideas about physical, biological distinctions or inferiority – although many people indeed remained convinced of that too! – but through alleged cultural incompatibility or absolute cultural difference. And it was this cultural style of racism that enabled religion to be increasingly singled out. Yet we find little and usually no reference to Islam per se, as one would immediately expect to today. Instead, their focus is on Sikhism, a faith and cultural identity that virtually nobody has flagged as a source of public concern or even interest for decades, let alone as a threat to ‘our values’ or, as Powell would put it, a ‘national danger’.\(^11\) No one in the public mainstream seems fixated on Sikhism any more, just as few in Britain seem inclined to praise European immigrants as generally a good thing for the country or ignore them completely. But this was precisely what had happened by the
1960s. It was to take a lot more time before Islam and Muslims in Britain became the paramount source of white animosity and anxiety – and even longer for continental Europeans to appear on the radar screens of xenophobes dominating the anti-immigration political stage. For Muslims, the first key turning points came in the 1980s, especially in connection with the international furore over the Ayatollah Khomeini’s *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie on the charge of blasphemy in his novel *The Satanic Verses*, together with the response of many British Muslims to this controversy. And for Europeans, the shift only came after the European Union’s enlargement starting in 2004, a theme I’ll return to later.\(^\text{12}\)

These British episodes of migration worry are worth highlighting both because of their national specificity and because of what they share in common with other Western European countries. (If time had allowed, the Netherlands\(^\text{13}\) as well as Germany\(^\text{14}\) would also have been important cases to explore.) However much many Britons like to insist on their differences from their nearest – if not their dearest! – continental neighbours, we can readily see similar tendencies at work with respect to attitudes – or silences – about migrant communities and cultures. If Britain’s case suggests that there was nothing necessarily consistent or inevitable about the negative public attention directed at Muslims, the picture was somewhat different if we turn to France, another nation that had shifted from being an imperial to a postcolonial one over the course of the 1950s and 1960s.

Like Britain, France attracted migrants from many parts of its overseas world both before and after decolonization.\(^\text{15}\) France also had nationality policies which formally included groups like Antilleans and Algerians as citizens in the late 1940s as it tried to shore up its empire – in vain, as it turned out.\(^\text{16}\) Although a few small territories like Martinique and Guadeloupe remain French today, others were lost, most spectacularly Algeria after an eight-year war that was undeclared but horrifically brutal, fought against insurgents between 1954 and 1962. Algerians were French citizens, but without equal rights in North Africa compared with the European settlers they outnumbered by about eight to one. Migration rights for Algerians together with poverty and war at home ensured that northward flows into the French hexagon increased markedly, not only during the war but after Algeria’s independence as well. During France’s *trente glorieuses*, Algerians became an important contingent of the many migrant workers who allowed booming companies like Renault and Citroën to satisfy customer demand for cars and another goods. But Algeria’s colonial history and its divisive war in which torture was standard procedure made the place of Algerians within France an especially difficult one. Other Afro-Caribbean and African migrant groups experienced discri-
mination and racism, but French public attention fixated upon the Algerian ‘other’ in particular and on Muslims in general in ways that set them apart. Decolonization histories, national histories, and other global events became combined to position the Muslim from Algeria outside the French national imaginary, regardless of citizenship and settlement rights – rights that France rolled back in the mid-1970s for those still in North Africa. By then, though, North Africans from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia were among those who had gone to France to work and were ultimately there to stay, bringing family members with them. This made French pessimists wonder about the fate of their nation and its culture, convinced as they were that these were under threat from this most worrying group of newcomers.

