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24. Towards further understanding of urban segregation

Sako Musterd

24.1 INTRODUCTION

In this volume, we have made efforts to provide recent experiences and understandings of urban segregation. With contributions from across the globe and from scholars with various disciplinary backgrounds, we have offered a range of ideas, insights and interpretations regarding urban segregation in residential and other domains of life. This has offered ample space for elaborate discussion of the roles of globalisation and the impact of various local, historically grown urban and welfare regime contexts on urban segregation. Segregation has been discussed in several dimensions, including demography (age, family type), socioeconomic distinction (class), and migrant, ethnic and race characteristics. Some challenging conceptual issues have been dealt with as well. The authors collectively cover the disciplines of urban geography, urban sociology, urban studies, urban design, political science, economics, housing studies, public policy, urban and regional planning, development studies and environmental policy.

This volume consists of a rich set of contributions that enhance our knowledge in the field of urban segregation. In this final chapter, it is not my intention to summarise the foregoing chapters, but instead to share some broader observations based on outcomes that have been addressed. These observations and results may be important for a wider understanding of, and may contribute to existing theory on, urban segregation. Before doing so, however, I will briefly reiterate where we started from in terms of the existing knowledge on urban segregation (section 24.2). This will provide a platform from which to launch the key issues that can be extracted from this volume, which may contribute to further or more elaborate understandings of urban segregation, and which deserve attention in future research and policy (section 24.3).

24.2 GLOBALISATION AND NEOLIBERALISM: CONTEXTS, HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND WELFARE REGIMES

The current state of urban segregation has been addressed by many as an outcome of global processes. The increasing internationalisation and global connectedness of cities and their hinterlands reflect the potential for a more open exchange of ideas, people, materials, and products at a global scale. New international divisions of labour and changing economic structures that require new professional skills have reshaped cities worldwide. Simultaneously, dominant states have rapidly spread their views on the 'ideal' (read neoliberal) type of welfare state across the globe. Even though not all cities have the same position in global (economic) networks (this also depends on their historically

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grown profile, something to which I will return soon), almost all have been affected by these stronger human, material, financial and economic global ties.

Globalisation and neoliberalism seem to be mutually related to one another. Globalisation can be seen as a vehicle for the global promotion of neoliberalism, but also in terms of being 'shaped by the politics and ideology of neoliberalism', as Mishra (1999, p. ix) argued. He also observed that the already tight connection between neoliberalism and globalisation has been further strengthened by powerful Anglo-Saxon countries, the US in particular (ibid, p. 9). Here I should emphasise that neoliberalism must not be seen as a plea for *laissez-faire* politics, leaving everything to the market by withdrawing government, but instead as a philosophy in which the state itself is also heavily involved. Neoliberal policies detest states that tell the economy what should be produced, how, for whom and at what price; on the contrary, the state embraces the active facilitation of an 'undisturbed' functioning of markets through de- and reregulation (this perspective was recently nicely summarised by Merijn Oudenampsen (2019), in a book review of *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, by Quinn Slobodian (2018, Harvard University Press)). Neoliberalism has become the ubiquitous leading principle across the globe. Basically, relations between people, places and states are nearly everywhere 'capitalist'. States can support this, or react against it (also see Block, 2019).

The US, although not the place where neoliberalism was invented, is one of the states which most distinctly promotes it. It therefore seems no coincidence that the US also happens to be the place where segregation was initially addressed as a 'natural' process (Park et al., [1925] 1974). Human ecology lines of thinking, inspired by Darwin, have strong parallels with liberal approaches to how societies could function, and American politicians, especially Republicans, still seem to stay close to this school of thought. Competition between households based on the assets they have – social, economic and cultural capital – is seen as the key concept, the logical mechanism, for sorting households across a set of residential milieus or over other domains. This regards the spatial sorting of demographic, socioeconomic, ethnic, cultural and other categories of the population, based on the amount of capital – of all sorts – that one has.

