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### Studying 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship

*Privileged migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw, Poland*

Girling, R.A.

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
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5.



CHAPTER 5

# The opportunity structure: Beyond the nation-state

*“I originally came out here [Wroclaw] to buy property. But the Irish property market had a crash, so I had two choices - either go back to London and work for an investment bank, or stay out here. I had a lot of friends in outsourcing at [a large consultancy firm] and they said you’re in the heart of outsourcing. So I opened the first center in Poland. We provide IT support in about 20 languages. We also do technology outsourcing. But our facilities are very high standard, similar to Google in look and feel... it’s quite a good size company now. About 300 people with clients all over the world with some of the biggest banks [and] technology companies out of San Francisco. We don’t do much business in Poland...Yeah, it’s the pricing. We’re a premium based model. They cannot afford us.... Clients are mainly in Europe and the US. So Ireland, UK, Germany, and Scandies and France. And the US. And Canada”, (Niall, Ireland, IT support).*

## 5.1. Introduction

This is the first of three chapters which looks at how migrant entrepreneurs’ variations in motivations (seen in Chapter 3) and resources (seen in Chapter 4) interact with the environment of Wroclaw, Poland, and the wider international context. This chapter, specifically, focuses on variations observed in the opportunity structures which the migrants access. Opportunity structures are most often used to refer to the ‘demand side’ of migrant entrepreneurship (Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Kloosterman 2010). They are, undeniably, an essential component of entrepreneurship, without which, there can be no enterprise. Nevertheless, within the literature their role has, until recently, been largely restricted to the environment of the *host country* (Rusinovic 2008; Chen & Tan 2009; Bagwell 2018). Considering scholars’ almost exclusive focus upon migration in (semi-)periphery-to-core contexts, perhaps it is hardly surprising that migrants, surrounded by relatively affluent core-state markets, have been predominantly observed accessing these host country markets. But, in an ‘upside down’, core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory context, do migrant entrepreneurs likewise restrict their entrepreneurial attention to the markets of the (relatively less affluent) host country? In the case of Niall (quoted above), it seems not. With his clients in ‘Europe and US...Ireland, UK, Germany, and Scandies and France’, he is clearly accessing markets *beyond* the borders of the host country (Poland). And, importantly, as will be seen below, he is not the only one. Yet, the same, it will be seen, cannot be said of (most, but not all of) the migrants from the periphery-states subject group. Further, even for those who are accessing markets within the host country only, I will question whether their businesses, within the modern globalised world, are genuinely uninfluenced by factors external to the host country. Put simply, this chapter all boils down to

one key question: Is the host country nation-state, as the largest unit of analysis, *large enough*?

Below, I aim to shed some light on this. How, if at all, do migrant entrepreneurs from core- and periphery-states, when positioned in the semi-periphery context of Wrocław, Poland, vary in the location of the opportunity structures which they access? And, if the location of these opportunity structures does vary, then how can such variation be explained? In order to explore this, I will divide the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship into three (micro, meso, and macro) levels (Kloosterman 2010), albeit with the expansion of the 'macro' level to include not just the host country, but the wider, international context. In doing so, I will analyze how variations in the migrant entrepreneurs' resources and motivations (on a micro level) are interacting with opportunity structures (on a meso level) and the environment of Wrocław, Poland, and the wider international context (on a macro level). Having already explored the micro level in previous chapters, I now turn to the meso level and the location of the opportunity structures accessed by the migrant entrepreneurs in this study.

## 5.2. The meso level: Opportunity structures and their location

As seen with Niall (from Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), he is clearly accessing *international* opportunity structures. But what about other migrants from core-states? Is Niall's behaviour representative of the subject group as a whole? For many of them, it seems so. As shown in Table 5.1, 21 (51%) of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-state subject group have clients predominantly in core-states. Francesco (Italy) is another good example. Over dinner, he tells me about his latest project, a large residential development in the South of Wrocław, being funded by an Irish investor and how another project is being co-funded by an old school friend from Italy. I ask him if it is normal for his investors to be from outside of Poland and he admits that, in actual fact, almost all of his investors are non-Polish and are predominantly from Ireland, the UK, and Italy. In other words, despite being based in Poland, Francesco contracts almost exclusively with clients outside of Poland. This is important and has theoretical significance. As noted in the introduction, the role of opportunity structures has often been restricted to the host country. This is true in particular within many of the theoretical models, such as the Interactive Model (Waldinger et al. 1990) and the Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999). Despite both models making excellent contributions to the field in terms of recognising the important role played by opportunity structures and the environment, importantly, they restricted this focus to the environment of the host country only. Kloosterman & Rath (2001), in an attempt to create a spatial typology of this macro environment, broke it up into three levels: 1. Neighbourhood;

2. Regional; and 3. *National*. This, inherently, left the host country nation-state as the largest unit of analysis.<sup>55</sup> But, as can be seen with not just Niall and Francesco, but also the majority (51%) of the migrant entrepreneurs from the core-state subject group, they are accessing opportunity structures *beyond the borders of the host country*. Other examples of this include Giovanni (Italy) whose company provides IT services to clients in Italy, Caleb (Israel) whose company sells Polish real estate to Israeli investors, and Karl whose company provides sales support to a sister company in Germany. Of course, this does not mean that none of these migrants conducted business within Poland. As a matter of fact, a significant (albeit smaller) number of them were found to be selling services or products to clients in Wroclaw (40%)<sup>56</sup> or nationally within Poland (7%).<sup>57</sup> Yet, noticeably, the overarching trend is that the migrants from the core-states subject group seem more likely to access opportunity structures outside of Poland, principally within core-states.

**Table 5.1. Location of (the majority of) clients: Core vs. periphery subject group comparison**

	<b>Local (Wroclaw)</b>	<b>National (Poland)</b>	<b>International (Core-states)</b>	<b>International (Periphery-states)</b>
Migrants from core-states	17 (40%)	3 (7%)	21 (51%)	0 (0%)
Migrants from periphery-states	19 (79%)	1 (4%)	3 (13%)	1 (4%)

(Source: Data collated from the interviews with migrant entrepreneurs<sup>58</sup>)

So, what is going on here? Strangely, despite being excluded from this theoretical framework, international opportunity structures are nothing new, as trade has been international since ancient times (Ambrosini 2012). This has not been left unnoticed by other scholars, who have made some excellent progress in detailing migrant entrepreneurs' more contemporary international activities, which in itself has become a sub branch of migrant entrepreneurship referred to as 'transnational migrant entrepreneurship' (Portes et al. 1999; 2002). Within this branch, it has been shown how migrants' home countries can play an important role in their business

55 It should be noted that Rath (2002) did, later, adopt a more international approach with his study of the garment industry, along with contributions from numerous other authors.

