Supplication and Appeasement in Conflict and Negotiation: The Interpersonal Effects of Disappointment, Worry, Guilt, and Regret

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This study examined the social effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation. In a computer-simulated negotiation, participants in Experiment 1 were confronted with a disappointed or worried opponent (supplication), with a guilty or regretful opponent (appeasement), or with a nonemotional opponent (control). Compared with controls, participants conceded more when the other experienced supplication emotions and conceded less when the other experienced appeasement emotions (especially guilt). Experiment 2 replicated the effects of disappointment and guilt and showed that they are moderated by the perceiver’s dispositional trust: Negotiators high in trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy one, but those with low trust were unaffected. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated through information about the other’s personality (cooperative vs. competitive), and a similar moderation was obtained.

Keywords: conflict, negotiation, emotion, supplication, appeasement

Social interactions can produce conflict at all levels of society. One of the most common and constructive ways of resolving such conflicts and conducting social and economic exchange is by means of negotiation. Negotiation can be defined as a discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving a perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). People may negotiate with a car dealer when buying a new car, work groups may negotiate the allocation of organizational resources, and parents may negotiate with their children about how to spend the holidays. Emotions are inherent to negotiation and social conflict (Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999) and are crucial to understanding how individuals behave within bargaining situations (Barry, 1999).

So far, empirical research on emotion in conflict and negotiation has focused almost exclusively on the effects of anger and happiness. Researchers focused mostly on the intrapersonal effects of moods and emotions (Barry & Oliver, 1996). The basic premise is that emotions have important social functions and that they are moderated by the perceiver’s dispositional trust: Negotiators high in trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy one, but those with low trust were unaffected. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated through information about the other’s personality (cooperative vs. competitive), and a similar moderation was obtained.

Emotions in Conflict and Negotiation

There are multiple definitions of emotion, most of which point to three distinct features of emotion: physiological reactions, action tendencies, and subjective experience (Lazarus, 1991). Emotions differ from moods in that they are discrete (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999), of relatively high intensity and short duration (Barry, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996), and intentional—directed at an object, person, or event (Frijda, 1993). In this article, we use the term emotion in the sense intended above, whereas affect is used as a superordinate construct that encompasses both moods and emotions (Barry & Oliver, 1996).

Research on emotion in conflict and negotiation can be roughly divided into two categories: studies of intrapersonal effects and studies of interpersonal effects. In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers focused mostly on the intrapersonal effects of moods and emotions, investigating the influence of a negotiator’s emotional state on his or her own cognitions and behavior. For example, positive affect has been shown to increase concession making (Baron, 1990), stimulate creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, &.Nowicki, 1987), increase joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), increase preferences for cooperation (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauer, & Shack, 1990), reduce the use of contentious tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and increase the use of cooperative negotiation strategies (Forgas, 1998). Conversely, negative affect has been shown to decrease initial offers (Baron et al., 1990), decrease joint gains (Allred et al., 1997), promote the rejection of ultimatum offers (Pillutla & Mur-nighan, 1996), increase the use of competitive strategies (Forgas, 1998), and decrease the desire to work together in the future (Allred et al., 1997).

Recently, scientific interest in the role of affect in conflict and negotiation has shifted away from the intrapersonal effects of moods and emotions. Recognizing that negotiation is a social phenomenon—negotiators’ emotions influence not only themselves, but also their counterparts—several scholars have emphasized the importance of the interpersonal or social effects of emotions in negotiations (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999; Morris & Kelton, 2000; Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b). The basic premise is that emotions have important social functions and...
consequences (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Parkinson, 1996). Most notable is that emotions convey information (Carver & Scheier, 1990), for instance about how one feels about things (Ekman, 1993), about one’s social intentions (Fredlund, 1994), and about one’s orientation toward other people (Knutson, 1996). In this way, one’s emotions may influence not only one’s own behavior, but also the behavior of others (Levenson, 1994).

In line with this social functions perspective, recent research has demonstrated the pervasive interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In a computer-mediated negotiation task with a simulated opponent, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) provided participants with information about the opponent’s emotional state (angry, happy, or no emotion) at three time points during the negotiation. They found that participants with an angry opponent placed lower demands and made larger concessions than did participants with a nonemotional opponent, whereas participants with a happy opponent placed higher demands and made smaller concessions. Sinaceur and Tiedens (in press) examined the effects of anger and happiness using a different paradigm and obtained similar results. In face-to-face negotiations, they instructed one negotiator in each dyad to show either anger or happiness. In keeping with the results obtained by Van Kleef et al. (2004a), Sinaceur and Tiedens found that participants conceded more to an angry than to a happy counterpart. So results from research using different procedures (i.e., computer mediated and face to face) point to the social impact of anger and happiness on negotiation behavior.

Supplication and Appeasement in Negotiations

The purpose of the present research was to investigate the interpersonal effects of emotions that may arise as a result of the appraisal that one has taken too much or received too little. Specifically, we focused on the interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret on demands and concessions in negotiations. Below we review research pertaining to these emotions, and we build on this research to advance a number of hypotheses regarding the interpersonal effects of these emotions on negotiation behavior.

When One Feels One Has Taken Too Much: Appeasement

Emotions such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, and interpersonal regret serve an appeasement function (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Of these emotions, guilt is perhaps the most extensively researched. It entails a feeling of self-reproach resulting from the belief that one has done something wrong (R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Baumeister et al. (1994) noted “from an interpersonal perspective, the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm, loss, or distress on a relationship partner” (p. 245). The experience of guilt is typically rooted in an interpersonal context and often (although not necessarily) arises as a result of a perceived transgression, in particular when the individual feels that he or she has violated some expectation or norm (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1990, 1995, 1999).

Guilt is closely linked with reactions such as regret, self-reproach, repentance, and remorse (R. H. Smith et al., 2002) and tends to produce outwardly focused behaviors aimed at reducing the damage caused by one’s behavior (Barrett, 1995; Tangney, 1995). Guilt is associated with perspective-taking, interpersonal sensitivity, and improved relationship outcomes (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). People experiencing guilt tend to engage in behaviors aimed at repairing the social relationship (Baumeister et al., 1994; M. Lewis, 2000). Research has shown that transgressions and concomitant guilt increase subsequent helping, compliance, and cooperation on the part of the transgressor (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Other research has found that guilt motivates people to apologize and to make reparations or amends (Friedman, 1985; Hoffman, 1982; H. B. Lewis, 1971). Furthermore, when the transgression has an interpersonal character, guilt motivates people to compensate the victim (Berscheid & Walster, 1967; Wallace & Sadalla, 1966). Thus, if the transgressor displays guilt, the victim may see this as an implicit commitment to rectify the transgression by making amends and as a promise of better treatment in the future (Baumeister et al., 1994; Manstead, 1991).

In an interpersonal context, social transgressions can also cause feelings of regret (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). When the regret is interpersonal in nature—that is, when one regrets a behavior that has inflicted harm on another person (rather than on oneself)—it shares a number of characteristics with guilt (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, & Manstead, 2004; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Because regret is an aversive state, people are motivated to avoid it and, once they experience it, to take action to undo it (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). Gilovich and Medvec (1994, 1995) refer to this undoing as “behavioral repair work” or “ameliorative behavior.” In the case of interpersonal regret, this repair work typically takes the form of apologizing to the person who has been affected by the transgression (Steiner, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
By extrapolating these findings to the domain of conflict and negotiation, we can advance the following general predictions. First, a negotiator who deals with an opponent who appears to experience emotions of appeasement (e.g., guilt or regret) is likely to expect the opponent to make up for his or her previous “transgression” (e.g., tough demands) by making a concession. Following this line of reasoning, a negotiator faced with an opponent who seems to be guilty or regretful can be expected to stand firm and wait for the other to make a concession. Second, emotions of appeasement are associated with interpersonal sensitivity and the willingness to appreciate another person’s perspective, and they share a number of relationship-repairing qualities (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Steiner, 2000). Guilt and regret can therefore be expected to signal an outward focus and a concern for the other and to have a beneficial effect on the interpersonal relationship.

When One Feels One Has Received Too Little: Supplication

Emotions such as sadness, disappointment, fear, and worry serve a supplication function (M. S. Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996). These emotions communicate dependency and a need for support (Eisenberg, 2000; Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001), and they evoke empathy and helping behavior (M. S. Clark et al., 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Hill, Weary, & Williams, 1986; Parrott, 1993). Sadness, for example, communicates to the self and to others that one is in need of help (Tomkins, 1963). Expressions of sadness have been demonstrated to increase perceptions of neediness and dependency (M. A. Clark & Taraban, 1991) and to evoke helping behavior in both children (Barnett, Howard, Melton, & Dino, 1982) and adults (M. S. Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg, 1987; Yee & Greenberg, 1998). In a similar vein, crying serves a help-seeking function (Labott, Martin, Eason, & Berkey, 1991). For example, Cornelius (1984) demonstrated that (involuntary) crying was an effective means of eliciting a positive and desired change in other people’s behavior, in this case a shift from conflict to support.

Similar effects on helping behavior have been observed for expressions of worry and fear. Like sadness, worry and fear communicate a need for assistance, and they elicit sympathetic and supportive responses in others (Eisenberg, 2000; Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). For example, a study of reactions to crime victims by Yee and Greenberg (1998) revealed that fear on the part of the victims influences observers’ appraisals of need and increases the inclination to help, especially if the observer and the victim are in a communal rather than an exchange relationship. By the same token, employees who display fear are likely to evoked sympathetic and egoistic motivations (Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, & Miller, 1989).

