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de Cesari, C.

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Heritage beyond the Nation-State?
Nongovernmental Organizations, Changing Cultural Policies, and the Discourse of Heritage as Development

Chiara De Cesari

In this article, I examine the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations and the changing role of the state in cultural heritage policy. These processes rely on an accelerated transnational circulation of policy ideas grounded in a notion of culture as development and participation. In the occupied West Bank, several local but internationally funded organizations work to preserve the historic built environment, supplanting the heritage agency of a beleaguered, nonsovereign Palestinian Authority. In Italy, the government itself has disempowered its own heritage agency. Neoliberal cultural policy discourse has inspired legislative reform that has left the Italian heritage management severely underfunded. In both Italy and Palestine, the lack of state involvement has given nonstate actors increasing responsibility for heritage and blurred the boundary between the state and these nonstate entities. Indeed, the transnational circulation of aid monies, expertise, and policy ideas is an important role. This local practice of resistance by heritage cannot be separated from global discourses. I argue that the current rearticulation of the discourse of heritage and cultural policy is intertwined with a general transformation whereby the contours of the state are increasingly frayed and its functions disassembled across a broad terrain.

In Palestine, the local civil society is unusually active in the field of heritage, which has historically been monopolized by the state. Many committed people from outside the Palestinian Authority (PA) work to protect their living historic environment from the twin pressures of an expanding Israeli colonization and an urban construction boom in the restricted areas under a fragile Palestinian jurisdiction. During my fieldwork, I have come to see that these civil society efforts are both a practice of spatiocultural resistance against the enduring occupation and part of a process of fragmented state formation in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a major role. This local practice of resistance by heritage cannot be separated from global discourses. Indeed, the transnational circulation of aid monies, expertise, and policy ideas is an important force shaping this heritagescape, with international donors in particular pushing Palestinians for a development agenda—however unlikely it is that “development” might materialize under occupation. In Palestine, embedded within a distinctive institutional geography of NGOs, I have encountered an equally distinctive heritage discourse—what I call “heritage as development” or “heritage as development and participation”—that emphasizes using heritage to improve people’s socioeconomic conditions, as opposed to preserving the allegedly intrinsic aesthetic and historic values of heritage that are traditionally foregrounded by older discourses of cultural policy.

Similar processes—proliferating NGOs and the remaking of the heritage discourse—are detectable in a number of other Middle Eastern and European countries, including Italy. In recent years, amid major cuts in the state cultural budget, a broader Italian movement to defend the commons has fought against what critics view as the state’s pernicious retreat from and growing privatization of heritage (as symbolized by major luxury shoe company Tod’s paying for the restoration of the Colosseum). Italy has a robust and long-standing tradition of dirigiste (centralized cultural policy), with the management of cultural resources and museums largely controlled by the state, but this policy area has been the object of intense legislative activity as well as heated public debate in the past two decades. As in Palestine, civil society in Italy mobilizes the language of heritage as development and participation—as, paradoxically, the Italian government itself does, even if for contrary purposes. New discourses of cultural policy tend to delegitimize the state and call for broader citizen involvement in heritage—discourses that have now become dominant across both policy and activist networks. This shared vocabulary, this surprising convergence, is what puzzled me about the discourse of heritage as development, which—with its ubiquity, versatility, and chameleonlike nature—is put to work by very diverse actors for very diverse projects.

The article starts from this paradox: How can the same discourse and institutional technologies exemplified by NGOs be put to work for very diverse purposes? How are the roles of the state and civil society in heritage and culture being renegotiated? In what follows, I examine the proliferation and growing influence of NGOs (“NGOization”), destatization, and the contested, shifting institutional geographies of heritage in Palestine and Italy, as well as the discourses that inform and legitimize them. NGOs and ideas of development and participation by means of culture, of course, are not specifically Palestinian or Italian phenomena but are typically globalized and deeply

Chiara De Cesari is Associate Professor in European Studies and Cultural Studies at the University of Amsterdam (Postbus 1619, 1000 BP Amsterdam, The Netherlands [c.decesari@uva.nl]). This paper was submitted 19 XII 14, accepted 6 III 18, and electronically published 4 II 20.

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ambiguous (De Cesari 2012). Scholars have noted uncanny similarities between neoliberal policies and the language and certain technologies of a leftist art of government (Ferguson 2010, 2011; see also Elyachar 2005), and NGOs are a key platform for what Evelina Dagnino (2007) calls a “perverse confluence” of democratic emancipatory projects and neoliberal ones (see also Clarke et al. 2014:175–177). The proliferation of the NGO form arguably originated when social movements professionalized and became NGOs by taking on the objectives and paradigm of development across the world, especially under the influence of international donors (Bernal and Grewal 2014b). In the process, for some critics, NGOs have been hijacked by a growing neoliberalization, an expanding regime of policies and practices appropriating alternative imaginaries, and have become agents of new forms of flexible governmentality (e.g., Sharma 2006). NGOs are organized people with a moral mission to improve human lives, solve a social problem, or provide a service that is lacking but is perceived as highly needed (Sampson 2017; see also Lashaw 2012). But while most NGOs maintain a strong self-perception of being separate from and opposed to the state, anthropological research has shown that NGOs are, in fact, deeply entangled with it (Bernal and Grewal 2014a; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Fisher 1997; Lashaw, Vannier, and Sampson 2017). Herein I analyze how NGOs came to shape heritage and cultural policy.

This article juxtaposes Italy with Palestine to both compare and trace the links between shifting configurations of cultural heritage management and discourse under very different kinds of state—namely, what political scientists would consider a “normal” and an “exceptional” state or a “strong” and a “weak” (even failed) one. I prefer to stress the colonial/noncolonial axis as the key difference between the two political contexts, with the “State of Palestine” as (partly) recognized by the United Nations, displaying some characteristics of a state (like an expanding bureaucracy) while being subjected to a military occupation and ongoing colonization by Israel and thus essentially lacking sovereignty. What brings these two cases together is that heritage is of major political salience in both. In Palestine, heritage is a key battleground where Palestinians struggle with Israelis (and with each other) over the future shape of the state. In Italy, heritage has been an important site of a struggle over competing visions of the common good and the postwelfare state. Significantly, there is much traffic between the two countries—although it is asymmetrical—with significant Italian development funding going into Palestinian heritage projects and plenty of experts going back and forth as part of task forces, missions, and all kinds of training programs. (Note that Italy has often claimed for itself a leading, global role in cultural policy, most recently with the organization of the first G7 meeting on culture in March 2017.)

What is to be gained from such a comparison that attends to cross-border connections too? The choice of an exceptional quasi state under a colonial occupation might seem odd and even fundamentally misplaced in an article examining the changing relationship between heritage, governmentality, and the state. Yet Palestine is simultaneously exceptional and arguably paradigmatic of broader trends in newer forms and rationalities of distributed government beyond the state (see Feldman 2008). Moreover, contrasting very different states and contexts throws into sharp relief their unlikely similarities—such as the NGO-ization of heritage and cultural policy—and the global connections that sustain them. In Palestine and Italy, indeed, policy making is heavily affected by an intensified transnational policy traffic (Peck and Theodore 2015) and by the global resilience of neoliberal ideas of the state and “good government” (Jessop 2014). But contrasting very different states also helps me avoid the trap of analytically attributing a single character to either institutional formations or discourses and the related danger of reproducing the narrative of an all-encompassing causal force called neoliberalism refashioning all that it encounters—particularly social movements and civil society—in its own likeness (a tendency that anthropologists have criticized in the past decade; see Clarke 2008; Ferguson 2010; Ganti 2014; Kipnis 2008). While I recognize the enduring power of neoliberal rationality, the fundamental differences between my two case studies prevent me from bringing similar phenomena—ideas and the technologies that operationalize them—together as the product of a homogenizing neoliberalization and enable me to instead focus on the back-and-forth movements between emancipatory and neoliberal projects and the cracks and fissures, the counter-uses and appropriations, of heritage discourses that are currently remaking the state.

State Transformation and the Discourse of Heritage as Development

How does cultural heritage articulate with new forms of transnational, neoliberal, and nonstate governmentality? The state has changed under neoliberal globalization along with dominant discourses about how it can work better—what constitutes “good governance”—and, crucially for my argument, how it can put culture to use. Heritage has long been implicated in discourses of cultural nationalism, and in nation-building projects worldwide, as an affective and effective narrative able to give substance and depth to the imagined community of the nation, binding it together (Anderson 1983). Nation-states have legitimized themselves by mobilizing tales of great past civilizations and laying claim to their legacy (Abu-El Haj 2001; Colla 2007; Herzfeld 1991; Thatcher 2018a). During the twentieth century, many countries have developed protective legislation and set up specialized state agencies to manage the national heritage, which was seen as a public good and as valuable in and of itself, and to use that heritage for the enlightenment, education, and identity-building of the public (Choay 2001). Museums and other governmental interventions in culture acted as “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser 1971). Motivated by a desire to shape the identities, values, and conduct
of visitors, such institutions were intended to civilize the public and turn individuals into good citizens: in this way, they helped form and consolidate liberal modes of government (e.g., Bennet 1995; Smith 2004) but also played a key role within several authoritarian regimes (e.g., Davis 2005). Arguably, state involvement in heritage—or rather heritage as part of an expanding state apparatus—grew throughout the second half of the twentieth century in much of Europe and the Middle East (Daher and Maffi 2014; Harrison 2013; Thatcher 2018a).

But policy makers in widely diverse places have begun to frame and regulate heritage in new ways from the 1990s onward. This is connected to the ongoing restructuring of globalized governance and the fact that, today, what is called the state often consists of a multiplicity of governmental technologies and devices extending well beyond its alleged confines (Gupta and Sharma 2006; Hilgers 2013; Jessop 2016; Rose et al. 2006). Scholars have noted a process whereby actors and sites of government have multiplied across scales, or a “destatization of government” (Miller and Rose 2008:212), especially along transnational vectors (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Trouillot 2001). A strict distinction between the state and civil society can in no way be taken for granted (e.g., Mitchell 1991); this is also because several traditional state functions have migrated to nonstate entities like NGOs. Some have advocated a “disaggeregated view of the state” (Gupta 2012:71–72). International and transnational actors—for example, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the European Union (EU)—are playing an increasingly large role as well, shaping national laws and institutions and mobilizing resources and initiatives (Bendix, Eggert, and Peselmann 2012; Lähdesmäki 2016; Meskell 2016, 2018; Niklasson 2017).

Whether such restructuring of the state amounts to a retreat or represents a reconfiguration or even an expansion of the state in disguise is a matter of debate among scholars.2 Contrary to what neoliberal ideology would have us believe, for Loïc Wacquant (2012), neoliberal policies do not bring about the withdrawal but rather the “reengineering” of a “centaur-state,” which Wacquant reads, along Bourdieu’s lines, as a “space of forces and struggles over the very perimeter, prerogatives and priorities of public authority” (73). Such a protean understanding of the state as a field of conflicts and contestation, as something that is being constantly reworked, constructed, contested, and reconfigured—the “contingent product of a changing balance of political forces located within and beyond the state” (Jessop 2008:124)—is particularly relevant to both the Italian and Palestinian contexts. In the former, the state continues to be central to heritage processes, even if it appears to be redeployed in the service of the market; in the latter, heritage also functions as a kind of state apparatus in the making, despite the ambiguous status of the Palestinian state. My argument is that there is an ongoing struggle over the very contours of the state in both Italy and Palestine that translates into relentless institutional change and instability, or a kind of “experimental statecraft” (Peck and Theodore 2015) at the margins of the state.

New discourses of cultural policy accompany this reconfiguration of the state. These discourses have a set of features in common. First, they rest on a transnational policyscape (Peck and Theodore 2015; for heritage and museums, see Levitt 2015), which explains why policy talk can appear so similar despite occurring in places that are very far away from each other. Policy ideas, practices, and routines circulate speedily across globalized expert networks—transnational professional forums, seminars, and training programs but also international charters—especially in and through widely applied policy packages, which reflect the standard-setting practices of organizations such as UNESCO or the EU. National heritages are thus increasingly interconnected because “best practices from elsewhere pervade so much of the policymaking conversation” (Peck and Theodore 2015:135).