For the most ardent supporters of neoliberalism, public institutions, including states, that directly intervene in the economy are actually seen as an obstacle to the functioning of markets, and cities. The relation between households and space would be best, they believe, when based on market competition principles. Yet, as said, the state still plays a crucial role in providing rules and regulations in favour of the functioning of markets. States that embrace such policies are buttressed by global and influential institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Policies in favour of the undisturbed functioning of markets often coincide with very limited support for those who are unable to participate fully in this market on their own steam: the unemployed, the elderly, the poor and people with health problems. Unsurprisingly, neoliberal dynamics have resulted in a steady increase in social inequality and rising social polarisation in societies (Sassen, 1991; Fainstein et al., 1992; Harvey, 2004; Piketty, 2014). Without intervention, social inequalities tend to translate into social-spatial inequalities, that is, segregation, as has been illustrated with figures on (spatial) inequality development between 1970 and 2009 for the US (Bischoff and Reardon, 2014).

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Apart from the type of welfare regime, other factors also have an impact on social and spatial inequalities. Past and current migration experiences, for example, have effects on population composition and social inequality. But historically grown urban economic dynamics also play a role. Plenty of cities have historically developed a strong profile in manufacturing. Especially when this profile had a rather one-dimensional and labour-intensive character, such cities quickly faced trouble when the urban economic structure changed in the direction of providing producer and consumer services. Cities that already had a profile that included such services, typically cities that had developed a multi-layered mixed economic profile, were much better equipped with the required educational institutions and other infrastructure, and with an adequately skilled population, than cities that had developed as a uniform centre for manufacturing. This meant that the position of these cities in global networks became very different; this could even occur between cities within one welfare regime.

Burgers and Musterd (2002) showed this when they compared social inequality in the two largest Dutch cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Amsterdam is a city and metropole that has been able to gain a much stronger position in global networks than Rotterdam, because historically speaking, Amsterdam developed a multidimensional economic structure with many (advanced) producer and consumer services. Rotterdam, by contrast, had developed a stronger manufacturing and port-related economic structure. Consequently, Amsterdam showed strong economic and demographic growth, but also higher levels of social inequality, while Rotterdam struggled with economic restructuring and faced a mismatch between demand and supply in the labour market, but experienced less polarisation. In general, capital cities have typically developed better points of departure, because they have historically been organised around service provision and frequently have a more mixed economy.

The fact that globalisation, neoliberalism, economic growth and rising social inequality seem to go together obviously does not imply that a neoliberal welfare regime should be seen as the best standard for economic development. This has actually been shown in Northern and Western Europe, where several states not only built up extensive or even universal types of welfare regime after the Second World War (Esping-Andersen, 1990), producing wealth for the whole population, but have also maintained strong social elements of these models in their politics and institutions in more recent decades, even though *overall* these regimes have become affected and characterised by more neoliberalism as well (see next section). Many affluent European states – and also Australia and Canada – did not unconditionally accept the negative external consequences of neoliberal market-oriented developments that also flooded their cities; indeed, they even tried to reduce the socially destructive effects of globalisation/neoliberalism/capitalism. Capitalism may be the ubiquitous philosophy, but its impact continues to be dependent on how powerful the state is, and how much the state wants to exercise that power, how the state judges market orientations, and when the state wants to put limits on the freedom of movement of capital. This obviously also depends on the organisation of other social classes and the institutions in place (also Block, 2019).

The importance of other than (neo)liberal welfare regimes was recognised and advocated early in the 20th century, and this seems to have resulted in lower levels of social and social-spatial inequality compared to those found in hardcore free-market-oriented societies where welfare regimes predominantly supported liberal markets. Moderating

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effects are clearly noticeable, for example, in welfare states that promote regulation and state support aimed at providing good-quality, accessible and affordable housing. Early experiences in this housing domain in Western and Northern Europe (see for example Forrest and Murie, 1988; Murdie and Borgegard, 1992; Murie, 1993) were very important for setting the conditions of the social-spatial domain. In a struggle between more socially driven interest groups on the one hand, and leaders who preferred privatisation and deregulated markets on the other, social housing was introduced by the first category, and finally gained political support as a means to combat harsh private capitalist housing practices. The development of social housing gained momentum after the Second World War, ironically, perhaps, because it also served capitalist objectives. A huge shortage of housing had to be dealt with, and simultaneously rents had to be kept low in order to avoid wage inflation. The scarcity of housing threatened to pave the way for private landlords to make extraordinary capital gains while offering poor-quality housing to a significant part of the population. Regulation, such as rent control and the development of a significant stock of decommodified social housing, were answers to such practices (Barlow and Duncan, 1994).