By reverse analogy with previous research suggesting that appeasement emotions enhance interpersonal relationships because they signal interpersonal sensitivity and concern (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998), we argue that supplication emotions lead to less positive impressions because they signal an inward focus and preoccupation with the self.

Experiment 1

The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate the interpersonal effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement in negotiations. We predicted that participants with an opponent who experiences disappointment or worry (i.e., emotions of supplication) would make smaller demands than would participants with a nonemotional opponent (Hypothesis 1a), whereas negotiators with an opponent who experiences guilt or regret (i.e., emotions of appeasement) would make larger demands (Hypothesis 1b). We also expected that participants with a guilty or regretful opponent would perceive the opponent as more interpersonally sensitive than would participants with a disappointed or worried opponent (Hypothesis 2a) and that they would develop a more favorable impression of the opponent (Hypothesis 2b). Finally, we explored whether the effects of the opponent’s emotion on participants’ impressions of the opponent are mediated by their perception of the opponent’s interpersonal sensitivity (Hypothesis 2c).

Method

Participants and Experimental Design

A total of 84 male and female undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam participated either in partial fulfillment of a course requirement or for monetary compensation (EUR 7, approximately US$8). The experimental design included the opponent’s emotion (disappointment vs. worry vs. guilt vs. regret vs. no emotion) as the independent variable and demand level as the main dependent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions, and the experimenters were blind to this assignment.

Procedure

For each session, 6 to 8 participants were invited to the laboratory. On arrival, participants were welcomed to the experiment and seated in sep-
arate cubicles in front of a computer. From that point onward all instructions, questionnaires, and experimental tasks were presented on the computer screen. To facilitate the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion (see below), we led participants to believe that the purpose of the study was to find out how knowledge about one’s opponent’s intentions affects negotiation processes in a situation in which the negotiating parties cannot see each other. They were then told that they would engage in a computer-mediated negotiation with another participant (whose behavior was in fact simulated by the computer).

Negotiation task. The negotiation task was one used previously by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, b; see also De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993). The task captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiation (i.e., multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about one’s own payoffs only, and the typical offer-counteroffer sequence). In the current version, participants learned that they would be assigned the role of buyer or seller of a consignment of mobile phones and that their objective was to negotiate the price, the warranty period, and the duration of the service contract of the phones. They were then presented with a payoff chart (see Appendix A) that showed which outcomes were most favorable to them, and they learned that their objective was to earn as many points as possible. Level 9 on price ($110) yielded 0 points, and Level 1 ($150) yielded 400 points (i.e., increments of 50 points per level). For warranty period, Level 9 (9 months) yielded 0 points, and Level 1 (1 month) yielded 120 points (i.e., increments of 15 points per level). Finally, for duration of service contract, Level 9 (9 months) yielded 0 points, and Level 1 (1 month) yielded 240 points (i.e., increments of 30 points per level). Participants were told, “You can see that the best deal for you is 1–1–1, for a total outcome of 760 points (400 increments of 30 points per level).” The corresponding payoff table for the other party was not displayed, and participants were told only that it differed from their own.

To enhance involvement in the negotiation task, we informed participants that points would be converted to lottery tickets at the end of the experiment and that the more points earned, the more lottery tickets one would obtain and the greater would be one’s chance of winning a EUR 50 (approximately US $64) prize. To emphasize the mixed-motive nature of the negotiation, we told participants that only those who reached an agreement would participate in the lottery. Thus, there were incentives both to earn as many points as possible and to reach an agreement.

After a short pause during which the computer supposedly assigned buyer and seller roles to the participants, all participants were assigned the role of seller. They were told that the buyer (i.e., the opponent) would make the first offer and that the negotiation would continue until an agreement was reached or time ran out. Just before the negotiation started, participants learned that an additional goal of the study was to examine the effects of having versus not having information about the opposing negotiator’s intentions. They read that the computer had randomly determined that they would receive information about the intentions of the opponent and that the opponent would not receive information about their intentions.

After these instructions, the negotiation started, and the buyer (i.e., the computer) made a first offer. Over the negotiation rounds the buyer proposed the following levels of agreement (for price—warranty—service): 8–7–8 (Round 1), 8–7–7 (Round 2), 8–6–7 (Round 3), 7–6–7 (Round 4), 7–6–6 (Round 5), and 6–6–6 (Round 6). Past research has shown that this preprogrammed strategy has face validity and is seen as intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). A demand by the participant was accepted if it equaled or exceeded the offer the computer was about to make in the next round. If no agreement was reached by the sixth round, the negotiation was interrupted (see De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). Following the procedure of a study by Tripp and Sondak (1992), we excluded from the sample participants who reached agreement before Round 6 (n = 8) to allow for repeated-measures analyses. (However, retaining these participants yielded a similar pattern of results.) Manipulation of the opponent’s emotion. We chose to manipulate the opponent’s emotion in the context of a computer-mediated negotiation in which parties could not see each other and communicated via computers (see De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993). Participants were led to believe that the purpose of the study was to find out how knowledge about one’s opponent’s intentions affects negotiation processes and outcomes. After the first, third, and fifth negotiation rounds, participants received information about “the intentions of the buyer,” which contained the manipulation of the buyer’s emotion. Participants had to wait for about a minute and a half while the buyer was supposedly asked to reveal what he or she intended to offer in the next round, and why. After this short wait, participants received what appeared to be the buyer’s answer. This was presented in a separate box in a different font and contained some minor typing errors in order to enhance experimental realism. The buyer’s intentions were held constant across conditions and contained the buyer’s intended offer for the next round. That is, after Round 1 the buyer wrote, “I think I will offer 8–7–7,” which would indeed be the buyer’s next offer. The buyer’s intention information also contained an emotional statement that constituted the experimental manipulation.

The emotion statements were pretested in a pilot study involving 64 psychology students, none of whom participated in the main study. We tested seven statements designed to reflect disappointment, six statements designed to reflect worry, seven statements designed to reflect interpersonal regret, and seven statements designed to reflect guilt. The statements were pretested using a within-participants design. All participants rated a selection of 13 or 14 out of the total of 27 statements, the order of statements being randomized across participants. The statements were distributed in such a way that each was rated by half of the participants. For each statement, participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how comprehensible they found it (1 = very incomprehensible, 7 = very comprehensible) and to what extent they felt it reflected disappointment, worry, regret, and guilt (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent). We then selected the statements that had the highest scores on the emotion they were supposed to reflect and the lowest scores on the emotions that they were not supposed to reflect, provided that they did not differ with respect to their comprehensibility. We selected three statements for each emotion. All selected statements were rated higher on the emotion they were supposed to express than on the emotions they were not supposed to express according to paired-samples t tests (5.09 < ts < 18.29, all ps < .01). Further, one-sample t tests showed that there was a significant effect of all statements on the rating of the corresponding emotion (13.80 < ts < 18.32, all ps < .01). Finally, paired-samples t tests revealed that the statements did not differ with respect to comprehensibility (all ts < 1.12, ns).

After the first negotiation round, participants in the disappointed opponent condition received the following information: “I am pretty disappointed about this,” followed by the intention statement “I think I will offer 8–7–7,” which was the same for all conditions. In the worried opponent condition, participants read “This worries me quite a lot,” followed by the intention statement “I think I will offer 8–7–7,” which was the same for all conditions. Participants in the control condition received the following information: “I feel guilty for not having conceded more;” in the guilt condition, participants read “I am sorry that I haven’t conceded more”; in the worry condition, participants read “I feel guilty for not having conceded more;” in the regret condition, participants read “I am pretty disappointed about this,” followed by the intention statement “I think I will offer 8–7–7,” which was the same for all conditions. In the control condition participants received only the intention statement. After the third and fifth negotiation rounds, participants in the experimental conditions again received an emotional statement and an intention, whereas in the control condition simply received the intention. Appendix B lists all statements used in the experiment.

Dependent measures. The main dependent variable was participants’ level of demand in Rounds 1 to 6. In addition, participants completed a postnegotiation questionnaire that contained manipulation checks and items designed to measure impressions of the opponent. To check the adequacy of the emotion manipulation, we asked participants to indicate on a 7-point scale how disappointed, worried, guilty, and regretful they thought their opponent had been during the negotiation. Perceptions of the
opponent’s disappointment were measured by three items (e.g., “The buyer appeared to be disappointed during the negotiation,” 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree), which were combined into a single index of perceived disappointment (α = .83). Perception of the opponent’s worry was measured using five items (e.g., “The buyer appeared to be worried during the negotiation”), which were averaged into an index of perceived worry (α = .88). Perception of guilt was measured by three items (e.g., “The buyer appeared to feel guilty during the negotiation”), which were combined into an index of perceived guilt (α = .93). Finally, perceptions of the opponent’s regret were measured by three items (e.g., “The buyer appeared to feel sorry during the negotiation”), which were averaged into a scale of perceived regret (α = .91).