Notions of global discourses like the “authorized heritage discourse” (Smith 2006) getting “vernacularized” (Merry 2006) rely on the assumption of a unidirectional, top-down trajectory that is not representative of the variegated phenomena at hand. Heightened transnational interconnectivity does not produce the exact repetition of policies but rather manifold translations, whereby outcomes are not predetermined; instead, highly context-specific “assemblages” get shaped by local politico-institutional landscapes and histories and “promiscuous entanglements of global and local logics” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010:200, paraphrasing Ong 2006:14). NGOs are crucial mediators in this transnational policyscape because of their capacity to “render local forms of . . . knowledge explicit, quantifiable, and commensurate with knowledge in other locations of the globe” (Elyachar 2015:860). “Engaged universals” like heritage exist and thrive precisely in and through their manifold local appropriations and “frictive” engagements, which both change and propel universals as essentially future-oriented claims (Tsing 2005). Such engagements in turn enable the mediators, like Palestinian civil society organizations, to forge transnational alliances and advance more successful claims to resources and recognition.

Second, that heritage and culture are good for socioeconomic development is common sense among policy makers today (Meskell 2011; Yudice 2003). This belief rests on a relatively new expedient rationality of culture as a resource to be used for other, noncultural, purposes, as potentially able to produce economic gains and stimulate the creative economy, provided that one invests in it. That the logic of the market percolates into every dimension of human life, including those, like heritage and culture, long deemed autonomous, is a well-known feature of neoliberalization (e.g., Brown 2006) and is connected to the shift from industrial-Fordist to cognitive-cultural capitalism (e.g., Rifkin 2000).

2. See the debate on neoliberalism and the neoliberal state that unfolded between 2011 and 2013 in the pages of the journal Social Anthropology, including contributions by Bockman (2012), Collier (2012), and Hilgers (2013), among many others.
In the Global North, policy makers have increasingly supported the so-called creative industries and projects of culture- and heritage-led urban regeneration because they have come to see culture as directly connected with the economy (O’Brien 2014). In the Global South, this idea spread as part of a new discourse of sustainable, participatory development that emerged out of the critique of traditional state-centered approaches; this discourse emphasized more locally attuned culture-based forms of development, often connected with tourism (Labadi and Gould 2015; Lafrenz-Samuels and Lilley 2015). Beginning in the late 1990s, even major international agencies like the World Bank moved from viewing local heritage and culture as obstacles to development to mobilizing them actively—the idea being that heritage is a key resource that poor countries can exploit to generate income (World Bank 2001). This transition in how heritage and culture are framed by policy occurred in the context of a broader shift from the older top-down, state-centered development paradigm to one based on empowerment and participation (Gupta 2012; Mosse 2013). Thus, across Palestine and elsewhere, heritage projects have proliferated in the past two decades as part of development schemes funded by international donors, often taking the form of urban renewal. In both Palestine and Italy, unsurprisingly, heritage is talked about as the “oil” of the country, promising a future of economic prosperity.

Third, new discourses of cultural policy fundamentally de-legitimize the role of the state in favor of a broader social involvement or participation by what is variously called the “people,” the “citizens,” or the “local communities” as well as various kinds of “public-private partnerships” (see McGuigan 2004, especially chap. 2). But participation can mean very different things in practice (Baiocchi and Gananza 2016; Cooke and Khatri 2001; McQuarrie 2013); often, in the recent proliferation of community-based participatory heritage projects, commodified and governmentized forms are difficult to differentiate from grassroots ones (e.g., Coombe and Weiss 2015; Roy 2009; Waterton and Smith 2010). Civil society projects may adopt a heavily市场化ized language of heritage, whereas private for-profit projects may be justified in the name of “involvement”; both types of projects tend to perform functions that were once performed by the state. The state itself can effectively mobilize participatory heritage as an instrument of government (De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015). For example, according to Emma Waterton (2010), the UK New Labour policy of social inclusion did invite those who had been thus far excluded from heritage to participate in it; yet instead of including long-silenced pasts, what this policy achieved was a kind of unmarked assimilation to a “notion of heritage that privileges the cultural symbols of a particular social group—the white, middle- and upper-classes—to which other groups are strongly encouraged to gravitate” (Waterton 2010:2). Neoliberal political rationality, crossing political boundaries and even incorporating its own adversaries, seems to involve citizens in the very process of governance in the framework of an increasingly “collaborative view of the state” (Dahl and Soss 2014:4). But how does participation in heritage actually work in Palestine and Italy?

Shadow Governmentalities in Palestine

The Palestinian NGO Riwaq Centre for Architectural Conservation has championed a localized narrative of heritage as socioeconomic development that appropriates and reworks globally circulating ideas about the “adaptive reuse” of heritage (De Cesari 2010a). In so doing, Riwaq has long acted as the Palestinian shadow ministry of culture and cultural heritage, working toward building a national cultural infrastructure. By inventorying historic properties, drafting new heritage legislation, developing policies, and promoting conservation planning and institution building, Riwaq is a model for all Palestinian organizations doing heritage-led urban renewal and historic conservation. A good example of Riwaq “seeing like a state” (Scott 1998) is the registry of historic buildings in Palestine, a project that Riwaq completed in 2006 after more than 15 years of work (Riwaq 2006). Riwaq’s registry is the only inventory of this kind in Palestine, and it complements the (much less detailed) archaeological database prepared by the ministry.

Riwaq has also been busy with numerous other projects of statist scope. Now working mostly in villages, Riwaq pioneered what later became standard practice in Palestine: restoring historic buildings for public use, for example, as cultural or community centers. The idea is to rescue an important part of Palestine’s heritage and to promote community identity and social cohesion while improving livelihoods and the quality of public spaces. Although the majority of its early conservation projects focused on single buildings (it has restored more than 100), in recent years Riwaq has turned to rehabilitating entire historic centers in long-neglected rural areas, with a broader vision of preserving a representative sample of Palestinian historical architecture (see fig. 1). The “50 Villages” scheme targets the 50 most significant historic centers of the West Bank and Gaza to rehabilitate them and create heritage bodies within their municipalities.

Riwaq pursues systematic territorial knowledge and a comprehensive approach; in this way, it has achieved a structural, capillary presence across the Palestinian territories. This type of knowledge and mode of intervention is traditionally a mark

3. This anti-state development-orientated narrative of cultural policy resonates with a broader neoliberal discourse about how the res publica should be run, and especially about the need for a “new public management,” which became dominant in the Global North in the 1990s and which insisted not only on market mechanisms but also on the decentralization of authority and empowerment of citizens (McGuigan 2004:46–47; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Key tropes of this neoliberal discourse of governance endure in more recent models of public administration, even those that purport to critique neoliberalism, such as, for example, the public value approach, which defends the positive role of government while stressing the necessity for public managers to “harness the commitment and resources of all three spheres, state, market and civil society” within a “networked community governance” (Benington and Moore 2011:14; see also Benington 2011).
of the state. In Palestine, however, it is nonstate entities like Riwaq that take over the function of institutionalizing heritage conservation at both the local and national levels. When the Swedish international development agency, a key donor for Palestinian heritage and sponsor of cultural development worldwide, decided to integrate its multiple heritage funding tracks, it first picked Riwaq and not a PA ministry to manage this ~€10,000,000 program and coordinate all the other beneficiary organizations. (Later, when this decision was contested, the leadership passed on to the local UNESCO office.)

The Riwaq example emerges from the particular political and historical conditions of Palestine, but NGOs are growing throughout the region together with a movement away from state-oriented cultural policy. In most Middle Eastern countries, heavily centralized state-directed cultural policies originating in the colonial period have been in place since independence (e.g., Colla 2007; Daher and Maffi 2014; Massad 2001). In the past two decades, however, private museums have mushroomed in cities like Istanbul and Beirut, while the boom of mega-museums in the Gulf is pushed forward by a muddled coalition of state and private interests (Arslan 2009; Downey 2016; Mejcher-Atassi and Schwartz 2012). That a transnationalized civil society plays a crucial role in preserving a cultural heritage of worldwide significance in the West Bank is a product of Palestine’s disrupted state-formation process and of the enduring Israeli occupation, but it is also a very interesting phenomenon in its own right, especially given that the West Bank has its own quasi-state infrastructure, the Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage (DACH) of the PA.

Palestinian NGOs, which have boomed since the 1990s, and other international and transnational actors have stepped in to complement a weak and ever-transitional PA in a variety of different domains, including heritage management. Created with the Oslo Accords in 1994, the PA is the semiautonomous entity to which Israel transferred the administration (of patches) of the Palestinian territories it had occupied in 1967. The main power broker in the area, Israel maintains control over borders and movement as well as over the majority of the land, which includes a multitude of expanding Jewish colonies and many archaeological sites. The promise of full independent statehood embodied by the PA never materialized due to the failure of the so-called peace process (e.g., Hilal 2007; Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 2009), which also produced a division between Islamist-ruled Gaza and the Western-backed West Bank PA.4

The state of Palestine, as the PA calls itself since receiving a

4. At the time of writing, Gaza and the West Bank are governed separately by two different political factions. In the West Bank, the reality is one of de facto Israeli military control and what some critics consider a puppet state. Gaza, on the other hand, is in a state of permanent siege.
form of UN recognition in 2012, tries to act like a state—and an authoritarian one at times—but in fact it struggles to do so, given its fundamental nonsovereignty and territorial fragmentation. For some, this is a state that failed even before coming into existence, because failure was inscribed into the very accords that created it (Said 1993). As I have argued elsewhere (e.g., De Cesari 2010a, 2019), the PA is only one actor—surely not the most powerful—in a dispersed if heavily polarized field; that is, it coexists with a mutated form of Israeli colonial rule, international aid agencies and major (American, European, and Gulf) donors, and a grassroots infrastructure of local service-providing organizations. However unlikely it might appear, neoliberal models of governance have shaped both PA policies and NGO practices down to the very idea of the possibility of “development” before liberation (Khalidi and Samour 2011; Tabar and Jabary Salamanca 2015).

Colonial conditions translate into a fragmented heritage geography: most conspicuously, in the so-called area C—that is, >60% of the West Bank—heritage sites are controlled by Israel, excavated, protected, and preserved (or neglected) by the Archaeology Unit of the Israeli Civil Administration, that is, the military government of the occupied territories, and in some cases, like famed Qumran, even directly run by the Israeli Nature and Parks Authority as Jewish national heritage. Historically the most important institution in the region, East Jerusalem’s Rockefeller Museum, which was once the Palestine Archaeological Museum, is also controlled by Israel and has long been the headquarters of the Israeli Antiquities Authority. Other key religious heritage sites in East Jerusalem—annexed by Israel after the 1967 occupation in violation of international law—are under the control of various religious denominations (Dumper 2014).

In the West Bank, a kind of “war of position” has been ongoing since the 1990s between the Palestinian “state” and “civil society” that together with the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict has profoundly shaped the local heritage field. This conflict over functions and responsibilities has elicited a number of court cases, mostly occasioned by the frequent occurrence of NGOs working without a license of the Department of Antiquities, but the main battlefield has been the drafting of new heritage legislation to replace the colonial law that until 2018 had regulated heritage work in the Palestinian territories (Kersel 2015). Based on their review of heritage legislation worldwide (including the Italian heritage legislation), Palestinian NGOs in the early 2000s drafted a new law widening the scope of public protection from antiquities older than AD 1700 to the recent vernacular past and involving more actors beyond the state. Yet this new law was long the object of behind-the-scenes negotiations and fights pitting NGOs against the Department of Antiquities, most adamantly around the issues of PA control of NGO activities and funding, and centralization versus decentralization of heritage management. Later, the department drafted its own (counter) law, but the Palestinian Legislative Council has not ratified any heritage legislation thus far, having essentially dissolved after the Islamist Hamas electoral victory and the 2007 Fatah/Hamas West Bank/Gaza split. A presidential decree of 2018 gave the West Bank a new heritage law, but before that only antiquities were formally protected in the Palestinian territories.

This legislative-cum-political stalemate of the past 10 years and the interplay of internal Palestinian and external factors has produced a precarious arrangement in heritage with an unofficial division of labor: the Department of Antiquities does mostly (salvage) archaeology, and nongovernmental and semigovernmental organizations take care of the recent past and vernacular built heritage, which remained for a long period of time outside of the scope of the old colonial law then in place and therefore outside of DACH’s official mandate. (As noted above, East Jerusalem, Area C, and Gaza as well as Palestinian heritage in Israel fall under different regulatory frameworks.) Working on the ground where the PA is absent, cultural NGOs, civil society museums, and galleries have also tried to coordinate with each other by creating networks and partnerships (see fig. 2), and they have kickstarted an emerging, broader cultural infrastructure that has resulted, for example, in the establishment of the Palestinian biennial, called Qalandiya International, by an alliance of organizations.

