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Privileged migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw, Poland

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Richard Girling

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Studying 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship
Privileged migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw, Poland

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam

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1.



CHAPTER 1

Introduction



1.1. The Italian man who went to Wrocław

Francesco (Italy) was living in the UK in the early 1990s when he met his Polish girlfriend. After falling in love, they soon married and moved back to her native city of Wrocław, Poland. As an Italian in Wrocław in the 1990s, he was, he admits, ‘very sought after’, because he was ‘exotic and interesting’. This, combined with his degree in architecture, made it easy for him to find well-paid employment as an architect. Yet, after four months in this position, whereby his architectural projects were often subject to alterations by his boss, he decided he wanted to have ‘more control’. And so, subsequently, he opened his own architecture firm, granting him full authority over his designs. Now, over 20 years later, Francesco employs 11 architects, among other office staff, all of whom are Polish. His investors, by contrast, are not from Poland, but instead are from much further afield, predominantly the UK, Ireland, and Italy.

The story of Francesco, at first glance, seems perhaps somewhat cliché. A man, moving countries for love, and who subsequently, as a migrant, opens his own business, adding to the plethora of other migrants in the world who have embarked upon an entrepreneurial trajectory. We have heard it all before, right? Yet, upon closer inspection, Francesco’s story seems to present some fresh and novel peculiarities which appear at odds with the mainstream literature surrounding migration and migrant entrepreneurship. This literature has, to date, almost exclusively been centred around migration from economically developing countries to those which are more economically developed (Ilhan-nas et al. 2011; Dheer 2018). Within such contexts, it has often been shown how migrants are subject to ‘restrictions, limitations, and discrimination’ (Benson & O’Reilly 2018: 11). Even their reasons for migrating in the first place have been depicted in a disadvantaged light, often assumed to be economic in character, a fact which is so taken-for-granted that many of the leading theories surrounding migrant entrepreneurship do not even include the variable of motivation in their models.¹ This assumption of money as a motivating factor has even been extended to migrants’ reasons for entering entrepreneurship, with Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010) describing how migrants, facing barriers to well-paid employment in the mainstream labour market, are forced to resort to self-employment for financial survival. Starting from this position of disadvantage, it is perhaps then unsurprising that scholars have subsequently searched for ways to account for migrants’ apparent success at entrepreneurship despite their

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1 For example, neither the Interactive Model (Waldinger et al 1990) nor Chen & Tan’s (2009) Integrative Model of Transnational Entrepreneurship include the factor of motivation in their diagrams representing their models. Further, the Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999), Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al. 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006), and Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010) rarely discuss the role of motivations.

disadvantaged circumstances. One such attempt is that of Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006) which stresses migrants' competitive advantage in terms of their access to a plentiful supply of affordable, co-ethnic labour.² This consideration of migrants' embeddedness within social networks has been followed by the Interactive Model (Waldinger et al. 1990) which expanded this to include migrants' embeddedness within the economic environment, and which has subsequently been even further expanded upon by the Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999) with its inclusion of the politico-institutional context. Yet, importantly, despite excellent contributions to the field in terms of incorporating the role of the environment, these models have restricted it to the host country only. In the context of migration from economically underdeveloped countries to those which are more economically developed, this is somewhat understandable. Owing to migrants' economically less developed locations of origin, it is unsurprising that they have been predominantly observed accessing (economically dominant) host-country markets only, while the markets in their home countries remain apparently less desirable (Rusinovic 2008) and, as such, have largely been neglected within the literature (Bagwell 2018).³

For Francesco, however, such theories seem problematic. First of all, he migrated away from an economically *more* developed country (Italy) toward an economically *less* developed country (Poland). This, in itself, seems to immediately beg the question *why?* In doing so, it 'calls into question taken-for-granted understandings of the relationship between migration and economics' (Benson & O'Reilly 2018: 91) and, subsequently, brings the hitherto hidden role of motivations into the foreground. Second, he states that, as an Italian in Wroclaw, he was 'sought after' and considered to be 'exotic and interesting'. This privileged standing within society, combined with the relative ease with which he found well-paid employment, likewise questions the often assumed correlation between minority groups and discrimination (Lundstrom 2017). Third, he appears to be exclusively hiring his staff from a pool of native, *Polish* labour. This, in turn, seems to contradict the ideas of Ethnic Enclave Theory which, as outlined above, would expect him to take

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2 Portes & Shafer (2006) point out that, despite co-ethnic employees often being willing to work longer hours and for lower wages, they do so in return for acquiring skills, which they later put to use creating their own enterprise, subsequently leading to positive long term economic payoffs.

3 Even within the field of transnational entrepreneurship, whereby studies have likewise been largely restricted to (semi)-periphery-core migratory contexts, it seems most common for migrants to sell goods and services to the economically dominant host-country markets (see, for example, Saxenian 1999; 2002). This idea will be further developed in Chapter 5.

advantage of a plentiful supply of affordable, *co-ethnic* (Italian) labour.⁴ Fourth, and finally, Francesco has international investors, which itself seems inconsistent with the aforementioned expectation that migrant entrepreneurs access opportunity structures within the host country only.

And, importantly, it seems Francesco is not just an isolated case. He has been followed by over 13 million people in 2019 alone who have likewise migrated in a ‘North-South’ direction.⁵ Of course, not all of them become migrant entrepreneurs, but I knew from firsthand experience that at least *some* of them do. Even before starting this study, I attended an ‘expat’ meet-up in Wrocław where I met a multitude of other migrants who had likewise moved *away* from economically more developed countries and had set up businesses in Wrocław. Sitting at a table laden with an abundant supply of aperol spritz and prosecco in the central square of Wrocław, I met Niall (Ireland) and Karl (Germany) whose stories seemed to mirror that of Francesco’s. Both of them talked of how they had a somewhat elevated status within Wrocław, sold products or services predominantly to a clientele outside of Poland (in ‘the West’), and did not employ co-ethnic labour. Further, even my own situation seemed to lend support to their experiences. I myself had likewise emigrated from an economically more developed country (the UK) and had also set up my own business in Wrocław, whereby I was also servicing an international clientele with employees who were predominantly Polish and, therefore, not co-ethnic.

So what was going on here? Looking for answers in the literature led me to find that almost no studies existed about migrant entrepreneurs who had migrated away from advanced economies toward those which are less economically developed. In a recent literature review by Dheer (2018) of 69 studies about migrant entrepreneurship, he found *none of them* analysed migration in this direction.⁶ Indeed, despite witnessing and experiencing migrant entrepreneurship first-hand in this ‘reverse’ context, I could only find a handful of studies about it (for example Harima 2014; Vance et al. 2016; and Andrejuk 2017, all of which I will elaborate upon later). Instead, the literature was oriented almost exclusively towards ethnic

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4 Admittedly, not all migrant entrepreneurs have been found to hire co-ethnic labour, and in several cases have been observed hiring migrants from third party countries (see Light & Ojeda in Rath (2002) and their differentiation between the ‘ethnic economy’, ‘immigrant economy’, and ‘mainstream economy’). However, Francesco’s hiring practices seem to be altogether different, belonging to neither the ‘ethnic economy’ nor the ‘immigrant economy’, and even within the category of the ‘mainstream economy’ his behaviour seems to be ‘flipped’, whereby he, as a migrant, is hiring ‘mainstream’ employees and not vice versa.

5 5% (13.6 million) of the global migrant stock of 272 million migrated in a North-South direction (UN DESA 2020).

6 Despite Dheer’s literature review (2018) not uncovering any studies in the context of migration from core- to (semi-)periphery-states, I was able to find some, albeit only a very small number. These are discussed in the literature review section.

groups from economically developing countries who had migrated to economically more developed countries. This study, then, aims to fill this gap in the literature by studying 'up' (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012) and interviewing 41 migrants who have emigrated *away* from economically more developed countries (such as the USA, Germany, the UK, and Italy) toward an economically less developed region, namely, the city of Wroclaw in Poland. Studying 'up', however, is inherently a relative term and requires the existence of a 'down' against which to position itself. Therefore, as part of the study, I have also interviewed 24 migrants who originate from economically less developed countries (such as Ukraine and Belarus), using them and their situations as a point of comparison against which to position migrants such as Francesco. This requirement, to research not only migrants from economically developed countries, but also economically underdeveloped countries, is one of the main reasons why Wroclaw was selected as the location of the study. Belonging neither to the world's most economically developed regions, nor most economically underdeveloped, the city provides an economic 'middle-ground' setting in which both groups of migrants can be simultaneously observed in a relatively neutral environment. Moreover, it is the city in which I myself have lived and worked for several years as a migrant entrepreneur and, as such, was also a convenient choice of location, wherein I could mobilise my local knowledge, experiences, and extensive network for the purposes of the study (Riemer 1972).

At this point, the reader might be wondering if this all really matters. After all, with global migration from economically developing to economically developed countries (circa 95.2 million) greatly outnumbering migration in the opposite direction (circa 13.6 million),⁷ you might ask if it matters that this less common demographic has been neglected in the literature. What, in other words, is the point of studying migrant entrepreneurs, such as Francesco, who are part of this smaller demographic? Now, below, I will make my case for this. Specifically, I will argue that the stories of Francesco and other migrant entrepreneurs who have migrated in a 'reverse' direction are not only interesting as empirical phenomena, but also have real theoretical and practical implications for the field of migrant entrepreneurship and even beyond.

1.2. Why study 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship?

"If we look at the literature based on fieldwork in the United States, we find a relatively abundant literature on the poor, the ethnic groups, the disadvantaged; there is comparatively little field research on the middle class, and little first hand work on the upper classes. Anthropologists might indeed ask themselves whether the entirety of fieldwork does not

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7 UN DESA 2020

depend upon a certain power relationship in favor of the anthropologist, and whether indeed such dominant-subordinate relationships may not be affecting the kinds of theories that we are weaving”, (Nader 1972: 5).

Nader (1972, quoted above) points out that there has been a reluctance in the field of anthropology to study ‘up’. Despite that observation being made over 40 years ago, it remains overwhelmingly true (Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012). Curiously, there appears to be no clear consensus for why we, as anthropologists and social scientists, have apparently been so hesitant to research those in positions of privilege. There are, however, three trains of thought. First, there can be methodological difficulties when it comes to accessing elites (ibid). Second, there has traditionally been a culture within anthropology departments to prefer more exotic research projects which concern themselves with the underprivileged ‘other’ (and the more ‘other’ the better) (Gusterson 1997). Third, Nader (1972) hinted at how we tend to research topics which incite our emotion. The example she gave is that of an anthropologist (L.H. Morgan) who was troubled by the treatment of Native Americans in the USA. This aversion subsequently led him to undertake a research project surrounding this phenomenon. By way of explanation, it seems it is our problematization of those in positions of disadvantage which often pulls us toward a certain research agenda. By contrast, we rarely look at those in positions of privilege, such as the wealthy, and think ‘this is a problem and should be researched!’ In other words, it is our failure to problematize those in positions of privilege which is perhaps underlying our reluctance to study ‘up’.

Such reluctance is epitomized within the literature surrounding migrant entrepreneurship. Research has centered around migration from economically developing countries, resulting in an almost total lack of research about more privileged forms of migration from economically *developed* countries (Dheer 2018). A small (but growing) number of migrant entrepreneurship scholars have, subsequently, acknowledged the ‘extreme lack of attention’ (Paik et al. 2017: 56) paid to this phenomenon and have called for more research in this field (Andresen et al. 2014). By studying ‘up’ in the field of migrant entrepreneurship, therefore, this project will help to fill this gap in the literature. Yet, a gap in the literature does not, in itself, constitute reason enough to warrant further research. What, in other words, makes it a gap that we should *fill*? Here, I will now provide five reasons.

First, there is a *theoretical warrant* to study ‘up’. Nader (1972) warns of how the exclusive ‘downward’ study of ‘ethnic-groups’, and the inherent ‘dominant-subordinate’ relationship, may be ‘affecting the kinds of theories that we are weaving’. Indeed, as will be seen in the literature review later in this chapter, it appears that many of the current theories may well have been ‘theorized largely on the basis of persistent power imbalances in the international system’ (Croucher 2009: 465) and, subsequently, there are serious question marks surrounding their ability to account for migration in a reverse context. In this way, through the micro

level study of more privileged forms of migration, we might be able to 'light up' previously invisible assumptions and structures (Duneier 2014: 7). And, in doing so, studying 'up' may create a counterpoint against which we can critically examine the current theoretical approaches within the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

Second, and this is an extension of the second point, there may be *methodological implications* for new research projects. As noted above, studying 'up' seems to problematize taken-for-granted notions about social phenomena. Researchers should, therefore, ask themselves whether their studies are based upon such assumptions and how, subsequently, these assumptions can be taken into consideration when developing research methodologies for new projects.

Third, on a general level, it may contribute to *changing the 'negative' narrative about migration* which has helped to fuel the recent rise in populism⁸ seen in many countries (Lutz 2019). The current narrative portrays migrants as disadvantaged individuals, originating from economically undeveloped countries, lacking agency and often subject to various disadvantages relative to the native population (Benson & O'Reilly 2018). The same is true within migrant entrepreneurship, with the stereotype being the disadvantaged migrant⁹ who originates from an economically developing country and, facing barriers within the new host-country, has been forced into entrepreneurship as a way of escaping unemployment (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). But what about migrant entrepreneurs who originate from economically developed countries? Are they equally lacking in agency and subject to such challenges? In the case of Francesco, outlined above, it would seem *not*. By the same token, even within certain (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts some scholars have highlighted more privileged forms of migration such as highly skilled migrant entrepreneurs (Saxenian 1999; 2002) those with extreme wealth (Froschauer & Wong 2012). Yet, within the mainstream media, such stories are rare and the term 'migrant', despite essentially meaning 'a person who moves from one place to another',¹⁰ remains loaded with various connotations of disadvantage. Indeed, such an apparent neglect of more privileged forms of migration might be causing us to create 'somewhat skewed notions of who migrants are' (Fechter & Walsh 2010:1198). More actively studying 'up', therefore, might begin to change this narrative, extending the semantic scope of 'migrant' and 'migrant entrepreneurship' beyond the stereotype of the 'disadvantaged migrant'.

Fourth, there may even be *theoretical ramifications beyond the field of migration*, in particular in terms of global inequality and power hierarchies. The key indicator most commonly used to measure inequality is wealth. What then, could be more meaningful, than studying those who are at the forefront of wealth creation i.e.

8 This is somewhat of a vicious circle with populism in turn fueling the negative narrative surrounding migration.

9 With a small number of exceptions, as will be shown further below.

10 Oxford Languages: <https://languages.oup.com/>

entrepreneurs? Switching the focus to migrant entrepreneurs from the world's wealthiest nations, and positioning these findings against those from some of the poorest, may offer key insights into the factors which reinforce (or breakdown) wealth inequality. If, for example, migrant entrepreneurs from core-states are *not* disadvantaged, but are actually *privileged*, then what implications does that have? Would such a difference in privilege between migrant entrepreneurs from economically developed and developing countries just be the tip of the iceberg, a surface level manifestation hinting at power hierarchies and systemic inequality on a global level? Unlike ethnicity or gender, the role of privilege stemming from one's citizenship and geographical origins has not been researched in any great depth (Choules 2006). Studying 'up' in the field of migrant entrepreneurship, therefore, may offer fresh insights into this line of inquiry. Indeed, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, this study reveals how the root causes of migrants' variation in privilege and disadvantage go well beyond the micro level of migrants' individual agency.

Fifth, and finally, there may be *policy implications* resulting from challenges to the current theories. Many governments around the world are actively encouraging migrant entrepreneurship (Collins 2003; 2010; Acs & Szerb 2007; Desiderio 2014). If policy is based upon the current theories, and these theories are founded upon assumptions which are not universally true, then what does that mean for the effectiveness of these policies? This, of course, may have particular significance for the governments of (semi-)periphery-states, for which this study is most relevant.

1.3. Definitions

'We as researchers must also recognise and think about the power relations implicit and explicit in the terminology we utilise in our research. It is through understanding and challenging labels that work to differentiate people, such as 'expatriate', 'migrant', or 'refugee', that we open up the possibility of confronting the privilege that underpins the ways in which these become determined' (Cranston 2017:10).

When writing this dissertation, I was confronted with three significant terminological questions to answer. First, how should I refer to the main agents of this study? Second, how should I describe migrants' origins and direction of migration? Third, to whom exactly do the terms 'study 'up' and 'down' refer? These three questions, and the explanation behind my decisions, are outlined below.

1.3.1. 'Migrant entrepreneur' and the alternatives labels

In the literature, many different terms are used, including 'migrant entrepreneur', 'ethnic entrepreneur', 'minority entrepreneur', 'diasporan entrepreneur',

‘transnational entrepreneur’, ‘expatriate entrepreneur’, ‘expat-preneur’, and ‘lifestyle entrepreneur’. Yet, throughout this dissertation, I almost exclusively use the term ‘migrant entrepreneur’. I do so for two main reasons.

First, however, I will briefly outline what exactly I mean when I use this term. The UN (1998: 9) defines the first part, a ‘migrant’, as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’. The second part, ‘entrepreneur’, is used to refer to ‘a person who sets up a business’.¹¹ However, with regard to the latter, what about someone who runs an informal (aka ‘illegal’) business which has not been registered? Have they still ‘set up a business’? Surely, in a practical sense, they are still an entrepreneur, albeit one that is not conforming to certain laws. For this reason, Rath & Swagerman (2011: 83) definition is preferred: ‘A person in effective control of a commercial undertaking for more than one client over a significant period of time’. Taken altogether, the term ‘migrant entrepreneur’ here is defined as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’ *and* who is in effective control of a commercial undertaking for more than one client over a significant period of time’ (ibid). Further, although I seldom make use of them in this dissertation, I should clarify that there are also two minor variations of the term, namely ‘immigrant’ and ‘emigrant’. In accordance with the UN definition (1998), the term ‘immigrant’ is simply the word ‘migrant’ from the perspective of the host country, whereas the word ‘emigrant’ is the same, but from the perspective of the migrant’s country of origin. Considering that most studies to date have been from (core-state) host countries, it is unsurprising, therefore, that the term ‘immigrant entrepreneur’ is often used interchangeably with ‘migrant entrepreneur’. As such, within a European context, it can be considered to be a eurocentric term.

I return now, then, to the reasons I settled upon the term ‘migrant entrepreneur’. First, as noted above, it explicitly refers to entrepreneurs who have, themselves, migrated. Compare this, for example, to the alternative options of ‘ethnic entrepreneur’, ‘diasporan entrepreneur’, or ‘minority entrepreneur’, which can all be used to include those who might *not* have migrated themselves, namely, second or third generation immigrants (Nestorowicz 2012). As such, for a study which focuses exclusively upon first generation migrants, the term ‘migrant entrepreneur’ seems a better fit.

Second, I deliberately use the term in a *transformative sense*. This point, however, only makes sense once I tell you about two other labels more commonly used to refer to migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, namely, ‘expatriate entrepreneurs’ (aka ‘expat-preneurs’) and ‘lifestyle entrepreneurs’. Importantly, these terms are both used almost exclusively within the context of privileged

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11 Cambridge International Dictionary of English (1995). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

migration from core-states.¹² For a study which does indeed concern itself with privileged migration from core-states, you might think that they are, therefore, ideal terms for this dissertation. However, in restricting their application to privileged forms of migration only, they have become inherently exclusionary terms, loaded with undertones of Western whiteness (Leonard 2016; Cranston 2017). Despite such undertones, they are often used axiomatically within the migration literature and ‘in an unreflective way’, resulting in ‘academic research playing a role in constructing what it seeks to explain’ (ibid: 9-10) and, subsequently, reproducing and reinforcing the dichotomy between privileged and disadvantaged forms of migration. In an effort to avoid this, throughout this dissertation, I instead apply the label ‘migrant entrepreneur’ to members of *both* subject groups, including those from core-states. I do this with the goal of leveling the linguistic playing field and bringing those often referred to as ‘expatriate entrepreneurs’ or ‘lifestyle entrepreneurs’ onto the same level as those referred to as ‘migrants’. In doing so, it is my intention to support Cranston’s (ibid:10) call for researchers to ‘confront the privilege that underpins the ways in which these [terms such as ‘expatriate’ vs. ‘migrant’] become determined.’

1.3.2. Describing the direction of migration

Now that I have clarified how to label the agents of the study, the next dilemma is how to describe the direction in which they are moving. Specifically, how to differentiate between those who are moving toward economically more developed countries versus those who are moving in other directions, as well as my criteria for operationalizing which countries are ‘economically developed’ and which are not. Here I have chosen to borrow terminology from World-systems Analysis (Wallerstein 1987; 2004). This approach splits the world into three levels of economic development: ‘Core’ countries (those with advanced economies), ‘periphery’ countries (those with non-industrialized economies / developing economies) and ‘semi-periphery’ countries (those in the middle). My reasons for deciding upon this nomenclature are two-fold. First, this trichotomous division has an important advantage over the potential alternative of the dichotomy ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’. Between 1992 and 2019, Poland’s GDP per capita has increased by over 600% to \$15,595, significantly more than less economically developed countries such as Chad (\$728), yet still less than a quarter of the USA (\$65,280).¹³ With such a ‘middle-of-the-range’ economy, the dichotomy of ‘North’ and ‘South’ is problematic in terms of deciding to which group Poland

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12 See, for example, the use of ‘expatriate entrepreneur’ in Vance et al. (2016), Vance et al. (2017), and Selmer et al. (2018), as well as ‘lifestyle entrepreneur’ in Stone & Stubbs (2007), Torkington (2010), and Marchant & Mottiar (2011). I must confess that I am also guilty of this (see Girling & Bamwenda 2018), which reveals my own learning curve in the use of such terminology.

13 World Bank 2020

would belong. By contrast, Wallerstein's trichotomous division of the world provides a necessary 'in between' group and, subsequently, a way of distinguishing and categorizing Poland's 'middle-ground' status.

Second, the terms have another important advantage over that of 'Global North' and 'Global South'. The latter terminology has been accused of presenting certain regions (i.e. those belonging to the 'North') as somehow 'exemplary', while others as conversely in need of improvement (Eckl & Weber 2007). The same can be said of Harima's (2014) 'ascending' and 'descending' migration terminology which seems similarly loaded with diametric connotations of superiority and inferiority. Consequently, in using such terms we might unwittingly 'reinforce the very power relations which we social scientists aim to describe' (Cranston 2017: 9). Wallerstein's terminology, by contrast, is loaded with a tradition which is critical of precisely the power relations which are embodied in the latter. In other words, the terms provide a way of discussing an uneven 'world-system' while simultaneously being critical of it. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, this lends itself well to the overarching theoretical findings within this dissertation.

Yet, my choice is not without its own problems. Specifically, it is somewhat problematic with regard to which criteria to use in order to classify countries according to the three (core, periphery, and semi-periphery) groups. Unfortunately, Wallerstein does not offer much help in this respect, writing that 'the key element distinguishing core-like from peripheral processes is the degree to which they are monopolized and therefore profitable' (Wallerstein 2004: 93). He then goes on to say that such processes tend to group in certain regions, or states and, as such, could be described as 'core-states' (ibid: 28). In other words, his focus is upon *relational processes* and not wealth per se. For this study, which seeks to compare migrant entrepreneurs from core- vs. periphery states, this does indeed present a problem, as it inherently requires some way of classifying which states can be considered core vs. periphery. As such, based upon Wallerstein's assumption that core-processes are more profitable and, therefore, should lead to the variation in countries' accumulation of wealth, I have (somewhat crudely) based the main determinant of core-periphery classification upon countries' GDP per capita. Those states ranking within the global top 50 of GDP per capita¹⁴ are defined as 'core' states, while those toward the bottom of this list are classified as 'periphery', and those in between as 'semi-periphery'. While recognizing this does not capture the full picture of global economic and power dynamics, it is a convenient operationalization which provides a practical and objective way of classifying states for the purposes of this study.

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14 World bank data (2008): <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

1.3.3. Studying ‘up’ vs. ‘down’

I turn now to the third and final terminological explanation, namely, to whom exactly I am referring with the terms ‘studying ‘up’ and ‘down’. These are relative terms and, so, it should be asked ‘relative to *what* exactly?’ As has been the case within the field of anthropology, both historically and largely up to the present day, the terms have been relative to the mainstream populations of core-states. To a certain extent, this reflects the Western-centric worldview of researchers within such countries, but it is fair to say that it also largely represents the hierarchy of power and wealth within the current global system. So, based on this relative positioning, does ‘down’ mean migration from (semi-)periphery countries? Put simply, the answer is ‘often yes, but not necessarily always’. In the majority of studies (to be discussed below), migrant entrepreneurs from the (semi-)periphery represent disadvantaged ethnic minorities. However, this is not always the case. There are a small number of studies which focus upon skilled - or even wealthy - migrant entrepreneurs from such regions, such as Saxenian’s (2002) study of highly skilled Indian, Chinese, and Taiwanese transnational entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley (see also Basu 1998, Hiebert 2002, and Froschauer & Wong 2012). Would such a focus still constitute studying ‘down’? Conversely, we might consider entrepreneurs who, despite originating from core-states, lack skills and money (some of whom you will read about in this study). Would researching such migrants still constitute studying ‘up’? Here the boundaries become blurred. Clearly, then, originating from a certain country does not always correlate to predetermined levels of access to resources. Having said that, and as will be seen in this dissertation, within the current global system, migrants from core-states are often granted certain privileges, so referring to the study of migrants from core-states as studying ‘up’ may well have a degree of objective justification.

At this point, I would like to address a major concern of using these terms. Having previously argued against the use of terminology which unthinkingly reinforces dichotomies of privilege and disadvantage, you may well question my inclusion of ‘up’ and ‘down’ which similarly portray notions of comparative superiority and inferiority. Yet, for a dissertation which is closely entwined with power relations, these two relational terms, which inherently convey variations in power, provide concise and convenient language with which to describe the dynamics of power observed in this study. It remains, however, a concern of mine that, in using these terms, I myself am subsequently contributing to the reproduction of the very power hierarchies which I wish to expose (Cranston 2017: 9). For this reason, and so as to acknowledge them as problematic, throughout this dissertation I write them in parentheses.

1.4. Background & theoretical context

In this section, I will show how, within the field of migrant entrepreneurship, there has been a tendency to study ‘down’ and, subsequently, there is a resulting gap in the literature in terms of studying ‘up’. This ‘downward’ facing concentration, I will demonstrate, has led to some serious theoretical consequences, specifically, the way in which current migrant entrepreneurship theories appear to be rooted in (semi-)periphery-to-core, dominant-subordinate contexts. Indeed, I will show how three of the most prominent theories (Disadvantage Theory, Ethnic Enclave Theory, and Mixed-embeddedness Approach) seem ill-equipped to account for the experiences of migrants such as Francesco (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) in ‘inverse’ migratory contexts.

1.4.1. The tendency within migrant entrepreneurship to study ‘down’

In a recent literature review by Dheer (2018) of 69 studies about migrant entrepreneurship, he found that *all of them* were based on migration to core-states. This finding is also supported by two additional literature reviews (Ilhan-Nas 2011; Aliaga-Isla & Rialp 2013), which revealed that the most frequently studied host countries were the United States, Canada, Australia, and countries in Northern Europe. With regard to Ilhan-Nas’ (2011) study, it also identified that, in terms of migrant entrepreneurs’ country of origin, developing economies were most frequently studied. This is also true in the literature surrounding ‘transnational entrepreneurs’ (see Saxenian 2002; Portes et al. 2001; Rusinovic 2008; and Light & Shahlapour 2016 among others.) In other words, almost all migrant entrepreneurship studies to date have studied ‘down’, focusing on migration in (semi-) periphery-to-core contexts.

By contrast, the study of migration in the opposite direction has received much less attention. This is perhaps all-the-more surprising given that core-to-(semi-)periphery migrant entrepreneurs are, of course, not a new phenomenon. After all, in the 16th-19th centuries, European colonialists migrated en masse to the (then) periphery regions of the Americas, Africa, and Australia (Portes et al. 1999), where many of them created businesses. However, since those colonialist times, the trend seems to have been less observable, at least, until recently. As noted by the Wall Street Journal (2015) in their article ‘The Rise of the Expat-preneur’,¹⁵ it appears to be getting more attention in a new, post-colonialist (or even neo-colonialist) context.

Indeed, this increase in attention of core-to-(semi-)periphery migrant entrepreneurs has recently been observed by a small number of migrant entrepreneurship scholars. In particular, business and management scholars (Vance et al. 2016; Paik et al. 2017) have explored the career career trajectories of what

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15 Link to article: <https://blogs.wsj.com/expat/2015/03/30/the-rise-of-the-expat-preneur/>

they refer to as ‘expat-preneurs’ (a term I personally choose not to use, as noted previously). Their research has, however, not been based upon original data, but instead upon ‘collective international experience and observance of emerging trends’ (Paik et al. 2017:51). Of greater relevance to this paper is Andrejuk’s (2017) comparative study of EU-12¹⁶ migrant entrepreneurs and EU-15¹⁷ entrepreneurs in the context of Poland. This study makes an excellent contribution to the field by highlighting the important role of cultural hierarchies within migrant entrepreneurship, yet is confined to migrants from core- and semi-periphery-states (migrants from periphery-states are not included) and does not attempt to position the findings within the theoretical landscape. Harima (2014) also examined core-to-(semi)-periphery migration, specifically, Japanese migrant entrepreneurs in the Philippines, Guatemala, and Argentina, however this study was extremely limited in size with just four interviewees. Most other studies which have tackled this phenomenon have been in the context of core-to-core migration, for example Stone & Stubbs’ (2007) study of British entrepreneurs in Spain and France and Marchant & Mottiar’s (2011) study of British entrepreneurs in Ireland.

If we extend the focus outside the scope of migrant entrepreneurship, it is easier to find more examples of studying ‘up’ within migration. These have largely centered around the topics of post-colonial migration and ‘lifestyle migration’, whereby privileged migrants from core countries move to more affordable destinations, usually with a more desirable climate (Benson & O’Reilly 2018; Torkington 2010). Despite not focusing on entrepreneurship, they have highlighted interesting dynamics surrounding core-to-(semi)-periphery migration in terms of privilege and class (Sklair 2001; Leonard 2010; 2016), ethnicity (Fechter 2005), and gender (Fechter 2010; Wang 2013).

But within the field of migrant entrepreneurship, such dynamics of core-to-(semi)-periphery migration remain largely unexplored. Instead, migrant entrepreneurship scholars, often situated at core-state universities, have remained fixated upon the migration happening right in front of them, namely, migration from (semi-)periphery-to-core states. Such a fixation has led, I argue, to the current migrant entrepreneurship theories being rooted in these contexts. This can be clearly seen in three of the most prominent migrant entrepreneurship theories: Disadvantage Theory, Ethnic Enclave Theory, and the Mixed-embeddedness Approach, as I will now show below.

1.4.2. Disadvantage Theory

Disadvantage Theory attempts to account for the high rates of entrepreneurship among immigrants and ethnic minorities. Put simply, it states that they turn to

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¹⁶ The 12 new countries which joined the EU since 2004.

¹⁷ The 15 original EU member countries.

entrepreneurship out of necessity and not out of volition (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). Relative to the host country environment, they may be disadvantaged in terms of education, training, and language, or simply discriminated against. This disadvantaged position increases the chance of unemployment and poverty, which ‘pushes’ migrants toward entrepreneurship. Despite some studies showing that not all disadvantaged migrants become entrepreneurs (Masurel et al. 2002; van Tubergen 2005), it remains an often-cited theory in the literature and has been observed in multiple studies (Light & Gold 2000; Constant & Zimmermann 2006; Ram & Jones 2008; Clark & Drinkwater 2010).

However, can Disadvantage Theory also account for migrant entrepreneurs who have migrated in the opposite direction? For example, does Francesco (highlighted in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter) have lower levels of resources relative to the native mainstream labour force, or is he subject to discrimination which, subsequently, ‘pushes’ him into self-employment? On the contrary, the case of Francesco, as well as a handful of other studies, seem to indicate quite the opposite. Andrejuk (2017), as mentioned previously, found evidence of migrants from core-states experiencing *cultural privilege* within Poland. Similarly, in a study of migrant entrepreneurs from Japan in the Philippines, Guatemala, and Argentina, Harima (2014) found higher levels of financial capital. As such, these early studies, in addition to the experiences of migrants in this dissertation, raise serious questions surrounding the ability of Disadvantage Theory to account for migrant entrepreneurship in core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory contexts.

1.4.3. Ethnic Enclave Theory

As with Disadvantage Theory, Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006) attempts to account for the high rate of entrepreneurship among migrants and ethnic minorities. It was developed in the context of Cuban migration to South Florida, where Wilson & Portes (1980) noticed an unusually high number of Cubans running their own businesses. In order to account for this, they theorised that the geographical concentration of Cubans in South Florida provided migrant entrepreneurs with plentiful access to cheap, co-ethnic labour in return for employment and training (ibid). This, in turn, provides migrant entrepreneurs with a competitive advantage over native entrepreneurs, subsequently explaining the relatively high rate of entrepreneurship among migrant groups.

However, once again, this theory was formulated in a (semi)-periphery-to-core context. Can this theory also account for migrant entrepreneurs who have moved

in the opposite direction?¹⁸ In the case of Francesco, it seems *not*. As shown in the opening vignette, he is employing exclusively native, *Polish* labour. This is once again supported by Harima's study (2014), whereby Japanese entrepreneurs in the Philippines hired *local*, Filipino labour and *not* co-ethnic Japanese labour. Of course, you might be wondering if the case of Francesco and the Japanese entrepreneurs in Harima's study are simply rare exceptions. However, as will be seen later in this dissertation, they seem to be representative of a greater trend at odds with Ethnic Enclave Theory.

1.4.4. The Mixed-embeddedness Approach

The Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999) is considered to be the most comprehensive model in its ability to include all factors which shape migrant entrepreneur outcomes. That is to say, it attempts to include all aspects of agency, structure, and the interaction between the two. Or, in the words of the authors, it incorporates 'not only the embeddedness in social networks of immigrants but also their embeddedness in the socio-economic and politico-institutional environment of the country of settlement' (Kloosterman & Rath. 2001: 190). Importantly, this includes 'the matching process' between entrepreneurs and the 'opportunity structure' (Kloosterman & Rath 2001). The authors attempted to unpack this previously vague concept of the opportunity structure by dividing it into two: 1. Accessibility (to what extent migrant entrepreneurs have access to markets); 2. Growth potential. They then unpacked the concept further by proposing a three level typology through which to analyse the accessibility and growth potential: 1. National, 2. Regional/Urban and 3. Neighborhood.¹⁹ In the context of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Amsterdam (around which the approach was formed), it seems to capture all the major influences upon the opportunity structure. The Turkish bakers and Moroccan butchers sold their products in Amsterdam, not internationally, so, likely as a result of this, only factors affecting the opportunity structure within the host country were identified. The Mixed-embeddedness Approach has subsequently been used as the theoretical foundation of comparative studies of migrant entrepreneurs in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the United States and South

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18 Here it should be noted that, even in certain core-state contexts, exceptions to Ethnic Enclave Theory have been observed. For example, in Light et al.'s (1999) study of the garment industry in Los Angeles, they observed that Korean migrant entrepreneurs often employed Mexican labour. Yet, importantly, this behaviour still seems different to the hiring practices of Francesco who, as previously observed, is hiring native, Polish labour.

19 Rath (2002) admittedly later refers to supranational forms of governance in his insightful book 'Unraveling the Rag Trade. Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Seven World Cities', yet at no point has either author formally updated their typology of the opportunity structure.

Africa (Kloosterman & Rath 2003), notably all in the context of (semi)-periphery-to-core migration.

But let us ask the question once again: What about migrant entrepreneurs who have migrated in the opposite direction? Can the Mixed-embeddedness Approach also account for their situations? Returning to the case of Francesco, whose investors are situated *internationally* (Italy, Ireland, and the UK), it seems not. In acquiring international investors, it seems likely that his business is to some degree affected by the presence (or lack thereof) international tariffs, taxation, and laws. Indeed, we only need to consider the recent COVID-19 pandemic, and its unprecedented effects upon the economy both within and outside of Poland, to realise how factors *beyond* the borders of individual countries can play a role in shaping matters both domestically and internationally. Subsequently, the restriction of the opportunity structure to just factors within the host country seems questionable.

Indeed, the supranational business activity of ‘transnational entrepreneurs’ has already been observed by other authors (Portes et al. 1999, Saxenian 2002, Rusinović 2008, Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015; Bagwell 2018). On the surface, such studies seem better able to account for the circumstances of Francesco. Yet, upon closer inspection, two key problems remain. First, these studies have been in the context of (semi)-periphery-to-core migration, whereby they were almost always utilizing labour in their (semi)-periphery countries of origin to provide products or services to the core country markets. Importantly, this seems to differ from the case of Francesco (as well as the Japanese migrant entrepreneurs in Harima’s study), who appear to be selling their products and services in the *opposite direction*. Second, much of the existing transnational entrepreneurship literature is restricted to the binary paradigm of the host and home countries (Solano 2020). For example, in Chen & Tan’s (2009) integrative model of transnational entrepreneurship, even though they acknowledge the role of factors outside of the host country, they restrict these factors to the *home country only*. Yet, as can be seen with the case of Francesco, his investors are situated not only in his home country of Italy, but also in third party countries (Ireland and the UK). As such, Francesco’s situation seems problematic not only for the theories which restrict migrant entrepreneurship to the host country, but also even to those which extend it to a binary paradigm of the host and home countries.

1.4.5. An alternative theoretical framework?


So far, I have argued that a number of popular theories are rooted in (semi)-periphery-to-core migratory contexts and, as a result of this, seem unable to adequately account for the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship in core-to-(semi)periphery contexts. The reader may, subsequently, be wondering, in light of the previously mentioned theoretical models apparently not constituting a suitable fit, then which theoretical framework will I be adopting for this study? In truth, at

the beginning of my research, I did not know. But, of course, I was not starting with a blank slate. Having already spoken with several migrant entrepreneurs who had migrated away from core-states to the semi-periphery-context of Wrocław, such as Francesco (mentioned in the introduction), as well as taking into account my own experiences as a migrant entrepreneur, I already had a few ideas. In particular, I had a sense that the required theoretical framework must somehow take into account the wider international environment. As such, I decided to develop a heuristic model, which would allow me to include this variable while simultaneously remaining open to exploring if and how it is connected to other variables. The principles of a heuristic approach are outlined below by Moustakas:

'Heuristics is a way of engaging in scientific search through methods and processes aimed at discovery; a way of self-inquiry and dialogue with others aimed at finding the underlying meanings of important human experiences', (Moustakas 1990: 15).

It is, in essence, an explorative and inductive approach, whereby theoretical explanations are only formulated *after* completion of the fieldwork. Yet, just because I decided to use a heuristic model, does not mean that I discount all of the other theoretical models. Indeed, we do not need to throw the baby out with the bathwater. These models, although (as shown previously) perhaps unable to account for the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship within core-to-(semi)-periphery contexts, still offer extremely valuable elements which can form the basis of the heuristic model for this study. In particular, I borrow Kloosterman's (2010) division of 'micro', 'meso', and 'macro' layers as a way of dividing the complex phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship up into manageable pieces. In terms of the micro level, I include all variables of agency, notably migrants' access to resources (from which I borrow Light & Gold's (2000) typology of human, financial, social, and cultural capital) but, importantly, I also include the role of *motivations* which, as noted earlier in this chapter, has often been neglected in many of the leading models within the field. In terms of the macro level, I include the environment within which the migrants of the study operate (namely, Wrocław and Poland), but - and once again this is important - I expand the macro layer to incorporate a supranational environment existing beyond the borders of the host-country. Finally, in terms of the meso level, my goal was to include everything which happens between the micro and macro levels, notably, migrants' businesses, including the opportunity structures they access, as well as their (ethnic) division of labour. A rough outline of this heuristic model can be seen in Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1. Heuristic model showing possible variables involved in the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship



Source: My own interpretation based upon the typologies of Kloosterman (2010) and Light & Gold (2000), albeit with additions of my own, namely, that of 'motivations' and the 'supranational environment'.

At this point, I should point out that there are no doubt some overlaps here between the three levels. For example, some authors might argue that social capital belongs to the meso level, as one's social contacts are inherently 'external'. However, by the same token, we could argue that financial capital, that is to say one's access to money and possessions of financial value, is similarly external to the individual and, therefore, also belongs to the meso level. Furthermore, there might be overlaps in terms of migrants' business opportunities, as they undoubtedly involve elements from all three levels. As such, this heuristic model should not be considered to be a finalized or 'exact' representation of the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship. No, the purpose of this model was to provide a simplified theoretical starting point in the form of a 'rough map'. In doing so, I aimed to include all possible variables while remaining open to heuristically researching if and how the variables are connected. Or, to put it another way, my goal was to include all potential 'ingredients', while subsequently exploring the 'recipe'.

1.5. Research questions

'Heuristic inquiry is a process that begins with a question or problem which the researcher seeks to illuminate or answer. The question is one that has a personal challenge or puzzlement in the search to understand one's self and the world in which one lives', (Moustakas 1990: 15).

Moustakas, above, highlights the personal nature of a heuristic approach. Indeed, this is also true of this study whereby, as a migrant entrepreneur from the UK, living and working in Poland, the original impetus for this research is rooted in my own personal experiences. Like all social scientists, I am attempting to understand the world around me and why, specifically, many of the leading migrant entrepreneurship theories seem to bear little or no resemblance to my own circumstances (and that of Francesco and other migrant entrepreneurs from core-states with whom I had already spoken). Yet, even an heuristic inquiry requires a 'point of entry' from which to begin the research. As such, I begin with a purpose statement, below, which in turn is subdivided into manageable research questions.

1.5.1. Purpose statement

The purpose of this project is to study 'up' within the field of migrant entrepreneurship by exploring the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states in the emerging economy of Wroclaw, Poland. Studying 'up', as a relative term, requires a 'down' against which to position itself. As such, this is a comparative study of migrant entrepreneurs from core *and* periphery countries. As a 'middle-ground', semi-periphery environment within the global economic spectrum, Wroclaw is a setting in which both groups can be simultaneously compared in a neutral, 'fixed' environment, using migrant entrepreneurs from periphery regions as a point of comparison. Specifically, the study aims to explore variations of motivations and resources (financial, human, social, and cultural) between the two subject groups, the interactions of these motivations and resources within the semi-periphery environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider international context and, finally, how these variations and interactions can be theoretically explained.

1.5.2. Research Questions

1. How do migrant entrepreneurs from core and periphery countries, in the 'middle-ground', semi-periphery environment of Wroclaw, Poland, vary in their motivations and access to resources (financial, human, social, and cultural capital)?
2. How do these variations interact with the environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider international context and how does this affect the everyday management of the firm, (ethnic) division of entrepreneurial labour, and the position of the firm in the wider economy?
3. How can these variations and interactions be theoretically explained?

1.6. Structure of this dissertation

In this first chapter, I have presented the case for why we should study ‘up’ in migrant entrepreneurship, using the anecdotal example of Francesco as a way to illustrate how migrants in core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory contexts might be problematic for many of the current theories. Having critiqued these theories, I then proposed my own heuristic model, as well as three main research questions, which serve the purpose of guiding the study.

In Chapter 2, I outline the research methodology used in the study. Specifically, I provide a rationale for the location of the study (Wrocław, Poland), the research design, study (Wrocław, Poland), and the methods selected.

Chapter 3 is the first of two chapters which address Research Question 1, namely, the variation between migrants’ motivations and micro level resources. This chapter, specifically, concerns itself with the topic of migrants’ motivations, which I divide into two separate questions. First, why move to Wrocław? Second, why open a business? I then present the findings in a comparative way, outlining variations (and similarities) between the two groups of migrant entrepreneurs.

In Chapter 4, I continue the analysis of migrants’ micro level resources, but this time consider their access to financial, human, social, and cultural capital. Once again, I do this in a comparative way, providing insight into how the two groups vary in their access to such forms of capital.

Chapter 5 is the first of three chapters in which I begin to address Research Question 2, namely, how migrants’ micro level resources (outlined in Chapters 3 and 4) interact with the meso and macro level environment. In particular, I focus on how the migrants vary in the location of the opportunity structures which they access. I then, subsequently, search for reasons for the variations encountered. In doing so, I explore how migrants and their resources, when situated within the wider, macro level environment), interact differently, leading to variations in the meso-level opportunity structures which they access.

In Chapter 6, I continue the focus upon how migrants and their resources interact with the environment, albeit switching the focus to the phenomenon of ethnic enclaves. Once again, I do this in a comparative way, providing insight into how the two groups seem to differ in the type and formation of such enclaves. And, once again, I attempt to position the meso-level variations encountered within the context of a wider, macro-level environment.


In Chapter 7, the final empirical chapter, I explore migrants’ relative levels of privilege and disadvantage. Once again making use of comparisons between members of each group, I show how privilege and disadvantage are manifested in the business practices and everyday lives of migrants. I then, subsequently, explore the underlying reasons for variations in their privileges and disadvantages and, once again, consider how migrants’ micro-level resources interact with a wider, macro-level environment.

In Chapter 8, I attempt to answer the third and final research question, namely, how the data presented in chapters 3-7 can be theoretically accounted for. In order to do so, I propose the concept of 'Global-embeddedness'. I then unpack this concept, demonstrating how it can explain the variations between the two subject groups and their interactions with the wider environment.

Chapter 9 is the final chapter and provides a summary and conclusions of the study, as well as exploring the implications both within - and beyond - the field of migrant entrepreneurship.



2.



CHAPTER 2

Settings & research design



2.1. Introduction

This study centres around a phenomenon in which I have been participating ‘on the front line’ for over six years and which, subsequently, is of great personal interest to me. As someone who has migrated away from a core-state (the UK) and has set up a business in Poland, I am, myself, a core-(semi)-periphery migrant entrepreneur and, in other words, am a potential subject of this study. As such, it seems inappropriate for me to outline this methodological section of the dissertation in a traditional academic, supposedly objective manner, writing in the third person and hiding myself and my agency. Indeed, as you may have noticed from Chapter 1, I often write in the first-person, which I believe to be ‘in keeping with the epistemologies of the research and in the pursuit of reflexivity’ (Webb 1992: 747). But it is not just my personal connection that makes this research relevant. As I have already signalled and will show in subsequent chapters, studying ‘up’ within the field of migrant entrepreneurship (and its findings) also has important implications for the wider field of migration studies and even - I will argue - societies as a whole. And, in order to enhance the credibility and validity of these findings, it was important (as with any academic study) to gather and analyze data using an appropriate research design and suitable methods.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe how I went about this process. Here, I will start by revealing my reasons for choosing Wroclaw, Poland, as the location of the study. I will then outline the research design and, specifically, how my choice of a qualitative, comparative, Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) approach, is well-suited to answering the research questions. In particular, I will pay tribute to the strengths of qualitative interviews in terms of their ability to generate the necessary depth of data required, as well as Grounded Theory’s ability to generate theory while simultaneously taking into consideration hidden power relations which, of course, are especially relevant to this study. I will then, subsequently, describe how I implemented such an approach, that is to say, the methods I utilized to gather and analyze the data, before then proceeding to provide an overview of the research sample. Following this, I will outline additional sources of data which I have included in the study and, last but not least, I will be transparent about the validity and generalizability of the study, highlighting several issues which impinge upon this.


2.2. Setting the scene: Why Wroclaw, Poland?

Wroclaw: The ‘Meeting Place’ (of core and periphery migration)

Situated in the South East of Poland (see Figure. 2.1.), Wroclaw is Poland’s fourth largest city, with a population of 641,000 (Statistical Office in Wroclaw, 2019). For the last two decades, the local government has run extensive marketing campaigns promoting the city as ‘the meeting place’. Although done so for touristic reasons,

there is actually a great deal of truth underlying this slogan. From a historical perspective, the city was the meeting place of German and Polish cultures when, in 1945, the city (then known by its German name of 'Breslau') was ceded to Poland following Germany's defeat in World War II. Within the space of a few years, most of the native German population had been replaced by Poles, many of whom themselves had been forcibly evicted from former Polish lands in the east (Thum 2011). Yet, despite the city's population becoming almost entirely Polish, traces of its German past remain. For those who look, such traces are easy to find. While walking to the center, you might notice the paint of an old building peeling off. Underneath the paint, you can clearly make out the word 'Lebensmittel' (German for 'food'), revealing how this building must have previously sold food products to the city's German inhabitants some 85 years ago.

Figure 2.1. Map of Wrocław, Poland




(Source: Google Maps, 2020.)

In more recent times, the city has once again become the meeting place of Europe's East and West, yet this time in more contemporary circumstances. Following the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 and Poland's subsequent 'opening up' to Western markets in the 1990s, along with its entry into the European Union in 2004, Wrocław has become an attractive location for Western multinationals to outsource production. With its pool of educated, relatively affordable labour, and

geographic proximity to Western Europe, it has seen a large influx of direct foreign investment by transnational corporations²⁰ (Klimek 2017). The subsequent boom in the economy has helped propel Wrocław (and Poland in general) from a region of net emigration to a region of net immigration²¹ with much of this demand for labour being met by migrants from Poland's eastern neighbours, notably Ukraine and Belarus.²² In 2019 alone, Wrocław and the region of Lower Silesia became home to 16,876 Ukrainians and 1,098 Belarusians, as shown in Figure 2.2 below.

Figure 2.2. The number of periphery-state migrants legally registered in Lower Silesia




Source: Polish Office for Foreigners, 2020.

But this upsurge in immigration has not only appeared from the *East*. In recent years, migrants from the *West* have also started to relocate to the city, albeit in smaller numbers. For the year of 2019, these migrant flows stemmed mainly from Germany (2,116), Italy (1,313), Spain (1,254), France (630) and the UK (576), as shown in Figure 2.3 below.

20 American companies alone have created as many as 220,000 jobs in Poland with investments of 130 billion PLN in the first quarter of 2018 (Report by KPMG: 'American investments in Poland', 2018).

21 Statistics Poland, 2019

22 Polish Office for Foreigners, 2020

Figure 2.3. The number of core-state migrants legally registered in Lower Silesia

Source: The Polish Office for Foreigners, 2020.

As such, this brings me to the first reason why Wrocław was selected as the location of this study, namely, the city's role as a 'meeting place' of core and periphery migration. By this I mean that Wrocław is a place where both core *and* periphery migrants can be observed in the *same setting*, which has the advantage of somewhat fixing the variable of the environment.²³

An economic 'middle-ground'

Second, not only does Wrocław provide a shared environment, but also one which can be considered economically 'neutral'. By this I mean that Wrocław, and Poland in general, can be classed as an economic 'middle-ground'. With a GDP of \$15,595, 63rd in the world (World Bank 2019), Poland neither belongs to the group of core-states, nor periphery-states. As a result of this middle-ground status, for those coming from periphery-states, it is relatively *more* economically developed, while for those coming from core-states, it is relatively *less* economically developed. Thus, to borrow the language of Harima (2014), it is a location in which both 'ascending' and 'descending' migrant entrepreneurs can both be found. As will be seen later in this dissertation, this relative 'distance' between migrants' locations of origin and

²³ However, I do, of course, recognize that the environment can never truly be fixed, because environments are inherently personalized and vary from person to person. For example, a migrant entrepreneur from Ukraine may be restricted in terms of visas, whereas a migrant entrepreneur from the EU faces less restrictions.

their new environment (Wroclaw) seems to lead to important variations in how they interact with this environment.