56 Examples of this include Anna (USA), who runs an arts and crafts store, Albert (France) who sells wine, Paul (USA), who sells coffee, and Laura (Germany), who runs a senior care home, all of whom service a local clientele.

57 For example, Mario (Italy) and Arthur (USA), who both own restaurant franchises throughout Poland.

58 The figures here show the predominant location of clientele. So, for example, Danilo has all of his clients in Poland, except for one client in the Netherlands, so his opportunity structure has been classified as 'National' (Poland).


practices (Saxenian 1999; 2002; Rusinovic 2008; Chen & Tan 2009; Sequeira et al. 2009; Bagwell 2018). On the surface, this seems very similar to the situations of Niall, Francesco, and many of the other migrant entrepreneurs in this study who are accessing international opportunity structures. Yet, upon closer inspection, some important differences emerge.

First, within the literature's almost exclusive focus upon transnational migrant entrepreneurship in a (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory context, the migrants are almost invariably selling products or services to markets within the host country, while using the country of origin to meet the demand side of the equation. Saxenian's (1999; 2002) study of high-skilled Asian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley is a prime example. Here it was seen how these migrants utilized home country resources (notably labour) to manufacture high-tech goods for consumption in the host country (USA). But, in the case of Niall, this flow of goods and services appears to be *in reverse*. He (and his 300 employees) are providing services in the *host country* and selling these services back to his *home country* (and third party countries in core-states). This pattern is mirrored by Francesco (mentioned above). His company is providing architectural and construction services in Wroclaw (i.e. the host country), yet the clients are based in his home country (Italy), as well as other third party countries in core-states, namely Ireland and the UK. So, in other words, the flow of goods and services seems to be in the *opposite direction*. Importantly, one of the few studies which *has* been done in a core-to-periphery migratory context, seems to reinforce this trend. In Harima's (2015) study, Japanese entrepreneurs set up English schools in the Philippines, wherefrom they then sold online English language lessons back to co-ethnic Japanese clients in Japan. Once again, in this scenario, supply is coming from the host country, while demand is coming from the home country. So then, why, in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, do migrant entrepreneurs appear more likely to target markets *within* the host country, while in core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory contexts, they seem more likely to target markets *outside* of the host country? On the one hand, it seems like the migrants are displaying different behaviour. Yet, on the other hand, these migrant entrepreneurs are united by the fact that they are (usually) targeting markets in the same geographical region, namely, *core-states*. Why, and how, they do this will be explored later in this chapter.

Second, the international opportunity structures observed in this study also seem to diverge from the mainstream transnational migrant entrepreneurship in terms of their multilateralism. By this I mean that the latter has often been restricted to a binary paradigm of the host country and home country (Solano 2015; Valenzuela-Garcia 2018). For example, in Chen & Tan's (2009) integrative model of transnational entrepreneurship, even though they acknowledge the role of factors outside of the host country, they restrict these factors to the migrants' *home country*. The same is true of Ren & Liu's (2015) model of 'dual embeddedness' which, as the name suggests, confines the role of the environment to just two locations,

namely, the host and home countries. But, as seen previously with both Niall and Francesco, not only are they selling products or services to their home country, but also to *multiple* third party countries. At this point, we can notice a trend within the literature. Over time, scholars have progressively expanded theoretical models to increasingly broaden the unit of analysis. This progression can be seen below in Figure 5.1. Despite this continual enlargement of the unit of analysis, it is repeatedly found that the new, larger, unit of analysis, is not large enough. And now, as seen with how certain migrant entrepreneurs are accessing opportunity structures not just in host and home countries, but also in third party countries, it appears that the unit of analysis, once again, is *not large enough*.

**Figure 5.1. The ever-expanding unit of analysis in migrant entrepreneurship**



Source: My own interpretation and understanding of existing models in terms of their largest units of analysis.

Third, the situations of Niall, Francesco, and many of the other migrant entrepreneurs in this study, question the very definition of transnationalism. A ‘transnational migrant’ has been defined, within the literature, as someone who regularly travels between the home and host country (Portes et al. 1999). But for certain migrant entrepreneurs encountered in this study, such a definition seems problematic. For example, James (USA) runs an e-commerce store selling dog accessories (online) to clients predominantly in the USA, Canada, the UK, and Ireland. Yet, despite all of his clients being situated in core-states, he very rarely travels to these countries.



So then, due to this lack of travel, should we follow Portes et al.'s (ibid) definition and determine him *not* to be a transnational entrepreneur? This, considering all of his clients are indeed international, would seem somewhat bizarre. As such, this study lends support to other authors' (Rusinovic 2008; Ambrosini 2012) preference for a definition which moves the emphasis away from the necessity of travel and more toward the engagement in any form of transnational activities which benefit the business.

Taken altogether, these three points highlight how this finding, that migrants from core-states have an apparent greater tendency to access international markets in core-states, seems problematic for much of the existing literature. By contrast, when we switch focus to the migrants from the periphery-states subject group, we observe that they are less problematic. Indeed, the large majority (79%) of migrants from the periphery-states subject group were found to be selling products or services *locally* (within Wroclaw and Poland). Examples of this include Bogdan (Ukraine), running a trendy barber shop targeting the local, male market, Natalia (Ukraine), selling custom-made cakes, as well as Aleksander, Andriy, Veronica, and Olek, (also all from Ukraine), with cafes servicing a local clientele. Their situations seem more inline with the mainstream migrant entrepreneurship literature, whereby they are accessing business opportunities within the host country only (Waldinger et al. 1990; Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Kloosterman 2010).