The PA focus on archaeology is a colonial legacy, ultimately the product of a Weltanschauung that considers only the Biblical, pre-Islamic heritage to be worthy of preservation as the cradle of Western civilization and vestige of ancient Israel (Bshara 2013; see also Abu El-Haj 2001). Yet paradoxically, the archaeologist who set up the PA Antiquities Department and ran it for almost 20 years was a former leftist militant profoundly committed to overcoming this legacy. His broader goal was cultural self-determination, that is, to write a “Palestinian history from a Palestinian point of view” (Taha 2006) that could be “diverse” and “multicultural” (Taha 2002); his broader goal, in other words, was to articulate a subaltern, cosmopolitan narrative against the long-standing hegemony of mono- 5

lithic colonial and later Zionist versions of the past, exclusively focused on biblical history and archaeology, narratives that helped obliter ate both the Palestinian past and present (Abu El-Haj 2001; Glock 1994; Masalha 2007; Yahya 2010). But these statements of cultural nationalism already signal the sundry ways that DACH itself is transnational: it is dependent on international funding as well as globally circulating narratives of heritage as development and heritage as celebration of cultural diversity (UNESCO 2001). In more recent years, DACH also has adopted the language of community archaeology and participation, in part to make its projects more palatable to the international donors.

The proliferating Palestinian heritage organizations that, like Riwaq, rehabilitate historic heritage and engage in urban renewal mobilize a similar discourse, but they are perceived by the Palestinian public as more efficient, modern, and professional than their “state” counterpart, if not untainted by
neoliberal logics. While the PA struggles under a patchwork sovereignty and a chronic funding deficit, NGOs have benefited from growing donor funding after 2000; the EU, for example, now actively supports the “engagement of civil society organizations . . . in governance . . . as partners in policy making and management of public resources” (see Costantini, Salameh, and Issa 2015:11). NGOs have managed to revitalize large areas in the historic centers of the most important West Bank towns, in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron, and in an increasing number of villages. Made up of highly dedicated individuals with a mission and often wide transnational networks, these heritage organizations are much better at obtaining funding from European (and Arab) donors thanks to their professional expertise and connections and thanks to the very language that they speak. As in other contexts in the Global South, where NGOs are booming under aid regimes (e.g., Bernal and Grewal 2014b), some Palestinians do criticize NGOs for being after the money and especially for following the donors’ agenda as opposed to Palestinian interests (Allen 2013; Challand 2009), but it is mostly NGOs in fields other than heritage that have been the targets of such critiques.

The language and practices of Palestinian cultural heritage have both deep local roots and global ramifications; they are not an imposition, a localization of a transnational regime of rules and routines, or a top-down movement. In Palestine, the alliance between heritage and political activism has a long history: for example, the Palestinian Folklore Movement, which was part of a broader process of nationalist mobilization that led to the First Intifada, pioneered participatory heritage in the West Bank in the 1970s and 1980s (De Cesari 2019). At the same time, the phenomenology of Palestinian heritage today cannot be understood without reference to globalizing processes and transnational circuits of knowledge, expertise, and money. Palestinian NGOs in general have taken advantage of the major, post-Oslo increase in foreign and particularly Western aid in support of the so-called peace process and, indirectly, of the later carrot-and-stick approach of donors who have diverted monies from the PA to the NGOs. Palestinian heritage organizations have benefited from the emphasis of (some, especially European) donors on culture- and civil society–based models of development. But it was the efforts of Palestinian heritage practitioners and cultural operators who worked creatively with donors that managed to put heritage on the agenda to get funding for their projects.

In practicing heritage as development in Palestine, in reworking its terms on the basis of a specific local social-organizing tradition and a reality of conflict, Palestinian practitioners actively participate in a globalized apparatus that is made up of overlapping networks of activists and practitioners (International Council of Museums, International Council on Monuments and Sites, Cultural Heritage without Borders), larger and
smaller organizations (UNESCO, the World Heritage Centre, Agha Khan Foundation, Euromed Heritage, the Ford Foundation), conventions and charters, standard practices, and set programs of action. All kinds of NGOs facilitate a multidirectional—and yet asymmetric—transfer of knowledge and policy ideas centered on development, which is the object of innumerable workshops, conferences, working groups, and most importantly joint projects with Palestinian institutions. It is in these networks—the term “apparatus” suggests perhaps too much of a formal, rigid infrastructure—that a shortcut takes place between grassroots critiques of state-led heritage in the name of people’s emancipation and neoliberal discourses of heritage, rearticulating the former into a new common sense, a new “authorized heritage discourse” (Smith 2006).

This frictive connection becomes especially apparent in the clash between centralized and decentralized visions of the future of Palestinian heritage. For Palestinian NGOs, a decentralized partnership management is more efficient, because it involves civil society and local government, in contrast to “the [state] Cultural Heritage Department requir[ing] an army of employees” (Al-Jubeh 2006:7); it is also, they say, more democratic. It is worth quoting from a paper by an NGO leader to understand their logic:

The society has a right to self-determination for what concerns heritage. Monopoly was acceptable in the past under the central state. But now, under the democratization of the state and its apparatuses, and under the rapid or gradual giving up of the oriented economy by the state, it is preferable that the law provides the private sector with potentials to invest in cultural heritage. This is because whatever capabilities the state has, it will not be able to cover the high costs of this sector. The experience might be gradual and ascending, and not about shifting from an oriented to a privatized heritage. The latter is not what we mean. What we mean is the state’s non-monopoly of investment in cultural heritage. (Al-Jube 2006:10, my own translation)

For Palestinian heritage NGOs, the battle for decentralization in heritage does not contradict their call for the state to do its job in setting the general regulatory framework through which civil society can participate in making heritage and culture thrive. Many of those associated with Palestinian heritage NGOs, like Al-Jubeh, did, in the name of the national cause, have a stint working for the PA but grew disillusioned with it, seeing the PA as failing and would-be authoritarian; they therefore created their own organizations to make up for the state’s shortcomings. Hence, calling for “the state’s non-monopoly” in heritage is both a recognition of a matter of fact (that NGOs are alone on the ground) and a demand for the PA to take citizens seriously and to deal pragmatically, creatively, and democratically with the dilemmas attached to its own weakness.

But this language of resistance and self-determination by civil society surprisingly comes with something close to what Jim McGuigan (2005:233) has termed “NEWLIBERAL-SPEAK,” following Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, namely, a neoliberal discourse representing state management as outdated and autocratic and depicting private management as flexible, dynamic, and democratic. Furthermore, it is this surprising resemblance (of grassroots emancipatory and neoliberal ideas) and the very capacity to connect and translate between local and global idioms (Elyachar 2015:859) that has arguably helped NGOs such as Riwaq acquire development funding and thrive. The calls of NGOs for a democratic, emancipatory heritage travel across transnational circuits and come to resonate with other, more populist, discourses of a “heritage by and for the people,” displacing the state from its former official role as guardian of the public good and firmly placing it in the past of heritage management. Given the exceptionality of the Palestinian condition of nonsovereign dispersed statehood, taking it as exemplary of broader trends may appear questionable; yet encountering a similar discourse elsewhere moved me to think that it could well be a paradigmatic case. Such “mentalities that govern” (Rose 2013:442), crossing political and ideological divides, also shape legislative developments and heritage management in Europe, particularly Italy, as I will discuss in the following section. While Palestinian heritage organizations appropriate a transnational discourse of heritage as development to counter colonization and to build a state of their own, in Italy other agendas and social forces are involved.

The State on a “Disassembly Line”:
The Battle over Italy’s Heritage

_Culture [cultural heritage] is in the hands of what is still a nineteenth-century infrastructure. Soprintendente [state heritage official] is one of the worst words of the bureaucracy’s vocabulary_. (Matteo Renzi, quoted in Sironi 2014, my translation)

Only 4 days after winning a vote of confidence in parliament in 2014, former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi—a man of the center-left Democratic Party (i.e., the European socialists)—cut 2,285 jobs from the state heritage management, which was described, even by those commentators perplexed by the measure, as “a bureaucratic machine . . . of mammoth proportions and often inefficient” (Sironi 2014). This statement is a good example of the hegemonic discourse of cultural heritage policy today, namely, one centered on the idea that the state-based, dirigiste model of heritage management is old, inefficient, and too costly as well as undemocratic. A form of “state phobia” (Dean and Villadsen 2016; Dhawan 2017) targeting cultural heritage management in particular holds sway on all sides of the Italian political spectrum (see also Montanari 2015a:158). As a matter of fact, today an archipelago of NGOs, local associations, cooperatives, foundations, public-private partnerships, and for-profit companies contribute to manage what used to be fully run by the soprintendenze (see fig. 3).

The paradox is that the same politicians who call for curtailing state involvement and increasing partnerships with the
private sector and general public simultaneously celebrate heritage as the very “oil” able to relaunch the country’s ailing economy. Dario Franceschini, Renzi’s minister for cultural heritage, cultural activities, and tourism, had declared while being sworn in that “to invest in the beauties and riches of our country is the best way to overcome the [economic] crisis” and that his ministry was “the most important economic ministry.” Heritage has been heavily commodified, with the policy debate reconceiving the national patrimony as a source of economic revenue that can “raise the competitiveness of the country” (Messineo and Occhilupo 2014). The right-wing Berlusconi government in 2002 implemented the most radical version of such understanding, when it made national historic properties—supposedly inalienable state property—available for sale to finance public works, a blatant for-profit exploitation of heritage that treated it as a resource to be capitalized on for aims that are entirely extracultural (Settis 2002). But more broadly, in the context of a postindustrial Italian economy within which tourism figures prominently, an essentially economic understanding of cultural heritage has emerged alongside a new policy emphasis on "valorization" (valorizzazione), or promoting "use and fruition" as opposed to preservation and conservation proper (tutela). Despite such rhetorical celebration of heritage, state disinvestment and budget cuts in culture are a reality, as if state involvement was an obstacle to unleashing culture’s economic empowering potential (for Renzi, state cultural heritage “chains modernization”). Between 2000 and 2013, a succession of diverse governments have halved the budget of the Ministry of Culture, with public expenditure on culture in 2013 reduced to, according to some sources, 1.1% of the overall state budget, which is well below the European average of 2.2% (Montanari 2015a:155). Most conspicuously, in 2008 the right-wing Berlusconi government drastically cut the state cultural budget in what amounted to a radical rollback of the state’s involvement in culture. But even after Franceschini came into office (to stay for more than 4 years), Italy remained second to last in the list of EU countries’ public spending on culture, according to Eurostat data (Tremolada 2016). And this funding is for the preservation of a national cultural patrimony that not only is considered the largest in the world, Italy having the highest number of properties on the World Heritage List, but is also characterized by being diffuso (widespread), that is, by its capillary dissemination and deep interpenetration with the Italian landscape as a whole (47% of the country’s territory is protected by law).

8. According to the Ministry of Culture and Article 6 of the Heritage Code, valorizzazione ("valorization" or "enhancement") refers to “activities aimed at promoting awareness of cultural heritage and to ensure the best conditions for public use and enjoyment of the same heritage, even by persons with disabilities, to promote the development of culture” (http://www.valorizzazione.beniculturali.it/en/vision.html, accessed May 29, 2018). Interestingly, in English, "valorization" means to ascribe a new value to something, especially by governmental intervention; see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/valorize (accessed April 18, 2018).
Historically, Italian cultural nationalism has tasked heritage with promoting Italian unity and identity and ultimately uniting a divided country. The 1948 Italian Constitution establishes heritage conservation as a fundamental principle and duty of the state: according to Article 9, the Italian republic “protects the landscape and the historic and artistic heritage of the Nation.” This article is the product of a long-standing history of heritage preservation; for some, this history of heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the unification of the Italian state. The postwar heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the history of heritage preservation; for some, this history of heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the preunification states and even the Renaissance.