Returning to the issue of urban segregation, we therefore see that welfare arrangements related to the housing domain have played an important role in reducing the negative externalities of globalisation and neoliberal economies. However, it was more than housing that created the differences between welfare regimes, and this too had an impact on cities. Similar efforts have been mentioned in domains such as health, social security, education, labour market access and income policies. Strong welfare states succeeded in developing high levels of health care and social security for all in need, and equal access to high-level education. The inclusionary or exclusionary attributes of universal and residual types of welfare regime respectively shape the social structures of cities. In research, this drove comparative analysis beyond the housing domain, which aimed to show the strength of the relation between the type of welfare state and urban social life. From the 1990s onward, again especially in Europe, several comparative research projects were initiated (see for example Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Musterd, 2005; Arbaci, 2007; van Kempen and Murie, 2009). Most of these studies sought specific and explicit comparisons between cities in different welfare regime contexts, often including the US context as a point of reference.

In her PhD dissertation, Domburg-De Rooij (2005) classified countries as residual, extensive or universal welfare states, based on an elaborate study of the welfare regime literature in the domains of social security, housing, health, labour market policy and education (scrutinising the work of Pierson, De Swaan, Titmuss, Leibfried, Therborn, Esping-Andersen, Kemeny, Donisson, Immergut and others). She subsequently connected her classification to information on socioeconomic segregation in 54 – relatively large – cities in these welfare regime types, covering Europe, the US and Canada, and was able to show a clear relationship (p. 132) between the level of segregation and the type of welfare regime: the highest levels were shown for residual market-oriented liberal welfare states; medium levels for welfare states with an extensive interventionist regime; and the lowest levels for so-called universal redistributive welfare states. Of course, much variation could also be shown within each regime type, because the historically grown and economic and professional structures of cities within one welfare regime may still differ substantially, but the trend was nevertheless very clear.

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This line of comparative research was continued in the past decade by the studies of Maloutas and Fujita (2012), Tammaru et al. (2016), Musterd et al. (2017) and Arbaci (2019). These studies filled important regional gaps by including a wider variety of national contexts, adding Eastern European and Southern European cities, but also some Asian and South American cities. They generally showed increasing inequality and rising levels of segregation, while welfare states were becoming even more neoliberal.

24.3 KEY ISSUES IN FUTURE RESEARCH ON URBAN SEGREGATION

So, building on the former section, what are the key messages that come from this volume in connection with the state of theory on urban segregation? First of all, it has been confirmed that globalisation, neoliberal and other welfare regimes, and historically grown economic, social, spatial and institutional contextual conditions all continue to play a key role in the development of social inequality and urban segregation, but some of these forces have started to become overwhelming. In particular, this regards the ongoing rise of neoliberal intervention models. Another impact that takes on major proportions – and is highly challengeable – is the framing of the inequality and segregation discourse. With the rise of mass media, especially so-called 'social media', framing has gained importance because of its almost immediate and widespread impact. Several other significant outcomes are worth paying more attention to as well, such as the strengthening of the connection between racial and socioeconomic class segregation. I will address some of the most striking findings of this volume, first of all by simply presenting them, sometimes with reference to other existing literature (section 24.3.1). This will be followed by some reflections and questions that relate to the findings and which aim to create a basis for further debate, and possibly also to trigger new research (section 24.3.2).