At this point, however, it is important to note that not all of the migrants from periphery-states acted in accordance with the mainstream literature. A small number (13%) were found to predominantly access *international* opportunity structures in core-states. I refer, now, to two of them, namely, Vanko and Ivan, from Ukraine. Vanko has two companies, one providing programming services to clients mainly in the USA, while the second installs security systems to clients in Northern Europe, namely Germany and Scandinavia. Ivan, on the other hand, builds custom-made LED displays for clients mainly in France and Switzerland. Vanko and Ivan demonstrate how, under certain circumstances, migrants from periphery-states can, and do, access international business opportunities in core-states. However, it seems that they are less likely to do so. The same can be said of their tendency to access opportunities in periphery-states, with just 4% (i.e. one migrant) doing so. This was Krishna (India), who is in the process of setting up a business exporting 'Polish goods' to India.<sup>59</sup> The fact that only one migrant from the periphery-states subject group is attempting to access opportunity structures in periphery-states lends support to Rusinovic's (2008) finding that migrant entrepreneurs were not interested in economic investments in their (semi-)periphery countries of origin. This reluctance among the periphery-state subject group to target markets in their

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59 At this early stage of his company formation, he did not want to reveal which products, for fear of someone else taking the idea, however he said it would be products specific to Poland.

countries of origin contrasts sharply with that of the migrants from core states who, as shown previously, have a strong tendency to do so. I will now, below, explore the underlying reasons for such variation.

### 5.3. The macro level: Environmental factors

As seen above, the migrant entrepreneurs from core-states seem more likely to access international opportunity structures, while those from periphery-states seem more likely to access local (Wroclaw and/or Poland) opportunity structures. But why is this? How can this variation between the two groups be explained? The remainder of the chapter aims to provide insight into this. Accordingly, I now turn to the role of the macro level environment. This level, and how it interacts with migrants' micro level motivations and access to resources, inherently encompasses a large number of variables and, therefore, complexity. For this reason, in order to make the analysis more manageable, I have divided the macro layer of the environment up into four separate layers: 1. Economic; 2. Technological; Socio-cultural; and 4. Politico-institutional.

#### 5.3.1. The economic environment

*"...my services would probably be quite expensive for the zloty, so at first I'm trying just for the French speaking world", (Gabriel, France, online marketing).*

The importance of the economic environment, and how it can affect migrant entrepreneurship, has been well-documented within the literature (Waldinger et al. 1990; Kloosterman et al. 1999). After all, it stands to reason that the number and types of business opportunities available during an economic boom, for example, might be quite different to those during an economic downturn. Further, it has also been highlighted how the economic environment, and its effects upon opportunity structures, can vary regionally within the host country (Kloosterman & Rath 2001). Nevertheless, once again, such studies have been largely restricted to the environment of the host country, subsequently neglecting if, and how, spatial economic variations might be affecting migrant entrepreneurship on a wider, international scale (Solano 2016; Bagwell 2018). On this wider level, outside the field of migrant entrepreneurship, it has been well documented how wealth is not equally distributed, but instead tends to be concentrated in certain regions, often 'global cities' within core-states (Sassen 2001; Brenner & Keil 2006). What effect, then, could this be having upon migrant entrepreneurs and their businesses?

Indeed, many of the migrant entrepreneurs (from both groups) spoke of how clients in core-states can, put simply, '*pay more*'. As seen from the words of Gabriel

(France, quoted above), he believes those in the French speaking world are better able to afford his services. This seems to mirror the situation of Niall (Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), who states that he targets clients in core-states, and not Poland, because Polish businesses ‘cannot afford us’. This is also in line with the opinions of the small number of migrant entrepreneurs from the periphery-states subject group who are likewise selling goods to clients in core-states:

*“They [in the USA] have bigger budgets and they’re ready to spend money. Because in Poland, from my understanding, Polish people are not ready to spend money. They are still trying to save money, to find something cheaper. This is an infinite loop. Maybe that’s why business goes very hard with Polish customers. I thought maybe because I’m Ukrainian, maybe because I’m a foreigner, or the language barrier. Now I have two business development managers from Poland, Polish people, [and they have the] same problem. With Polish companies work is pretty hard. I say come on guys, let’s keep it, let’s target the Western market, because it has no sense [targeting Polish clients]”, (Vanko, Ukraine, IT and security systems).*

So, for Gabriel, Niall, and Vanko (above), there is a perception that clients in core-states *pay more*, and, conversely, that clients from Poland *pay less*. This begins to reveal not only how the global economic environment plays a role in migrant entrepreneurship, but how it is *uneven*. Indeed, it is this uneven, economic landscape which has provided the backdrop against which the process of outsourcing has been so prominent in recent decades (Sassen 1999). While for some, this conjures up negative images of the decline of certain industries and cities in the core-states (the auto industry in Detroit, for example), for others outside of core-states, it can be a totally different story, with millions of dollars of direct foreign investment flowing into these regions (Sassen 1991). Undoubtedly, Wrocław is one such region. With its pool of educated, relatively affordable labour, and geographic proximity to Western Europe, it has seen a large influx of direct foreign investment by transnational corporations (Klimek 2017). Its position as a growing centre of outsourcing is confirmed during my interview with a representative of the Wrocław city government:

*“So really we have a lot of big investors [multinational corporations] and these investors were attracted also by our policy, also by the agency for Wrocław agglomeration development, because our former mayor, Mr. Dutkiewicz had this idea to attract big investors to Wrocław...sometimes we competed for these big companies, for example Amazon, I remember that Cracow wanted Amazon, but Wrocław won. A lot of jobs were created, we can tell that more than 120,000 jobs were created thanks to these investors”, (Representative from the City of Wrocław).*

Outsourcing is, of course, a relative process. It only makes economic sense to outsource production if price disparities exist between two separate locations. But, in reality, these two locations are part of a broader, global landscape of *multiple* locations. The importance of this can be seen with the example of Caleb (Israel), below, who runs his own property investment company in Wrocław:

*“Why would Israeli investors invest in Poland? First of all the property prices are much cheaper. And the economic story of Poland appeals to many people and many people see potential and upside and potential increase in value and ongoing return which is of course better than Israel. You need a lot of money to invest in property there, here you need a third compared to what you would need in Israel. It’s relatively closer to Israel than other markets like the US or even the UK or other places which are really expensive,”* (Caleb, Israel, real estate).