Impression of the opponent was assessed with seven items (“The buyer strikes me as a sympathetic person”; “During the negotiation, the buyer made a hostile impression,” reverse scored; “The buyer made a cooperative impression”; “The buyer made a friendly impression”; “The buyer made a competitive impression,” reverse scored; “The buyer made a stubborn impression,” reverse scored; “I have developed a positive impression of the buyer”; 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). The seven items were combined into a measure of impression of the opponent (α = .79). We also included three items measuring participants’ perceptions of the opponent’s interpersonal sensitivity and perspective taking (“During the negotiation, the buyer was self-centered,” reverse scored; “During the negotiation, the buyer took my interests into consideration”; “During the negotiation, the buyer appeared to be preoccupied with him- or herself,” reverse scored). These three items were averaged into an index of the opponent’s interpersonal sensitivity (α = .82).

**Results**

**Treatment of the Data**

The offers made by participants in each round were transformed into an index revealing the negotiator’s total level of demand for each negotiation round (i.e., the number of points demanded in that round, summed across the three negotiation issues of price, warranty, and service; see Appendix A).

**Manipulation Check**

A 5 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment, worry, guilt, regret, no emotion) × 4 (perception of the opponent’s emotion: disappointment, worry, guilt, regret) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor revealed a significant interaction between the opponent’s emotion and participants’ perceptions of the opponent’s emotion (F(12, 213) = 31.77, p < .01 (partial r^2 = .59). Post hoc tests showed that participants in the disappointed opponent condition rated the opponent as more disappointed (M = 5.96, SD = 1.25) than did participants in all the other conditions (2.84 < Ms < 4.95, 0.96 < Sds < 1.29). Similarly, participants with a worried opponent rated the opponent as more worried (M = 5.94, SD = 0.85) than did participants in the other conditions (2.54 < Ms < 4.79, 0.83 < Sds < 1.68), and participants with a guilty opponent rated the opponent as more guilty (M = 5.85, SD = 1.39) than did those in the other conditions (1.85 < Ms < 4.39, 0.82 < Sds < 1.85). Finally, participants with a regretful opponent rated the other as more regretful (M = 5.03, SD = 1.60) than did participants in all the other conditions (1.98 < Ms < 2.77, 0.68 < Sds < 1.04) except the guilty opponent condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.72). Furthermore, paired-samples t tests showed that ratings within each condition were higher for the intended emotion than for the other emotions (2.27 < ts < 11.73, all ps < .05).

**Demand Level**

Demand level in Rounds 1 to 6 was analyzed using a mixed-model ANOVA with the opponent’s emotion (disappointment vs. worry vs. guilt vs. regret vs. no emotion) as a between-participants variable and negotiation round (1 to 6) as a repeated-measures variable. Unsurprisingly, this analysis revealed a main effect of round, F(5, 355) = 286.28, p < .01 (partial η^2 = .80), indicating that demands declined from Round 1 (M = 677, SD = 63) to Round 6 (M = 484, SD = 93). More important, there was a significant effect of the opponent’s emotion on average demands, F(4, 71) = 7.76, p < .01 (partial η^2 = .30), indicating that participants’ demands were influenced by their adversaries’ emotions (disappointment: M = 533, SD = 59; worry: M = 513, SD = 76; guilt: M = 633, SD = 79; regret: M = 592, SD = 46; control: M = 569, SD = 56). Finally, the main effects of the opponent’s emotion and negotiation round were qualified by a significant two-way interaction, F(20, 355) = 5.21, p < .01 (partial η^2 = .23). As can be seen in Figure 1, the influence of the opponent’s emotion became more apparent as the negotiation progressed. In Round 1, there were no differences among any of the conditions. This is hardly surprising, given that the emotion manipulation began only after this round. From the second round onward, however, the different conditions started to diverge, the effect becoming stronger after each consecutive round. Therefore, we decided to use demands in Round 6 for our specific hypothesis tests.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b were tested with planned comparisons. The means and standard deviations as well as the specific contrasts...
that were computed to test these hypotheses are shown in Table 1. Four contrasts were computed. First, we tested whether participants made smaller demands to opponents who experienced supplication emotions (i.e., disappointment and worry) than to nonemotional opponents (Contrast 1). Second, we examined whether participants responded differentially to disappointed versus worried counterparts in terms of their demands (Contrast 2). Third, we examined whether participants made larger demands to opponents engaging in appeasement (i.e., guilt or regret) than to nonemotional opponents (Contrast 3). Fourth, we tested whether participants responded differentially to guilty versus regretful counterparts (Contrast 4). For Hypotheses 1a and 1b to be supported, Contrasts 1 and 3 should be significant (participants should make lower demands to opponents showing signs of supplication and higher demands to opponents showing signs of appeasement). Contrasts 2 and 4 speak to the question of whether the two supplication emotions (disappointment and worry) have similar effects on demands, and whether the two appeasement emotions (guilt and regret) have similar effects on demands. The latter two contrasts were computed for exploratory purposes.

In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, Contrast 1 was significant. Participants made smaller demands to a disappointed or worried opponent than to a nonemotional opponent, \( t(71) = 2.89, p < .01 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .15 \)). Contrast 2 was nonsignificant, indicating that participants did not make differential demands to disappointed versus worried counterparts, \( t(71) < 1, ns \). In support of Hypothesis 1b, Contrast 3 was significant—participants made larger demands to opponents who engaged in supplication because they perceived the appeasement emotions guilt and regret differed. These findings clearly support the hypothesis that were computed to test these hypotheses are shown in Table 1.

Ratings of Interpersonal Sensitivity and Impression of the Opponent

An ANOVA showed that participants’ ratings of the opponent’s interpersonal sensitivity were influenced by the opponent’s emotion, \( F(4, 71) = 5.62, p < .01 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .24 \)). As predicted (Hypothesis 2a), planned comparisons revealed that participants with a guilty or regretful opponent judged the opponent to be more interpersonally sensitive (\( M = 4.31, SD = 1.36 \) and \( M = 4.33, SD = 1.39 \), respectively) than did participants with a worried or disappointed opponent (\( M = 3.15, SD = 1.05 \) and \( M = 2.69, SD = 1.14 \), respectively), \( t(71) = 4.37, p < .002 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .21 \)).

Participants with a nonemotional opponent occupied an intermediate position (\( M = 3.86, SD = 1.15 \)) that differed from the disappointment and worry conditions, \( t(71) = 2.76, p < .01 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .15 \)), but not from the guilt and regret conditions, \( t(71) = 1.22, ns \).

We also found a significant effect of emotion on participants’ impressions of the opponent, \( F(4, 71) = 4.87, p < .002 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .22 \)). Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, planned comparisons showed that participants developed more favorable impressions of opponents who experienced guilt or regret (\( M = 4.48, SD = 0.99 \) and \( M = 4.24, SD = 0.87 \), respectively) than of opponents who experienced disappointment or worry (\( M = 3.19, SD = 1.07 \) and \( M = 3.78, SD = 0.75 \), respectively), \( t(71) = 3.64, p < .01 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .16 \)). Again, participants with a nonemotional opponent occupied an intermediate position (\( M = 4.02, SD = 0.79 \)), differing from the disappointment and worry conditions, \( t(71) = 2.14, p < .04 \) (partial \( \eta^2 = .09 \)), but not from the guilt and regret conditions, \( t(71) = 1.28, ns \).

To test the idea that participants developed more favorable impressions of opponents who engaged in appeasement than of opponents who engaged in supplication because they perceived the former to be more interpersonally sensitive than the latter (Hypothesis 2c), we conducted mediated regression analyses (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). To this end, the opponent’s emotion was dummy coded (0 for worry and disappointment and 1 for guilt and regret). This dummy variable had a significant effect on participants’ impressions of the opponent (the dependent variable; \( \beta = .45, p < .01 \)) and on participants’ judgments of the opponent’s interpersonal sensitivity (the mediator; \( \beta = .51, p < .01 \)). When both variables were simultaneously entered into the regression, a significant effect of interpersonal sensitivity on impression emerged (\( \beta = .69, p < .01 \)), and the originally significant effect of the dummy variable on impression was reduced to nonsignificance (\( \beta = .10, ns \)). The reduction of the direct path from the opponent’s emotion to participants’ impressions of the opponent was significant according to a Sobel test (\( Z = 3.74, p < .01 \); see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998, and for an updated version of the formula,

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Contrasts Computed to Test Hypothesis 1 (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand and contrast</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
<th>Worry</th>
<th>Guilt</th>
<th>Regret</th>
<th>No emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand in Round 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrast 1*</td>
<td>435 (63)</td>
<td>422 (85)</td>
<td>573 (100)</td>
<td>527 (59)</td>
<td>492 (70)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrast 3*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Contrast 4*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>−1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( p < .05 \).
see Kenny’s Web site at http://users.rcn.com/dakenny/mediate.htm). These findings suggest that the effect of the opponent’s emotion on impressions is indeed mediated by judgments of interpersonal sensitivity, although it should be noted that both constructs were measured at the same time.

Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 are largely supportive of our predictions. In line with Hypothesis 1, participants whose opponents experienced emotions of supplication (i.e., disappointment or worry) made smaller demands than did participants whose opponents experienced emotions of appeasement (i.e., guilt or regret). Negotiators who are faced with an opponent who experiences emotions of appeasement appear to anticipate behavioral repair in the form of concessions and stand firm. Conversely, negotiators who deal with a counterpart who experiences emotions of supplication respond to the other’s discomfort by making concessions. Thus, supplication and appeasement emotions have unique and theoretically meaningful effects on negotiation behavior. Further, and consistent with Hypotheses 2a to 2c, participants whose opponents showed signs of appeasement developed a more positive impression of the opponent than did those whose opponents engaged in supplication, because the former were perceived as more interpersonally sensitive than the latter. This finding is in line with the presumed relationship-enhancing functions of expressing guilt and regret.