The postwar heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the history of heritage preservation; for some, this history of the Nation.

duty of the state: according to Article 9, the Italian republic establishes heritage conservation as a fundamental principle and uniting a divided country. The 1948 Italian Constitution establishes heritage conservation as a fundamental principle and duty of the state: according to Article 9, the Italian republic “protects the landscape and the historic and artistic heritage of the Nation.” This article is the product of a long-standing history of heritage preservation; for some, this history of heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the unification of the Italian state. The postwar heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the history of heritage preservation; for some, this history of heritage preservation is the oldest in Europe, going back to the preunification states and even the Renaissance. The postwar regulatory framework goes back to a fascist (but relatively liberal) law of 1939 (Ainis 2009) that established a centralized, top-down heritage management bureaucracy made up of a complex network of specialized departments with local branches, namely, the soprintendenze that Prime Minister Renzi so much despises (e.g., D’Agostino 1984).

But restless regulatory restructuring (Peck and Tickell 2002: 392) along with shrinking public budgets and the broader restructuring of the welfare state has transformed this management system in the past 20 years. From the 1990s onward, both right and center-left governments have promulgated a staggering multitude of laws and regulations affecting heritage. Francheschini has given his name to a reform of Italian cultural heritage management that is only the most recent in a series that pundits have defined as an “insane whirlwind” of legislative activities (Ainis 2009) or even a “normative swarm” (G. Severini quoted in Forte 2015). Like previous reforms, Francheschini’s has sparked a broadly based protest movement with an ongoing national campaign (http://emergenzacultura.org/, or emergency culture) against what activists rather see as a threat to the national patrimony. Often the pattern is that reforms trigger public uproar, which in turn triggers further legislative intervention. Reform-triggering debates also get reignited whenever a piece of the huge Italian patrimony suffers damage—that is, quite often, as when parts of the world-famous archaeological site of Pompeii collapsed—or whenever accusations of corruption are aired, which is also a frequent occurrence. Neither experts nor the public agree about whom to blame, although all agree that the Italian cultural landscape is rapidly deteriorating (see fig. 4); surely these reforms have thus far failed to achieve their stated goal of improving the state of heritage.

Recent legislation shows a number of underlying trends. Most importantly, and despite their chaotic nature, these reforms and the budget cuts have undeniably created the conditions for multiple actors—local, private, but also civil and nonprofit—to enter the heritage arena in what pundits have variously defined as decentralization (Luca, Baraldi, and Gordon 2007) or privatization (Ponzini 2010) of heritage. First, measures have been implemented to devolve former state functions from the center to the regional and local levels, according to the EU principle of subsidiarity, which maintains that services can be better provided by entities that are closest to the citizens and main beneficiaries. For critics, this type of decentralization has expanded bureaucracy and drained resources, because it has fragmented and confused decision-making by essentially juxtaposing a system of regional soprintendenze to the older centralized one—a centralized and a decentralized logic coexisting within a bipolar system in an uneasy and always shifting balance. (Note here the paradox of a neoliberalized...
restless policy making producing more bureaucracy instead of less; see Graeber 2015.)

Second, another set of measures have effectively separated conservation (tutela) from valorization (valorizzazione), or use and development, assigning the second to nonstate actors, who are assumed to be much more efficient than the state at promoting use. Heritage services and functions have been externalized to associations and firms, beginning with the outsourcing of so-called auxiliary services like running museum cafés but growing to include the management of entire sites (and outright privatization in some cases). These measures have been criticized for privatizing profits while socializing costs, because in several cases they have assigned heritage revenues (from ticketing, merchandising, and guided tours) to private, for-profit actors while leaving the cost of conservation exclusively to the state. They have also led to a veritable exhibition industry of blockbuster shows with no meaningful research content, like the most popular Italian exhibition of 2015 on “Tutankhamon Caravaggio Van Gogh,” all brought together under one roof (Montanari 2015a:18ff). Rumors of corruption and crooked contracts abound (Fantauzzi and Sironi 2015). Responding to such critiques, Franceschini quietly created a private law holding company owned by his ministry to compete with private actors to run heritage services and to benefit from the culture sector’s surplus value, which is estimated at 6% of the Italian gross domestic product (Cillis 2016). Public-sector heritage, in other words, is reconfigured by market rationales (McGuigan 2015) so that the state thinks and looks increasingly like a firm—a “slim core surrounded by a conglomeration of suppliers, subcontractors, service providers, temporary personnel . . . and allied firms” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005:74)—thereby indirectly undercutting its own legitimacy and specific role in heritage and culture.

The logic of valorization has disempowered the soprintendenza. A third set of measures have promoted what policy makers call autonomization and managerialization of heritage, including all sorts of public-private partnerships and foundations. Franceschini’s hallmark decree has created 20 major heritage sites (for archaeology, art, and architecture). It also points to the growing significance of volunteers and citizen initiatives to the upkeep of the heritage agencies, which are perceived as hindering modernization (Montanari 2015b).

Soprintendenza personnel describe what has happened to their own institution as svuotamento (the agency having been “emptied out” or “evacuated”) coupled with institutional exhaustion due to endless internal reorganization.15 Salaries remain very low, while there are fewer and fewer permanent positions within the state heritage agency because jobs have been cut and retired professionals are not being replaced. Temporary employment and precarious working conditions have become the hallmark and norm of cultural labor, with highly specialized experts now forced to work in underpaid, flexible positions.16

One heritage site can provide a glimpse into this forced evacuation of the state heritage management. It is a small archaeological museum displaying a magnificent collection of archaic Greek pottery located in a seventeenth-century villa on the southern island of Ischia, an important tourist destination. The municipality together with the local soprintendenza branch run the Pithecusae museum. A far-sighted mayor bought the location in the 1970s, and the museum originally had 12 employees. By 2017, however, it was run by one soprintendenza functionary, who was not present on-site and had multiple other tasks, and one remaining guard, who had not been paid for the past several months. Local volunteers included three archaeologists, who sometimes also worked for the soprintendenza on temporary contracts. The town had meanwhile become insolvent, amid rumors that its administration was planning to sell the villa to a luxury hotel company.

The Pithecusae museum exemplifies the dire conditions of abandonment of the so-called beni minori (smaller or less well-known heritage sites that get penalized by the tourism and economy-driven logic that inform policies and privilege blockbuster sites like the Uffizi and the Colosseum (still the main beneficiaries of state investments). It also points to the growing significance of volunteers and citizen initiatives to the upkeep of the national heritage. With more than 7,000 volunteers, the Fondo Ambiente Italiano, an NGO founded in the 1970s on the model of the English National Trust, runs 52 heritage sites and organizes many activities, including opening more than 8,500 heritage sites each spring. There has been a debate among heritage professionals in Italy about whether volunteers are

14. With the so-called Madia law 124/2015.

15. All unmarked quotes in this Italian section come from a series of interviews I carried out with heritage managers and some of the major participants in the heritage debate in 2015–2017.

beneficial to heritage conservation or merely a cheap substitute for professional workers (e.g., Gioli 2014). When I asked one of the Pithecusae volunteer archaeologists for her opinion on the matter, she retorted: “Do volunteers steal professional, permanent-contract jobs? No, you cannot take away what is not there. And without us, the museum closes.” This new role for volunteers and citizen initiatives, but also for cooperatives and firms, has made pundits argue that, in Italy, heritage management is in the process of “going out of itself” (Pastori 2015), that is, being displaced or “externalized” from its former location “within” the state. The problem, of course, is that the system as a whole no longer guarantees scientific quality or a standard of rights for heritage workers. A neoliberalized rationality has transformed centralized management and expert knowledge and an older state’s “way of seeing” (e.g., Scott 1998).

This institutional rearticulation has been accompanied by heated debates about the functions and very contours of the state in heritage. What is striking is that all sides claim to be promoting a more democratic, participatory heritage model. Some media and politicians have represented these debates as opposing statist “conservatives” to “innovators” pushing for an “agile” management and less state involvement; in actuality, this is a clash between two different visions of the participatory state, as illustrated by the fact that key voices on both sides are or have been heads or members of the chief advisory body of the culture ministry. The head of that body as I write, archaeologist Giuliano Volpe (2015), has defended recent heritage reforms as a way of opening up the heritage domain to citizen involvement (see also Carandini and Conti 2012; Manacorda 2014). The problem with heritage for Volpe—a former election candidate on the slate of the radical left—is an outdated apparatus characterized by a hyperconcentration of power in the state (originating in the fascist laws of the 1930s) and an expert-dominated, elitist, and authoritarian vision of heritage that must be dismantled. The state no longer can care for the Italian patrimony alone, so new actors should and indeed are moving in to produce a “thousand new management forms” (Volpe 2015:768). The current regulatory transformations herald a process of “social appropriation” and are to be encouraged as a long-needed democratization of heritage (see also Manacorda 2014).

The counterargument is that the rhetoric of public involvement helps legitimize neoliberal state interventions in the service of capitals and lobbies, producing a loss of popular sovereignty and a less democratic heritage for the benefit of the few, as illustrated by recent incidents such as the closure of Florence’s historic Ponte Vecchio for a Ferrari dinner (Montanari 2015a). From this perspective, the powers that be, including ministers, developers, and the construction industry, attack the soprintendenze for standing in the way of the spread of concrete over the Italian landscape and resisting its full commodification and overexploitation, while justifying this move with the populist argument that they are transferring power from the state’s technoscientific bodies to its elected political ones (Montanari 2015b; see also Amabile 2016; Emiliani 2016). Italy, however, needs a much better staffed, stronger, and more just state caring for the public good.

If the Italian state is “working against itself on an eager ‘disassembly line,’” there are a wealth of local movements and civic initiatives mobilizing outside of traditional political structures to claim citizens’ right to protect their living environment (Settis 2011; 2012). Citizens exercising their right and duty to protect heritage exemplify what Salvatore Settis (2011), borrowing a category of Roman law, calls “popular action” by citizens “assert[ing] the claims of the public interest and the common good, even when the State keeps silent” (21). A famous example is Rome’s Teatro Valle, the old opera house that a group of artists and concerned citizens occupied in 2011 in order to save it from an impending privatization (see fig. 5); by turning the theater into a center of cultural and political experimentation—of a true participatory culture—they preserved a heritage and public space to rethink cultural policy from below as an alternative to neoliberal governmentality and its grip of profit-logic-cum-suffocating-bureaucracy. As in Palestine, when the state fails to act and abandons public space, these kinds of initiatives step in to preserve, use, and develop heritage, thus not simply complementing the state but, at times, substituting for it.

Conclusion

What is at stake in the battle over cultural heritage unfolding in Palestine and Italy is not only the protection of people’s living environments but also diverging visions of states in transformation, whose contours are increasingly frayed and whose functions are disassembled across a broad terrain. In both places, multiple actors of widely different kinds—especially civil society and NGOs—play increasingly important roles in heritage by performing functions that were once the prerogative of the state. There are major differences between the two contexts: most importantly, in Palestine, state “weakness” and “limited capacity” are imposed from without; they are structural and a product of the Israeli occupation. In contrast, in Italy, the weakness of the state is largely self-inflicted and is the result of specific policies implemented by the Italian state itself. Unquestionably, heritage’s commodification and the role of profit and private actors is much less pronounced in Palestine, owing to the limited impact of tourism on the local economy (although the aspiration to build on tourism for the future does represent a powerful drive for both the PA and Palestinian NGOs). But the comparison between colonial and noncolonial contexts foregrounds how quasi-colonial conditions of fragmentation and multiple, graduated sovereignties are also spreading to non-colonial contexts under neoliberal globalization. Put in other terms, “state failure” (whether engineered from within or without) is more of a structural feature of today’s phenomenologies of governmentality than mainstream, Eurocentric theories of

the state—which relegate that failure to a few “exceptional” places outside of Europe—would have us believe (see Jessop 2016).

Having pioneered participatory heritage from the 1970s onward, Palestinian organizations have banked on dominant ideas of heritage—about the value of NGOs and culture for development—among donors and international agencies to implement a kind of urban renewal sui generis, countering colonization and improving local livelihoods. These organizations harness neoliberal rationalities to advance their emancipatory project, tapping into transnational networks that make those organizations stronger but that also influence their actions. At the same time, these organizations function as governmental technologies, as key elements of a “state which is not one” made up of unevenly distributed power nodes, and ultimately providing for a form of “tenuous” government (Feldman 2008) to subsist in the occupied territories. Organizations such as Riwaq then open up real spaces of socioinstitutional experimentation and participation and, in so doing, come to resemble what Jim Ferguson (2010, 2011) has advocated as an emerging “leftist art of government” that can make use of neoliberal tools (see also De Cesari 2010a, 2019).