As can be seen, the desire of the Israeli property investors to invest in Poland not only depends upon the high cost of real estate in Israel (Charney 2003) and the low cost in Poland, but also the comparatively undesirable real estate markets in *third party countries*. As such, it highlights how restricting the focus to a binary paradigm of the host and home country is insufficient. In order to truly understand Caleb’s business, we must not only consider its embeddedness within the economy of the host country (Kloosterman & Rath 2001) and the home country (Chen & Tan 2009), but also the wider, international economic environment (Levitt & Schiller 2004; Wang 2013; Bagwell 2018).

Indeed, a multilateral appreciation of the uneven global economic environment would also explain why, unlike many migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group, several of those from periphery-states disagree that Polish clients ‘pay less’. For example, Pavlo (Ukraine) owns a construction company with a 100% Polish clientele and, compared to his home country, he finds the Polish market very lucrative. ‘Why not target Ukrainian clients?’ I ask. He explains to me that he can make more from Polish clients than Ukrainian. It seems then, that for Pavlo, opportunity structures in Wrocław are comparatively *more lucrative* than the equivalent opportunity structures in Ukraine. So, in other words, while Gabriel, Niall, and Vanko (mentioned previously) talk about how clients in core-states can ‘pay more’, Pavlo talks about how clients in periphery-states ‘pay less’. Through their perceptions, the presence of a multilateral, uneven, economic landscape begins to emerge. Moreover, it is a landscape which appears to be hierarchical, with core-states at the top, periphery-states at the bottom, and Wrocław somewhere in the middle. As such, it seems reminiscent of World-systems Theory (Wallerstein 1987; 2004) which divides the world up into three components of varying wealth and power: Core, periphery, and semi-periphery. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1,

throughout this thesis I have adopted Wallerstein's trichotomous terminology because, unlike the dichotomy of 'Global North' vs. 'Global South', it seems better able to account for the apparent multiple levels of wealth and power observed in this study.

So, within such an economic hierarchy, do the migrant entrepreneurs, who access these relatively more affluent target markets in core-states, have correspondingly higher revenues and profits? Such a clearcut structural explanation does not always hold true. By this I mean that migrant entrepreneurs targeting clients 'further up' the hierarchy do not always earn more and, likewise, those targeting clients 'further down' the hierarchy do not always earn less. For example, Veronica (Ukraine), despite relocating from Ukraine (with a lower GDP per capita), to Poland (with a higher GDP per capita), did not receive an automatic corresponding boost in revenues for her business. On the contrary, she tells me how her cafe is struggling and not attracting enough customers, subsequently leading to financial difficulties for her. She even admits that she sometimes regrets not staying in Ukraine.

Conversely, Mario (Italy), despite targeting a local opportunity structure in Poland (with a comparatively lower GDP per capita compared to Italy), did not see an automatic corresponding *decrease* in revenue. On the contrary, he runs a successful franchise of juice bars in Wroclaw (and other major Polish cities), now with 14 locations. As such, a top-down structural assumption (of businesses being more successful if they access core-state markets) is clearly not always manifested in terms of outcomes.

Nonetheless, this variation in outcomes does not take away from the strong evidence presented above for the presence of a macro level, uneven, international, economic environment. Importantly, such an environment, with lucrative markets concentrated in core-states, provides a mechanism for explaining *why* so many migrant entrepreneurs from the core-states subject group *want to* (and do) access opportunity structures there. Indeed, this seems to mirror the findings of Harima's (2015: 85) study of Japanese migrant entrepreneurs in the Philippines, whereby they were driven by the 'favourable economic gap between developed and developing countries'. By way of explanation, economic disparity (on a macro level) appears to be creating business opportunities (on a meso level) which are then accessed by migrant entrepreneurs (on a micro level), pending their ability and motivation to do so. Furthermore, such economic disparity would also explain why so few of the migrant entrepreneurs were found to access relatively less lucrative opportunity structures in periphery-states.<sup>60</sup> But this raises an interesting question: If markets in core-states are so much more attractive than those in periphery-states, or even a semi-periphery-state like Poland, then why don't all migrant entrepreneurs -

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60 This would also explain why the 'ethnic entrepreneurs' in Rusinovic's (2008) study (within the Netherlands) were found to be disinterested in targeting markets within their home countries.

including migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states - target these more lucrative markets? This question seems to relate to the *how*. In other words, while the uneven economic landscape seems to provide a way to account for *why* migrant entrepreneurs would want to access opportunity structures in core-states, it does not explain *how* they do so.

### 5.3.2. The technological environment

So, then, how do migrant entrepreneurs access the comparatively lucrative markets in core-states? Here, I will argue that taking into consideration other layers of the macro environment, such as the *technological environment*, can help to shed some light on this. Specifically, I will propose that variations in the location of migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures can be better understood by situating them within the wider technological environment. In order to explore this, I will further break this down into two levels: 1. Migrant entrepreneurs' choice of industry sector and to what extent it lends itself to long-distance distribution; and; 2. How migrant entrepreneurs' industry sector itself might be representative of the broader, global level uneven technological environment.

#### *1. Industry sector and long-distance distribution*


First, in order for a business to service clients internationally, the product or service must lend itself to long-distance distribution. Some products and services seem to be more suitable than others. IT services, for example, are a prime example. Previously, we saw how Gabriel (France), Niall (Ireland), and Vanko (Ukraine), despite residing in Wrocław, provide IT services to clients in core-states. This trend of IT companies accessing international opportunity structures is echoed in an interview with Agnieszka, a local accountant, who (thanks to her English-language skills) does the bookkeeping for many non-Polish companies:

*"Mostly, if someone has company here in Poland, they sell to Polish companies. There are also some specific companies [engaged in] IT that are using Polish employees and they sell abroad", (Agnieszka, representative of an accountancy firm in Wrocław).*

So, is it just migrant entrepreneurs in the IT sector who are able to access international opportunity structures? In short, no. There are also examples of migrant entrepreneurs who are selling products and services unrelated to the IT sector, yet still service an international clientele. Caleb (Israel), for example, sells Polish real estate to investors in Israel, Jari (Finland) provides consultancy services to Finnish companies looking to invest in Poland, and Hans (Germany) runs a legal consultancy with clients situated predominantly in Germany. Clearly, then, this phenomenon of accessing international opportunity structures is not

restricted to the IT sector. However, as seen in Figure 5.2 below (showing the industrial sector and location of the opportunity structure of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states), it is a phenomenon which does, indeed, seem most prevalent in just a handful of sectors, namely 'information and communication', 'professional activities', and 'financial services'.<sup>61</sup> Conversely, industries such as 'gastronomy' and 'education' seem to correspond to more local (namely, Wroclaw) opportunity structures.