One finding of Experiment 1 was unanticipated. On the basis of the literature reviewed in the introduction, we expected guilt and regret to have similar effects on demands. However, the present findings suggest that guilt has a stronger effect than does regret. A possible explanation could be that expressions of regret are more ambiguous. Expressing regret for not having conceded more could indicate regret for hurting someone else or regret for not having been more strategic and self-interested. Expressions of guilt are more unequivocal in that they necessarily imply that one feels bad about one’s behavior vis-à-vis someone else.

Another issue concerns the emotional statements that were used to manipulate guilt and regret. In previous work (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), we used rather straightforward expressions to manipulate anger and happiness (e.g., “This offer makes me really angry/happy”). Although similar expressions could easily be used to express disappointment and worry (e.g., “I am very disappointed”), we felt that expressions of guilt and regret would appear implausible unless they were accompanied by some kind of justification. We therefore decided to add a brief explanation to the first guilt and regret statements for why the opponent felt guilty or regretful (e.g., “I feel guilty for not having conceded more”). However, in addition to making the emotion statement more credible, this also inadvertently introduced an implicit intention to concede. Despite the fact that only the first of three guilt and regret statements was accompanied by such an implicit intention, we cannot be sure that guilt and regret were driving the effects. This issue is dealt with in Experiment 1b.

Experiment 1b

The goal of Experiment 1b was to identify the unique interpersonal effects of guilt on demands by contrasting the guilt manipulation of Experiment 1 with a “clean” manipulation that did not include a justification for why the guilt was experienced. Both guilt conditions were compared with a control condition. We expected that participants in both guilt conditions would make smaller concessions in the course of the negotiation than would participants in the control condition and that the two guilt conditions would not differ from each other. Extending the line of argument presented earlier, we further predicted that participants in both guilt conditions would expect larger concessions from the opponent than would participants in the control condition (Hypothesis 3).

Method

Participants and Design

Eighty-four undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam were assigned to one of three conditions: guilt with implicit intention to concede, guilt without implicit intention to concede, or no emotion. In return for participation, they received course credit or EUR 5 (approximately $6).

Procedure

The procedure was similar to the one used in Experiment 1, except for the manipulation of guilt. In the guilt with intention condition, we used the same guilt statements as in Experiment 1. Thus, after the first negotiation round, participants received the following statement from the opponent (see Appendix B): “I feel guilty for not having conceded more, I think I will offer 8–7–7.” In the guilt without intention condition, we omitted the explanatory part. Thus, after the first round, participants simply read “I feel guilty. I think I will offer 8–7–7.” Participants who reached agreement before Round 6 (n = 7) were excluded from the analyses (although retaining these participants yielded similar results).

Dependent Measures

In addition to recording demands, we included a brief questionnaire to measure participants’ expectations of the opponent’s future concessions and to check the emotion manipulation. After Round 6, participants read that the negotiation would be temporarily interrupted for some questions and that the negotiation would resume later. Expectations regarding the opponent’s future concessions were then measured by three items (“I expect that the opponent will make large concessions in the next rounds”, “I expect that the opponent will take a cooperative stance”, “I expect that the opponent will be conciliatory”; 1 = totally disagree to 9 = totally agree; α = .85). The manipulation of guilt was checked using the same scale as in Experiment 1 (α = .89).

Results

Manipulation Check

An ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the opponent’s emotion on participants’ perceptions of the opponent’s emotion, F(2, 74) = 37.99, p < .01 (partial η² = .51). Planned comparisons showed that participants in the guilt with intention (M = 6.36, SD = 1.77) and guilt without intention (M = 6.26, SD = 2.01) conditions rated the other as more guilty than did participants in the no-emotion condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.18), t(74) = 8.72, p < .01 (partial η² = .51). The two guilt conditions did not differ from each other, t(74) = .21, ns.
Demand Level

As in Experiment 1, an ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of round, $F(5, 370) = 128.76, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .76$), indicating that demands declined from Round 1 ($M = 641, SD = 72$) to Round 6 ($M = 489, SD = 100$). More important, we found a significant effect of the opponent’s emotion on average demands, $F(2, 74) = 4.53, p < .015$ (partial $\eta^2 = .08$), indicating that participants’ demands were influenced by the opponent’s emotion (guilt with intention: $M = 575, SD = 78$; guilt without intention: $M = 574, SD = 88$; control: $M = 521, SD = 66$). These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and negotiation round, $F(10, 370) = 4.64, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .14$). As in Experiment 1, the influence of the opponent’s emotion became more apparent as the negotiation progressed. In Round 1, there were no differences among any of the conditions. From the third round onward, the different conditions started to diverge, the effect becoming stronger after each round. Planned comparisons of demands in Round 6 revealed that both guilt conditions (guilt with intention: $M = 524, SD = 88$; guilt without intention: $M = 536, SD = 107$) differed significantly from the control condition ($M = 430, SD = 70$), $t(74) = 4.93, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .19$), and that they did not differ significantly from each other, $t(74) = .45, ns$.

Expectations of Opponent’s Future Concessions

An ANOVA yielded an effect of emotion on participants’ expectations of the opponent’s future concessions, $F(2, 74) = 6.35, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .14$). Planned comparisons revealed that participants in both guilt conditions expected more cooperation from the opponent (guilt with intention: $M = 5.45, SD = 1.19$; guilt without intention: $M = 5.10, SD = 1.28$) than did participants in the control condition ($M = 4.28, SD = 1.31$), $t(74) = 3.45, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .06$). Again, the guilt conditions did not differ from each other, $t(74) = .82, ns$.

Discussion

These results show that the interpersonal effects of guilt as observed in Experiment 1 also obtain when no justification for the experienced guilt is provided or, in other words, no implicit intention to concede is mentioned. In line with our theoretical model, participants in both guilt conditions expected the opponent to make large concessions, supporting Hypothesis 3. Furthermore, participants in both guilt conditions made smaller concessions than did participants in the control condition, providing additional support for Hypothesis 1b.

Experiment 2

The results thus far support the central proposition of the present research: In a negotiation, emotions of appeasement elicit high demands from one’s adversary, whereas emotions of supplication elicit low demands. The objective of Experiment 2 was twofold. The first objective was to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 by investigating the potential moderating role of interpersonal trust. Trust plays an important role in negotiations, and it is essential to the resolution of mixed-motive conflict (Lindskold, 1978). It can be defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Among other things, level of trust has been shown to affect the exchange of information regarding preferences and priorities in negotiations (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), the willingness to cooperate (Yamagishi, 1986), the attainment of integrative solutions (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980), and the desire for future interaction (Naquin & Paulson, 2003; for a review, see Ross & LaCroix, 1996).

Aside from its specific effects in the negotiation arena, trust has a more generalized influence on the trustworthiness individuals ascribe to others and on their willingness to accept information as sincere and accurate (Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996; Rotter, 1980). This has important consequences for negotiators’ reactions to their opponent’s emotions. Although the effects of trust on responses to other people’s emotions have not been the explicit focus of research attention, some indirect evidence exists for the moderating role of trust. For instance, research has shown that the interpersonal consequences of expressions of distress depend on how receivers interpret such expressions (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). Sometimes recipients respond to these expressions in less than helpful ways because they misread the expressioner’s intent (L. F. Clark, 1993). When observers perceive that the expression is untruthful or manipulative, they are less likely to respond positively. On the other hand, when they view the expressions as trustworthy or at least benign, they are more likely to respond with social helping (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). In other words, individuals’ reactions to others’ emotions are likely to be moderated by interpersonal trust.

Variations in trust may be rooted in individual differences or stem from characteristics of the situation (Yamagishi, 1986). The present experiment is concerned with the potential moderating role of individual differences in interpersonal trust. The aforementioned research suggests that a negotiator’s decision to adapt his or her demands to the opponent’s emotions will be influenced by the focal negotiator’s level of interpersonal trust. Negotiators with high levels of trust can be expected to adapt their demands to the opponent’s emotional state, whereas those with low trust may not respond differentially to the other’s emotions. To test this idea, we manipulated the opponent’s emotion (guilt vs. disappointment) and measured participants’ level of dispositional trust. We predicted that individuals high in trust would make higher demands to a guilty opponent (i.e., an opponent engaging in appeasement) than to a disapponted opponent (i.e., an opponent engaging in supplication). By contrast, we predicted that individuals low in dispositional trust would not respond differentially to their counterpart’s emotions (Hypothesis 4). We further hypothesized that, compared with high trust participants, low trust participants would be more suspicious about the opponent’s emotion and more likely to discount the other’s emotions than incorporate them into their negotiation strategy (Hypothesis 5).