24.3.1 Findings

The first key observation is that many contributions to this volume underpin the aforementioned change from a variety of 'social' types of welfare state to a variety of political economies with a strong market orientation. This implies that interventions aimed at limiting social inequality, which favour redistributive policies and interventions in markets, are increasingly making way for alternatives where regulation is designed in support of economic markets. Deregulation, reregulation and recommodification are keywords attached to this development. This results in increasing social (spatial) inequality. In some contexts and cities, market-oriented welfare regimes have already dominated the scene for a longer period of time. This regards not only the US, but also Brazil and several other South American countries, as well as many African countries. This is again shown by (very) high levels of social inequality: some are wealthy, while the majority are poor. In Australia, a market-driven profile has also become stronger over the past few decades, after a period of more limited inequality.

Several European countries used to be in favour of more egalitarian welfare models aimed at a redistribution of wealth, and were characterised by relatively strong policies in the domains of health, social security, education and housing. Yet, over the past thirty

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years, most of these regimes have also shifted towards neoliberal forms of governance. A stereotypical example of such a transformation has recently been provided by Andersson and Magnusson Turner (2014) for the case of Sweden. For a very long period of time, Sweden has been presented as the example of a state par excellence, representing one of the most universal welfare regimes in the world, but this position seems to have been lost. In countries like China, we also see rapidly rising inequality levels: in 2017, for instance, its Gini coefficient was 0.467, higher than in the US (0.391) and much higher than in the European Union (0.307) (sources: OECD and World Bank websites, 2019). The implication of the increasing dominance of neoliberal regime types is that more processes are driven by market orientations, deregulation and the fine-tuning of regulation in favour of market processes. This is associated with increasing social inequality and consequently with fewer people benefitting from economic growth. Increasing social inequality will result in increasing socio-spatial segregation (urban/rural; inner/outer urban, centre/periphery, etc.). Space will 'bake' inequality into the urban and rural landscapes. This serves to harden differences, which will be difficult to roll back. It will drive political wedges between increasingly different populations who now inhabit these various zones. Increased socio-spatial polarisation has clear political implications.

Still, there are important differences between continents and between cities. It has already been observed that in quite a few European countries and cities, inequality and segregation levels are still moderate (Tammaru et al., 2016; Musterd et al., 2017). We do not see many 'no-go' areas in European cities, or areas which colleagues might warn you not to visit. This is, however, not the case in South African, South American and US cities. In very unequal cities, social polarisation has reached very high levels. This has not only resulted in a significant development of areas where the poor live and which are avoided by the middle class, but also in a rapid rise of the phenomenon of gated communities for the affluent, who are disaffiliating from the rest of society (Atkinson and Blandy, 2016). It must be said that such gated communities are also gaining traction in the European realm. Developers use arguments related to fear, safety and security to pull middle- and upper-class households into such gated domains; affluent households themselves seem to see their segregation in gated communities as a defence mechanism to escape from negative externalities of crime and disorder, but also from difference.

The effects of these spatial processes can be devastating. In fact, this development results in a reduction of the freedom of movement through urban space for both the poor and the affluent. In very unequal cities, vast sections have become detached from urban life for both categories of the population, creating plenty of negative processes. Increasing criminality is not only associated with inequality, but also with sharp spatial divisions that often imply unequal access to jobs, to good health services and to high-quality education facilities. When these inequalities are excessive, also in terms of the spatial scale in which they become manifest, inequalities are ultimately likely to translate into estrangement, increasing fear of 'the other', decreasing trust in governance and the motives of the elite, and a continuation of separation, also spatially. This seems to be an ideal breeding ground for conflict.

