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Studying 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship

Privileged migrant entrepreneurs in Wroclaw, Poland

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
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8.



CHAPTER 8

Theoretical explanation: Global-embeddedness

'By jettisoning methodological nationalism, an orientation that makes the nation-state the unit of analysis, scholars of migration and development are better able to examine differences of power within states and regions and around the globe', (Schiller & Faist 2010: 5).

8.1. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to answering the third and final research question, namely: 'How can these variations and interactions (encountered in Chapters 3 to 7) be theoretically explained?' After all, so far in this dissertation I have gone to great lengths to highlight a number of issues with the current theories, while not yet offering an alternative theoretical framework or solution. Hence, now, in this chapter, this is exactly what I will attempt to do. I will start by recapping how this study has 'lit up' the prominent role played by a *macro level global environment*, and how this environment seems not only uneven, but uneven on multiple levels (economic, technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional). It is, I will argue, only by situating migrant entrepreneurs (as well as their motivations and access to resources) within this global environment that we can theoretically account for the variations and interactions observed in this study. Subsequently, in order to foreground the importance of the role played by this macro level environment, I will propose the term 'Global-embeddedness'. In doing so, my goal is to extend scholars' calls for adopting a more global unit of analysis (Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2010) into the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

8.2. A multi-layered, uneven, global environment

Throughout the empirical chapters (3 to 7), I have highlighted how the migrant entrepreneurs in this study seem to be operating not just within a local and national environment, but within a wider, *international context*. This international context is, of course, a tremendously broad and complex entity, so in order to simplify the analysis, I have consistently broken it down into four distinct (yet closely intertwined) layers: 1. Economic; 2. Technological; 3. Socio-cultural; and 4. Politico-institutional. At this point, I would like to express that there may well be other layers of this environment and by no means do I claim that this typology is exhaustive. No, instead, my goal in creating this typology is to simply reflect, and organize, various aspects of the macro environment which seem to be playing a role in the businesses and lives of the migrant entrepreneurs in this particular study. With this in mind, I will now, below, attempt to outline these layers of the macro environment.

8.2.1. The global economic environment

The idea of an uneven, economic environment is nothing new. How certain cities and regions can be more prosperous than others has been well-documented (Scott 1998; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Scott & Storper 2003). Yet, within the field of migrant entrepreneurship, this observation has been largely restricted to the uneven economic environment within the host country (Bagwell 2018). This study, however, has highlighted how economic variations exist not only within the borders of the host country, but also *internationally*. Indeed, many of the migrant entrepreneurs in this study spoke of how clients in core-states can ‘pay more’, clients in periphery-states ‘pay less’, while clients in the semi-periphery environment of Wrocław appear to be paying on a level somewhere between the two. Similarly, they spoke of how labour, and expenses in general, are more expensive in core-states, less expensive in periphery-states, while, once again, within the semi-periphery environment of Wrocław, these costs are somewhere between the two. This geographical variation in income and expenses beyond the borders of Poland, reveals not only the presence of the global economic landscape, but how it is *uneven*.

This, in turn, lends support to scholars who, outside of the migrant entrepreneurship literature, have highlighted the uneven economic development not just within nation-states, but *between* them (Sassen 1991; Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005). Within the complex internationalisation of trade and processes, control has become centered within a small number of ‘global cities’, such as New York, London, and Tokyo, while other (semi-)periphery cities have arguably benefited from the decentralization of other parts of the supply chain (Sassen 1991). As a matter of fact, Wrocław, as shown in previous chapters, has been a benefactor of huge levels of direct foreign investment by transnational corporations attracted by its composition of ‘concentrated competitive advantages’ (Scott 1998: 155), namely membership of the EU, proximity to Western Europe, and a plentiful supply of affordable, educated labour. The subsequent booming economy and increased demand for labour has led to wages rising sharply in recent years, showing how the economic environment is not only uneven across space, but also time (Hoang 2014).

8.2.2. The global technological environment

This study also unearthed data which hints at the presence of an uneven, global, *technological* environment. In Chapter 5, I showed how migrants from core-states seem more likely to be located within tertiary service sectors, which itself seems representative of broader variation between the migrants’ countries of origin. These tertiary industries, as noted in Chapter 5, seem to lend themselves better to long-distance distribution, subsequently empowering entrepreneurs (often those from core-states) within these sectors with an apparent greater ability to target comparatively more affluent clients situated internationally in core-states.