**Figure 5.2. The industry sector and location of opportunity structures of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states**




Source: Data collated from the interviews with migrant entrepreneurs.

<sup>61</sup> It should be noted that many migrant entrepreneurs from core-states were also situated within the 'gastronomy' and 'education' sectors. Both of these are sectors which (predominantly) target a local (Wroclaw) clientele. So, by no means am I stating that 'all migrant entrepreneurs from core-states access international opportunity structures'. The point here is simply that, based on those interviewed, migrants from core-states seem more likely to access international opportunity structures and certain industry sectors seem more conducive to this than others.

As such, the industry sector seems to be an important indicator of the likelihood of migrant entrepreneurs accessing international opportunity structures. Importantly, this would help to explain why those from periphery-states seem less likely to access such opportunities. Indeed, Figure 5.3 (the same as Figure 5.2 but with data for the migrants from the *periphery-states subject group*) shows how the majority of these migrant entrepreneurs are situated within secondary sectors, such as ‘construction’ and ‘gastronomy’, and correspondingly do *not* access international opportunity structures. Moreover, the only migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states who *are* servicing an international clientele are located exclusively in the ‘information & communication’ and ‘professional activities’ sectors. This finding is lent support by a Wang & Liu’s (2015: 15) study, which likewise found that migrant entrepreneurs situated in the ‘Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services’ sector were more likely to be engaged in transnational business.<sup>62</sup>

**Figure 5.3. The industry sector and location of opportunity structures of migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states**



Source: Data collated from the interviews with migrant entrepreneurs.

62 Even further support comes from Zolin & Schlosser’s (2013) study which found migrants with international businesses tend to have relatively high technological capabilities.



This phenomenon, of industry sector determining whether or not migrant entrepreneurs can access international opportunity structures, is perhaps most easily grasped when looking at industries which do *not* lend themselves well to long-distance, international distribution. A good example is hairdressing. Dale, a hairdresser from the UK, moved to Poland to be with his Polish partner and child. Once in Poland, he set up his own salon. However, after a few short months, he closed the salon and moved back to the UK. Upon asking him why, he answered:

*“Because the British have more disposable income! The currency exchange rate is amazing at the moment. I live off my tips, and send all my wages to my girlfriend and baby [in Poland]”, (Dale, UK, hairdressing salon).*

Of course, in the hairdressing industry, servicing clients remotely is not an option. But, if his UK client-base can pay more than his Polish client-base, then why did he not use the same strategy as Vanko, who flies his team of employees to clients in Northern Europe to install security devices? By this I mean why doesn't Dale remain in Poland, then fly to clients in the UK to cut their hair? The answer likely relates to the cost and frequency of service. While security systems only need to be installed occasionally, and are relatively expensive, haircuts are more frequent and cost less. This means that residing in Poland and flying to clients is not a cost-effective option. This characteristic, of being difficult (or cost-inefficient) to sell products or services internationally, can also help to explain why other businesses (such as the cafes and restaurants in the 'gastronomy' sector) did not access international opportunity structures.

## *2. Industry sector as an indicator of broader, international variation*

We saw above how variation in migrant entrepreneurs' industry sector goes some way to accounting for variations in their ability to access international opportunity structures. Yet, it does not explain why, in the first place, the two groups seem to differ in this respect. Importantly, the variation of industry sector seems representative of the wider list of 970 migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw (provided by the Statistical Office of Wroclaw) with distinct divisions between nationality and sector. Why, then, do those from core-states seem more likely to create businesses in certain sectors, such as 'professional services' and 'information and communication'? Noticeably, these sectors can be considered 'high skilled' or characteristic of advanced economies. As such, this study lends support to other scholars who point out the correlation between technological development and migrants' ability to target opportunity structures further afield (Faist 2000; Zhou 2004; Anwar & Daniel 2017). Further, it poses the question of whether there might be a correlation between migrants' industry sector and the technological development of their location(s) of origin. Economies in core-states usually have

a higher percentage of people employed in high skilled tertiary sectors,<sup>63</sup> so, as a result, one might expect migrant entrepreneurs from core-states to be more likely to have acquired human capital in these industries. Subsequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that, upon migrating to Poland and starting their own business, they seem more likely to do so within the same industry. Mattheus and Hans, who are from Germany where approximately 71.6% of the German workforce is in the tertiary sector,<sup>64</sup> are a good example. They both: 1. were involved in this sector in Germany prior to emigrating; and 2. later set up businesses in this sector. By contrast, in Ukraine, only 45% of the workforce is in the tertiary sector,<sup>65</sup> which perhaps provides insight into why so few of the Ukrainian migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw seem to be involved in such sectors.

However, such a simplistic structuralist approach is problematic. First, as seen in Chapter 4, no significant variation of human capital between the two groups was observed. Indeed, both groups were found to be highly educated (with over 80% of them possessing university degrees) in similar industries (such as business, marketing, law, IT, etc). This, as a result, seems to detract from the argument that the migrants are somehow embodying broader, macro-level variations in technological development and economic structure of their locations of origin. It could, however, be emblematic of a kind of 'under-employment' (Hume 1973) among the periphery-states subject group. Despite having relatively high levels of education, the majority of them seem to have created businesses in sectors which do not necessarily require university level qualifications, such as 'gastronomy' and 'construction'. Andriy (Ukraine), for example, has a law degree from Ukraine, which he tells me he cannot use in Poland, 'because it's a different system', so, instead, he set up his own cafe and coffee roasting business. Hans (Germany), by contrast, despite not possessing a law degree, has set up his own legal consultancy firm, advising clients in Germany about the new laws surrounding GDPR and personal data protection. Such variation suggests that there is more going on here than differences in migrants' human capital and industry sector alone.