(Neo)liberal processes also imply that socioeconomically stronger households will have a large impact on the social structuring of cities. As already briefly mentioned, this may hit poor households particularly hard. This has recently been shown in independent research projects in which the changing spatial position of affluent and poor households has been

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the focus. The outcomes of these projects point to the 'suburbanisation of the poor' or to the 'decentralisation of the disadvantaged'; Randolph (in this volume) refers to the development of an 'urban inversion'. This unfolds parallel to gentrification processes which enable better-off households to settle in the central parts of metropolitan areas. This has become a fairly general process in several North American, European and Australian cities (Hulchanski, 2010; Hedin et al., 2012; Randolph and Tice, 2014; Cooke and Denton, 2015; Hochstenbach and Musterd, 2018; Kneebone, 2019). This urban inversion is not only creating new social-spatial divisions, but is possibly also creating increasing difficulties for the poor to connect to the locations where jobs can be found. Especially in larger metropolitan areas with centres that are seen as attractive for the better-off, poorer households may be forced to locate further away from concentrations of jobs, which following deindustrialisation are typically found in the central parts of metropolitan areas. This may result in spatial mismatches between labour supply and demand, although it should not be forgotten that other factors, such as racial discrimination, also have an important impact on demand and supply matching (Tuttle, 2019). At the time when Kain (1968) wrote about this phenomenon, it was about poor Blacks in the inner city and jobs in suburban areas. Now we more frequently experience the reverse: poor populations in the suburbs and most jobs in central city areas.

A second key finding concerns the intensifying relation between racial and socioeconomic class segregation. Authors of three chapters in this volume came to this conclusion, independently of each other. The tighter relation was registered for US cities (Jargowsky), for the South African city of Cape Town (van Rooyen and Lemanski) and for the Brazilian city of São Paulo (Marques and França). While these (groups of) cities substantially differ from each other, and histories of the Black and the poor in these contexts have been clearly different, they appear to have much in common in terms of the current relations between race and class. This implies that the two types of segregation are actually converging. This partly has roots in long-term processes of sustained racial oppression in the past, which also had socioeconomic impacts at the individual level. Even decades after this oppression has formally come to a halt, however, the association between race and class is still very strong. Even though institutional racism has decreased, the socioeconomic position of Blacks has not improved much. If we currently want to understand the position of Blacks, we should pay more direct attention to their socioeconomic condition, alongside racial factors. The problem is that we find the largest concentrations of Blacks in market-oriented political economies (South Africa, Brazil, US). Such contexts do not seem to be very helpful, however, because, as was noted earlier, these capital-driven regimes tend to pay only limited attention to the position of the poor and unemployed. Large sections of the Black population will therefore likely experience persistent weak (socio)economic positions.

Finding three relates to the time dimension in segregation studies. It favours those who make a plea for more longitudinal studies. Segregation processes cannot be completely understood through cross-sectional research, because segregation levels are measured for dynamic urban systems. The systems may be in flux; segregation levels may be decreasing or increasing. This may be driven by temporary processes, however, while the underlying long-term structural processes are pushing in another direction. Early stage (potential) gentrification processes, for example, may start with an influx of households with a low or moderate income into a neighbourhood that has gentrification potential, but where this

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has not yet been fully 'discovered'. These 'marginal' gentrifiers will thus initially help to increase the level of segregation, because they will contribute to a further homogenisation of the neighbourhood in socioeconomic terms. When these marginal gentrifiers start to realise social mobility *in situ* and to further ignite the gentrification of the neighbourhood, a phase of social mixing will develop, and thus segregation levels will go downwards. Only when gentrifiers significantly increase in numbers will segregation levels possibly go up again. When gentrification processes become 'mature' – that is, when the neighbourhood has clearly become gentrified – newcomers will have to have a stronger position to get in. If this process continues, the neighbourhood will subsequently reach a stage in which the residents have a more homogeneously *strong* socioeconomic position. Such conditions will once again result in rising segregation levels.

Teernstra (2014) and Hochstenbach and van Gent (2015) have provided empirical evidence for such gentrification processes. The lesson learned is that segregation should be seen as a process and it should be studied over a period of time in order to be able to distinguish temporal effects from more structural ones. Another reason for studying segregation over a longer period is that the causes of socio-spatial segregation may be found far back in time. Social inequality tends to translate into socio-spatial inequality, but the process of getting there takes time. In this volume, this has been shown in the form of the experiences following the large system change due to the collapse of the Iron Curtain in Central and Eastern European countries in 1989/90. With the transformation from socialist to neoliberal state regimes after 1990, social inequality increased significantly and almost immediately; yet the social-*spatial* inequality actually decreased initially due to the reconfiguration of social patterns. After approximately ten years, segregation finally started to increase substantially – after this had already taken place at a micro scale. Housing market transformation takes some time (also see Marcińczak et al., 2016, and Kovács, Chapter 7 in this volume).