One such pessimist was Jean Raspail, a widely-published ‘new right’ author whose oeuvre included his 1973 novel The Camp of the Saints. Deeply racist and widely translated, the book won a persistent white supremacist international following for its apocalyptic vision of a ‘Third World’ invasion of the West via the coast of Southern France; unsurprisingly and most certainly depressingly, the book remains extremely popular today as Europe confronts its current ‘crisis’.\(^\text{17}\) In it, the menacing ‘multitude’ on the verge of demographically overrunning France originated in Calcutta. But if we look at his other writings, it is clear that Raspail’s focus was not on Indians at all – a group that had a negligible presence at best in France. Rather, it centred on those from south of the Mediterranean – that is, from France’s former empire instead of Britain’s. Not only were they Muslim; they personified French disappointments about the contraction of its global power, whether they were men, women, or children, and whether they were born in North Africa or in France.

Thus, in 1985, Raspail asked the question ‘Will we still be French in thirty years’ time?’ and worried that by 2015 ‘France would no longer be a nation’ but rather ‘nothing more than a geographical space’. His anxiety over the allegedly imperilled ‘fate of our civilization’ centred on the birth rates of two ‘communities’ into which he divided France’s population. The first community consisted of people of French nationality together with those who had come to France from other European countries, and the second of ‘non-European foreigners’ hailing primarily from south of the Mediterranean, 90 per cent of whom were of the ‘Islamic culture or religion’, as he put it. While the fecundity of the first was weak, that of the second was estimated as three times higher. This rapidly expanding group could never be assimilated, according to Raspail, because they had values that made them unlikely to want to or even be able to do so.\(^\text{18}\)
Several aspects of his article are particularly revealing, and share some common ground with British figures like Peter Griffiths and Enoch Powell. Neither Griffiths nor Powell focused whatsoever on Muslims, but, like Raspail, they did highlight the ‘problems’ that attended the shift from a primarily male migrant population into a familial one with the arrival of dependants.\textsuperscript{19} Significantly, Powell denied the possibility of national belonging to children of immigrants, regardless of birthplace or technical rights. ‘The West Indian or Asian does not by being born in England, become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or an Asian still.’\textsuperscript{20} Raspail subscribed to the same outlook, considering the idea that ‘little Algerians’ or ‘little Africans’ could ever be French absolutely implausible – yet a deeply disturbing prospect all the same.\textsuperscript{21}

The other noteworthy feature of Raspail’s fear-mongering prognosis related to how he collapsed native French together with people of other European ancestral backgrounds. In doing this, he implicitly acknowledged France’s history of being a nation of European immigration long before inward flows from its former empire took off. France had attracted foreign labour from neighbouring countries like Belgium, Italy and Spain as well as from Poland and Eastern Europe since the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{22} European immigrants remained very substantial after 1945, but with one community now standing head and shoulders above the others: namely, the Portuguese.

Portuguese arrivals into France illustrate well how Europeanness could make a difference, even when the migrant group in question was at a huge disadvantage compared to the mainstream. In Western Europe’s poorest, least developed country that had been governed by an imperialist dictatorship since the 1920s, emigration had long been an integral aspect of Portugal’s national history. It became even more so after the 1950s. Some Portuguese left for Angola and Mozambique, two of the nation’s African territories, but far more crossed European borders en route to better-paid jobs in countries like the Netherlands, Germany, and especially France, where over two-thirds ended up. Although the Portuguese state appreciated the remittances migrant workers sent home to their families and entered into bilateral labour agreements with other countries, it insisted on strict quotas legally allowed to depart each year. Both wealthy landowners and the dictatorship had vested interests in limiting emigration because they needed cheap farm workers as well as soldiers to fight African anti-colonial insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s. This was another reason why so many younger men left, namely to escape military service as well as rural poverty. Between 1957 and the regime’s ultimate collapse in the revolution of 1974, over 1.4 million Portuguese left, over half of them illegally – well over 10 per cent of the country’s entire population.\textsuperscript{23}
Possessing only the ‘rabbit’s passport’, as the saying went, and at risk of imprisonment if they were caught, the Portuguese made dangerous journeys through Spain and over the Pyrenees partly hidden on trucks and partly on foot, aided by organized rings of smugglers. And when they reached France, their living and working conditions resembled those of Algerians in many ways: they did similar types of jobs in factories and on construction sites for lower wages than white French workers earned, and they typically lived in bidonvilles – shantytown slums – for many years.\textsuperscript{24} They also faced ethnic discrimination. As one sociologist observed of French workplace attitudes, ‘If every Algerian was Mohammed, every Portuguese was Antonio.’\textsuperscript{25} During the Algerian War years, moreover, Portuguese (as well as Italians) in cities like Paris could find themselves at risk of being ‘shot by mistake’ by the French police on the hunt for suspected Algerian insurgents, who ‘fired on any dark-skinned person seen out too late at night’.\textsuperscript{26}