As such, this variation in sector hints at the presence of technological hierarchies, whereby certain areas around the world seem ‘higher up’ than others. Or, in the words of Burawoy (2001: 150): ‘[technologies] do not flow on a level plain, but are propagated through inequalities of power between transmitter and receiver. There is a hierarchical chain...’. As such, variations in the technological level of migrant entrepreneurs’ industry sector, as well as their country of origin, could be indicative of variations in their position within such technological hierarchies.

8.2.3. The global socio-cultural landscape

I showed, previously, how migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, within the environment of Wrocław, appear to benefit from an ‘elevated status’, while those from periphery-states experience the opposite, lending support to Andrejuk’s (2017) observation of cultural hierarchies within Poland. Importantly, I also highlighted how such cultural hierarchies appear to stretch beyond Poland’s borders into international contexts, whereby cultural capital of those from core-states ‘can become transnationally acknowledged’ (Weiss 2005: 722) and seems to take on positive values in contexts external to Poland. Further, I showed how the treatment of certain migrant entrepreneurs of non-white heritage has changed in recent years (along with the new government), reflecting once again how such hierarchies do not just vary across space, but also time.

8.2.4. The global politico-institutional landscape

In Chapter 6, I showed how certain authors seem justified in highlighting the important role played by the politico-institutional environment within the host country (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman & Rath 2001; Engelman 2001), yet, importantly, I also showed how this layer of the environment does not stop at the host country’s borders. On the contrary, I showed how laws originating from outside of Poland can impact migrant entrepreneurs within Poland. This seems to happen in two ways. First, international regulation can *directly* affect migrant entrepreneurs and their opportunity structures. For example, Jari (from Finland) is now selling non-plastic straws, as a result of EU legislation which bans the use of regular plastic straws as of 2021. Further, the importance of international legislation becomes even more apparent for migrants providing products or services internationally (whereby they must adhere to the local laws and regulations of their international clients). Second, international regulation can have *indirect* effects. Migrants, purely based upon their citizenship, are often subject to different regulations and restrictions, essentially constituting a kind of passport hierarchy. While those from core-states often enjoy freedom of movement (both geographically and institutionally), those from periphery-states seem more likely to be subjected to restrictions. Further, migrants’ experience of non-Polish (i.e. international) regulatory systems, such as

those from their home country, often influences how they perceive Polish regulation. For example, migrants originating from nation-states with comparatively high taxes often subsequently perceive taxes in Poland to be low, revealing how such opinions must be situated within the wider, international, politico-institutional environment.

8.3. Global-embeddedness

This uneven, global environment, I will now argue, plays an important role in the phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship. This role, however, has so far been largely neglected. Indeed, over the last several decades, migration and social science scholars have been preoccupied with using the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis, a tendency referred to as ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Schiller 2002; Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Wolf 2010; Glick Schiller & Faist 2010; Schiller 2015). This has been defined by Schiller & Faist (2013: 28) as ‘an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states’. As a sub-branch of migration, it is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the field of migrant entrepreneurship has followed in these footsteps. Indeed, prominent theories within the field have almost invariably been restricted in focus to within the borders of the host country only. Disadvantage Theory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010), for example, was formulated on the basis of comparisons between migrants and the *host-country* labour force, while Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006) was based upon Cubans in the context of Miami and labour markets in the wider US (i.e. host country) economy. Then, of course, there is the Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999) which, as mentioned in previous chapters, went so far as to explicitly label the host country as the largest unit of analysis in its typology of the opportunity structure (Kloosterman & Rath 2001).