High rates of entrepreneurship

But, importantly, choosing a location whereby core and periphery migration can be observed is, on its own, not enough. After all, the goal of the study was not to research just migrants per se, but rather, migrant *entrepreneurs*. So, it was important to select a location for the study which not only has a plentiful supply of core- and periphery-state migrants, but which is also a location where these migrants own their own businesses. This brings me to the third reason why Wroclaw was chosen, namely, the relatively high rate of migrant entrepreneurship in Poland. Indeed, it appears that the governmental rules and regulations there are rather favourable for self-employment. In a study by Nestorowicz (2012), Poland was found to have the highest rate of migrant entrepreneurship out of all OECD members. Immigrants there were found to be 18% more likely than the native population to create their own company, compared to an average of -6% in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, and Portugal, and an OECD average of around 1%.²⁴ As such, it seems to be a good choice of location in terms of finding a large pool of migrant entrepreneurs from which to draw.²⁵

Practical considerations

There is also a fourth, and final, reason for my selection of Wroclaw as the location of the study. It is the city in which I myself live and work as a migrant entrepreneur. In doing so for six years, I have acquired insightful knowledge, first hand 'life experiences', and 'situational familiarity' (Riemer 1972: 467). While recognizing that this pre-existing knowledge can lead to certain biases and preferences, it can also benefit the study in terms of 1. enriching sociological observations; 2. helping to build a connection with the interviewees who are subsequently more open to answering my questions honestly; and 3. helping with understanding and demonstrating the cultural background in which my studied subjects (migrant entrepreneurs) live and work. With regard to the last point, there is also a pragmatic

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24 These figures are supported by similar findings of high rates of entrepreneurship within Poland in the 2019 OECD report 'The Missing Entrepreneurs 2019: Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship' (OECD 2019), as well as in Andrejuk's (2017) comparative study of migrant entrepreneurs in Poland, albeit Andrejuk points out how this varies depending on the migrants' countries of origin.

25 However, as will be mentioned later in this chapter, it should be taken into account that this figure could be artificially inflated by a 'phenomenon known as involuntary self employment or quasi self-employment' (Andrejuk 2017: 574, Kautonen et al. 2010) whereby employees are encouraged by their employers to set-up their own businesses to reduce employers' social security contributions.

component, as I now speak and understand a relatively high level of Polish, which was very helpful in terms of data collection.

2.3. Research design

'Grounded Theory procedures force us to ask, for example: What power is in this situation and under specified conditions? How is it manifested, by whom, when, where, how, with what consequences (and for whom or what)? Not to remain open to such a range of questions is to obstruct the discovery of important features of power in situ and to preclude developing further conceptualization', (Strauss & Corbin 1998 - in Glaser 2002: 25).

This is an exploratory, comparative study of migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states in the shared 'middle-ground', semi-periphery environment of Wrocław, Poland. In order to give myself the best chance of answering the research questions, I consciously adopted a qualitative, comparative, Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) approach, predominantly relying upon data gathered from qualitative interviews with the migrant entrepreneurs. In doing so, I implicitly made several methodological decisions. I will now, below, recount these decisions, as well as my reasons underpinning them.

First and foremost, qualitative interviews - and a qualitative approach in general - allow for an 'in-depth exploration of a particular topic or experience' (Charmaz 2006: 25) which is necessary in order to answer the first two research questions. These questions involve a large number of variables and the subsequent complexity requires a deeper understanding than might be afforded by quantitative methods. The complexity is further exacerbated by the analysis of not one but *two* subject groups. By using qualitative interviews, therefore, I aimed to 'achieve abstraction by doing justice to the context in which the different cases are embedded' (Palmberger & Gingrich 2013: 95). As such, these interviews form an essential component to understanding, at a deeper level, not just the variations of motivations and resources of the two subject groups (i.e. Research Question 1), but also *how* these variations in motivations and resources of the two subject groups play out in the environment of Wrocław, Poland, and the wider international context (i.e. Research Question 2). Further, qualitative interviews also allow for the exploration of the dimension of *time*, namely the history of the migrant entrepreneurs and their businesses. Considering migrant entrepreneurship is not a static phenomenon, but rather is made up of a series of processes over time, the ability to inquire about the past is an extremely useful attribute of interviews. For example, I was able to ask the migrant entrepreneurs about their original (past) motivations for starting their business, how these motivations may have changed over time, how

the business start-up process transpired, and how certain factors have affected their businesses since its conception etc. This information is of course interpretive, seen through the eyes of the interviewees, then of course interpreted once again by me, the interviewer, however it still provided valuable data required to answer the first two research questions. Additionally, qualitative interviews allowed me to *purposefully select* interviewees (Patton 2002). This ability was very beneficial for this particular study, as it enabled me to research, in a targeted way, a specific population (migrant entrepreneurs from core-states) which might otherwise be overlooked if using other qualitative research methods. Indeed, the flexible nature of qualitative interviews makes them a good fit for such an exploratory study in a relatively unknown field. In the words of Charmaz (2006: 29): ‘interviewing is a flexible, emergent technique; ideas and issues emerge during the interview and interviewers can immediately pursue these leads.’ For an exploratory study such as this, where little is known about migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, this flexibility is a strong advantage of the method.²⁶

Considering Research Question 1 and 2 both seek to explore variations between the two subject groups, I turn now to my explanation for adopting a *comparative* approach. As a comparative *and* Grounded Theory study, a comparative component is intrinsically required on two levels. First, on a general level, the role of the second subject group (migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states) is to act as a point of reference against which to compare data from the first (migrant entrepreneurs from core-states). Data emerging from the core-state subject group can then be better situated when positioned against the periphery-state subject group. Second, as a study which adopts a Grounded Theory approach, the use of comparison is much more than simply the process of comparing the two subject groups. Indeed, ‘constant comparison’ is an inherent component of Grounded Theory, as it is required in order to help outline the emerging categories (Charmaz 2006). In any case, if it is accepted that this comparative component is required, then it may be asked why I did not simply compare data about the migrant entrepreneurs from

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26 I also considered an ethnographic approach and case study approach, but decided against them. In terms of the former, I lacked a physical location per se where the subject groups could be observed. What I mean by this is, it is not like an ethnography of a Muslim community in Egypt (for example) where the subjects can be observed in a communal settings such as a mosque. Migrant entrepreneurs in Wrocław do not have a ‘church’ or club to which they belong, subsequently presenting challenges to adopting an ethnographic approach. In terms of the latter, a case study approach would have had the advantage of offering a deeper level understanding of a smaller number of cases. However, such an approach is more suitable for pre-selected subjects of interest. At the beginning of this study, I did not know the subjects, so pre-selecting them to take part in a case study would have been problematic. Qualitative interviews with a greater number of migrant entrepreneurs, by contrast, allowed me to get a better ‘lay of the land’ and, as such, seemed a better starting point.

core-states with data from the substantial stockpile of *pre-existing* studies about migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states. After all, as noted in the literature review section, there is indeed a plethora of such studies. However, importantly, these studies were conducted at different times (in the past), in different places and often using different methods. With so many variables, it would make for an unfair comparison and, subsequently, weaken the validity and significance of any differences encountered. For this reason, I decided to simultaneously study *both* migrant entrepreneurs from core-states *and* migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states.

Last, but certainly not least, I will explain my reasons for adopting a Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) approach. Indeed, one of the main goals of Grounded Theory is to do exactly what my third research question requires, namely, to abstract *theory* from the data (Strauss & Corbin 1990). It does so via a combination of methods, including purposeful, theoretical sampling, constant comparison (noted above), coding, and conceptualization (Glaser 2002: 24). Of particular relevance to this study is Grounded Theory's consideration of hidden power dynamics. As quoted at the beginning of this section, it forces us to question how power is 'manifested' and 'by whom, when, where, how, with what consequences (and for whom or what)' (Strauss & Corbin 1998 - in Strauss 2002: 25). This, combined with Grounded Theory's goal of grounding theory in the data, helps to generate new concepts and theories which are independent of pre-existing theories which themselves, as seen in Chapter 1, may well conceal hidden power relations.

At this point, however, I should point out that I was not starting this research with a 'blank slate'. As a migrant entrepreneur myself, and as someone who had been studying the subject of migrant entrepreneurship, it was inherently impossible for my research to be 100% inductive. Indeed, while one of the founding principles of Grounded Theory is to conduct the literature review *after* the fieldwork (Charmaz 2006), I admit that I did so *before* and that, in doing so, these pre-existing ideas (both from the literature and my own experiences) must have undoubtedly influenced my research questions, fieldwork, and theorizing. Here, it seems, I am not alone, as Timmermans & Tavory (2012) point out that induction is always theoretically informed and beginning with no prior ideas is essentially impossible. That being said, where possible, I attempt to ground my findings in the data and, importantly, the study unearthed several observations which I was not anticipating. As such, while recognising that following a purely inductive research agenda was not entirely possible, I have still done my best to follow the principles of a qualitative, Grounded Theory approach.

2.4. Methods and fieldwork

As someone who has worked and lived as a migrant entrepreneur in Poland for over six years, it could be said that I have spent extensive amounts of time ‘in the field.’ Yet, I only began to formally research and analyse migrant entrepreneurship upon undertaking this study. As such, the fieldwork formally took place between October 2018 to May 2020. This fieldwork consisted of a number of methods which closely connected with my research design (outlined above) and, therefore, were chosen with a view to generating the data necessary to answer the research questions. With regard to Research Questions 1 and 2, which concern themselves with migrants’ motivations and access to resources and how they interact with the environment, I make use of the following: 1. purposeful sampling; 2. qualitative interviews; 3. organizational coding; 4. constant comparison. With regard to Research Question 3, which concerns itself more with theoretically accounting for the data uncovered in the study, I rely upon two additional methods, namely, 5. theoretical coding; and 6. conceptualization.

1. Purposeful sampling

It goes without saying that, in order to study migrant entrepreneurs (from core- and periphery-states) in Wrocław, I first needed to *find* them. As a starting point, in August, 2018, I met with a representative from the Statistical Office in Wrocław from whom I was able to purchase a list of 970 businesses in Wrocław which were established with foreign capital.²⁷ This attribute (of setting up a business with foreign capital) can be used to denote foreign, non-Polish ownership.²⁸ This list (of migrant entrepreneurs from both core- and periphery-states) constituted one of the main sources of subjects for the study. However, it was not the only source. Other subjects were located via migrant networking meet-ups (namely, InterNations events, in addition to another local weekly international meet-up known as ‘Tower of Babel’), as well as online sources, including Google My Business, the ‘Wrocław Expats’ Facebook group, and LinkedIn. Migrants selected from these initial sources often later referred fellow migrant entrepreneurs from within their social networks, leading to a total of 26 additional ‘snowball sampling’ (Goodman 1961) interviewees

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27 The list also included 2,552 LLCs, however, I decided not to include them in the study, because I was unable to establish the nationality of the owners of these LLCs. Further, many of the LLCs appear to be branches of internationally-run companies, for example one of the businesses on the list is ‘KRAFT POLSKA SPÓŁKA Z OGRANICZONĄ ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCIĄ’ which is no doubt a Wrocław branch of the international food distributor Kraft Foods and, therefore, not owned by someone who is a self-employed entrepreneur per se.

28 There were a very small number (10) of exceptions, whereby a handful of sole proprietors listed their nationality as Polish, however the overwhelming majority were indeed non-Polish.

being included in the study. A summary of the number of migrant entrepreneurs and their sources is provided below in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1. Sources of migrant entrepreneurs in this study

	Migrants from core-states	Migrants from periphery-states
Snowball method	20	6
List of 970 sole proprietors	14	9
Google My Business	2	2
Migrant networking meet-ups	4	0
'Wroclaw Expats' Facebook group	1	5
LinkedIn	0	2
TOTAL	41	24

Source: Original data from this study.

But, of course, simply finding the subjects of the study did not guarantee the data necessary to answer the research questions. In order to help me collect this data in a more targeted way, I opted to employ a sampling strategy of *purposefully selecting* subjects who ‘best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question’ (Creswell 2003: 239). Starting with ‘initial sampling’, I conducted four pilot interviews with the goal of gaining a very general overview of migrant entrepreneurs (from core-states) in the environment of Wroclaw. I then, later, moved onto more targeted thematic and theoretical sampling. Charmaz (2006: 14) offers a helpful metaphor to understand this process: ‘Like a camera with many lenses, first you view a broad sweep of the landscape. Subsequently, you change your lens several times to bring scenes closer and closer into view.’ Indeed, considering the exploratory nature of this study, this was exactly my approach. The ability to zoom in on interesting trends allowed me to be more targeted in pursuing certain themes which were of relevance to the research questions. For example, during the study it emerged that migrant entrepreneurs with greater levels of core-state social and cultural capital seem more likely to access core-state (i.e. international) opportunity structures. In order to explore this in greater depth and breadth, I was then able to purposefully select a number of subsequent migrant entrepreneurs to further explore this phenomenon. Summarily, compiling all of the above sources together, in total I included 41 subjects from core-states and 24 from periphery-states. An overview of these migrants will be shared later in this chapter.

2. Qualitative interviews

Each migrant entrepreneur took part in a qualitative interview, all of which were conducted by me. Each interview took on average 45 minutes with some lasting

much longer, while for a small number the interviews lasted less than 30 minutes, usually because they claimed to be busy, or their data began to repeat that of previous interviewees. Where possible, the conversations were recorded and (later) transcribed. However, a small number of migrants stated they did not want the conversation to be recorded, in particular those from Ukraine or Belarus. In such cases, I made notes during the conversations in lieu of recordings. Further, for both subject groups, the recordings almost always do not capture the full conversation, as talking invariably started prior to beginning the recording and continued after stopping the recording. In fact, some of the more interesting feedback was noted during these times.

Where possible, I interviewed the subjects at their workplaces (so as to simultaneously see their businesses first hand). However, in situations whereby the subjects worked from a home office, or did not want to meet at their workplace, the interviews took place at nearby cafes, bars, or restaurants. In a small minority of cases, whereby the subjects were not currently in Wroclaw, the interviews took place over Skype or over the phone.

In total, I conducted 65 interviews with migrants from core- and periphery-states, resulting in 488 pages of transcription. With regard to *how many* migrant entrepreneurs were interviewed, this number was not predefined. Rather, data collection continued until the categories were 'saturated' which, in the words of Charmaz (2006: 13) is when 'gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of these core theoretical categories'. In order to 'go deeper' in certain cases, I subsequently met again with 11 migrants, of whom I then spoke with six of them once again. Toward the end of the study, Wroclaw (as well as Poland and global civilisation as a whole) experienced the turmoil of the COVID-19 pandemic. At this point, I wrote to all the interviewees, asking them how it is affecting their businesses, of which 23 provided feedback. This was not planned at the beginning of the study, however Creswell (2003: 234) reminds us that qualitative research is an emergent process and 'may change or shift after the researcher enters the field and begins to collect data'.

3. Organizational coding

Following the transcribing of the interviews, I codified the data according to *organizational* categories. Such categories 'function primarily as abstract 'bins' for sorting the data for further analysis' (Maxwell & Chmiel 2014: 25). As a starting point, these initially stemmed from the research questions. For example, with regard to Research Question 1 (concerning itself with how the two groups of migrants vary in their motivations and access to resources), I coded the data according to the following organizational categories: i. Motivation(s) for migrating to Poland; ii. Motivation(s) for opening a business; iii. Interviewee's access to financial capital; iv. Interviewee's human capital; v. Interviewee's social capital; vi. Interviewee's cultural capital. With regard to Research Questions 2 (concerning itself with how such

variations affect the everyday management of the firm, the ethnic division of labour, and the firm's position within the wider economy), I coded data into categories such as: i. Business type; ii. Privilege and/or disadvantage; iii. Labour supply; iv. Geographical location of clients; and v. COVID-19. Despite many of these initial categories stemming a priori from the research questions, as I collected more and more data over the course of the study, other categories emerged from the data. For example, in terms of the subjects' motivations for moving to Poland, a common factor (among those from the core-states subject group) was that of being in a relationship with a Polish partner. As such, I began to pay closer attention to this and subsequently added subcategories of motivations, such as 'moving for a partner', 'moving for a better quality of life', 'moving for lower costs' etc. Yet, importantly, such categories and trends are only visible when viewed in relation to other data. As such, it highlights the importance of 'constant comparison', to which I now turn below.

4. *Constant comparison*

Throughout the study, both during fieldwork and afterwards, I made use of constant comparison. This worked hand-in-hand with coding, whereby sometimes comparison came first and helped me to develop codes, whereas at other times I would compare subjects according to the codes I had created. For example, with regard to migrants' motivations (i.e. the first research question), one interviewee stated that they moved to Wrocław because of the positive 'vibe' of the city. I then compared this against other interviewees to see if it was part of a wider trend within the group (which indeed it was). At this point, it became a category which I then compared against members of the *other* subject group. So, in other words, I compared data on two distinct levels, that is to say, *intra*-group and *inter*-group. But, importantly, there was also a third (theoretical) level on which this took place. While conducting the research, I was also constantly analyzing how the migrants' situations and experiences compare with the wider theoretical landscape. Indeed, such theoretical comparison formed an important part of the next method, namely, *theoretical coding*.

5. *Theoretical coding*

In addition to coding the data into organizational categories, I also made use of *theoretical* categories (Maxwell & Chmielecki 2014). Subsequent qualitative interview candidates were then purposefully selected 'in order to progress the development of...emergent conceptual ideas' (Rapley 2014: 58). Thus, subsequent sampling decisions were often 'emergent, progressive and inductive' (ibid: 58). This process of coding, selecting new candidates, then further coding continued until data saturation (Charmaz 2006) and a theoretical understanding emerged (Strauss & Corbin 1990). In doing so, I initially made use of a priori theoretical categories such as: i. Disadvantage Theory; ii. Ethnic Enclave Theory; and iii. the Mixed-

embeddedness Approach. But, as the study continued, more inductive categories began to emerge, for example, the role of various macro layers of the environment, namely: i. Socio-cultural; ii. Economic; iii. Technological; and iv. Politico-institutional. These inductive theoretical categories then formed the basis for 'conceptualization'.

6. Conceptualization

In accordance with Glaser's outline of conceptualization, in this study I identified patterns emerging from the data. These patterns (such as the emergent role of macro level layers of the environment, as noted above) were numerous, yet all seemed to be united by one single conceptualization. It was at this point that I coined the term 'Global-embeddedness' (see Chapter 8 for a full description and explanation of this). This term, as prescribed by Glaser (2002: 24), was chosen through a process of 'constantly trying to fit words to it to best capture its imageric meaning'. Furthermore, once again in accordance with Glaser's guidelines surrounding conceptualizations, the concept is 'abstract of time, place, and people' (ibid: 25). This, importantly, means that it is a concept which can, in theory, be universally applied to other contexts.

2.5. Overview of the research sample

I turn now to the research sample. By this, I am referring to the migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states who are residing in Wroclaw and whom I interviewed. The goal of this section is not to go into any great depth (as such depth will be explored in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation), but rather to provide a brief overview of the subjects' basic demographic information, namely, their nationality, gender, and industry sector. For those of you who would like to see a full list of the subjects, you can find this in the Appendix (Tables 10.1 and 10.2).

Starting with nationality, as can be seen from Table 2.2, below, the core-state subject group consists of 41 migrants from 11 core-states, specifically: the UK, the USA, Italy, France, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Canada, Australia, and Israel. The periphery-state subject group is somewhat smaller, with 24 migrants originating from 5 periphery-states (Ukraine, Belarus, India, Nigeria, and South Africa).

Table 2.2. The citizenship of migrants included in the research sample

Migrants from core countries		Migrants from periphery countries	
UK	7	Ukraine	15
USA	7	Belarus	4
Italy	6	India	2
France	5	Nigeria	2
Germany	5	South Africa	1
Ireland	4		
Finland	2		
Portugal	2		
Canada	1		
Australia	1		
Israel	1		
TOTAL	41	TOTAL	24

Source: Original data from this study.

Notably, and perhaps quite fitting for a study which concerns itself with scrutinizing those often at the top of power hierarchies, almost all of the subjects (40 out of 41) from core-states are male. This trend is similar among those from periphery-states (18 out of 24). Although there was no deliberate gender sampling strategy, such a gender imbalance can be partially explained by quantitative migration data from the Polish Office for Foreigners, which shows how migrants are indeed more likely to be male.²⁹ In terms of location, all but two of the migrants live and work in Wrocław with the exceptions being one migrant from Finland in Poznań (Poland) and another from Ukraine in Warsaw (Poland), whom I was referred to via interviewees in Wrocław, but whom I still decided to include in the study.³⁰

In terms of industry sector, there are some broad variations between the two subject groups. For example migrants from core-states are better represented within the 'professional activities' and 'information and communication' sectors, while the majority of those from periphery-states are located within the

²⁹ Specifically, for the year of 2019, male migrants from core-states such as Germany, Italy, and the UK outnumbered their female counterparts by about 3:1, while for those from the Ukraine it was closer to 3:2).

³⁰ I made this decision because, as a study which made use of purposeful theoretical sampling, I deemed their situations to be theoretically relevant. For example, one of them was from Ukraine and employed both Polish and Ukrainian employees, which later provided valuable insight into the variation in work roles and the ethnic division of labour.


‘gastronomy’, ‘wholesale’, and ‘construction’ sectors, as shown in Figure 2.4 below. For the most part, these variations seem to mirror the broader, macro-level situation within Poland in terms of migrants’ citizenship and industry sector (as will be seen in Chapter 5).

2.6. Other data

As part of the fieldwork, I also gathered additional information from a range of other sources. This included qualitative interviews with representatives from nearly one dozen local organizations which have regular contact with migrants and migrant entrepreneurs, such as the City of Wroclaw, various chambers of commerce, as well as a number of NGOs. I have listed these organizations and supplementary data sources below:

- Interviews with representatives from the following local organizations:
  - The City of Wroclaw
  - American Polish Chamber of Commerce (Wroclaw Chapter)
  - British Chamber of Commerce (Wroclaw Chapter)
  - German Chamber of Commerce (Wroclaw Chapter)
  - Nomada (an NGO providing assistance to migrants)
  - Europa Forum (an NGO facilitating networking between German and Polish businesses)
  - A local (Wroclaw) accountant who has a large non-Polish clientele
  - InfoLink (NGO promoting cultural understanding in Wroclaw)
  - German consulate
  - Office of the Ukrainian Honorary Consul
  - Centre of Ukrainian Culture and Development (CUKR)
- ‘Expatriate’ news outlets, such as ‘WroclawUncut.com’ and ‘NotesFromPoland.com’;
- ‘Expatriate’ forums, such as the ‘Wroclaw Expats’ Facebook group.

Figure 2.4. The industry sector of the migrants included in the research sample



Source: Original data from this study.

This was done for two main reasons. First and foremost, by broadening the type and source of data *beyond* the two subject groups, it helped with providing additional data necessary to more comprehensively answer Research Questions 1 and 2. For example, interviews with the British and German Chambers of Commerce revealed that, for the majority of their members, the Chambers serve as a way of connecting Polish supply with British/German demand. In other words, this additional data helped to shed light on the presence of an uneven, international, economic environment which in itself provided insight into why so many migrants from core-states (who themselves are operating within this wider environment) seem to likewise be targeting core-state markets. As such, for this particular example, it provided data very relevant to answering research question 2, which concerns itself with how migrants and their resources interact with the wider environment. Second, having alternative sources of data helps to improve the validity of the study, as themes uncovered in the primary (interview) data can then be triangulated with these secondary sources of data (Creswell 2003). ‘Triangulate’ here is meant in the sense of analyzing how data from these secondary sources relates to data gathered from the migrant entrepreneurs. So, to continue the previous example of the interviews with the British and German Chambers of Commerce, this information about the trend of targeting British and German (i.e. core-state) markets could then be triangulated with the qualitative interview data, subsequently lending additional support and understanding to the existence of this trend.

2.7. Limitations of the study

In this final section of the chapter, I would like to highlight issues concerning the validity and generalizability of the study. With regard to the former, there are several challenges. These include language issues, transference, and the inclusion in the study of certain migrants who, perhaps, are not ‘true entrepreneurs’. I will describe these below, as well as the measures I have taken to (where possible) mitigate against them. With regard to the latter (generalizability), I will remind readers that the primary goal of this study was not to present a numerical representation of its findings, but rather to understand, at a deep level, the specific particulars of migrant entrepreneurship in a core-to-(semi)-periphery migratory context. By this I mean that, even though the study might not be numerically representative, it does not mean that it is not representative of trends and causal mechanisms (Lin 1998).

2.7.1. Validity of the study

First, there are question marks surrounding a small number of subjects included in the study. I had feared that a large proportion of the respondents would turn out not to be ‘true entrepreneurs’ per se (i.e. sole proprietors who set up their

business as a way for their employers to avoid the high social security payments in Poland, a 'phenomenon known as involuntary self employment' or 'quasi self-employment' (Andrejuk 2017: 574, Kautonen et al. 2010)). However, this was only encountered in a small number of cases, for example a German migrant who had set up his own marketing company, but to all intents and purposes was working as an employee, running the marketing campaigns for his (sole) employer. This person was omitted from the study. However, four other migrants, who are arguably in similar situations, were included in the study. These are Adrian (UK), who worked as an English teacher and set up his own company at the bequest of his employer, an English language school. However, he later went on to provide work for other clients, subsequently enabling him to meet Rath & Swagerman's (2011: 83) definition of a migrant entrepreneur, namely 'a person in effective control of a commercial undertaking for more than one client over a significant period of time'. Volodomir (Ukraine), Maria (Belarus), and Louis (France) also, at the time of interview, only had one official client. However, I decided to still include them in the study because they said they were actively trying to find additional clients.

Second, this study encountered challenges in terms of languages and communication. Many of the interviews with the migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states were conducted in Polish. While my Polish is fluent, it is not native level. This, combined with the non-native Polish of the subjects, creates the potential for misunderstandings. For those who permitted me to record the interviews, this was somewhat mitigated by my ability to later listen carefully to and transcribe the recordings, allowing deeper reflection to ensure I understand the interviewees' intended meaning. However, as mentioned previously, many of the migrants from Ukraine and Belarus did not want the conversations to be recorded, which added an extra level of difficulty in ensuring I was capturing accurate information. In such situations, I made notes, which, to the best of my ability, accurately reflected our conversations.

Third, there is a risk of transference, namely, that my own experiences (as a migrant entrepreneur from a core-state and running an IT business in Wroclaw) will influence not just my a priori ideas, but also my ongoing analysis of the data. According to Creswell (2003: 237), this can 'cause researchers to lean toward certain themes, to actively look for evidence to support their positions'. To address this, I have tried to be fully transparent about my role in the study, writing in the first person to reflect my active participation as the main instrument collecting and interpreting the data.

Further, in an attempt to mitigate the above risks, I have employed a number of additional strategies suggested by Creswell (*ibid*). First, by collecting data from not just the migrant entrepreneurs, but also additional sources (such as quantitative third party data, as well as representatives of third party organizations), it allowed for triangulation of data to check for congruency. For example, many migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states spoke of how they access Polish labour and

service clients in core-states, which (as will be seen in Chapter 5) was a trend supported by third party quantitative data from representatives of third party organizations. Second, where possible, I have tried to include quotes from the participants of the study which provide ‘rich, thick description’ which can ‘add to the validity of the findings’ (ibid: 251). Third, throughout the study I have been transparent and presented evidence *contrary* to the broader trends of the study. For example, in Chapter 3, despite my observation that those from core-states often benefit from greater legal mobility, I also note the contradictory example of Dave (Canada), who experienced quite the opposite. Last, but not least, I have spent over six years living and working as a migrant entrepreneur in the field. Throughout this time, I have attended ‘expat’ meet-ups, entrepreneurial meet-ups, conferences, as well as other formal and informal gatherings with fellow migrant entrepreneurs. Living within the city, I have also frequented many of their businesses not only as part of the study, but also in ‘normal life’. Such a prolonged time in the field has led, I believe, to a better, in-depth understanding of the environment and its inhabitants.

2.7.2. Generalizability of the study

As is common in qualitative research, with this study I did not seek to present a numerical representation of the findings. Rather, my primary goal was to understand, at a deep level, the specific particulars of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states in Wrocław and to position them against those from the periphery-states. As such, it was more about ‘understanding rather than measuring difference’ (Lewis et al. 2003: 50) with the focus on the depth and detail of the particulars and not generalizability (Greene & Caracelli 1997). That being said, as will be seen in Chapters 8 and 9, I believe that this study still has important theoretical ramifications within the field of migrant entrepreneurship, as well as the wider migration literature and even global inequality in general. In this sense, even though the study might not be numerically representative, it could well be representative of underlying causal mechanisms which help to explain the ‘how’ of broader social phenomena (Lin 1998).

2.8. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have detailed the research design and methodology used in this study. I started by explaining my choice of Wrocław as the location of the study, then proceeded to describe the reasons underpinning my research design, specifically, why I opted for a qualitative, comparative, Grounded Theory approach. This, importantly, I related back to how my choices enabled me to answer the research questions. I then, subsequently, described what I actually *did*, that is to say, my fieldwork and how I went about performing the methods I had chosen.

Although all closely connected, for the sake of simplification, I broke these down into six distinct methods, namely: i. purposeful sampling; ii. qualitative interviews; iii. organizational coding; iv. constant comparison; v. theoretical coding; and vi. conceptualization. I then presented an overview of the research sample, including basic demographic information such as gender, nationality, and industry sector. Following this, I highlighted additional sources of data before, finally, taking into consideration several issues concerning the validity and generalizability of the study. Throughout it all, I wrote in the first person to reflect my active participation as the main instrument collecting and interpreting the data.

3.



CHAPTER 3

**Revealing the hidden
role of motivations in
migrant entrepreneurship**

"Maybe someone from Ukraine is seen as cheap labour, and someone from Germany is seen as someone who is choosing to be here. Like I would be more categorized as an expat, whereas someone from Ukraine would be more categorized as a migrant", (Mattheus, Germany, educational consultancy).

3.1. Introduction

This is the first of two chapters which aim to answer how the two groups of migrants vary in their motivations and micro level resources (i.e. my first research question). This chapter, specifically, is devoted to the former, that is to say *motivations*, and seeks to compare those of the migrants from core-states against that of migrants from periphery-states. But, importantly, within the context of migrant entrepreneurship, there is not only one question concerning migrants' motivations but, rather, *two*: First, why migrate? Second, why start a business? Of course, that is not to say that the migrants always made their decisions in this order. After all, many of them ran their own businesses *prior* to moving to Wroclaw. Rather, by breaking the theme of motivations down into two separate questions, my goal here is to organize my analysis.

Before commencing with this analysis, however, I would like to first continue and develop an observation from Chapter 1, namely, the curiously overlooked role played by motivations within the literature. There I had highlighted how many of the most cited theories in migrant entrepreneurship rarely incorporate the role of migrants' motivations. This is even true of the Mixed-embeddedness Approach which, despite being generally acknowledged as the most comprehensive theory in the field, pays little attention to migrants' individual agency (Peters 1999, 2002). But, and here's the key question, why is this? Such an omission seems to naturally suggest that migrants' motivations for relocating and starting their own business are not important. Yet, as someone who has, myself, migrated to another country and embarked upon my own entrepreneurial journey, I know firsthand what huge undertakings both actions are and, as such, the corresponding levels of motivation they require to carry out. Additionally, it is worth remembering that the large majority of people do *not* migrate (circa 97% of people globally),³¹ nor do they start their own businesses (circa 90% among women and 82% among men in OECD countries).³² So, considering such actions not only require considerable effort, but are also clearly quite exceptional, why then, do the leading theoreticians often seem to overlook the motivations underlying them? The answer, I argue, and as I will continue to stress throughout this dissertation, can be found in the

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31 UN DESA 2020

32 OECD 2017

almost exclusive focus upon migrant entrepreneurship in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts (Ilhan-nas et al. 2011; Dheer 2018). Within such contexts, many authors seem to assume that migrant entrepreneurs want to migrate to an economically more developed country and similarly assume that their decision to open their own businesses is likewise rooted in economic considerations. In effect, this reduces migrant entrepreneurs to a kind of 'homo-economicus' (Persky 1995), void of their own free will, drawn to economically more developed countries and entrepreneurship purely for financial gain. Yet, when we look at migration in the opposite direction, we suddenly seem to be prompted to ask *why*. For example, when I tell you about Mattheus (quoted above), who moved from Germany to Poland to open his own educational consultancy, you might somewhat automatically ask 'why?' Why would he move *away* from an economically more developed country (Germany) to an economically *less developed* country (Poland)? In other words, Mattheus' migration 'calls into question taken-for-granted understandings of the relationship between migration and economics' (Benson & O'Reilly 2018: 91), as well as assumptions surrounding migrants' expected gains of such a move. So, as can be seen here, when migration is in a core-to-(semi)-periphery direction, suddenly the question of *choice* seems to arise. In other words, by studying 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship, we begin to shine a light on the previously ignored (or, at best, assumed) factor of motivation. In this sense, such 'upward-facing' studies might serve as a way of revealing the hidden role played by motivations in migrant entrepreneurship.

But at this point, we might ask if this distinction between core and periphery is even justified.³³ By this I mean, do migrants from core-states really have more of a choice when migrating to Poland and opening their own business? And, conversely, for those from periphery-states, is it less of a choice and more of a *necessity*? On the one hand, economic motivations would provide a rationale for why (semi-)periphery-to-core migration flows are so much larger than migration flows in the opposite direction.³⁴ It would also provide a way to explain high rates of migrant entrepreneurship among many (semi-)periphery-to-core migrant populations who, faced with discrimination and barriers to the mainstream labour market in the host country, turn to entrepreneurship out of economic necessity (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Ram & Jones 2008). Yet, on the other hand, even within (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, it has been shown that motivations are not always economic in character (Knight 2015; Rametse et al. 2018), nor uniform (Masurel et al. 2002; Lin & Tao 2012).

³³ This distinction (of choice vs. necessity) has even been used as a defining way to classify the difference between so-called 'expat-preneurs' vs. migrant entrepreneurs (Vance 2016).

³⁴ Global migration from South-North (approx. 95.2 million) greatly outnumbers migration from North-South (approx. 13.6 million), (UN DESA 2020).

So then, in this chapter, drawing upon data from the qualitative interviews of both subject groups, I aim to shed some light on this. In doing so, I divide the chapter into two main parts. The first concerns itself with migrants' motivations underlying their migration to Wrocław, while the second addresses their motivations for starting a business. In both sections, I begin by analyzing the motivations of those from core-states, before then later comparing this against the motivations of those from periphery-states. I start, then, with the intriguing question of 'why Wrocław?'

3.2. Why Wrocław?

3.2.1. Migrant entrepreneurs from core-states

"I was living in England, and I met a Polish girl there, and she convinced me to come on holiday in Poland...London was a bit too big for me. Too intensive, too fast, too overcrowded. I felt like [Wrocław] is an easier place, especially when you get married and have kids and grandparents are not far away, but also in a business sense I felt that this would give me a better opportunity to stand out. I would call it pioneering in many senses, being sort of the first. In London, although I had a nice job, I worked at a bank, it was quite comfortable, it was more difficult and I didn't see much of a future there. And I was one of an infinite number of people. But here [in Wrocław] I had certain advantages, a mixed set up skills that made me a bit more, I don't like to say big shot, but I had more competitive advantages and less competition...Quite quickly I felt comfortable in Poland and I moved here from England in 2014 after two years of a Ryanair relationship going back and forth every second or third weekend...I love the city...I enjoy its geography, layout, architecture, its history, its culture, its vibe, its environment. Also in terms of geography it's quite close to many places in Europe. It's quite central in Europe. So basically I fell in love with the place, I connected to it. Everything about it. I think the size is ideal in many senses.... Poland is great fun. It was and is a little bit of a themepark for me", (Caleb, Israel, property investment).

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, when describing migration in a core-to-(semi-)periphery direction, we seem compelled to ask why. Why, for example, did Caleb (quoted above) migrate from Israel (via London) to Wrocław? As can be seen, his decision was not based upon one single reason, but rather on a combination of reasons. This seems similar to the findings within the lifestyle migration literature, whereby motivations for migrating were complex, often consisting of multiple factors (Ono 2015; Andrzejuk 2017; Benson & O'Reilly 2018). For Caleb, these motivations appear to include the following: 1. His partner was

from Poland; 2. His quality of life is better in this ‘more comfortable’ environment and city with a positive ‘vibe’; 3. In terms of his business, he feels like Wrocław offers a business-friendly environment with less competition; and 4. He likes the geographical proximity of Wrocław to ‘many places in Europe’. I have chosen to highlight Caleb’s reasons, because they are broadly representative of the reasons provided by many other migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group. What is important here is that, in contrast to the ‘homo-economicus’ motivations often assumed by the leading migrant entrepreneurship theories (as outlined in the introduction), three out of four of these motivations seem to be *non-economic* in character. As will be seen, this was often (but not always) a different story for many migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states.

First, however, I will elaborate (in greater detail) upon the reasons why migrant entrepreneurs from core-states migrated to Wrocław. At this point I would like to reiterate that most migrants cited multiple reasons. That being said, some reasons seemed to play a greater role than others in their decision-making process. As such, I have listed them below in order of their perceived importance.

Moving for a partner

Living in Wrocław myself, I often get asked “why did you move to *Poland*?!” Those (usually Polish) people posing the question are often incredulous that someone from *England* would voluntarily want to move to *Poland*. They then often add “it must be because of a Polish woman, no?” and give me a knowing wink. Although I myself did not move to Poland for a Polish partner, listening to my interviewees from core-states, their assumption seems like a reasonable expectation. As can be seen from Table 3.1, 19 out of 41 of the core-states subject group said that they had a Polish partner prior to moving to Wrocław. Notably, all 19 of them were men, which is because, as acknowledged in Chapter 2, the large majority (40 out of 41) of the migrants from the core-state subject group were male, an imbalance that loosely mirrors the preponderance of men in quantitative migration data. Such variation is no doubt rooted in systemic gender inequality, revealing how migration itself is a ‘gendered phenomenon’ (Pessar 2005: 2). Nevertheless, this finding lends support to Andrejuk’s (2017) study of migrant entrepreneurs from Western Europe wherein such migrants were found to have often moved to Poland for a Polish partner.

Table 3.1. Polish partner prior to moving to Poland? Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

	Had a Polish partner prior to moving to Poland	Had a non-Polish partner prior to moving to Poland	No partner prior to moving to Poland	Total
Migrants from core-states	19 (47%)	0 (0%)	22 (53%)	41 (100%)
Migrants from periphery-states	1 (4%)	15 (60%)	9 (36%)	25 (100%)

Source: My own data collated from the qualitative interviews with the Global North and Global South migrant entrepreneurs, 2020.

Importantly, this figure (47%) is much higher than that of those from periphery-states (4%). In the face of the assumption that migrants relocate from areas of lower economic development to areas of higher economic development for financial reasons, migrating in the opposite direction for a *partner* would provide a mechanism for accounting for this contra-directional migratory flow. Yet, while this finding breaks down the assumption that migrants are primarily motivated by economics, it simultaneously reinforces the stereotype of Western men pairing up with Eastern European women (Chun 1996). As was the case with Caleb (previously outlined), this usually happens in the following way: Polish woman moves abroad, Polish woman meets foreign man, Polish woman returns to Poland with foreign man. Here perhaps I give the impression that these men are somewhat dragged back to Poland against their will but, of course, that is not the case. They go willingly and are often rewarded with a host of additional benefits, both material (such as the partner owning a house in Wrocław) and immaterial. In terms of the latter, Caleb is a good example once again, whereby his move to Wrocław meant being closer to his partner's parents and, therefore, free babysitting and help looking after the children. It was a similar story for Connor (Ireland), for whom this extended family support was also one of the main pull factors of Wrocław:

"We moved as soon as we realized we wanted to start a family...it was just the support network. I phoned everybody that I knew who had international wives and girlfriends who were living abroad and had started families and I said what do I need to know? And they all turned around and said look it doesn't matter about nannies, this, that, and the other. They said...You need to be close to her mother. So everyone said that's it. That is your key success factor", (Connor, Ireland, IT company).

Clearly, then, for migrants such as Connor, relocating to Wrocław was about far more than simply moving for a partner.³⁵ And, in fact, the majority of migrants in this subject group (albeit only a slight majority at 53%), moved to Poland not for a partner but for *other reasons*, to which I now turn below.

A better quality of life / Wrocław as a 'vibrant' city

Caleb described how, for him, Wrocław somehow felt 'more comfortable' and even described it as a 'little bit of a theme park'. This idea of having a better quality of life was echoed by many of the other migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group, such as Anna (USA):

"In Chicago I loved my life, but it was very go-go-go and it was very busy. And when I moved here it was the first time in my life that I had ever been not busy. People were like 'hey do you want to meet up for coffee tonight?' and I was like 'hey sure!' I hadn't been spontaneous in so long, because Mondays were volleyball and Tuesdays were this and Wednesdays were this and girls night was on Thursdays and on Fridays we did this and it was like highly regimented and highly social but not free. And here I had time to cook, read, and meet people. [Whereas] in Chicago I had a lot of friends, but I never had motivation to meet new people, because I had all these friends and they fill up every night, so how could I possibly need anyone else? But here it was like a reset on life," (Anna, USA, arts & crafts store).

It seems that, for Anna, relocating to Poland was a way of freeing herself from her previous life and the commitments that it entailed. Importantly, her motivation (to have a more relaxed lifestyle) is non-economic in character. This desire for a better quality of life as a motivation, as opposed to moving for financial gain, once again seems similar to the motivations described in the lifestyle migration literature (Stone & Stubbs 2007; Torkington 2010; Ono 2015; Andrejuk 2017; Benson & O'Reilly 2018). Poland, despite not being a stereotypical lifestyle destination with sunny beaches all year round, seems to provide both Anna and Caleb (as well as many of the other migrant entrepreneurs from core-states) with a less stressful environment.

Closely related to this is the idea of Wrocław being 'vibrant'. When conducting these interviews, I remember, after about the fifth interview within the core-states subject group, thinking: 'Interesting! Almost all of them have used the word 'vibrant'

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35 It is also interesting to note that, since Connor's decision to move to Poland six years ago, his mother-in-law now no longer helps with raising his children, yet he and his wife still choose to stay. In his own words, he 'came for family, but stayed for the developers'. As such, it highlights the non-static nature of motivations and how they can change over time (Knight 2015).

or ‘vibe’ when referring to Wrocław.’ But what exactly do they mean by this? For Giovanni (Italy), he uses the word to describe ‘an energy’ which he feels in Wrocław:

“In Italy there are a lot of old people and here is the opposite. There are a lot of young people. And that mixed with the economic boom or opportunity, makes Poland have a vibe, like an energy, that Italy does not have any more. So Italy is kinda like a dying country right now. Poland is on the other side of the spectrum. It’s like a growing country”, (Giovanni, Italy, IT company).

Giovanni’s desire to change countries for ‘a vibe’ seems a far cry from the narrative of ‘the disadvantaged migrant’ who is often portrayed as migrating as a result of war, political insecurity, and financial hardship. This idea, and how it relates to the situation of those from the periphery-states subject group, will be further explored later in this chapter.

Lower costs and a favourable business environment

I mentioned previously that the motivations of migrants from core-states seem to be mainly non-economic in character and how this seems to go against the assumed economic motivations of migrant entrepreneurs in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts. However, at times, economic considerations do indeed seem to play a role, albeit a different one:

“Rent [in Italy] is still 1000 [Euro] a month, so you have nothing left, that’s why so many people live with their parents. Here it is kind of the opposite. The economy is going very well. It’s kinda like Italy in the 60s. So in terms of the economy and opportunity and that sense, working wise and stuff like that, there’s an economic boom, right? Programmers make twice as much, three times as much as everyone else, so the average salary in Poland, actual salary, is probably 1000 Euros. Programmers make 4000. The cost of living is half as much compared to Italy, but salaries are two times, three times as much, for programmers,” (Giovanni, Italy, IT company).

As can be seen from Giovanni’s words above, compared to Italy, Wrocław is much more affordable for him and his business. In other words, whereas migrant entrepreneurs migrating in a (semi-)periphery-to-core direction are assumed to be doing so for increased income, those migrating in the opposite direction can often paradoxically benefit from *reduced costs*. In effect, Giovanni is demonstrating a kind of *geoarbitrage* (Hayes 2014). He is exercising the privilege of being able to geographically relocate in order to take advantage of spatial price differentials between Poland and Italy. This form of geoarbitrage, whereby migrants’ movements

are motivated by lower costs in the host country, has also been observed in other core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory contexts, such as Japanese entrepreneurs in the Philippines (Harima 2015), as well as North Americans migrating to South America (Dixon et al. 2006; Hayes 2014; Benson & O'Reilly 2018). Importantly, geoarbitrage is only possible where spatial economic differentials exist. Indeed, according to Giovanni, the cost of living in Italy is twice as high as in Wroclaw. In other words, it is the uneven, international, economic environment which provides the economic motivation for Giovanni to relocate from Florence to Wroclaw. It should be noted that Giovanni's geoarbitrage would not make economic sense if, once in Poland, he were to experience a corresponding decrease in income. He was, however, able to reconcile this problem by continuing to provide his IT services remotely to clients in Florence. In other words, migrating to Wroclaw enabled him to decrease costs, while simultaneously maintaining the same level of income, subsequently resulting in increased profit.

At this point, a further question needs to be asked: If lower costs are the goal, then why didn't Giovanni move to parts of the world which have even lower costs than Poland? Indeed, Michael (USA), who also talks about the benefit of lower costs in Wroclaw, points out that if that were his main motivation then he would go even 'more East':

"Huge arbitrage opportunity. Geoarbitrage is great. I mean partially, but not really. Because if I wanted to save more money I could have gone even more East and went to Thailand or something like that...But here I feel like it's more enjoyable and you get more bang for your buck and you feel like everything is a bit more slower", (Michael, USA, E-commerce).

Clearly then, in the case of migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw, reducing costs cannot be the only motivation. It seems more to be an added benefit which accompanies other reasons. So then, what are these other reasons? Two of them have already been discussed above (i. moving for a partner and ii. for a better quality of life). Another, as illustrated by Caleb at the beginning of this section, is the business-friendly environment and 'lack of competition' offered in Wroclaw. While some migrant entrepreneurs from core-states complained about the excessive Polish bureaucracy, others cited Wroclaw (and Poland in general) as an excellent place to start a business. For example, Roberto, who runs his own Italian restaurant in the centre, talks of how the city offers 'more opportunity' and lower taxes:

"In Wroclaw there's more opportunity...it's an open market...I was searching for a place for business. And after two days, running around, I see a lot of opportunity... [whereas] Italy is dead...because of taxes", (Roberto, Italy, Italian restaurant).

It appears that, for Roberto, the tax rate is an important factor. This lends support to Kloosterman et al.'s (1999) emphasis upon the important role played by the politico-institutional environment and its effects upon opportunity structures. However, it also presents a challenge to the Mixed-embeddedness Approach, as will be seen shortly.

In the meantime, however, let us return to the idea of Wrocław as being perceived by migrants from the core-states subject group as providing a business-friendly environment. This is closely related to the perception of the city offering 'less competition'. As seen with Caleb, he describes himself as a 'pioneer', moving to Wrocław where he is one of only a handful of Israelis, subsequently granting him 'more competitive advantages and less competition'. This notion of underdeveloped markets offering 'pioneers' less competition seems to inherently conjure up images colonialist times and, as a result, begs the question of if 'the phenomenon being described [is] best captured by the concept "transnationalism" or perhaps something more akin to imperialism' (Croucher 2009: 484). I will return to these ideas in Chapter 7.

Geographical proximity to Western Europe

As pointed out above, if lower costs are one of the main motivations, then we might ask why they chose Poland and not a country 'more East' with even lower costs. Another reason which helps to explain this is Poland's geographical proximity to Western Europe. This seems to be particularly attractive to migrant entrepreneurs originating from Western Europe. Albert (France), for example, likes that he is still within one day's drive of his relatives in France. For others, however, such as Karl (Germany), it was more about business logistics:

"Wrocław because our company and corporation is a German company and it's close to the German border in case we go on to develop our Polish branch a little bit more, we have here the best area for the stuff we are doing. We are IT hardware distribution....And right now we only have our warehouse in Germany but for the future we are planning to have the warehouse in Poland to save some costs and here is the best area because we are in this three country corner with Czech Republic, Germany and Poland", (Karl, Germany, technical hardware wholesale).

Regardless of whether the motivation is based upon their family or business, the point here is that, for migrant entrepreneurs from Western Europe, Poland's geographical proximity is often considered to be an important attribute. Poland offers these migrants the ability to reduce costs, while still staying close to their country of origin. As such, it seems to almost represent a kind of 'near-sourcing', whereby locations are chosen for their blend of cost-savings and geographical proximity, as well as the other reasons mentioned above.

Other reasons

In the interest of focusing on the most significant motivations for migration to Wrocław, I have chosen to 'sideline' less significant reasons (those which were mentioned less frequently and which seemed to play a less important role). These reasons included moving to Wrocław as an assigned 'expatriate', finding a job independently, as well as studying abroad. I will, however, briefly mention the example of Gabriel, who left France in search of better employment opportunities:

"In 2009, basically after graduation, I graduated in financial accounting, between 2008, basically in the heart of the financial crisis, the worst time to get hired. So after going around looking to find some work, it was not the time to hire, basically, all budgets were frozen, and so, yeah, basically I was like 6 months unemployed in France, I was like, fuck it I have to move somewhere," (Gabriel, France, online marketing).

This example highlights how privilege among migrant entrepreneurs from core-states cannot be assumed. Gabriel's situation seems more in line with the stereotype of the 'disadvantaged migrant' whose migration is seen to be 'forced' and not voluntary. This in itself shows how migrant entrepreneurs from core-states are not a uniform group.

Indeed, above we have seen a variety of different reasons underlying the migration from core-states to Wrocław and how these reasons can vary from individual to individual. Yet, the results of my analysis show how some reasons seem more prominent than others, such as the decision to move for a partner. Subsequently, while it may be tempting to sweepingly attribute this segment of migration to the stereotype of core-state men marrying Eastern European women, I have shown how the situation is much more nuanced, with the majority (53%) of these migrants, instead, founding their migration upon *other* reasons, such as a better quality of life, as well as a more affordable one. At this point, as a comparative study, it is important to position these findings against those from periphery-states, which is exactly what I now proceed to do below.

3.2.2. Migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states

"...because of the 5 year history of the Ukraine war with Russia...Ukraine is a little harder place to live than before. I have two children and I'm not scared to leave them [in Wrocław] to play outside without me. In Ukraine I couldn't. No, no, it's impossible. You can't do this... People [in Wrocław] are kinder, maybe. I don't want to say that Ukrainian people are angry or something, but the situation with war and there's this instability, it's really stressful for people. Because of that a lot of uncontrolled weapons...I had several businesses in Ukraine. Actually I was pretty tired of this...Business

in Ukraine is difficult because of corruption, because of instability, and I personally had some business meetings like a fight club with criminals because I need to solve some business issues. That's not normal and I'm tired of that...I quit everything", (Vanko, Ukraine, IT company and security systems).