The second objective of Experiment 2 was to shed more light on the process underlying the effects of supplication and appeasement emotions on demands. According to the social functions perspective that was outlined in the introduction, appeasement emotions such as guilt signal that behavioral repair can be anticipated, whereas supplication emotions such as disappointment signal that the other needs help. It seems reasonable to assume that such considerations would affect participants’ negotiation objectives.
and strategy. In this context it is useful to consider the role of the negotiator’s goal (Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 1967; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; Zeik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). Among other things, higher goals tend to produce larger demands and greater resistance to concession making (Holmes, Throop, & Strickland, 1971; Kelley et al., 1967; D. L. Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982; Yukl, 1974a, b). A negotiator who expects to receive compensation in the form of large concessions (e.g., in the case of a guilty opponent) can be expected to adopt higher goals than a negotiator who does not anticipate large concessions (e.g., in the case of a disappointed opponent). Thus, it may be that negotiators concede more to a disappointed opponent than to a guilty one because the other’s guilt raises their goals, whereas disappointment lowers them. To examine this possibility, we measured participants’ goals and hypothesized that participants with a guilty opponent would adopt higher goals than would those with a disappointed opponent (Hypothesis 6). We further predicted that negotiators’ tendency to make higher demands to guilty opponents than to disappointed ones would be mediated by the ambitiousness of their goals (Hypothesis 7). Finally, we were interested to see whether guilt and disappointment are indeed interpreted to mean that someone has received too much versus too little, as suggested by the literature reviewed in the introduction. This issue was addressed in an exploratory fashion.

Method

Participants and Experimental Design

Participants were 154 undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam. They took part in the experiment for course credit or for monetary compensation (EUR 7, approximately U.S.$8). The experimental design included the opponent’s emotion (disappointment vs. guilt) and the participant’s dispositional trust (high vs. low) as the independent variables and demand level as the main dependent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions with the use of a double-blind procedure.

Procedure

The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 1, with one major exception. In addition to manipulating the opponent’s emotion, we also measured the participant’s level of dispositional trust (see below). As in Experiment 1, participants who reached agreement before Round 6 (n = 6) were excluded from the analyses (although retaining these participants yielded a similar pattern of results).

Assessment of trust. Trust was assessed with Yamagishi’s (1986) trust scale, which comprises the following five items: “Most people tell a lie if they can benefit from doing so”; “Those devoted to unselfish causes are often exploited by others”; “Many people do not cooperate because they pursue only their own interests”; “Most people are basically honest”; and “There will be more people who will not work if the social security system is developed further” (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). The internal consistency of the scale was good (α = .77). Following past research (Parks & Hulbert, 1995), a median split (MdN = 4.63) was performed to classify participants as high or low in trust, yielding 35 to 40 participants per condition. Ratings on the trust scale did not differ across emotion conditions (disappointment: M = 4.68, SD = 0.61; guilt: M = 4.65, SD = 0.63), F(1, 146) < 1, ns. After the assessment of trust, participants completed a 10-min filler task (consisting of a number of unrelated scales) to reduce the likelihood of carryover effects from the trust assessment to the negotiation task. After the filler task, participants proceeded to the negotiation task, which was identical to the one used in Experiment 1.

Dependent measures. In addition to recording demands, we measured participants’ goals, their interpretation of the other’s emotions, suspicion regarding the trustworthiness of the opponent and his or her emotions, and discounting of the other’s emotions. We used the same manipulation checks as in Experiment 1 (disappointment: α = .85; guilt: α = .88).

Participants’ goals were measured with six items, two for each issue (“On which level of [price/warranty/service] do you strive to reach an agreement?” and “On which level of [price/warranty/service] do you hope to reach an agreement?”). Responses could range from 1 (indicating an extremely low goal) to 9 (indicating an extremely high goal; see Appendix A). The items were averaged into a single index of participant’s goal (α = .79).

Interpretation of the opponent’s emotion was assessed by two semantic differentials, both of which were introduced by the question, “How do you interpret the emotions the buyer expressed during the negotiation?” The two items participants responded to were “The buyer has received too much/the buyer has received too little” and “The buyer has offered me too much/the buyer has offered me too little” (both measured on a 7-point scale). Because the correlation between the items was modest (r = −.39), we analyzed them separately.

Suspicion was measured with three items (“During the negotiation I was suspicious”; “I distrusted the information I received from the buyer”; “The information I received from the buyer made me suspicious”; 1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree), which were combined into a single index (α = .79). Discounting of the opponent’s emotion was also measured by three items (“During the negotiation I did not take the information about the buyer into account”; “During the negotiation, I paid serious attention to the information I received about the buyer,” reverse scored; “I ignored the information I received from the buyer”; 1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree), which were also averaged into a single index (α = .67).

Results

Manipulation Check

A 2 (emotion of the opponent: disappointment vs. guilt) × 2 (dispositional trust: high vs. low) × 2 (perception of the opponent’s emotion: disappointed vs. guilty) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor revealed a significant interaction between the opponent’s emotion and participants’ perceptions of the opponent’s emotion, F(1, 144) = 300.54, p < .01 (partial η2 = .67). Participants with a disappointed opponent rated the opponent as more disappointed (M = 5.25, SD = 1.42) than did those with a guilty opponent (M = 3.29, SD = 1.16). Similarly, participants with a guilty opponent rated the other as more guilty (M = 4.56, SD = 1.54) than did those with a disappointed opponent (M = 2.21, SD = 0.76). Paired-sample t-tests showed that participants in the disappointed-opponent condition rated the opponent as more disappointed than guilty (M = 5.25 vs. M = 2.21), t(72) = 15.84, p < .01, and that participants in the guilty-opponent condition rated the opponent as more guilty than disappointed (M = 4.56 vs. M = 3.29), t(74) = 7.79, p < .01. There were no effects of trust.

Demand Level

Demands in Rounds 1 to 6 were submitted to a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. guilt) × 2 (participant’s trust: high vs. low) mixed-model ANOVA with the opponent’s emotion and the participant’s trust as between-participants variables and demands in Rounds 1 to 6 as a repeated-measures variable. As in Experi-
ment 1, we first describe lower order effects, and we then turn to
the hypothesized interaction. The anticipated effect of round was
significant, $F(5, 720) = 413.82, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .74$),
showing that demands declined from Round 1 ($M = 643, SD = 77$) to Round 6 ($M = 466, SD = 91$). Results further revealed a
main effect of the opponent’s emotion on average demand, $F(1,
144) = 10.30, p < .002$ (partial $\eta^2 = .07$), indicating that partici-
pants’ demands were influenced by their adversaries’ emotions
(disappointment: $M = 521, SD = 75$; guilt: $M = 560, SD = 84$).
These effects were qualified by an Emotion \times Round interaction,
$F(5, 720) = 8.48, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .06$), which showed that
the effect of the opponent’s emotion on participants’ demands
increased from Round 1 (disappointment: $M = 641, SD = 77$;
guilt: $M = 646, SD = 78$) to Round 6 (disappointment: $M = 439,
SD = 80$; guilt: $M = 491, SD = 93$).

In line with Hypothesis 4, there was a significant interaction
between opponent’s emotion and participant’s trust, $F(1, 144) =
7.67, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .05$). As predicted, simple effects
analysis revealed that high trust participants made higher demands
to a guilty opponent ($M = 586, SD = 66$) than to a disappointed
one ($M = 510, SD = 66$), $F(1, 144) = 16.96, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 =
.26$), whereas those low in trust did not respond differentially to
their counterpart’s emotions (guilt: $M = 537, SD = 92$; disappoin-
tment: $M = 531, SD = 82$), $F(1, 144) < 1, ns$. This interaction
was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between emo-
tion, trust, and round, $F(5, 720) = 2.59, p < .03$ (partial $\eta^2 = .08$),
indicating that the interactive effects of emotion and trust became
more apparent as the negotiation progressed (see Figure 2). Simple
effects analysis revealed a significant Emotion \times Round interaction
for high trusters, $F(5, 720) = 8.07, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .16$),
but not for low trusters, $F(5, 720) = 1.74, ns$. As can be seen from
Figure 2, participants with high levels of trust made larger con-
cessions in the course of the negotiation when the opponent
experienced disappointment than when the opponent experienced
guilt, whereas participants with low levels of trust were not re-
sponsive to the opponent’s emotional state.

**Interpretation of the Opponent’s Emotions**

ANOVA’s yielded significant main effects of emotion on the two
items tapping the participant’s interpretation of the opponent’s
emotion. Participants who negotiated with a guilty opponent in-
terpreted the other’s emotion as signifying that the other had
obtained too much ($M = 3.71, SD = 0.97$), whereas those who
dealt with a disappointed opponent took the other’s emotion to
mean that the other had received too little ($M = 4.47, SD = 1.17$),
$F(1, 144) = 19.33, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .11$). Conversely,
participants with a guilty opponent interpreted the other’s emotion
as a signal that the other had offered too little ($M = 4.88, SD =
1.09$), whereas those with a disappointed partner were more likely
to believe that the other’s emotion revealed that he or she had
offered too much ($M = 4.49, SD = 1.04$), $F(1, 144) = 5.28, p <
.025$ (partial $\eta^2 = .04$). There was no significant effect of trust and
no interaction.

**Suspicion and Discounting of the Opponent’s Emotions**

According to Hypothesis 5, low trusters would be more suspi-
cious and more likely than high trusters to discount their counter-
part’s emotion. In line with this prediction, an ANOVA showed a
tendency for participants low in trust to be more suspicious ($M =
3.92, SD = 1.20$) regarding the opponent’s emotions than were
participants high in trust ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.31$), $F(1, 144) = 2.79,
p < .10$ (partial $\eta^2 = .02$). Low trusters were also more likely to
discount the opponent’s emotion than were high trusters ($M =
3.14, SD = 1.23$ vs. $M = 2.71, SD = 0.99$), $F(1, 144) = 5.14, p <
.025$ (partial $\eta^2 = .04$). There were no effects of emotion and no
interaction ($F$s < 1, ns).