For reasons in large part well beyond its control, the PA has effectively failed to achieve the goal of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state. In a mutated colonial context, NGOs, together with the major donors, perform traditional state functions, especially in those areas that fall outside of the PA’s limited and fragile reach—the historic built environment being one of them. In a way, the unregulated spaces that Palestinian heritage organizations have occupied can be compared with the areas of deregulation and abandonment created by the rollback neoliberalization of the Italian right-wing government of the early 2000s, with its drastic, blanket budget cuts and attempted large-scale alienation of state cultural property.

In Italy, over the past 20 years, regulatory interventions have turned the local tradition of cultural heritage management inside out. That these developments bear the traces of neoliberal policy making is highlighted by the fact that the single most important principle guiding recent legislation has been an economic one, a product of the so-called spending review to cut the state budget. The Italian state has made an entrepreneurial logic its own, something detectable in how resources are allocated (prioritizing spectacular, profit-making heritage) but also in how the Ministry of Culture works (e.g., via the new in-house for-profit company recently set up to manage sites). Reforms have oscillated between so-called rollback and rollout neoliberal rationalities, whereby deregulation alternates with state restructuring along economic principles.

Reforms have oscillated between so-called rollback and rollout neoliberal rationalities, whereby deregulation alternates with state restructuring along economic principles. The state here is being reconfigured by way of a combination of neoliberal management with “the deliberate stretching of the neoliberal policy repertoire (and its associated rhetorics)

18. For Peck and Thickell (2002), in the United States and Europe, an earlier “destructive” phase of “roll-back” neoliberalism in the Thatcher-Reagan years was superseded by a “creative” rollout phase in the 1990s, with Third Way policies managing the social devastation produced by deregulation through a new kind of “proactive statecraft” (384) that consolidates neoliberalized modes of governance while combining technocratic management with authoritarianism and, paradoxically, devolution.
To say this is not to obscure the power relations regulation is currently being heavily contested (see Ferguson and already separate and opposing entities and view them instead thinking normatively of states and NGOs in heritage as always “rationality has stirred up critiques of Thickell 2002:390). The local deployment of a transnational components, is erasing the specificity of the Italian system without being able to fully neutralize contradictory regulatory logics.19 Through this process, the state has “gone out of itself”—outsourced state functions—for some in favor of the construction industry and abusive property speculation. As in Palestine, nonstate actors are becoming more and more important, but whether this promotes democratization and a more plural heritage is not at all certain: some actors, like the Teatro Valle, resemble Riwaq in their creative, experimental institutionalism, whereas others, such as private, for-profit companies, restrict access to heritage and exploit its benefits for their own gain.

If NGOs are increasingly responsible for how we think and “do” heritage and cultural policy, I argue that we should stop thinking normatively of states and NGOs in heritage as always already separate and opposing entities and view them instead as entangled, sharing a shifting and yet-uncharted terrain whose regulation is currently being heavily contested (see Ferguson and Gupta 2002).20 “To say this is not to obscure the power relations at play in the field of heritage; on the contrary, it foregrounds the ways that such power relations are not to be taken for granted but rather interrogated in their ever-changing forms. It does not assume the state’s ontological superiority or privileged role in a hierarchy and points instead to the frictions generated by the paradox of the state—namely, how it is simultaneously part of and above society, one institutional ensemble among others and yet responsible for their overall functioning (Jessop 2016:248). The boundaries between the state, civil society, and the private sector are undeniably blurred. The Italian example of Civita, allegedly an NGO but one with deep ties to former prime minister and business tycoon Berlusconi, which runs a big slice of heritage services in Italy through both its for-profit and not-for-profit subsidiaries, clearly points at this blurred, frayed boundary. There are revolving doors between the state and civil society too. The last two presidents of the Fondo Ambiente Italiano, the largest heritage organization in Italy, have held key jobs within the Ministry of Culture while advocating for a more prominent role for civil society in heritage as a “strategic alternative” to decreasing public involvement (Montanari 2015a:127). Also, if in Palestine the state heritage agency works essentially like an NGO, with its specialized focus on one type of heritage and its dependency on international donors, it is not uncommon to find a profit logic at work in the civil society sector there as well. Again, this does not mean erasing the key distinction between commodifying and “commoning” uses of heritage. (It is actually very important to distinguish between them by way of careful analyses.) But adopting a reduced, Manichean optics informed by the opposition between state and civil society risks obscuring these distributed, disassembled modes of heritage governance.

An ambivalent, chameleonlike discourse of heritage as development and participation informs this ongoing multiplication of heritage actors and the increasing importance of NGOs. Multifarious actors mobilize this language, yet they often mean very different things by it. Indeed, this language crosses unlikely political and institutional lines, so that we see Palestinian heritage NGOs and Italian *indignados*—but also prime ministers Renzi and David Cameron, the Italian Third Way, and British conservatives—criticizing the authoritarianism of state heritage. In both Italy and Palestine, state bureaucrats are accused of a tyrannical “proprietary conception” (Volpe 2015:732) of heritage. In both places, various actors call for citizens to “do it ourselves” without waiting for the state to care for a people’s heritage (761), which is key to “transform[ing] culture into a trigger of development, employment, and the improvement of current living conditions” (449). No longer mobilized only to enlighten citizens and promote national identity, cultural and cultural heritage are now framed by globally circulating policy discourses as triggering socioeconomic development and curing social ills. But despite this shared vocabulary around heritage, there are major differences that remain. In Italy, the government often mobilizes the rhetoric of civil society participation and heritage as development to legitimize budget cuts. However, many of the heritage policies implemented in recent years by the Italian state have effectively outsourced heritage labor and made it precarious, while letting cultural resources and the environment deteriorate—despite taking such actions in the name of a less elitist heritage and greater efficiency. In contrast, many Palestinian organizations have managed to give substance to this rhetoric of development and participation. Social movements and civil society organizations, such as those in Palestine, have invented a whole new way of deploying culture and heritage in the service of sociopolitical goals by involving nonexperts, but major international cultural and development organizations and an increasingly transnationalized policy-making practice have appropriated and recontextualized these ideas into policy packages. Yet as ideas of participatory heritage are taken up by other forces, and even by states, and become independent from the movement that generated them, one is confronted not simply with a “strange shadowy version . . . an uncanny [neoliberal] double” (Fraser 2009:114).

20. An interesting parallel can be drawn between the current proliferation of nongovernmental organizations in heritage and the nineteenth-century heritage movements and associations that Astrid Swenson (2013) has analyzed for France, Germany, and England.
of the original but with a whole game of shadows and mutual cooptation by opposing forces. So while major heritage bodies like UNESCO have rejuvenated themselves by incorporating alternative approaches to heritage, different kinds of NGOs tap into this now-dominant language of heritage as development to advance their own agendas.

In this intensifying game of mutual appropriations, governmental techniques or devices “migrate”—I would say move back and forth—across political and institutional camps (Ferguson 2010:174). But they remain polyvalent, which also means that there are spaces for reappropriations and resistance. Participation and citizen involvement, in other words, are the names of a struggle to fill these categories with specific meanings. Neoliberalism did not invent participatory heritage, but it attempts to colonize it, while the battle for participation’s substance, its meaning in practice, remains open and looks more like a Gramscian war of position than a frontal attack against a monolithic state.

Looking at this larger picture in the context of cultural capitalism, we can spot signs of a transnational “re-governamentalization” of cultural heritage (cf. Bennet 1995, 2015) along mutated lines: “state heritage” is being rearticulated across a much broader field (see also Coombe 2012). Shaped but not determined by neoliberal logics, NGOs are entangled in state-formation processes and are key to cultural policy today in part because of their capacity to translate between different cultures and forms of knowledge, from the local to the global. Under neoliberal globalization, de facto sites of government proliferate across scales, while core state functions in heritage are outsourced to different local, national, and transnational entities. New policy rationalities travel and are eclectically deployed in a multiplicity of projects that, while constituting a “networked laboratory” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010:211), do not need to produce similar results: such policy traffic is both multidirectional and asymmetric. Is this a neoliberalization of heritage? How to make sense of the counter-uses of neoliberalism by a revitalized Indigenous politics? Is the dominant expert discourse of heritage rejuvenating itself by recuperating criticisms of its undemocratic nature, incorporating oppositional perspectives to guarantee its ongoing hegemony (see Boltanski and Chiapello 2005)? These terms are surely too general for what we observe to be not an all-encompassing discourse but rather a series of interconnected, situated assemblages of glocal actors and logics that are subject to the play of political forces located within and beyond the state.

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the absurdity of development in a context of subordination and under settler colonial conditions. In response, civil society organizations have worked with their limited (and varied) resources to place heritage on the donors’ and the Palestinian official agendas, as well as on the agendas of ordinary Palestinians. In the absence of a strong central authority, NGOs have been able to relatively fill the void in heritage policies and to create local heritage paradigms and approaches.

The local paradigms and approaches are often overshadowed, or concealed, by grand narrative and universal (Eurocentric) approaches such as World Heritage List; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization conventions; charters; or best practices. These metanarratives overlook the potential that sites might offer in terms of serving the needs of the local communities before the tourism sector, which benefits the colonizer much more than it benefits the indigenous population (since tourism is mostly controlled by Israel).

It is common to claim that “heritage” is a European concept/construct that was brought to light by newly born states that strove to call specific memories/nations/citizens into existence. State is also defined in terms of territorial sovereignty and the ability to exclude nonnationals from the privileges/responsibilities of nationals. While heritage and state (in spite of its strength or weaknesses) are almost settled concepts in Europe, in Palestine these are not defined nor, for that matter, do they exist. It is ironic that heritage, in Palestine, is defined by a colonial law that ascribes or denies value of artifacts. Palestine, as a state, is equally problematic. In a sense, Palestine is a nonmember state in the League of the Nations, territorially not delineated nor recognized; the majority of Palestinians are refugees displaced from their homes in present-day Israel and not necessarily living within the borders of historic (British Mandate) Palestine. The implications of these contradictions are central to the questions posed above. How can we, Palestinians, use value systems that undermine our customs and practices the indigenous population (since tourism is mostly controlled by Israel).

As to the decentralization and democratization couple, while decentralization is a neoliberal concept that aims to increase efficiency and reduce bureaucracy, it is also masked by democratization and the peoples’ right (which is not a contested right) to have a say concerning their space and built environment. While in Italy, there is a long tradition of democracy and a longer history of centralization, in Palestine, democracy is not a settled practice and centralization is almost impossible. Under settler colonialism, decentralization is the only possible approach to the Oslo Agreement’s fragmented geography, checkpoints, bypass roads, and Jewish settlement clusters. This means that civil society is always already at greater proximity to the happenings, unlike the heavy bureaucratic web based in Ramallah or Gaza. Democratization of heritage in Palestine, as
civil society calls for, would be the central institutionalizing of decentralization to enable a framework that mitigates risks and malrestoration or excavation practices. In Italy, it seems that decentralization is masked by democratization, which in its turn masks the neoliberal agendas, withdrawal of the state, and creation of an enabling environment of privatization/commodification. In Palestine, most of archaeological sites are in Area C, under Israeli control. Civil society organizations are active in restoring living heritage that is not protected by law and privately owned (including the Islamic or Christian endowments). In other words, privatization processes in Palestine are far different from those driven by structural adjustments called upon by the IMF or World Bank. What we can talk about in Palestine is that within the conditions created after the Oslo Agreement and the creation of quasi-autonomous state, Palestine political and economic elite are intertwined and managed to create an interdependent state of clientele that favors specific projects that do not necessarily benefit heritage or the common welfare, but rather a small group of stakeholders. Good examples are the Intercontinental Hotel that made use of early-twentieth-century Jacir Palace in Bethlehem and tolerating the construction of a private cable car atop of Tell es-Sultan—the most ancient city in the world.

While the Italian heritage activists are waging a “war of position,” the Palestinian civil society organizations have been salvaging the leftovers of an unfinished colonial project and deploying it in meaning-making and decolonization processes. This is not in isolation from the conditions created by settler colonialism, Eurocentric approaches toward heritage, and the state’s quest for a piece of the translocal global dreams and cultural tourism market all woven into civil society attempts to find approaches and paradigms closer to those of the indigenous people than to meta-discourses.