Switching the focus to migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states, I would like to ask the following question: Is the neglect of their motivations (or, at best, the assumption of them to be economic in character) by the leading theories in the field of migrant entrepreneurship justified? By this I mean, is their migration more about necessity and less about volition? On the surface, Vanko's motivations seem, indeed, to be different to those of the migrants from core-states. For example, he describes how the environment in Kiev was neither conducive to raising a family, nor running a business. Further, although not mentioned, he and his partner chose Wroclaw because the immigration paperwork criteria required for Poland was somewhat easier to meet than that of other countries, such as Germany. In this way, Vanko seems representative of many other migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group. However, as will be seen below, the variation between the two subject groups is much more complicated and nuanced than might be assumed. In fact, I will show below how the varying motivations of both subject groups can be unified by the *same* underlying theoretical framework. I now turn to these motivations which, once again, I will describe in order of their perceived importance. In doing so, I will constantly compare them back to those from the core-states with the goal of furthering the analysis.

3.2.2.1. Differences

Negative factors in the home country

The most striking difference between the two groups is that almost all of the migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group, unlike those from core-states, said they did *not* move to Wroclaw for a Polish partner.³⁶ By contrast, as seen from the words of Ivanko (quoted previously), what is more commonly cited is negative factors in their country of origin. This was especially common among those from Ukraine, in particular those from the areas of Ukraine most affected by the recent war. The subsequent effects upon both the level of safety, as well as the economy, seem to have motivated people, such as Vanko, to leave Ukraine.

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36 As shown in Table 3.1., only one person from the periphery-states subject group moved to Wroclaw for a Polish partner. This person (Abebi) was from Nigeria. There was also another migrant entrepreneur from Nigeria, John, who originally came to study, but stayed because he married a Polish partner with whom he now has a child. Interestingly, no Ukrainians or Belarussians spoke of having a relationship or partner from Poland.

with regard to the latter (the economy), this often features prominently in the motivations of many of those emigrating, such as Aleksander:

“In 2015 our economy was really bad...because of the war. I was in the army 2014-15 and when I finished that I was looking for work but there was nothing in my sphere, because I studied history”, (Aleksander, Ukraine, cafe).

For several interviewees from periphery-states, this insecurity extended beyond factors related to the war. They talked about the lack of democracy or, for want of a better phrase, the lack of *rule of law*:

“In Ukraine we don't have taxes, maybe our new president will make it, but it's something crazy, the system. And in Poland, you know, your taxes, but you have medicines, you have good cities, good roads, it's something for return. I want to pay. In Ukraine we pay, but we don't know what for, because we don't have roads, we don't have medicines, we don't have anything. Maybe the new president will make the rules, how it must look, in Poland they have it already”, (Andriy, Ukraine, cafe).

These notions of insecurity within Aleksander's and Andriy's home country seem to follow the often cited narrative within the migration literature of the 'disadvantaged migrant', migrating out of necessity rather than volition (Sassen 2016). As such, Andriy's motivations seem altogether different to that of migrants from core-states. Yet, upon closer inspection, Andriy's behaviour, as well as that of the core-state migrants, can be unified by De Haas' 'aspirations-capabilities framework' (2011). This framework describes how migrants' motivations are based upon 'spatial opportunity differentials' (ibid: 20). This is inherently logical because, if all locations shared the same opportunities, then there would be no inherent reason to change location. So, in this way, both groups of migrants are unified by the fact that they are migrating to take advantage of new opportunities in Wroclaw to which they previously did not have access in their location of origin. However, importantly, despite De Haas' framework unifying the migrants in this way, this study reveals how the spatial opportunity differentials experienced by the two subject groups often remain very different. For example, returning to the example of Roberto (Italy), despite his less than flattering description of his home country, it is important to note that back in Florence he had relatively well-paid employment, a safe and stable environment, as well as friends and family. As such, the spatial opportunity differentials which exist between his location of origin (Florence) and Wroclaw are somewhat different to that of those between Wroclaw and the locations of origin of many of those from the periphery-states subject group. So, despite both Roberto and Andriy *choosing* to migrate, Roberto's choice is rooted in a greater degree of privilege than that of Aleksander. This is, no doubt, what Mattheus (quoted at the

beginning of this chapter) is referring to when he reflects upon how migrants from core-states are seen to be 'choosing' to be in Wroclaw, whereas for those from periphery-states it is perceived as less of a choice.

Visa reasons

If one of the main motivations of those from periphery-states is to improve their standard of living and to live in a stable, functional democracy, then why not move countries 'more West', such as German or France? Symon (Ukraine) verbalises this logic:

"Because of level of life, why should you go from Africa to another Africa? If you have a chance to go to Germany, of course you go to Germany. Or Denmark, Norway. Why do you go to Poland?", (Symon, Ukraine, delivery company).

So why Poland? The large majority of migrants from periphery-states, in addition to citing Poland's geographical proximity to their home country, spoke about *visa restrictions and migration paperwork*. This seems to work on two levels. First, many third party countries (by which I mean countries other than the host and home country) impose restrictions which makes migrating there relatively difficult (Jaroszewicz 2018). Second, Polish immigration regulations are comparatively more welcoming. For example, the Polish government has provided a legal pathway to residency and citizenship for Ukrainians who can prove they have Polish ancestry³⁷ (Szulecka 2016). Volodomir (Belarus), below, is a good example of this. He wanted to move to Germany, but chose Poland because legally migrating there was somewhat easier:

"Yes [the visa for Poland was easier]. And the second part is that because when I was living in Ukraine, my relatives were from Belarus and they were living there when this territory was Poland", (Volodomir, Ukraine, IT company).

This way of obtaining immigration papers, through family heritage, was a common theme among migrant entrepreneurs from Ukraine and Belarus, while for others

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37 Furthermore, Polish migration policy regarding work visas has prioritized migration from its Eastern neighbours, apparently preferring such migration with 'close cultural and geographic connections, such as Ukraine' (Szulecka 2016: 116).

they initially moved to Poland on student visas.³⁸ This is where the other side of De Haas' (2011) aspirations-capabilities framework is helpful. The framework describes how migrants' desires to migrate to areas of new opportunities can be restricted by their capability to do so. In other words, it can explain how Volodomir, lacking the politico-institutional capability to move to Germany, chose Poland instead which, although perhaps not having the same opportunities as Germany, was a country to which he had the *capability* to migrate. Once again, this is in stark contrast to many of the migrant entrepreneurs from core-states who, almost without exception, did not even discuss visa issues.³⁹ This in itself seems to reveal how, despite both groups of migrants adhering to De Haas' (ibid) aspirations-capabilities framework, their degree of capability (at least with regard to international mobility) appears somewhat asymmetrical.

3.2.2.2. Similarities

I have shown, above, how migrants from the periphery-states subject group often seem to base their motivations for migrating upon escaping negative factors within their home countries. Yet, importantly, I have also pointed out how these negative factors must be understood within the wider context of spatial opportunity differentials. The negative factors present in migrants' locations of origin, and migrants' subsequent decision to move to Wrocław, inherently reveals how they perceive Wrocław to conversely offer *opportunities*. In exercising their agency and *choosing* to move to Wrocław for better opportunities, the behaviour of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states seems more akin to that of the stereotypical privileged migrant from core-states. Indeed, I will highlight now, below, how some of the motivations of migrants from the periphery-state subject group seem more in line with that of those from the core-states subject group.

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38 It is likely not a coincidence that most of those interviewed from periphery-states obtained their immigration paperwork via student visas or family members in former Polish territories. This is because the list of migrant entrepreneurs which I obtained from the Wrocław Statistical Office was of sole proprietorships. This is important, because under a regular work visa in Poland, it is not legal to create your own sole proprietorship, however, creating an LLC is possible. By contrast, creating a sole proprietorship is legal under a student visa or permanent residence card (obtained via family members of former Polish territories). So, it is not surprising that most sole proprietors from periphery-states gained their immigration papers in this way. By contrast, if we were to analyse migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states running LLCs in Wrocław, then we might find a lower incidence of those possessing student visas or permanent residence cards.

39 There was, however, one notable exception, whereby Dave (Canada) had significant problems with the authorities when trying to obtain Polish residency and at one point was even arrested.

Favourable business environment

Previously, I showed how Andriy (Ukraine) spoke positively about the infrastructure and functional system in Wroclaw and how this provides him with an environment whereby it is easier to live and run a business. So, it seems fair to say that Andriy's choice of Wroclaw was partially motivated by its favourable business environment. As such, this seems to mirror the motivation of several migrant entrepreneurs from core-states who, as seen previously, also spoke of the business-friendly conditions.

However, upon closer inspection, this 'similarity' is much more nuanced. Specifically, the way in which Andriy perceives Wroclaw to provide a good business environment seems somewhat different to that of the perception of migrants from the core-states subject group, such as Giovanni (Italy, previously highlighted earlier in this chapter). For Giovanni, the attraction for his business was Wroclaw's low level of taxes. Yet, when describing the exact same environment of Wroclaw, Andriy perceives the taxes as *high* (albeit a price worth paying for functional government and institutions). So, how can it be that the exact same tax rate is viewed in such antithetical ways? Here I argue that this situation perfectly illustrates how motivations cannot be viewed solely within the context of the host country. Migrants, such as Roberto and Andriy, do not arrive in Wroclaw 'carte blanche' without any pre-existing experiences. Their opinions about Wroclaw are, to a large degree, dependent upon how Wroclaw relates to their pre-existing experiences and perceptions of other cities and places. So, for Giovanni, coming from Italy where the level of taxation is apparently high, the tax rates in Wroclaw seem comparatively low. Conversely, for Andriy, coming from Ukraine where the tax level of taxation is (apparently) low, the tax rates in Wroclaw seem paradoxically high. This in itself reveals how de Haas' opportunity differentials do not only differ bilaterally between Wroclaw and migrants' locations of origin, but also how they differ *multilaterally* between Wroclaw, migrants' locations of origin in core-states, and migrants locations of origin in periphery-states. It is this variation in the opportunities across multiple locations, I argue, which creates the variation in migrants' perception of Wroclaw. This has theoretical significance. Kloosterman & Rath (2001), in an attempt to outline the levels of the opportunity structure within the Mixed-embeddedness Approach, had made the host country the largest unit of analysis. Yet, as seen above, Roberto's and Andriy's perceptions of Wroclaw are clearly dependent upon their pre-existing perceptions of spaces *beyond the borders of the host country*. As such, it highlights how migrants and their motivations must be situated not only within the host country, but also within a wider, uneven, global environment.

It is not always about money

As mentioned in the introduction, in the context of (semi-)periphery-to-core migration, the motivation for moving from an economically less developed country to an economically more developed country is often assumed. However, as is the case with migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, for several migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states, their main motivation was *not money*. Artem (Belarus) is a good example of this. Running his own translation company, whereby all his work is done online, he can physically work anywhere he wants. Why then, move to Poland where his cost of living will increase, yet his income will remain the same? The effects of the subsequent increased cost of living are clearly visible from his words:

"Living is more expensive here, first because of housing. Gas, water, heating, and so on....Simply the way of [inaudible]. I had to teach every member of my family to turn off the water when you brush your teeth and to warm your room only when you need it. When you're out, turn it off. That's it", (Artem, Belarus).

From a 'homo-economicus' perspective, it makes no sense. It seems, therefore, that Artem is not solely motivated by financial gain. So then, what *is* he motivated by? Why migrate to a country where he will have less money? As he continues to speak, the reasons become clearer:

"We lived in [inaudible] city [in Belarus], it's about 300,000 inhabitants there, we thought about it's got to be bigger. Wroclaw is a great size, it's not too big. It's a great choice of universities, a lot of culture, it's important to me, a lot of jazz, because I like jazz...If I want to go to a concert, I can go to a concert everyday. Which is important for me...At the moment we have a 3-level apartment...which is impossible to find in Belarus. Actually not 3-level, but 5-level. My wife rents a room for her work in the same building, and we also have a garage", (Artem, Belarus, translation company).

It seems that, for Artem and his family, that the increase in the cost of living is a worthwhile price to pay for a relatively increased *standard of living*. On first impressions, this may appear to echo those from core-states, who relocated to Wroclaw for a better quality of life. However, there seems to be an important difference here between quality of life and standard of living. For those from core-states, such as Michael from New York, he did not move to Poland for a better standard of living, because in New York he already had access to 3-level apartments, concerts, and other amenities which are considered to constitute a high standard of living. Rather, he moved to Poland for a better *quality of life*, specifically for a less stressful life (among other reasons). By contrast, those from periphery-states,

such as Artem, their migration seems more about acquiring a better *standard of living*, i.e. for new luxuries to which they did not previously have access.

Indeed, it seems for several others from periphery-states that the main motivation was also not monetary. For Veronica (Ukraine) it was more about an adventure. She had a business in Kiev and life was ‘going quite well’. However, she describes her life there as being ‘a bit easy and boring’ and she ‘wanted a change’. She subsequently moved to Wroclaw and opened her own cafe selling Ukrainian baked goods. This idea of migrating for an adventure, or to escape boredom, seems very similar to many from core-states and is at odds with the narrative of the ‘disadvantaged migrant’. By the same token, this idea of migrating out of desire or adventure, and not out of necessity, in some cases even mirrored the language of those from periphery-states who chose Wroclaw for the ‘vibe’ of the city. Anastasia (Ukraine), for example, chose Wroclaw as their new home for exactly this reason. She and her husband run a pet grooming salon and, despite having no family or connections here, chose to migrate simply because “the city felt right”.

Geographical proximity

One final, but also often cited factor, was the geographical proximity of Poland to the home countries (notably, those from Ukraine and Belarus) of migrants from the periphery-states subject group. For example, Aleksander, Andriy, and Olek, all from Ukraine and running cafes in Wroclaw, mentioned that they like being able to travel back to Ukraine to visit family and friends. Further, Andriy simultaneously runs a business in Ukraine, so by staying (relatively) close to it, he can keep an eye on it. Once again, this seems to 1. mirror the motivations of many of those from the core-states subject group, who also chose Poland for its geographic proximity (albeit proximity to Western Europe, not Eastern Europe); and 2. highlight how factors *beyond the host country* seem to play a role in shaping migrant entrepreneurs’ motivations for choosing Wroclaw.

3.3. Why entrepreneurship?

3.3.1. Migrant entrepreneurs from core-states

“It was Credit Suisse...everything was fine, there was no issue, but I just felt like a windshield wiper. I kept doing the same thing again and again...this isn’t what I wanted to do. Basically, the second day I was working there...I was getting off the tram and at 9am you’ll see hordes of people getting off the tram and walking into a gray building on a gray day, and I was listening to Pink Floyd ‘Bricks in the Wall’, so I just freaked out and had to go stand to the side and separate myself from everyone for a few minutes, so then I had to figure out what else I was going to do...I would probably still be

making more [money] with Credit Suisse. Yeah, I could go back to one of the banks, but yeah I really wouldn't want to", (Paul, USA, coffee sales)

I now turn to the second section of the chapter, that is to say, the migrants' motivations for opening their own business. As noted in the introduction, this is a somewhat exceptional and arduous endeavour, so what is it that motivates migrants to embark upon such a trajectory? In answering this question, I would like to begin by revisiting the concepts of Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), which I first introduced in Chapter 1. This theory attributes the relatively high rates of migrant entrepreneurship (almost invariably in core-states) to migrants' disadvantaged status within the host country, resulting in barriers to the mainstream labour market and, subsequently, pushing migrants into self-employment. Yet, what is immediately apparent from Paul's words (quoted above) is how he *already* had well-paid employment, which he voluntarily left in order to start his own business whereby he earns *less*. He admits he could still return to that job, but he does not want to. This is echoed quite emphatically by Bruce (Australia) who declared to me that he would rather 'sell [his] blood and organs' than return to work in the mainstream labour market. The examples of Paul and Bruce, as well as many other migrants from the core-states subject group, put simply, seem to turn Disadvantage Theory 'on its head'. By this I mean it appears to be almost the exact opposite of the theory. Instead of facing barriers to the mainstream labour market and turning to self-employment out of necessity, it seems that mainstream employment remains a *back-up option* to which they would only return *if necessary*. Indeed, for migrants experiencing the inversion of this theory, a mirror-opposite 'Advantage Theory' (or 'Privilege Theory') seems more appropriate. In this way, Disadvantage Theory appears to fall into the trap first identified by Nader way back in 1972, yet apparently still relevant today, whereby the exclusive focus upon 'the disadvantaged' and 'ethnic groups', and the subsequent 'dominant-subordinate relationships', might 'be affecting the kinds of theories that we are weaving' (Nader 1972: 5).⁴⁰

Returning to Paul's situation, an important question needs to be asked: Why, when he can earn more money in the mainstream labour market, did he enter the world of self-employment? Are we not dealing here with a rational actor? It seems at least, that we are not dealing with the rational 'homo-economicus' (Persky 1995). This idea, that money is *not* the main motivation, was a recurring theme. Mattheus, quoted below, seems to epitomise this:

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40 Even in certain periphery-to-core migratory contexts, other authors (for example, Rath 2011) have questioned Disadvantage Theory as a way of accounting for high rates of entrepreneurship.

"I'm not doing this for money. I'm not looking for the clients who pay the most and then try to go after those. I'm not a very good entrepreneur in this sense. I really don't care much about money, as long as I can cover my needs and support my family and so on, but money has never been the motivation to do this", (Mattheus, Germany, education consultancy).

So, if money does not motivate Paul or Mattheus, then what does? I now explore these non-economic motivations in greater depth below.

Perceived increase in agency / escaping corporate employment

As shown with the example of Paul, entrepreneurship appears to be a way of escaping 'meaningless' corporate employment. This motivation was mirrored by many of the other migrants from the core-states subject group. In essence, it can be broken down into two parts. First, the 'push' of the supposedly undesirable corporate job. Second, the 'pull' of self-employment and the apparent increase in meaning and agency. In terms of the former, it is worth asking what is so bad about these jobs that it is pushing them away. After all, these corporate posts often pay above the average native wage level, are situated in relatively sleek, air-conditioned buildings, and are at corporations with household names within the international community. Why, then, have so many of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group turned their back on this? For Paul, at its very core, it seems to be about *meaning*. While Paul used the metaphor of a windscreen wiper to express this, Walter (UK), quoted below, prefers the metaphor of 'doozers':

"It was also about being the master of my own destiny. I could never imagine being in a corporation, being told to do something and then being told it's not needed anymore, after spending weeks on it, and that can really demotivate me. I don't know if you remember Fraggles Rock...there were these little characters called the 'Doozers', and when I saw them, I thought about corporate people. They build stuff and then it's destroyed and they keep building it and it gets destroyed and their life is pointless", (Walter, UK, English language school).

In Wrocław, there is a large concentration of BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) service centers, providing back office support for their counterpart offices in core-states. This, combined with the low unemployment rate of under 2%, means that finding employment is apparently not very difficult, especially if you speak English or other core-state languages.⁴¹ Indeed, this was the case of many migrants from core-states who, upon moving to Wrocław, had found work within this sector.

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41 The role of languages, language hierarchies, and cultural hierarchies will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Yet, within this BPO environment, with its focus on support and not innovation, many of them soon found the work to be repetitive and lacking in meaning. This, subsequently, contributed to ‘pushing’ them into the arms of entrepreneurship which, by contrast, seems to offer these migrant entrepreneurs an escape route—a path to more agency and meaning. Mattheus (Germany), below, speaks to this:

“The agency. I have the ultimate say of who I work with. And I have the ultimate say of what I do and how I do it. Of course, I adjust to the clients’ needs, but it’s my adjustment and I choose what to compromise...When I work with a client I work with the client and I’m not above them I’m not below them, we’re on an eye-to-eye level...I don’t think I could ever follow an order from someone that can’t convince me why that makes sense”, (Mattheus, Germany, education consultancy).

This motivation of agency seems very powerful. It is interesting to note that many of those who left corporate employment in the mainstream labour market now work longer hours and receive less pay (relative to his previous job in the corporate sector), yet they are willing to do so for the agency which comes with running his own business. The motivating power of this seems almost akin to how, in Orwell’s *Animal Farm* (Orwell 1945), the animals worked longer hours and for less food because they were working (or so they thought) for themselves as opposed to some oppressive managing authority. Similarly, migrants like Paul now work even harder and for less money, yet are willing to do so in return for the apparent increase in control and agency.

Less stressful work

“I just needed something a bit more quiet, a bit less stressful. Being a general manager was really great, but it was taking a lot of time, a lot of stress, a lot of energy. We had a kid, so my life-work balance was a bit unfair. We thought about this idea of a wine shop with my experience and with the opportunity that Poland could offer and we decided we should do it and it’s an interesting adventure”, (Albert, France, wine shop).

As seen from the words of Albert, above, agency was not the only non-economic motivational factor. For him, it was more about finding a less-stressful occupation. Running his own wine shop in a suburb of Wroclaw, his lifestyle is now much more relaxed compared to his previous employment as the general manager of a hotel chain in Paris. Indeed, Albert was not the only one. Stewart (USA) also turned his back on a more stressful lifestyle, likewise opting for an occupation related to wine, albeit *making* wine instead of just selling it.

“Winery is a cool business to be in, it’s a nice Dad job, you can spend time with your kids...Would have been better ROI [return on investment] if I had just day traded stocks, but that would have been boring...”, (Stewart, USA, vineyard).

The motivations of both Stewart and Paul (as well as several others from the core-states subject group) seem very similar to those of those within the ‘lifestyle entrepreneur’ literature, whereby lifestyle - and not money - is the main motivating factor, and so they consciously choose occupations which can support their desired lifestyle (Marchant & Mottiar 2011; Benson & O’Reilly 2018).⁴²

3.3.2. Migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states

“There was no work in Ukraine. There was a proposition to come to Wroclaw to my friend and open a cafe”, (Aleksander, Ukraine, cafe).

Switching the focus now to the periphery-state subject group, we begin to see quite a different story. The case of Aleksander (quoted above), in contrast to that of Paul and many of those from the core-states subject group, seems more in line with the narrative of the ‘disadvantaged migrant’. As I will show below, this seems to be the case for many - but not all - of the migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states.

3.3.2.1. Differences

Barriers to mainstream employment

Faced with unemployment, Alexander (quoted above) decided to start his own business. In doing so, his behaviour adheres to the ideas of Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). Although this is usually observed within the confines of the host country, the principle remains the same: Aleksander, facing barriers to mainstream employment, has turned to self-employment as a source of income. Similarly, Andriy, also from Ukraine, has a law degree, yet his qualification is not recognized in Poland, which was part of his reason for opening a cafe:

“I think not [about being a lawyer in Poland], because it’s a different system. I think that if I want to be a lawyer in Poland I must do 2 or 3 years studies”, (Andriy, Ukraine, cafe).

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42 At this point, I would like to mention that there were a number of other (less common) motivations cited by the migrants in this study from core-states. These include creating a business in order to improve their resume, as well as simply for financial gain. However, in the interest of brevity and not diluting the more major trends, I have omitted them.

In this particular case, it once again highlights the important role played by governments and institutions (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Engelen 2001; Bruton et al. 2010). Polish institutions, as a result of not recognising Andriy's law degree from Ukraine, provide a barrier to him obtaining employment as a lawyer in the mainstream labour market, subsequently pushing him toward self-employment. As such, the examples of Aleksander and Andriy seem to correspond to the narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant'.

It's about money

"I can't imagine being an employee for someone. I know that I can earn more with my own company", (Petro, Ukraine).

Several migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states, including Petro (quoted above), spoke about how self-employment offers higher reimbursement than employment in the mainstream labour market. What is interesting is to link this back to the migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, such as Paul (among many others), who left their well-paying jobs to start their own businesses and now earn less. In other words, self-employment for them meant a pay decrease, whereas for Petro it meant a pay increase. Again, this seems to position Petro in line with the narrative of the 'disadvantaged immigrant', and hints at broader, macro labour market disparities, whereby those from periphery-states are seemingly paid less than those from core-states. This idea of a 'labour hierarchy' will be explored further in Chapter 6. For the purpose of this chapter, however, which is restricted to the role of motivations, the main point here is that, for several migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group, self-employment seems to offer (in cases) the ability to earn more. Consequently, it would be easy to understand why migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states, after migrating to economically more developed countries, might be motivated to open their own business (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010).

4.3.2.2. Similarities

It's not about money or necessity

"Getting a job was not a problem. Come on, there's lots of jobs here for professional English speakers! Jobs - they are not a problem", (John, Nigeria, English language school).

In contrast to the examples outlined above, in this section I will now show how, even for migrants from periphery-states, there are cases which force us to question the 'disadvantaged' narrative so often assigned to them. In particular, I will show how

their motivations for opening their own business are not always rooted in necessity, but instead can be privileged acts of *volition*. John (quoted above), provides a good example of this. As an English speaker, within the BPO environment of Wrocław and its huge demand for employees who speak core-state languages, it was easy for him to find relatively well-paid employment within the mainstream labour market. Interestingly, this was also observed among other migrants from periphery-states who spoke 'core-state languages' - not only English but also others such as Spanish and German. Armed with this core-state cultural capital, these migrants later created their own business not because they could not find employment in the mainstream labour market, but because they *wanted to*. Importantly, this goes against the ideas of Disadvantage Theory and, in doing so, seems instead to more closely resemble the situations of many of those from the core-states subject group. Here, the role played by language seems key. And, in contrast to the literature which stresses the importance of learning the host country language (Bleakley & Chin 2004; Dustman & Fabbri 2003), in the semi-periphery context of Wrocław, what seems to be more important is *core-state languages*. At this point, we begin to see the emergence of a culture hierarchy, an idea which I will elaborate upon in Chapter 7.

However, in a number of cases, even those who did *not* speak core-state languages opened their own business out of volition and not necessity. Natalia (Ukraine) is a good example of this. She runs a cake shop close to the Wrocław main square. She tells me, with obvious passion, that it had always been her dream to open her own cake shop. For her, it is something she loves and it does not feel like work. For Bogdan, also from Ukraine, it was slightly different. When studying, he did an internship in an office environment and hated it. So he decided to open his own business instead of going into the corporate world. He started with providing hookah pipes to restaurants, but it was not making much money. After returning home to Ukraine, and seeing his mother (who runs her own hair salon), and after getting his hair cut at a male barbers in Wrocław, he decided to open his own salon. Such behavior seems to more closely resemble the rationale of many of those from the core-states subject group who opened their own businesses as a way of escaping 'meaningless' corporate employment. The examples of Natalia and Bogdan are, once again, at odds with the narrative often told in the migrant entrepreneurship literature of the disadvantaged migrant who, faced with barriers to the mainstream labour market, is forced into self-employment. Their stories, by contrast, seem much closer to that of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, for whom the act of opening a business was rooted in volition, not economic necessity. As such, this study lends support to the idea that migrant entrepreneurs, even within a periphery-to-core context, cannot be assumed to be a homogenous group with identical motivations (Oliveira 2007).


3.4. Conclusions

In this Chapter, I explored migrants' motivations for both 1. migrating to Wrocław; and 2. opening their own business. In terms of the former, I showed how studying 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship reveals how motivations for migrating cannot be assumed to be exclusively economic in character. On the contrary, the migrants from core-states often based their migration upon *non-economic* motivations, such as moving for a partner, a better quality of life, as well as taking into consideration Wrocław's geographic proximity to Western Europe. Even when the main motivation *was* economic, it seems to be inverted, whereby they moved to Wrocław for *lower costs* as opposed to higher wages. This in itself seems to represent a kind of *geoarbitrage* (Hayes 2014), whereby the migrant entrepreneurs are geographically relocating to take advantage of spatial price differentials. I also showed how, even for those from periphery-states, motivations for migrating likewise cannot always be assumed to be economic in character, with several of them mirroring the non-economic motivations of those from the core-states subject group. However, general differences in motivations remain, such as the apparent tendency of those from periphery-states (notably, Ukraine) to base their reasons for migrating upon economic and political insecurity in their home country. On the surface, these reasons do indeed seem different to those from core-states and, subsequently, more in line with the narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant'. Yet, importantly, these surface-level variations in motivation can be unified by the underlying aspirations-capabilities framework developed by De Haas (2011). Migrants from both core- and periphery-states, seem to demonstrate the same behaviour in the way that they base their motivations upon perceived 'spatial opportunity differentials' between their home and host countries (and, in cases, third party countries). Importantly, this highlights the importance of positioning migrants not only within the environment of the host country, but also within a wider, global environment. This, I argued, has theoretical significance, as it raises questions around Kloosterman & Rath's (2001) restriction of the opportunity structure to the host-country only.

In terms of reasons for starting a business, motivations can likewise not be assumed to be economic in character. Indeed, many migrants from the core-states subject group became entrepreneurs not out of economic necessity, but instead out of a desire for more *agency*, often leaving well-paid employment to do so. This goes against the ideas of Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010) which describes how migrants enter self-employment after facing barriers to the mainstream labour market. Indeed, their situations often represent the *exact opposite* of Disadvantage Theory, whereby they are only willing to return to the mainstream labour market if absolutely necessary. Yet, once again, even for certain migrants from the periphery-states subject group, I showed how motivations were likewise not always economic in character, with agency and/or passion for their work seemingly taking precedence over monetary gain.

Subsequently, this study lends support to the idea that migrant entrepreneurs are not one homogenous group with identical motivations (Oliveira 2007), but instead have varying motivations (Masurel et al. 2002; Lin & Tao 2012) which cannot necessarily be assumed to be economic in character (Glinka & Brzozowska 2015; Rametse et al. 2018; Brzozowska & Glinka 2019) nor rooted in necessity (Ndofor and Priem 2011), and which are subject to change over time (Knight 2015). Consequently, it helps to reveal the hidden role of motivations in migrant entrepreneurship. In doing so, it also exposes how some of the leading theories, most notably Disadvantage Theory, appear to be rooted in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts. This, I have shown, seems to exemplify Nader's warning of how such 'dominant-subordinate relationships' may be 'affecting the kinds of theories that we are weaving' (Nader 1972: 5).

4.



CHAPTER 4

**Migrant entrepreneurs'
access to resources:
The other side of the coin?**

Abandoning his pre-med major at a prestigious Ivy League university, Arthur (USA) moved to Poland in the early 1990s to explore opportunities in the country's newly formed real estate market. It was there when, completely by accident, he stumbled across Wroclaw after his car broke down nearby. Subsequently taking a liking to the city, he decided, using some of the \$200,000 USD he had made from selling half of his previous business in the USA, to buy a building in the market square.⁴³ Initially thought of as a real estate investment, he struggled to find tenants for what he considered to be the perfect location for a restaurant. So, with no willing restaurateurs, he opened one himself. Leveraging a contact of his within the fast food industry in the USA, he arranged to buy the licensing rights for Wroclaw for a renowned American fast food franchise. This, combined with all related expenses, cost him over three million USD. He was able to secure the capital required by borrowing one million USD from a friend and two million USD from a bank. Despite not speaking any Polish, he somehow managed to meet all the extensive bureaucratic requirements for opening the restaurant and was soon serving his first customers. Following the collapse of communism, the ability to consume American fast food was apparently very appealing to the local population and, as a result, the business boomed. Some 25 years later, after expanding his fast food franchise across Europe, he sold his controlling stake in the company, now valued (at the time of writing) at over one billion USD, (Arthur, USA, former restaurant franchise owner).

4.1. Introduction

This is the second chapter concerning itself with the question of agency. While Chapter 3 looked at the motivations of migrant entrepreneurs, this chapter looks at migrant entrepreneurs' *access to resources*. But what are these resources? According to Light & Gold (2000), they consist of four forms of capital (financial, human, social, and cultural), all of which can assist with production and productivity.⁴⁴ Indeed, financial capital (ibid; Bruder et al. 2011), human capital (ibid; L. Altinay & E. Altinay 2008; Kerr & Lincoln 2010), social capital (ibid; Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012), and cultural capital (Johnson 2000; Min & Bozorgmehr 2000; Nee & Sanders 2001) have all been shown to play a

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43 According to Arthur, this building, following the fall of the communist regime, was one of the first buildings in the town square to be privatized.

44 Light & Gold (2000: 84) refer to these four forms of capital as 'class resources'. They also write about additional resources specific to ethnic minorities, namely, 'ethnic resources'. However, for the purposes of this paper, I do not distinguish between 'ethnic' and 'class' resources and, instead, refer only to 'class resources', which I do under the terms 'resources' and 'forms of capital', which I use interchangeably.

role in shaping migrant entrepreneurship. However, within the literature's almost exclusive focus upon migration in (semi-)periphery-to-core contexts (Ilhan-Nas et al. 2011; Dheer 2018), migrant entrepreneurs have often been found, relative to the native population, to be *lacking* in many of these resources. Specifically, they have been shown to have low levels of financial capital (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al. 1994; Kloosterman 2010), human capital (Johnson 2000; Kloosterman & Rath 2002), and host country cultural capital (Nee & Sanders 2001), while often compensating for this via high levels of co-ethnic social capital (Min & Bozorgmehr 2000; Drori & Lerner 2002; Portes & Shafer 2006; Ram et al. 2008). This restricted access to resources, and how such shortages hinder access to the mainstream labour market, has been the central premise upon which Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010) has been founded. But do migrants, in an 'upside down', core-to-(semi-)periphery context, also lack access to resources? For example, does Arthur (highlighted above), display low levels of financial, human, social, and cultural capital? With the exception of his limited levels of *Polish* cultural capital (not speaking Polish), it would seem that he does *not*. He, seemingly, has high levels of financial capital (with existing funds of \$200,000, plus the ability to borrow much more), human capital (having been educated at an Ivy League university in the USA, albeit not completing his studies), social capital (high level contacts within the USA fast food industry), and cultural capital (with English language skills and 'Americanness' which, apparently, in the environment of Wroclaw, was very desirable). Could it be, then, that migrant entrepreneurs like Arthur, who have migrated in a core-to-(semi-)periphery direction, are more likely to have *greater* access to such resources? Indeed, this notion is supported by other studies which found certain groups of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states to have above average levels of financial (Drake & Collard 2008; Harima 2014), human (Stone & Stubbs 2007; Marchant & Mottiar 2011), and cultural (Andrejuk 2017) capital. Yet, by leveraging his high level home country contact within the fast food franchising industry, Arthur also seems to be mirroring the behaviour of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states, who, as stated above, were often found to rely upon co-ethnic social capital. Subsequently, assumptions of a clear-cut binary distinction between core and periphery might be misfounded. As a matter of fact, even within (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, it has been shown how migrant entrepreneurs do not always lack access to resources. In certain contexts, they have been shown to have relatively high levels of human (Saxenian 1999; 2002), financial (Light & Gold 2000; Froschauer & Wong 2012), social (Leung 2001; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012); and cultural (Masurel et al. 2002) capital.

But what about the migrant entrepreneurs in this study? How do their situations, in terms of their access to resources, fit into all this? Below, I will explore how, if at all, migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states vary in their access to resources. This section draws upon data from the qualitative interviews and, as

such, information about forms of capital were usually spoken about in relation to their businesses (i.e. the *mobilization* of these resources), so it is difficult to separate this from how it interacts with the environment. For this reason, much of the data about migrant entrepreneurs' access to resources will be presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 (which look at how forms of capital interact with the wider environment). That being said, there are still some broad trends which I would like to highlight here below. In line with Light & Gold's (2000) typology,⁴⁵ mentioned above, the chapter is divided into four sections, each focusing upon one of the four forms of capital: financial, human, social, and cultural.

4.2. Financial capital

The correlation between access to financial capital and entrepreneurship has been well documented (Light & Gold 2000; Watson et al. 2000; Galbraith et al. 2007; Drake & Collard 2008). Yet, once again, within the literature and its almost exclusive focus within (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, many studies have found that migrant entrepreneurs 'tend to lack financial resources or do not have easy access to significant funds' (Kloosterman 2010: 28). But what about migration in the opposite direction? Are migrant entrepreneurs from core-states also likely to lack access to financial capital? Considering the uneven distribution of wealth between core- and periphery-states, one might be tempted to assume that they are more likely to have *greater access* to such capital. Indeed, as seen above, the case of Arthur from the USA appears to lend support to this. He is one of 14 (34%) migrants from the core-state subject group (see Table 4.1.) who demonstrate significant access to financial capital and, as such, is in line with other studies showing relatively high levels of financial capital among migrants from core-states (Drake & Collard 2008; Harima 2014). Table 4.1, below, provides a basic outline of the subject groups' comparative access to financial capital.

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45 This typology closely relates to the ideas of Bourdieu (1984). Light & Gold (2000), however, apply this typology specifically toward the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship and, as such, citing their work seems more relevant to this study than citing Bourdieu. Having said that, Light & Gold (ibid: 84) distinguish between these four forms of capital (aka 'class resources') and 'ethnic resources', which is something I seldom do in this dissertation, so in this respect my approach is admittedly more in line with Bourdieu who does not distinguish between the two.

Table 4.1. Access to financial capital: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

	Migrants from core-states		Migrants from periphery-states	
	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)
Demonstrates significant (access to) financial capital	34	14	12.5	3
Does NOT demonstrate significant (access to) financial capital	66	27	87.5	21

Source: Aggregated data from qualitative interviews from this study.

The enhanced access to financial capital of migrants such as Arthur can, of course, influence their business practices. Among other things, it can play a role in enabling (or restricting) the specific business opportunities which can be accessed (Kloosterman 2010). For Arthur, buying a renowned American restaurant franchise, along with associated expenses, cost him over three million USD. As such, it seems that this is an opportunity which is only accessible to those with (access to) relatively high levels of financial capital. Another good example is that of Stewart, from California, who set up his own vineyard next to Wrocław:

“[It] cost 3 million zloty to get started. Financed it all ourselves with our savings, which is cool because there are no shareholders, so now we’re free. Whereas my competitors financed it and had to keep paying back the loan. Whereas I can focus on quality. Economics would not teach you to do this, because they want fast return”, (Stewart, USA, vineyard).

What Stewart’s quote does not reveal is that he had to wait several years for his vines to yield grapes. Let us consider this situation for migrants with restricted access to financial capital. Would it be possible for them to buy all the necessary land and spend several years, without revenue, waiting for the vines to grow? It seems unlikely. Therefore, it would appear that both the vineyard industry, and certain fast food franchises, are at the ‘upper’ end of the spectrum of opportunity structures.

Conversely, many migrant entrepreneurs (21: 87.5%, as shown in Table 4.1) from periphery-states talked about their difficulties with raising financial capital. Symon (Ukraine), is a good example:

“We thought about a different sphere. We thought about optics [an optical shop]. But it’s hard for us to start like this...the main [barrier] was the investment. The investment was quite high. Because the main investment in this sphere is products...and if you buy products you should sell them.

And what should I do if I can't sell them?...if I want to start a company from zero, I will have nothing. It's a lot of investment, a lot of marketing, a lot in advertisement, a lot of money", (Symon, Ukraine, courier agency).

Again, we can see here how financial capital can influence (or, in this case, *block*) access to certain business opportunities. For Symon, it was essentially a lack of financial capital which blocked him from opening a shop selling optical lenses. He subsequently decided to open a courier agency, because it required a smaller initial financial investment. As such, Symon's situation seems more in line with the narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant' who can only 'set up shop at the lower end of this opportunity structure' (Kloosterman 2010: 4). This relationship between opportunity structures and migrant entrepreneurs access to resources will be further developed in Chapter 5.

However, in contrast to the situations of Arthur, Stewart, and Symon, mentioned above, this study also unearthed several examples of the *exact opposite*, showing that any deductive assumptions of a core-periphery wealth divide might be misfounded. This is captured perfectly in my encounter with two migrant entrepreneurs, one from the USA, and one from Ukraine, and two cups of coffee, as recounted below.

The first cup of coffee

For the first cup of coffee, I walk into a large cafe, situated right in the heart of Wroclaw and with maximum foot traffic. The ceilings are high, elegant chandeliers hang down, and a team of professional baristas are bustling around behind the counter in front of a large selection of expensive looking stainless steel-clad coffee machines. The owner greets me and offers me a choice of what seems like 100 ways to roast and brew coffee. I opt for the 'lightly-roasted, cold-pressed' option. He then calls out to one of the baristas, who picks up a mug and sets to work preparing my coffee.

The second cup of coffee

Now, let us leave this scene and jump to my second cup of coffee. Further from the centre, not far from the railway tracks, I am walking around the outside of an old, redbrick factory. With its original purpose clearly no longer in operation, much of the building looks abandoned, except for several independent-looking stores which appear to have sprouted into existence on one side of the building. I walk, looking for a sign saying 'cafe' or 'coffee', or some indication where I should be meeting the owner of a coffee roasting business. At the end of the building, I see a door and peer inside. I gaze upon a man behind a bar made of homemade chipboard, pouring coffee beans into some device. The device, I am later told, is a coffee roaster. Yet, this coffee roaster was unrecognizable from the steel-clad machines from the previous cafe. No, this coffee roaster, I am proudly told, was homemade.

And, indeed, it looked very much homemade. A small barrel, fixed upon a piece of wood. The man hits it with a mallet. 'Coffee?' he asks with a friendly smile.

But what is my point here? Well, up until now, I have avoided telling you which coffee roaster is from the USA and which is from Ukraine. As you have probably guessed, it is a reversal of what you might consciously or subconsciously assume from a core-periphery wealth divide. Andriy (Ukraine) is the owner of the fancy-looking cafe in the heart of Wroclaw, while Paul (USA) is the man with the homemade coffee roaster in the abandoned red brick factory. Paul, lacking significant access to financial capital, was restricted in the location of his cafe, subsequently opting for a cheaper venue further from the center. Andriy, by contrast, rents prime real estate and purchased state-of-the-art equipment costing in excess of 30,000 Euro. Indeed, Paul was not the only migrant from a core-state to display a lack of access to financial capital. Anna, also from the USA, talks of her struggles:

"I tried to get a loan last year for expansion. I not only got rejected, I got rejected on a really really bad offer. And that was super depressing, because I have extremely good credit in the US, but I have no credit here. And so I have no credit history, which means that I had to do everything based on the results of my business which don't look great. So, they did not want to give me good terms, but then they decided to reject it anyway." (Anna, USA, arts & crafts store).

Clearly, then, we cannot deductively assume that spatial variations in global wealth will be neatly distilled and representative on a micro level. As seen with Paul, Anna, and Andriy, it cannot be assumed that, by virtue of originating from core-states, they have greater access to financial capital than those from periphery-states. Of course, some migrants do indeed fit within the stereotype of a 'core-periphery rich-poor' divide, such as Arthur and Stewart (USA), who both demonstrate extensive wealth, as well as Symon (Ukraine) who, conversely, lacked the funds to buy the inventory required to start his own optical lens shop. However, what is surprising here is the large number of migrants from the core-state subject group who do not fit within this stereotype. Migrants such as Paul and Anna (USA, mentioned above) are representative of the many other migrants (27: 66%, as shown in Table 4.1) from the core-state subject group who came to Poland with little or no savings nor access to financial capital. These migrants seem to be in stark contrast to the 'super rich transnational elites' observed by Beaverstock (2002) or the 'transnational capitalist class' outlined by Sklair (2012) in other core-to-(semi)periphery migratory contexts. So, how can it be that so many of the migrants in this study, despite originating from core-states with high levels of GDP per capita, seem to possess relatively

low levels of financial capital?⁴⁶ One obvious suggestion is that wealth (both in core- and periphery-states) is not equally distributed. It could be that many of the migrant entrepreneurs from core-states simply do not originate from the ‘upper’ end of this distribution within their own countries. For such migrants, relocating to an economically less developed location (Wroclaw) might, as observed in Chapter 3, subsequently be viewed as an act of ‘geoarbitrage’ (Hayes 2014), providing them with a way to increase their relative wealth.⁴⁷ Conversely, for those emigrating from periphery-states who demonstrate relatively high levels of financial capital, such as Andriy (Ukraine, highlighted above), perhaps they originate from the upper end of the economic spectrum of their home countries. Indeed, it has often been observed that it is rarely the poorest who emigrate from periphery-states, but in fact is more often those with access to financial capital (De Haas 2007). Regardless of the explanation, this study highlights the extensive individual variation of migrant entrepreneurs in terms of their access to financial capital. Of particular importance is how, despite observing a very slight trend of migrants from core-states being more likely than those from periphery-states to have greater access to financial capital, such access cannot always be assumed purely based upon migrants’ geographical location of origin. As such, it once again shows how migrant entrepreneurs, whether they originate from core- or periphery-states, cannot be treated as homogenous groups (Oliveira 2007).

4.3. Human capital

Taking education level as the primary indicator of human capital, it has been well documented in the literature how this can affect migrant entrepreneurship (L. Altinay & E. Altinay 2008). In accordance with Disadvantage Theory, it has been claimed that lower levels of education can act as a barrier to mainstream employment, resulting in migrants turning to entrepreneurship out of necessity (Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). Yet, the exact opposite (that higher levels of education lead to higher rates of entrepreneurship) has also been claimed (van Tubergen 2005; Hunt 2010). Indeed, the latter’s argument is that a lack of education not only acts as a barrier to mainstream employment, but also acts as a barrier to the skills required to successfully run one’s own business. Regardless of which

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⁴⁶ It is perhaps not surprising that both groups had examples of low access to financial capital. This is because most of those interviewed were from the list of sole proprietorships provided by the Wroclaw Statistical Office. Sole proprietorships tend to be smaller than LLCs, so it is not surprising to hear stories of financial struggles on both sides. It would, perhaps, be interesting to extend the research to LLCs to see if this changes things. However, due to the LLC lists not revealing company owners, this makes it pragmatically much more difficult to investigate.

⁴⁷ This theme is further developed in Chapter 7.

is more accurate, the narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant', with low levels of education, remains. But what about in an 'upside down' core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory context? Is such a narrative also applicable? In the case of Arthur (in the introduction to this chapter), who was educated at an Ivy League university in the USA, it seems this cannot necessarily be assumed. Indeed, as shown in Table 4.1., Artur seems to be representative of a broader trend with 80.49% (33) of migrants from the core-states subject group with university education. The topics of their degrees span multiple fields, including finance, IT, chemistry, engineering, architecture, business, management, and project management. This high level of education seems in line within other studies of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states (Tubergen 2005; Marchant & Mottiar 2011). Yet, even in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, other studies have also shown certain groups of migrant entrepreneurs to have relatively high levels of education (Saxenian 1999; 2002). Indeed, this study lends support to this, with 80% (20) of the migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states likewise having attended university. For example, Artem (Belarus, translation) has a degree in history, while his partner (also from Belarus and running her own cosmetic surgery practice) similarly appears to have no shortage of university level education:

"She has medical education, education as a lawyer, she doesn't practice law, she likes medicine and she practices medicine, now she studies in medicine continuing education, and I guess in a year she will get the second education, second university, she has a lot of courses and development", (Artem, Belarus, speaking about his partner, also from Belarus, who runs their own cosmetic surgery practice in Wrocław⁴⁸).

Again, among those from periphery-states, the degree topics range across multiple fields, including history, medicine, languages, business, marketing, zoology, and logistics (among others). As such, it seems that, regardless of whether migrants originate from core- or periphery-states, a lack of education cannot necessarily be assumed. To be sure, Table 4.2, below, shows how both subject groups demonstrate almost identical rates of university education.

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48 Artem did not want me to interview his wife, but instead provided all answers on behalf of his wife.

Table 4.2. Education level: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

	Migrants from core-states		Migrants from periphery-states	
	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)
University educated	80.49%	33	80%	20
High school or lower	19.51%	8	20%	4

Source: Aggregated data from qualitative interviews from this study.

However, not all migrants in the study were university educated. As also shown in Table 4.2, a small number of migrants from *both* subject groups only attended high school (or lower). In terms of those from core-states, 19.51% (8) of them did not attend university. Bruce (Australia) is one such example:

“I’m a double drop out. I’m lazy as shit... I managed to get through high school, passing with c minuses. The occasional moment of genius, but on zero effort. Never did any homework, I studied on the morning of the exam, that kind of thing”, (Bruce, Australia, online affiliate marketing).

The case of Bruce is in line with a handful of other studies showing that high levels of education among migrants from core-states cannot always be assumed (Stone & Stubbs 2007).⁴⁹ As with those from the core-states, there are also a minority (20%) of migrants from periphery-states who do not possess any university education. Interestingly, these seem to be situated mainly in the construction sector. For example, Maxim (Belarus) who has worked in this line of work (predominantly in Belarus and Russia) since he was 15 years old. Likewise, Danilo (Ukraine) quit university after a few months to work in construction and learned the skills from his father. Yet, despite low levels of education, Bruce, Maxim, and Danilo all run relatively successful businesses. This demonstrates how a lack of education does not necessarily correspond to a lack of skills required to open and run a business and, as such, seems at odds with Tubergen’s (2005) and Hunt’s (2010) findings that low levels of education decrease the rate of entrepreneurship. How then, can this be explained? First, there are, of course, many other input factors besides human capital (as outlined above and below), not even mentioning the role of the environment and its interactions with these resources (Waldinger et al. 1990; Kloosterman et al. 1999). However, even staying within the scope of human capital, there might be a possible explanation. It seems that Bruce, Maxim, and Danilo, have all acquired skills outside of formal education, namely, via work experience.

⁴⁹ In Stone & Stubbs (2007) study, it was found that UK migrant entrepreneurs who migrated to Spain were much less likely to be university educated than those who migrated to France).

Although somewhat more difficult to measure, this can also be considered as a component of human capital (Light & Gold 2000) and it offers a way to explain how migrants can obtain the skills necessary to open and run successful businesses while still lacking formal qualifications (Kerr & Lincoln 2010). That being said, there were also examples, within both subject groups, of migrants choosing industry sectors totally unrelated to their previous work experience. As seen in Chapter 3, Roberto (Italy) chose to open an Italian restaurant because, as a criminal lawyer in Italy, he wanted something totally different as a way to 'relax' and escape. For Veronica (Ukraine) it was a similar story. She left her job, importing construction materials, to open her own bakery-cafe, despite having no previous experience working in this sector. As such, correlations between work experience and industry sector cannot always be assumed. Regardless, the most important finding here is that both groups of migrant entrepreneurs, whether they originate from core- or periphery-states, display relatively high levels of education and, as such, the level of education seems unlikely to play a significant role in variations between the migrants' business practices.

4.4. Social capital

"The reason I succeed is I have, you know, something like 25,000 contacts and can pick up the phone to pretty much anybody and say do me a favour and give me 5 minutes of your time", (Connor, Ireland, IT company).

The role of social capital in shaping migrant entrepreneurship outcomes has featured prominently in the literature. Scholars have explored how this role can be both positive (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Light & Gold 2000; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012) and negative (Geertz 1963; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Flap et al. 2000). Yet, once again, the majority of these studies have been in (semi-) periphery-to-core contexts, usually restricting the focus to within the borders of the host country, often centered around the idea of Ethnic Enclaves in the immediate environment (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al. 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006). But what about migrants' social capital *outside of the host country*? Does it not also play a role in shaping migrant entrepreneurship? As such, this section will explore not only the levels of migrant entrepreneurs' social capital, but will also pay particular attention to its *location*.