A fourth finding to be interpreted as key regards the framing of social or ethnic spatial inequality. In Chapter 1, some attention has already been paid to the fact that segregation has usually been presented in negative terms, commonly as 'bad'. In particular, the incorrect association between segregation and the concept of the ghetto may have caused much damage – and seems to continue to do so – by increasing stigmatisation. Even though it has frequently been clarified and empirically supported that the ghetto concept does not match segregation situations other than the 'classic' Black ghetto, the historical Jewish ghettoes in Venice and other European cities, and the Jewish ghettoes under the German Nazi regime (Philpott, 1978; Deurloo and Musterd, 1998; Peach, 1996; Arbaci, 2019), very moderate segregation situations continue to be represented as ghettoes. Hutchison (2019) recently summarised work on the history of the ghetto concept; surprisingly, he only cautiously concludes that the ghetto concept 'may not apply to the patterns of social exclusion and marginalisation found in cities in other countries [other than the US]' (p. 8). In my opinion, his caution is totally out of place in contexts with other types of ethnic or social concentration histories. The application of the race-based ghetto concept in contexts where concentrations of disadvantage and poverty (including poor migrants and refugees) contain only a fraction of these categories is simply misleading (see for example Wacquant, 2007; Pan Ké Shon and Verdugo, 2015; and Walks, Chapter 23 in this volume). This type of framing stimulates the development of parallel societies, while the framing is often said to be designed *against* such a development. The use of the ghetto concept

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produces fear for such neighbourhoods and frightens the public, all the while creating gaps. This helps to legitimate fierce intervention, but at the cost of enormous stigmatisation and the unequal treatment of residents depending on where they live.

In fact, the question of how urban social processes are framed is a more general one, beyond the ghetto concept. Even specific designations, or the framing of 'ordinary' disadvantaged neighbourhoods, or of neighbourhoods as 'deserving some special attention', including camp-like spaces for Roma, refugee centres or (temporary) spaces where other population groups have gained access, might create more problems than they solve.

24.3.2 Reflections, Responses and Questions

The use of 'strong' concepts to address concentrations of migrant minorities, often called segregated neighbourhoods, or the use of such concepts to address disadvantaged neighbourhoods, not only continues to stigmatise the selected neighbourhoods but also contributes to perpetuating the association between segregation and 'severe problems'. This denies the fact that individual households often try to find a place to live which fits their own socioeconomic position and where they find households that to some extent resemble their own profile (see McPherson et al., 2001; Sampson, 2012). Such preferences result in relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods. Small distinctions between neighbourhoods may already trigger selective residential behaviour and add to the segregation (also Schelling, 1971). Musterd et al. (2016) recently supported these views based on large-scale longitudinal research in which the probability of moving from a neighbourhood was found to be related to the (mis)match between the social attributes of the household itself and similar social attributes at the level of the neighbourhood. They found that larger social distances between the two resulted in a – much – higher probability to move. Moreover, those who did move commonly selected neighbourhoods that appeared to fit their own position better.

Van Gent et al. (2019) continued this line of research. They researched three matching dimensions simultaneously: economic status, ethnic background and sociocultural disposition (the last based on level of education and the share of each partner's income in the total household income). They found that a good match between individual households and the neighbourhood would decrease the probability that they would move, while a bad match increased the probability. These findings offer new input for segregation and desegregation (mixing) debates and perhaps also for a discussion on whether there might also exist something like 'good segregation', in addition to 'bad segregation'.