Much like the Algerians, the numbers of Portuguese in France skyrocketed in the early 1960s and exceeded 800,000 by the late 1970s; in fact, the two groups vied for the status of being France’s largest and second-largest migrant group. Unlike the Algerians, many Portuguese had entered France illegally, but significantly the clandestin taint did not encumber them over the long term. France gradually regularized their status, for they were seen not simply as essential labourers but equally as good candidates for assimilation. Within a nation whose weak birth rate was a deeply entrenched source of anxiety, North African family reunification and the birth rate of Muslim families was politically contentious and pathologized by the media, as exemplified by Raspail’s demographic analysis. By contrast, the high rate of Portuguese female and familial migration was officially encouraged.\textsuperscript{27} And by the 1980s, France’s substantial Portuguese population largely escaped the increasingly vociferous public debates about the ‘problems’ associated with immigration. They became virtually invisible, owing ‘this absence, which is called integration’ to their juxtaposition with North Africans.\textsuperscript{28} Like many others from Western, Southern, and Eastern Europe, the Portuguese were considered good candidates for the French ‘melting pot’. This was because of what they were – fellow Europeans, culturally Christian, and therefore ‘more like us’ – and because of what they were not, namely racialized others, often Muslim.

Together with the integration of particular migrant groups, the integration of Europe itself further facilitated this process. During the 1980s, Portugal, Spain, and Greece became part of the European Economic Community, as Britain had been since 1973. Free intra-European movements across what became renamed the European Union became increasingly commonplace, indeed counting as one of its core ideals and practices by the 1990s. But with
the new millennium came new challenges. One came from new trans-EU mi-
grants, the other from enhanced anxieties about Europe’s Muslim minorities
with the series of Islamist terrorist attacks on Western targets, of which the 11
September 2001 attacks in the United States were the most globally transfor-
mative.

In the early twenty-first century, movements within Europe took on new
dimensions as twelve new member states, most in Eastern and Southeastern
Europe, entered the EU in 2004 and 2007. Taking advantage of their ability to
live and work within wealthier Western European countries, vast numbers
went in search of better opportunities. Like newcomers from former colonies
(or earlier waves of ‘guest workers’), they played economically invaluable
roles by taking low-skilled ‘3-D’ jobs – dirty, dull, or dangerous – that citizens
of the receiving nations preferred to avoid. Others came with manual skills or
with professional qualifications that were in high demand, like doctors,
nurses, and dentists. But like postcolonial arrivals, however, Eastern Eur-
opeans now provoked extremely xenophobic populist responses.

One of the most memorable of these was France’s debate around the figure
of the ‘Polish plumber’, which peaked around the time of its referendum on
the European Constitution in 2005. The Polish plumber acted as a symbol of
France’s fears about the EU – fears that ended in 55 per cent of the French
voting ‘no’ and rejecting the Constitution. Seized upon by those on the far
right who played up the prospect of an unmanageable ‘flood’ of migrants as
well as by Eurosceptics on the left who highlighted the threat to French work-
ners posed by migrants willing to work for low wages, the Polish plumber ra-
pidly achieved the iconic status of one of France’s ‘New Mythologies’. In fact,
he featured in a 2007 volume published to coincide with the fiftieth anniver-
sary of Roland Barthes’ celebrated text *Mythologies*, one of the exemplars of
contemporary culture that contributors deemed to be as revealing about
French social obsessions in the new millennium as Barthes’ *steak-frites* and
the *DS* were about France in the late 1950s. ‘*Le plombier polonais*’ took his
place alongside the euro, the blog, Botox, Google, ‘*la capsule Nespresso*’, and
‘*les bobos*’ (bourgeois bohemians). And he was described thus: ‘Armed with
his moustache and spanner, the Polish plumber was erected as a symbol of
globalization and a liberal Europe by the Constitution’s opponents, killing off
the jobs and social gains of French citizens from within the intimate spaces of
their bathrooms and heating ducts.’