John Clarke
Visiting Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, and Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom (john.clarke@open.ac.uk). 2 IX 18

This is a thoughtful and thought-provoking article that contributes to a number of significant debates within and beyond anthropology—about the changing place and politics of cultural heritage, about changing state formations, about the dynamics of neoliberalization, and about the contemporary visibility of nongovernmental or civil society organizations. I am delighted to have the chance to respond to it, and in these comments, I focus on three issues: the recurring problem of state formation, the hyphenated nation-state, and, finally, what Chiara De Cesari calls the “polyvalency” of neoliberal reform.

There seems to be a general understanding that states are not what they were, but it is more difficult to find agreement on what they have become. This may have something to do with the overreified concept of “the state” (at the heart of so much political science) that itself obscured both the diversity and heterogeneity of state forms. This was important even back in the days when we thought that states looked and behaved like states, before the tides of anti-statism, state reform, and new modes of governing rearranged the landscape, both practical and conceptual. De Cesari leads us through these dilemmas of state (re)formation, contrasting the remaking of the Italian state with the processes of not quite state formation of the Palestinian Authority. But there remains a dilemma: Do we know what we expect a state to look like now? Will Weber’s minimalist view of being able to claim a monopoly of legitimate violence do (especially when the legitimacy of almost any violence is now contested—from international intervention to domestic policing)? More importantly in this context, do we understand the contemporary entanglements of states and civil society organizations as the rolling back of the state (surrendering functions and capacities) or as enlarging the reach of the state through other means (enrolling civil society organizations into performing in statelike ways)? These questions continue to dog attempts to imagine and reimagine states (e.g., Cooper et al. forthcoming; Jansen 2015).

Although it is not a term that she uses, it is important that both of De Cesari’s cases are nation-states (or would-be nation-states, in the case of Palestine). Some time ago, Akhil Gupta wrote of the “unsettled hyphen” that linked nation and state as a way of underlining their contingent linking (1998:316–327). What this article reveals is that all three elements are now unsettled, not just the hyphen. The nation has become the focus of many new mobilizations and reinventions, not least in the revalorization of culture and heritage. From xenophbic restorationism in the old powers (make “X” great again) to nation-building in emergent nations or even nation invention and projection in Palestine, the nation is back at the center of attention—at exactly the point where so many doubt the competence or capacity of states to deliver a future. This article reminded me again of the complex ways in which nations and states are entangled, even though its conceptual register centers on states.

Finally, De Cesari opens out the question of neoliberal reform, asking how the same anti-statist discourses can sustain very different projects—the Italian dynamic of economic valorization and commodification and the Palestinian attempts to link development and participation. But I suspect that the analysis of polyvalency could be taken further in examining how discourses, policies, and practices are translated between different sites (Clarke et al. 2016). In particular, it would be worth thinking about how neoliberalism itself involves borrowings and bendings from diverse sources (activist movements, alternative policy sources, older and emergent politics) in order to create an expansive and potentially plausible discursive and policy repertoire (see, e.g., Newman 2012). It is their articulation into a (shifting) political project that gives them their political character, rather than it being intrinsic to the words, ideas, or policies. This implies that neoliberalism
needs to be treated as a heterogeneous assemblage—both shape shifting and mobile (across words and place). Consequently, it should be no surprise that words, discourses, and strategies can be borrowed again, or even stolen back and inflicted differently (this was the message of Raymond Williams’s [1976] brilliant analysis of keywords and their shifting historical usage).

However, this poses difficult challenges for critical analysis of politics and policy (in whatever field). It demands that we look past the language of policy in order to see what is neoliberal or neoliberalizing in practice. The differences between the Italian tendency toward commodification and the Palestinian tendency toward a form of commoning sustained by the same discourses indicate the importance of looking to practices rather than just policy discourses. But do such discursive borrowings carry political risks? This question applies in both directions. What happens to neoliberal projects as they attempt to appropriate other vocabularies, registers, and policies as they seek to both exploit them and neutralize them, rendering them fit for neoliberal purposes? Do they become deflected? Do the strains, tensions, and contradictions of such assemblages have political consequences? What happens to emergent counter-projects as they try to bend what have become normalized as neoliberal discourse? Can they escape the stranglehold of the dominant? Can they make new possibilities from such impure resources? Judith Butler (1993) once argued that all politics are necessarily made from resources that are “inevitably impure” (241), but the question is what happens in practice: Do the impurities provide the grit for political traction, or do they corrupt and tarnish the project?

Ayhan Kaya
Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University, Santral istanbul Campus, 34060 Beylerbeyi, Istanbul, Turkey (ayhan.kaya@bilgi.edu.tr). 30 VII 18

In her paper, De Cesari deliberates how and why heritage is currently being managed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local communities, and transnational bodies rather than by nation-states themselves. Drawing from two case studies in Palestine and Italy, she finds that several local, non-, or semi-governmental, internationally funded organizations are taking care of an important part of the national heritage in both cases. Although the two cases are historically, politically, and economically very different, both are exposed to neoliberal forms of governmentality in the management of national cultural heritage.

De Cesari’s paper draws attention to the growing impact of neoliberalization of technics of governmentality exercised in the management of cultural heritage. Her intervention is an original one, as she claims that neoliberal governance of cultural heritage takes place in both noncolonial and colonial settings. She argues that the state withers away from the sphere of managing cultural heritage by appropriating local communities and volunteers. Based on a critical heritage perspective, her intervention is complementary to what social scientists have observed since the early 1980s. Neoliberal policies implied that individuals are expected to take care of themselves within the framework of existing free market conditions, while the states become economically minimal. Neoliberal states are very well aware of the fact that individuals who have to learn to be prudentialist are more inclined to generate local, ethno-cultural, religious, or other forms of communities to fight against all sorts of perils of globalization, uncertainty, and insecurity. Communities refer to symbolic walls of protection, cohesion, and solidarity for such individuals.

The retreat to selective national and local heritages seems to be one of the tactics generated by individuals who are feeling lost in the midst of globalization. Heritage is essentially a discursive political idea, which asserts a national interest in tangible or intangible things, traditionally regarded as private. In this regard, heritage is not an immutable entity but a discursive practice shaped by specific circumstances.

In times of societal, economic, and political crises, heritage may give temporal and material authority to the construction of identities, especially when the heritage at stake has been recognized as legitimate through state-sanctioned heritage management manifesting itself by “authorized heritage discourse.” As heritage is ultimately a cultural practice, involved in the construction and regulation of a range of values and understandings, at the national level, it could be perceived as an operational instrument of governmentality in the Foucauldian sense. The origins of the dominant heritage discourse as a form of governmentality are linked to the development of nineteenth-century nationalism, rationality, colonialism, and liberal modernity. Museums, national myths, and symbols, as well as non-portable antiquities and historic buildings, were institutionalized and reified in the same century as manifestations of national identity and cultural achievement. In this sense, the author reiterates very well how that Italian cultural nationalism has historically tasked heritage with promoting Italian national unity and identity since the late nineteenth century. Heritage was even depicted as an essential element of national unity in the 1948 Italian Constitution, which has established heritage conservation as a fundamental principle and duty of the state.

De Cesari introduces us to a particular NGO in Palestine, Riwaq, which inventories historic properties, drafts new heritage legislation, develops policies, and promotes conservation planning and institution building. The author portrays Riwaq as a successful model for all Palestinian organizations doing heritage-led urban renewal and historic conservation. Riwaq generates a distinctive heritage discourse, which is what she calls “heritage as development” or “heritage as development and participation.” This kind of discourse instrumentalizes heritage to improve people’s socioeconomic conditions, as opposed to preserving the allegedly intrinsic aesthetic and historic values of heritage that are traditionally foregrounded by older discourses of cultural policy. The author also reveals that there is an alliance between heritage and political activism. For
example, the Palestinian Folklore Movement, which pioneered participatory heritage in the West Bank in the 1970s and 1980s, later became a part of a broader process of nationalistic mobilization leading to the First Intifada in 1987.

Unlike the Palestinian case where the central state is weak, Italy has a robust and long-standing tradition of dirigiste, centralized cultural policy, with the management of cultural resources and museums largely controlled by the state. However, in a similar way to the Palestinian society, the Italian civil society also resorts to the language of heritage as development and participation. In both cases, though, new discourses of cultural policy tend to delegitimize the state and call for broader citizen involvement in heritage discourses. In her analysis, De Cesari depicts in detail how recently the neoliberal Italian state actors have challenged the hegemonic discourse of cultural heritage policy centered on the idea that the state-based, undemocratic, costly, and dirigiste model of heritage management. Instead, Italian governments are promoting popular participation and citizen involvement in heritage management.

Comparing Palestinian and Italian cases, De Cesari concludes that neoliberalism is now colonizing participatory heritage in both countries. The neoliberal logic develops former state functions from the center to the regional and local levels to maintain the idea that services can be better provided by entities that are closest to the citizens and main beneficiaries. However, the author contests this argument by claiming that public involvement in heritage management legitimizes neoliberal state interventions in the service of capitals and lobbies, producing a loss of popular sovereignty and a less democratic heritage for the benefit of the few.

Eventually, De Cesari convincingly concludes that both in the Global North and the Global South policy makers have become more involved in policies and technics of governmentality that see culture as directly connected with the economy. Be it generating creative industries as in the Global North or culture-based forms of sustainable development as in the Global South, heritage becomes the subject of a very strong neoliberal economic logic percolating everywhere. It does not matter whether there is a weak state with limited capacity imposed from outside as in Palestine or a strong state weakened by populist and self-inflicted policies as in Italy; both colonial and noncolonial contexts are becoming exposed to similar conditions of fragmentation and multiple sovereignties under neoliberal globalization. Thus, one cannot do without wondering whether privatization and decentralization of cultural heritage promotes democratization and a plural heritage.

The answer given by De Cesari to this question seems to be a negative one, as she rightfully observes a neoliberal tourism and economy-driven logic operating behind the discourse of involving civil society actors in managing heritage. This anthropological intervention made by the author opens up new venues for social scientists, policy makers, and relevant civil society actors to see the neoliberal logic that prioritizes NGOs, local communities, private individuals, and volunteers in the management of cultural heritage.

In her comparison of Italy and Palestine, Chiara De Cesari makes a compelling argument for the increasingly important role of the local nongovernmental organization (NGO) in heritage management. De Cesari moves beyond the standard literature on the significance of heritage to nation-building and to state identity by providing an in-depth examination of how current economic, political, and societal situations result in a delegation of caring for culture to nonstate actors. Initially, the assignment of heritage oversight to NGOs appears to be a positive development for the relevant ministries in Italy and Palestine, but De Cesari illustrates the complexities of a state outsourcing care to nonstate groups with competing articulations of heritage.

Given the current global geopolitical climates and economic instability, the cash-strapped governments of Italy and Palestine can no longer rely on foreign aid (European Union for Italy, the United States for Palestine) in support of heritage. One of the first places that states cut budgets is the cultural sector, which, as De Cesari notes, may result in the phenomenon of subcontracting the management of heritage. Luckily, in both Italy and Palestine, a robust and comprehensive set of local NGOs work behind the scenes and at the front lines of documentation, interpretation, promotion, and protection of sites, monuments, and objects. The decision to delegate oversight is a tricky one for states, as the financial benefits from tourism can be substantial. De Cesari illustrates this tension with a comment made by the Italian Minister for Cultural Heritage, who equates heritage with oil, acknowledging the potential for tourism to revive the country’s ailing economy. Because states recognize the powerful messages that a site, building, or object can convey about a cultural legacy and that there is money to be made from tourism, they have not ceded full responsibility for control and oversight to these NGOs. By maintaining administration through policy and law, the state can and does continue to reap the economic benefits of heritage through tourism initiatives, while absolving itself of the daily financial responsibilities of upkeep and staffing.

In May 2018, the Palestinian Decree Law on Tangible Cultural Heritage n. 11/2018 was enacted after a long “legislative-cum-political stalemate” lasting more than 10 years. Major changes to heritage protection in Decree Law No. 11 include an expansion of the time frame from the previous 1700 CE to 1917 CE for those objects, sites, and structures eligible for protection. A more flexible definition of tangible heritage is expanded to include items deemed of cultural, natural, or economic value (emphasis mine). The use of “economic” in the legal definition of tangible heritage means that the government of Palestine may decide to preserve, protect, or interpret a site based on perceived commercial viability, a direct reflection of profit motive and the state. The new Decree Law also includes
a provision for the establishment of a comprehensive national inventory of all tangible cultural heritage in Palestine. As De Cesari notes, Riwaq, the Palestinian NGO dedicated to the built environment, already created and maintains a national inventory—so why does the government need to duplicate this effort? Is this the embodiment of De Cesari’s frictive connection between the centralized and decentralized vision for Palestinian heritage under the new Decree Law? Why did it take the government more than 10 years to enact a cultural heritage law? What broke the stalemate? Has government become more cognizant of the power of the past? Are they afraid of abandoning economic, historical, political, and cultural power to NGOs?