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63 World Bank data, 2019: <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>

64 Statista.com, "Distribution: Distribution of employment by economic sector from 2008 to 2018"(2018 ) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/624297/employment-by-economic-sector-in-germany/>

65 OECD.org, "Compendium of Enterprise Statistics in Ukraine, 2018 <https://www.oecd.org/eurasia/competitiveness-programme/eastern-partners/Compendium-Enterprise-Statistics-Ukraine-2018-EN.pdf>

### 5.3.3. The socio-cultural environment

*“So I went to them [in Florence, Italy], I kind of invented the partnership. So, look, I want to move to Poland. We’ve been working together before and I’m honest, so they can tell that they trusted me. I’m moving to Poland so I want to do this: I want to take all your technology related projects. You outsource them to me, same as you have been doing, but I create a team in Poland and you don’t have to pay them, I will take care of everything, I’ll take care of making sure they don’t take advantage of you, because I pay them, so they would be taking advantage of me. You trust me. You just talk to me and give me all your technology related projects. And they were happy...”, (Giovanni, Italy, IT company).*

So far I have shown how an uneven economic environment, on a global scale, provides a strong financial motivation for migrant entrepreneurs to target lucrative markets in core-states, while certain industries seem more (or less) conducive to such long-distance distribution. Yet, as seen above, simply having the technological ability to target international markets does not mean that migrants do so. In other words, there appear to be other factors at play. One such factor, as I will suggest in this section, is the socio-cultural environment. Within the literature, it has often been found how social capital (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Flap et al. 2000; Light & Gold 2000; Lin & Tao 2012) and cultural capital (Masurel et al. 2002; 2004; Fregetto 2004) play an important role in shaping migrant entrepreneurship. Importantly, such capital only has value within how it interacts with larger social structures (Coleman 1988). As such, migrants’ embeddedness within such social structures needs to be taken into consideration (Granovetter 1985). Further, not only are migrants embedded within these structures, but so are their opportunity structures (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001). Nevertheless, once again, these observations have invariably taken place within a (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory context, usually restricting the focus to social structures within the host country only (Bagwell 2018). But in a reverse, core-to-(semi-)periphery migratory context, do migrant entrepreneurs, with high levels of social and cultural capital from core-states (as observed in Chapter 4), really restrict themselves to the socio-cultural environment of the (relatively less affluent) host country? Considering the uneven global economic landscape outlined previously, it seems unlikely, as it might be somewhat expected that they would capitalize upon their social and cultural capital from wealthy regions within core-states. Indeed, I will now highlight, below, how migrant entrepreneurs’ variation in social and cultural capital on a micro level, and its position within social structures on a macro level, seems to be playing an important role in migrant entrepreneurs’ varying ability to target international opportunity structures on a meso level.

*Social capital as a bridge to opportunity structures*

As seen previously with the example of Giovanni, he appears to be utilising social capital as a bridge to clients in his home country of Italy. On one hand, this seems to lend support to the mainstream literature which has often documented the positive role which social capital can play (Zimmer & Aldrich 1987; Light & Gold 2000; Katila & Wahlbeck 2012; Lin & Tao 2012). Yet, on the other hand, there are some important differences here. First, within the literature, migrants have often been found to cluster together, creating geographically proximate social networks often referred to as 'ethnic enclaves' (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Drori & Lerner 2002; Portes & Shafer 2006). But, the example of Giovanni, by contrast, shows how such social networks cannot be assumed to be spatially confined to the local (host country) environment and, instead, can clearly extend internationally (Chen & Tan 2009; Zolin & Schlosser 2013; Bagwell 2018; Solano 2020). This topic of ethnic enclaves will be further developed in Chapter 6. For now, however, it is interesting to question the dynamic between Giovanni's apparent international social network and the global, economic environment. Indeed, the ability of migrants such as Giovanni to utilise social capital as a bridge to lucrative markets in core-states would help to account for the higher rate of international entrepreneurship among the core-states subject group. After all, as seen in Chapter 4, these migrants were (unsurprisingly) found to have higher levels of social capital originating from core-states. For example, one of Giovanni's projects is being co-funded by an old friend of his from Italy. This, in itself, is a clear example of how social capital can serve as a lucrative bridge to core-country sources of revenue. But, importantly, there seems to be more going on here than just social capital alone, as I will now show below.

*Cultural capital as a bridge to opportunity structures*

*"Being Irish, there is a higher level of trust. It's like working with people from the UK, you know what you're going to get. If you say you are going to do something, it gets done. There's a perception with the Ukraine and Belarus that you don't know if it's going to get done. I get offers now from Ukraine for apps and software development, but the first thing he says is certain certifications and that they have not done the basic due diligence to make sure we can work together. It's just getting an email from an Indian company - they just have a list of companies that they spam with emails. They don't tailor the message at all", (Seamus, Ireland, healthcare consultancy).*

As can be seen above from the words of Seamus, even without prior social capital, migrants from certain countries seem to somehow qualify for a pre-approved elevated standing within society. For Seamus, being Irish is rewarded with a favourable perception, specifically, 'a higher level of trust'. Conversely, for those

from periphery-states, Seamus associates their cultural capital with a lower level of trustworthiness. Indeed, this can also be seen in the situation of Josh (UK). He has a team of Polish employees who are calling UK investors. In order to make them seem 'less Polish', he anglicises all of their names to make them more 'palatable' for the investors. So, for example, "if someone is called Paweł, we'll call them Paul", he tells me. Such an action seems to imply that having a name more typical of British culture would be more beneficial for business while, conversely, having a Polish name would be less beneficial. Does this mean that British or Irish cultural capital is objectively 'better' than Ukrainian or Belarusian capital? No, such capital, of course, when considered in isolation, does not have any inherently greater utility than the equivalent forms of capital from periphery-states. However, importantly, within the context of macro-level, cultural hierarchies, it appears to take on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988) whereby cultural capital from core-states can become 'transnationally acknowledged' and 'associated with high standards worldwide' (Weiss 2005: 722). This, it seems, grants migrants who possess such capital with a distinct advantage in terms of accessing opportunity structures in core-states. In other words, the bridging role of social capital (observed previously) seems to also be similarly observed in migrants' use of *cultural capital*.