First, however, I would like to better define what exactly I mean when I use the term 'social capital'. After all, it is a broad term which, within the literature, has often been subdivided into three groups, namely: 'friends and family members, ethnic community and the host society' (Dheer 2018: 595). Such a division, however, seems quite 'host country centric' and largely ignores the role of social capital in - or originating from - migrants' home (or even third party) countries. Subsequently, for

the purposes of this study, whereby I encountered a lot of data relating to the use of migrants' social capital from *outside of Poland*, such categories seem somewhat narrow. As such, I adopt a broader method of categorisation which works on two (functional and geographic) levels. First, on a functional level, I consider social capital to be any social contacts which affect (positively or negatively) migrants' businesses. Within this, I then further subdivide this into two functions: i. social capital which affects supply (e.g. labour and production); and ii. social capital which affects demand (e.g. clients and sales). Second, on a geographic level, I explore how migrants' social capital varies according to its geographic location and origin. Given that the goal of this chapter is to describe migrants' forms of capital, leaving the ways in which it interacts with the environment for subsequent chapters (namely, Chapters 5, 6, and 7), the remainder of this section focuses principally on this second level. How, then, do the two subject groups vary in the geographic location and origin of their social capital?

Indeed, as mentioned above, the role of social capital has often been restricted to within the borders of the host country.⁵⁰ Yet, when observing the core-state migrants in the semi-periphery context of Wrocław, it becomes immediately apparent that much of their social capital is situated in core-states, well beyond the borders of the host country. This should actually not come as a surprise, given that most migrant entrepreneurs from core-states have spent much of their lives studying there, working there, making connections along the way. For example, Connor (from Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this section), boasts of having '25,000 contacts' whom he has largely accumulated throughout his time in Ireland, the UK, and California. In other words, prior to moving to Poland, he had acquired a significant amount of social capital from (and situated in) core-states.

Nevertheless, social capital is, of course, a non-static variable and can change over time. Indeed, having been living in Wrocław where he has been running his own IT business for the past six years, Connor has been actively acquiring social capital on a more local level. He is a prolific networker and hosts a monthly 'coffee morning' networking group for entrepreneurs at one of the local universities. Through such networking, he has met, and subsequently hired, several local (Polish) programmers, who now work for his company. As such, Connor's situation seems representative of three broader trends among the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group. First, it shows how the level of local social capital seems to correlate with the length of time spent in Wrocław.⁵¹ This is unsurprising, given that the longer someone stays somewhere, the more likely they are to acquire social

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50 With the exception of scholars of transnational entrepreneurship (for example Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015; Bagwell 2018).

51 I refer here to the number of both weak and strong ties (Granovetter 1973) which seem to increase over time in the location in which migrants are residing. This does not, however, mean that migrants' pre-existing social capital (accumulated prior to moving to Wrocław) necessarily decreases over time. As a matter of fact, as will be seen in Chapter 5, many migrants (notably those from core-states) seem to make use of this pre-existing social capital.

capital over time (Williams & Krasniki 2018). Second, it is important to note how most of his local social capital originates either from Poland or core-states. The significance of this will become increasingly apparent through the remainder of this dissertation. Third, he appears to be using local, Polish social capital as a means of supply, with his ethnic division of labour being apparently entirely composed of Polish nationals. On one hand, Connor's situation appears to be confirming the key role played by local social capital in migrant entrepreneurship (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Light & Gold 2000; Lin & Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). Yet, on the other, his composition of social capital, and how it is not co-ethnic, seems to be at odds with the ideas of Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al. 1994) which stress the important role played by co-ethnic labour. This correlation between migrants' social capital and their ethnic division of labour will be explored on a much deeper level in Chapter 6.

Switching the focus now to the periphery-states subject group, let us return to Danilo (Ukraine), who runs his own small construction firm in Wroclaw with four employees. On first impressions, his situation seems to mirror that of Connor's. Having also lived in Poland for several years, he has built up a pool of contacts from which he has hired all of his employees. Yet, upon closer examination, there are two important ways in which Danilo's social capital seems to differ from that of Connor's. First, while Connor's local pool of contacts consists mainly of Poles and people from core-states, Danilo's seems to be composed much more of co-ethnic Ukrainians. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that 1. prior to coming to Poland, Danilo spent most of his life in Ukraine so, understandably, he has built up a social network largely composed of Ukrainians, such as his wife, parents, and sister, all of whom have joined him in Wroclaw; and 2. there is a large in-flow of Ukrainian migration to Wroclaw which has provided an extensive co-ethnic pool of social capital. It has been shown in the literature how migrants with shared linguistic and cultural background tend to cluster together (Portes & Wilson 1980; Portes & Jensen 1989), so it is perhaps to be expected that Danilo seems more inclined to build connections with this plentiful supply of co-ethnic social capital. Second, unlike Connor who is exclusively hiring Polish labour, all four of Danilo's employees are Ukrainian. The reasons for this will be explored in depth in Chapter 7. For now, however, it is sufficient to point out that Danilo's circumstances seem to exemplify the ideas of Ethnic Enclave Theory, whereby his business is benefiting from a plentiful supply of co-ethnic labour.

Despite these apparent variations between Connor and Danilo, which themselves are largely representative of broader trends between the core- and periphery-states subject groups, I would like to stress once again that, as a non-static variable, migrants' social capital can (and indeed does) change over time. Just because migrants from periphery-states start out with their social capital predominantly composed of periphery-state contacts, does not mean that they cannot later acquire contacts from core-states. As a matter of fact, for Danilo

(Ukraine), it is something he would like more of, but he finds it difficult. At his construction company, all of his clients, until recently, have been Polish. During our first interview, he tells me that he had just been contracted by a Polish client for a project in the Netherlands. He explained how the Polish company, despite not doing any of the actual construction work themselves, made a profit by subcontracting the project to him and then simply 'sitting in the middle'. I asked Danilo why he does not contact clients in the Netherlands directly, so that they could cut out the middleman, subsequently making more profit and saving the Dutch clients money. He said he would like to, but he does not have the contacts. More recently, I spoke with Danilo again and he told me he is now doing a second project for that very same Dutch client, but this time he has contracted with them directly. It seems, therefore, that he has started the process of acquiring social capital in core-states. As such, it highlights how migrants' social networks can change over time. For Vanko, also from Ukraine, it is a similar story. Through repeated trips to the USA, and through meeting prospective clients face-to-face, he has, over time, been able to accumulate social capital there:

"I visited the US many times and I have some connections there. They return to me and say can you do this for us and I say of course...Conferences, LinkedIn as well, sometimes as I mentioned just word-of-mouth...With customers you have to meet them personally, because you have to create the trust...we met several times", (Vanko, Ukraine, IT company and security systems).

Clearly, then, an a priori determination of the geographic origin of social capital, based upon migrants' locations of origin, does not rule supreme. Migrant entrepreneurs have an element of agency, whereby, despite originating from a certain region, they can, over time, acquire social capital in other regions, as demonstrated by Vanko and Danilo above. Nevertheless, this process of social capital acquisition is not always an easy, nor even, process. As will be seen in Chapter 7, migrants from periphery-states appear to face more legal restrictions than their counterparts from the core-states subject group in terms of their international mobility. Visa requirements, imposed by national governments, can block them from legally traveling to many core-states (Beaverstock 2002; Fechter 2005; Sklair 2012), subsequently curtailing their ability to acquire social capital in such locations. As such, although migrants appear to have an element of agency in terms of their social capital acquisition, it appears to be within an uneven (and, frankly, unfair) macro level environment. The role of this macro level environment will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters. For the purposes of this section, however, the key point is that the two subject groups seem to vary (in most cases, but not all) in the geographical origin of their social networks, whereby migrants from core-states are more likely to have social networks composed of

core-state social capital, while migrants from periphery-states are paradoxically more likely to have networks composed of social capital from periphery-states.

4.5. Cultural capital

"They expect Ukrainians to speak Polish and, if they don't, then they really don't like it. Whereas there are Americans and British people who have lived here for a whole long time and don't speak Polish and people would give them a pass. So I haven't quite figured that one out", (Anna, USA, art & craft store).

The role of cultural capital has featured prominently in the field of migrant entrepreneurship. Cultural theory has been a popular way to account for how two different cultural groups, within the same environment, can vary in rates of entrepreneurship (Masurel et al. 2002; 2004; Fregetto 2004). However, this claim is weakened by evidence that the same cultural group, when situated in two different environments, can also have varying rates of self-employment (Min & Bozorgmehr 2000; Rekers & Van Kempen 2000). Subsequently, there is now a general consensus that cultural traits cannot be the only factor at play. Yet, it is still understandably included as an input variable in the leading migrant entrepreneurship models (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Waldinger et al. 1990; Chen & Tan 2009) and it seems likely to play a role, albeit not a definitive one. So, with regard to migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states, how do they vary, if at all, in their composition of cultural capital? As one of the major components of culture, language will be the main focus of this section. This is not to say that other aspects of culture are not important. As noted by Light & Gold (2000), there are, of course, other components to cultural capital, including tastes or actions signifying a bourgeois status (Bourdieu 1984), occupational traits (Farkas 2017), and even entrepreneurial culture (Berger 1995). Language, however, lends itself more easily to being quantified, allowing comparisons between the two groups. Further, it is likely the case that someone who speaks the language of a certain culture has simultaneously acquired knowledge of cultural traits specific to that culture. Thus, using language as an indicator of cultural capital, this section will explore, below, variations between the two groups.

As was the case with social capital, the type of cultural capital possessed by the migrants seems to correlate (in most, but not all cases) to their country of origin. In other words, migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group seem more likely to speak core-state languages, while those from the periphery-states subject group seem more likely to speak periphery-state languages. This is clearly visible from Table 4.3. below, which shows how 100% (41) of those from core-states spoke English and 54% (22) spoke a second core-state language. This is, of course,

unsurprising, as we would expect migrants to learn and reproduce the language(s) of their home country environment. Of the 54% who speak a second core-state language, these were invariably migrant entrepreneurs from countries where English was not the official language, whereby they acquired English as a second language. Examples of this include Igor (Finland) who speaks Finnish and English, Gabriel (France) who speaks French and English, and Mattheus (Germany) who speaks German and English. In the case of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states countries where English is the national language (USA, Canada, UK, Australia), it was common that they *only* spoke English. A typical example is Tom (USA), who has been living in Poland for around six years, yet does not speak Polish nor any other languages besides English.

This trend between the location of origin and language proficiency is mirrored among those from the periphery-states subject group, with all of them speaking the mother tongue of their (periphery-state) location of origin. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they were found to be less likely to speak core-state languages, with just 11 (46%) of them speaking English and 3 (13%) speaking a second core-state language. Yet, as can be seen, there were several exceptions. Ivan, for example, despite growing up in Ukraine, was one of those who learned not only English, but also a second core-state language (French). Clearly, then, being born into a certain region does not completely determine language proficiency.⁵² As shown with the example of Ivan, there is some room for agency, whereby migrants can, over time, acquire languages other than those predominantly spoken in their locations of origin. The trend, however, between location of origin and languages spoken, remains a strong one, as seen in Table 4.3.

This correlation (between location of origin and languages spoken) is somewhat obvious. What, however, is not so obvious, is why there is such variation between the two groups in terms of their proficiency in the host country language of Polish. While the vast majority of those from periphery-states (88%: 21) have acquired fluent Polish, only a minority of those from core-states (14.6%: 6) have achieved this.⁵³ How then, can this be explained? On the one hand, the variation in host country language proficiency could be related to the linguistic distances between the migrants' native languages and Polish. Many of those from the periphery-states subject group are from Ukraine and Belarus, so the linguistic distance between their mother tongue and Polish is relatively small.

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52 It is also interesting to observe the correlation between cultural capital and social capital. By virtue of learning French, it seems Ivan was then able to start acquiring social capital in French speaking locations, notably France and Switzerland.

53 There were a small number of exceptions. Anna (USA), for example, has successfully acquired a high level of Polish proficiency during her four years in Wroclaw. She now speaks Polish fluently with her clients in her art and crafts store.

Table 4.3. Languages spoken: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

	Fluent Polish	Fluent English	Fluent periphery-state language	Fluent 2nd core-state language
Migrants from core-states	14.6% (6)	100% (41)	0% (0)	54% (22)
Migrants from periphery-states	88% (21)	46% (11)	100% (24)	13% (3)

Source: My own data collated from qualitative interviews with migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states.

Conversely, almost all of those from the core-states subject group have mother tongues from non-Slavic language families (e.g. Anglo-Saxon), so the linguistic distance is comparably greater. However, on the other hand, how can the relatively high level of English proficiency among many Poles in the UK (Johannson & Sliwa 2004) be explained? Have they not bridged the same linguistic gap that would be required of English-speaking migrants moving to Poland? Subsequently, it seems there might be other factors contributing to this variation in Polish proficiency. Anna (quoted at the beginning of this section) highlights how certain migrants from core-states are 'given a pass' and, apparently, are under less pressure from the host society to learn Polish.⁵⁴ This in itself seems to hint at the presence of cultural hierarchies within Poland (Andrejuk 2017) and raises interesting questions about the power of certain languages and cultures over others. Light & Gold (2000: 91) point out that while human capital is said to increase productivity, cultural capital 'conveys prestige'. Perhaps then, within a cultural hierarchy whereby some languages (e.g. English) seem to convey more prestige than others (e.g. Polish), it might perhaps explain why migrants from core-states seem less motivated to learn the host country language. This theme will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 7.

The question of motivation (to learn Polish) might also have an economic component to it. Within the almost exclusive focus of the literature upon migration to core-states (Ilhan-nas et al. 2011; Aliagla-Isla & Rialp 2013; Dheer 2018), the importance of host country language proficiency is often reported to be a key factor in economic integration (Kindler & Szulecka 2013; De Paola & Brunello 2016) and business growth (L. Altinay & E. Altinay 2008). As such, it is somewhat assumed that learning the host country language is *desirable*. And, conversely, lacking proficiency in the host country language has usually been associated with disadvantage among migrant entrepreneurs (Johnson 2000; Nee & Sanders 2001).

⁵⁴ This trend of migrants from core-states not learning Polish is corroborated by a recent article on the blog 'Notes from Poland' which was set up by Stanley Bill (Director of the Polish Studies Programme at the University of Cambridge) and Daniel Tilles (assistant professor at the Pedagogical University of Kraków) <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/07/01/its-easier-to-find-work-and-a-good-life-here-poland-attracts-immigrants-from-western-europe/>

Yet, in this ‘upside down’ context of core-to-semi-periphery migration, wherein the native population has a significantly lower GDP per capita compared to their country of origin, would they even want to economically integrate? And would learning Polish greatly benefit their business growth? In this sense, studying ‘up’ in migrant entrepreneurship begins to question assumptions about the importance of host country language acquisition.

4.6. Conclusions

Above I have shown how, in contradiction to the narrative of the ‘disadvantaged migrant’ so often depicted in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, in the ‘upside down’ context of core-to-semi-periphery migration, migrants do *not* always lack access to resources. On the contrary, I have shown how they (sometimes, but not always) have relatively *high levels* of access to financial, human, social, and cultural capital. This seems in line with other studies of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states (Drake & Collard 2008; Marchant & Mottiar 2011; Stone & Stubbs 2007; Andrejuk 2017) and shines a light on how certain prominent theories, notably Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010) appear to have been created in one-sided, dominant-subordinate (Nader 1972), periphery-to-core migratory contexts. Yet, I have also shown how, even for the migrants from periphery-states, a lack of resources likewise cannot always be assumed. In cases, many of these migrant entrepreneurs were also shown to have relatively high levels of access to a range of capital resources. This lends support to other studies which have unearthed similar findings (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Kloosterman et al. 1999; Light & Gold 2000; Leung 2001; Masurel et al. 2002; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). That being said, I have also shown how there is great variation, with several migrants from both groups also displaying a lack of access to various forms of resources. As such, it reveals how migrant entrepreneurs, whether they originate from core- or periphery-states, cannot be treated as homogenous groups (Oliveira 2007).


Importantly, I have also shown how, although the two groups seem to have similar *levels* of access to resources, they appear to vary in the *geographical origin* of these resources. For example, with regard to social capital, migrants from core-states were found (unsurprisingly) to have relatively high levels of social capital in core-states. Conversely, those from periphery-states seem more likely to have social networks composed of social capital from periphery-states. The same can be said of cultural capital. Migrants from core-states appear more likely to speak core-state languages, while those from periphery-states seem more likely to speak periphery-state languages.

But why does the geographic origin of migrants’ various forms of capital matter? After all, taken in isolation, geography in itself is largely meaningless. But geography

matters, I argue, for two reasons. First, in the context of a world in which different societies are geographically concentrated in different locations (for example, USA society is concentrated in North America, while Ukrainian society is concentrated in Eastern Europe), geography is a *proxy* for the specific society in which one resides. Different societies, in turn, influence the composition of social and cultural capital of their members. So, for example, a migrant entrepreneur who grows up in a core-state is more likely to have contacts from that core-state and speak a core-state language. In other words, purely 'by accident of birth' (Benson & O'Reilly 2018: 120), it seems that migrant entrepreneurs inherit specific variations in the character of their resources. Of course, not everything is predetermined from the top-down: Individuals do have some room for manoeuvre. For example, Vanko, despite growing up in Ukraine, has acquired core-state cultural capital (learned English), as well as social capital (developed a number of contacts in the USA and Western Europe). Nevertheless, despite Vanko's agency, the fact remains that migrant entrepreneurs' starting point within the global environment seems to play a dominant role in the shaping of the geographic origin of their resources.

Second, this has theoretical significance. As noted in previous chapters, within the field of migrant entrepreneurship there has been a strong tendency to restrict the focus within the borders of core-states. Within this methodological nationalistic approach (Wimmer & Schiller 2002; Wallerstein 2004), researchers have explored how migrant entrepreneurs and their resources interact with the host country environment (Waldinger et al. 1990; Kloosterman & Rath 2001). However, as seen above, migrant entrepreneurs' resources are (to some degree) shaped by their position within a wider, global environment. As will be seen in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, this variation in the geographic origin of resources seems to play an important role in accounting for variations between the two subject groups' business practices and behaviours. Importantly, if such variation in the geographic origin of resources does indeed play a role, and the value of resources are (to some degree) determined by their position within a wider, global system, then should the largest unit of analysis not be this global system? If so, then such a narrow focus upon the host country (Bagwell 2018) may well be blinding us to the full picture. As such, in order to fully understand the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship, I once again argue that we need to not only situate migrant entrepreneurs and their resources within the host country, but also within this wider, global environment. Subsequently, in the same way that Schiller (2010; 2013) calls upon migration scholars to move beyond using the nation state as the largest unit of analysis, I will continue to argue (in subsequent chapters) that scholars of migrant entrepreneurship must do the same.

5.



CHAPTER 5

The opportunity structure: Beyond the nation-state

"I originally came out here [Wroclaw] to buy property. But the Irish property market had a crash, so I had two choices - either go back to London and work for an investment bank, or stay out here. I had a lot of friends in outsourcing at [a large consultancy firm] and they said you're in the heart of outsourcing. So I opened the first center in Poland. We provide IT support in about 20 languages. We also do technology outsourcing. But our facilities are very high standard, similar to Google in look and feel.... it's quite a good size company now. About 300 people with clients all over the world with some of the biggest banks [and] technology companies out of San Francisco. We don't do much business in Poland...Yeah, it's the pricing. We're a premium based model. They cannot afford us.... Clients are mainly in Europe and the US. So Ireland, UK, Germany, and Scandies and France. And the US. And Canada", (Niall, Ireland, IT support).

5.1. Introduction

This is the first of three chapters which looks at how migrant entrepreneurs' variations in motivations (seen in Chapter 3) and resources (seen in Chapter 4) interact with the environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider international context. This chapter, specifically, focuses on variations observed in the opportunity structures which the migrants access. Opportunity structures are most often used to refer to the 'demand side' of migrant entrepreneurship (Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Kloosterman 2010). They are, undeniably, an essential component of entrepreneurship, without which, there can be no enterprise. Nevertheless, within the literature their role has, until recently, been largely restricted to the environment of the *host country* (Rusinovic 2008; Chen & Tan 2009; Bagwell 2018). Considering scholars' almost exclusive focus upon migration in (semi-)periphery-to-core contexts, perhaps it is hardly surprising that migrants, surrounded by relatively affluent core-state markets, have been predominantly observed accessing these host country markets. But, in an 'upside down', core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory context, do migrant entrepreneurs likewise restrict their entrepreneurial attention to the markets of the (relatively less affluent) host country? In the case of Niall (quoted above), it seems not. With his clients in 'Europe and US...Ireland, UK, Germany, and Scandies and France', he is clearly accessing markets *beyond* the borders of the host country (Poland). And, importantly, as will be seen below, he is not the only one. Yet, the same, it will be seen, cannot be said of (most, but not all of) the migrants from the periphery-states subject group. Further, even for those who are accessing markets within the host country only, I will question whether their businesses, within the modern globalised world, are genuinely uninfluenced by factors external to the host country. Put simply, this chapter all boils down to

one key question: Is the host country nation-state, as the largest unit of analysis, *large enough*?

Below, I aim to shed some light on this. How, if at all, do migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states, when positioned in the semi-periphery context of Wrocław, Poland, vary in the location of the opportunity structures which they access? And, if the location of these opportunity structures does vary, then how can such variation be explained? In order to explore this, I will divide the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship into three (micro, meso, and macro) levels (Kloosterman 2010), albeit with the expansion of the 'macro' level to include not just the host country, but the wider, international context. In doing so, I will analyze how variations in the migrant entrepreneurs' resources and motivations (on a micro level) are interacting with opportunity structures (on a meso level) and the environment of Wrocław, Poland, and the wider international context (on a macro level). Having already explored the micro level in previous chapters, I now turn to the meso level and the location of the opportunity structures accessed by the migrant entrepreneurs in this study.

5.2. The meso level: Opportunity structures and their location

As seen with Niall (from Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), he is clearly accessing *international* opportunity structures. But what about other migrants from core-states? Is Niall's behaviour representative of the subject group as a whole? For many of them, it seems so. As shown in Table 5.1, 21 (51%) of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-state subject group have clients predominantly in core-states. Francesco (Italy) is another good example. Over dinner, he tells me about his latest project, a large residential development in the South of Wrocław, being funded by an Irish investor and how another project is being co-funded by an old school friend from Italy. I ask him if it is normal for his investors to be from outside of Poland and he admits that, in actual fact, almost all of his investors are non-Polish and are predominantly from Ireland, the UK, and Italy. In other words, despite being based in Poland, Francesco contracts almost exclusively with clients outside of Poland. This is important and has theoretical significance. As noted in the introduction, the role of opportunity structures has often been restricted to the host country. This is true in particular within many of the theoretical models, such as the Interactive Model (Waldinger et al. 1990) and the Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999). Despite both models making excellent contributions to the field in terms of recognising the important role played by opportunity structures and the environment, importantly, they restricted this focus to the environment of the host country only. Kloosterman & Rath (2001), in an attempt to create a spatial typology of this macro environment, broke it up into three levels: 1. Neighbourhood;

2. Regional; and 3. *National*. This, inherently, left the host country nation-state as the largest unit of analysis.⁵⁵ But, as can be seen with not just Niall and Francesco, but also the majority (51%) of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-state subject group, they are accessing opportunity structures *beyond the borders of the host country*. Other examples of this include Giovanni (Italy) whose company provides IT services to clients in Italy, Caleb (Israel) whose company sells Polish real estate to Israeli investors, and Karl whose company provides sales support to a sister company in Germany. Of course, this does not mean that none of these migrants conducted business within Poland. As a matter of fact, a significant (albeit smaller) number of them were found to be selling services or products to clients in Wroclaw (40%)⁵⁶ or nationally within Poland (7%).⁵⁷ Yet, noticeably, the overarching trend is that the migrants from the core-states subject group seem more likely to access opportunity structures outside of Poland, principally within core-states.

Table 5.1. Location of (the majority of) clients: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

	Local (Wroclaw)	National (Poland)	International (Core-states)	International (Periphery-states)
Migrants from core-states	17 (40%)	3 (7%)	21 (51%)	0 (0%)
Migrants from periphery-states	19 (79%)	1 (4%)	3 (13%)	1 (4%)

(Source: Data collated from the interviews with migrant entrepreneurs⁵⁸)

So, what is going on here? Strangely, despite being excluded from this theoretical framework, international opportunity structures are nothing new, as trade has been international since ancient times (Ambrosini 2012). This has not been left unnoticed by other scholars, who have made some excellent progress in detailing migrant entrepreneurs’ more contemporary international activities, which in itself has become a sub branch of migrant entrepreneurship referred to as ‘transnational migrant entrepreneurship’ (Portes et al. 1999; 2002). Within this branch, it has been shown how migrants’ home countries can play an important role in their business

55 It should be noted that Rath (2002) did, later, adopt a more international approach with his study of the garment industry, along with contributions from numerous other authors.

56 Examples of this include Anna (USA), who runs an arts and crafts store, Albert (France) who sells wine, Paul (USA), who sells coffee, and Laura (Germany), who runs a senior care home, all of whom service a local clientele.

57 For example, Mario (Italy) and Arthur (USA), who both own restaurant franchises throughout Poland.

58 The figures here show the predominant location of clientele. So, for example, Danilo has all of his clients in Poland, except for one client in the Netherlands, so his opportunity structure has been classified as ‘National’ (Poland).


practices (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Rusinovic 2008; Chen & Tan 2009; Sequeira et al. 2009; Bagwell 2018). On the surface, this seems very similar to the situations of Niall, Francesco, and many of the other migrant entrepreneurs in this study who are accessing international opportunity structures. Yet, upon closer inspection, some important differences emerge.

First, within the literature's almost exclusive focus upon transnational migrant entrepreneurship in a (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory context, the migrants are almost invariably selling products or services to markets within the host country, while using the country of origin to meet the demand side of the equation. Saxenian's (1999; 2002) study of high-skilled Asian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley is a prime example. Here it was seen how these migrants utilized home country resources (notably labour) to manufacture high-tech goods for consumption in the host country (USA). But, in the case of Niall, this flow of goods and services appears to be *in reverse*. He (and his 300 employees) are providing services in the *host country* and selling these services back to his *home country* (and third party countries in core-states). This pattern is mirrored by Francesco (mentioned above). His company is providing architectural and construction services in Wroclaw (i.e. the host country), yet the clients are based in his home country (Italy), as well as other third party countries in core-states, namely Ireland and the UK. So, in other words, the flow of goods and services seems to be in the *opposite direction*. Importantly, one of the few studies which *has* been done in a core-to-periphery migratory context, seems to reinforce this trend. In Harima's (2015) study, Japanese entrepreneurs set up English schools in the Philippines, wherefrom they then sold online English language lessons back to co-ethnic Japanese clients in Japan. Once again, in this scenario, supply is coming from the host country, while demand is coming from the home country. So then, why, in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, do migrant entrepreneurs appear more likely to target markets *within* the host country, while in core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory contexts, they seem more likely to target markets *outside* of the host country? On the one hand, it seems like the migrants are displaying different behaviour. Yet, on the other hand, these migrant entrepreneurs are united by the fact that they are (usually) targeting markets in the same geographical region, namely, *core-states*. Why, and how, they do this will be explored later in this chapter.

Second, the international opportunity structures observed in this study also seem to diverge from the mainstream transnational migrant entrepreneurship in terms of their multilateralism. By this I mean that the latter has often been restricted to a binary paradigm of the host country and home country (Solano 2015; Valenzuela-Garcia 2018). For example, in Chen & Tan's (2009) integrative model of transnational entrepreneurship, even though they acknowledge the role of factors outside of the host country, they restrict these factors to the migrants' *home country*. The same is true of Ren & Liu's (2015) model of 'dual embeddedness' which, as the name suggests, confines the role of the environment to just two locations,

namely, the host and home countries. But, as seen previously with both Niall and Francesco, not only are they selling products or services to their home country, but also to *multiple* third party countries. At this point, we can notice a trend within the literature. Over time, scholars have progressively expanded theoretical models to increasingly broaden the unit of analysis. This progression can be seen below in Figure 5.1. Despite this continual enlargement of the unit of analysis, it is repeatedly found that the new, larger, unit of analysis, is not large enough. And now, as seen with how certain migrant entrepreneurs are accessing opportunity structures not just in host and home countries, but also in third party countries, it appears that the unit of analysis, once again, is *not large enough*.

Figure 5.1. The ever-expanding unit of analysis in migrant entrepreneurship



Source: My own interpretation and understanding of existing models in terms of their largest units of analysis.

Third, the situations of Niall, Francesco, and many of the other migrant entrepreneurs in this study, question the very definition of transnationalism. A ‘transnational migrant’ has been defined, within the literature, as someone who regularly travels between the home and host country (Portes et al. 1999). But for certain migrant entrepreneurs encountered in this study, such a definition seems problematic. For example, James (USA) runs an e-commerce store selling dog accessories (online) to clients predominantly in the USA, Canada, the UK, and Ireland. Yet, despite all of his clients being situated in core-states, he very rarely travels to these countries.

So then, due to this lack of travel, should we follow Portes et al.'s (ibid) definition and determine him *not* to be a transnational entrepreneur? This, considering all of his clients are indeed international, would seem somewhat bizarre. As such, this study lends support to other authors' (Rusinovic 2008; Ambrosini 2012) preference for a definition which moves the emphasis away from the necessity of travel and more toward the engagement in any form of transnational activities which benefit the business.

Taken altogether, these three points highlight how this finding, that migrants from core-states have an apparent greater tendency to access international markets in core-states, seems problematic for much of the existing literature. By contrast, when we switch focus to the migrants from the periphery-states subject group, we observe that they are less problematic. Indeed, the large majority (79%) of migrants from the periphery-states subject group were found to be selling products or services *locally* (within Wroclaw and Poland). Examples of this include Bogdan (Ukraine), running a trendy barber shop targeting the local, male market, Natalia (Ukraine), selling custom-made cakes, as well as Aleksander, Andriy, Veronica, and Olek, (also all from Ukraine), with cafes servicing a local clientele. Their situations seem more inline with the mainstream migrant entrepreneurship literature, whereby they are accessing business opportunities within the host country only (Waldinger et al. 1990; Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Kloosterman 2010).

At this point, however, it is important to note that not all of the migrants from periphery-states acted in accordance with the mainstream literature. A small number (13%) were found to predominantly access *international* opportunity structures in core-states. I refer, now, to two of them, namely, Vanko and Ivan, from Ukraine. Vanko has two companies, one providing programming services to clients mainly in the USA, while the second installs security systems to clients in Northern Europe, namely Germany and Scandinavia. Ivan, on the other hand, builds custom-made LED displays for clients mainly in France and Switzerland. Vanko and Ivan demonstrate how, under certain circumstances, migrants from periphery-states can, and do, access international business opportunities in core-states. However, it seems that they are less likely to do so. The same can be said of their tendency to access opportunities in periphery-states, with just 4% (i.e. one migrant) doing so. This was Krishna (India), who is in the process of setting up a business exporting 'Polish goods' to India.⁵⁹ The fact that only one migrant from the periphery-states subject group is attempting to access opportunity structures in periphery-states lends support to Rusinovic's (2008) finding that migrant entrepreneurs were not interested in economic investments in their (semi-)periphery countries of origin. This reluctance among the periphery-state subject group to target markets in their

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59 At this early stage of his company formation, he did not want to reveal which products, for fear of someone else taking the idea, however he said it would be products specific to Poland.

countries of origin contrasts sharply with that of the migrants from core states who, as shown previously, have a strong tendency to do so. I will now, below, explore the underlying reasons for such variation.

5.3. The macro level: Environmental factors

As seen above, the migrant entrepreneurs from core-states seem more likely to access international opportunity structures, while those from periphery-states seem more likely to access local (Wroclaw and/or Poland) opportunity structures. But why is this? How can this variation between the two groups be explained? The remainder of the chapter aims to provide insight into this. Accordingly, I now turn to the role of the macro level environment. This level, and how it interacts with migrants' micro level motivations and access to resources, inherently encompasses a large number of variables and, therefore, complexity. For this reason, in order to make the analysis more manageable, I have divided the macro layer of the environment up into four separate layers: 1. Economic; 2. Technological; Socio-cultural; and 4. Politico-institutional.

5.3.1. The economic environment

"...my services would probably be quite expensive for the zloty, so at first I'm trying just for the French speaking world", (Gabriel, France, online marketing).

The importance of the economic environment, and how it can affect migrant entrepreneurship, has been well-documented within the literature (Waldinger et al. 1990; Kloosterman et al. 1999). After all, it stands to reason that the number and types of business opportunities available during an economic boom, for example, might be quite different to those during an economic downturn. Further, it has also been highlighted how the economic environment, and its effects upon opportunity structures, can vary regionally within the host country (Kloosterman & Rath 2001). Nevertheless, once again, such studies have been largely restricted to the environment of the host country, subsequently neglecting if, and how, spatial economic variations might be affecting migrant entrepreneurship on a wider, international scale (Solano 2016; Bagwell 2018). On this wider level, outside the field of migrant entrepreneurship, it has been well documented how wealth is not equally distributed, but instead tends to be concentrated in certain regions, often 'global cities' within core-states (Sassen 2001; Brenner & Keil 2006). What effect, then, could this be having upon migrant entrepreneurs and their businesses?

Indeed, many of the migrant entrepreneurs (from both groups) spoke of how clients in core-states can, put simply, '*pay more*'. As seen from the words of Gabriel

(France, quoted above), he believes those in the French speaking world are better able to afford his services. This seems to mirror the situation of Niall (Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), who states that he targets clients in core-states, and not Poland, because Polish businesses 'cannot afford us'. This is also in line with the opinions of the small number of migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group who are likewise selling goods to clients in core-states:

"They [in the USA] have bigger budgets and they're ready to spend money. Because in Poland, from my understanding, Polish people are not ready to spend money. They are still trying to save money, to find something cheaper. This is an infinite loop. Maybe that's why business goes very hard with Polish customers. I thought maybe because I'm Ukrainian, maybe because I'm a foreigner, or the language barrier. Now I have two business development managers from Poland, Polish people, [and they have the] same problem. With Polish companies work is pretty hard. I say come on guys, let's keep it, let's target the Western market, because it has no sense [targeting Polish clients]", (Vanko, Ukraine, IT and security systems).

So, for Gabriel, Niall, and Vanko (above), there is a perception that clients in core-states *pay more*, and, conversely, that clients from Poland *pay less*. This begins to reveal not only how the global economic environment plays a role in migrant entrepreneurship, but how it is *uneven*. Indeed, it is this uneven, economic landscape which has provided the backdrop against which the process of outsourcing has been so prominent in recent decades (Sassen 1999). While for some, this conjures up negative images of the decline of certain industries and cities in the core-states (the auto industry in Detroit, for example), for others outside of core-states, it can be a totally different story, with millions of dollars of direct foreign investment flowing into these regions (Sassen 1991). Undoubtedly, Wrocław is one such region. With its pool of educated, relatively affordable labour, and geographic proximity to Western Europe, it has seen a large influx of direct foreign investment by transnational corporations (Klimek 2017). Its position as a growing centre of outsourcing is confirmed during my interview with a representative of the Wrocław city government:

"So really we have a lot of big investors [multinational corporations] and these investors were attracted also by our policy, also by the agency for Wrocław agglomeration development, because our former mayor, Mr. Dutkiewicz had this idea to attract big investors to Wrocław...sometimes we competed for these big companies, for example Amazon, I remember that Cracow wanted Amazon, but Wrocław won. A lot of jobs were created, we can tell that more than 120,000 jobs were created thanks to these investors", (Representative from the City of Wrocław).

Outsourcing is, of course, a relative process. It only makes economic sense to outsource production if price disparities exist between two separate locations. But, in reality, these two locations are part of a broader, global landscape of *multiple* locations. The importance of this can be seen with the example of Caleb (Israel), below, who runs his own property investment company in Wrocław:

“Why would Israeli investors invest in Poland? First of all the property prices are much cheaper. And the economic story of Poland appeals to many people and many people see potential and upside and potential increase in value and ongoing return which is of course better than Israel. You need a lot of money to invest in property there, here you need a third compared to what you would need in Israel. It’s relatively closer to Israel than other markets like the US or even the UK or other places which are really expensive,” (Caleb, Israel, real estate).

As can be seen, the desire of the Israeli property investors to invest in Poland not only depends upon the high cost of real estate in Israel (Charney 2003) and the low cost in Poland, but also the comparatively undesirable real estate markets in *third party countries*. As such, it highlights how restricting the focus to a binary paradigm of the host and home country is insufficient. In order to truly understand Caleb’s business, we must not only consider its embeddedness within the economy of the host county (Kloosterman & Rath 2001) and the home country (Chen & Tan 2009), but also the wider, international economic environment (Levitt & Schiller 2004; Wang 2013; Bagwell 2018).

Indeed, a multilateral appreciation of the uneven global economic environment would also explain why, unlike many migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group, several of those from periphery-states disagree that Polish clients ‘pay less’. For example, Pavlo (Ukraine) owns a construction company with a 100% Polish clientele and, compared to his home country, he finds the Polish market very lucrative. ‘Why not target Ukrainian clients?’ I ask. He explains to me that he can make more from Polish clients than Ukrainian. It seems then, that for Pavlo, opportunity structures in Wrocław are comparatively *more lucrative* than the equivalent opportunity structures in Ukraine. So, in other words, while Gabriel, Niall, and Vanko (mentioned previously) talk about how clients in core-states can ‘pay more’, Pavlo talks about how clients in periphery-states ‘pay less’. Through their perceptions, the presence of a multilateral, uneven, economic landscape begins to emerge. Moreover, it is a landscape which appears to be hierarchical, with core-states at the top, periphery-states at the bottom, and Wrocław somewhere in the middle. As such, it seems reminiscent of World-systems Theory (Wallerstein 1987; 2004) which divides the world up into three components of varying wealth and power: Core, periphery, and semi-periphery. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1,

throughout this thesis I have adopted Wallerstein's trichotomous terminology because, unlike the dichotomy of 'Global North' vs. 'Global South', it seems better able to account for the apparent multiple levels of wealth and power observed in this study.

So, within such an economic hierarchy, do the migrant entrepreneurs, who access these relatively more affluent target markets in core-states, have correspondingly higher revenues and profits? Such a clearcut structural explanation does not always hold true. By this I mean that migrant entrepreneurs targeting clients 'further up' the hierarchy do not always earn more and, likewise, those targeting clients 'further down' the hierarchy do not always earn less. For example, Veronica (Ukraine), despite relocating from Ukraine (with a lower GDP per capita), to Poland (with a higher GDP per capita), did not receive an automatic corresponding boost in revenues for her business. On the contrary, she tells me how her cafe is struggling and not attracting enough customers, subsequently leading to financial difficulties for her. She even admits that she sometimes regrets not staying in Ukraine.

Conversely, Mario (Italy), despite targeting a local opportunity structure in Poland (with a comparatively lower GDP per capita compared to Italy), did not see an automatic corresponding *decrease* in revenue. On the contrary, he runs a successful franchise of juice bars in Wroclaw (and other major Polish cities), now with 14 locations. As such, a top-down structural assumption (of businesses being more successful if they access core-state markets) is clearly not always manifested in terms of outcomes.

Nonetheless, this variation in outcomes does not take away from the strong evidence presented above for the presence of a macro level, uneven, international, economic environment. Importantly, such an environment, with lucrative markets concentrated in core-states, provides a mechanism for explaining *why* so many migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group *want to* (and do) access opportunity structures there. Indeed, this seems to mirror the findings of Harima's (2015: 85) study of Japanese migrant entrepreneurs in the Philippines, whereby they were driven by the 'favourable economic gap between developed and developing countries'. By way of explanation, economic disparity (on a macro level) appears to be creating business opportunities (on a meso level) which are then accessed by migrant entrepreneurs (on a micro level), pending their ability and motivation to do so. Furthermore, such economic disparity would also explain why so few of the migrant entrepreneurs were found to access relatively less lucrative opportunity structures in periphery-states.⁶⁰ But this raises an interesting question: If markets in core-states are so much more attractive than those in periphery-states, or even a semi-periphery-state like Poland, then why don't all migrant entrepreneurs -

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60 This would also explain why the 'ethnic entrepreneurs' in Rusinovic's (2008) study (within the Netherlands) were found to be disinterested in targeting markets within their home countries.

including migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states - target these more lucrative markets? This question seems to relate to the *how*. In other words, while the uneven economic landscape seems to provide a way to account for *why* migrant entrepreneurs would want to access opportunity structures in core-states, it does not explain *how* they do so.

5.3.2. The technological environment

So, then, how do migrant entrepreneurs access the comparatively lucrative markets in core-states? Here, I will argue that taking into consideration other layers of the macro environment, such as the *technological environment*, can help to shed some light on this. Specifically, I will propose that variations in the location of migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures can be better understood by situating them within the wider technological environment. In order to explore this, I will further break this down into two levels: 1. Migrant entrepreneurs' choice of industry sector and to what extent it lends itself to long-distance distribution; and; 2. How migrant entrepreneurs' industry sector itself might be representative of the broader, global level uneven technological environment.

1. Industry sector and long-distance distribution


First, in order for a business to service clients internationally, the product or service must lend itself to long-distance distribution. Some products and services seem to be more suitable than others. IT services, for example, are a prime example. Previously, we saw how Gabriel (France), Niall (Ireland), and Vanko (Ukraine), despite residing in Wrocław, provide IT services to clients in core-states. This trend of IT companies accessing international opportunity structures is echoed in an interview with Agnieszka, a local accountant, who (thanks to her English-language skills) does the bookkeeping for many non-Polish companies:

"Mostly, if someone has company here in Poland, they sell to Polish companies. There are also some specific companies [engaged in] IT that are using Polish employees and they sell abroad", (Agnieszka, representative of an accountancy firm in Wrocław).

So, is it just migrant entrepreneurs in the IT sector who are able to access international opportunity structures? In short, no. There are also examples of migrant entrepreneurs who are selling products and services unrelated to the IT sector, yet still service an international clientele. Caleb (Israel), for example, sells Polish real estate to investors in Israel, Jari (Finland) provides consultancy services to Finnish companies looking to invest in Poland, and Hans (Germany) runs a legal consultancy with clients situated predominantly in Germany. Clearly, then, this phenomenon of accessing international opportunity structures is not

restricted to the IT sector. However, as seen in Figure 5.2 below (showing the industrial sector and location of the opportunity structure of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states), it is a phenomenon which does, indeed, seem most prevalent in just a handful of sectors, namely ‘information and communication’, ‘professional activities’, and ‘financial services’.⁶¹ Conversely, industries such as ‘gastronomy’ and ‘education’ seem to correspond to more local (namely, Wrocław) opportunity structures.

Figure 5.2. The industry sector and location of opportunity structures of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states




Source: Data collated from the interviews with migrant entrepreneurs.

⁶¹ It should be noted that many migrant entrepreneurs from core-states were also situated within the ‘gastronomy’ and ‘education’ sectors. Both of these are sectors which (predominantly) target a local (Wrocław) clientele. So, by no means am I stating that ‘all migrant entrepreneurs from core-states access international opportunity structures’. The point here is simply that, based on those interviewed, migrants from core-states seem more likely to access international opportunity structures and certain industry sectors seem more conducive to this than others.

As such, the industry sector seems to be an important indicator of the likelihood of migrant entrepreneurs accessing international opportunity structures. Importantly, this would help to explain why those from periphery-states seem less likely to access such opportunities. Indeed, Figure 5.3 (the same as Figure 5.2 but with data for the migrants from the *periphery-states subject group*) shows how the majority of these migrant entrepreneurs are situated within secondary sectors, such as ‘construction’ and ‘gastronomy’, and correspondingly do *not* access international opportunity structures. Moreover, the only migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states who *are* servicing an international clientele are located exclusively in the ‘information & communication’ and ‘professional activities’ sectors. This finding is lent support by a Wang & Liu’s (2015: 15) study, which likewise found that migrant entrepreneurs situated in the ‘Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services’ sector were more likely to be engaged in transnational business.⁶²

Figure 5.3. The industry sector and location of opportunity structures of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states



Source: Data collated from the interviews with migrant entrepreneurs.

62 Even further support comes from Zolin & Schlosser’s (2013) study which found migrants with international businesses tend to have relatively high technological capabilities.

This phenomenon, of industry sector determining whether or not migrant entrepreneurs can access international opportunity structures, is perhaps most easily grasped when looking at industries which do *not* lend themselves well to long-distance, international distribution. A good example is hairdressing. Dale, a hairdresser from the UK, moved to Poland to be with his Polish partner and child. Once in Poland, he set up his own salon. However, after a few short months, he closed the salon and moved back to the UK. Upon asking him why, he answered:

“Because the British have more disposable income! The currency exchange rate is amazing at the moment. I live off my tips, and send all my wages to my girlfriend and baby [in Poland]”, (Dale, UK, hairdressing salon).

Of course, in the hairdressing industry, servicing clients remotely is not an option. But, if his UK client-base can pay more than his Polish client-base, then why did he not use the same strategy as Vanko, who flies his team of employees to clients in Northern Europe to install security devices? By this I mean why doesn't Dale remain in Poland, then fly to clients in the UK to cut their hair? The answer likely relates to the cost and frequency of service. While security systems only need to be installed occasionally, and are relatively expensive, haircuts are more frequent and cost less. This means that residing in Poland and flying to clients is not a cost-effective option. This characteristic, of being difficult (or cost-inefficient) to sell products or services internationally, can also help to explain why other businesses (such as the cafes and restaurants in the 'gastronomy' sector) did not access international opportunity structures.

2. Industry sector as an indicator of broader, international variation

We saw above how variation in migrant entrepreneurs' industry sector goes some way to accounting for variations in their ability to access international opportunity structures. Yet, it does not explain why, in the first place, the two groups seem to differ in this respect. Importantly, the variation of industry sector seems representative of the wider list of 970 migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw (provided by the Statistical Office of Wroclaw) with distinct divisions between nationality and sector. Why, then, do those from core-states seem more likely to create businesses in certain sectors, such as 'professional services' and 'information and communication'? Noticeably, these sectors can be considered 'high skilled' or characteristic of advanced economies. As such, this study lends support to other scholars who point out the correlation between technological development and migrants' ability to target opportunity structures further afield (Faist 2000; Zhou 2004; Anwar & Daniel 2017). Further, it poses the question of whether there might be a correlation between migrants' industry sector and the technological development of their location(s) of origin. Economies in core-states usually have

a higher percentage of people employed in high skilled tertiary sectors,⁶³ so, as a result, one might expect migrant entrepreneurs from core-states to be more likely to have acquired human capital in these industries. Subsequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that, upon migrating to Poland and starting their own business, they seem more likely to do so within the same industry. Mattheus and Hans, who are from Germany where approximately 71.6% of the German workforce is in the tertiary sector,⁶⁴ are a good example. They both: 1. were involved in this sector in Germany prior to emigrating; and 2. later set up businesses in this sector. By contrast, in Ukraine, only 45% of the workforce is in the tertiary sector,⁶⁵ which perhaps provides insight into why so few of the Ukrainian migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw seem to be involved in such sectors.

However, such a simplistic structuralist approach is problematic. First, as seen in Chapter 4, no significant variation of human capital between the two groups was observed. Indeed, both groups were found to be highly educated (with over 80% of them possessing university degrees) in similar industries (such as business, marketing, law, IT, etc). This, as a result, seems to detract from the argument that the migrants are somehow embodying broader, macro-level variations in technological development and economic structure of their locations of origin. It could, however, be emblematic of a kind of ‘under-employment’ (Hume 1973) among the periphery-states subject group. Despite having relatively high levels of education, the majority of them seem to have created businesses in sectors which do not necessarily require university level qualifications, such as ‘gastronomy’ and ‘construction’. Andriy (Ukraine), for example, has a law degree from Ukraine, which he tells me he cannot use in Poland, ‘because it’s a different system’, so, instead, he set up his own cafe and coffee roasting business. Hans (Germany), by contrast, despite not possessing a law degree, has set up his own legal consultancy firm, advising clients in Germany about the new laws surrounding GDPR and personal data protection. Such variation suggests that there is more going on here than differences in migrants’ human capital and industry sector alone.

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63 World Bank data, 2019: <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>

64 Statista.com, “Distribution: Distribution of employment by economic sector from 2008 to 2018”(2018) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/624297/employment-by-economic-sector-in-germany/>

65 OECD.org, “Compendium of Enterprise Statistics in Ukraine, 2018 <https://www.oecd.org/eurasia/competitiveness-programme/eastern-partners/Compendium-Enterprise-Statistics-Ukraine-2018-EN.pdf>

5.3.3. The socio-cultural environment

“So I went to them [in Florence, Italy], I kind of invented the partnership. So, look, I want to move to Poland. We’ve been working together before and I’m honest, so they can tell that they trusted me. I’m moving to Poland so I want to do this: I want to take all your technology related projects. You outsource them to me, same as you have been doing, but I create a team in Poland and you don’t have to pay them, I will take care of everything, I’ll take care of making sure they don’t take advantage of you, because I pay them, so they would be taking advantage of me. You trust me. You just talk to me and give me all your technology related projects. And they were happy...”, (Giovanni, Italy, IT company).

So far I have shown how an uneven economic environment, on a global scale, provides a strong financial motivation for migrant entrepreneurs to target lucrative markets in core-states, while certain industries seem more (or less) conducive to such long-distance distribution. Yet, as seen above, simply having the technological ability to target international markets does not mean that migrants do so. In other words, there appear to be other factors at play. One such factor, as I will suggest in this section, is the socio-cultural environment. Within the literature, it has often been found how social capital (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Flap et al. 2000; Light & Gold 2000; Lin & Tao 2012) and cultural capital (Masurel et al. 2002; 2004; Fregetto 2004) play an important role in shaping migrant entrepreneurship. Importantly, such capital only has value within how it interacts with larger social structures (Coleman 1988). As such, migrants’ embeddedness within such social structures needs to be taken into consideration (Granovetter 1985). Further, not only are migrants embedded within these structures, but so are their opportunity structures (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001). Nevertheless, once again, these observations have invariably taken place within a (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory context, usually restricting the focus to social structures within the host country only (Bagwell 2018). But in a reverse, core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory context, do migrant entrepreneurs, with high levels of social and cultural capital from core-states (as observed in Chapter 4), really restrict themselves to the socio-cultural environment of the (relatively less affluent) host country? Considering the uneven global economic landscape outlined previously, it seems unlikely, as it might be somewhat expected that they would capitalize upon their social and cultural capital from wealthy regions within core-states. Indeed, I will now highlight, below, how migrant entrepreneurs’ variation in social and cultural capital on a micro level, and its position within social structures on a macro level, seems to be playing an important role in migrant entrepreneurs’ varying ability to target international opportunity structures on a meso level.

Social capital as a bridge to opportunity structures

As seen previously with the example of Giovanni, he appears to be utilising social capital as a bridge to clients in his home country of Italy. On one hand, this seems to lend support to the mainstream literature which has often documented the positive role which social capital can play (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Light & Gold 2000; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). Yet, on the other hand, there are some important differences here. First, within the literature, migrants have often been found to cluster together, creating geographically proximate social networks often referred to as 'ethnic enclaves' (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Drori & Lerner 2002; Portes & Shafer 2006). But, the example of Giovanni, by contrast, shows how such social networks cannot be assumed to be spatially confined to the local (host country) environment and, instead, can clearly extend internationally (Chen & Tan 2009; Zolin & Schlosser 2013; Bagwell 2018; Solano 2020). This topic of ethnic enclaves will be further developed in Chapter 6. For now, however, it is interesting to question the dynamic between Giovanni's apparent international social network and the global, economic environment. Indeed, the ability of migrants such as Giovanni to utilise social capital as a bridge to lucrative markets in core-states would help to account for the higher rate of international entrepreneurship among the core-states subject group. After all, as seen in Chapter 4, these migrants were (unsurprisingly) found to have higher levels of social capital originating from core-states. For example, one of Giovanni's projects is being co-funded by an old friend of his from Italy. This, in itself, is a clear example of how social capital can serve as a lucrative bridge to core-country sources of revenue. But, importantly, there seems to be more going on here than just social capital alone, as I will now show below.