Admittedly, there have, however, been at least two groups of migrant entrepreneurship scholars who have paid more attention to factors beyond the borders of the host-country. First, scholars of migrant entrepreneurship within the garment industry have (perhaps unavoidably) acknowledged the far-reaching effects of globalization upon the sector (see, for example, Rath 2002 or Ram et al. 2003). Second, scholars of transnational entrepreneurship have, as the name suggests, written extensively about migrant entrepreneurs with *transnational* businesses (see Saxenian 1999; 2002; Portes et al. 1999; 2001; Rusinovic 2008; Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015; Bagwell 2018). Yet, despite both groups of scholars addressing factors beyond the borders of the host country, at least three key concerns remain. First, this international exploration is often restricted to the binary paradigm of the host and home countries, de facto ignoring any role played by third-party countries. Second, even when taking third-party countries into account,

the authors tend to retain the nation-state as their largest unit of analysis, which itself still ignores any role played by supranational factors. Third, both groups of scholars, in addition to most migration scholars in general, have tended to focus upon migration to their country of residence (Schiller & Faist 2010). This can even be seen from the language they use whereby, instead of using the term '*migrant entrepreneur*', they often use '*immigrant entrepreneur*', implicitly revealing a host-country viewpoint.

This third point, I will now argue, has important consequences. As a result of most leading migration scholars being located at educational institutions within core-states, they have (understandably) tended to focus on the flows of migration happening right in front of their eyes, namely, *migration to core-states*. This, when coupled with the fact that most migration to core-states tends to originate from *periphery-states*,⁹⁰ has resulted in the overwhelming majority of migrant entrepreneurship studies to date having been not only focused on the host country nation-state as the largest unit of analysis (Chen & tan 2009; Bagwell 2018), but also situated within *(semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts* (Ilhan-nas et al. 2011; Dheer 2018). Importantly, core- and periphery-states are themselves not situated within a flat and even global landscape, but rather, as I have outlined above, within an uneven, hierarchical, global landscape, whereby core-states find themselves toward the 'top' end and periphery-states diametrically toward the 'bottom'. Theories, then, which have been developed in the context of (semi-)periphery-to-core migration, may well have been created within 'dominant-subordinate relationships' which can grant 'a certain power relationship in favor of the anthropologist' (Nader 1972: 5). Indeed, by restricting our focus to (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts, many of the current theories and models have, I argue, been 'theorized largely on the basis of persistent power imbalances in the international system' (Croucher 2009: 479). Subsequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that these theories often seem to make a number of assumptions which reflect this dominant-subordinate context within which they were created. First, as detailed in Chapter 3, they assume that migrants' motivations are economic in character or even neglect them altogether. This, I proposed, is because in the (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts in which they have been formulated, the authors have often *assumed* that migrants want to move to a more economically developed country and, likewise, open their own business for economic reasons. Second, as seen in Chapter 5, the Interactive Model (Waldinger et al. 1990) and Mixed-embeddedness Approach (Kloosterman et al. 1999) assume that migrants only access opportunity structures within the borders of the host country. This, perhaps, is unsurprising, given that the migrants, upon which these theories were based, appeared to conduct their businesses almost entirely within the (economically dominant) host-country's borders, seldom extending their businesses internationally. Third, Ethnic Enclave Theory (as detailed

90 South-North migration flows greatly outweigh that of North-North (UN DESA 2020).

in Chapter 6) assumes that migrants often have access to a plentiful supply of affordable, co-ethnic labour. Fourth, and finally, Disadvantage Theory (as seen in Chapters 4 and 7) assumes that migrants, invariably originating from (semi)-periphery-states, are often disadvantaged (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010).

Yet, when we study 'up' in migrant entrepreneurship, as has been done in this study, we begin to see how such inverse migratory contexts seem problematic for these theories. Indeed, they reveal how the assumptions outlined above cannot necessarily be assumed. First, they highlight how motivations (for both migrating and starting a business) are not only important, but are also non-uniform and, therefore, cannot always be assumed to be economic in character. Second, the opportunity structure cannot be assumed to be situated solely within the borders of the host country. Third, ethnic enclaves cannot be assumed to provide a plentiful pool of affordable, co-ethnic labour. Fourth, migrants cannot always be assumed to be disadvantaged.