**Participants’ Goals**

In line with Hypothesis 6, participants’ goals were influenced by
the opponent’s emotion. Participants who dealt with a guilty op-
ponent reported higher goals ($M = 5.04, SD = 0.79$) than did those
who dealt with a disappointed opponent ($M = 5.38, SD = 0.79$),
$F(1, 144) = 7.73, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$ (recall that low
numbers correspond to high goals; see Appendix A). This effect
was moderated by the participant’s level of trust, $F(1, 144) = 4.63,
p < .04$ (partial $\eta^2 = .03$). Means and standard deviations per-
taining to this interaction are shown in Table 2. Simple effects
analyses revealed that high trusters adapted their goals to the

![Figure 2](image-url)
opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 144) = 11.54, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .15$), whereas low trusters did not, $F(1, 144) < 1, \ ns$.

**Mediation Analysis**

To investigate whether the interactive effects of the opponent’s emotion and the participant’s trust on demands were mediated by the participant’s goals (as predicted in Hypothesis 7), we performed mediated regression analyses, following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure. In Step 1 we entered emotion, trust, and their interaction as the independent variables and demands as the dependent variable. This produced a significant main effect of emotion ($\beta = .24, p < .003$) and an interaction between emotion and trust ($\beta = .22, p < .01)$. In Step 2, we used the same independent variables to predict the participant’s goals. This, too, yielded a significant main effect of emotion ($\beta = .21, p < .01) and a significant interaction ($\beta = .17, p < .04$). In Step 3, we simultaneously entered emotion and goals to predict demands. This yielded a significant effect of goals on demands ($\beta = .61, p < .01$) and reduced the formerly significant Emotion x Trust interaction to nonsignificance ($\beta = .11, \ ns$). A Sobel test indicated that the reduction of the direct path from the Emotion x Trust interaction to demands was significant ($Z = 2.10, p < .04$; see Kenny et al., 1998). In support of Hypothesis 7, these results show that the interactive effect of the opponent’s emotion and the participant’s trust on demands is fully mediated by the participant’s goals.

**Discussion**

The results of Experiment 2 corroborate our hypotheses. As predicted, negotiators’ reactions to their opponent’s emotions are moderated by trust. Negotiators with high levels of dispositional trust responded with high demands to an opponent who appeared to experience guilt or to a disappointed opponent, whereas low trusters did not respond differentially to the opponent’s emotions. These findings replicate and extend those of Experiment 1 by showing that negotiators are more likely to act on their opponent’s emotions to the extent that they trust the opponent and see his or her emotions as trustworthy and reliable. We further found that individuals with low trust were more suspicious regarding the trustworthiness of the other’s emotions and were more likely to discount them rather than take them into account when designing their negotiation strategy. Furthermore, Experiment 2 sheds some light on the processes underlying the effects of guilt and disappointment on demands. A mediation analysis revealed that negotiators with high levels of trust made smaller demands to a disappointed opponent than to a guilty one because the other’s disappointment led them to lower their goals, whereas the other’s guilt led them to raise their goals. Finally, results pertaining to participants’ interpretation of their counterparts’ emotions are compatible with the framework that was outlined in the introduction: Guilt is interpreted to mean that the other has claimed too much, whereas disappointment is taken as a signal that the other has received too little.

The fact that trust was measured rather than manipulated might be regarded as a limitation of Experiment 2. Although the results are consistent with our predictions, we cannot rule out the possibility that they are caused by some unknown third variable that was not taken into account. Another shortcoming of Experiment 2 is that there was no nonemotional control condition. Therefore, we cannot draw firm conclusions as to whether disappointment led participants to place lower demands, whether guilt led them to place higher demands, or both. Although Experiment 1 demonstrated that guilt and disappointment elicited higher and lower demands, respectively, compared with a nonemotional control condition, we felt that a replication of this effect would increase confidence in its robustness. We therefore conducted a third experiment in which trust was manipulated (through expectations about the opponent’s personality) and a control condition was included.

**Experiment 3**

Experiment 3 showed that individual differences in dispositional trust moderate the interpersonal effects of supplication and appeasement emotions in negotiations. As noted earlier, variations in trust may also arise from features of the situation and/or the other party (Yamagishi, 1986). Among other things, trust depends on a negotiator’s expectations about the other’s cooperation or competition. Indeed, trust has been defined as the expectation that the other will cooperate (Prufit & Kimmel, 1977). Because trusting another person is more risky to the extent that he or she can be expected to take advantage of and exploit the trust (Ross & LaCroix, 1996), people exhibit greater levels of trust in relation to others whom they expect to be cooperative than others whom they expect to be competitive (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001;
De Dreu et al., 1998; Deutsch, 1960; Kee & Knox, 1970; Loomis, 1959; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; for an overview of bases of trust in negotiation, see Ross & LaCroix, 1996). On the basis of this research and the results of Experiment 2, we predicted that negotiators would make higher demands to a guilty opponent than to a disappointed one, but only if they believed that the opponent was cooperative. If the opponent was expected to be competitive, the trustworthiness of his or her emotions should be decreased, and hence negotiators should not adapt their demands to the other’s emotion (Hypothesis 8).

Method

Participants and Experimental Design

Ninety-four male and female undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam participated for course credit or monetary compensation (EUR 7, approximately US $8). The experimental design included the opponent’s emotion (disappointment vs. guilt vs. no emotion) and the opponent’s personality (cooperative vs. competitive) as the independent variables and demand level as the main dependent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, and the experimenters were blind to this assignment.

Procedure

The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, except that trust was manipulated rather than measured. As in the preceding experiments, participants who reached agreement before Round 6 (n = 2) were excluded from the analyses (although including these participants in the analyses yielded a similar pattern of findings).

Manipulation of trust. Trust was manipulated by varying participants’ expectations regarding the opponent’s cooperation versus competition with a procedure that has been used successfully in past research (see De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a (fake) “Personality Test.” This questionnaire was described as measuring collaboration skills and contained 20 items having to do with cooperation in daily life (e.g., “In the bus, I vacate my seat for older people”; “I enjoy working with other people”; “Love and respect are more important than status and money”; “Winning is everything”; “I like situations in which it is me against someone else”). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement on 5-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).

After completion of this personality test, participants received the same instructions as in Experiments 1 and 2. They then learned that on the basis of the personality test, each participant had been classified as either “cooperative” or “competitive” and that some participants would receive this information about their opponent, whereas others would not. Next, participants read that the computer had selected them to receive their opponent’s personality information, but that the opponent would not receive their information. In the cooperative opponent condition, the outcome of the opponent’s personality test was presented on the screen with answers allegedly given by the opponent suggesting that he or she was very cooperative. These answers were accompanied by a “general test result,” which indicated that the other could best be classified as cooperative. In the competitive opponent condition, participants were shown answers suggesting that the opponent was very competitive, and the general test result showed that the other could best be classified as competitive.

Dependent measures. The emotion check was the same as in Experiment 2. To check participants’ expectations regarding the opponent’s cooperative versus competitive orientation, we asked participants to rate the opponent’s personality on five 7-point semantic differential scales (e.g., “cooperative–competitive,” “compliant–bossy,” “dominant–docile,” reverse scored). These items were averaged into a composite index of judgment of the opponent’s cooperativeness versus competitiveness, ranging from 1 = cooperative to 7 = competitive (α = .90). Additionally, we assessed participants’ perceptions of the opponent’s trustworthiness using three items (“The buyer is very trustworthy—not very trustworthy,” reverse scored; “The buyer is very unreliable–very reliable”; “The buyer is very honest–very dishonest”). These items were combined into an index of the opponent’s trustworthiness, ranging from 1 = not very trustworthy to 7 = very trustworthy (α = .84).

Results

Opponent’s emotion. As in the previous experiments, an ANOVA showed the predicted interaction between the opponent’s emotion and the participants’ perception of the opponent’s emotion, F(2, 86) = 168.30, p < .01 (partial η² = .80). Participants in the disappointed opponent condition rated the opponent as significantly more disappointed (M = 6.08, SD = 0.93) than did participants in the guilty or nonemotional opponent conditions (M = 3.91, SD = 1.16; M = 2.81, SD = 1.00). Similarly, participants with a guilty opponent rated the opponent as more guilty (M = 5.67, SD = 0.85) than did participants in the other two conditions (disappointment: M = 2.22, SD = 1.10; no emotion: M = 2.57, SD = 0.89). Furthermore, paired-samples t tests showed that ratings within the emotion conditions were higher for the intended emotion than for the other emotion (8.13 < t < 15.82; both ps < .01). The ratings did not differ in the control condition.

Opponent’s cooperation/competition and trustworthiness. An ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the manipulation of the opponent’s orientation on participants’ judgments of the opponent’s trustworthiness, F(1, 86) = 19.63, p < .01 (partial η² = .19). There was no main effect of the opponent’s emotion and no interaction. We also obtained a significant main effect of the opponent’s orientation on perceptions of the opponent’s trustworthiness, F(1, 86) = 18.69, p < .01 (partial η² = .18). Participants who learned that the opponent had a cooperative orientation judged the other as more trustworthy (M = 5.14, SD = 0.98) than did those who learned that the other had a competitive orientation (M = 4.17, SD = 1.23).