Cultural capital as a bridge to opportunity structures

"Being Irish, there is a higher level of trust. It's like working with people from the UK, you know what you're going to get. If you say you are going to do something, it gets done. There's a perception with the Ukraine and Belarus that you don't know if it's going to get done. I get offers now from Ukraine for apps and software development, but the first thing he says is certain certifications and that they have not done the basic due diligence to make sure we can work together. It's just getting an email from an Indian company - they just have a list of companies that they spam with emails. They don't tailor the message at all", (Seamus, Ireland, healthcare consultancy).

As can be seen above from the words of Seamus, even without prior social capital, migrants from certain countries seem to somehow qualify for a pre-approved elevated standing within society. For Seamus, being Irish is rewarded with a favourable perception, specifically, 'a higher level of trust'. Conversely, for those

from periphery-states, Seamus associates their cultural capital with a lower level of trustworthiness. Indeed, this can also be seen in the situation of Josh (UK). He has a team of Polish employees who are calling UK investors. In order to make them seem 'less Polish', he anglicises all of their names to make them more 'palatable' for the investors. So, for example, "if someone is called Paweł, we'll call them Paul", he tells me. Such an action seems to imply that having a name more typical of British culture would be more beneficial for business while, conversely, having a Polish name would be less beneficial. Does this mean that British or Irish cultural capital is objectively 'better' than Ukrainian or Belarusian capital? No, such capital, of course, when considered in isolation, does not have any inherently greater utility than the equivalent forms of capital from periphery-states. However, importantly, within the context of macro-level, cultural hierarchies, it appears to take on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988) whereby cultural capital from core-states can become 'transnationally acknowledged' and 'associated with high standards worldwide' (Weiss 2005: 722). This, it seems, grants migrants who possess such capital with a distinct advantage in terms of accessing opportunity structures in core-states. In other words, the bridging role of social capital (observed previously) seems to also be similarly observed in migrants' use of *cultural capital*.

Some migrant entrepreneurs have even found a niche whereby their business product is this very act of bridging core-state clients with supply from outside of core-states. Caleb (Israel) describes himself as 'the link who brings the Israeli investors'. He connects Israeli capital with the comparatively low-cost property market in Poland. By understanding both Polish and Israeli cultures, he acts as a bridge between not just people, but cultures and communication styles:

"Yes [being Israeli helps], first of all in terms of speed and sharpness, I think Israeli are much more to the point and direct and straight and expect faster responses. And generally more direct, less polite, less subtle...Polish people are more different in the way they are acting and communicate. And sometimes I have to bridge this gap. And generally you know, Israelis can be a little bit arrogant and quite aggressive and you need to make sure they don't overdo it in terms of the negotiation. You don't want to upset the other side", (Caleb, Israel, property investment).

This bridging role between cultures and markets seems very similar to the concept of Middleman Minority Theory (Bonacich 1973). This, of course, is nothing new, as middlemen, such as Jews in Europe, have been trading between cultures for centuries (ibid). Yet, there appears to be an important difference here, as migrants like Caleb, as opposed to being part of a wider cultural group within Poland, seem to be functioning not as ethnic groups but as individuals. As such, Caleb seems to be performing some kind of 'modern middleman role' (Terjesen & Elam 2009: 1093). In such a role, the importance of language skills is usually emphasized (Sui et al. 2015;

Solano 2020), as supported by Caleb's example above. Yet, for many of those from English-speaking countries (such as Niall, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), they access international opportunity structures, despite being monolingual. On the surface, the concept of 'monolingual middlemen' seems like an oxymoron. But in the context of an unequal socio-cultural international environment, whereby English has come to dominate international business (Light 2011), it seems that these migrants' singular language use is sufficient.

Additionally, incorporating the data from the periphery-states subject group lends support to the importance of positioning migrants' micro level social and cultural capital within macro level hierarchies. First of all, the low number of migrants accessing core-state opportunity structures seems to correlate to their lower levels of core-state social and cultural capital (as detailed in Chapter 4). Second, and perhaps more importantly, for the small number of migrants who were observed accessing markets in core-states, they invariably possess social and cultural capital from core-states. Let us, for example, recall the situation of Ivan (Ukraine), who learned fluent French (i.e. core-state cultural capital) and, subsequently, acquired several business contacts in France and Switzerland (i.e. core-states) to whom he is now able to sell his LED displays.

5.3.4. The politico-institutional environment

Above, we have seen how the economic, technological, and socio-economic layers of a macro-level environment appear to be playing a role in the variation of the location of the opportunity structures which migrant entrepreneurs access. This section now concerns itself with a fourth and final layer, namely, the politico-institutional environment. The important role played by governments and institutions, and how it affects migrant entrepreneurship, has been superbly documented by scholars in recent decades (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Engelen 2001; Welter & Smallbone 2011). As noted previously, Kloosterman and Rath (2001) described how the macro environment can be observed on three levels: 1. Neighbourhood; 2. Regional; 3. National. This typology has been extremely helpful in highlighting how there is spatial variation in the politico-institutional environment within nation-states. Yet, once again, such a typology fixes the host country nation-state as the largest unit of analysis and, subsequently, restricts the focus to the institutional environment within that country. But are migrant entrepreneurs and their opportunity structures not also affected by institutions and regulation *external to the host country*? In the case of Niall (Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), with his clients in 'Europe and US...Ireland, UK, Germany, and Scandies and France', it seems safe to assume that his business must, at least in part, be subject to the laws and regulations of those countries, as well as international trade and tariff agreements between those countries and Poland. Even with regard to his business operations within Poland, these operations are likely to be subject

to external, EU regulation. In other words, when it comes to analysing the role of the politico-institutional environment, I question, once again, if the host-country nation-state, as the largest unit of analysis, is large enough.

Indeed, this study unearthed some clear examples of regulation external to the host country affecting migrant entrepreneurs and their access to opportunity structures. This seems to happen in two ways: 1. directly; and 2. indirectly. With regard to the former, I will use the example of Jari (Finland), who is helping his client to sell eco-friendly plastic straws within the EU:

“[The] EU made this single use plastic product directive that some products are not allowed after 2021, like straws, they are not allowed to be plastic anymore, so we have a material that is fully compostable, and doesn’t create [any] percent microplastics...It’s easier to sell because there’s the legislation”, (Jari, Finland, sales consultancy).

Here, as a result of EU legislation (i.e. legislation stemming from beyond Poland’s borders), the market for such straws has greatly expanded. One would expect that, conversely, the market for single-use plastic straws has narrowed. As such, this is a clear example of how international legislation is *directly* affecting the opportunity structure both in Poland and across the EU. Of course, I should point out that the effect of international regulation is not restricted to *action*. The role of *inaction* is equally as important. For example, prior to the EU introducing the regulation about plastic straws, its inaction to pass such a law meant that there was a greater opportunity structure surrounding the sale of regular plastic straws.

Second, legislation from beyond Poland’s borders was also found to affect migrant entrepreneurs’ and their opportunity structures *indirectly*. This time, I turn to the example of Gabriel (France, quoted below) to illustrate this:

“The plan in the future, hopefully the next couple of years, would be to live half the year in Asia and half the year in Europe. And during the half year in Europe the biggest part of it could probably be Wrocław”, (Gabriel, France, online marketing).

Here, we can see how certain groups seem able to migrate across political borders with ease (Lundstrom 2017; Benson & O’Reilly 2018; Sklair 2012). Importantly, not only does Gabriel enjoy such international legal mobility, but so does his business. Despite residing in Poland, he has registered his company in Estonia, which he tells me offers a lower rate of taxation. As such, Gabriel appears to be demonstrating a kind of *legal geoarbitrage*, whereby within the international politico-institutional landscape he can cherry pick from an international buffet of regulative systems. This seems reminiscent of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ described by Sklair (2012), whereby a privileged group of people navigate easily across the global,

institutional landscape. As such, migrants such as Gabriel seem to ‘transcend the multiple institutional environments in which they are embedded’ (Terjesen & Elam 2009: 1093). Conversely, the migrants from periphery-states are *not* always privileged with such mobility, subsequently (at least on the surface) restricting them to the politico-institutional environment of the host country. Barriers to such mobility could help to explain why some groups seem more able to conduct business internationally, while others seem less able.

At this point, I would like to turn our attention to the migrant entrepreneurs who are only accessing opportunity structures within Poland. With such ‘local’ opportunity structures, it would be understandable to assume that they are only affected by the politico-institutional environment of the host country. But, upon closer inspection, they and their businesses might be more internationally embedded than we might assume. Let us, for example, consider the case of Andriy (Ukraine), who runs a high-end hipster cafe in the heart of Wroclaw. In my conversation with him, he tells me how he used to import his coffee supplies from Ukraine, however he has since switched to a supplier in Spain. I asked him why he changed and he tells me it is easier to buy supplies from within the EU, because there are less taxes and paperwork. So, right here, we see how Andriy’s business’ supply chain is affected by *international regulation* (namely, the EU’s Customs Union). His choice of coffee supplier is a clear example of how the institutional environment from beyond the host country (Poland) is affecting his business. Second, he tells me that 70% of his employees are Ukrainian. Once again, this is another example of elements of internationalism present within his business. These employees, as Ukrainians in Poland, are inherently international. They originate from an environment external to the host country and, by the same token, Andriy’s ability to hire them depends upon an *international agreement* between Poland and Ukraine allowing Ukrainians to work in Poland. Third, Andriy (like many others from the periphery-states subject group) would have actually preferred to have moved to a country ‘more West’, but the paperwork for legally migrating to Poland was much easier. In other words, his very presence in Poland is conditional upon national laws of other countries, such as Germany, which make migrating comparatively more difficult than migrating to Poland. Fourth, Andriy tells me how the tax rates in Wroclaw seem (compared to Ukraine) quite high. But, as seen in Chapter 3, migrants’ varying perception of whether the tax rates in Poland were low or high are seemingly dependent upon how they compare to the tax rates of their home country. Taken altogether, these points demonstrate how, even for migrant entrepreneurs who appear to be operating solely within the politico-institutional environment of the host country, they might in fact be more internationally embedded than we assume.

5.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have shown how studying 'up' within the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship in Wrocław, reveals how we cannot assume that migrant entrepreneurs access opportunity structures exclusively within the host country only. On the contrary, 51% of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, as well as a minority (17%) of those from periphery-states, were found to be accessing *international opportunity structures*. Conversely, the large majority of those from periphery-states (79%) were found to be accessing *local* opportunity structures within the host country.

Subsequently, dividing the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship into three (micro, meso, and macro) levels (Kloosterman 2010), I have attempted to account for this variation. Specifically, I have explored how variations in migrant entrepreneurs' motivations and access to resources (on a micro level), when positioned within an international environment (on a macro level), can lead to variation in the business opportunities which they act upon (on a meso level). In order to simplify the analysis, I further subdivided this macro level environment into four separate levels (economic, technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional). First, on an economic level, global inequalities in the spatial distribution of wealth seem to have resulted in the ability of clients in core-states to 'pay more', whereas clients in periphery-states 'pay less'. This uneven economic environment, I argued, provides a rationale for why so many of the migrant entrepreneurs from core-state targeted such markets, while almost no one (from either group) was found to be selling goods or services to markets in periphery-states. Yet, although it provides a way to explain *why* they target markets in core-states, it does not explain *how* they do so, which, I proposed, is where the other levels of the macro environment come into play.

Indeed, turning to the second (technological) macro level, I showed how certain industries lend themselves better to international distribution, allowing migrants within such industries to service clientele in core-states while physically residing in Poland. Migrants from the core-states subject group were shown to be more commonly located in these industries, which provides a way to explain why they seem more able to access these markets. Further, I postulated that this variation in migrants' industry sector might be indicative of broader, macro level differences in economic structure and technological development in migrants' countries of origin.


Third, on a socio-cultural level, I showed how social and cultural capital from countries, when positioned within an uneven, socio-cultural hierarchy stemming from the hegemony of core-states (Weiss 2005), appears to take on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988), granting its holders with distinct advantages, namely, the ability to bridge their businesses to comparatively lucrative markets in core-states. As seen in Chapter 4, most migrant entrepreneurs from core-states were found to possess more core-state cultural and social capital than those

from periphery-states. As such, this variation of social and cultural capital (on a micro level), which acquires its value from its embeddedness within an unequal, international, socio-cultural environment (on a macro level), subsequently provides a way to account for the spatial variation in the opportunity structures they access (on a meso level).

Fourth, and finally, I showed how migrants' opportunity structures are not only embedded within the politico-institutional environment of the host country (Kloosterman & Rath (2001), but also within a wider, international, institutional environment. This environment seems capable of influencing migrants' businesses in two ways. First, international laws themselves can affect opportunity structures *directly*, for example EU regulation which expands or restricts opportunity structures. Second, international regulation can affect migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures *indirectly*. For example, within the uneven, international, politico-institutional landscape, migrant entrepreneurs from core-states enjoy relatively free movement, allowing many of them to consciously navigate around this international politico-institutional landscape, selecting the perceived best possible options from this international buffet of regulatory systems. Conversely, those from periphery-states seem more likely to face restrictions, reducing their ability to travel to countries in core-states and conduct business internationally. Further, even in the case of migrants accessing opportunity structures within the host country, I showed how their businesses might be more internationally embedded than we assume, with migrants' business practices apparently being indirectly influenced in a multitude of ways by regulation external to Poland. This, I argued, shows that national regulation cannot be viewed in isolation, but instead must be situated within a broader, international, politico-institutional landscape.

In conclusion, I have shown how, in order to understand migrants' motivation and ability (on a micro level) to access international opportunity structures (on a meso level), we must understand how both are embedded, and interact with, not just the host country environment, but the wider, international environment (on a macro level). Further, even migrants who are accessing opportunity structures within the borders of the host country are still, I have argued, embedded within this wider, global environment. Despite other authors acknowledging the role played by factors beyond the host country (Chen & Tan 2009; Ren & Liu 2015; Solano 2020; Bagwell 2018), importantly, they have generally restricted this role to the binary paradigm of the host country and home country. In this chapter, however, I have shown how third party countries can often play a role. This, I argue once again, must force the field of migrant entrepreneurship to move beyond using the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis and extend it even beyond the binary paradigm of host and home countries to include the wider, *global* environment.

6.



CHAPTER 6

Ethnic enclaves in reverse?

"All [my employees are] Polish...So I would program, but if I don't want to, or I have too much stuff, I would outsource it to [Polish programmers]. Italians...if they know they can charge a hundred for something, they'll always try to sell it for 200...[whereas] I felt that Polish programmers... would give me a fair price...My clients are Italian, but I try to do everything, as much as I can, in Poland. Which includes having collaborators in Poland, paying taxes here, having the company here", (Giovanni, Italy, IT company).

6.1. Introduction

This is the second chapter looking at how migrant entrepreneurs, their motivations, and their access to resources interact with the environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider, international context. While Chapter 5 looked at opportunity structures, this chapter examines migrants' ethnic division of labour. Within the literature, it has often been found that migrant entrepreneurs employ co-ethnic employees (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Werbner 2001; Rametse et al. 2018). This reliance upon co-ethnic labour is one of the central premises around which Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006) was formed. Indeed, within a geographically concentrated clustering of immigrants, 'enclave entrepreneurs can cheapen labor costs...by the exploitation of the more vulnerable immigrant labor force' (Wilson & Portes 1980: 315). Examples of such enclaves include Cubans in Miami (ibid), Koreans in Los Angeles (Min & Bozorgmehr 2000), and Arabic communities in Israel (Drori & Lerner 2002). Further, ethnic enclaves have often been described as being at the 'lower end' of host country societies, whereby migrant entrepreneurs' networks of underprivileged co-ethnic labour not only enables them to offer cheaper prices (ibid), but also can hold back business development (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Flat et al. 2000) and, subsequently, 'breaking out' from these enclaves is invariably seen as 'progress' (Ram & Hillin 1994; Engelen 2001; Drori & Lerner 2002; Ndofo & Priem 2011; Arrighetti et al. 2014). In other words, such studies follow a long tradition of social scientists' 'downward facing' concentration upon 'the poor, the ethnic groups' (Nader 1972:5). But what happens when we begin to study 'up'? Do migrant entrepreneurs, in an 'upside down', core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory context also rely upon co-ethnic labour? Is it also cheap and plentiful? And if not, then how do they meet their labour needs? And how does this compare with those in this study from periphery-states?

Indeed, below I will compare how the migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states vary in their ethnic division of labour. I will then, subsequently, provide insight into any variations encountered. In order to organize the analysis, I will once again divide the environment up into three layers: micro, meso, and macro (Kloosterman 2010). In doing so, I will pay close attention to how the macro level environment interacts with variations in the migrant entrepreneurs' access

to resources (and motivations) on a micro level, resulting in variations in their ethnic division of labour on a meso level. As with Chapter 5, I further subdivide the macro level environment into four layers: 1. Politico-institutional; 2. Economic; 3. Socio-cultural; and 4. Technological. I begin first, however, with the meso level and, specifically, the ethnic division of labour of migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group.

6.2. The ethnic division of labour of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states

As mentioned in the introduction, it has been found that migrant entrepreneurs and their businesses often make use of a plentiful supply of cheap, co-ethnic labour (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Kloosterman et al. 1998). However, for those from core-states, in the semi-periphery environment of Wroclaw, it seems to be quite a different story. Indeed, those who decided to hire employees⁶⁶ were found more likely to hire *native, Polish labour* and less likely to hire co-ethnic labour. As shown in Table 6.1 below, 20 (49%) of them employ a (predominantly) Polish workforce, while only 15 (12%) employ (predominantly) co-ethnic labour.

Table 6.1. The ethnic division of labour: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

	No employees	Employs mainly Polish	Employs co-ethnic	Employs mainly other nationals
Migrants from core-states	13 (32%)	20 (49%)	5 (12%)	3 (7%)
Migrants from periphery-states	12 (50%)	1 (4%)	11 (46%)	0 (0%)

Source: Data collated from the qualitative interviews with the migrant entrepreneurs in this study⁶⁷.

One of these entrepreneurs is Giovanni (Italy, quoted at the beginning of this chapter). As seen, he made the conscious decision to employ native, Polish programmers and not co-ethnic Italian programmers. This, and the reasons underlying it, present a number of problems for Ethnic Enclave Theory. I will, now,

66 ‘Employment’ here includes both official employment and unofficial employment, as well as work contracts of a temporary nature.

67 Percentages have been rounded up or down to the nearest whole number, which means that the total percentages when amalgamated might amount to slightly over or under 100%.

list these problems below. At this point, I would like to point out that my goal here is to simply describe what is happening (among both groups), before later in this chapter going into depth to explain and understand the variations observed.

Co-ethnic (core-state) labour as more expensive

First, Giovanni states that Polish programmers are less likely to overcharge him. In other words, their labour is cheaper. This theme, that Polish labour is more affordable than co-ethnic (core-state) labour, is a recurring one among many of the other migrant entrepreneurs from core-states. It is perhaps most noticeable not when these entrepreneurs are hiring cheap, Polish labour, but rather, when they need to hire (comparatively expensive) co-ethnic labour. This was the case for Roberto (also from Italy), who is running his own Italian restaurant in Wrocław:

“Our [Italian] chef is very expensive because we have to give him money with Euro. But if you want to have a real Italian place, you have to pay this price...[Otherwise] you are a random place without any soul, without any place. The chef will prepare carbonara with smietana,⁶⁸ a typical and original Italian recipe with the style of German or Polish people. We are integralist, fundamentalist. Never smietana in the carbonara, or you will go to fuck off!”, (Roberto, Italy, Italian restaurant).

As can be seen, Roberto is having to pay *above average wages* to retain an Italian chef. This is perceived as a necessary expense to provide his customers with authentic Italian food. Importantly, this seems to be in direct contradiction to one of the basic assumptions of Ethnic Enclave Theory, namely that co-ethnic labour is more affordable than mainstream native labour (Wilson & Portes 1980; Kloosterman et al. 1998). Moreover, it contradicts the wider narrative of how migrants supposedly ‘steal’ the jobs of native employees by under-cutting their wages. On the contrary, in the case of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states in the context of Wrocław, it seems to be back-to-front, with these migrants commanding higher wages than the mainstream, native workforce. Indeed, in the words of another migrant from the core-state subject group: ‘people from the West expect higher salaries’.

Furthermore, the relatively affordable Polish labour seems part of a greater trend of expenses in general being lower in Poland. As seen in Chapter 3, for many of those from core-states, the cost of running a business and living in Wrocław are perceived to be ‘cheaper’. This seems to further undermine not only the ethnic enclave as a source of cheap labour, but also a source of cheap products (Drori & Lerner 2002). Indeed, here it seems to be flipped, with core-state migrant labour and their businesses offering the opposite, namely, comparatively expensive labour

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68 The Polish word for sour cream. The point here is that it is a Polish - and not Italian - ingredient.

and products. As such, it begins to paint a picture of ethnic enclaves in reverse. In doing so, it reveals how Ethnic Enclave Theory was formulated in 'downward' facing contexts and why, as a result, it struggles to account for more privileged forms of migration from core-states.

Co-ethnic (core-state) labour as NOT plentiful

Second, an ethnic enclave, with its concentration of co-ethnic labour, inherently assumes such labour to be plentiful. Yet, in the case of core-state migrant entrepreneurs in Wrocław, such supplies of co-ethnic labour are very limited. As seen in Chapter 2, the number of core-state migrants is much lower than that of those from periphery-states. This lack of co-ethnic labour provides an additional reason why migrants from core-states seem less likely to employ such labour. With co-ethnic labour in short supply, they seem to turn instead to a plentiful supply of native, *Polish* labour. This idea of Polish labour being selected for its plentiful supply, and not simply its affordability, was also a recurring theme. Igor (Finland), who runs a consultancy helping Finnish companies to conduct business in Poland, explains:

"In the IT world it is not anymore near-sourcing. The IT guys in Poland, they cost 3,6,7 thousand [Euro / month]. So it's not anymore an issue of cost. It's an issue of getting people....one company here in Poznan they started 2 years ago, they had 10 people in the beginning and now they have 90. And they don't come here for cheap labour, they come here to grow", (Igor, Finland, business consultancy).

Igor is one of several migrant entrepreneurs from the core-state subject group (as well as representatives from third party organizations, such as the American Chamber of Commerce) who point out the growing cost of labour in Poland which has led to it becoming less of a primary factor in the hiring of Polish labour. Instead, as Igor points out, for many of them it is now more about the *availability* of labour.

Co-ethnic (core-state) network not spatially confined

Third, ethnic enclaves, such as the Cubans in Miami studied by Wilson & Portes (1980), are usually presented in the context of being spatially confined, whereby their businesses rely on resources in the immediate environment (Drori & Lerner 2002). While this has also been observed among migrants from core-states, such as the study of British migrants in beachside regions in Spain (Blackwood & Mowl 2000; Stone & Stubbs 2007), the Algarve in Portugal (Torkington 2010), and North Americans in South America (Dixon et al. 2006; Hayes 2015), the findings of this study differ considerably. First, as noted above, for the migrants from the core-states subject group, the supply of co-ethnic migrants is somewhat limited. This means that if an ethnic enclave exists, it is extremely small. Perhaps as a result of this, Giovanni's social network seems to be less co-ethnic but instead more

multinational. He regularly attends international meetups at local bars in Wroclaw,⁶⁹ which seems more in line with the multinational migrant communities observed in Singapore (Beaverstock 2002) whereby core-state migrants are united not by a shared nationality, but instead by their shared transnational core-state class (Weiss 2005).

Second, Giovanni's situation presents a further problem concerning the spatial assumption of ethnic enclaves. Enclaves have been found to provide migrant entrepreneurs not just with a pool of co-ethnic labour, but also co-ethnic *markets* (Chaganti and Greene 2002). But, as seen in Chapter 5, the opportunity structure is not always confined to the local, ethnic enclave. Giovanni, for example, despite making use of local labour, services clients internationally in Italy. Yet, despite Giovanni's clientele not being spatially proximate, they are still co-ethnic. This in itself seems to lend support to other scholars who emphasise how ethnic networks are not necessarily geographically concentrated (Toussaint-Comeau 2008) and can extend internationally (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Weiss 2005; Chen & Tan 2009; Valenzuela-Garcia 2018). It also lends support to the differentiation between spatially confined ethnic enclaves and broader, geographically unconfined ethnic economies (Light et al. 1994).

Other reasons

At this point, I would like to make it clear that what I have described so far are the overall *trends* of the core-states subject group. There were, however, a small number of migrants from this group whose reasons for hiring native, Polish labour were not necessarily rooted in its plentiful supply nor affordability. One such example is Anna, who employs Polish staff at her arts and crafts store:

"My employees are Polish. They do speak English. I have had employees in the past who did not speak English and that was not a good strategy. It's no problem for me to work with them, but we do have enough English-speaking clients that you need to know enough English to be able to explain things and answer questions and not panic and this is essential. And I have a hard time finding employees who speak both Polish and English and who are interested in art. Because I'm finding that a lot of the people who go to the art school here are either Polish who do art who don't really speak English, or foreigners who do art who don't speak any Polish. So it has not been as easy to find bilingual [staff] as I expected",
(Anna, USA, arts & craft store).

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69 For example, the 'Tower of Babel' meet-ups, attended by approximately 50 migrants every week at a local bar in the centre of Wroclaw.

As can be seen, Anna's company is simultaneously servicing Polish and non-Polish clients, which is why both English and Polish language skills are required. As such, her reasons for hiring native, Polish labour seem less about Polish labour being affordable and plentiful and, instead, more about finding staff with the language skills necessary to access both an international and Polish clientele.

6.3. The ethnic division of labour of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states

"They [my employees] are all Ukrainian. I am not against employing Polish, but they are not willing to work for the wages I pay. Plus it's just easier hiring from the people I know who are mainly Ukrainian" (Bogdan, Ukraine, hairdressing salon).

Let us now switch focus to the migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group. Here I ask if they are also more likely to employ native, Polish labour. The answer, in short, is no. Unlike the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group, the majority of them (who have employees) seem instead to opt for *co-ethnic* (periphery-state) labour. As seen previously in Table 6.1, 11 (46%) of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group hire predominantly co-ethnic employees, whereas only 1 (4%) hire a predominantly Polish workforce. Bogdan (Ukraine, quoted above) is representative of this broader trend of those hiring co-ethnic labour. Using Bogdan as an example, I will now show, below, how his ethnic division of labour compares to that of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group. Once again, my goal here is to simply describe what is happening, leaving deeper analysis of any variations encountered for later in this chapter.

Co-ethnic labour as more affordable (and easier to exploit)

As can be seen from Bogdan's words above, it seems that his co-ethnic, Ukrainian employees are more willing to work for the (apparently low) wages he pays. As such, in contrast to those from core-states, Bogdan's behaviour seems to be more in line with the labour practices described in the mainstream literature, whereby co-ethnic migrants can provide a source of more affordable labour (Wilson & Portes 1980; Kloosterman et al. 1998). It is a similar story for Pavlo (also from Ukraine), who runs a small construction firm and also employs co-ethnic Ukrainians. Like Bogdan, he does this because he can pay them less. This is possible, he tells me, because they are also Ukrainian, so he can trust them, which means he can pay them under-the-table, subsequently avoiding taxes. This lends support to other scholars' findings of higher levels of trust within ethnic groups sharing the same language and culture (Aaltonen & Akola 2018; Vershinina & Rogers 2020) and how

it can be exploited (see Rath 2000: 6) to add an extra level of economic concession upon an already comparatively affordable source of labour.

A plentiful supply of co-ethnic labour

For Bogdan, in addition to co-ethnic Ukrainian labour being more affordable, it seems that it is also 'easier' for him to access. He states that 'it's just easier to hire from the people I know', suggesting that he has a plentiful supply of co-ethnic labour within his social network. This theme, of hiring co-ethnic labour from within one's own social network, was also recurring. Danilo (also from Ukraine) employs four people at his construction company, all of whom are Ukrainians 'from friends and...family'. Danilo's and Bogdan's situations seem understandable within a wider perspective, whereby they are two of thousands of Ukrainian migrants who have moved to Wrocław in recent years. As such, a plentiful supply of co-ethnic labour is hardly surprising and seems in line with other studies which have found high rates of co-ethnic employment within larger, co-ethnic migrant groups (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Flap et al. 2000). This seems in direct contrast to those from core-states who, as noted previously, seem to be part of much smaller migrant groups, resulting in their supply of co-ethnic labour, at least on a local level, being far less plentiful.

Co-ethnic (periphery-state) labour as spatially restricted?

Returning once again to the example of Bogdan, he is employing co-ethnic, Ukrainian labour at his barber shop. In other words, it is spatially confined to Wrocław. As such, it seems to conform with the conventional idea of ethnic enclaves, similar to that described by Wilson & Potes (1980) whereby entrepreneurs source their labour from a plentiful supply of geographically proximate, affordable, co-ethnic labour. However, for a small number of migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group, this access to cheap, co-ethnic labour is not always geographically proximate. For example, for Vanko (Ukraine), it looks quite different:

"My developers are in the Ukraine, it's cheaper. So business development and accounting I have here, but developers I have in the Ukraine", (Vanko, Ukraine, IT company).

As can be seen, Vanko is hiring developers in Ukraine, well beyond the local environment of Wrocław and even Poland. On the surface, this seems to mirror the situation of many of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group, whereby their co-ethnic networks are not necessarily restricted to the home country (Saxenian 2002; 1999; Weiss 2005; Toussaint-Comeau 2008; Chen & Tan 2009). Yet, on closer inspection, the use of such networks seems to be somewhat different. While those from core-states were found to be using their networks to access *demand*, Vanko appears to be using his to help with *supply*. Clearly then,

there seems to be more going on here. Further explanation of this will follow later in this chapter.

Other reasons

As with the migrants from the core-states subject group, there were of course a variety of other (albeit less common) reasons underlying their hiring practices. Indeed, for Olek (Ukraine), despite also following the trend of hiring co-ethnic (Ukrainian) labour, his reasons for doing so seem less about its affordability and availability and more about linguistic factors:

“We did a renovation, the building contractors were also from Ukraine... Everything was through [Ukrainian] friends, because it’s difficult without Polish...”, (Olek, Ukraine, cafe and e-scooter recharging firm).

Here, for Olek, hiring co-ethnic building contractors was more about the ability to communicate with them in Ukrainian (and Russian). At first sight, this lends support to other studies which have highlighted how a shared language and culture increases the chance of hiring co-ethnic labour (Clark & Drinkwater 2000). Yet, interestingly, as my conversation with Olek continued, it became clear that there was perhaps an even more pragmatic reason for hiring co-ethnic Ukrainians:

“[I] sometimes [hire] Polish, but the problem is they can then just open their own company. So in general I employ Ukrainians. They can do it after their other jobs because it can be done outside of regular work hours. It’s very important for them to earn more money and return to Ukraine with more money”, (Olek, Ukraine, e-scooter recharging).

In other words, he tries to avoid hiring Polish employees as a way of reducing the risk of them being disloyal to him and competing against him. Instead, he hires Ukrainians on work-visas without Polish passports or permanent residency cards. So, in this example, Olek’s trust of co-ethnic labour is apparently not based upon a shared language and culture, as highlighted in other studies (Aaltonen & Akola 2018), but rather in the lack of their legal capacity to formally compete against him. Regardless, the point here is that migrants from the periphery-states subject group are, at times, motivated to hire co-ethnic labour for reasons other than its plentiful supply and relative affordability.

Exceptions

Despite the majority of those from the periphery-states subject group predominantly hiring co-ethnic labour, there were also several exceptions, whereby a small number of them were found to be employing native, *Polish* labour. Petro (Ukraine) is one of these exceptions. He has a construction company with 30 employees, five of whom

are Polish. These five employees work in the office and it is their job to communicate with Polish clients, whereas the other 25 employees are all Ukrainian and work on the construction site. Petro explained to me that these Polish office employees are more expensive than his Ukrainian construction workers, but that he needs to employ them because he needs their language skills to interact with the Polish clientele. In this sense, his company presents a Polish 'face' to the predominantly Polish clientele, while engaging co-ethnic labour on the supply side. On first impressions, this seems to mirror the situation of Anna (outlined previously) who hires Polish employees for their ability to communicate with her predominantly Polish-speaking clientele. And, collectively, these examples lend support to other studies which have highlighted the vital role of host country language skills in accessing host country markets (L. Altinay & E. Altinay 2008; Arrighetti et al. 2014). But, upon closer examination, there remains a difference between the situations of Anna and Petro. Crucially, for Petro, hiring Polish labour appears to be a more expensive endeavour (relative to the cost of co-ethnic labour), whereas for Anna (and many of the other migrants entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group), hiring Polish labour seems to be the exact opposite, namely, *less expensive*.

6.4. Insight into the variation

Above I have outlined distinct meso level variations between the two subject groups in terms of their ethnic division of labour. While those from periphery-states seem are likely to conform with Ethnic Enclave Theory and hire co-ethnic labour, those from core-states usually buck this trend and, instead, are more likely to hire native, Polish labour. Now, in this section, my goal is to account for such variation. Specifically, I will show how these variations are the result of an uneven, *macro level* environment and how it interacts with migrant entrepreneurs' and their variation in micro level resources. In order to make such an analysis more manageable, I will once again divide this macro level environment up into four layers: 1. Politico-institutional; 2. Economic; 3. Socio-cultural; and 4. Technological.

6.4.1. The politico-institutional environment

As seen in Chapter 5, the political-institutional environment plays a role in shaping migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures. Here, I will show how it also seems to play a role in shaping their hiring practices. In support of Kloosterman & Rath (2001), I will show how this happens on both a regional and national level. Yet, once again, I will also show how it likewise plays a key role on an *international* level.

Regional

The increase in immigration to Wrocław in recent years, combined with a lack of capacity of the local government to process the paperwork of all the new arrivals, has led to Wrocław having reportedly the longest waiting times in Europe⁷⁰ with an average of 328 days in 2018.⁷¹ As a result of this, the supply of labour is, in effect, being limited through the action (or inaction) of the local government, subsequently causing problems not only among migrant entrepreneurs seeking to employ non-EU labour, but also Polish business owners in general.⁷² Despite this, as seen previously, many migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states, in particular, Ukraine, continue to employ co-ethnic labour, so it seems that the long waiting times do not block labour altogether, but simply slow down the time it takes to formally access it. Although this demonstrates how the politico-institutional environment can affect migrant entrepreneurs' hiring practices on a local level, it does not, however, provide any insight into the variations between the two groups of migrant entrepreneurs.

National

I turn now, then, to the role of regulation on a national level. Andriy (Ukraine) explains to me below why he predominantly hires Ukrainian students:

“70% [of employees are] from Ukraine, but the people from Ukraine usually study here and can work and it's possible to work here. But when they finish their academy, they can't work and must go home”, (Andriy, Ukraine, cafe).

Andriy is referring to a national law which allows non-EU residents to work if they have a student visa. This, combined with the lengthy wait time and cost of applying for regular work permits, makes students a relatively more attractive source of labour. So, in other words, it seems that national laws reduce his access to some types of co-ethnic labour (non-student Ukrainians), but not others (Ukrainians with student visas).

For Olek (mentioned further above), these restrictions, regarding who can and cannot open a business, have had a positive effect, essentially reducing potential competition. As seen previously, he predominantly hires Ukrainian nationals as

70 'FOREIGNERS IN LOWER SILESIA WAIT THE LONGEST FOR RESIDENCE PERMIT': <https://wroclawuncut.com/2019/07/02/foreigners-in-lower-silesia-wait-the-longest-for-residence-permits/>

71 'REPORT CONFIRMS POLISH AUTHORITIES CAN'T COPE WITH IMMIGRATION INFLUX': <https://wroclawuncut.com/2019/08/20/report-confirms-polish-authorities-cant-cope-with-immigration-influx/>

72 'BUSINESSMAN BLOCKS URZĄD PARKING IN PROTEST OVER PAPERWORK DELAYS': <https://wroclawuncut.com/2019/11/14/businessman-blocks-urzed-delays/>

a way of increasing employee loyalty. Unlike Polish employees, these Ukrainian employees (on work visas) cannot legally open a sole proprietorship to compete against him. This, perhaps, offers a way to account for the high incidence of co-ethnic employment among Ukrainians. That being said, this was seldom mentioned by other migrant entrepreneurs, so it does not seem to be a common reason. Further, despite being unable to open sole proprietorships, his employees would still legally be entitled to open an LLC, so it would suggest that this is not a full-proof strategy.

International

Here, I will once again argue that an extra layer of the politico-institutional environment, namely an *international* level, also plays a key - albeit indirect - role in shaping migrant entrepreneurs' hiring practices. As seen in Chapter 3, for many of those from periphery-states, Wroclaw was not at the top of their list in terms of destination countries. As such, their choice of Poland depends upon three key components within the international politico-institutional environment. First, regulation within their country of origin must allow them to legally emigrate. Second, regulation within Poland must allow them to immigrate (or, at least, reside in Poland). Third, regulation of their first choice countries (e.g. Germany) must provide sufficient legal barriers to deter them to the extent that they choose Poland instead. These factors, when combined with the uneven international *economic* environment (which provides an economic incentive for those in impoverished locations to relocate to more affluent locations), provide the backdrop against which we have seen high levels of migration from periphery-states (notably, Ukraine) to Wroclaw and Poland in general. Subsequently, it seems fair to say that the international layer of the politico-institutional environment has played a key role in contributing to the plentiful supply of Ukrainian labour within Wroclaw. It still does not, however, explain why the Ukrainian migrant entrepreneurs seem more likely than their core-state counterparts to make use of this labour supply. Subsequently, in search of answers, I now turn to other layers of the global environment.

6.4.2. The economic environment

As seen previously, many of the migrant entrepreneurs from core-states spoke of how much 'cheaper' Wroclaw is in comparison to their (core-state) country of origin. Importantly, it seems that these migrant entrepreneurs are not the only ones who appreciate the relatively low-cost environment of Wroclaw. They, I propose, might just be micro-level examples of a macro-level trend of core-state companies outsourcing labour and production to Wroclaw. Indeed, in the previous chapter we saw this confirmed by a representative of the City of Wroclaw who explained how 'more than 120,000 jobs were created thanks to these investors'. It seems that the availability of affordable labour, combined with other factors (such as

Poland's membership of the EU and its geographical proximity to Western Europe) have contributed to Wrocław becoming 'the heart of outsourcing' (Niall, Ireland, IT support) for many Western multinational corporations. This is further supported by a range of third party data. In a report by KPMG,⁷³ it was found that American companies alone have created as many as 220,000 jobs in Poland with investments of 130 billion PLN in the first quarter of 2018. As such, the comparatively affordable (Polish) labour supply provides a mechanism to explain why the majority of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states predominantly hire native, Polish labour.

It seems, however, that Wrocław, despite having lower costs than core-states, is not the location of the lowest costs. As seen previously, several migrant entrepreneurs are accessing even 'cheaper' sources of labour located in periphery-states, such as Vanko (Ukraine) who is employing Ukrainians physically located in Ukraine.⁷⁴ For Vanko, his main motivation in hiring these employees is the relatively lower wages compared to the wages of equivalent labour in Wrocław. Conversely, it was seldom observed that migrant entrepreneurs employed (the relatively more expensive) labour located in core-states.⁷⁵ At this point, we begin to see the beginnings of a labour hierarchy, with labour in core-states at the top of this hierarchy, labour in periphery-states at the bottom, and labour in Wrocław (within the semi-periphery-state of Poland) being somewhere in between.

Indeed, this variation of the cost of labour across *space* is supported by the situation of Niall (Ireland) who runs his own IT company in Wrocław (and Cracow), employing about 200 people. He explains to me how, despite 70% of his labour being Polish, he also recruits employees from core-states and relocates them to Wrocław:

"We headhunt people from the West, yes they make less than London, but the costs are much less in Poland, so we can offer them a great life",
(Niall, Ireland, IT support).

So, in this example, the same labour, when present in core-states, is more expensive, yet, after being relocated to Wrocław, becomes less expensive. In other words, *the cost of the exact same labour can vary across space*.⁷⁶

But that is not all. Importantly, as seen earlier in this section, the cost of labour seems to vary not only according to its geographical location, but also according to its geographical origins. Let us remember, for example, how Roberto has to pay

73 'American investments in Poland', KPMG 2018.


74 There was also one example of a migrant entrepreneur from the core-states subject group who was found to utilise periphery-state labour situated within a periphery-state. This was Bruce (Australia) who was employing an online assistant in the Philippines.

75 This was only observed in one case, which was Hans who employed a German employee (a qualified lawyer) physically located in Germany.

76 Later in this chapter I will also provide evidence for how it can vary across time.

higher wages for his Italian chef and, conversely, how Bogdan’s employees are all Ukrainian because, according to him, they are more affordable. This, in effect, adds additional layers to the labour hierarchy, whereby the price of labour varies not only according to its location, but also its geographic origin. An outline of this hierarchy is shown in Figure 6.1.⁷⁷

Figure 6.1. Variation in the cost of labour according to the geographical origin and location of the labour



Source: My own illustration based upon trends which emerged from the qualitative interviews with migrant entrepreneurs and representatives of third party organizations.

When looking at this hierarchy, an important question arises: If labour from periphery-states is more affordable, then why don’t more migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group employ this demographic? That is to say, if the goal of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states is to reduce labour costs by relocating production to Wroclaw, then why don’t they go ‘further down the labour hierarchy’ and hire periphery-state migrant labour in Wroclaw, or further still, hire periphery-state labour within periphery-states? Clearly, then, there are other factors at play besides purely economic ones. Indeed, I now turn to another layer of the macro environment, namely, the socio-cultural layer.

77 At this point, I would like to point out that this hierarchy is non-static and can change over time. Earlier we saw how Igor (Finland) stated that ‘in the IT world, it is not anymore near-sourcing.’ His use of the word ‘anymore’ here implies that that was not always the case. Indeed, the cost of labour in Poland has increased considerably since it joined the EU. As such, this highlights how the economic environment not only varies across space, but also across time.

6.4.3. The socio-cultural environment

The socio-cultural environment, I will now argue, plays a role in two key ways: 1. It contributes to uneven wages; and 2. It provides the backdrop against which social and cultural capital can perform a bridging role to sources of labour. Starting with the first, I already showed in the first half of this chapter how migrant entrepreneurs are not only embedded within local socio-cultural networks (such as spatially confined ethnic enclaves), but also within a wider, international socio-cultural environment. This environment, as noted in Chapter 5, is far from being 'flat', but instead seems somewhat hierarchical with core-state cultures positioned toward the top of this apparent cultural hierarchy. The labour originating from these 'top level' cultures is, apparently, worth more. I have already mentioned the example of Roberto and his Italian chef, but this pattern was also repeated in other sectors, for example how Walter (UK) pays his teachers from the UK more than his teachers from Poland:

"I mean that's dictated by the fact that the companies expect to pay less for Polish teachers [of the English language]. So, it's not that we will set the prices. The prices are kind of...dictated by the market, so I don't really agree with it necessarily, but at the same time there is some logic to it, because the British people have to come a little bit further and people are gaining knowledge about the culture as well as the language", (Walter, UK, English language school).

Walter attributes this to the market, but why is the market (i.e. the wider society of Wrocław) willing to pay more for English language teachers from the UK, or Italian food prepared by Italian chefs? It seems that such cultural goods are viewed as being more valuable, while if they were to be provided by Polish labour they would somehow then be less valuable. Here, we begin to see the emergence of cultural hierarchies, to which I will return in Chapter 7.

Second, migrants' social and cultural capital can perform an important *bridging role* to sources of labour. While in Chapter 5 I showed how such capital can bridge migrants (predominantly from core-states) to affluent core-state *markets*, here I highlight how it can also bridge migrants (predominantly from periphery-states) to the relatively affordable sources of (co-ethnic) periphery-state *labour*. So, for example, as seen previously, Danilo (Ukraine) employs an exclusively Ukrainian workforce with whom he was connected via his Ukrainian social and cultural capital. So, importantly, both subject groups are demonstrating the important role played by social networks in entrepreneurship (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987), albeit in varying ways. Yet, although this provides a way to explain why migrants from periphery-states seem more likely (and better able) to access affordable sources of periphery-state labour, it does not explain why they do 'go further down the labour hierarchy'

by likewise utilizing it as a bridge to even more affordable sources of periphery-state labour physically located in periphery-states. This, I argue, can be explained by the final (technological) layer of the global environment, as outlined below.

6.4.4. The technological environment

Within the literature, it has been shown how technological developments have provided the backdrop against which migrant entrepreneurs are able to conduct business internationally (Zhou 2004). Indeed, as seen in Chapter 5, certain industries seem better able than others to lend themselves to international distribution. Importantly, the exact same ability, which allows a business to access clients internationally, inherently also allows businesses to choose sources of labour geographically distant from the clientele. This, when combined with the uneven global economic landscape, provides business owners with an opportunity to reduce costs by relocating their production to geographical locations where they can access a plentiful supply of affordable labour. But, of course, not all industries lend themselves well to long-distance distribution, in which case business owners can, instead, look to certain groups of immigrant labour as an alternate way of decreasing costs. This process is described by Sassen (1999):

‘Immigration and off-shore production are ways of securing a low-wage labor force...in developed countries. They also represent a sort of functional equivalence: that is, productive facilities that cannot be shifted off-shore and have to be performed where the demand is, e.g., restaurants and hospitals, can use immigrant labor while facilities that can be shifted abroad can use low-wage labor in less developed countries’, (Sassen 1999: 1144-1145).

This seems to be exemplified by the situations of Vanko and Bogdan (both from Ukraine). As seen previously, Vanko has a team of programmers in Ukraine which services his clients in the USA. Instead of employing programmers in the USA, or programmers in Wrocław, he has chosen a geographical location which offers him a plentiful supply of affordable programmers. This act of sourcing labour from his home country seems in line with the behaviour of other high-skilled migrant entrepreneurs in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts (Saxenian 1999; 2002). Figure 6.1., previously, showed a hierarchy of labour costs. It seems somewhat logical that, given the freedom and flexibility of choosing the nationality and location of labour, that migrant entrepreneurs, such as Vanko, choose the most affordable option (so long as it also meets their other non-economic needs). While Vanko is able to employ co-ethnic labour situated in Ukraine, Bogdan, by contrast, who is running his own hairdressing salon, is in an industry which does *not* lend itself well to international distribution. As such, he is unable to make use of co-

ethnic labour physically located in Ukraine. Subsequently, and with the bridging role of his social and cultural capital (as outlined above), he has hired the 'functional equivalent' (Sassen 1999), namely, co-ethnic immigrant labour in Wrocław.

6.5. Conclusions


Within the literature surrounding ethnic enclaves, migrant entrepreneurs have often been found to recruit employees from a plentiful pool of local, co-ethnic labour (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Min & Bozorgmehr 2000; Drori & Lerner 2002). Indeed, in this chapter I showed how many migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states (in particular those from Ukraine) seem to be doing exactly this. Yet, when we begin to study 'up' and look at the migrants from core-states, we start to see a very different picture. These migrants appear less likely to employ co-ethnic labour which, it seems, is often *neither cheap nor plentiful*. On the contrary, it appears to be more expensive and limited in supply within Wrocław. As a result of this, these (core-state) migrant entrepreneurs seem more likely to opt for native, Polish labour.

Furthermore, in contrast to the assumption of Ethnic Enclave Theory that migrant entrepreneurs rely upon resources in the immediate environment (Wilson & Portes 1980; Drori & Lerner 2002; Portes & Shafer 2006), migrants from both subject groups were shown to (sometimes, but not always) make use of social capital extending *internationally*, subsequently lending support to other scholars who emphasise the international character of social networks (Toussaint-Comeau 2008; Chen & Tan 2009). Yet, importantly, the use of such capital seems to vary according to its geographical location. While social and cultural capital from core-states aids migrants with accessing core-state markets i.e. *demand* (as seen in Chapter 5), social and cultural capital in periphery-states seems more likely to play a role in labour *supply* and production.

Dividing the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship up into three (micro, meso, and macro) layers (Kloosterman 2010), I subsequently explored reasons for these variations. Here, I showed how the various layers (politico-institutional, economic, socio-cultural, and technological) of the macro environment interact with migrant entrepreneurs' variations in motivations and access to resources (on a micro level), resulting in these variations in migrants' ethnic division of labour (on a meso level). Starting with the politico-institutional layer of the macro environment, I showed how its specific, international configuration (combined with economic incentives) helps to explain why so many people from periphery-states (in particular, Ukraine) have migrated to Poland, leading to the plentiful supply of periphery-state labour within Wrocław. Yet, to understand why this supply of labour is not only plentiful, but also *affordable*, it was necessary to highlight the important role played by the economic environment. Here, I showed how its unevenness, on

an international level, creates spatial variations in the cost of labour, with labour located in core-states costing more than the equivalent labour in (semi-)periphery-states. Nonetheless, even on a local level within Wrocław, wage disparities seem to persist, with labour from core-states apparently costing more than the equivalent labour from periphery-states. This, I argued, shows how migrants are not only embedded within an uneven economic environment, but also an uneven socio-cultural environment which, as shown, assigns greater value to certain cultures over others. As a consequence of this, the outline of a labour hierarchy within Wrocław becomes apparent, whereby the cost of labour varies not only according to the location in which it is situated, but also the location from whence it came. Within such a hierarchy, there is an economic incentive for entrepreneurs to access the more affordable pools of labour further down the hierarchy (assuming they also possess the requisite skills required by the entrepreneur). But, importantly, their ability to do so is affected by their position within two other layers of the macro environment. First, returning to the socio-cultural environment, I showed how migrants from periphery-states (notably, Ukraine) seem better able to utilise periphery-state social and cultural capital to bridge themselves to relatively affordable (co-ethnic) sources of labour situated in - or originating from - periphery-states. Second, migrants' position within the technological environment helps to explain why some businesses, which lend themselves well to long distance distribution, seem better able than others to take advantage of more affordable sources of labour located in periphery-states.

7.



CHAPTER 7

**Equal players in an
unequal game?
Power and privilege**

“Every country has its own community of immigrants that are less favored and are pretty much doing the jobs that the local people don’t want to do. So for a Ukrainian coming here and setting up their own business, even though they have the language skills, because the languages are very similar, it would be very difficult for them from a perception point of view. Whereas, when we arrive, we are coming from super developed countries and we’re supposed to come with higher education and great knowledge and I think it’s just a matter of perception really, because we don’t have much more to offer”, (Louis, France, online marketing).