Since 1999, in the face of ongoing occupation and fractured oversight (Kersel 2015), under the direction of the late Adel Yahya, the NGO Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange (PACE) mobilized local populations to repair damaged historic buildings, clean up the areas, build paths to the sites, and assist in creating interpretive signs for visitors (Yahya 2002). Through town hall meetings, community clean-up days, and educational outreach in schools, PACE has encouraged interest in the objects and places of Palestine. Locals adjacent to biblical sites like Bethel (Betin) and Gibeon (Al-Jib), those near various Maqaams (martyrs’ tombs), and village residents near Roman-Byzantine ruins all worked together to protect the past (Yahya 2002). Similar community activities aimed at caring for culture continue through the efforts of other NGOs, museums, and university departments from Birzeit and Al-Quds. Why do the citizens of Palestine take on the mission to preserve and to protect the historical legacy? Are these efforts part of the resistance to the colonial occupation of Palestine, as De Cesari suggests? By protecting the past, are Palestinians securing their future? Tourism to well-maintained sites bringing capital to the adjacent areas through entry fees; the sale of food, beverages, and accommodations; and the hiring of local guides is a well-documented phenomenon. Do the economic realities of heritage motivate locals and NGOs just as they do the state? Whatever the reason(s), the grassroots efforts of Palestinian citizens, NGOs, and educational institutions result in greater attention to sites and objects—a good outcome for an increasingly fraught moment for the local population.

Through a richly described set of examples, De Cesari illustrates that the relationships between states, occupied territories, and NGOs may not always be congenial or even complementary. They can be antagonistic and oppositional with differing goals, motives, and missions, but typically, all interactions occur with the aim of protecting and preserving the cultural heritage of the nation. It takes a village to care for culture, with international conventions, state-sanctioned laws and policies, and implementation efforts by locals and NGOs working toward a common purpose. For decades, Palestine has been the model for decentralization and the effective management of archaeological sites and objects and historic buildings. Does the new Decree Law No. 11 mean a weakening of the position and influence of NGOs in the realm? Or does the articulation of the importance of the economic value of cultural heritage signal a nod to its potential in local empowerment and the role that NGOs can play in establishing greater financial stability in Palestine? Let us hope that the new law intends the latter.

In late August 2018, the US Trump administration made drastic cuts to US assistance for Palestinians. The reduction of US$200 million paralleled the administration’s scaling back of support to United Nations’ efforts focused on Palestinian refugees. For this reason, the move by Trump was not particularly surprising, yet it was sobering. Currently there is a scramble to fill the void, and new players such as Canada, Norway, Turkey, and Gulf states have offered some support, yet it certainly does not fill the void. These and other events confirm that the landscape of US interests in the Middle East and North Africa region and Europe is undergoing a period of catalytic change. Lingering Cold War policies aimed at containment and security-driven rationales no longer propel US-driven funding.

Almost a century ago, Article 22 of the League of Nations (i.e., the mandates) sought to redefine the structure of Empire as reflected in the rhetoric of assistance in the Middle East and the greater Mediterranean. Lines drawn in the sand were about the façade of aid as much as pipelines and railways spanning the desert. Initiatives for archaeology and museums were made possible by the support of key patrons, such as Rockefeller, Carnegie, and J. P. Morgan. These included the footprints of the American Academy in Rome (established in 1894) and the American School of Oriental Study and Research in Palestine (established in 1900 in Jerusalem). Since this time, negotiations with key partners and the respective territories have waxed and waned at punctuated periods. The realignment of southeast Europe at the end of the twentieth century reflected the predicaments that ensued after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1989 Soviet collapse, and the 1990s Balkan conflicts.

We saw an equally, if not more, volatile landscape at the opening of the twenty-first century. As of fall 2018, stability and democracy seem unimaginable ideals. Rather, this century has thus far been consumed by the events of September 11, 2001, the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, the escalation of conflicts in Syria and the resulting mobility of people, and the rampant increase in right-wing nationalism at a global level. Diverse political textures and economic uncertainties make even more vulnerable the promise of democracy and, to be sure, any future roles for the United States as well as Europe. The shock-and-awe events of museums plundered and monuments smashed make clear that heritage gets caught in the crossfire, often as the primary target. People have rallied to these and other calls of heritage in crisis.
What does the future hold? Reconstruction and assistance have always been cash cows for many, fueled by the type of development programs and state-sponsored buy-in reported by De Cesari. The European community’s hesitation in rebuilding against the backdrop of committed Gulf interests reflects the troubled waters still ahead. The author does well to remind us of the pitfalls associated with neoliberalism and its penetrating effects on local communities—the uneven power nodes of cultural capitalism. The discourse of cultural policy and attached funding is always woven into the politics of place, fueled by larger-scale questions of resources, security, and the relative capacity of human agency. “NGOization” has come to redefine the game of assistance. To be sure, we see big players (re)negotiating contracts, such as the UN Development Programme, US Agency for International Development, and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency or direct funding from foreign ministries (e.g., Austria, Germany, Japan, and Qatar). Yet as De Cesari demonstrates, the role of business tycoons as well as specific sectors of civil society, too, shape networks for entrepreneurs and the selective integration of “communities” with “their” heritage.

De Cesari offers a critical analysis as much as a warning of how heritage is embedded in politics. For me, her work has the potential to contribute to future scholarship on social engineering practices that have the capacity to affect entire generations—from the perspectives of history to the languages and traditions that children come to know and emulate (see Luke 2013, 2018). That nations privilege a heritage-driven perspective to define national identity is not new. Scholarship that unpacks the dangerous spheres of nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic participation is welcomed and needed, especially if we are to understand better the tangled webs for state actors, civil society, and the private sector.

Lynn Meskell
Department of Anthropology, Main Quad, Building 50, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA (lmeskell@stanford.edu). 6 IX 18

In this article De Cesari (2010a, 2010b, 2014) extends her already impressive corpus of work analyzing heritage, governance, and sovereignty in Palestine, while simultaneously turning the lens toward Italy, perhaps Europe’s most high-profile arbiter of cultural heritage and conservation. While the two examples might initially seem at odds given disparities in context, cultural capital, and capacity, not to mention statehood and international recognition, she reveals precisely how in each case the roles of the state and civil society are being renegotiated. Increasingly, cultural policy is deployed to ensure broader citizen involvement in the face of receding state support, while promoting discourses of development, partnership, and participation. In a classic example of governmentality, policy makers and bureaucrats aim to produce responsible heritage citizens who will themselves bear the burden of conservation and management efforts as part of a perceived public good (see also Meskell 2011). And while seemingly democratic and inclusive, embracing broader swaths of civil society, one can also see reflected the protean expansion of the neoliberal state. As her incisive study makes clear, such flexible strategies can be implemented by diverse actors for diverse projects.

In the case of Palestine, De Cesari describes how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as vital players in strategies of state building and spatiocultural resistance against the enduring Israeli occupation. These NGOs tend to be active proponents of what she calls “heritage as development” or “heritage as development and participation.” As such, they have been successful in marshaling much-needed visibility, aid, and expertise. In other arenas of “experimental statecraft,” Palestine makes effective use of intergovernmental agencies like the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to gain recognition, maintain territorial integrity, and protect heritage, in what De Cesari has previously termed “anticipatory representation” in global governance. While there has been a loss of faith in international organizations, and it would be easy to be cynical about their effectiveness in solving territorial disputes, Palestinians continue their appeals to international mechanisms and conventions. Since obtaining UNESCO membership in 2011, Palestine has been active in the 1972 World Heritage Convention, inscribing the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in 2012, the cultural landscape of Battir in 2014, and the Old Town of Hebron in 2017. Significantly, all three sites were simultaneously inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, signaling their emergency status and further entrenching international support in a variety of forms (Meskell 2018). In the case of Battir, the UNESCO listing had ancillary protective effects: the Israeli High Court of Justice went on to rule against the planned construction of the Separation Barrier through Battir. This too may be another example of the “perverse confluence” of projects, politics, and participation.

In Italy, De Cesari boldly takes on Europe’s powerhouse of cultural capital, with more UNESCO World Heritage sites than any other nation and deploying its self-proclaimed leadership in global heritage and conservation as an effective tool of international diplomacy. Along with France, Italy brands itself as an arbiter of culture and a bastion of civilization at home, while exporting its particular technical expertise globally, particularly in the Middle East. The fact that sites such as Pompeii and Venice are increasingly under threat from development, commercialization, mismanagement, and poor conservation is often pardoned on a global stage in light of Italy’s international influence in heritage matters. Yet this somewhat hegemonic heritage status is increasingly accompanied by state disinvestment, budget cuts, job losses, and regulatory restructuring, as De Cesari demonstrates. Older ideas of heritage conservation as a fundamental duty of the state, enshrined in the
1948 Constitution, must now uncomfortably adapt to an era of public-private partnerships (PPP). Despite the specter of centralization and strong cultural nationalism, today Italian heritage is being operated, commodified, and privatized in new and controversial ways. I recently witnessed this firsthand while discussing PPPs with an audience of heritage professionals and philanthropists on Rome’s Capitoline Hill, which included Carla Fendi, who was then restoring the Trevi Fountain. Even more controversially, Tod’s, the Italian luxury shoemaker, was busily conserving the Colosseum and Bulgari the Spanish Steps. These and other multimillion euro endeavors are met with public criticism and disdain, while state-based alternatives are unforthcoming. The key concern, as De Cesari notes, is that “when the state fails to act and abandons public space, these kinds of initiatives step in to preserve, use, and develop heritage, thus not simply complementing the state but, at times, substituting for it.”

Taken together, these two heritage landscapes evince very different and complementary visions of states in transformation. Her choice is illuminating, employing the important work she has conducted in Palestine to reflect upon political machinations in Italy, a state that lays claim to historic dominance but also in global heritage policy and management. De Cesari provides a compelling framework for us to trace the machinations and also the tentacular reach of states through other myriad agencies and by other means. She brilliantly captures what many researchers like myself are grappling with in emergent economies like India, where the mix of enduring empire and entrepreneurial models must contend with an overstretched state apparatus, like the Archaeological Survey of India and a neoliberal government that is auctioning off its monuments for private sponsorship amid public outcry. Perhaps unsurprisingly, India’s Minister for Tourism defended its adopt-a-monument scheme by citing Italy’s decision allowing Tod’s role in the Colosseum. So why not in India, and why not at the Taj Mahal? This is indeed the shape of things to come and De Cesari gives us a great deal to attend to, given these new futures for the past.

Cristina Sánchez-Carretero and Victoria Quintero-Mórón
Instituto de Ciencias del Patrimonio—Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Avenida de Vigo s/n, 15705, Santiago de Compostela, A Coruña, Spain (cristina.sanchez-carretero@incipit.csic.es)/Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Carretera de Utrera, kilometer 1, 41013, Sevilla, Spain. 10 X 18

Unfolding the Vocabulary versus Grammar Paradox: The Remaking of Heritage Discourses

De Cesari offers a refreshing and thought-provoking perspective on the “back-and-forth movements between emancipatory and neoliberal projects” in relation to heritage discourses and the current remaking of the state. She proposes to look at heritage, governmentality, and the state from a prism of three key elements: (1) accelerated transnational circulation of cultural policy ideas, (2) culture as development and participation, and (3) the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the rearticulation of the state. The author convincingly argues that the discourse of heritage as development—or heritage as development and participation—uses a common vocabulary in extremely different situations such as Palestinian and Italian heritage management. De Cesari concentrates on the colonial/noncolonial axis as the key difference between the two cases. She demonstrates how, beyond their differences, both cases are very similar regarding the ways that cultural and heritage policies are being remodeled and shape the transformation of the governance models.