Demand Level

Demands were submitted to a 3 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. guilt vs. no emotion) × 2 (opponent’s personality: cooperative vs. competitive) mixed-model ANOVA with the opponent’s emotion and personality as between-participants variables and demands in Rounds 1 to 6 as a repeated-measures variable. A main effect of round indicated that participants’ demands declined over time (Round 1: M = 643, SD = 89; Round 6: M = 457, SD = 103), F(5, 430) = 143.22, p < .01 (partial η² = .63). Furthermore, we found a main effect of emotion on average demands, F(2, 86) = 4.41, p < .02 (partial η² = .10). Planned comparison results were consistent with those of the previous experiments, indicating that participants with a disappointed opponent made lower demands (M = 505, SD = 88) than did
participants with a guilty opponent ($M = 556$, $SD = 94$), $t(89) = 1.88, p < .05$ (partial $\eta^2 = .05$). Participants with a nonemotional opponent occupied an intermediate position ($M = 541$, $SD = 70$) that did not differ significantly from the other two conditions ($t < 1.50, ns$).

We also found a significant interaction between the opponent’s emotion and the opponent’s orientation, $F(2, 86) = 4.74, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .10$). In line with our expectations, simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect of the opponent’s emotion in the cooperative opponent condition, indicating that average demands were lower for participants who negotiated with a disappointed opponent ($M = 475$, $SD = 52$) than for those who dealt with a guilty or nonemotional opponent ($M = 603$, $SD = 81$ and $M = 558$, $SD = 77$, respectively), $F(2, 86) = 7.73, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .37$). In the competitive opponent condition, by contrast, there was no effect of the opponent’s emotion on demands ($523 < M < 525$), $F(2, 86) = 0.01, ns$.

Finally, we found a significant three-way interaction between opponent’s emotion, opponent’s orientation, and negotiation round, $F(10, 430) = 3.84, p < .025$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$ (see Figure 3). Results of simple effects analysis were consistent with Hypothesis 8, revealing a significant Emotion $\times$ Round interaction in the cooperative opponent condition, $F(10, 430) = 5.62, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .22$), but not in the competitive opponent condition, $F(10, 430) = .31, ns$. Planned comparisons of demands in Round 6 revealed that participants with a cooperative opponent made higher demands when the opponent appeared to feel guilty than when the opponent expressed no emotion ($M = 553$, $SD = 130$ vs. $M = 472$, $SD = 69$), $t(39) = 2.24, p < .03$ (partial $\eta^2 = .06$), and that they made lower demands when the other appeared to be disappointed ($M = 393$, $SD = 59$), $t(39) = 3.06, p < .01$ (partial $\eta^2 = .08$). There were no differences in the competitive opponent condition ($439 < M < 449$), $t < 1.0, ns$.

**Discussion**

The results of Experiment 3 replicate those of Experiment 2 using a situational manipulation of trust. Participants who thought that the opponent had a cooperative orientation (i.e., high trust) conceded more to a disappointed opponent than to a nonemotional one, and they tended to concede less to a guilty opponent. By contrast, participants who believed the other to be competitive (i.e., low trust) did not respond differentially to the other’s emotions. Thus, the results of this experiment are consistent with the findings reported in Experiment 2, and this suggests that trust is an important prerequisite for the interpersonal effects of disappointment and guilt to obtain. Further, the inclusion of a nonemotional control condition allows for specific conclusions regarding the respective effects of disappointment and guilt. In line with the results of Experiment 1, the present data show that participants who expected cooperation made significantly smaller demands to a disappointed opponent than to a nonemotional one, whereas they made significantly larger demands to a guilty counterpart.

**General Discussion**

The results of the present experiments support our predictions. Negotiators whose opponents appeared to experience emotions of appeasement (i.e., guilt or regret) developed a positive impression of their opponents, but they were nonconciliatory in the level of their demands. By contrast, participants whose opponents experienced emotions of supplication (i.e., disappointment or worry) rated their opponents less positively, but they made larger concessions in the course of the negotiation (Experiment 1). Experiment 1b showed that negotiators with a guilty opponent expected to receive larger concessions from the other than did those with a nonemotional opponent. Also in line with our theoretical framework were results showing that the interpersonal effects of guilt and disappointment on demands were mediated by the focal negotiator’s goals. Negotiators with a disappointed opponent lowered their goals and made smaller demands, whereas those with a guilty opponent raised their goals and made larger demands. The data further showed that participants with a guilty opponent believed that the other had claimed too much and offered too little, whereas those with a disappointed counterpart believed that the other had received too little and offered too much. This, too, is consistent with our theoretical framework. Apparently, emotions of supplication signal that one is in need of compensation, which may lead others to lower their goals and make concessions. Conversely, emotions of appeasement appear to signal that one is willing to compensate one’s counterpart, which may lead others to increase their goals and stand firm.

The findings of Experiments 1 and 2 point to the pervasive effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement on

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**Figure 3.** Demand level as a function of the opponent’s emotion, the opponent’s orientation, and negotiation round in Experiment 3.
negotiation behavior and impressions, and the results of these experiments shed some light on the processes underlying these effects. In addition, the present research has identified an important moderator of the interpersonal effects of appeasement and supplication emotions on demands and concessions: interpersonal trust. Experiment 2 showed that only negotiators with high levels of trust adapted their goals and demands to their opponent’s emotion. Participants with low trust reported more suspicion regarding the opponent’s emotions, were more likely to discount them, and did not adapt their goals and demands to the other’s emotion. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated by varying participants’ expectations regarding the opponent’s cooperative versus competitive orientation, and a similar effect was found. Participants who expected a cooperative opponent had high trust and made larger concessions to a disappointed opponent and smaller concessions to a guilty opponent. By contrast, participants who thought that the opponent had a competitive orientation had low trust and did not respond differentially to the opponent’s disappointment versus guilt in terms of their demands and concessions.

Together, the results of these experiments strongly support the idea that emotions of appeasement and supplication have the potential to influence negotiation behavior at the interpersonal level. This conclusion has interesting implications for research on conflict and negotiation and for our understanding of the social consequences of emotions. Below we discuss these implications as well as address some of the strengths and limitations of our approach. We conclude by outlining some avenues for future research.

Implications and Contributions

In exploring the interpersonal effects of appeasement and supplication emotions in negotiations, the present work makes a number of important contributions. First, prior research on emotions in negotiation has focused almost exclusively on the role of general positive versus negative affect or, in a few cases, discrete emotions such as anger, happiness, and compassion (Alfred et al., 1997; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). The present research extends this line of inquiry by examining the effects of guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry. Our findings demonstrate that these emotions, like anger and happiness, can have a powerful impact on negotiation behavior. This underscores the recent acknowledgment of the importance of considering affective phenomena in conflict and negotiation and indicates that scholarly attention should not remain limited to the role of anger and happiness.

Second, the current research indicates that the role of emotion in negotiation cannot be understood by merely classifying emotions as positive or negative. Previous research has explored the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations, demonstrating that negotiators concede more to angry opponents than to happy ones (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). Although it is tempting to explain this finding in terms of a positivity–negativity dimension, the present results suggest that it would be unwise to do so. The emotions that were investigated in this research—guilt, regret, worry, and disappointment—are all negative in valence, yet they have quite different effects on behavior: The effects of guilt and regret were opposite to those of worry and disappointment. A more fruitful approach, then, is to adopt a social–functional perspective on emotion, which assumes that emotions have distinct social functions and consequences (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000). This conclusion points to the need for more research on the effects of discrete emotions rather than nonspecific positive versus negative effect.

Third, the present findings contribute to a more thorough understanding of the social consequences of expressing guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry. Although all of these emotions have been the subject of research, most of this research has focused on the intrapersonal effects of these emotions on the individual’s cognitions and behavior. For example, research on guilt has addressed the question of how the experience of guilt influences the guilty party’s behavior and thereby his or her relationship to the interaction partner. Thus it has been shown that guilt motivates people to make apologies and amends and to compensate the other for one’s transgression (see Baumeister et al., 1994, for an overview of this research). Although this research contains an interpersonal component (guilt may affect interpersonal relations), the major focus has been on the impact of guilt on the individual’s own motivations and behavior. Our findings move beyond the intrapersonal effects of guilt by showing that interaction partners anticipate compensation from the guilty party by making high demands and small concessions. In a similar vein, previous research on regret has established that regret instigates a desire to undo one’s actions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 2000). The present research suggests that regret may not only affect one’s own behavior but also that of others, although the effects of regret appear to be weaker than those of guilt. A possible explanation for this lies in the ambiguous nature of regret. An opponent who regrets his or her behavior may do so because he or she has harmed the other or because he or she should have been more strategic and self-interested.

The present findings also increase our understanding of the interpersonal effects of worry and disappointment. As is the case with guilt and regret, most previous research on disappointment has adopted an intrapersonal approach, investigating for instance how the experience of disappointment motivates people to minimize future disappointment (see Zeelenberg et al., 2000, for an overview). Our research shows that disappointment can also influence behavior at the interpersonal level—it appears to be effective in eliciting concessions. The same holds for expressions of worry. These findings are consistent with prior research on distress-related emotions such as sadness, which have been shown to facilitate prosocial behavior (Barnett et al., 1979; Batson, 1987; Eisenberg, Fabes, Miller, et al., 1989; Fabes et al., 1994; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Apparently, various emotions related to distress and supplication have broadly comparable effects on others’ behavior.