So, then, how can such variations be explained? Here, I will argue that they can only be understood within the context of the wider, global environment. Scholars' methodological nationalistic focus upon migrant entrepreneurship in (semi-)periphery-to-core migratory contexts has, I argue, largely blinded us to the important role played by *factors beyond the borders of host countries*. Wrocław, despite being surrounded by a moat, does not exist in isolation. Its population of migrant entrepreneurs are part of, and affected by, a wider, international environment, extending well-beyond city and national borders and existing on multiple levels and subject to change over time. As such, to truly understand all processes involved in migrant entrepreneurship, we must situate migrant entrepreneurs not just within the local and national environment, but within an uneven, multi-layered (economic, technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional) global environment. To describe the positioning of migrants' micro level resources (their motivations and resources) and their meso-level environment (namely, their businesses and the opportunity structures which they access) within this macro level, multi-layered, global environment, I propose the term 'Global-embeddedness'. By using this term, I aim to capture several important implications. First, migrant entrepreneurs operate within an environment extending well-beyond the host country. Second, this environment varies across both time and space. Third, migrants' resources can be shaped by their position within this global environment. Fourth, and finally, despite this global environment influencing migrants and their resources, it is not strictly 'top down', as migrants do have an element of agency, albeit often actively consuming and reproducing such structures (Burawoy 2001).


Of course, such a global approach is nothing new. Within the wider social sciences literature, several scholars have already called for us to move beyond the nation-state as the largest unit of analysis (Wimmer & Schiller 2002; Wallerstein 2004; Weiss 2005; Wolf 2010; Schiller & Faist 2010; Schiller 2015). Yet, within the

field of migrant entrepreneurship, it is a somewhat novel suggestion. Although, as noted in Chapter 5, some scholars have emphasized the importance of factors outside of the host country (Chen & Tan 2009; Solano 2015; Bagwell 2018), these factors are often restricted to the binary paradigm of host and home countries. Yet, a Global-embeddedness Approach, as shown in Figure 8.1, below, calls instead for a consideration of how migrants' (and their motivations and resources) are embedded not only within their host and home countries, but within third party countries as well as the wider global environment. As such, the concept of Global-embeddedness echoes scholars' calls for adopting a more global unit of analysis (Wallerstein 1987; 2004; Weiss 2005; Schiller & Faist 2010) and extends it into the field of migrant entrepreneurship.

I anticipate two 'push backs' regarding the use of this term. First, some might argue that we should simply reposition the existing term 'Mixed-embeddedness' to incorporate a wider, global context. However, my counter argument would be that, importantly, the term 'Mixed-embeddedness' lacks any connotations of positioning migrants within global hierarchies, and instead has centred around migrants' embeddedness within host-country environments. 'Global-embeddedness', by contrast, forefronts the importance of the wider, global context, as well as the power dynamics implicit within this. A second potential criticism of the term is that such global theories have previously been criticised for trying to be a 'grand narrative' (Schiller & Faist 2010). However, my counter argument would be that positioning migrant entrepreneurs within this global environment is the only way to truly incorporate all factors at play. Not doing so would mean not understanding the full picture.

Last of all, I would like to clarify two further things. First, adopting such a global approach does not mean refraining from using the nation-state unit of analysis altogether (Schiller & Faist 2010). On the contrary, as seen from my depiction in Figure 8.1. of what 'Global-embeddedness' encompasses, I still make use of the terms 'host country', 'home country', and 'third party countries', so clearly I am not advocating for a total abandonment of the nation-state unit of analysis. No, instead, I am proposing that, in the same way that cities are not the largest unit of analysis, neither should nation-states. Instead, I argue, the largest unit of analysis should be much wider, namely, *global* structures. Second, I would like to clarify that Global-embeddedness is an approach and not a model. By this I mean it does not attempt to define or predict how global processes work. No, rather, the purpose is to simply acknowledge the important role played by an uneven global environment, and to situate migrant entrepreneurs (and their motivations and resources) within it. In doing so, we can better understand the full context within which migrant entrepreneurship takes place.

Figure 8.1. Global-embeddedness: Expanding the unit of analysis to include the global, macro environment




Source: My own diagram based on my interpretation of other models.