Thus penetrating into the most private parts of domestic life, France’s de-
monized Polish plumber joined the ranks of other postwar migrants de-
scribed as intruders who breached barriers, both of homes and nations. And
like the West Indian, South Asian, or North African men envisioned as sexual
predators in earlier decades, moreover, the Polish plumber was at times a highly sexualized symbol as well, the masculine and moustachioed migrant handyman chosen (indeed, invited in) over the native worker to keep the feminized French domestic realm and heating ducts in good repair.\textsuperscript{30} The Polish tourism board played upon this kind of imagery (and also made a joke out of it) as it set about trying to counteract negative portrayals of its expatriates and of Poland by extension. One rebuttal came in the form of a promotional campaign that tried to entice the French to visit Poland on vacation, using posters featuring a 21-year-old male model dressed as a plumber: ‘Je reste en Pologne – venez nombreux’ (roughly translated as ‘I’m staying in Poland – come one, come all’).\textsuperscript{31}

As a symbol of fear and dislike directed towards migrants, the Polish plumber serves as an important reminder of how different groups can become singled out under specific historical conditions. The significant ‘others’ of one time and place may, or may not, retain their prominence under other circumstances. Common citizenship and labour rights and that of freedom of movement, and in this instance perceptions of relative cultural and ethnic proximity as fellow Europeans, have not protected Eastern Europeans from xenophobia and discrimination in the early twenty-first century, just as was so often the case with late colonial and postcolonial migrants.\textsuperscript{32}

A deeper historical awareness of these changing targets of hostility and worry, and the ways different groups have suffered over time, is important, not least in times like ours when fears seem to vacillate between focusing on Muslims and border-crossing Europeans, some of whom of course are also Muslim. Indeed, debates about today’s migration ‘crisis’ reflect both of these at the same time, helping to account for some of their stridency. Not only are non-Europeans ‘invading’ Europe from without, but once inside the EU their ability to travel elsewhere within its confines has created panic not only in Mediterranean points of arrival but in Northern, Western, Central, and Eastern Europe as well. If EU citizens can take advantage of open borders in an integrated Europe, so too can those who have entered, largely unwanted, from outside the continent. Worrying about migration thus becomes an activity in which internal and external EU dimensions become inseparable.

We see this in the current debate raging around the possibility of a ‘Brexit’ as Britain heads closer to its referendum about whether to stay in or leave the EU. Migration is absolutely central to this, as the EU is both the source of fellow-EU migrants as well as non-EU refugees, who happen to be largely Muslim. This is blatantly apparent in the scare tactics being deployed by those linked with the ‘leave’ campaign as they circulate visions of Britain within an EU that might one day include Turkey and additional Balkan countries, and
hence of a Britain unable to exclude millions more EU nationals. In the words of Vote Leave, by 2030 the EU would encompass ‘a visa-free zone from the English Channel to the borders of Syria’ – if, that is, Britain does leave, a decision it will make exactly three weeks from today (23 June 2016).33

Meanwhile, even if we limit ourselves to contemplating Britain’s current resident EU population, the actual picture is a very different one than that swirling around in much of the public imagination. To quote one recent report, ‘the typical profile of a European migrant in Britain [is] no longer a Polish plumber, but a young, single French or Spanish graduate working in the financial, technology or media industries’.34 This provides us with a timely reminder not only of the immense diversity of migrants’ national origins – and the relative invisibility of many peripatetic Europeans, like the French – but also of their privileges, education, and class. Where do the categories of unskilled and skilled migrant workers as well as ‘kennismigranten’ (knowledge migrants) – or indeed expatriates – start and stop? This immense migration diversity makes this a question not just one for political and social commentary and academic analysis but a highly personal issue for many academics themselves – including a number sitting here (or standing here!) in this beautiful, awe-inspiring Aula today.