Altogether, it appears that discrete emotions have distinct and predictable effects in negotiations, which can be conceptualized and understood in terms of the information they provide. For example, guilt (and to a lesser degree regret) informs the adversary that one has taken too much, and it signals that one is willing to compensate for this. Disappointment and worry, on the other hand, inform the other that one has received less than expected and signal that one is in need of compensation. Because the information conveyed by these and other emotions is similar across situations, we believe that parallel effects are to be expected in other domains of social interaction.
The identification of trust as a moderator of the interpersonal
effects of supplication and appeasement emotions on negotiation
behavior constitutes a fourth contribution of the present work. Two
different operationalizations of trust were used. In Experiment 2
we measured individual differences in trust; in Experiment 3 we
manipulated trust by providing information about the opponent’s
personality. Although both methods have been shown in prior
research to constitute valid operationalizations of trust (De Dreu &
Van Kleef, 2004; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Yamagishi, 1986),
they differ in a number of respects. Measures of dispositional trust
tap directly into the generalized tendency of individuals to trust
others, to believe in their honesty, and to accept what they say and
do as true and righteous (or not). By contrast, the method that was
used in Experiment 3 varied levels of state trust by manipulating
characteristics of the opponent, rather than assessing a character-
istic of the focal individual. Despite these differences, the two
methods similarly affected participants’ perceptions of the trust-
worthiness of the opponent and of his or her emotional expres-
sions, and both meaningfully moderated the interpersonal effects
of the other’s emotions.

Previous research has demonstrated the important role of infor-
mation processing motivation in determining the interpersonal
effects of anger and happiness on demands and concessions (Van
Kleef et al., 2004b). Negotiators concede more to angry opponents
than to happy ones, but only if they are sufficiently motivated to
consider the emotions of the other and to think about their impli-
cations for their own goal attainment. The present research shows
that trust has a similar moderating effect on the interpersonal
effects of supplication and appeasement emotions. Negotiators
tend to give in when the opponent experiences emotions of sup-
plication, but they stand firm when the opponent experiences
emotions of appeasement. However, this holds only for negotiators
with high levels of trust; those with low trust do not adapt their
demands to the other’s emotion.

The current findings point to an interesting dilemma facing
negotiators who anticipate future interaction. Expressions of dis-
appointment or worry (supplication) can elicit concessions from
others, but they may also contribute to a negative impression. By
contrast, expressions of guilt and regret (appeasement) may serve
to engender a more positive impression, but they may lead others
to stand firm and resist concession making. Thus, on the one hand,
negotiators may be motivated to express guilt or regret strategi-
cally to make a good impression and to induce or maintain a
positive interpersonal relationship, but this would be at the expense
of their personal negotiation outcomes. On the other hand, they
may choose to display disappointment or worry to get their oppo-
nents to comply with their wishes, thereby inadvertently spoiling
the interpersonal climate.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

There are some limitations to our findings. First, there was no
face-to-face interaction. The primary purpose of this research was
to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the interpersonal
effects of discrete emotions in negotiation by generating and
testing new hypotheses about the effects of supplication and ap-
peasement emotions. In doing this, we made an explicit decision to
maintain as much experimental control as possible, and we chose
to use a computer-mediated negotiation paradigm to permit a
carefully controlled manipulation of the opponent’s emotion. As a
result, some caution is needed when generalizing the results. At the
very least, our findings pertain to computer-mediated negotiations.

Given the pervasiveness of negotiation as a form of social inter-
action and the increasing popularity of information technologies as
a communication medium, the question of how individuals react to
each other’s emotions in computer-mediated communication is
itself of great theoretical and practical importance (McGrath &
Hollingshead, 1994; McKersie & Fonstad, 1997; Moore,
Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). However, considering
that our paradigm has previously yielded results that have also
been found in face-to-face settings (Sinaceur & Tiedens, in press)
we have no reason to suspect that our findings are restricted to the
domain of computer-mediated interaction. Future research could
shed more light on this issue by investigating the extent to which
the interpersonal effects of emotions relating to supplication and
appeasement generalize across settings.

Another issue concerns the “cognitive” nature of the emotion
manipulation that was used in the present experiments. The fact
that we used verbal manipulations of emotion raises the question
of whether our findings generalize to settings in which emotions
are communicated in a different manner (e.g., nonverbally). One
could argue that the effects would be different if people were
presented with behavioral rather than cognitive emotion cues. This
possibility cannot be ruled out on the basis of the present data.

However, previous research on anger and happiness in negotia-
tions has documented similar effects regardless of whether a verbal
(Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b) or nonverbal (Sinaceur & Tiedens, in
press) manipulation was used. We therefore have no reason to
doubt the generalizability of our findings. However, future re-
search is needed to explore this issue in greater depth.

A final issue concerns the way in which the information about
the opponent’s emotions and personality was presented. We told
participants that the computer had randomly determined that they
would receive information about the intentions or personality of
their counterpart, but that the other would not receive such infor-
mation about them. A possible downside of this procedure is that
it created an asymmetric situation in that participants believed
that they had more information about the opponent than vice versa.
For one thing, knowledge of this fact may have given participants a
sense of power over the opponent. Given that previous research
has found that high-power negotiators are less susceptible to their
counterpart’s emotions than are low-power negotiators (Sinaceur
&Tiedens, in press; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, in
press), this asymmetry is likely to have contributed to a more
conservative test of our hypotheses. However, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the informational asymmetry may have influ-
enced our findings in one way or another. Future research might
explore possible differences in responses to the other’s emotions as
a function of the distribution of information.

After a decade of research on the interpersonal effects of moods
and, occasionally, of emotions on the negotiator’s cognition and
behavior, there has been a recent upsurge of interest in the social
effects of discrete emotions in negotiations. This research has
begun to document the interpersonal effects of emotions relevant
to negotiation and conflict resolution. Although the results are
promising, many questions remain unanswered. How does the
expectation of future interaction with the same partner influence
the interpersonal effects of different emotions on negotiation be-
behavior? Are there other variables, besides trust and information processing, that moderate these effects? What happens when more than one negotiator expresses certain emotions? What factors determine whose emotions will have the bigger impact? How long can a negotiator effectively continue to use anger or disappointment as a means of eliciting concessions? Do the effects of these emotions on demands wear off or even reverse in the long run? The investigation of these and other questions will allow the study of emotion in social conflict to continue to advance.

Conclusion

The present research investigated the interpersonal effects of guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry in negotiations. The results showed that negotiators tend to make larger concessions to opponents who experience disappointment or worry (supplication emotions) than to nonemotional opponents, whereas they make smaller concessions to adversaries who experience guilt or regret (appeasement emotions). This effect was shown to be mediated by the focal negotiator’s goals (negotiators with a guilty opponent adopted higher goals than did those with a disapproved opponent) and moderated by interpersonal trust—negotiators with high levels of trust adapted their demands to their counterpart’s emotion, but those with low trust did not. These findings point to the pervasive interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations, and they stress the need for more research on the role of emotion in conflict and negotiation. Such research promises to enhance our understanding of the negotiation process, of the factors that facilitate or hinder constructive conflict resolution, and of the social consequences of emotions in general.

References


SUPPLICATION AND APPEASEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS


Yukl, G. A. (1974b). Effects of the opponent’s initial offer, concession...


### Appendix A

#### Participants’ Payoff Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Price of phones</th>
<th>Warranty period</th>
<th>Service contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Payoff</td>
<td>Warranty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$145</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$140</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$135</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$130</td>
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<td>5 months</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>6 months</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>7 months</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$115</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>$110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Prices in Euros were converted to U.S. dollars and rounded to the nearest U.S.$5.

### Appendix B

#### Statements Used for the Manipulation of the Opponent’s Emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent’s emotion</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After Round 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointment</td>
<td>I am pretty disappointed about this, I think I will offer 8–7–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>This worries me quite a lot, I think I will offer 8–7–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>I feel guilty for not having conceded more, I think I will offer 8–7–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret</td>
<td>I feel sorry that I haven’t conceded more, I think I will offer 8–7–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No emotion</td>
<td>I think I will offer 8–7–7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| After Round 3 | |
| Disappointment | This is going awry, I am very disappointed. I am going to offer 7–6–7 |
| Worry | This is going awry, I am very worried. I am going to offer 7–6–7 |
| Guilt | This is going awry, I feel pretty guilty. I am going to offer 7–6–7 |
| Regret | This is going awry, I regret it. I am going to offer 7–6–7 |
| No emotion | I am going to offer 7–6–7 |

| After Round 5 | |
| Disappointment | I am going to offer 6–6–6, because I am really disappointed |
| Worry | I am going to offer 6–6–6, because I am really worried |
| Guilt | I am going to offer 6–6–6, because I feel very guilty |
| Regret | I am going to offer 6–6–6, because I am very sorry |
| No emotion | I am going to offer 6–6–6 |

*Note.* Statements were pretested and have been translated from Dutch. The typing errors deliberately included in the original versions are not shown.

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