7.1. Introduction

As mentioned in previous chapters, ‘migrants’ are often depicted as lacking agency and subject to ‘restrictions, limitations, and discrimination’ (Benson & O’Reilly 2018: 11). As with many of the other issues identified so far in this dissertation, this narrative is largely the result of scholars’ almost exclusive focus upon migration in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts (Ilhan-Nas 2011; Dheer 2018). Yet, as I also have shown in previous chapters, when we switch the focus to migrants who have migrated in the opposite direction, we start to see how they cannot necessarily be assumed to be disadvantaged. On the contrary, I have shown how migrants moving in this direction are often diametrically *privileged*. But this dichotomy between privilege and disadvantage should actually come as no surprise, as ‘oppression and privilege operate hand in hand’ and ‘one cannot exist without the other’ (Ferguson 2013: 578). Just because scholars’ attention within the field of migration has been focused upon just one side of the equation does not mean that the other side does not exist. Indeed, logically, it has always existed in equal measure albeit, in the context of migration, it has remained largely unobserved and, subsequently, seemingly invisible. As such, ‘employing the notion of privilege is one way of shifting the gaze from those who are from underdeveloped countries, excluded or oppressed and onto those who are from overdeveloped countries, exclusionary or oppressive’ (Choules 2006: 276). This idea, that those from core-states are often more privileged, is even reflected in everyday language. They are frequently referred to not as ‘migrants’, but instead as ‘expats’, which has connotations of ‘whiteness’ and ‘privilege’ (Fechter & Walsh 2010; Leonard 2016). Even within the migrant entrepreneurship literature, many scholars have employed similarly loaded nomenclature, such as ‘expat-preneurs’ (Vance et al. 2016; Selmer et al. 2018) or ‘descending diaspora entrepreneurs’ (Harima 2014). Such terms seem to position these subjects as somehow *above* the position of ‘migrants’. Yet, importantly, most of the core-state migrants in this study can hardly be considered to be the ‘super rich transnational elites’ observed by Beaverstock (2002) or the ‘transnational capitalist class’ outlined by Sklair (2012) and, in terms

of financial capital, do not seem to be overtly privileged. As a matter of fact, as seen in Chapter 4, I showed how both groups of core- and periphery migrant entrepreneurs in this study seem to have relatively *equal* levels of resources (albeit with variation in the origin of such resources). Indeed, Louis (France, quoted above) seems to be conscious of this when he says ‘we don’t have much more to offer’. What is problematic here, therefore, is how both subject groups, despite displaying relatively similar levels of resources, appear to be showing variations in how they are privileged or disadvantaged. What, in other words, is granting certain migrants (usually those from core-states), in certain situations, certain privileges, if not their levels of resources?

The goal of this chapter is to shed some light on this and, in doing so, to complicate notions of privilege in migration research. In keeping with previous chapters, I will once again breakdown the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship into three (micro, meso, and macro) levels (Kloosterman 2010). In doing so, I will explore how, on a micro level, migrant entrepreneurs’ motivations and access to resources (and their *origins*) are interacting with the wider macro level environment, resulting in variations on a meso level between the two groups’ apparent levels of privilege and disadvantage. I start first, below, with the meso level by exploring and recapping how the two groups seem to vary in the ways in which they are privileged and/or disadvantaged.

7.2. The meso level: Privilege and disadvantage of migrant entrepreneurs

“Foreigners living in Poland will have experienced various reactions to having decided to live here: You’re from New York, wow! London? Cool! France? Nice place? Spain – great language. But also: Russia? This is a free country now, luckily. Ukraine? Oh. Turkey? Are you an Arab? I hope you are not a terrorist. Armenia? Where’s that? Can you see the difference? The west is the best, the east is the beast”, (Bobby Chopper, WroclawExpats.com).

This quote, ‘the West is the Best, the East is the Beast’, was published in an article on Wroclawexpats.com,⁷⁸ a website offering third party services to ‘expats’ in Wroclaw. Far from the author being racist or prejudiced against those from the East, they were attempting to draw readers’ attention to the (unfair) difference in reception which awaits foreigners in Wroclaw. This idea, that how people in Wroclaw are treated is influenced by their location of origin, was also very evident in the words of many of the migrant entrepreneurs I interviewed, such as Stuart (UK):

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⁷⁸ Wroclawexpats.com (2018): <http://wroclawexpats.com/2018/04/expats-migrants-or-wroclawians/>

“There’s still a sort of mentality that when you’re from the West, you’re sort of somehow better. When you’re from the East, you’re somehow worse”, (Stuart, UK, IT company).

What is interesting here is that Stuart, despite being part of an ethnic minority, is considered to have a positive standing within society. As such, it questions the often assumed correlation between minority groups and discrimination (Lundstrom 2017). But, as can be seen, such a correlation for those from the ‘East’ remains very prevalent. Indeed, in addition to reports in the news of xenophobic attacks on Ukrainians,⁷⁹ many migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states spoke of negative treatment based on nationality, such as Danilo (Ukraine):

“On Facebook one [Polish person] wrote ‘there are too many Ukrainians! Why are you coming still?’, (Danilo, Ukraine, construction company).

So, it seems that while Stuart (and those from the core-states) are often viewed in a positive way, Danilo (and many others from periphery-states) experience quite the opposite. In other words, within the environment of Wrocław, migrants appear to be subject to a variation in social standing, granted to its owners purely ‘by accident of birth’ (ibid: 120).

Such variation in social standing can have real implications for migrant entrepreneurs and their businesses. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, originating from a core-state is often associated with higher levels of trust, quality, and, subsequently, *value*. For example, Mattheus (Germany), explains below how by virtue of being from Germany, his services are somehow worth more:

“I still get to charge more because I’m German. Not because I’m better than anyone else, but because I’m from the West. I have immediately a different standing somehow...Racism [laugh]. It’s racism that I benefit from, because there is in Poland a subtle sense of inferiority towards England and Germany and France and so on and, if you come from those places, and don’t have dark skin, you immediately have more authority somehow. It helped me. Maybe someone from Ukraine is seen as cheap labour, and someone from Germany is seen as someone who is choosing to be here. Like I would be more categorized as an expat, whereas someone from Ukraine would be more categorized as a migrant”, (Mattheus, Germany, education consultancy).

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79 Local (Wrocław) news story: “Man arrested for xenophobic attack on 2 ukrainians” <https://wroclawuncut.com/2019/03/27/man-arrested-for-xenophobic-attack-on-two-ukrainian-citizens/>

Mattheus, purely thanks to his German cultural capital, is the benefactor of significant advantages within Wrocław (namely, the ability to charge more), which seems to directly benefit his business. But, importantly, such benefits were not only restricted to a local level. We saw before in Chapter 5 how migrants from core-states can leverage their core-state social and cultural capital to bridge themselves to affluent core-state markets. Such capital is, apparently, valued by clients not only within Poland, but also *internationally*. To re-quote Seamus (Ireland) once again: ‘Being Irish, there is a higher level of trust.’ Seamus, in addition to others from core-states, have been able to leverage their core-state cultural capital (which, it seems, is associated with greater levels of trust) to acquire international clients. As such, it illustrates how certain forms of cultural capital are ‘transnationally acknowledged’ and ‘associated with high standards worldwide’ (Weiss 2005: 722). Conversely, (semi-)periphery cultural capital is often associated with lower standards and less trust. Indeed, this appears to be exactly the case for Artem (Belarus) who describes below his experiences at border crossings:

“I see it at the border, when you’re Russian or Ukrainian, they check it slowly, or doubt that you’re fair. And if you’re American, they just hurry to check you.” (Artem, Belarus, translation).

So, here, according to Artem, originating from Russia or Ukraine has connotations of *untrustworthiness*. As such, it adds to the general picture that those displaying cultural capital originating from periphery-states somehow have a disadvantaged social standing.⁸⁰

On the surface, this variation in social standing according to country-of-origin is nothing new. After all, there have been numerous studies which have documented the various forms of privilege of core-state migrants in (semi-)periphery contexts (Fechter 2005; Fechter & Walsh 2010; Hoang 2014; Lundstrom 2017). These studies, however, have focused on the topic of white privilege and how Western white migrants in postcolonial societies become the ‘visible other’, thereby inheriting a set of largely positive connotations. Yet, within this study of core-state migrants in Wrocław, whereby it is a largely ‘white-on-white’ non-colonial context, ethnicity becomes less visible. Despite this, migrants from core-states somehow manage to retain their goodie bag of unearned privileges. This, I will show below, happens through the dual process of 1. migrants, in lieu of skin colour, employing other

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80 There were, however, a small number of exceptions whereby the origin of the migrants’ cultural capital did not always correspond to the paradigm of ‘core = positive’ and ‘periphery = negative’. For example, Mario (Italy) said that he had to provide a double deposit for his restaurant location, because the Polish landlord heard his Italian accent. Further, several migrants from Ukraine stated that they have been treated well in Poland.

methods to mark their core-state origins; and 2. such origins being interpreted by others as something positive. With regard to the former, these methods include referring to themselves not as ‘migrants’, but instead as ‘expats’ (Koutonin 2015; Cranston 2017), as well as attending ‘expat meetups.’⁸¹ This in itself lends support to other authors who have observed how migrants from economically developed countries often centre around certain ‘elite’ spaces, reinforcing their cultural supremacy (Piekut 2003; Lundstrom 2017). But there is also one more - and perhaps even more powerful - strategy which these migrants utilize in order to foreground their core-state origins. Here, I refer to the power of language, which I will now discuss below.

Power and language

Walter (UK) has been living in Poland for over a decade. Unlike many other migrants from the core-states subject group, he has actually been able to acquire a reasonable level of Polish. Historically, this would usually be welcomed by many Poles, who often viewed his attempts at learning the language as ‘cute’ and a novelty that someone from *England* would learn *Polish*, when it usually the other way round. Yet, more recently when he has been speaking Polish in public, his non-native accent has been interpreted as being *Ukrainian*. Walter speaks, below, about the totally different reaction this is often accompanied by:

“If you’re British, at least up until recently, you were kind of given privilege status. So if you go to McDonalds and say ‘hi can I have two big macs’, ‘oh yes of course’, whatever. But if you were to speak in Polish to them, nowadays they may mistake you for being Ukrainian as has happened to me and they treat you like shit”, (Walter, UK, English language school).

Language then, it seems, is being used as a signifier of nationality. Speaking English appears to align migrants with core-states, which then is attached to a higher level of social standing. Speaking periphery-state languages, by contrast, or speaking Polish with an accent which could be interpreted as originating from periphery-states, seems to correspondingly subject migrants to various disadvantages.

This privileged status of core-state languages is even visible when walking around the city centre. On most streets, you can see advertising for English (and also often French, German, Spanish and Italian) language schools. Walter, quoted above, as the owner of an English language school, directly benefits from this demand for core-state languages. Of course, he is not the only one who benefits. As seen in Chapter 3, for those who can speak core-state languages, finding well-paid employment (within the environment of Wrocław) seems relatively easy. For

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81 For example, monthly InterNations events, as well as the weekly ‘Tower of Babel’ international meetup and Facebook group: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/BabelWroclaw/>

example, Paul (USA), could not find employment in Paris, but in Wrocław it was a different story:

"I was in Paris...and I applied to like probably seventy different places over a nine month period and I received one phone call...I came out here [to Wrocław] and...I put out my CV to five companies and within the same week I got five phone calls", (Paul, USA, coffee roasting).

Paul's ability to easily find well-paid employment thanks to his core-state language skills, when combined with the positive social standing which accompanies such languages, reveals how within the semi-periphery environment of Wrocław 'English-speaking Westerners can convert their native language proficiency, as hegemonic linguistic and cultural capital, into symbolic prestige and economic and social capital' (Lan 2011: 1670).

For those from periphery-states, however, it is often quite a different story. Aleksander (Ukraine) is a good example. After his cafe in Wrocław went bankrupt, he could only find relatively low-paid work as a waiter, despite possessing a PhD. So, why did Paul find it easy to obtain high paid employment, whereas Aleksander did not? It appears that the answer does not relate to their education level, rather, it seems more about their cultural (specifically, linguistic) capital. Put simply, Paul speaks a core-state language (English), whereas Aleksander does not. Indeed, this idea is supported by the situation of Aleksander's partner who 'is a German linguist, so careerwise it's easier for her.' Here, it seems that Aleksander's partner (as well as many others from the periphery-states subject group who speak core-state languages) found it much easier to obtain well-paid employment in the mainstream labour market. Within such an environment, where core-state languages, as seen in previous chapters, have a higher value both socially and economically, it is perhaps unsurprising that very few (14.6%) of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group have learned Polish. Indeed, this ability to migrate to a new country, not learn the host country language, and still retain a high standing within society, points to the imperialistic undertones of such migration (Croucher 2009: 484).

Does ethnicity play a role?

I mentioned before that this study is largely within a 'white-on-white' context. Nonetheless, for the small number (4) of migrants in the study who were visibly of colour, ethnicity appears to, at times, play a role. Until recently, walking around the city centre, it would be rare to encounter faces of colour. But, with the recent increase in immigration, including non-white immigration, it seems not only has the number of non-white people in Wrocław increased, but also, correspondingly, the

number of racially motivated attacks.⁸² Such racism can extend into the business environment and have real impacts upon migrants' companies. For example, John (Nigeria), speaks to this:

"Well I think on OLX⁸³ I got a message when someone wrote and asked me where I'm from. I said I'm from Nigeria, you can read it on my description, and he said ok sorry", (John, Nigeria, English language school).

The business prospect declined John's English teaching services because he is from Nigeria. This seems in line with Lan's (2011) study, which found that English language schools often reject black teachers because their clientele prefer teachers who are white. At first glance, John's situation seems to be a clearcut example of racism. But, upon closer inspection, he points out that it is not so much about his skin colour, but rather the fact he is from Nigeria:

"If you're black and you're from the UK, it would be fine. They just need to get to know where you're from, I even see it on their faces you know, someone who has already rated you highly, talking to you with respect, the moment they get to know you're from Africa, ...And that's what I call racism, you know, when what I merit, you don't give me the opportunity, not when you call me some crappy name, or talk to me in some crappy way", (John, Nigeria, English language school).

In other words, John's negative treatment seems less about ethnicity and more about the country of origin. This highlights the subtle interplay between ethnicity and culture and, ultimately, suggests how within the environment of Wrocław, cultural capital can play an even greater role than skin colour. The significance of this will become clearer later in this chapter.

Politico-institutional privilege

Above I have shown how migrants can experience a string of unofficial privileges via the social prestige of core-state cultural capital. However, such privileges are not always unofficial and can, at times, be formally underwritten by governmental (and non-governmental) actors. Anna (USA), for example, speaks below about her comparative freedom of movement:

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82 Local (Wrocław) news story about a racially motivated attack: <https://wroclawuncut.com/2019/01/23/racist-attacker-sentenced-to-10-months-community-service/>

83 A Polish internet directory which lists jobs and items for sale. It can be considered a Polish version of GumTree or Craigslist.

“As an American it’s super easy. We don’t have to have a visa. We just have to have a passport. You don’t have to have a way of working. I mean, technically you should be doing it on a working visa, right, you shouldn’t be doing this on a tourist visa, but you can. They don’t check. That’s a problem for your own immigration problems. But literally I could land tomorrow and go into urząd miejski [the government office] and I could be a business owner”, (Anna, USA, arts & crafts store).

The above quote reveals the privileged mobility which Anna enjoys. Despite being from outside the EU, she can easily move to Poland and set up a business. Indeed, this legal mobility for those from core-states seems to apply not only to traveling to Poland, but to many other locations around the world. Previously, we saw how Gabriel (France) plans on living ‘half the year in Asia and half the year in Europe’, a desire he expresses without ever considering visa restrictions. As such, Gabriel and Anna (as well as many others from core-states⁸⁴) demonstrate how certain groups seem able to migrate across political borders with ease (Sklair 2012; Lundstrom 2017; Benson & O’Reilly 2018). This privileged mobility seems a result of government policies which view such migration as *desirable* and which actively target and promote this demographic (Collins 2010; Sumption 2012; Bagley 2015). With such mobility comes great choice and, as noted in Chapter 5, this can allow these privileged migrants to take advantage of an international buffet of regulatory systems, picking and choosing the environments which best match their businesses’ needs. Or in the words of Kunz (2018):

‘Like other migrants, respondents skillfully navigated the global differences in wealth, power and status they were presented with. Yet, unlike many other migrants, they did so from a privileged position within the global power-geometries of international migration’.

However, for those from periphery-states, it can be a totally different story (as noted in Chapter 3). Andriy (Ukraine) and his wife, for example, wanted to move to Barcelona, but for visa reasons they could not, so instead they settled on Poland. Their plan is to obtain Polish citizenship, then take advantage of the freedom of movement within the Schengen area to move to Barcelona. In this sense, and as noted in Chapter 3, they seem to be performing a kind of international stepwise migration (Paul 2011; Zijlstra 2020), essentially taking the ‘long way’ to their desired destination as a result of lacking the privileged mobility of many of their counterparts from core-states. The variation in legal mobility of migrants according to their country of origin is, in essence, a form of formally underwritten

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84 However, as previously noted, there was one exception, whereby Dave (Canada) had an issue with his visa and was subsequently arrested.

discrimination. Not only can such discrimination affect migrants' location of their business, but it can also affect the business itself. Symon (Ukraine) explains below:

"It would be easier, because if you're a Polish person you have many benefits which I don't have....For example money. This guy I told you about, he worked for 5 years, 3 years in Norway and 2 years in Poland for a transport company. He told me how much he earns, he earns 150 grand for 5 years. In Ukraine I worked in a bank in a good position. I'm not like just a guy who's sitting and speaking with normal clients, I work with business clients. I earned per month something like 800 or 900, something like 1000 dollars. In Ukraine it's good money, but if you want to start a business, it's nothing", (Symon, Ukraine, delivery company).

Symon attributes his lack of financial capital to his inability to legally migrate to a more economically developed country, such as Norway, where he could earn more money. As a result, he believes that being Polish (and having the freedom of movement which would accompany this) would make conducting business 'easier'. Clearly, then, when compared to many of those from core-states, there appears to be distinct differences in migrants' freedom of movement which, in turn, can affect their businesses.

Interestingly, regulation which treats people differently based upon their nationality does not only stem from nation-states, but also from the private sector. This can be seen from my dialogue with Bruce (Australia):

Bruce: "Probably being Australian made things a lot easier...They ask for a lot of verification, so if you're just a guy from Ukraine, or a young 19 year old Indian, now trying to start a business, it's painful, because you can see everything is there, you can sign up for it, but a week later, without any explanation, it's absolutely horrible the way they are treated, I'm in all the groups and forums and I can see everyday there is some form of national discrimination, where somebody was just deplatformed on Amazon after a year of working their ass off and investing their capital and marketing, just to get shut down, just because you started an LLC in America and your postal address is in Deli, so you're not a legitimate business. Knowing full well that PayPal isn't available in Nigeria. Are all Nigerians scammers? Fuck no they're not, and how are they not supposed to be scammers if we don't allow them to make legitimate ends online?"

Me: "So coming from Australia, you had less resistance in terms of PayPal and other online platforms accepting you?"

Bruce: "Yeah, when I started, you could open up 10 different PayPal accounts and use prepaid credit cards from Woolworths to verify them. I had hundreds of PayPal accounts."

As can be seen from Bruce's words, companies such as PayPal are, purely based upon nationality, restricting who can and cannot open an online account. Even from personal experience, having worked for an international online software company, I saw first-hand how it is common practice for firms to block all new signups coming from IP addresses in certain countries, such as Nigeria. And even today, at the time of writing, PayPal does not allow people in Ukraine to withdraw money to Ukrainian bank accounts.⁸⁵ So, as can be seen, formally underwritten discrimination based upon nationality seems not only present in the public sector, but clearly also extends into the private sector.

7.2.2. A recap of the two subject groups' variations in privilege and disadvantage

I have highlighted, above, some variations between the two subject groups in terms of their relative levels of privilege and disadvantage. Specifically, I showed: 1. how migrants with core-state cultural capital seem to have more social prestige (not only in the environment of Wrocław, but also internationally); 2. how this privileged position of core-state cultural capital is exemplified in the use of languages; 3. how this privileged position of core-state cultural capital can have economic privileges, including making it easier to secure well-paid employment; 4. how those from core-states often have more international mobility. But these represent only some of the multiple other variations of privilege which have been revealed throughout this dissertation. The goal of this section, then, is to now provide a more comprehensive list of all privileges (and, conversely, disadvantages) identified so far. Indeed, Table 7.1, below, summarizes the variations observed between the two groups.

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⁸⁵ This statement is supported by my conversations with Ukrainians in Wrocław, as well as third party news articles such as this: <https://www.kyivpost.com/technology/paypal-doesnt-work-in-ukraine-but-resourceful-locals-know-how-to-use-it.html?cn-reloaded=1>

Table 7.1. Disadvantage and privilege: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison

Parameter	Core-states subject group	Periphery-states subject group
Social prestige within Wrocław	☑ Often spoke of benefiting from social prestige.	☒ Frequent stories of discrimination.
Mother tongue standing within Wrocław	☑ Core-state languages tolerated or even admired. Economically in-demand.	☒ Periphery-state languages less admired. Migrants often expected to learn Polish.
The ability to find well-paid employment	☑ Migrants often left well-paid employment to start their businesses (i.e. finding well-paid employment was relatively easy).	☒ Migrants often found starting their own business to be a better paid alternative than a job within the mainstream labour market.
Cost of labour	☑ Spoke of how labour from core-states costs more.	☒ Spoke of how labour from periphery-states costs less.
International mobility	☑ Rarely spoke of barriers to international mobility.	☒ Migrants often spoke of visa issues. Poland was often chosen as a 'second choice', because obtaining work and residency permits was easier than for their first choice (core-states such as Germany) was more difficult.
Feeling of security within home country	☑ Home country considered safe and with rule-of-law.	☒ Frequent stories of war and the lack of rule-of-law in home country.
Access to core-state markets	☑ Migrants seem better able to access core-state markets.	☒ Migrants seem less able to access core-state markets.
Access to periphery-state labour	☒ Migrants seem less able to access (comparatively) affordable periphery-state labour.	☑ Migrants seem better able to access (comparatively) affordable periphery-state labour.

Source: Data gathered from this study. Note: This information represents the general *trends*, but there were, of course, exceptions and variations within both subject groups.

As shown, migrants from core-states are privileged in many ways, while those from periphery-states seem to be conversely disadvantaged. In the same way that white people in McIntosh's (1988) groundbreaking paper seem privileged in the environment of American society, migrant entrepreneurs from core-states in this study seem to benefit in a similar way with 'an invisible package of unearned assets'. In Chapter 3, for example, while exploring the variations in the motivations of the

two groups of migrants, I showed how the ‘starting points’ of migrant entrepreneurs are often uneven. Those from periphery-states are born into economically deprived and unsafe environments, often lacking ‘rule-of-law’.

“I’m a person who saw in my life such things, you know, I saw war, I saw dead people...I would never wish for someone to see these things. Because in my opinion I’m a lucky person, I have family, my family has some amount of money. But I know a lot of my friends, a lot of people there who didn’t have this. [They] do not live anymore, because the first day of war they go to war and [they died]. A lot of friends I lost in this war.”, (Symon, Ukraine, delivery company).

Such variation was often found to provide a strong motivation for those from the periphery-states subject group to emigrate. Further, regardless of their motivations for migrating, the ability to do so varies between the two groups. In Chapter 5 we then saw an additional layer of privilege of those from the core-states subject group. Specifically, these migrants seem better able to access markets in core-states, while those from periphery-states seem less able to do so. Further, in Chapter 6, we also saw evidence of a labour hierarchy, whereby labour from core-states seems to be valued more than that of periphery-states. Yet, for these migrants there was one notable ‘privilege’, namely, their apparent greater ability to access this affordable (co-ethnic) labour supply. Migrants from core-states, by contrast, were shown to be more likely to hire (comparatively more expensive) native, Polish labour.

But here comes the key question: Why do such variations exist? Other studies of core-to-(semi-)periphery migration have usually attributed migrants’ privileges to variations in financial capital (such as Beaverstock’s 2002 study of ‘super rich transnational elites’), human capital (Vance et al. 2016), or ethnicity (Fechter 2005; Hoang 2014; Lundstrom 2017). However, as mentioned in the introduction, migrants in this study were found (in Chapter 4) to have relatively equal levels of financial and human capital, plus predominantly share the same (white) skin colour.⁸⁶ So, then, how, in the context of this study, is privilege and disadvantage realized? In order to gain insight into this, I turn now, below, to the role of the macro level environment.

7.3. The macro level: Environmental factors

In keeping with previous chapters, and in order to help organise and simplify the analysis, I have once again divided the macro level environment up into four separate

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⁸⁶ Furthermore, most of the subjects in this study share two additional characteristics: 1. They are from the same continent (Europe) and; 2. they are from similar religious (Christian) contexts.

layers: 1. Socio-cultural; 2. Economic; 3. Technological; and 4. Politico-institutional. I begin, below, with the role of the socio-cultural layer of the environment.

7.3.1. The socio-cultural environment

Cultural hierarchies

As seen above and in previous chapters, in the environment of Wrocław, certain cultures seem to be valued above others. This, by definition, constitutes a cultural hierarchy. The presence of cultural hierarchies provides a mechanism to explain how variations in privilege occur, despite both subject groups predominantly sharing the same skin colour and having relatively equal levels of resources. What seems to be playing the key role here is not necessarily the migrants' skin colour, nor their levels of resources, but rather their nationality and the geographical origin of their cultural capital. For example, let us return to the case of Walter (UK). As the owner of an English language school, he is one of many UK and USA entrepreneurs within the 'education' sector meeting the strong local demand for English language instruction. Ukrainian language schools, by contrast, are much harder to find.⁸⁷ In other words, it seems that local cultural hierarchies (on a macro level) appear to be creating opportunity structures (on a meso level) for certain languages (such as English) which are then acted upon by migrant entrepreneurs (on a micro level). Importantly, migrants' ability to act on such opportunities depends not just on their motivation to do so (as noted in Chapter 3), but also their access to the necessary resources. In this case, Walter, by virtue of being born and raised in the UK, has acquired certain cultural capital which is now, in the environment of Wrocław, seems to take on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988), subsequently becoming desirable and economically valuable.

Conversely, for those from periphery-states, it seems to be quite the opposite. Within such cultural hierarchies, their cultural capital can take on connotations of lower value,⁸⁸ with those from periphery-states being seen, in the semi-periphery environment of Wrocław, as 'cheap labour'. Yet, within their own countries, their cultural capital may have had more value. For Andriy (Ukraine), he was a lawyer with a degree from a well-respected university within Ukraine, fluent in Russian and Ukrainian, with a good standing within society in Kiev. But in the context of Wrocław, this cultural capital seems of little value. In such situations, migrants can make efforts to convert their capital into 'universally understood cultural currency' (Weiss 2005: 720; Erel 2010). In the case of Andriy, he has considered attempting to get his law degree recognized in Poland, however he tells me that it would

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87 This statement is supported by the fact that out of 292 Ukrainian sole proprietorships, only 11 of them were in the 'education' sector.

88 However, it has also been noted that, within certain (semi-)periphery ethnic groups, shared cultural capital can have certain in-group benefits (Vershina & Rogers 2020).

involve two to three years of studying, so instead, opening a cafe seemed like a preferable option.

Cultural hierarchies across space

Andriy's situation highlights how different forms of cultural capital can take on different values in different spaces. This is also demonstrated by Josh (UK) who explains to me in a strong cockney accent how his standing within society has also changed since moving to Wroclaw, albeit for better and not for worse:

"I'm a native English guy. I'm sure you've experienced that. Even with women there is always an appeal, they notice the excitement of a foreigner, or an English guy, more and more people telling you they like your accent...I feel like superman in Smallville...In the UK, I would never be able to get as many good opportunities as I do here in Poland. For example Forbes magazine have asked to interview me, but in England they wouldn't give a shit about me", (Josh, UK, English language school and investor relations business).

Josh, apparently, did not have as many opportunities in the UK as he now has in Poland. Within the UK, his cockney accent is often associated with lower socioeconomic status (Giles & Sassoon 1983) which, incidentally, highlights the various 'shades of white' present within UK society (Halej 2015). Yet, upon migrating to Poland, Josh's UK cultural capital suddenly became interpreted as something extremely positive, resulting in him feeling 'like Superman in Smallville'. In other words, he was able to piggyback on the positive standing of UK culture within Poland, while simultaneously jettisoning the more nuanced negative interpretations of the specific standing of his own accent and class within UK society. At this point, I would like to reflect back on the notion of 'geoarbitrage' (Hayes 2014), which has been used in the context of migrants who geographically relocate in order to increase their relative economic standing. Josh's situation, however, highlights a new, cultural component to geo-arbitrage, whereby migrants can also alter their relative cultural standing. Indeed, this idea, that cultural capital can be interpreted differently across space, is further reinforced by Dave (Canada) who explained to me how his social prestige in Poland was nothing compared to what he had previously received in Indonesia:

"Some countries as a westerner you do get a prestige bump, but I don't feel that strongly in Poland, not like in Indonesia where you're a white guy and a rockstar", (Dave, Canada, Poland).

For Dave, traveling to Indonesia means an even greater increase in social prestige, enhanced by his white skin in a postcolonial context. As such, it reveals how

migrants like Dave, Josh, and Andriy ‘do not only cross national borders but also move between different sets of social classification systems that are tied to local, national and transnational hierarchies’ (Lundstrom 2017: 82, citing Kusow 2006). Subsequently, the value of migrants’ cultural capital, must be determined according to the cultural hierarchies within which they are situated, recognising that these hierarchies (and, therefore, the value of certain forms of cultural capital) can, and do, vary across space (Weiss 2005).

Despite this variation, certain cultural hierarchies seem more pervasive than others. As seen previously, various forms of core-state cultural capital seem to be valued not only within Wrocław, but also internationally. For example, I demonstrated previously how core-state cultural capital seems to grant its beholders greater levels of trust in international contexts and is ‘associated with high standards worldwide’ (Weiss 2015: 722). This is supported by other studies which have likewise shown how core-state cultural capital is often positively interpreted in a range of other environments, including Hong Kong (Findlay et al. 1996), Jakarta (Fechter 2005), Singapore (Beaverstock 2002), and a number of former soviet republics (Vershinina & Rogers 2020). In other words, despite variation of cultural hierarchies on a local level, such variation seems to take place within broader global hierarchies.

Cultural hierarchies across time

Not only can cultural hierarchies vary across space, but they can also vary across time. Paul (USA) is one of the few migrants in this study who is of colour. Below, he talks about how, within the environment of Wrocław, this used to be perceived as a positive thing, yet has changed in recent years:

“About 2-3 years ago, well no, before the new government came in, I was exotic. After the government came in...on the street, I’m a foreigner...My daughter and I have a code word for alcoholics or street people, so that I can get on the other side, we call them ‘ZELFS’. That’s just the secret word. So basically on a couple of occasions I’ve had a ZELF come up to me and ask me for a cigarette and I look mediterranean, I look like an Arab, if I say ‘no’, I’ve had a couple people shout ‘Alu Akbar’ at me”, (Paul, USA, coffee sales).

The environment within Wrocław is, according to Paul, becoming increasingly hostile to people who look like they might originate from the Middle East. Paul’s skin colour used to be interpreted as ‘exotic’ and was bestowed with positive meaning within local cultural hierarchies. Yet now, within an increasingly Islamophobic society, it takes on more negative connotations. Ignoring the reasons for why this is happening, the important point here is how the environment is changing over time. Indeed, because ethnicity and religion are social constructs, they are,

inherently, fluid and subject to change (Murguia & Forman 2003; Garner 2006). This, of course, is nothing new. In the context of the USA, historians have reminded us that the relative positioning of ethnic groups within cultural hierarchies has been ever-changing and evolving over time. In the 19th Century, Irish, Jewish, Italian, and Slavic migrants were at first often treated as inferior and subject to discrimination (Jacobson 2001; Roediger 2006). This then began to change as these ethnic groups progressively moved upwards within cultural hierarchies during the course of the 20th Century. A similar trend was observed in the context of Irish migration to the UK (McDowell 2009). Clearly, such hierarchies have been present and evolving for hundreds of years (and, no doubt, since even before then, from the dawn of human civilisation - see Heinrich & Gil-White 2001). Yet, despite that, unlike ethnicity or gender, the role of privilege stemming from one's nationality and geographical origins has not (to my knowledge) been researched in as much depth (Choules 2006).

Top down or bottom up?

At this point, I would like to address how, so far, I have portrayed cultural hierarchies as being somewhat 'top-down' with migrants seemingly powerless to control how their various forms of cultural capital are valued (or devalued) within them. Yet, importantly, migrant entrepreneurs play an active role in the creation and continuation of such hierarchies. In a sense, this can be considered to be 'good news' for migrants, as it means they (and, in fact, all of us) have a degree of agency in terms of how we produce or breakdown cultural hierarchies. However, instead of attempting the formidable undertaking of changing these macro level hierarchies, the path of least resistance for migrants is to adapt, on a micro level, their own cultural capital in a way that positively raises their standing within these hierarchies. This was observed in Halej's (2015) study, whereby Central Eastern European migrants deliberately demonstrated behaviours commonly attributed to mainstream British society in order to raise their perceived status within UK cultural hierarchies. Further, although not included in the study, several of my friends from Turkey and Afghanistan (also residing in Wroclaw) recently explained to me how it is common for them to tell local Polish people that they are from Italy or Cyprus, which is a habit they have acquired in order to avoid negative reactions. In other words, by superficially changing their location of origin, they move 'up' cultural and religious hierarchies in the eyes of the Polish people with whom they are speaking. In doing so, their micro-level behaviour 'lights up' the presence of broader structures (Duneier et al. 2014: 7), revealing the presence of cultural hierarchies and, in this case, *islamophobia* within Poland.⁸⁹ Yet, ironically, their actions to overcome these structures are undoubtedly 'feeding back into constituting them' (Duneier & Molotoch 1999: 1291).

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⁸⁹ For a more detailed discussion of racism toward 'skilled migrants' within Wroclaw, please see: Jaskulowski & Pawlak 2020.

While it may come as a surprise that migrants from periphery-states reproduce cultural hierarchies which disadvantage them, it should come as no surprise that these hierarchies are also reproduced by migrants who are *privileged* by them, namely, migrants from core-states. Let us, for example, return to the example of Walter (UK) and his English language school in Wroclaw. By providing English language instruction, he is reinforcing existing cultural hierarchies in three ways. First, he is part of an English-as-a-native-speaker demographic which is paid more money to teach English than non-native speakers, subsequently creating a 'misconception that teaching English is better carried out by native speakers', despite there being strong evidence that being a native speaker does not always equate to being a good teacher (Guo & Beckett 2007: 120). Second, by spreading the proliferation of the English language, he is 'contributing to neocolonialism by empowering the already powerful and leaving the disadvantaged further behind' (ibid:117). Third, by promoting the English language, he is not only increasing the standing of the language within the world, but also Anglocentric culture in general (ibid: 124). And, of course, in reinforcing the position of the English language atop cultural hierarchies, Walter simultaneously - albeit largely unwittingly - bolsters the demand for his school's services.

Furthermore, cultural hierarchies are not only influenced from 'above' and 'below', but also *laterally* across time. Taking this aspect into consideration can explain the current configuration of cultural hierarchies and why, for example, English language instruction is currently in greater demand than Ukrainian. Indeed, the reason for this lies well beyond the here and now. It is the result of a series of historical events, going back hundreds of years, stretching well-beyond the borders of not just Wroclaw, but also Poland, often said to be starting with the colonization of the Americas and continuing hand-in-hand with economic dominance (Guo & Beckett 2007; Phillipson 2018). In other words, the current local (Wroclaw) environment must not only be situated within hierarchies which stretch across space, but also *time* (Buzan & Lawson 2015).

7.3.2. The politico-institutional environment

I now turn to the role of the politico-institutional layer of the macro environment and the role it plays in creating variations in privileges between the two subject groups. As seen previously in this chapter, migrants from periphery-states often face a number of restrictions which are imposed by both the public *and* private sectors. As such, it highlights how not just governments, but also organizations, play a role in converting citizenship into a hierarchical structure. Passports themselves have no objective differences, but, when positioned within politico-institutional environments, they can take on structurally imposed value. Indeed, 'citizenship... is only graspable through how it is actually animated in life, through individual subjects, communities, organizations and state-making actors' (Fogelman 2018:

168). To put this into Mixed-embeddedness terms, through a lottery of birthplace, migrants' micro level cultural capital appears to interact differently within an uneven (and, frankly, unfair) macro level, international politico-institutional environment, resulting in variations on a meso level in migrants' privileges and disadvantages. Importantly, although each state has its own citizenship and assigns the rules regarding the privileges of that citizenship, it is part of a much broader, global politico-institutional environment, with clear trends of those with core-state citizenship receiving unearned privileges, while those with periphery-state citizenship face restrictions. And it is not a coincidence that core-state citizens - on a global level - often receive unearned privileges. Citizenship is, after all, 'a construct designed to protect the dominant group' (Choules 2006: 288). Accordingly, shining a light upon the privileged (politico-institutional) mobility of migrants from core-states offers us 'a way to better highlight the nature and implications of global inequality' (Croucher 2012: 2).

7.3.4. The economic environment

"For me Poland is a great place to have a business, the labour is cheap, the taxes are accommodating let's say, yeah, I feel like it's a great place to start a business. Here you can get an office that's cheaper, a lawyer that's cheaper, an accountant that's cheaper, the apartment where you live is cheaper, it makes more sense", (Tom, USA, financial trading).

As shown in previous chapters, migrants operate within an uneven, global, economic environment, whereby wealth seems to be concentrated in certain areas within core-states. Although this rarely resulted in corresponding high levels of financial capital among migrants from the core-state subject group (as seen in Chapter 4), it still provides an important layer of the macro environment within which migrant entrepreneurs operate, and which can subsequently help to explain the variations in migrants' relative levels of disadvantage and privilege. Indeed, the uneven socio-cultural and politico-institutional environments observed above are, fundamentally, built upon a foundation of economic disparity. For example, citizenship privilege, argues Choules (2006: 285), exists 'largely because of the disparity in wealth between countries'. Indeed, this ability to dictate the international politico-institutional environment goes hand-in-hand with economic dominance. Put simply, wealth creates power and power creates wealth: the one reinforces the other (Hickel 2017).

This macro level variation in wealth across the globe can also privilege (or disadvantage) migrants even before they migrate. As seen in Chapter 3, the variation in earning potential between the home- and host countries often underpinned the motivations of the migrations of those from the periphery-states subject group. After all, low incomes in periphery-states (combined with

unsafe politico-institutional environments) provide strong incentives for migrants to relocate to more affluent, stable areas (Faist 2000). Conversely, most of the migrants from the core-states subject group were found to move primarily for non-economic factors, suggesting that their migration is more about volition rather than (economic) necessity. In other words, migrants' motivations themselves seem to reflect unequal spatial variations in the global economic environment, revealing how certain migrations seem more privileged than others.

Yet, for several of those from the core-state subject group, such as Tom (USA, quoted above), their migration to Poland, as well as their decision to stay, was at least partially based upon economic reasons. Instead of migrating to Poland for higher incomes, they did so for *lower costs*, representing a form of 'geo-arbitrage' (Hayes 2014). Indeed, for those who are able to relocate to Poland to reduce their expenses, while retaining their relatively high revenues via their access to the lucrative markets in core-states (as seen in Chapter 5), migrating to Poland can be a very fiscally responsible business decision. Subsequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that this demographic is often seen as 'good migrants' which are economically positive for the local economy, as they are viewed as bringing in additional revenue and skills to the region (Croucher 2009; Dearie & Geduldig 2013; Vance et al. 2016). However, upon closer inspection, there is an argument to be made that such migrants are perhaps not as privileged as many assume. First of all, privilege is relative. Despite core-to-(semi-)periphery migrants (in many, but not all cases) being wealthier than the native population, these migrants were not necessarily wealthy in their home countries (Croucher 2012). Second, geoarbitrage may on the surface seem like taking advantage of spatial disparities of wealth, but the act of moving toward more affordable areas is paradoxically also a move away from more expensive areas. Indeed, many migrants in this study (from core-states) spoke of their home countries being exactly this: *expensive*. In other contexts, it has been argued that this constitutes a form of necessity migration, whereby stagnating economies and declining welfare states in many core-states are pushing migrants from core-states to (semi-)periphery-states (Dixon et al. 2006; Hayes 2015; 2018). Further, after a period of time in this more affordable (semi-)periphery environment, migrants can become 'trapped', financially less able to return to the comparatively expensive home countries (Drake & Collard 2008; Leonard 2010; Lan 2011). This in itself highlights how economic privilege and disadvantage can at times be more nuanced than one might expect and can be better understood once situated within the wider, global economic environment.

7.3.3. The technological environment

There is a fourth, and final layer of the macro environment which also contributes to realizing privilege (and disadvantage) of the migrants in this study. I speak, of course, of the role of the technological layer of the environment. In Chapter 5,

we saw how global differentials in the technological composition of macro level economies seem to become instilled on a micro level in terms of the industry sectors in which migrant entrepreneurs' are situated. Specifically, those from core-states seem more likely to have businesses in tertiary sectors (such as 'professional services'), while those from periphery-states were more commonly in secondary sectors (such as 'construction' and 'gastronomy'). This then, in turn, grants migrants from core-states with an advantage, as tertiary sector services seem to lend themselves better to long-distance distribution, allowing these migrants to target the more lucrative international markets situated in core-states. This privilege (of long-distance distribution) was recently brought to the forefront with the global COVID-19 pandemic. The government enforced lockdown in Wroclaw caused severe problems for many migrant entrepreneurs who were selling products and/or services to clients locally, such as Abebi (Nigeria) with her arts and crafts store:

"I never could have imagined being closed for days and days, with my cash flow abruptly cut off", (Abebi, Nigeria, African arts store).

Considering the majority of those from periphery-states service a local clientele, this lockdown disproportionately affected their businesses. This adds yet another layer of disadvantage onto the other layers previously outlined above. By contrast, many of the migrants providing services 'remotely' (i.e. predominantly those from core-states) were able to continue unscathed. Some even *benefitted*. Michael (USA), with his e-commerce business, speaks to this:

"My e-commerce business has been making record sales since the quarantine. Even though the product lines are totally unrelated to survival essentials. My guess is that people are at home, ordering everything online and having them delivered", (Michael, USA, e-commerce).

Clearly, then, migrants' position within the technological environment must also be taken into account when exploring who receives certain privileges and who does *not*.

7.6. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have shown how migrant entrepreneurs cannot be assumed to be disadvantaged and, on the contrary, those from core-states (in particular) often demonstrate the exact opposite, namely, *privilege*. In the same way that white people in McIntosh's (1988) groundbreaking paper seem privileged in the environment of American society, migrant entrepreneurs from core-states in this study seem to benefit in a similar way with 'an invisible package of unearned assets',

such as social and linguistic prestige, the ability to find well-paid employment, relatively unrestricted international mobility, and easier access to affluent markets in core-states. Privilege, however, cannot exist without oppression (Ferguson 2013), so, perhaps unsurprisingly, migrants from periphery-states were found to be correspondingly subjected to *disadvantages*, such as a lower social standing of their cultures and languages, restricted international mobility, barriers to well-paid mainstream employment, and barriers to accessing affluent markets in core-states. There is, however, one exception, whereby periphery-state migrant entrepreneurs are privileged by their apparent superior ability to access more affordable supplies of labour from - or located in - periphery-states. Nevertheless, the broader trend of those from core-states receiving more privileges remains.

In other core-to-(semi-)periphery contexts, such privilege has been closely tied to the role of ethnicity (Fechter 2005; Hoang 2014; Lundstrom 2017) or resources (Beaverstock 2002; Sklair 2012). Within this study, however, both groups of migrant entrepreneurs were predominantly white and with relatively equal levels of resources which, subsequently, begs the question how the aforementioned variations in privileges can be accounted for. Looking for insight into this, I explored how variations in migrant entrepreneurs' motivations and access to resources (on a micro level) interact with the wider environment (on a macro level), resulting in apparent variations in privileges and disadvantages (on a meso level). In keeping with previous chapters, in order to simplify and organize the analysis, I subdivided the macro environment up into four separate layers: 1. Socio-cultural; 2. Politico-institutional; Economic; and 4. Technological.

Starting with the socio-cultural macro environment, I showed how migrants' variation in the geographical origin of their cultural capital, when positioned within cultural hierarchies, leads to differences in the interpretation and valuation of this capital. Specifically, it seems that core-state cultural capital, within the environment of Wrocław, takes on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988), subsequently becoming desirable and economically valuable. These cultural hierarchies, I revealed, stretch well-beyond Wrocław, with core-state capital often being 'transnationally acknowledged' and 'associated with high standards worldwide' (Weiss 2005: 722). However, I also highlighted how there can be local variations, exposing how migrants 'do not only cross national borders but also move between different sets of social classification systems that are tied to local, national and transnational hierarchies' (Lundstrom 2017: 82, citing Kusow 2006). Further, in addition to varying across space, I also demonstrated how cultural hierarchies can vary across time. Despite their evolution over hundreds (and no doubt thousands) of years, I noted how, unlike ethnicity or gender, privilege based upon citizenship has not been explored in as much depth (Choules 2006).

I then switched the focus to the politico-institutional layer of the macro environment and the role it plays in disadvantaging those from periphery-states, who are often subject to a collection of regulatory barriers, both public and private,


which have the effect of reducing their politico-institutional mobility. Conversely, I showed how this layer of the environment grants those from core-states with relative freedom of movement, both geographically and in business matters. This, I argued, is no coincidence, as citizenship is, after all, 'a construct designed to protect the dominant group' (Choules 2006: 288).

I then outlined the crucial role of the economic environment in the variation of privileges between the two subject groups. First of all, I highlighted the symbiotic relationship between the economic environment and other levels of the macro environment. Second, I recounted how the uneven economic landscape leads to variations in the relative privilege (or disadvantage) of motivations for migrating, with many migrants from periphery-states migrating for economic reasons, while those from core-states often have the privilege of basing their migrations upon non-economic factors. Nevertheless, I also showed how this is not always the case, and how some migrants from core-states can themselves be considered 'necessity migrants', whereby stagnating economies and declining welfare states in many core-states are pushing them from core-states to (semi-)periphery-states (Dixon et al. 2006; Hayes 2015; 2018).

Finally, on a technological level, I showed how migrants' position within certain industry sectors (which itself is broadly a reflection of structural differences between core- and periphery economies) can lead to various privileges and disadvantages, namely, the ability to provide products or services remotely to affluent clientele in core-states. The idea of this ability as a privilege, I argued, was brought to the forefront during the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, whereby businesses providing services locally were negatively impacted by government enforced lockdowns, while many of those providing services remotely remained relatively unscathed - or even benefited.

Throughout exploring the role of this multi-layered macro environment, I highlighted three additional observations. First, even though the macro environment affects migrant entrepreneurs in a 'top-down' manner, the migrants themselves play an active role in the process, as they consume and reproduce macro structures on a micro level (Burawoy 2001). Second, the macro environment is not only present on a local (Wroclaw) level, but extends well-beyond the borders of Poland. Third, not only does it stretch and vary across space, but also across time. Taking these points into consideration, in addition to the phenomena I have highlighted in this chapter in general, I argue that the degree to which migrants experience privilege and/or disadvantage can only be properly understood if we first position them, their motivations, and resources, not just within the environment of Wroclaw in the here and now, but also within a global environment which itself is the result of a series of historical events over time (Buzan & Lawson 2015).

8.



CHAPTER 8

Theoretical explanation: Global-embeddedness

'By jettisoning methodological nationalism, an orientation that makes the nation-state the unit of analysis, scholars of migration and development are better able to examine differences of power within states and regions and around the globe', (Schiller & Faist 2010: 5).

8.1. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to answering the third and final research question, namely: 'How can these variations and interactions (encountered in Chapters 3 to 7) be theoretically explained?' After all, so far in this dissertation I have gone to great lengths to highlight a number of issues with the current theories, while not yet offering an alternative theoretical framework or solution. Hence, now, in this chapter, this is exactly what I will attempt to do. I will start by recapping how this study has 'lit up' the prominent role played by a *macro level global environment*, and how this environment seems not only uneven, but uneven on multiple levels (economic, technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional). It is, I will argue, only by situating migrant entrepreneurs (as well as their motivations and access to resources) within this global environment that we can theoretically account for the variations and interactions observed in this study. Subsequently, in order to foreground the importance of the role played by this macro level environment, I will propose the term 'Global-embeddedness'. In doing so, my goal is to extend scholars' calls for adopting a more global unit of analysis (Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2010) into the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

8.2. A multi-layered, uneven, global environment

Throughout the empirical chapters (3 to 7), I have highlighted how the migrant entrepreneurs in this study seem to be operating not just within a local and national environment, but within a wider, *international context*. This international context is, of course, a tremendously broad and complex entity, so in order to simplify the analysis, I have consistently broken it down into four distinct (yet closely intertwined) layers: 1. Economic; 2. Technological; 3. Socio-cultural; and 4. Politico-institutional. At this point, I would like to express that there may well be other layers of this environment and by no means do I claim that this typology is exhaustive. No, instead, my goal in creating this typology is to simply reflect, and organize, various aspects of the macro environment which seem to be playing a role in the businesses and lives of the migrant entrepreneurs in this particular study. With this in mind, I will now, below, attempt to outline these layers of the macro environment.

8.2.1. The global economic environment

The idea of an uneven, economic environment is nothing new. How certain cities and regions can be more prosperous than others has been well-documented (Scott 1998; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Scott & Storper 2003). Yet, within the field of migrant entrepreneurship, this observation has been largely restricted to the uneven economic environment within the host country (Bagwell 2018). This study, however, has highlighted how economic variations exist not only within the borders of the host country, but also *internationally*. Indeed, many of the migrant entrepreneurs in this study spoke of how clients in core-states can ‘pay more’, clients in periphery-states ‘pay less’, while clients in the semi-periphery environment of Wrocław appear to be paying on a level somewhere between the two. Similarly, they spoke of how labour, and expenses in general, are more expensive in core-states, less expensive in periphery-states, while, once again, within the semi-periphery environment of Wrocław, these costs are somewhere between the two. This geographical variation in income and expenses beyond the borders of Poland, reveals not only the presence of the global economic landscape, but how it is *uneven*.

This, in turn, lends support to scholars who, outside of the migrant entrepreneurship literature, have highlighted the uneven economic development not just within nation-states, but *between* them (Sassen 1991; Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005). Within the complex internationalisation of trade and processes, control has become centered within a small number of ‘global cities’, such as New York, London, and Tokyo, while other (semi-)periphery cities have arguably benefited from the decentralization of other parts of the supply chain (Sassen 1991). As a matter of fact, Wrocław, as shown in previous chapters, has been a benefactor of huge levels of direct foreign investment by transnational corporations attracted by its composition of ‘concentrated competitive advantages’ (Scott 1998: 155), namely membership of the EU, proximity to Western Europe, and a plentiful supply of affordable, educated labour. The subsequent booming economy and increased demand for labour has led to wages rising sharply in recent years, showing how the economic environment is not only uneven across space, but also time (Hoang 2014).

8.2.2. The global technological environment

This study also unearthed data which hints at the presence of an uneven, global, *technological* environment. In Chapter 5, I showed how migrants from core-states seem more likely to be located within tertiary service sectors, which itself seems representative of broader variation between the migrants’ countries of origin. These tertiary industries, as noted in Chapter 5, seem to lend themselves better to long-distance distribution, subsequently empowering entrepreneurs (often those from core-states) within these sectors with an apparent greater ability to target comparatively more affluent clients situated internationally in core-states.