Some migrant entrepreneurs have even found a niche whereby their business product is this very act of bridging core-state clients with supply from outside of core-states. Caleb (Israel) describes himself as 'the link who brings the Israeli investors'. He connects Israeli capital with the comparatively low-cost property market in Poland. By understanding both Polish and Israeli cultures, he acts as a bridge between not just people, but cultures and communication styles:

*"Yes [being Israeli helps], first of all in terms of speed and sharpness, I think Israeli are much more to the point and direct and straight and expect faster responses. And generally more direct, less polite, less subtle...Polish people are more different in the way they are acting and communicate. And sometimes I have to bridge this gap. And generally you know, Israelis can be a little bit arrogant and quite aggressive and you need to make sure they don't overdo it in terms of the negotiation. You don't want to upset the other side", (Caleb, Israel, property investment).*

This bridging role between cultures and markets seems very similar to the concept of Middleman Minority Theory (Bonacich 1973). This, of course, is nothing new, as middlemen, such as Jews in Europe, have been trading between cultures for centuries (ibid). Yet, there appears to be an important difference here, as migrants like Caleb, as opposed to being part of a wider cultural group within Poland, seem to be functioning not as ethnic groups but as individuals. As such, Caleb seems to be performing some kind of 'modern middleman role' (Terjesen & Elam 2009: 1093). In such a role, the importance of language skills is usually emphasized (Sui et al. 2015;

Solano 2020), as supported by Caleb's example above. Yet, for many of those from English-speaking countries (such as Niall, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), they access international opportunity structures, despite being monolingual. On the surface, the concept of 'monolingual middlemen' seems like an oxymoron. But in the context of an unequal socio-cultural international environment, whereby English has come to dominate international business (Light 2011), it seems that these migrants' singular language use is sufficient.

Additionally, incorporating the data from the periphery-states subject group lends support to the importance of positioning migrants' micro level social and cultural capital within macro level hierarchies. First of all, the low number of migrants accessing core-state opportunity structures seems to correlate to their lower levels of core-state social and cultural capital (as detailed in Chapter 4). Second, and perhaps more importantly, for the small number of migrants who were observed accessing markets in core-states, they invariably possess social and cultural capital from core-states. Let us, for example, recall the situation of Ivan (Ukraine), who learned fluent French (i.e. core-state cultural capital) and, subsequently, acquired several business contacts in France and Switzerland (i.e. core-states) to whom he is now able to sell his LED displays.

### 5.3.4. The politico-institutional environment

Above, we have seen how the economic, technological, and socio-economic layers of a macro-level environment appear to be playing a role in the variation of the location of the opportunity structures which migrant entrepreneurs access. This section now concerns itself with a fourth and final layer, namely, the politico-institutional environment. The important role played by governments and institutions, and how it affects migrant entrepreneurship, has been superbly documented by scholars in recent decades (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Engelen 2001; Welter & Smallbone 2011). As noted previously, Kloosterman and Rath (2001) described how the macro environment can be observed on three levels: 1. Neighbourhood; 2. Regional; 3. National. This typology has been extremely helpful in highlighting how there is spatial variation in the politico-institutional environment within nation-states. Yet, once again, such a typology fixes the host country nation-state as the largest unit of analysis and, subsequently, restricts the focus to the institutional environment within that country. But are migrant entrepreneurs and their opportunity structures not also affected by institutions and regulation *external to the host country*? In the case of Niall (Ireland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter), with his clients in 'Europe and US...Ireland, UK, Germany, and Scandies and France', it seems safe to assume that his business must, at least in part, be subject to the laws and regulations of those countries, as well as international trade and tariff agreements between those countries and Poland. Even with regard to his business operations within Poland, these operations are likely to be subject

to external, EU regulation. In other words, when it comes to analysing the role of the politico-institutional environment, I question, once again, if the host-country nation-state, as the largest unit of analysis, is large enough.

Indeed, this study unearthed some clear examples of regulation external to the host country affecting migrant entrepreneurs and their access to opportunity structures. This seems to happen in two ways: 1. directly; and 2. indirectly. With regard to the former, I will use the example of Jari (Finland), who is helping his client to sell eco-friendly plastic straws within the EU:

*“[The] EU made this single use plastic product directive that some products are not allowed after 2021, like straws, they are not allowed to be plastic anymore, so we have a material that is fully compostable, and doesn’t create [any] percent microplastics...It’s easier to sell because there’s the legislation”, (Jari, Finland, sales consultancy).*

Here, as a result of EU legislation (i.e. legislation stemming from beyond Poland’s borders), the market for such straws has greatly expanded. One would expect that, conversely, the market for single-use plastic straws has narrowed. As such, this is a clear example of how international legislation is *directly* affecting the opportunity structure both in Poland and across the EU. Of course, I should point out that the effect of international regulation is not restricted to *action*. The role of *inaction* is equally as important. For example, prior to the EU introducing the regulation about plastic straws, its inaction to pass such a law meant that there was a greater opportunity structure surrounding the sale of regular plastic straws.

Second, legislation from beyond Poland’s borders was also found to affect migrant entrepreneurs’ and their opportunity structures *indirectly*. This time, I turn to the example of Gabriel (France, quoted below) to illustrate this:

*“The plan in the future, hopefully the next couple of years, would be to live half the year in Asia and half the year in Europe. And during the half year in Europe the biggest part of it could probably be Wroclaw”, (Gabriel, France, online marketing).*

Here, we can see how certain groups seem able to migrate across political borders with ease (Lundstrom 2017; Benson & O’Reilly 2018; Sklair 2012). Importantly, not only does Gabriel enjoy such international legal mobility, but so does his business. Despite residing in Poland, he has registered his company in Estonia, which he tells me offers a lower rate of taxation. As such, Gabriel appears to be demonstrating a kind of *legal geoarbitrage*, whereby within the international politico-institutional landscape he can cherry pick from an international buffet of regulative systems. This seems reminiscent of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ described by Sklair (2012), whereby a privileged group of people navigate easily across the global,

institutional landscape. As such, migrants such as Gabriel seem to 'transcend the multiple institutional environments in which they are embedded' (Terjesen & Elam 2009: 1093). Conversely, the migrants from periphery-states are *not* always privileged with such mobility, subsequently (at least on the surface) restricting them to the politico-institutional environment of the host country. Barriers to such mobility could help to explain why some groups seem more able to conduct business internationally, while others seem less able.