This should not be seen as an unconditional plea for unlimited homogeneity or segregation. Although some levels of sorting, based on homogeneity tendencies in societies, do not have to be alarming, and actually perhaps also help to reduce social conflicts that otherwise would develop in involuntarily arranged socially mixed neighbourhoods, there is reason to mark the limits to segregation. These limits include the level of segregation or concentration, and the size of the – homogeneous – segregated neighbourhoods involved, in combination with whether the segregation is voluntary or not. High levels of segregation are engines for producing negative stigmas, especially for poorer neighbourhoods. Frequently, such stigmas are imposed on these poor neighbourhoods from outside. But problems may also arise from the inside. Individuals, in particular those who are most frequently and intensely exposed to their direct environment, run the risk of being

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negatively affected by their environment, especially if the share of individual households with problems related to unemployment, limited income, criminal records, addiction and the like is high, and if the size of the neighbourhood with these attributes is large.

Institutional segregation connected to the Black population in the US, and to former South African apartheid, as well as to the Jewish ghettoes, is nowadays justifiably seen as unacceptable, but other forms of involuntary segregation also deserve attention. We should therefore increase our awareness of where the limits are, when stigmatisation tends to be ignited, and when a negative reputation starts to have an impact. The solution to problematic segregation is, of course, not simple. Perhaps some of the potential problems can be avoided by forms of 'spatial engineering'. It will seldom be helpful to demolish segregated neighbourhoods, even though this has occurred frequently, but geographical intervention 'light' might have some positive effects. An example of such a strategy might be to enable the development of small-scale enclaves, relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods of different socioeconomic status, which are brought together in larger districts. These districts will therefore be relatively heterogeneous. If inequalities are not too big, and when a wide range of services (education, social services, retail, recreation, public spaces, etc.) can be offered that allow for sharing between different categories of residents, this might create a situation in which households will feel facilitated with regard to their residential behaviour, while estrangement processes are avoided by facilitating more mixing. Such a 'design' will nevertheless still run the risk of not being successful, especially if small concentrations of poorer households, which are located amidst concentrations of more affluent households, become stigmatised, or when the affluent lock themselves into their own residential cocoon (see Boterman and Musterd, 2016; Walks, 2015).

The issues addressed here, especially regarding potential solutions, are – it must be said – also connected to the existence of multiple moral double standards. One of these moral double standards regards the obvious individual wish to find a place to live next to people who are more or less like oneself. People who express this wish are at the same time often fighting against segregation, which is clearly the collective result of their own individual behaviour. Especially those who have greater choice and resources, will be able to realise the homogeneity they wish for and thus to create segregated (maybe gated) communities for themselves, while simultaneously contributing to the development of lower-class homogeneous places. The second moral double standard regards the connection between social inequality and social-spatial inequality. There is ample academic support for the existence of this relationship. However, it seems that few politicians and citizens who call for the reduction of social-spatial inequality appear to be in favour of reducing social inequality – making poor people richer and rich people poorer. Nevertheless, there are some signals in support of that direction. Recently the Pope has remarked on social inequality, along with the head of the World Bank. The 'us' and 'them' discussion, representing the ones 'left behind' versus the 'elite', is also gaining attention. It likely was an important reason for discussing social inequality in recent Davos conferences of the world elite.

Another question that must be addressed at the end of this urban segregation volume is why governments, politicians and voters who have problems with segregation continue to support (neo)liberal welfare regimes. This question is raised because neoliberal regimes seem to be the best guarantee for increasing levels of segregation. Repeatedly, scholars have shown that neoliberal regimes inherently produce parallel societies and that more

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are currently being created; there is a risk that insurmountable gaps will develop between population groups, which will result in processes of estrangement. In fact, all of these inequality-related issues are manifest in various domains, and they also emerge at the individual level. High levels of inequality tend to shape bad health conditions for individuals, negative experiences with violence, lower educational performance, and more limited social mobility, as Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) argue.

Why is there support for market-oriented political economies if the fear of high levels of segregation is so prominently expressed? It has been shown that segregation levels are lower in so-called extensive or universal welfare states than in market-oriented contexts. Much research has supported the view that structural factors should be addressed to tackle issues of inequality and the negative collective effects of individual behaviour (also Arbaci and Rae, 2013). Structural interventions have to deal with social inequality, and with equal access to affordable housing, health care and education. This requires a welfare regime that aims to reduce extreme inequalities, and which is driven by objectives to provide opportunities for all. At the moment, this seems difficult to realise. Other societal questions and ambitions may be seen as more important than segregation issues, even though segregation may have serious impacts on people's daily lives.