As such, this variation in sector hints at the presence of technological hierarchies, whereby certain areas around the world seem ‘higher up’ than others. Or, in the words of Burawoy (2001: 150): ‘[technologies] do not flow on a level plain, but are propagated through inequalities of power between transmitter and receiver. There is a hierarchical chain...’. As such, variations in the technological level of migrant entrepreneurs’ industry sector, as well as their country of origin, could be indicative of variations in their position within such technological hierarchies.

8.2.3. The global socio-cultural landscape

I showed, previously, how migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, within the environment of Wrocław, appear to benefit from an ‘elevated status’, while those from periphery-states experience the opposite, lending support to Andrejuk’s (2017) observation of cultural hierarchies within Poland. Importantly, I also highlighted how such cultural hierarchies appear to stretch beyond Poland’s borders into international contexts, whereby cultural capital of those from core-states ‘can become transnationally acknowledged’ (Weiss 2005: 722) and seems to take on positive values in contexts external to Poland. Further, I showed how the treatment of certain migrant entrepreneurs of non-white heritage has changed in recent years (along with the new government), reflecting once again how such hierarchies do not just vary across space, but also time.

8.2.4. The global politico-institutional landscape

In Chapter 6, I showed how certain authors seem justified in highlighting the important role played by the politico-institutional environment within the host country (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Englelman 2001), yet, importantly, I also showed how this layer of the environment does not stop at the host country’s borders. On the contrary, I showed how laws originating from outside of Poland can impact migrant entrepreneurs within Poland. This seems to happen in two ways. First, international regulation can *directly* affect migrant entrepreneurs and their opportunity structures. For example, Jari (from Finland) is now selling non-plastic straws, as a result of EU legislation which bans the use of regular plastic straws as of 2021. Further, the importance of international legislation becomes even more apparent for migrants providing products or services internationally (whereby they must adhere to the local laws and regulations of their international clients). Second, international regulation can have *indirect* effects. Migrants, purely based upon their citizenship, are often subject to different regulations and restrictions, essentially constituting a kind of passport hierarchy. While those from core-states often enjoy freedom of movement (both geographically and institutionally), those from periphery-states seem more likely to be subjected to restrictions. Further, migrants’ experience of non-Polish (i.e. international) regulatory systems, such as

those from their home country, often influences how they perceive Polish regulation. For example, migrants originating from nation-states with comparatively high taxes often subsequently perceive taxes in Poland to be low, revealing how such opinions must be situated within the wider, international, politico-institutional environment.

8.3. Global-embeddedness

This uneven, global environment, I will now argue, plays an important role in the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship. This role, however, has so far been largely neglected. Indeed, over the last several decades, migration and social science scholars have been preoccupied with using the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis, a tendency referred to as ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Schiller 2002; Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Wolf 2010; Glick Schiller & Faist 2010; Schiller 2015). This has been defined by Schiller & Faist (2013: 28) as ‘an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states’. As a sub-branch of migration, it is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the field of migrant entrepreneurship has followed in these footsteps. Indeed, prominent theories within the field have almost invariably been restricted in focus to within the borders of the host country only. Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), for example, was formulated on the basis of comparisons between migrants and the *host-country* labour force, while Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006) was based upon Cubans in the context of Miami and labour markets in the wider US (i.e. host country) economy. Then, of course, there is the Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999) which, as mentioned in previous chapters, went so far as to explicitly label the host country as the largest unit of analysis in its typology of the opportunity structure (Kloosterman & Rath 2001).

Admittedly, there have, however, been at least two groups of migrant entrepreneurship scholars who have paid more attention to factors beyond the borders of the host-country. First, scholars of migrant entrepreneurship within the garment industry have (perhaps unavoidably) acknowledged the far-reaching effects of globalization upon the sector (see, for example, Rath 2002 or Ram et al. 2003). Second, scholars of transnational entrepreneurship have, as the name suggests, written extensively about migrant entrepreneurs with *transnational* businesses (see Saxenian 1999; 2002; Portes et al. 1999; 2001; Rusinovic 2008; Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015; Bagwell 2018). Yet, despite both groups of scholars addressing factors beyond the borders of the host country, at least three key concerns remain. First, this international exploration is often restricted to the binary paradigm of the host and home countries, de facto ignoring any role played by third-party countries. Second, even when taking third-party countries into account,

the authors tend to retain the nation-state as their largest unit of analysis, which itself still ignores any role played by supranational factors. Third, both groups of scholars, in addition to most migration scholars in general, have tended to focus upon migration to their country of residence (Schiller & Faist 2010). This can even be seen from the language they use whereby, instead of using the term '*migrant entrepreneur*', they often use '*immigrant entrepreneur*', implicitly revealing a host-country viewpoint.

This third point, I will now argue, has important consequences. As a result of most leading migration scholars being located at educational institutions within core-states, they have (understandably) tended to focus on the flows of migration happening right in front of their eyes, namely, *migration to core-states*. This, when coupled with the fact that most migration to core-states tends to originate from *periphery-states*,⁹⁰ has resulted in the overwhelming majority of migrant entrepreneurship studies to date having been not only focused on the host country nation-state as the largest unit of analysis (Chen & tan 2009; Bagwell 2018), but also situated within *(semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts* (Ilhan-nas et al. 2011; Dheer 2018). Importantly, core- and periphery-states are themselves not situated within a flat and even global landscape, but rather, as I have outlined above, within an uneven, hierarchical, global landscape, whereby core-states find themselves toward the 'top' end and periphery-states diametrically toward the 'bottom'. Theories, then, which have been developed in the context of (semi-)periphery-to-core migration, may well have been created within 'dominant-subordinate relationships' which can grant 'a certain power relationship in favor of the anthropologist' (Nader 1972: 5). Indeed, by restricting our focus to (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, many of the current theories and models have, I argue, been 'theorized largely on the basis of persistent power imbalances in the international system' (Croucher 2009: 479). Subsequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that these theories often seem to make a number of assumptions which reflect this dominant-subordinate context within which they were created. First, as detailed in Chapter 3, they assume that migrants' motivations are economic in character or even neglect them altogether. This, I proposed, is because in the (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts in which they have been formulated, the authors have often *assumed* that migrants want to move to a more economically developed country and, likewise, open their own business for economic reasons. Second, as seen in Chapter 5, the Interactive Model (Waldinger et al. 1990) and Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999) assume that migrants only access opportunity structures within the borders of the host country. This, perhaps, is unsurprising, given that the migrants, upon which these theories were based, appeared to conduct their businesses almost entirely within the (economically dominant) host-country's borders, seldom extending their businesses internationally. Third, Ethnic Enclave Theory (as detailed

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90 South-North migration flows greatly outweigh that of North-North (UN DESA 2020).

in Chapter 6) assumes that migrants often have access to a plentiful supply of affordable, co-ethnic labour. Fourth, and finally, Disadvantage Theory (as seen in Chapters 4 and 7) assumes that migrants, invariably originating from (semi)-periphery-states, are often disadvantaged (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010).

Yet, when we study 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship, as has been done in this study, we begin to see how such inverse migratory contexts seem problematic for these theories. Indeed, they reveal how the assumptions outlined above cannot necessarily be assumed. First, they highlight how motivations (for both migrating and starting a business) are not only important, but are also non-uniform and, therefore, cannot always be assumed to be economic in character. Second, the opportunity structure cannot be assumed to be situated solely within the borders of the host country. Third, ethnic enclaves cannot be assumed to provide a plentiful pool of affordable, co-ethnic labour. Fourth, migrants cannot always be assumed to be disadvantaged.

So, then, how can such variations be explained? Here, I will argue that they can only be understood within the context of the wider, global environment. Scholars' methodological nationalistic focus upon migrant entrepreneurship in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts has, I argue, largely blinded us to the important role played by *factors beyond the borders of host countries*. Wrocław, despite being surrounded by a moat, does not exist in isolation. Its population of migrant entrepreneurs are part of, and affected by, a wider, international environment, extending well-beyond city and national borders and existing on multiple levels and subject to change over time. As such, to truly understand all processes involved in migrant entrepreneurship, we must situate migrant entrepreneurs not just within the local and national environment, but within an uneven, multi-layered (economic, technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional) global environment. To describe the positioning of migrants' micro level resources (their motivations and resources) and their meso-level environment (namely, their businesses and the opportunity structures which they access) within this macro level, multi-layered, global environment, I propose the term 'Global-embeddedness'. By using this term, I aim to capture several important implications. First, migrant entrepreneurs operate within an environment extending well-beyond the host country. Second, this environment varies across both time and space. Third, migrants' resources can be shaped by their position within this global environment. Fourth, and finally, despite this global environment influencing migrants and their resources, it is not strictly 'top down', as migrants do have an element of agency, albeit often actively consuming and reproducing such structures (Burawoy 2001).


Of course, such a global approach is nothing new. Within the wider social sciences literature, several scholars have already called for us to move beyond the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis (Wimmer & Schiller 2002; Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Wolf 2010; Schiller & Faist 2010; Schiller 2015). Yet, within the

field of migrant entrepreneurship, it is a somewhat novel suggestion. Although, as noted in Chapter 5, some scholars have emphasized the importance of factors outside of the host country (Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015; Bagwell 2018), these factors are often restricted to the binary paradigm of host and home countries. Yet, a Global-embeddedness Approach, as shown in Figure 8.1, below, calls instead for a consideration of how migrants' (and their motivations and resources) are embedded not only within their host and home countries, but within third party countries as well as the wider global environment. As such, the concept of Global-embeddedness echoes scholars' calls for adopting a more global unit of analysis (Wallerstein 1987; 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2010) and extends it into the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

I anticipate two 'push backs' regarding the use of this term. First, some might argue that we should simply reposition the existing term 'Mixed-embeddedness' to incorporate a wider, global context. However, my counter argument would be that, importantly, the term 'Mixed-embeddedness' lacks any connotations of positioning migrants within global hierarchies, and instead has centred around migrants' embeddedness within host-country environments. 'Global-embeddedness', by contrast, forefronts the importance of the wider, global context, as well as the power dynamics implicit within this. A second potential criticism of the term is that such global theories have previously been criticised for trying to be a 'grand narrative' (Schiller & Faist 2010). However, my counter argument would be that positioning migrant entrepreneurs within this global environment is the only way to truly incorporate all factors at play. Not doing so would mean not understanding the full picture.

Last of all, I would like to clarify two further things. First, adopting such a global approach does not mean refraining from using the nation-state unit of analysis altogether (Schiller & Faist 2010). On the contrary, as seen from my depiction in Figure 8.1. of what 'Global-embeddedness' encompasses, I still make use of the terms 'host country', 'home country', and 'third party countries', so clearly I am not advocating for a total abandonment of the nation-state unit of analysis. No, instead, I am proposing that, in the same way that cities are not the largest unit of analysis, neither should nation-states. Instead, I argue, the largest unit of analysis should be much wider, namely, *global* structures. Second, I would like to clarify that Global-embeddedness is an approach and not a model. By this I mean it does not attempt to define or predict how global processes work. No, rather, the purpose is to simply acknowledge the important role played by an uneven global environment, and to situate migrant entrepreneurs (and their motivations and resources) within it. In doing so, we can better understand the full context within which migrant entrepreneurship takes place.

Figure 8.1. Global-embeddedness: Expanding the unit of analysis to include the global, macro environment




Source: My own diagram based on my interpretation of other models.

8.4. Global-embeddedness and migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw

I will now demonstrate, below, how adopting a Global-embeddedness Approach can account for the variations encountered in this study. So far in this dissertation, I have ordered these variations into four distinct organizational categories, namely: 1. variations in migrant entrepreneurs' motivations (Chapter 3); 2. variations in access to opportunity structures (Chapter 5); 3. variation in migrants' ethnic division of labour (Chapter 6); and 4. variations in privilege and disadvantage (Chapter 7). However - and importantly - these categories are not all equal, nor do they necessarily happen in this order. Indeed, despite these variations all being directly or indirectly caused by migrants' varying Global-embeddedness, it is the latter (i.e. variations in privilege and disadvantage) which largely determines migrants' motivations and the location of their (accessed) opportunity structures. These categories, in turn, combine to influence migrants' variation in their ethnic division of labour. This causal relationship can be seen below in Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2. The relationship between migrants' Global-embeddedness and the variations encountered in this study



Source: My own diagram based on the data encountered in this study.

At this point, the reader might ask why, if the organizational category of migrants' composition of privileges and disadvantages plays such a prominent role, did I order this category as the final empirical chapter and not the first? Here, my answer is that it was only after analysis of the migrant entrepreneurship process (including their motivations, their opportunity structures, and their ethnic division of labour) that their composition of privileges and disadvantages became visible. I now foreground

the importance of this organizational category by elevating it to the top of my discussion, below.

8.4.1. Disadvantage vs. privilege

Here I argue that, by looking through a Global-embeddedness lens, we can begin to understand how the two groups vary in their composition of privileges and disadvantages. As explained previously, the world is not a flat, level playing field. Migrants operate within a multi-layered (economic, technological, socio-cultural, politico-institutional), uneven environment. It is the variation in the position of the migrants (and their resources) within this uneven environment which generates the variation in privileges. For example, starting with the socio-cultural layer of the macro environment, those from core-states are, unsurprisingly, more likely to possess higher levels of core-state cultural and social capital. This, when situated within cultural hierarchies (both within Wrocław and beyond) takes on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988). As a result of this, those possessing core-state cultural capital are granted a relatively higher standing within society, while those with periphery-state cultural capital experience the mirror opposite.

Second, switching to the politico-institutional layer of the global environment, migrants are granted a number of privileges (or disadvantages) based purely upon their citizenship. In general, those possessing passports from core-states are bestowed with greater politico-institutional mobility (both geographically and for business matters) than those possessing passports from periphery-states.

Third, the uneven, international technological landscape also plays a role in realizing certain privileges. As mentioned previously, migrant entrepreneurs, on a micro-level, might (often, but not always) embody broader, international technological variation. Specifically, those from core-states seem more likely to run businesses in tertiary sectors, which tend to lend themselves better to long-distance distribution, allowing them to target (more lucrative) business opportunities in core-states. How this ability is a *privilege* was recently foregrounded by the global COVID-19 pandemic, whereby those dependent upon a local clientele were often very negatively affected by the government enforced lockdown, whereas many of those capable of servicing clients remotely were largely unscathed (or even benefitted).

Fourth, and finally, the uneven global economic landscape also contributes to variation in migrants' privileges. Its symbiotic relationship with the aforementioned socio-cultural, politico-institutional, and technological hierarchies plays a role in reinforcing them, while also providing the uneven economic starting point around which migrants' often base their motivations for migrating, as I will now show below.

8.4.2. Variation in motivations

Such variation in privilege plays a dominant role in determining variations between the two subject groups in terms of their motivations for both migrating to Wrocław, as well as starting a business. With regard to the former, these variations in motivation are reflections of 'spatial opportunity differentials' (De Haas 2011: 20) between migrants' locations of origin (and third party countries) and their host country environment (i.e. Wrocław). Importantly, such spatial opportunity differentials are themselves a reflection of an uneven global environment and migrants subsequent privileged (or disadvantaged) position within this environment. Once we situate the migrant entrepreneurs within the various layers of this environment, such differing motivations between the two subject groups begin to make sense. First of all, within the uneven, global *economic* environment, with wealth concentrated in regions in core-states, it is perhaps unsurprising that the migrant entrepreneurs who are privileged to be born into such economically prosperous regions are less likely to relocate to Wrocław for higher earnings. Conversely, for those from periphery-states, whereby their migration to Wrocław constitutes a move to an economically more developed region, it is likewise unsurprising that they seem more likely to do so for higher revenues. Of course, as also seen in Chapter 3, it is not always so simple, as a small number of those from core-states did indeed relocate to Wrocław for economic reasons, however, importantly, this was more about *reducing costs*, as opposed to increasing earnings.

Second, the uneven, international, politico-institutional environment also plays a role. Owing to its unevenness, it grants certain migrants with certain privileges, while unfairly assigning disadvantages to others. Such privileges or disadvantages then influence migrants' motivations for migrating. For example, migrants from periphery-states (notably, Ukraine) were motivated to move to Wrocław for its comparatively safe environment with 'rule-of-law'. For those from core-states, by contrast, whereby their home country environments can also be considered to be safe with 'rule-of-law', this was not a motivating factor. Further, within such an uneven environment, migrants experience variation in their politico-institutional mobility, which is based almost entirely upon their citizenship. For those from core-states, it is often relatively easy to travel and work around the world. For those from periphery-states, however, they regularly face legal barriers which curtails their ability to travel and work (Sklair 2012). This is illustrated by how many of the periphery-state migrant entrepreneurs in this study chose Poland because they could not legally migrate to other third party countries such as Germany. This, combined with Polish national legislation allowing them to immigrate and work, contributed to them choosing Poland. Wrocław, in other words, was not their first choice. This highlights how migrants' aspirations can be restricted by their capabilities (De Haas 2011) and, importantly, how such capabilities are a reflection

of migrants' privileged or disadvantaged position within an uneven, international uneven, international politico-institutional environment.

Let us now consider the variation in migrants' motivations for starting their own business. As seen in Chapter 3, many of those from the core-states subject group talked about how opening a business was a way of escaping 'meaningless' corporate employment and a way of having more agency, whereby money was not the main motivation. Those from the periphery-states subject group, by contrast, spoke more about how entrepreneurship was a pathway to exactly that, namely, *more money*. Here, once again, I argue that migrants' varying Global-embeddendesss, and their subsequent variation in their composition of privileges and disadvantages, can serve as a way of understanding such variation. As mentioned previously, those from core-states are granted the privilege of finding it easier to secure relatively well-paid positions within the mainstream labour market. It stands to reason, therefore, that if a migrant already has a well-paid job, that they would then be less likely to be motivated to open their own business for financial reasons. Conversely, for those from periphery-states, who face more barriers to securing well-paid employment in the mainstream labour market (Grand & Szulkin 2002), it should not come as a surprise that they are more likely to be motivated by the relatively higher earnings offered by an entrepreneurial trajectory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). As such, it reveals how motivations themselves seem to reflect broader inequalities in the environment and the embeddedness of migrants and their resources (i.e. their 'Global-embeddedness') within this environment.

8.4.3. Variation in migrants' location of (accessed) opportunity structures

In Chapter 5, I detailed the variation in the geographical location of migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures whereby those from core-states seem more likely to access *international* opportunity structures in core-states, while those from periphery-states seem more likely to access *local* opportunity structures in Wrocław. Here I argue, once again, that adopting a Global-embeddedness Approach enables us to account for variations between the two subject groups. First of all, by situating migrant entrepreneurs within global economic hierarchies, we can account for *why* migrant entrepreneurs would even *want to* access opportunity structures in core-states. Within this uneven, economic landscape, whereby wealth is concentrated in core-states, clients there can 'pay more', so there is an *economic incentive* to target them. Likewise, it explains why almost no migrant entrepreneurs (from either subject group) were observed accessing opportunity structures in (comparatively less affluent) periphery-states. Second, it provides a mechanism to explain *how* they access such markets. This can be done by situating migrant entrepreneurs within the other layers (technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional) of the global environment. In terms of the technological environment, as seen above

(and in Chapter 5), certain industries, in particular those in the tertiary sector, seem to lend themselves better to international distribution. Migrant entrepreneurs from core-states are more likely to be located within such industries, which helps to explain *how* they are able to service clients internationally. Turning now to the role of the socio-cultural layer of the global environment, the acquisition of core-state social and cultural capital can act as a bridge to core-state markets. Unsurprisingly, it seems that clients situated in core-states are more likely to conduct business with people they know and in a language they know. It follows then, that migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, who have usually spent much of their lives acquiring core-state social and cultural capital, are more likely to possess the socio-cultural capital necessary to bridge this gap. Last, but not least, the international politico-institutional layer of the global environment also helps to account for the 'how'. As seen above, the international politico-institutional landscape is *uneven*. While most migrant entrepreneurs from core-states can travel and conduct business internationally with relative ease, those from the periphery-states seem to face more restrictions. This uneven landscape can restrict migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states from moving freely to core-states,⁹¹ subsequently curtailing their ability to acquire social and cultural capital in these countries, with the end result that they are less likely to be able to 'bridge' themselves to clients situated in core-states. The migrants, in other words, owing to their Global-embeddedness, inherit a specific composition of privileges and/or disadvantages which, in turn, enables or restricts the opportunity structures which they are able to access.

8.4.4. Variation in migrants' ethnic division of labour

Last of all, I argue that migrants' varying Global-embeddedness, in conjunction with its subsequent shaping of migrants' privileges, motivations, and opportunity structures (as outlined above), can account for the variations in the subject groups' ethnic division of labour. As a reminder, this study found that migrants from core-states, in contradiction to Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006), were less likely to source employees from a plentiful supply of affordable co-ethnic labour (as it was neither plentiful nor affordable) and, instead, often opted to hire native, Polish labour. Here, I will subdivide my explanation into three key questions: 1. Why is core-state labour less plentiful? 2. Why is core-state labour less affordable? And 3. If periphery-state labour is more affordable, then why doesn't everyone access this labour supply? Starting

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91 This restriction of international mobility might also help to explain why, in many studies (for example, Kloosterman et al. 1999), (semi)-periphery-to-core migrant entrepreneurs seem less likely to access international opportunity structures. After all, once inside a core-state, such a restriction of international mobility might discourage them from further moving around, subsequently encouraging them to focus on business opportunities within the core-state host country.

with the first question, an uneven global environment inherently creates ‘spatial opportunity differentials’ (De Haas 2011: 20) which, as seen above, underlies migrants’ motivations for migrating. Such motivations, combined with migrants’ varying capability to migrate to a location of their choosing (i.e. their position within an uneven politico-institutional global environment), have resulted in relatively high numbers of migrants from certain periphery-states (notably, Ukrainians) migrating to Wrocław. Conversely, only a small number of migrants from core-states have relocated to Wrocław. This helps to explain why, for those from core-states, co-ethnic labour is *not plentiful*.

I turn now to the second question, which concerns itself with why core-state labour is less affordable. Again, by considering the international context, we can begin to understand why this may be. Within the context of Wrocław’s BPO economy, which itself is positioned within a global economy, serving predominantly core-state clients, those who possess core-state cultural capital are often highly desirable within the labour market. This demand of core-state labour, combined with its lower supply within Wrocław, provides a mechanism for explaining its relatively higher cost.

Third, and finally, there is the question of why both subjects groups do not access the same labour supply. By this I mean, if periphery-state labour is more affordable, then why were those from the core-states subject group rarely found to access it and, instead, more often found to be hiring native, Polish labour? Here, I argue that the answer can be found in one of the only privileges of migrants from periphery-states, namely, their privileged access to periphery-state labour. While those from core-states are able to leverage their core-state cultural and social capital to access profitable opportunity structures in core-states, those from periphery-states, conversely, are able to leverage their periphery-state social and cultural capital to access an affordable supply of periphery labour.

8.5. Conclusions

In this chapter, I attempted to answer the third and final research question, namely: ‘How can these variations and interactions (encountered in Chapters 3 to 7) be theoretically explained?’ In order to do so, I first outlined the presence of an uneven, macro environment which exists on a *global scale* and consists of multiple layers (economic, technological, politico-institutional, and socio-cultural). I then, subsequently, argued that the variations and interactions encountered in this study can be understood by situating migrants (and their motivations, and access to resources) within this global environment. In doing so, I proposed the concept of ‘Global-embeddedness’. Finally, I demonstrated how this concept can help us to understand four specific variations identified in this study, namely: 1. variations in motivations; 2. variations in the locations of (accessed) opportunity

structures; 3. variations in the ethnic division of labour; and 4. variations in privilege and disadvantage. These variations, I proposed, are not all equal, as the latter (migrants composition of privileges and disadvantages) seems to play a prominent role in shaping migrants' motivations and opportunity structures which, in turn, influences their ethnic division of labour.

9.



Conclusions

9.1. Introduction

This study has asked what happens when we study ‘up’ in migrant entrepreneurship. As a point of entry, I started with the story of Francesco (Italy) who, over 20 years ago, decided to migrate to his wife’s native city of Wroclaw, Poland, whereupon he subsequently opened his own architecture firm. Francesco’s story, I argued, presents a number of curious dilemmas for many of the leading theories within the field of migrant entrepreneurship. These dilemmas, I suggested, seem somehow connected to Francesco’s migration being ‘in reverse’, whereby he moved from an economically *more developed* country to one which is economically *less developed*. And, importantly, Francesco is not alone. Although part of a migration trend which is indeed far smaller than that of migration to core-states, he has been joined by over 13 million⁹² (in 2019 alone) other migrants who have likewise moved in a North-South direction, including myself. Of course, not all of them become entrepreneurs, but I could see with my own eyes (in Wroclaw) that many of them *do*. Despite this, the phenomenon of core-to-(semi)-periphery migrant entrepreneurship has received very little attention among scholars. Indeed, in a literature review by Dheer (2018) of 69 studies, he found that *none of them* analysed migration in this direction. Subsequently, this study has attempted to fill the gap in the literature by studying ‘up’ (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012). Yet, any attempt to study ‘up’ requires a ‘down’ against which to position itself. As such, this has been a comparative study which has not only included migrants from core-states (such as the USA, UK, and Germany), but also periphery-states (namely, Ukraine and Belarus). Wroclaw, as a city within a semi-periphery state, provided an ideal setting in which both subject groups could be observed in a relatively neutral environment. Importantly, the study’s results reveal variations between the two subject groups which are problematic for many of the existing theories. This, I argue, is indicative of how such theories have been rooted in dominant-subordinate periphery-to-core migratory contexts. As a direct consequence of this, through studying the micro level agency of migrant entrepreneurs who have migrated in the opposite direction, this study was able to ‘light up’ previously hidden assumptions and structures (Duneier 2014: 7). Thereupon, in order to foreground the importance of situating migrant entrepreneurship within these (uneven and global) structures, I subsequently proposed the concept of ‘Global-embeddedness’.

9.2. Why does this study matter?

As noted above, this study has helped to fill a gap in the literature. But what makes it a gap which is worth filling? Here, I provided five compelling reasons. First and

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foremost, I proposed that there are important theoretical reasons to do so. Nader (1972: 5) warned against anthropologists' 'downward' facing preoccupation with disadvantaged groups and minorities. This, she states, inevitably creates a 'dominant-subordinate' relationship between the researcher and the subject of study and, subsequently, may be 'affecting the kinds of theories that we are weaving' (ibid). Indeed, despite this warning being issued well over 40 years ago, I argued that it still seems to ring true in the field of migrant entrepreneurship even today. This, I demonstrated, can be seen in the way that Francesco's situation (as an example of studying 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship) seems problematic for three of the most prominent theories within the field, namely, Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006), and Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999).

Starting with Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), I questioned whether migrants, such as Francesco, are indeed, as the theory suggests, 'disadvantaged'. This theory would attribute his entrepreneurial adventures as merely an act of *necessity*, resulting from his disadvantaged migrant status, which curtails his ability to access the mainstream labour market. This, I argued, was certainly not the case with Francesco who certainly did not seem to occupy a disadvantaged position relative to the mainstream Polish society. After all, he had openly admitted to the social prestige he enjoyed as an Italian in Wrocław and how he was viewed as 'exotic', not to mention how he had found high paid employment as an architect and, subsequently, did not start his own company out of necessity but, rather, *volition*.

I then turned to Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006), another theory which makes efforts to explain the high rate of entrepreneurship among certain migrant populations. In contrast to Disadvantage Theory, however, this theory proposes that migrant entrepreneurs may have a distinct *advantage*, namely, a plentiful supply of affordable, co-ethnic labour. But, once again, I questioned whether this is true of migrants from core-states, such as Francesco, for whom, as an Italian in Wrocław, a plentiful supply of affordable, co-ethnic labour seemed unlikely.

Finally, I suggested that Francesco's circumstances do not even seem to fit within arguably the most inclusive theory within the field, namely, that of Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999). In a well-meaning and genuinely helpful attempt to create a typology of the opportunity structure, the authors assign the *host-country* as the largest unit of analysis (Kloosterman & Rath 2001). Yet, for Francesco, who has clients and investors in the UK, Ireland, and Italy, it would seem his opportunity structure extends well beyond the borders of the host-country.

Second, and returning to the original question of why this is a gap in the literature which is worth filling, I suggested that doing so may have methodological

implications for new research projects. If, for example, studying ‘up’ reveals the presence of hidden assumptions and structures, then this might serve as a reminder to other researchers about the importance of identifying taken-for-granted notions in their research.

Third, I postulated that shifting the focus toward more privileged forms of migration may help to change the negative narrative surrounding migration. Within the mainstream Western media, migrants are often presented as a homogenous, disadvantaged group. Although a small number of studies have helped to highlight that not all migrants are disadvantaged (e.g. Saxenian 1999; 2002; Froschauer & Wong 2012), such ideas have largely been drowned out amidst the wider narrative. Nonetheless, by more actively shining the spotlight upon more privileged forms of migration, we might begin to expand the semantic scope of ‘migrant’ beyond one of negativity and disadvantage.

Fourth, I proposed that there may even be theoretical ramifications *beyond the field of migrant entrepreneurship*, in particular in terms of global inequality. The most common indicator of inequality is wealth. What then, could be more meaningful, than researching those at the forefront of wealth creation, that is to say, *entrepreneurs*? I proposed that, through the micro-level analysis of migrant entrepreneurs from polar opposite sides of the economic spectrum, we might be able to shine a light upon the processes which create and reinforce global inequality.

Fifth, and finally, I suggested that there may be subsequent implications for policy-makers. After all, if the migrant entrepreneurship theories have been rooted in dominant-subordinate contexts, then what does that mean for the policy-makers, governments, and organizations who are building and implementing policy based upon such theories? This, I proposed, may be of particular relevance to policy-makers in (semi-)periphery countries for whom theories built upon core-state contexts may well be incompatible.

9.3. Why an heuristic model?

Having highlighted how studying ‘up’ appears to pose a number of problems for many of the existing theories, I needed, of course, to propose an alternative theoretical model for the purposes of conducting the study. Yet, as an explorative, inductive study, I attempted to withhold any final theoretical proposals until later on and, instead, proceeded with a heuristic model. By using this model, my aim was to include all possible variables, while remaining open to if and how they are connected to one another. In other words, I tried to include all the ingredients without yet knowing the exact recipe. As a starting point, this heuristic model included many variables from existing models. For example, I borrowed from Kloosterman’s (2010) division of ‘micro’, ‘meso’, and ‘macro’ layers which allowed me to break up the complex phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship into more

manageable pieces. Additionally, in order to include variables of agency on a micro level, I borrowed from Light & Gold's (2000) typology of human, financial, social, and cultural capital. However, I also added two additional variables of my own. The first was that of 'motivations' which I added on the micro level and which, based on initial pilot interviews, as well as my own experiences, seemed to be playing an important role. The second was added on the macro level, whereby I extended it from not only including Wroclaw and Poland, but also a wider, supranational context which, once again based upon the initial pilot interviews, seemed to be of importance. It was only later, upon collecting the empirical data, that the full scale of this international context became apparent, subsequently leading to me proposing the term 'Global-embeddedness' (as will be seen in the 'Results' section).

9.4. Research questions

The purpose of this project was to study 'up' within the field of migrant entrepreneurship by exploring the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states in the emerging economy of Wroclaw, Poland, and to position this phenomenon against that of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states. Yet, as with any research project, it can be difficult to decide at what angle to approach the research. As such, in order to guide the study, I formulated three research questions:

1. How do migrant entrepreneurs from core and periphery countries, in the 'middle-ground', semi-periphery environment of Wroclaw, Poland, vary in their motivations and access to resources (financial, human, social, and cultural capital)?
2. How do these variations interact with the environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider international context and how does this affect the everyday management of the firm, (ethnic) division of entrepreneurial labour, and the position of the firm in the wider economy?
3. How can these variations and interactions be theoretically explained?

9.5. Methodology

Wroclaw was chosen as the location of the study for four main reasons. First, it is a location where both subject groups can be found. Second, with a GDP of \$15,595, 63rd in the world (World Bank 2019), Poland neither belongs to the group of core-states, nor periphery and, subsequently, provides a relatively neutral, economic 'middle-ground' setting for the study. Third, Poland has been shown to have relatively high rates of migrant entrepreneurship (Nestorowicz 2012) so

not only did Wrocław provide the opportunity to migrants, but also, importantly, migrant *entrepreneurs*. Fourth, and finally, it was chosen for pragmatic reasons, as Wrocław has been the city within which I, myself, have lived and worked as a migrant entrepreneur for the past six years, lending itself well to certain advantages for the study (such as Polish language skills, familiarity with the local business environment, etc).

In terms of research design, I consciously chose a qualitative, comparative, Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) approach. This, importantly, I related back to how my choices enabled me to answer the research questions. First and foremost, a qualitative approach (in which I predominantly relied upon qualitative interviews) enabled me to go ‘deeper’ to gather the kind of rich, in-depth information which was necessary to answer the first two research questions. These questions, with a large number of variables, create an inherent level of complexity, for which qualitative interviews enabled me to understand, at a deeper level, not just the variations of motivations and resources of the two subject groups (i.e. Research Question 1), but also *how* these variations in motivations and resources of the two subject groups play out in the environment of Wrocław, Poland, and the wider international context (i.e. Research Question 2). Second, in terms of my choice of a comparative approach, this was inherently required in order to answer the first two questions which, of course, seek to explore variations between the two subject groups (and their interactions with the environment). Further, as an important component of a Grounded Theory approach, I also made use of ‘constant comparison’ which helped to identify emerging categories (Charmaz 2006) and, in doing so, was an important part of answering all three research questions. Third, and finally, I adopted a Grounded Theory approach for two main reasons. First, as an approach which aims to generate theory, it was well-suited to answering the third and final research question, namely, to theoretically account for data encountered in answering the first two research questions. Second, Grounded Theory’s consideration of hidden power dynamics is of particular relevance to this study. This, when combined with the ability to ground theory in data, permits the generation of new concepts separate from pre-existing theories which may themselves conceal hidden power relations.

My fieldwork took place between October 2018 and May 2020 and consisted of six distinct methods, all of which were chosen in accordance with the research design and their ability to collect and analyze the data necessary to answer the research questions. In terms of Research Questions 1 and 2 (pertaining to migrants’ motivations, their access to resources, and variations in these interact with the environment), I employed the following: 1. purposeful sampling; 2. qualitative interviews; 3. organizational coding; 4. constant comparison. In terms of Research Question 3, which concerns itself more with theoretically accounting for the data uncovered in the study, I made use of two additional methods, specifically: 5. theoretical coding; and 6. conceptualization. With regard to the

latter (conceptualization), this played a significant role in the genesis of the term 'Global-embeddedness' which was based upon emergent patterns and was chosen through a process of 'constantly trying to fit words to it to best capture its imageric meaning' (Glaser's 2002: 24) .

The research sample itself, in accordance with the comparative study research design, consisted of two main subject groups. The first group was made up of 41 migrant entrepreneurs from core states (the UK, the USA, Italy, France, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Canada, Australia, and Israel), while the second group was made up of 24 migrant entrepreneurs from five periphery-states (Ukraine, Belarus, India, Nigeria, and South Africa). Although it was not done on purpose, the large majority of subjects were male (40/41 of those from core-states and 18/24 of those from periphery-states), which can partially be attributed to the preponderance of males within wider migration data. Further, in terms of industry sector, the migrants from core-states were better represented within the 'professional activities' and 'information and communication' sectors, while the majority of those from periphery-states were located within the 'gastronomy', 'wholesale', and 'construction' sectors. Importantly, this also seemed to reflect wider quantitative data concerning migrants in Poland.

In order to complement the data gathered from the two subject groups, I also collected additional information from a range of other sources. This consisted of qualitative interviews with almost one dozen local organizations which have regular contact with migrants and migrant entrepreneurs, such as the City of Wroclaw, various chambers of commerce, as well as a number of NGOs.

In conducting all of the above, the study faced several challenges in terms of both validity and generalizability. With regard to the former, these included language issues, transference, and the inclusion in the study of certain migrants who, perhaps, are not 'true entrepreneurs'. In order to mediate these challenges, I employed a number of strategies. For example, in terms of transference, which can 'cause researchers to lean toward certain themes, to actively look for evidence to support their positions' (Creswell 2003: 237), I made proactive efforts to be entirely transparent about my role in the study, writing in the first person to reflect my active participation as the main instrument collecting and interpreting the data. With regard to the latter, I argued that, even though the study might not be numerically representative, it could well be representative of underlying causal mechanisms which help to explain the 'how' of broader social phenomena (Lin 1998).

9.6. Results

The study yielded a number of important findings which I presented in four empirical chapters (3-7), as well as one theoretical chapter (8). I will now summarize these findings below.

9.6.1. Variations in motivations and access to resources

Motivations

In Chapter 3, I showed how, in contradiction to the mainstream literature and theories surrounding migrant entrepreneurship, it cannot be assumed that migrants, when relocating to new countries and starting their own businesses, are always motivated by money alone. Indeed, migrants from the core-states subject group often moved to Wrocław for non-economic reasons, such as for a Polish partner (and sometimes their extended family) or to improve their quality of life, while also taking into account other factors, such as Poland's geographic proximity to Western Europe. Importantly, even for those who moved to Wrocław for economic reasons, these reasons seem to be somewhat 'upside down', with Wrocław being chosen not for higher income, but instead for *lower costs*. This in itself seems to represent a kind of *geoarbitrage* (Hayes 2014), whereby the migrant entrepreneurs are geographically relocating in order to take advantage of global price disparities. Conversely, for those from the periphery-states subject group, motivations for moving to Wrocław seemed more likely to be based upon economic considerations, as well as negative factors within their country of origin, such as lack of 'rule of law'. However, this was not always the case, as some of them talked about migrating to improve their lifestyle or to inject some excitement and 'adventure' into their lives, which more closely resembles the motivations of many those from core-states.

With regard to motivations for opening a business, I similarly showed how such motivations, once again, cannot be assumed to be economic in character. In contradiction to Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), the migrants from the core-states subject group, who seem to have easy access to well-paid employment within the mainstream labour market, (usually) do not open a business out of necessity, but do so instead out of volition, often in pursuit of more agency. Indeed, for many of them, it even seems to be the opposite of Disadvantage Theory, whereby they are only willing to return to the mainstream labour market if absolutely necessary. Conversely, for migrants from the periphery-states subject group, the theory seemed more applicable, as many (but by no means all) of them were pushed into entrepreneurship by restrictions to well-paid employment in the mainstream labour market.

In summary, the results show that migrant entrepreneurs' are not one homogenous group with identical motivations (Oliveira 2007), but instead have varying motivations (Masurel et al. 2002; Lin & Tao 2012) which cannot necessarily be assumed to be economic in character (Glinka & Brzozowska 2015; Rametse et al. 2018; Brzozowska & Glinka 2019) nor rooted in necessity (Ndofor and Priem 2011), and which are subject change over time (Knight 2015). Consequently, in highlighting the diversity of migrants' motivations, and the important role they play, the results of this study help to reveal the hitherto understated role of motivations in migrant entrepreneurship.

Access to resources

In Chapter 4, I showed how, in contradiction to the narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant' so often depicted in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, in an inverse context, migrant entrepreneurs do not always lack access to resources. On the contrary, I showed how they (sometimes, but not always) have relatively *high levels* of access to financial, human, social, and cultural capital. Such findings seem in line with other studies of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states (Stone & Stubbs 2007; Drake & Collard 2008; Marchant & Mottiar 2011; Andrejuk 2017). Yet, I also showed how, even within a periphery-to-core context, a lack of resources among migrant entrepreneurs likewise cannot always be assumed. In cases, many of the migrant entrepreneurs were also shown to have relatively high levels of access to a range of capital resources. This, similarly, lends support to other studies which have reported similar findings (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Kloosterman et al. 1999; Light & Gold 2000; Leung 2001; Masurel et al. 2002; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). That being said, I also highlighted the extensive variation, with several migrants from both groups also displaying a *lack* of access to various forms of resources.

Importantly, despite the two groups of migrants apparently not varying significantly in their levels of resources, they often vary in the geographic origin of such resources. While those from core-states (unsurprisingly) seem more likely to possess cultural and social capital from regions in core-states, conversely, those from periphery-states seem more likely to possess such forms of capital from periphery-states. This, as seen in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, had important implications in terms of how these variations in the origins of such capital plays out in an unequal environment.

9.6.2. Interactions with the environment

The location of migrants' opportunity structures

In Chapter 5, I showed how it cannot be assumed that migrant entrepreneurs access opportunity structures exclusively within the host country only. Yet, what is interesting here is the variation between the two subject groups. While 51% of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states were found to access *international* opportunity structures, conversely, only a small number of those from periphery-states were found to do so, with the majority of them selling goods or services *locally* within the host country.

The (ethnic) division of labour

In Chapter 6, I showed how, in contrast to the ideas of Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Min 2000; Drori & Lerner 2002), we cannot assume that migrant entrepreneurs take advantage of a plentiful supply of co-ethnic labour. Yet, once again, what was interesting here is the variation between the two subject groups. For the majority of those from the core-state subject group,

co-ethnic labour was neither cheap nor plentiful and, instead, they were found more likely to employ native, Polish labour. By contrast, those from the periphery-state subject group (notably, Ukraine) did indeed seem to be conforming to Ethnic Enclave Theory, with many of them employing co-ethnic labour.

Disadvantage and privilege

In Chapter 7, I showed how, in contrast to the mainstream narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant', not all migrants can be assumed to be disadvantaged and, instead, often demonstrate the exact opposite, namely, privilege. In particular, migrants from core-states are, in general, granted a higher standing within the local environment, have greater access to well-paid employment, greater legal mobility, as well as possessing the apparent ability to bridge themselves to lucrative markets in core-states. Those from the periphery-state subject group, by contrast, often (but not always) experience the opposite. They do, however, appear to possess one notable privilege, specifically, their ability to access more affordable supplies of periphery labour.

9.6.3. Theoretical explanation: Global-embeddedness

In Chapter 8, in an attempt to theoretically account for the above findings, I proposed the concept of 'Global-embeddedness'. Underpinning this concept is the existence of multiple layers (economic, technological, socio-cultural, politico-institutional) of a macro level environment which extend well-beyond the borders of the host country. All migrants, I argued, even those seemingly operating within the confines of the local, host country, are in fact embedded not only within their local environment, but also within this wider, global environment. It is the embeddedness of migrants (as well as their motivations and access to resources) within this global environment which, I proposed, can help us to understand the variations observed between the two subject groups and their interactions with the environment. In coining the term 'Global-embeddedness', my goal was to foreground the important role played by such macro level structures and the inherent power dynamics involved. While calls for such an approach have been more vocal within social sciences as a whole (Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2013), the field of migrant entrepreneurship (as shown) has remained centred around the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis. Even for the studies which do go beyond the host country borders (Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015), the focus is often restricted to the binary paradigm of the host and home countries. As such, this study echoes calls for scholars to 'jettison' the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis (Schiller & Faist 2013: 5) and extends such a multilateral, global approach into the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

Subsequently, in order to demonstrate Global-embeddedness 'in action', I used the concept to explain four key variations encountered in this study: 1. Variation

in motivations; 2. Variation in the location of (accessed) opportunity structures; 3. Variation in the ethnic division of labour; and 4. Variation in privileges and disadvantages. It was, however, the latter (variation in privileges and disadvantages) which was shown to play a most prominent role here. Accordingly, I elevated this variation to the top of my discussion.

Variation in privileges and disadvantages

As a starting point, I showed how migrants' variation in their composition of privileges reflects migrants' position within the various layers of an uneven macro environment, that is to say, their *Global-embeddedness*. For example, those raised within core-states are bestowed with core-state cultural and social capital which, within global cultural and politico-institutional hierarchies, takes on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988). This, in turn, often grants them a number of privileges, such as higher wages, greater legal mobility, greater chances of securing well-paid mainstream employment, and the ability to bridge oneself to affluent core-state markets. Conversely, those originating from periphery-states inherit periphery-state social and cultural capital which, within the same global cultural and politico-institutional hierarchies, takes on more negative value. This, conversely, leads to several disadvantages, such as lower wages, restricted legal mobility, less chance of securing well-paid mainstream employment, and less chance of bridging oneself to affluent core-state markets.

Variation in motivations

Such variation in privileges, I showed, then has a direct effect upon migrants' motivations for both migrating and starting their own business. In terms of the former, migrants' motivations for moving to Wrocław are themselves often a reflection of their variation in privileges. For example, migrants who are privileged by their citizenship within economically developed core-states are far less likely to be motivated to move to Wrocław for higher earnings and, as a result, are more likely to be motivated by other factors.

In terms of the latter, migrants' motivations for starting a business are, likewise, often shaped by their variation in privileges. For those from core-states, who largely as a result of their privileged position within socio-cultural hierarchies find it easier to secure well-paid employment, it is subsequently unsurprising that their main motivation for starting a business is seldom higher earnings. For those from periphery-states, by contrast, who through no fault of their own are handed a set of disadvantages (including greater difficulty securing well-paid employment), it is easy to understand why both their move to Wrocław, as well as their decision to open a business, are often (but not always) motivated by the prospect of higher earnings.

Variation in the location of (accessed) opportunity structures

Here I demonstrated how variation in the location of migrants' (accessed) opportunity structures is similarly caused by variation in migrants' composition of privileges. Those from core-states, by virtue of spending time within core-state cultures, are endowed with core-state cultural and social capital. Such capital, I showed, can be used as a bridge to affluent core-state markets. The access to such markets is further facilitated by core-state migrants' often favourable position within the politico-institutional and technological layers of an uneven, global environment.

Variation in the ethnic division of labour

Finally, I demonstrated how the above factors collectively lead to variations in the migrants' ethnic division of labour. Migrants' position with an uneven global macro environment (i.e. their Global-embeddedness), when combined with their motivations, leads to variations in the volume and cost of various ethnic pools of labour in Wrocław whereby, specifically, labour from core-states is less plentiful and more expensive than periphery-state labour (notably, from Ukraine). Here migrant entrepreneurs from Ukraine have an advantage, as they are subsequently able to leverage their periphery-state cultural and social capital as a bridge to this plentiful supply of affordable co-ethnic labour, while core-state migrants, by contrast, make do with a plentiful supply of native, Polish labour.

9.7. Implications of this study

“What will we do with such knowledge? ...it is an open question whether we will choose to use unearned advantage to weaken hidden systems of advantage, and whether we will use any of our arbitrary awarded power to try to reconstruct power systems on a broader base”, (McIntosh 1988: 36).

Finally, here at the end of this dissertation, I consider the implications of the study. In order to do so, I think it is fitting to return to where we began, that is to say, with the story of Francesco. Although seemingly insignificant on the surface, his story, I have shown over the past nine chapters, has several far reaching implications within the field of migrant entrepreneurship, not least in terms of problematizing the current theories and highlighting the implicit power relations hidden within them. Yet, Francesco's story (and that of many other privileged migrant entrepreneurs in the study), I argue, also carry implications further afield, specifically, for those interested in reducing *global inequality*. The key indicator most commonly used to measure inequality is wealth. As a study which concerns itself with those who are at the forefront of wealth creation, that is to say, *entrepreneurs*, this study's findings, I propose, are of great relevance to the issue of global inequality. Indeed, in this dissertation, I have closely scrutinised entrepreneurs from some of the

world's wealthiest nations and positioned these findings against those from those from some of the poorest. This, I have shown, has revealed how an uneven, global environment often privileges the former, while subjecting the latter to a number of disadvantages. The important point here is that such variation seems *systemic*. Unlike previous observations of systemic inequality, which have largely centred around the role of ethnicity (for example Young 2011 and Feagin 2017) and gender (see Ridgeway 2004, among others), this study has foregrounded that of inequality based upon *nationality and citizenship*. This in itself generates three implications.

First, for those looking to address inequality in societies, it suggests that we should extend the field of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991; 2017) to also include one's nationality and citizenship.

Second, it questions the validity of success generated on the back of privilege rooted in one's position within global hierarchies. Those from core states who are often considered 'successful', such as millionaires, entrepreneurs, and even academics, may well owe some degree of their success to their favourable embeddedness within this systemic, global environment. Subsequently, in acknowledging this, those who have profited from their nationality might have to, in the words of McIntosh (1988: 30), 'give up the myth of meritocracy'.

Third, upon recognizing the systemic privilege and disadvantage created by one's position within an uneven global environment, we have to ask ourselves, once again in the words of McIntosh (quoted at the beginning of this section), 'what will we do with such knowledge?' Those interested in promoting the ideals of fairness and equality would likely agree that we, especially those of us who *benefit* from such systemic inequality, have a responsibility to use this knowledge to help make the world a fairer place. But, of course, making the decision to act is easy. How one can actually make a difference, in the face of such powerful, yet intangible, global hierarchies, is quite another question altogether. As a starting point, we could, suggests Choules 2006: 288), 'seriously consider renouncing the politico-legal construct of citizenship'. Indeed, tackling laws which treat people differently based upon citizenship or nationality would at least remove any legal fortification of citizenship privilege. However, even if such an ambitious plan could be achieved, it is likely that the cultural hierarchies, around which such laws were no doubt created to reinforce, would remain, conceivably in the same way that gender and racial inequality persists despite attempts in recent decades to address the legal injustices between sexes and ethnic groups. How, then, can these underlying hierarchies be tackled? As academic scholars, perhaps one of the best contributions we can make is to simply document the existence of such structures and how they function. After all, awareness of a problem is usually the first step toward solving it. This study has done exactly this, albeit only within the context of the specific phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship. There remains, however, a multitude of other professions, sectors, and additional areas of research to explore. Here, scholars might consider how one's nationality contributes to the success (or failure)

of 'regular' employees or those who have *not* migrated. What role, for example, does this play in the success of a Dutch academic within the Netherlands? Or of a Polish police officer within Poland? And how does citizenship, nationality, and one's Global-embeddedness interact with other aspects of intersectionality, such as gender and ethnicity?

Last but not least, we should remember that the macro hierarchies encountered in this study only became visible through the micro level analysis of those who *benefit* from such hierarchies. This in itself forces us to ponder what else might be 'lit up' (Duneier 2014: 7) via the act of studying 'up' (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012). We (quite justifiably) write paper upon paper about 'the poor, the ethnic groups, the disadvantaged' (Nader 1972: 5), yet the relative advantages enjoyed by privileged elites - and the root causes of such privilege - remain largely unexplored (with some notable exceptions, for example Ho's (2009) ethnography of Wall Street financial institutions). What, in other words, a curious paradox it would be if the answers to solving social deprivation and hardship were not to be found in disadvantage alone but also, conversely, *privilege*.