I am delighted to report that my own years as an American ‘kennismigrant’, first in Britain and now here in the Netherlands, have been extremely happy ones. Unlike so many less fortunate migrants of other descriptions, I have a great many people to thank for extending an incredibly warm welcome to me, including countless people here at the UvA, who have offered me this tremendous opportunity as Hoogleraar voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis. It is a great honour, and I am deeply grateful to the College van Bestuur and to onze decaan, Frank van Vree. I very much hope to do my best and to be a worthy successor to Niek van Sas. Thank you so much, Niek, for welcoming me here as your ‘dakpan’, the ‘roof tile’ you overlapped with and provided so much encouragement and friendly advice to in the run-up to your own retirement.

In this interests of time (and the borrel that impatiently awaits us all in the next room!), I want to restrict further thank-yous to a small and extremely select group of people: namely, those I have known for at least twenty years, and those who are here today. The first of these has to be Sonya Rose, now professor emerita from the University of Michigan. Sonya: what can I say? Way back in 1993, you rescued me as a PhD student, and in the years since given me more support – and written more letters of reference – than either you or I can remember. You’ve not only been a mentor and source of academic inspiration for your brilliant research, but a source of sanity and a
good friend with an even better sense of humour – as is Guenther, also here with you today (and who never needs much of a reason to pay a visit to Amsterdam!). There are many words to describe your official role, Sonya: promovendibegeleider (in Dutch), doctoral supervisor (in English), and Doktormutter (in German) among them. To these I can add the following three: fantantisch, fantastic, fantastisch!

Next, I’d like to thank my mother-in-law/Schwiegermutter/schoonmoeder, Ursula Rieger, a red-haired inspiration in her own way, who has her own scholarly gene as made manifest through her passion for the works of Albrecht Dürer and all things Nürnberg-history. Thanks, Ursula, for all those wonderful Franconian Christmases, for coming here today, listening to me prattle on in English, and for passing along your wonderful son, Bernhard.

And speaking of … biggest thanks of all go to Bernhard Rieger, who I first stumbled across in the British Library – the old one! – way back in May of 1995. Who would have guessed that a German and an American PhD student, hooking up in London, would ever have lasted over twenty-one years of academic migration that have taken Bernhard to London, Iowa, Bremen, and back to London, and me to London, Birmingham, York, and now Amsterdam? Perhaps our first date was prophetic: you invited me along to a reading by David Lodge, known for his novels about messed-up international academics. Bernhard, thanks so much for all your love, fun, friendship, and patience, not least during all those hours I’ve spent worrying about writing about migration.

Ik heb gezegd.
Notes


4. I have discussed this example and related topics at greater length elsewhere. See Elizabeth Buettner, “This is Staffordshire not Alabama”: Racial Geographies of Commonwealth Immigration in Early 1960s Britain’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 42:4 (2014), 710-40.

5. ‘These people should be told of our ways and manners’, said one letter to the editor of the town’s newspaper. ‘[T]he Indians are the most ill-mannered and slovenly [of all ‘coloured immigrants’] … On buses they straight at one and then breathe garlic into one’s face. They parade in groups blocking the pavement and giving girls silly, sickly grins.’ N.E. Egan, ‘No Half-Way House’, ‘It’s Your Opinion’, *Smethwick Telephone*, 16 June 1961.