The main question throughout the article is how the same discourse and institutional technologies—exemplified by NGOs—can be put to work for very different purposes. The “pervasive confluence” (Dagnino 2007) of the language of neoliberal policies and the language of certain technologies of leftist emancipatory projects is one of the keystones of the article. However, mimicking vocabularies does not mean sharing grammars (Cornwall and Eade 2010). Our suggestion is to place the vocabulary versus grammar paradox at the center of the research (Quintero-Mórón and Sánchez-Carretero 2017). The author concentrates on the vocabulary, but what about the grammar, which includes meaning—semantics—as well as the unspoken rules to communicate—syntax? We want to point out the relevance of ethnographic details on the different grammars of heritagization processes that share the same vocabularies. How are mimicking vocabularies enacted in particular performances? What are their effects? In which contexts are they enacted? The question remains: How can ethnography be used to explore this paradox? In this respect, ethnographic work on the grammar of these common vocabularies is an important step to analyze the trap that constitutes the “neoliberal versus emancipatory projects” dichotomy (Franquesa 2016; Quintero-Mórón and Sánchez-Carretero 2017).

Chiara De Cesari proposes a successful multiscale approach but fails to do the same with the actors involved in each scale. One of the main problems of the article is the limited use of a multi-actor ethnographic analysis. This problem encompasses two dimensions: (1) the generalist and wide use of the notion of “heritage management” that hides the multilayered spheres of “heritage regimes” (Bendix, Eggert, and Peselmann 2012; Haefstein 2012) and the ways that different actors gain access to these spheres, and, related to this first dimension, (2) the scales and characterizations of the NGOs.

In relation to this first point, the author grants a great centrality to the vocabulary and the heritage discourses developed by new actors like the NGOs: “new discourses of cultural policy accompany this reconfiguration of the state.” Nevertheless, her argument around the ways that diverse heritage regimes are activated as well as her argument around the shifting and
replacement of the "authorized heritage discourses" (the old one based on aesthetic and historical criteria is replaced by a new one based on development and participation) become evanescent. Heritage regimes include different tasks, actions, and tools that in the article appear under the overarching level of "heritage management." However, the technologies embedded in this level are complex, and different actors have limited access depending on their features, dimensions/scales, and political projects. For instance, producing heritage laws requires different instruments from those used for implementing heritage policies or designing heritage planning. The infrastructures are different and the role of states, NGOs, and other actors are also diverse depending on these spheres.

Second, exploring, characterizing, and differentiating actors, while going beyond a blurred NGO concept (Bernal and Gray 2014; Ferguson, 2004), are essential to understanding their roles in shaping new heritage discourses and policies. Throughout the article, De Cesari emphasizes that it is important to differentiate between "commodifying and 'commoning' uses of heritage" and that the opposition between state and so-called civil society risks obscuring disassembled modes of heritage governance. However, De Cesari alternates between being specific about the differences among international NGOs and local organizations and mixing both types several times, and even when she marks the difference between NGOs and civil society throughout the article, she equates some grassroots organizations as being on the same level as other international NGOs (see the Teatro Valle, Civita, or the Fondo Ambiente Italiano). Readers would appreciate ethnographic details about the cartography of actors involved in the heritage discourses. Learning about the heterogeneity of NGOs could clarify the different grammars of the "heritagization game" (Davallon 2010).

Finally, we want to point out the importance of the analysis of participation in the article. Participation itself is a buzzword and, at the same time, has received little attention and is a troubling concept in anthropology (Adell et al. 2015; Cortés-Vazquez, Jiménez-Esquinas, and Sánchez-Carretero 2017; Kelty 2017; Roura and Alonso 2018; Sánchez-Carretero et al. 2019). De Cesari uses "heritage as development" combined with "heritage as development and participation." Discourses employed to legitimize different actions—for instance, obtaining funds by NGOs or attempting to give neoliberal lobbies and states a human development façade while trying to privatize heritage management—turn "participation" and "development" into floating signifiers. In these situations, ethnographic work, not only on the vocabulary but also on the grammar of heritage regimes, is much needed. The analysis of the imperative of participation and the consequences of the "heritage participatory turn" is the focus of our research project "ParticipAT" (http://www.participat.org), wherein we analyze "participation" as a governmental technique in terms of the political subjects it creates. The perspective of Chiara De Cesari is very much welcome in this regard, because she is not only interested in the varying meanings of participation in heritage but also in the transformations that participation is producing on the heritage regimes.

Reply

I am tremendously grateful to my colleagues for their generosity in responding to my piece. Overall, their commentaries are remarkably convergent. They prompt me to see and to articulate arguments that were not in sharp focus in the original article. Their commentaries have helped me to flesh out and paint more vividly the key points that I want to make.

To start, I want to dive into the heart of the trouble and respond to what are perhaps the most critical (if very constructively so) remarks offered by Cristina Sánchez-Carretero and Victoria Quintero-Morón in their commentary. They would have appreciated more ethnographic detail about the "cartograph[ies] of actors" playing a role in the processes that I analyze. I fully agree that we need more ethnographies of heritage that attend closely to the complexities of these processes and the variety of actors involved in them: if NGOs significantly shape heritage practices today, they come in many forms and relate in very different ways to the heritage regimes and the states that they operate within and between (Bendix, Eggert, and Peselmann 2012). Moving beyond the dichotomy between official and unofficial heritage and heritage and counterheritage, which is all too often taken for granted in heritage studies, it is essential to grasp this ethnographic complexity. The challenge is to examine how, in a context of shifting state morphologies, governance works today through participation, harnessing not only civil society but also citizens' energies, hearts, and souls, by using heritage to stir passion, attachment, and belonging. This also entails grasping how subaltern groups in turn may harness heritage to stake their claims on the state in more or less successful ways. An overused analytical approach, based on the dichotomy between official heritages and unofficial counterheritages, cannot properly capture the shifting, porous state boundaries of participatory governance.

While calling for rich ethnographies, my article differs from the classic ethnographic essay detailing situated lives, practices, and discourses. It is comparative. It is an experiment stemming from the bafflement I felt in encountering the same anti-statist language being mobilized by different actors, pursuing different purposes, across different places (and even in the same place). I was baffled, above all, at what Evelina Dagnino and John Clarke call the "pervasive confluence" of neoliberal and grassroots idioms and projects. It is crucial that we attend to such unlikely connections, which tend to escape our notice. We need to understand the ethnographic complexity behind this apparent similarity without losing sight of translocal and transnational connections. In Sánchez-Carretero and Victoria Quintero-Morón's terms, the challenge is to both grasp the "grammar" specific to a language and recognize that that language shares a "vocabulary" with other languages. Put differently, we must examine the specific deployments and effects of anti-statist languages without forgetting the many contaminations between state and subaltern histories and trajectories. To say this with John Clarke (and Judith Butler), scholars must attend to "what

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happens in practice,” to what is done by whom using “impure resources” emerging from contaminated histories and trajectories. If neoliberal policy appropriates grassroots ideas and practices, subaltern groups can also make use of it. They can see in, tactically reversing what Audre Lorde famously called the “master’s tools.” Ultimately, what we call “heritage” is not only polyvalent but also traveling fast. It is imperative, therefore, to examine “how discourses, policies and practices are translated between different sites” and with what specific effects (see also Clarke et al. 2015). This is what Khaledn Bshara suggests too. Language is tricky—“traduttore, traditore”—in many ways.

By “grassroots” heritages, I mean subaltern groups’ varied attempts to make long-silenced pasts and identities visible and in the process to claim sovereignty, dignity, and self-determination in the public sphere. How to conceptualize the relationship between these heritage practices and neoliberalized governance regimes that are increasingly premised on participation and transnational connections? What does it mean to resist what Lynn Meskell calls “the tentacular reach of states through other myriad agencies”? What is the state and what is civil society today? John Clarke asks, Is the state opening up a free space for citizen involvement and civil society, or is it coopting citizenry? Is the state actually becoming more authoritarian in disguise? Given the growing ideological and practical significance of cultural policy as a field of soft power, it is important at this juncture that scholars of heritage pose such questions. In framing an answer, a few points need to be made.

Closely connected to the nation-state, heritage and museums have long been an instrument of government (e.g., Bennett 1995, 2015). Our collective memories—the history that common people carry around in their heads” (Carl Becker, quoted in Zerubavel 1995:3)—inspire our sense of self, of who we are, at both individual and collective levels. Such memories are deeply patterned and imprinted by the nation-state in a variety of ways: school curricula, everyday banal nationalism, and urban (and rural) landscapes inscribed with distinctive heritage narratives. Memories are also fundamental to the operation and reproduction of nation-states. In contemporary societies, however, heritage’s roles far exceed those of identity-building and citizen education. Today, heritage is increasingly moored to changing knowledge and cultural economies, to new practices of citizenship and new interpenetrations of the social and the political. States of heritage are in transformation.

In Palestine, national identity is very strong. How has this been achieved without a state infrastructure and a set of ideological state apparatuses in place? Which agencies and bodies produce and instill such affective attachment? If the state is absent, failing, or being disassembled by neoliberal policy, who and what fills the vacuum it leaves, and what are the new rules of the game under such conditions? As John Clarke lucidly observes, if historically much political science has “obscured both the diversity and heterogeneity of state forms,” all my commentators concur that today it is crucial to examine (1) the ways that the roles of the state, civil society, and capital (the so-called private sector) are all being renegotiated and (2) what Christina Luke aptly describes as “the dangerous spheres of nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic participation,” which, however seemingly benign, might well produce pernicious effects that often go unchecked.

Ayhan Kaya emphasizes the affective dimension of heritage as “refuge”: “the reassuring certainty of a strong, tightly knit sense of community and belonging in times of sweeping change, acute socioeconomic deprivation, and profound social vulnerability. Under these conditions, heritage becomes a vehicle of subjectification that the state can effectively mobilize to serve its agenda. Still, Khaledn Bshara points toward other material and affective possibilities and more imaginative uses of heritage: civil society, he writes, can take “matters into its hands . . . [by] trying to change things on the ground by using the same tools (heritage) that have been used to subjugate [it].” While reimagining space and social forms in Palestinian villages and towns through heritage practice, Palestinian NGOs have also crafted new paradigms that “further complicate or rethink heritage and state” in ways that “do not follow the Eurocentric models.” Bshara suggests the possibility of (productive) failures that do not stop Palestinian NGOs from experimenting with existing models of heritage management. How are received heritage models being reworked through these forms of participation?

I would like to conclude by reflecting on some of the most recent developments of the issues dealt with in my article. When I started writing this article, neoliberalism did not seem like old news, as it does now. The financial crisis, and its diverse aftermaths in different parts of the world, have made neoliberalism’s unsustainability plain to see. Yet the policies adopted in response to the crisis—for example, the austerity programs implemented in Europe and the United States—were inspired by neoliberal principles (and triggered further crises). In Palestine, a new heritage law was eventually ratified in 2018. It introduced into the Palestinian legal framework the idea of heritage’s economic value. Arguably, however, the situation has not changed too much. If this centralizing law gives the Palestinian Authority authority over the recent past, it does not furnish it with the capacities and resources needed to take care of it: NGOs continue to do the lion’s share of heritage work, while fragmentation remains and multiple, graduated sovereignties endure.

As I write, the Italian state—like the United States, a stunning eight countries in the European Union, Brazil, and Russia—has been taken over (through liberal elections) by some of the worst kinds of right-wing populism. “Radicals” for many, populists have been elected on an essentially anti-neoliberal platform, often by people impoverished and disenfranchised by neoliberal “reform” (Mouffe 2018). The paradox, however, is that the new Italian ministry of culture still epitomizes neoliberalism, variously continuing or even pushing further the neoliberal language of cultural policy developed by previous administrations of different political stripes. In India and Turkey too, as Lynn Meskell here and Ayhan Kaya and Ayşê Tecmen elsewhere (2019) remind us, the local brands of
right-wing populism in government mobilize a nationalist discourse of heritage: these discourses mix entrepreneurialism and marketization with nostalgic references to imperial pasts and imperial ambitions, while an overstretched state puts its monuments up for sale before private investors and sponsors (consider, for instance, the case of the Taj Mahal). Another enduring paradox is that right-wing populists continue to celebrate heritage as an engine of both development and the nation’s rebirth, even as they drastically reduce public spending in the cultural sphere. Once more, this simultaneously activates and coopts civil society and the grassroots, while opening up new possibilities for intervention and resistance.

—Chiara De Cesari

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De Cesari  Heritages beyond the Nation-State?