It is problematic that answers to several of these other questions are not associated with similar intervention requirements as the issue of segregation. Issues regarding economic growth, labour market participation and the facilitation of individual choice are currently predominantly approached from a neoliberal perspective. While safety issues and environmental problems are perhaps understood as negative collective effects of individual behaviour, not everyone automatically associates this with inequality, even though many environmental problems are related to class distinctions. Large regional or national identity debates that currently feed the media are based more on ideas related to exclusion and inequality than on ideas about inclusion, equality and solidarity. All of these issues may overrule (spatial) inequality questions. In this political climate, it is not surprising that the rich are becoming even richer, and that the distance between the upper class and the working class is becoming larger than it already was – as Préteceille and Cardoso, and Marques and França (among others) have shown in this volume. Clearly, the rich becoming richer can also be seen as responsible for increasing spatial inequality. Préteceille and Cardoso rightly note that 'urban segregation is first of all a question to the rich, and not of the poor as many public discourses and policies tend to state'.

In some contexts, urbanisation has been characterised by high speed, high density, close proximity and extensive development. This is what can be seen in China and some other Asian cities. Building activity has typically been seen as the answer to high levels of economic and urban population growth. Even though this development implies growing social and socio-spatial inequality, economic growth figures and the number of dwellings built in high-density high-rise buildings seem to prevail. The potential negative effects of socio-spatial segregation come second, or maybe even third or last.

Perhaps we should acknowledge that the causes of segregation are more complex than we have presented here. Individuals and households who have a choice may act in such a way that they individually benefit from their own behaviour – socially, culturally and economically. This may simultaneously create negative collective outcomes at a higher level, which may also have a negative effect on the individuals themselves. This is a typical case of the 'prisoner's dilemma'. As we have shown, these behaviours and collective effects differ

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by context. This gives something to hold onto. It might be wise to rethink the experiences of many European and some other welfare states which were gained over the past seventy years, when they became deeply involved in social policies, regulation and decommodification in various domains of life. Several welfare states developed regimes which were quite distinct from the liberal capitalist models that dominated the 19th and early 20th centuries; and in fact, such regimes do still dominate in several countries to this day.

Europe, compared to other continents, still has the opportunity to take a different path. Its rich urban history, which has produced and preserved some very interesting and varied physical structures within its cities, might become even richer if a special set of inclusive social structures were also to be aimed for, somewhat resembling the extensive welfare states experienced after 1945. There are still fascinating examples of cities that 'work' which are applying such social principles. Vienna is perhaps the most clear representative of such cities in Europe, but Paris, Milan, Amsterdam, Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, Barcelona and Berlin have also been able to maintain some of their strong social character, even though these cities are transforming, and even though much of the critique of their urban development is legitimate. In European countries people are still willing to pay taxes for positive social interventions so long as the taxes provide for health, welfare, education and so on; this actually decreases inequality somewhat. If, however, social and socio-spatial inequality were to increase in aggregate, it is not clear presently how the less well-off would respond in such circumstances.

There is much debate about 'just' cities (Fainstein, 2005, 2010; Uitermark, 2009; Musterd, 2019): cities characterised by a high degree of decommodification, by the avoidance of a residualisation of the social housing sector, by the availability of affordable and accessible housing for all social classes and by limited social inequality; all of which result in limited spatial inequality, and an absence of no-go areas or gated communities. It is worth the effort to continue this debate. We should also keep our memories of more socially driven European welfare states alive, because these states happened to have welfare regimes that seemed to work. In these welfare states, cities were made accessible, socially welcoming, less segregated and more humane. A much wider redistribution of income and wealth prevented the development of a few super-rich taking the biggest chunk of total income, and it enabled a much wider segment of the population to have a decent income and a good life as well.

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