11. Ibid., 16.

12. On these issues, see Webster, ‘The Empire Comes Home’, 156-57; Humayun Ansari, *The Infidel Within*: *Muslims in Britain Since 1800* (London: Hurst, 2003). I have explored this wider topic in greater depth in comparative perspective in Elizabeth Buettner, *Europe after Empire: Decolonization, Society, and Culture* (Cam-
Like Britain, the Netherlands of course also had late colonial and postcolonial migration waves, with the Indisch Dutch, Surinamese of African, Indian, and Javanese descent, and Antilleans being the most significant groups and which all experienced racism. What is more, the Netherlands also had many labour migrants from Southern Europe, some of whom settled permanently and others who freely came and went. This was a privilege that groups like Italians enjoyed thanks to freedom of labour movement within the European Economic Community after the 1950s. Whatever forms of discrimination these groups encountered, over time they faded by comparison with the increasingly relentless public attention focused on those who had come as so-called ‘guest workers’, especially from Turkey and Morocco. The latter groups not only lacked Europeanness to make them comparatively more appealing as temporary or permanent residents; they also did not have the citizenship rights, Dutch language skills, and cultural connections that often came though Dutch colonial upbringings. Most newcomers from Dutch overseas territories or ex-colonies were Christian – or, if they were Indo-Surinamese, largely Hindu. Gradually, the Hindoestanis became widely praised for their successful process of re-settlement, their improved socio-economic profile, and cultural adaptation without having forsaken their roots – even by some of the most vocal Dutch multicultural critics. Most Turks and Moroccans, by contrast, were Muslim, with a religious and cultural identity that, over time, became the preeminent form of worrying difference over all others. Of countless works on these topics, see Gert Oostindie, Postcolonial Netherlands: Sixty-Five Years of Forgetting, Commemorating, Silencing (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011); numerous studies by Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, including Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, ‘The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance: The Timing and Nature of the Pessimist Turn in the Dutch Migration Debate’, Journal of Modern History, 87:1 (2015), 72-101 (see especially pp. 81 and 91). For my own treatment of Dutch themes, see Buettner, Europe after Empire, 213-23, 270-83, 375-88, 491-96.

Germany was also a postwar nation of immigration, both from inside and outside Europe, albeit lacking communities of colonial origin. In Germany, non-Europeans were not evaluated vis-à-vis one another, like West Indians and Sikhs were in Britain or Surinamese and other groups were in the Netherlands, but rather exclusively against European labour migrants. The years of Germany’s economic miracle were fuelled by labour input not simply from Turkey but also from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Yugoslavia, all of them being less-developed and lower-wage economies. Italians and others were so-called ‘guest workers’ who sometimes stayed and sometimes left – and if they were from other countries in the European Economic Community, they could freely come and go without official permits. Turks, on the other hand, soon knew that if they left they would be unlikely to be allowed to return, a prospect that encouraged many men to send for their wives and children. In Germany by the mid-1980s, a postwar migration history that had been intensely multinational in character from the Mediterranean basin had been racialized; the ‘guest worker’ who annoyingly insisted on


19. In his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, Powell had argued that ‘We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.’ Powell, ‘Rivers of Blood’, 15.


21. Jean Raspail, ‘Serons-nous encore Français dans 30 ans?, 126. As Ahmed Boubeker has noted of this mindset, ‘[t]he foreigner is no longer one who comes from elsewhere, but rather one that is permanently reproduced within the social body … there is a radical rupture between recognized citizens and second-class ones.’ Ahmed Boubeker, ‘Le “creuset français”, ou la légende noire de l’intégration’, in Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire (eds.), La fracture coloniale: La société française au prisme de l’héritage colonial (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2005), 188-89.


30. Tellingly, Polish women workers, although well represented amongst recent EU migration trends, were not singled out as the figures around which French dissent coalesced.


33. Jennifer Rankin, ‘Will staying in EU really lead to an influx equal to Scottish population?’, *Guardian*, 20 May 2016. (Postscript: Britain’s 23 June 2016 referendum resulted in approximately 52 percent voting to leave the European Union and 48 per cent voting to remain within it.)