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Appendices



Appendix A - List of migrant entrepreneurs

Table 10.1. List of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states

Alias	Citizenship / Nationality	Industry sector
Bruce	Australia	Information & communication
Dave	Canada	Activities related to real estate market support
Jari	Finland	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Igor	Finland	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Albert	France	Wholesale & resale trade
Louis	France	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Victor	France	Financial and insurance services
Michel	France	Gastronomy
Gabriel	France	Information & communication
Mattheus	Germany	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Karl	Germany	Wholesale & resale trade
Laura	Germany	Healthcare & social Help
Hans	Germany	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Klaus	Germany	Wholesale & resale trade
Connor	Ireland	Information & communication
James	Ireland	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Seamus	Ireland	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Niall	Ireland	Information & communication
Caleb	Israel	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Marco	Italy	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Roberto	Italy	Gastronomy
Angelo	Italy	Gastronomy
Francesco	Italy	Construction
Giovanni	Italy	Information & communication
Mario	Italy	Gastronomy
Adriano	Portugal	Education
Afonso	Portugal	Gastronomy
Adrian	UK	Education
Stuart	UK	Information & communication
Josh	UK	Education
Sam	UK	Education
Gavin	UK	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Dale	UK	Other

Table 10.1. Continued.

Alias	Citizenship / Nationality	Industry sector
Walter	UK	Education
Anna	USA	Culture, education & recreation activities
Tom	USA	Financial and insurance services
Paul	USA	Gastronomy
Arthur	USA	Gastronomy
Michael	USA	Wholesale & resale trade
Stewart	USA	Farming, forestry & fishing
Jake	USA	Education

Source: My own list collated from a range from a range of sources, as described in Chapter 2.

Table 10.2. List of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states


Alias	Citizenship	Industry sector
Maxim	Belarus	Construction
Artem	Belarus	Professional activities, technical, scientific
Nikita	Belarus	Wholesale & resale trade
Maria	Belarus	Information & communication
Rahul	India	Gastronomy
Krishna	India	Wholesale & resale trade
Abebi	Nigeria	Wholesale & resale trade
John	Nigeria	Education
Gordon	South Africa	Wholesale & resale trade
Aleksander	Ukraine	Gastronomy
Andriy	Ukraine	Gastronomy
Bogdan	Ukraine	Other
Natalia	Ukraine	Gastronomy
Danilo	Ukraine	Construction
Anastasia	Ukraine	Other
Olek	Ukraine	Gastronomy
Pavlo	Ukraine	Construction
Sofia	Ukraine	Wholesale & resale trade
Petro	Ukraine	Construction
Symon	Ukraine	Transport & storage
Veronica	Ukraine	Gastronomy
Volodomir	Ukraine	Information & communication
Vanko	Ukraine	Information & communication
Ivan	Ukraine	Professional activities, technical, scientific

Source: My own list collated from a range from a range of sources, as described in Chapter 2.

Appendix B - List of 970 migrant entrepreneurs from the Statistical Office in Wroclaw

This list was purchased from the Statistical Office in Wroclaw in 2018. Although the list did not provide the nationality of the registrants, using the Polish Central Registration and Information on Business' (CEIDG)⁹³ online database, I was able to search one-by-one to check their nationality. Of the 970 sole proprietors, 305 (31%) were from core-states with the majority of them originating from Germany, the UK, Italy, the USA, and France, as can be seen in Figure 10.1, below.

Figure 10.1. Migrants from core-states who were registered as having a sole proprietorship in Wroclaw in 2018




Source: Statistical Office in Wroclaw and the Polish Central Registration and Information on Business (CEIDG) (2018).

93 <https://prod.ceidg.gov.pl/CEIDG.CMS.ENGINE/?D;f124ce8a-3e72-4588-8380-63e8ad33621f>

421 (i.e. 43%) of the sole proprietors on this list originated from periphery-states, notably, Ukraine and Belarus, as shown in Figure 10.2. below.

Figure 10.2. Migrants from periphery-states who were registered as having a sole proprietorship in Wrocław in 2018




Source: Statistical Office in Wrocław and the Polish Central Registration and Information on Business (CEIDG) (2018).

Appendix C - Migration statistics (Poland)

Core-state migration to Poland

As can be seen from Figure 10.3. (below), the number of migrants making the switch from core-states to Poland has been steadily increasing since 2011.⁹⁴ These migration flows have stemmed predominantly from Germany (21,311), Italy (8,526), the UK (6,240), Spain (5,876), and France (5,756).⁹⁵

Figure 10.3.: The number of core-state migrants legally registered in Poland



Source: Polish Office for Foreigners, 2020.

This national trend is largely mirrored on a smaller scale, within Wrocław (as shown in Chapter 2).


⁹⁴ With the exception of German migrants, which seems to have plateaued since 2015.

⁹⁵ Polish Office for Foreigners, figures provided for the year of 2019.

Periphery-state migration to Poland

As can be seen in Figure 10.2 (below), migration from periphery states has been gradually increasing between 2011 to 2019, notably from Ukraine (213,502), Belarus (24,750), Vietnam (11,816), India (9,918), and Georgia (5,439).⁹⁶

Figure 10.4. The number of periphery-state migrants legally registered in Poland



Source: Polish Office for Foreigners, 2020.

Once again, as was the case with migrants from core-states, this national trend of migration from periphery-states seems to be mirrored on a smaller scale in Wrocław and the district of Lower Silesia (as shown in Chapter 2).

⁹⁶ Figures listed in brackets here provided for the year of 2019 only.

Summary (English)

This study concerns itself with a previously understudied phenomenon, namely, that of migrant entrepreneurs who have gone ‘against the traffic’ and migrated from an economically more developed country to one that is economically less developed. Despite over 13 million migrants moving in this direction in 2019 alone (UN DESA 2020), it was found that, in a recent literature review by Dheer (2018) of 69 migrant entrepreneurship studies, none of them analysed migration in this direction. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to fill this gap in the literature by studying ‘up’ (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012) through the analysis of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states (such as the UK, Germany, USA etc) in the emerging economy of Wroclaw, Poland, and to comparatively position this phenomenon against that of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states (Ukraine and Belarus, among others). But what, however, makes this a gap in the literature worth filling? Here, I argue that there is a theoretical warrant to study ‘up’. Nader (1972) warns of how the exclusive ‘downward’ study of ‘ethnic-groups’, and the inherent ‘dominant-subordinate’ relationship, may be ‘affecting the kinds of theories that we are weaving’. Indeed, as I show throughout this dissertation, it appears that many of the current theories may well have been ‘theorized largely on the basis of persistent power imbalances in the international system’ (Croucher 2009: 465) and, as a result, there are serious question marks surrounding their ability to account for migration in a reverse context. In this way, through the micro level analysis of more privileged forms of migration, the study helps to ‘light up’ previously invisible assumptions and structures (Duneier 2014: 7) and, in doing so, it creates a counterpoint against which we can critically examine the current theoretical approaches within the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

As an explorative, inductive study, I withhold my final theoretical arguments until later on and, instead, adopt a heuristic model. In doing so, my aim is to include all possible variables, while remaining open to if and how they are connected to one another. With so many variables, however, I needed a way to organize the study, which I do through the use of three main research questions:

1. How do migrant entrepreneurs from core and periphery countries, in the ‘middle-ground’, semi-periphery environment of Wroclaw, Poland, vary in their motivations and access to resources (financial, human, social, and cultural capital)?
2. How do these variations interact with the environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider international context and how does this affect the everyday management of the firm, (ethnic) division of entrepreneurial labour, and the position of the firm in the wider economy?
3. How can these variations and interactions be theoretically explained?

In terms of research design (Chapter 2), I adopt a qualitative, comparative, Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) approach, with the primary data source stemming from 65 qualitative interviews with 41 migrant entrepreneurs from core-states (the UK, the USA, Italy, France, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Canada, Australia, and Israel) and 24 from periphery-states (Ukraine, Belarus, India, Nigeria, and South Africa) in the shared ‘middle-ground’, semi-periphery environment of Wrocław, Poland. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions, aiming to ‘achieve abstraction by doing justice to the context in which the different cases are embedded’ (Palmberger & Gingrich 2013: 95). They were then transcribed and codified first according to *organizational* categories, then *theoretical* categories, finally culminating in the process of *conceptualization*.

Wrocław was chosen as the location of the study for four main reasons. First, it is a location where both subject groups can be found. Second, with a GDP of \$15,595, 63rd in the world (World Bank 2019), Poland neither belongs to the group of core-states, nor periphery and, subsequently, provides a relatively neutral, economic ‘middle-ground’ setting for the study. Third, Poland has been shown to have relatively high rates of migrant entrepreneurship (Nestorowicz 2012) meaning that Wrocław not only provides a plentiful supply of migrants, but also, importantly, migrant *entrepreneurs*. Fourth, and finally, it was chosen for pragmatic reasons, as Wrocław has been the city within which I, myself, have lived and worked as a migrant entrepreneur for the past six years, therefore lending certain advantages to the study, such as Polish language skills, first hand ‘life experiences’, and ‘situational familiarity’ (Riemer 1972: 467).

In conducting the study, I faced several challenges in terms of both validity and generalizability. With regard to the former, these consisted of language issues, as well as the potential of ‘transference’, which can ‘cause researchers to lean toward certain themes, to actively look for evidence to support their positions’ (Creswell 2003: 237). In order to mediate these challenges, I employed a number of strategies. For example, in terms of transference, I made proactive efforts to be entirely transparent about my role in the study, writing in the first person to reflect my active participation as the main instrument collecting and interpreting the data. With regard to the latter (generalizability), I argued that, even though the study might not be numerically representative, it is representative of underlying causal mechanisms which help to explain the ‘how’ of broader social phenomena (Lin 1998).

The study makes six contributions (five empirical and one theoretical) to the field of migration and migrant entrepreneurship. First, in terms of migrants’ *motivations* (Chapter 3), I show how, in contradiction to the mainstream literature and theories surrounding migrant entrepreneurship, it cannot be assumed that migrants, when relocating to new countries and starting their own businesses, are always motivated by money alone. Indeed, migrants from the core-states subject group often moved to Wrocław for non-economic reasons, such as for a Polish partner (and sometimes

their extended family) or to improve their quality of life, while also taking into account other factors, such as Poland's geographic proximity to Western Europe. Importantly, even for the minority who moved to Wrocław for economic reasons, these reasons seem to be somewhat 'upside down', with Wrocław being chosen not for higher income, but instead for *lower costs*. This in itself seems to represent a kind of *geoarbitrage* (Hayes 2014), whereby the migrant entrepreneurs are geographically relocating in order to take advantage of global price disparities. Conversely, for those from the periphery-states subject group, motivations for moving to Wrocław are more closely connected to economic considerations, as well as negative factors within their country of origin, such as lack of 'rule of law'. However, this was not always the case, as some of them talked about migrating to improve their lifestyle or to inject some excitement and 'adventure' into their lives, which more closely resembles the motivations of many those from core-states.

Further, in terms of motivations for opening a business, I similarly show how such motivations, once again, cannot be assumed to be economic in character. In contradiction to Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), the migrants from the core-states subject group, who seem to have easy access to well-paid employment within the mainstream labour market, (usually) do *not* open a business out of necessity, but do so instead out of *volition*, often in pursuit of more agency. As a matter of fact, for many of them, it even seems to be the opposite of Disadvantage Theory, whereby they are only willing to return to the mainstream labour market if absolutely necessary. Conversely, for migrants from the periphery-states subject group, the theory seemed more applicable, as many (but by no means all) of them were pushed into entrepreneurship by restrictions to well-paid employment in the mainstream labour market.

Second, in terms of migrants' access to resources (Chapter 4), I show how, in contradiction to the narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant' so often depicted in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, in an inverse context, migrant entrepreneurs do not always lack access to resources. On the contrary, I show how they (sometimes, but not always) have relatively *high levels* of access to financial, human, social, and cultural capital. Such findings seem in line with other studies of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states (Stone & Stubbs 2007; Drake & Collard 2008; Marchant & Mottiar 2011; Andrejuk 2017). Yet, I also show how, even within a periphery-to-core context, a lack of resources among migrant entrepreneurs likewise cannot always be assumed. In cases, many of the migrant entrepreneurs display relatively high levels of access to a range of capital resources. This, similarly, lends support to other studies which have reported similar findings (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Kloosterman et al. 1999; Light & Gold 2000; Leung 2001; Masurel et al. 2002; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). That being said, I also highlight the extensive variation, with several migrants from both groups also displaying a *lack* of access to various forms of resources. Importantly, despite there being relatively little variation in levels of resources between the two subject groups as a whole,

they vary quite considerably in terms of the *geographic origin* of such resources. While those from core-states are (unsurprisingly) more likely to possess cultural and social capital from regions in core-states, conversely, those from periphery-states are more likely to possess such forms of capital from periphery-states. This, as becomes apparent in the subsequent chapters, has important implications in terms of how these variations in the origins of such capital play out in an unequal environment.

Third, in terms of the location of migrants' opportunity structures (Chapter 5), I show how we cannot assume that migrant entrepreneurs sell products and services exclusively within the host country only. While this indeed often seems the case with those from periphery-states, it is quite a different story for those from core-states, whereby 51% of them were found to access international opportunity structures.

Fourth, in Chapter 6 I show how, in contrast to the ideas of Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Min 2000; Drori & Lerner 2002), we cannot assume that migrant entrepreneurs take advantage of a plentiful supply of co-ethnic labour. Although the majority of those from the periphery-state subject group (notably, Ukraine) do indeed seem to be conforming to Ethnic Enclave Theory, with many of them employing co-ethnic labour, for those from the core-state subject group it is once again a different story. For them, co-ethnic labour is neither cheap nor plentiful and, instead, they were found more likely to employ native, Polish labour.

Fifth, in Chapter 7 I show how, in contrast to the mainstream narrative of the 'disadvantaged migrant', not all migrants can be assumed to be disadvantaged and, instead, often demonstrate the exact opposite, namely, privilege. In particular, migrants from core-states are, in general, granted a higher standing within the local environment, have greater access to well-paid employment, greater legal mobility, as well as possessing the apparent ability to bridge themselves to lucrative markets in core-states. Those from the periphery-state subject group, by contrast, often (but not always) experience the opposite. They do, however, appear to possess one notable privilege, specifically, their ability to access more affordable supplies of periphery labour.

Finally, in an attempt to theoretically account for the above findings, in Chapter 8 I propose the concept of 'Global-embeddedness'. Underpinning this concept is the existence of multiple layers (economic, technological, socio-cultural, politico-institutional) of a macro level environment which extend well-beyond the borders of the host country. All migrants, I argue, even those seemingly operating within the confines of the local, host country, are in fact embedded not only within their local environment, but also within this wider, global environment. It is the embeddedness of migrants (as well as their motivations and access to resources) within this global environment which, I propose, can help us to understand the variations observed between the two subject groups and their interactions with the environment. In coining the term 'Global-embeddedness', my goal is to foreground the important

role played by such macro level structures and the inherent power dynamics involved. While calls for such an approach have been more vocal within social sciences as a whole (Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2013), the field of migrant entrepreneurship (as shown) has remained centred around the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis. Even for the studies which do go beyond the host country borders (Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015), the focus is often restricted to the binary paradigm of the host and home countries. As such, this study echoes calls for scholars to 'jettison' the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis (Schiller & Faist 2013: 5) and extends such a multilateral, global approach into the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

Last but not least, in Chapter 9 I consider the implications of the study. Although it is a study within the very niche field of migrant entrepreneurship, this research, I argue, carries implications much further afield, specifically, for those interested in global inequality. The key indicator most commonly used to measure inequality is wealth. As a study which concerns itself with those who are at the forefront of wealth creation, that is to say, entrepreneurs, this study's findings, I propose, are of great relevance. Indeed, in this dissertation, I closely scrutinize entrepreneurs from some of the world's wealthiest nations and position these findings against those from those from some of the poorest. This, I show, reveals how an uneven, global environment often privileges the former, while subjecting the latter to a number of disadvantages. The important point here is that such variation seems systemic. Unlike previous observations of systemic inequality, which have largely centred around the role of ethnicity (for example Young 2011 and Feagin 2017) and gender (see Ridgeway 2004, among others), this study has foregrounded that of inequality based upon nationality and citizenship and, subsequently, propels these categories into the intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991; 2017) debate.

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

Dit onderzoek gaat over een onderwerp dat tot nog toe onderbelicht is gebleven, namelijk migrantenondernemers die ‘tegen de stroom in’ migreren van een economisch ontwikkeld land naar een economisch minder ontwikkeld land. Ondanks het feit dat er in 2019 meer dan 13 miljoen migranten in deze richting migreerden (UN DESA 2020), waaronder ook vele migrantenondernemers, is er nog weinig over hen bekend. In een recente studie van Dheer (2018), die 69 onderzoeken naar migrantenondernemers analyseerde, was er geen enkel onderzoek dat keek naar migratie naar economisch minder ontwikkelde landen. Het doel van het onderhavige onderzoek is om deze kloof in de wetenschappelijke kennis te dichten door ‘opwaarts onderzoek’ te doen (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012) naar migrantenondernemers uit kernlanden (zoals het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Duitsland, de Verenigde Staten, ed) in de opkomende economie van Wrocław, Polen. De positie van deze ondernemers vergelijk ik met die van migrantenondernemers uit meer perifere landen (onder andere Oekraïne en Wit-Rusland).

Maar wat maakt dit onderwerp zo interessant? In dit onderzoek beargumenteer ik dat er vooral een *theoretische rechtvaardiging* is om opwaarts onderzoek te doen. Nader (1972) waarschuwde ons dat als we ons beperken tot ‘neerwaarts onderzoek’ naar ‘etnische groepen’ en de dominante-ondergeschikte relatie die daaraan inherent is, ‘dan heeft dit invloed op de theorieën die we ontwikkelen’. In dit onderzoek zal ik laten zien dat veel van de theorieën die we gebruiken daadwerkelijk ‘grotendeels ontwikkeld zijn op basis van hardnekkige machtsverschillen in het internationale systeem’ (Croucher 2009: 465). Hierdoor wordt in twijfel getrokken of deze theorieën wel in staat zijn om migratie in een omgekeerde richting te verklaren. Door meer bevoorrechte migratievormen op microniveau te analyseren brengt dit onderzoek onzichtbare veronderstellingen en structuren aan het licht (Duneier 2014: 7). Op deze manier biedt het een contrapunt dat ons in staat stelt om bestaande theoretische perspectieven op migrantenondernemerschap te bekritisieren.

In dit verkennende, inductieve onderzoek presenteer ik mijn definitieve theoretische beweringen pas aan het einde van de studie, en in plaats daarvan maak ik gebruik van een heuristisch model. In dit model worden alle mogelijke variabelen opgenomen zodat er met een open blik kan worden bepaald of en hoe de variabelen zich tot elkaar verhouden. Ik heb ervoor gekozen dit onderzoek te structureren aan de hand van drie hoofdvragen:

1. Wat zijn de verschillende motieven van migrantenondernemers uit kernlanden en uit perifere landen die in de ‘tussengelegen’ semi-periferie van Wrocław, Polen, een bedrijf hebben opgezet? En hoe verschillen zij in hun toegang tot hulpbronnen (financieel, menselijk, sociaal en cultureel kapitaal)?

2. Hoe uiten de verschillen tussen migrantenondernemers zich in de stad Wroclaw, Polen en in de internationale context op het gebied van het dagelijkse management van het bedrijf, de (etnische) verdeling van arbeid, en de positie van het bedrijf in de bredere economie?

3. Hoe kunnen deze verschillen en wisselwerkingen theoretisch worden verklaard?

Dit onderzoek is ontworpen als een kwalitatieve, vergelijkende studie op basis van de 'grounded theory' benadering (Glaser & Strauss 1967). De primaire onderzoeksgegevens komen voort uit 65 kwalitatieve interviews met 41 migrantenondernemers uit kernlanden (Verenigd Koninkrijk, Verenigde Staten, Italië, Frankrijk, Duitsland, Ierland, Finland, Portugal, Canada, Australië en Israël) en 24 ondernemers uit perifere landen (Oekraïne, Wit-Rusland, India, Nigeria en Zuid-Afrika) in de 'tussengelegen' semi-periferie van Wroclaw, Polen. De interviews bestonden uit open vragen met als doel 'een mate van abstractie te bewerkstelligen door recht te doen aan de context waarin de verschillende gevallen zijn ingebed' (Palmberger & Gingrich 2013: 95). Alle interviews zijn vervolgens getranscribeerd en gecodeerd, eerst aan de hand van organisatorische categorieën, daarna theoretische categorieën, uitmondend in het proces van conceptualisatie.

Er zijn vier redenen waarom er is gekozen voor Wroclaw als onderzoekslocatie. Ten eerste is Wroclaw een stad waar beide onderzoeksgroepen actief zijn. Ten tweede heeft Polen een BBP van \$15,595 en staat op de 63e plaats in de wereldeconomie (World Bank 2019). Daarmee behoort Polen noch tot de kernlanden, noch tot de perifere landen en neemt daarom een relatieve 'neutrale', economische tussenpositie in die geschikt is voor dit onderzoek. Ten derde is aangetoond dat Polen een relatief hoog aantal migrantenondernemers kent (Nestorowicz 2012). Dit betekent dat er niet alleen veel migranten in Wroclaw wonen maar ook veel migrantenondernemers. Ten vierde vormt Wroclaw ook een pragmatische keuze omdat dit de stad is waar ik zelf de afgelopen zes jaar als migrantenondernemer heb gewoond en gewerkt. Dit biedt een aantal voordelen, waaronder mijn Poolse taalvaardigheden, 'levenservaringen' uit de eerste hand, en 'vertrouwdheid met de situatie' (Riemer 1972: 467).

Tijdens het onderzoek ondervond ik een aantal uitdagingen in termen van validiteit en generaliseerbaarheid. De validiteit werd invloed door taalproblemen alsmede door het gevaar van 'overdracht' (*transference*) omdat 'onderzoekers soms geneigd zijn zich te richten op bepaalde onderwerpen en actief op zoek gaan naar bewijs dat hun eigen positie bevestigt' (Creswell 2003: 237). Ik heb een aantal strategieën aangewend om deze uitdagingen het hoofd te bieden. Zo heb ik geprobeerd de kans op overdracht te verkleinen door volledig open en transparant te zijn over mijn rol in het onderzoek. Ik heb er bewust voor gekozen om in de eerste persoon te

schrijven omdat ik daarmee laat zien dat ikzelf, als onderzoeker, het voornaamste instrument was voor het verzamelen en interpreteren van de data. Ten opzichte van de andere uitdaging, de generaliseerbaarheid van het onderzoek, stel ik dat het onderzoek vanuit een kwantitatief oogpunt wellicht niet representatief is, maar wel onderliggende causale verbanden blootlegt die verklaren *hoe* bredere sociale ontwikkelingen ontstaan (Lin 1998).

Dit onderzoek levert op zes manieren een bijdrage aan onze kennis over migratie en migrantenondernemers, waarvan vijf empirische en een theoretische. Ten eerste, in termen van beweegredenen voor migratie (hoofdstuk 3), laat ik zien dat migranten die naar een ander land verhuizen om daar een bedrijf op te zetten dat niet alleen doen voor het geld. Dit is in tegenstelling tot de mainstream literatuur en theorieën over migrantenondernemerschap. In feite migreren ondernemers uit kernlanden vaak naar Wrocław vanwege niet-economische redenen, bijvoorbeeld voor een Poolse partner (en soms voor familie), of om hun levenskwaliteit te verbeteren. Ook waren er andere beweegredenen, zoals de kleine geografische afstand tussen Polen en West Europa.

Bij de ondernemers die wel naar Wrocław verhuisden voor economische motieven, waren de economische beweegredenen in feite 'omgekeerd'. Zij trokken niet naar Polen voor een hoger inkomen, maar voor de *lagere kosten*. In feite is dit een vorm van *geoarbitrage* (Hayes 2014), waarbij migrantenondernemers hun geografische locatie veranderen om te profiteren van mondiale prijsverschillen. De motieven van ondernemers uit perifere landen om naar Wrocław te verhuizen zijn, daarentegen, wel economisch gemotiveerd. Zij gaven vaak negatieve redenen aan voor hun vertrek uit het land van herkomst, zoals een gebrek aan rechtsorde. Deze motieven golden echter niet voor iedereen; sommige ondernemers zagen hun migratie als een manier om hun levensstijl te verbeteren of om wat spanning en 'avontuur' aan hun leven toe te voegen, en hun motieven lijken daardoor op die van de meeste migrantenondernemers uit kernlanden. Dit toont dus aan dat ondernemers niet alleen economische motieven hebben om een bedrijf te starten. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat, in tegenstelling tot de 'Disadvantage Theory' (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), migranten uit kernlanden vaak goede toegang hebben tot goedbetaalde banen in de mainstream Poolse arbeidsmarkt. Ze ondernemen vaak niet uit noodzaak maar omdat ze dat willen en omdat ze meer zeggenschap willen krijgen over hun leven en werk. Feitelijk lijkt de situatie van ondernemers uit kernlanden het tegenovergestelde te zijn van de Disadvantage Theory, omdat deze ondernemers alleen terug willen keren naar de mainstream arbeidsmarkt als dat absoluut noodzakelijk is. In feite is de Disadvantage Theory beter toepasbaar op ondernemers uit perifere landen, aangezien velen van hen (al dan niet iedereen) uit noodzaak ondernemers zijn geworden omdat zij geen goedbetaalde baan op de mainstream arbeidsmarkt konden vinden.

Ten tweede is er het empirische inzicht in de hulpbronnen van migranten-ondernemers (hoofdstuk 4). In dit onderzoek laat ik zien dat het gebruikelijke beeld van de 'minderbedeelde migrantenondernemer' die zich van de (semi-) periferie naar een kernland beweegt, in de omgekeerde richting niet klopt. Integendeel, migrantenondernemers uit kernlanden die naar de semi-periferie vertrekken, hebben soms (maar niet altijd) relatief goede toegang tot hulpbronnen als financieel, menselijk, sociaal en cultureel kapitaal. Deze bevindingen komen overeen met andere onderzoeken naar migrantenondernemers uit kernlanden (Stone & Stubbs 2007; Drake & Collard 2008; Marchant & Mottiar 2011; Andrejuk 2017). Het blijkt ook dat veel migrantenondernemers uit de periferie vaak ook goede toegang tot hulpbronnen hebben als zij naar de semi-periferie verhuizen. Dit vormt een belangrijke onderbouwing voor onderzoeken met soortgelijke bevindingen (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Kloosterman et al. 1999; Light & Gold 2000; Leung 2001; Masurel et al. 2002; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). Dat gezegd hebbende toont mijn onderzoek ook de grote verscheidenheid binnen de twee migrantengroepen aan, aangezien er in beide groepen meerdere migrantenondernemers waren met een duidelijk gebrek aan hulpbronnen. Als we kijken naar de twee groepen als geheel dan zijn er weinig verschillen in de hoeveelheid hulpbronnen, maar wel in de *geografische oorsprong* van deze hulpbronnen. Zoals verwacht hebben ondernemers uit kernlanden vaker cultureel en sociaal kapitaal uit kernregio's, en omgekeerd hebben ondernemers uit de periferie vaak hulpbronnen uit perifere landen. In verdere hoofdstukken zal duidelijk worden hoe verschillen in de geografische oorsprong van hulpbronnen zich uitspelen in een ongelijke context.

Ten derde, in termen van de locatie van de kansenstructuur van migranten (hoofdstuk 5), laat ik zien dat we er niet automatisch van uit moeten gaan dat migrantenondernemers alleen producten en diensten in het gastland verkopen. Terwijl dit vaak wel het geval is voor ondernemers uit de periferie, gaat dit niet op voor ondernemers uit kernlanden, aangezien 51% van hen toegang heeft tot *internationale* kansenstructuren.

Ten vierde ontkracht ik de ideeën van de Etnische Enclave Theorie (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Min 2000; Drori & Lerner 2002) door te laten zien dat migrantenondernemers niet altijd gebruik maken van vele co-etnische arbeidskrachten in hun bedrijf. Ondanks het feit dat de werkwijze van de meerderheid van ondernemers uit de periferie (en met name Oekraïne) wel lijkt aan te sluiten bij de Etnische Enclave Theorie, is dit wederom niet het geval voor ondernemers uit kernlanden. Voor hen is het inhuren van co-etnische arbeidskrachten geen goedkope optie en bovendien is er amper aanbod. In plaats daarvan huren deze ondernemers vaak lokale Poolse arbeidskrachten in.

Ten vijfde en laatste is er de empirische bevinding, neergelegd in hoofdstuk 7, dat, in tegenstelling tot wat velen denken niet alle migrantenondernemers ‘minder-bedeeld’ zijn. Het tegenovergestelde blijkt waar te zijn, namelijk dat veel van migrantenondernemers *bevoorrecht* zijn. Dit is met name het geval voor migranten uit kernlanden die in het algemeen een hogere status hebben binnen de lokale context, betere toegang hebben tot goedbetaalde banen, meer mobiliteitsrechten genieten, en blijkbaar het vermogen hebben om een brug te slaan naar lucratieve markten in kernlanden. De positie van ondernemers uit perifere landen is vaak (maar niet altijd) het tegenovergestelde. Hun positie heeft echter één belangrijk voordeel, namelijk hun toegang tot betaalbare arbeidskrachten uit de periferie.

Tot slot introduceer ik in hoofdstuk 8 het concept van *global embeddedness* (‘mondiale inbedding’) in een poging om de bovenstaande bevindingen op theoretische wijze te verwoorden. Het uitgangspunt van dit concept is dat de context waarin migrantenondernemers zich bevinden, uit meerdere domeinen (economisch, technologisch, sociaal-cultureel, politiek-institutioneel) bestaat. Deze domeinen strekken zich tot ver buiten het gastland uit. Op basis van dit onderzoek stel ik dat alle migranten, ook degenen die alleen actief lijken te zijn binnen de lokale kaders van het gastland, in feite in zowel de lokale context als in de bredere, mondiale context ingebed zijn. Het analyseren van de inbedding van migrantenondernemers (alsmede hun motieven en toegang tot hulpbronnen) in deze mondiale context kan ons helpen te begrijpen waarom er verschillen zijn tussen de twee groepen ondernemers en hoe die verschillen hun interactie met de bredere omgeving beïnvloeden.

Met mijn introductie van de term *global embeddedness* probeer ik meer aandacht te vestigen op de belangrijke invloed van macroniveau-structuren op migrantenondernemerschap en de bijbehorende machtsverhoudingen. Terwijl er op andere gebieden binnen de sociale wetenschappen duidelijke oproepen zijn gedaan voor meer aandacht voor het macro-niveau (Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2013), blijft binnen het veld van migrantenondernemerschap, zoals ik heb laten zien, de natiestaat de belangrijkste eenheid voor analyse. Zelfs bij onderzoeken die zich uitstrekken tot buiten de grenzen van het gastland (Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015), blijft de focus liggen op het tweeledige paradigma van thuislanden en gastlanden. Daarom pleit dit onderzoek ervoor om de natiestaat niet langer als belangrijkste eenheid van analyse te beschouwen (Schiller & Faist 2013: 5) en om ook het veld van migrantenondernemerschap met behulp van een multilaterale, mondiale benadering te analyseren.

Ten slotte bespreek ik in hoofdstuk 9 de gevolgen van het onderzoek. Ondanks het feit dat het onderzoek een kleine niche binnen het veld van migrantenondernemerschap betreft, beargumenteer ik dat het toch bredere implicaties heeft,

met name voor onderzoekers die geïnteresseerd zijn in mondiale ongelijkheden. Vaak wordt rijkdom of vermogen gebruikt als een manier om ongelijkheid te meten. Aangezien ondernemers een belangrijk aandeel hebben in het creëren van vermogen zijn de resultaten van deze onderzoek zeer relevant. In deze dissertatie neem ik in feite ondernemers uit de rijkste landen van de wereld onder de loep en vergelijk hun positie met ondernemers uit een paar van de armste landen ter wereld. Ik laat zien dat de eerstgenoemde ondernemers in een ongelijke mondiale context vaak een bevoorrechte positie hebben, in tegenstelling tot de laatstgenoemden. Het is belangrijk om te wijzen op het systemische karakter van deze verschillen. Anders dan eerdere observaties van systemische ongelijkheid die zich voornamelijk richtten op de rol van etniciteit (zie bijvoorbeeld Young 2011 en Feagin 2017) en gender (zie onder andere Ridgeway 2004), laat dit onderzoek zien dat er ook sprake is van ongelijkheid is op basis van *nationaliteit* en levert daarmee een belangrijke bijdrage aan het debat over intersectionaliteit (Crenshaw 1991; 2017).

Streszczenie (Summary in Polish)

Niniejsza rozprawa dotyczy zjawiska, które do tej pory nie zostało dokładnie zbadane. Mianowicie, zjawiska przedsiębiorców-migrantów, którzy idąc „pod prąd” wyemigrowali z kraju bardziej rozwiniętego gospodarczo do kraju gospodarczo mniej rozwiniętego. Mimo, iż ponad 13 milionów migrantów podążało w tym kierunku tylko w 2019 roku (UN DESA 2020), okazało się - w ostatnim przeglądzie literatury badań migracji przedsiębiorców (69 badań) przeprowadzonym przez Dheera (2018) - że żadne z tych badań nie analizowało migracji w tym kierunku. Celem niniejszej rozprawy jest zatem wypełnienie owej luki w literaturze drogą „studying up” (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997; Aguiar 2012) poprzez analizę przedsiębiorców-migrantów z krajów globalnego centrum (takich jak Wielka Brytania, Niemcy, USA itp.) we wschodzącej gospodarce Wrocławia i porównanie tego zjawiska do zjawiska emigrujących przedsiębiorców z krajów peryferyjnych (m.in. Ukraina i Białoruś). Co sprawia, że wypełnienie tej luki w literaturze jest pożądane? W niniejszej rozprawie przedstawiam argumenty za teoretycznym nakazem praktyki „study-up”. Nader (1972) ostrzega przed tym, jak wyłączenie badania „w dół” („study-down”) „grup etnicznych” i inherentna relacja „dominujący-podwładny” może „mieć wpływ na rodzaje teorii, które tworzymy”. Istotnie, w niniejszej dysertacji demonstruję, iż okazuje się, że wiele z obecnych teorii mogło być „wyprowadzonych w dużej mierze na podstawie utrzymującej się nierównowagi sił w systemie międzynarodowym” (Croucher 2009: 465), i w rezultacie pojawiają się poważne znaki zapytania dotyczące ich zdolności do uwzględnienia emigracji w odwrotnym kontekście. W ten sposób, poprzez analizę na poziomie mikro bardziej uprzywilejowanych form migracji, niniejsze badanie pomaga „rozjaśnić” wcześniej niewidoczne założenia i struktury (Duneier 2014: 7). Wskutek czego tworzy kontrapunkt, przeciwko któremu możemy krytycznie analizować obecne podejścia teoretyczne w dziedzinie przedsiębiorczości migrantów.

Niniejsze badanie jest studium eksploracyjnym i indukcyjnym, w związku z tym wstrzymuję moje finalne argumenty teoretyczne na koniec badania, a w zamian przyjmuję model heurystyczny. Czyniąc to, moim celem jest uwzględnienie wszystkich możliwych zmiennych, pozostając otwartym na to, czy, i jak są one ze sobą połączone. Przy tak wielu zmiennych potrzebowałem jednak sposobu na uporządkowanie badania, czego dokonuję za pomocą trzech głównych pytań badawczych:

1. W jaki sposób przedsiębiorcy-migranci z krajów centralnych i peryferyjnych, w „środkowym”, pół-peryferyjnym środowisku Wrocławia, różnią się pod względem motywacji i dostępu do zasobów (kapitał finansowy, ludzki, społeczny i kulturowy)?
2. W jaki sposób te różnice współgrają ze środowiskiem Wrocławia, Polski oraz szerszym kontekstem międzynarodowym, i jak wpływa to na codzienne zarządzanie firmą, (etniczny) podział pracy przedsiębiorczej i pozycję firmy w szeroko rozumianej gospodarce?
3. Jak te różnice i interakcje mogą być teoretycznie wyjaśnione?

W zakresie projektu badawczego (Rozdział 2), za metodę analizy przyjmuję jakościową, porównawczą, Teorię ugruntowaną (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Główne źródło danych wywodzi się z 65 wywiadów jakościowych z 41 przedsiębiorcami-migrantami z krajów centralnych (Wielka Brytania, USA, Włochy, Francja, Niemcy, Irlandia, Finlandia, Portugalia, Kanada, Australia i Izrael) oraz 24 przedsiębiorcami-migrantami z krajów peryferyjnych (Ukraina, Białoruś, Indie, Nigeria i RPA) we wspólnym „środkowym”, pół-peryferyjnym środowisku Wrocławia w Polsce. Wywiady składały się z pytań otwartych, mających na celu „osiągnięcie abstrakcji poprzez oddanie sprawiedliwości kontekstowi, w którym różne sytuacje są osadzone” (Palmerberger i Gingrich 2013: 95). Następnie zostały one poddane transkrypcji i skodyfikowane najpierw według kategorii organizacyjnych, potem kategorii teoretycznych, a ostatecznie zakończyły się procesem konceptualizacji.

Wrocław został wybrany na lokalizację badania z czterech głównych powodów. Po pierwsze, jest to lokalizacja, w której obie grupy przedmiotowe są obecne. Po drugie, biorąc pod uwagę PKB Polski na poziomie 15 595 USD i 63. miejsce na świecie (Bank Światowy 2019), pod względem ekonomicznym Polska nie należy ani do grupy państw centralnych, ani do grupy państw peryferyjnych, tym samym zapewniając względnie neutralne, ekonomicznie „centralne” otoczenie, idealne do celów badawczych tej dysertacji. Po trzecie, wykazano, że Polska ma stosunkowo wysokie wskaźniki przedsiębiorczości migrantów (Nestorowicz 2012). Oznacza to, że Wrocław zapewnia nie tylko dużą podaż migrantów, ale także - co istotne - migrantów-przedsiębiorców. Ostatecznie, po czwarte, Wrocław został wybrany na lokalizację badania ze względów pragmatycznych, ponieważ jest miastem, w którym osobiście mieszkam i pracuję jako przedsiębiorca-migrant od sześciu lat, tym samym nadając badaniu pewne korzyści, jak chociażby: znajomość języka polskiego, „doświadczenie życiowe” z pierwszej ręki i „znajomość sytuacji” (Riemer 1972: 467).

Prowadząc badania, stanąłem przed kilkoma wyzwaniami zarówno pod względem trafności, jak i możliwości uogólnienia. Odnośnie do pierwszego z nich, te wyzwania obejmowały kwestie językowe, a także potencjał zjawiska „przeniesienia”, które może wpłynąć na skłanianie się badaczy ku pewnym tematom, do aktywnego poszukiwania dowodów na poparcie ich stanowisk” (Creswell 2003: 237). W celu mediacji tych wyzwań, zastosowałem kilka strategii. Na przykład, względem zjawiska przeniesienia, podjąłem proaktywne starania, aby być całkowicie uczciwym w stosunku do mojej roli w badaniu, zatem piszę w pierwszej osobie liczby pojedynczej celem odzwierciedlenia mojego aktywnego udziału jako głównego narzędzia gromadzenia i interpretowania danych. W odniesieniu do drugiego wyzwania (możliwości uogólnienia) utrzymuję, że chociaż badanie może nie być reprezentatywne liczbowo, jest reprezentatywne dla leżących u jego podstaw mechanizmów przyczynowych, które pomagają odpowiedzieć na pytanie „jak” w wyjaśnianiu szeroko pojętych fenomenów społecznych (Lin 1998).

Niniejsze badanie niesie ze sobą istotny wkład w postępowanie nauki, szczególnie w dziedzinie migracji i przedsiębiorczości emigrantów. Wkład ten jest zarówno empiryczny (pięć istotnych kontrybucji) jak i teoretyczny. Zaczynając od wkładu empirycznego, po pierwsze, w zakresie motywacji migrantów (Rozdział 3), wykazuję w przeciwieństwie do głównego nurtu literatury i teorii dotyczących przedsiębiorczości migrantów, że nie można wychodzić

z założenia, iż migranci przenosząc się do nowych krajów i rozpoczynając własną działalność gospodarczą są zawsze motywowani wyłącznie środkami finansowymi. Faktycznie, migranci z grupy przedmiotowej państw centralnych często przenosili się do Wrocławia z powodów pozagospodarczych, jak chociażby dla polskiego partnera (a czasem ich dalszej rodziny), lub w celu poprawy jakości życia, jednocześnie biorąc pod uwagę takie czynniki jak geograficzna bliskość Polski do Europy Zachodniej. Co istotne, nawet dla mniejszości, która przeniosła się do Wrocławia z powodów ekonomicznych, powody te wydają się być nieco „odwrócone”, gdyż Wrocław był przez nich wybierany nie ze względu na wyższe dochody, ale niższe koszty życia. Taka metodyka sama w sobie wydaje się stanowić rodzaj geoarbitrażu (Hayes 2014), w ramach którego migrujący przedsiębiorcy dokonują relokacji geograficznej, aby skorzystać z globalnej dysproporcji cen. Przeciwnie wygląda sytuacja w przypadku badanych z grupy krajów peryferyjnych. Ich motywacje do przeprowadzki do Wrocławia są ściślej związane ze względami ekonomicznymi, a także z negatywnymi czynnikami w kraju ich pochodzenia, takimi jak brak rządów prawa. Jednakże, taka sytuacja nie dotyczyła wszystkich badanych z grupy państw peryferyjnych. Niektórzy z nich mówili o emigracji w kontekście polepszenia swojego stylu życia lub wprowadzenia w swoje życie więcej „emocji i przygody”, co bardziej przypomina motywacje wielu badanych osób z grupy państw centralnych.

Ponadto, biorąc pod uwagę motywacje do założenia firmy, również w tym aspekcie wykazuję w mojej analizie, że nie można zakładać, iż takie motywacje mają charakter ekonomiczny, co jest rozbieżne z Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). Otóż, migranci z grupy badawczej państw centralnych, którzy wydają się mieć łatwy dostęp do dobrze płatnego zatrudnienia w ramach głównego nurtu rynku pracy, (zwykle) nie zakładają własnej firmy z konieczności, ale robią to z własnej woli, często w pogoni za większą sprawczością („agency”). W rzeczywistości, wiele przypadków z grupy badawczej państw centralnych jest nie tylko rozbieżnych z Disadvantage Theory, ale wręcz przeciwnych do tejże teorii, wykazując, że migranci są skłonni powrócić do głównego nurtu rynku pracy tylko wtedy, gdy jest to absolutnie konieczne. Sytuacja wygląda odwrotnie w przypadku migrantów z grupy badawczej państw peryferyjnych. Disadvantage Theory wydaje się bardziej stosowna w tej grupie, ponieważ wielu migrantów państw peryferyjnych (ale w żadnym wypadku nie wszyscy) zostało niejako zepchniętych do przedsiębiorczości z powodu ograniczeń, a nawet utrudnień dobrze płatnego zatrudnienia głównego nurtu rynku pracy.

Drugi wkład empiryczny dotyczy dostępu migrantów do zasobów (Rozdział 4). W opozycji do utartej narracji o imigrantach znajdujących się w niekorzystnej sytuacji („disadvantaged migrant”), tak często przedstawianych w kontekście migracji z kierunków (pół)peryferiach do centralnych, pokazuję, w jaki sposób, w odwrotnym kontekście (odwrotnym kierunku), migrującym przedsiębiorcom nie zawsze brakuje dostępu do zasobów. Wprost przeciwnie do tej narracji, wykazuję w niniejszej dysertacji, jakże (czasami, ale nie zawsze) mają oni stosunkowo wysoki poziom dostępu do kapitału finansowego, ludzkiego, społecznego i kulturowego. Wyniki badań tejże dysertacji wydają się zbieżne z innymi wynikami badań dotyczących przedsiębiorców-migrantów krajów globalnego centrum (Stone & Stubbs 2007; Drake & Collard 2008; Marchant & Mottiar 2011; Andrejuk 2017). Jednakże, badania

w niniejszej rozprawie, ponadto pokazują, że nawet w kontekście kierunku peryferii-do-centrum nie zawsze można założyć brak zasobów wśród migrujących przedsiębiorców. W niektórych przypadkach wielu przedsiębiorców-migrantów demonstruje stosunkowo wysoki poziom dostępu do szeregu zasobów kapitałowych. Analogicznie, jest to potwierdzeniem innych badań, przedstawiających podobne rezultaty (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Kloosterman i in. 1999; Light & Gold 2000; Leung 2001; Masurel i in. 2002; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). To powiedziawszy, podkreślam jednocześnie zróżnicowanie w kwestii zasobów - kilku migrantów z obu grup wykazuje również brak dostępu do różnych form zasobów. Istotnie, pomimo stosunkowo niewielkich różnic w poziomach zasobów między dwiema grupami badawczymi jako całością, różnią się one dość znacznie pod względem pochodzenia geograficznego takich zasobów. Podczas gdy osoby z państw centralnych (czego można się spodziewać) częściej posiadają kapitał kulturowy i społeczny z regionów państw globalnego centrum, odwrotnie, osoby z państw peryferyjnych częściej posiadają takie formy kapitału z państw peryferyjnych. Te zależności, które staną się widoczne w kolejnych rozdziałach, mają istotne implikacje dla roli, jaką te różnice w pochodzeniu kapitału odgrywają w nierównym środowisku.

Po trzecie, w zakresie lokalizacji struktur możliwości zawodowych migrantów (Rozdział 5), pokazują, jak nie możemy zakładać, że przedsiębiorcy-migranci sprzedają produkty i usługi wyłącznie w kraju ich przyjmującym. Chociaż wydaje się to wiarygodne w przypadku badanych z krajów peryferyjnych, zupełnie inaczej wygląda sytuacja dla badanych z krajów centralnych - 51% z nich, co wynika z niniejszych badań, ma dostęp do międzynarodowych struktur możliwości zawodowych.

Po czwarte, w Rozdziale 6. pokazują, jak w przeciwieństwie do idei Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Min 2000; Drori & Lerner 2002), nie możemy zakładać, że migrujący przedsiębiorcy korzystają z obfitej podaży siły roboczej własnej grupy etnicznej. Chociaż większość przypadków z grupy badawczej państw peryferyjnych (zwłaszcza z Ukrainy) rzeczywiście wydaje się być zgodna z teorią enklaw etnicznych (Ethnic Enclave Theory), a wielu z nich zatrudnia etniczną siłę roboczą, w przypadku migrantów z grupy badawczej państw centralnych jest to, znowu, zupełnie inna historia. Dla migrantów z państw centralnych etniczna siła robocza nie jest ani tania, ani obfita, a zamiast tego, wyniki badań wskazują, że częściej zatrudniają rodzimą, polską siłę roboczą.

Po piąte, w rozdziale 7. pokazują, że w przeciwieństwie do narracji głównego nurtu o „migrantach znajdujących się w niekorzystnej sytuacji” nie można zakładać, że wszyscy migranci znajdują się w niekorzystnej sytuacji, w zamian tego, często demonstrują coś wręcz przeciwnego, mianowicie przywilej. W szczególności, migranci z krajów centralnych mają na ogół wyższą pozycję w środowisku lokalnym, mają większy dostęp do dobrze płatnego zatrudnienia, większą mobilność prawną, a także posiadają pozorną zdolność wpływu swojej działalności na lukratywne rynki w państwach centralnych. Natomiast, migranci z grupy badawczej państw peryferyjnych często (choć nie zawsze) doświadczają przeciwnych uwarunkowań. Wydaje się jednak, że posiadają jeden znaczący przywilej, a konkretnie, możliwość dostępu do bardziej przystępnych cenowo zasobów peryferyjnej siły roboczej.

Finalnie, przedstawiam w niniejszej dysertacji teoretyczny wkład w rozwój nauki. Próbując teoretycznie wytłumaczyć powyżej przedstawione wyniki badań proponuję koncepcję Global-embeddedness w rozdziale 8. U podstaw tej koncepcji leży istnienie wielu warstw (ekonomicznych, technologicznych, społeczno-kulturowych, polityczno-instytucjonalnych) środowiska na poziomie makro, które wykraczają daleko poza granice kraju przyjmującego. Dowodzę, że wszyscy migranci, nawet ci, którzy pozornie działają w granicach lokalnego kraju przyjmującego, są w rzeczywistości osadzeni nie tylko w swoim lokalnym środowisku, ale także w szerszym, globalnym środowisku. Właśnie termin „Global-embeddedness”, czyli zakorzenienie migrantów (jak również ich motywacje i dostęp do zasobów) w globalnym środowisku, z którego propozycją wychodzę, może pomóc nam zrozumieć różnice obserwowane między dwiema grupami badawczymi i ich interakcje ze środowiskiem, w którym funkcjonują. Tworząc termin „Global-embeddedness”, moim celem jest uwypuklenie ważnej roli, jaką odgrywają struktury społeczne i ekonomiczne na poziomie makro i związana z tym nieodłączna dynamika siły. Chociaż apele o takie podejście nie są obce w obrębie nauk społecznych jako całości (Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2013), dziedzina przedsiębiorczości migrantów, (jak pokazano), pozostaje skupiona wokół państwa narodowego jako największej jednostki analizy. Nawet w przypadku badań, które wykraczają poza granice kraju przyjmującego (Chen i Tan 2009; Solano 2015), często koncentrują się one na binarnym paradygmacie kraju przyjmującego i kraju macierzystego. W związku z tym, niniejsza praca wspiera apel do naukowców o „odrzućenie” państwa narodowego jako największej jednostki analizy (Schiller & Faist 2013: 5) i w istocie rozszerza wielostronne, globalne podejście w dziedzinie przedsiębiorczości migrantów.

Na ostatnim miejscu (Rozdział 9.), lecz wcale nie mniej ważnym, rozważam implikacje przeprowadzonych badań. Chociaż jest to badanie w bardzo niszowej dziedzinie - a mianowicie przedsiębiorczości migrantów - twierdzę, że ma ono znacznie szersze implikacje, szczególnie w aspekcie globalnej nierówności. Kluczowym wskaźnikiem najczęściej używanym do pomiaru nierówności jest bogactwo. Niniejsze badanie, dotyczy tych, którzy stoją na czele tworzenia bogactwa, czyli przedsiębiorców. Między innymi dlatego wyniki badania, które przedstawiam, mają ogromne znaczenie. Rzeczywiście, w tej rozprawie uważnie przyglądam się przedsiębiorcom z niektórych najbogatszych krajów świata i zestawiam te ustalenia z wynikami pochodzącymi z najbiedniejszych krajów świata. W ten sposób właśnie pokazuję, jak nierówne, globalne środowisko często uprzywilejowuje tę pierwszą, bogatszą grupę, jednocześnie narażając drugą na szereg niekorzyści. Ważną kwestią jest tutaj to, że takie zróżnicowanie wydaje się mieć charakter systemowy. W przeciwieństwie do poprzednich obserwacji systemowych nierówności, które w dużej mierze koncentrowały się wokół roli etniczności (na przykład Young 2011 i Feagin 2017) i płci (zob. M.in. Ridgeway 2004), niniejsze badanie wysuwa na pierwszy plan nierówność opartą na narodowości i obywatelstwie, a następnie przenosi te kategorie do debaty na temat interseksyjności (Crenshaw 1991; 2017).

Biography

Richard Girling is a political sociologist in the final year of his PhD trajectory at the University of Amsterdam where he has been researching the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship. He holds a First Class Honours degree from the University of Durham, UK, and a Masters degree from the University of Wroclaw, Poland. As a migrant entrepreneur himself, he is the CEO and Founder of his own international digital agency which employs 10 people and services over 100 clients across the US and Europe. With a strong passion for meaningful change, Richard holds positions at several not-for-profit organizations, including Metropolis International and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. He is also the former Executive Director of Literacy Alberni Society, a small NGO within the migration and education sector in British Columbia, Canada.

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