At this point, I would like to turn our attention to the migrant entrepreneurs who are only accessing opportunity structures within Poland. With such 'local' opportunity structures, it would be understandable to assume that they are only affected by the politico-institutional environment of the host country. But, upon closer inspection, they and their businesses might be more internationally embedded than we might assume. Let us, for example, consider the case of Andriy (Ukraine), who runs a high-end hipster cafe in the heart of Wroclaw. In my conversation with him, he tells me how he used to import his coffee supplies from Ukraine, however he has since switched to a supplier in Spain. I asked him why he changed and he tells me it is easier to buy supplies from within the EU, because there are less taxes and paperwork. So, right here, we see how Andriy's business' supply chain is affected by *international regulation* (namely, the EU's Customs Union). His choice of coffee supplier is a clear example of how the institutional environment from beyond the host country (Poland) is affecting his business. Second, he tells me that 70% of his employees are Ukrainian. Once again, this is another example of elements of internationalism present within his business. These employees, as Ukrainians in Poland, are inherently international. They originate from an environment external to the host country and, by the same token, Andriy's ability to hire them depends upon an *international agreement* between Poland and Ukraine allowing Ukrainians to work in Poland. Third, Andriy (like many others from the periphery-states subject group) would have actually preferred to have moved to a country 'more West', but the paperwork for legally migrating to Poland was much easier. In other words, his very presence in Poland is conditional upon national laws of other countries, such as Germany, which make migrating comparatively more difficult than migrating to Poland. Fourth, Andriy tells me how the tax rates in Wroclaw seem (compared to Ukraine) quite high. But, as seen in Chapter 3, migrants' varying perception of whether the tax rates in Poland were low or high are seemingly dependent upon how they compare to the tax rates of their home country. Taken altogether, these points demonstrate how, even for migrant entrepreneurs who appear to be operating solely within the politico-institutional environment of the host country, they might in fact be more internationally embedded than we assume.



## 5.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have shown how studying ‘up’ within the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship in Wrocław, reveals how we cannot assume that migrant entrepreneurs access opportunity structures exclusively within the host country only. On the contrary, 51% of migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, as well as a minority (17%) of those from periphery-states, were found to be accessing *international opportunity structures*. Conversely, the large majority of those from periphery-states (79%) were found to be accessing *local* opportunity structures within the host country.

Subsequently, dividing the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship into three (micro, meso, and macro) levels (Kloosterman 2010), I have attempted to account for this variation. Specifically, I have explored how variations in migrant entrepreneurs’ motivations and access to resources (on a micro level), when positioned within an international environment (on a macro level), can lead to variation in the business opportunities which they act upon (on a meso level). In order to simplify the analysis, I further subdivided this macro level environment into four separate levels (economic, technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional). First, on an economic level, global inequalities in the spatial distribution of wealth seem to have resulted in the ability of clients in core-states to ‘pay more’, whereas clients in periphery-states ‘pay less’. This uneven economic environment, I argued, provides a rationale for why so many of the migrant entrepreneurs from core-state targeted such markets, while almost no one (from either group) was found to be selling goods or services to markets in periphery-states. Yet, although it provides a way to explain *why* they target markets in core-states, it does not explain *how* they do so, which, I proposed, is where the other levels of the macro environment come into play.

Indeed, turning to the second (technological) macro level, I showed how certain industries lend themselves better to international distribution, allowing migrants within such industries to service clientele in core-states while physically residing in Poland. Migrants from the core-states subject group were shown to be more commonly located in these industries, which provides a way to explain why they seem more able to access these markets. Further, I postulated that this variation in migrants’ industry sector might be indicative of broader, macro level differences in economic structure and technological development in migrants’ countries of origin.

Third, on a socio-cultural level, I showed how social and cultural capital from countries, when positioned within an uneven, socio-cultural hierarchy stemming from the hegemony of core-states (Weiss 2005), appears to take on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988), granting its holders with distinct advantages, namely, the ability to bridge their businesses to comparatively lucrative markets in core-states. As seen in Chapter 4, most migrant entrepreneurs from core-states were found to possess more core-state cultural and social capital than those

from periphery-states. As such, this variation of social and cultural capital (on a micro level), which acquires its value from its embeddedness within an unequal, international, socio-cultural environment (on a macro level), subsequently provides a way to account for the spatial variation in the opportunity structures they access (on a meso level).

Fourth, and finally, I showed how migrants' opportunity structures are not only embedded within the politico-institutional environment of the host country (Kloosterman & Rath (2001), but also within a wider, international, institutional environment. This environment seems capable of influencing migrants' businesses in two ways. First, international laws themselves can affect opportunity structures *directly*, for example EU regulation which expands or restricts opportunity structures. Second, international regulation can affect migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures *indirectly*. For example, within the uneven, international, politico-institutional landscape, migrant entrepreneurs from core-states enjoy relatively free movement, allowing many of them to consciously navigate around this international politico-institutional landscape, selecting the perceived best possible options from this international buffet of regulatory systems. Conversely, those from periphery-states seem more likely to face restrictions, reducing their ability to travel to countries in core-states and conduct business internationally. Further, even in the case of migrants accessing opportunity structures within the host country, I showed how their businesses might be more internationally embedded than we assume, with migrants' business practices apparently being indirectly influenced in a multitude of ways by regulation external to Poland. This, I argued, shows that national regulation cannot be viewed in isolation, but instead must be situated within a broader, international, politico-institutional landscape.

In conclusion, I have shown how, in order to understand migrants' motivation and ability (on a micro level) to access international opportunity structures (on a meso level), we must understand how both are embedded, and interact with, not just the host country environment, but the wider, international environment (on a macro level). Further, even migrants who are accessing opportunity structures within the borders of the host country are still, I have argued, embedded within this wider, global environment. Despite other authors acknowledging the role played by factors beyond the host country (Chen & Tan 2009; Ren & Liu 2015; Solano 2020; Bagwell 2018), importantly, they have generally restricted this role to the binary paradigm of the host country and home country. In this chapter, however, I have shown how third party countries can often play a role. This, I argue once again, must force the field of migrant entrepreneurship to move beyond using the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis and extend it even beyond the binary paradigm of host and home countries to include the wider, *global* environment.