8.4. Global-embeddedness and migrant entrepreneurs in Wrocław

I will now demonstrate, below, how adopting a Global-embeddedness Approach can account for the variations encountered in this study. So far in this dissertation, I have ordered these variations into four distinct organizational categories, namely: 1. variations in migrant entrepreneurs' motivations (Chapter 3); 2. variations in access to opportunity structures (Chapter 5); 3. variation in migrants' ethnic division of labour (Chapter 6); and 4. variations in privilege and disadvantage (Chapter 7). However - and importantly - these categories are not all equal, nor do they necessarily happen in this order. Indeed, despite these variations all being directly or indirectly caused by migrants' varying Global-embeddedness, it is the latter (i.e. variations in privilege and disadvantage) which largely determines migrants' motivations and the location of their (accessed) opportunity structures. These categories, in turn, combine to influence migrants' variation in their ethnic division of labour. This causal relationship can be seen below in Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2. The relationship between migrants' Global-embeddedness and the variations encountered in this study



Source: My own diagram based on the data encountered in this study.

At this point, the reader might ask why, if the organizational category of migrants' composition of privileges and disadvantages plays such a prominent role, did I order this category as the final empirical chapter and not the first? Here, my answer is that it was only after analysis of the migrant entrepreneurship process (including their motivations, their opportunity structures, and their ethnic division of labour) that their composition of privileges and disadvantages became visible. I now foreground

the importance of this organizational category by elevating it to the top of my discussion, below.

8.4.1. Disadvantage vs. privilege

Here I argue that, by looking through a Global-embeddedness lens, we can begin to understand how the two groups vary in their composition of privileges and disadvantages. As explained previously, the world is not a flat, level playing field. Migrants operate within a multi-layered (economic, technological, socio-cultural, politico-institutional), uneven environment. It is the variation in the position of the migrants (and their resources) within this uneven environment which generates the variation in privileges. For example, starting with the socio-cultural layer of the macro environment, those from core-states are, unsurprisingly, more likely to possess higher levels of core-state cultural and social capital. This, when situated within cultural hierarchies (both within Wroclaw and beyond) takes on structurally imposed value (Coleman 1988). As a result of this, those possessing core-state cultural capital are granted a relatively higher standing within society, while those with periphery-state cultural capital experience the mirror opposite.

Second, switching to the politico-institutional layer of the global environment, migrants are granted a number of privileges (or disadvantages) based purely upon their citizenship. In general, those possessing passports from core-states are bestowed with greater politico-institutional mobility (both geographically and for business matters) than those possessing passports from periphery-states.

Third, the uneven, international technological landscape also plays a role in realizing certain privileges. As mentioned previously, migrant entrepreneurs, on a micro-level, might (often, but not always) embody broader, international technological variation. Specifically, those from core-states seem more likely to run businesses in tertiary sectors, which tend to lend themselves better to long-distance distribution, allowing them to target (more lucrative) business opportunities in core-states. How this ability is a *privilege* was recently foregrounded by the global COVID-19 pandemic, whereby those dependent upon a local clientele were often very negatively affected by the government enforced lockdown, whereas many of those capable of servicing clients remotely were largely unscathed (or even benefitted).

Fourth, and finally, the uneven global economic landscape also contributes to variation in migrants' privileges. Its symbiotic relationship with the aforementioned socio-cultural, politico-institutional, and technological hierarchies plays a role in reinforcing them, while also providing the uneven economic starting point around which migrants' often base their motivations for migrating, as I will now show below.

8.4.2. Variation in motivations

Such variation in privilege plays a dominant role in determining variations between the two subject groups in terms of their motivations for both migrating to Wrocław, as well as starting a business. With regard to the former, these variations in motivation are reflections of ‘spatial opportunity differentials’ (De Haas 2011: 20) between migrants’ locations of origin (and third party countries) and their host country environment (i.e. Wrocław). Importantly, such spatial opportunity differentials are themselves a reflection of an uneven global environment and migrants subsequent privileged (or disadvantaged) position within this environment. Once we situate the migrant entrepreneurs within the various layers of this environment, such differing motivations between the two subject groups begin to make sense. First of all, within the uneven, global *economic* environment, with wealth concentrated in regions in core-states, it is perhaps unsurprising that the migrant entrepreneurs who are privileged to be born into such economically prosperous regions are less likely to relocate to Wrocław for higher earnings. Conversely, for those from periphery-states, whereby their migration to Wrocław constitutes a move to an economically more developed region, it is likewise unsurprising that they seem more likely to do so for higher revenues. Of course, as also seen in Chapter 3, it is not always so simple, as a small number of those from core-states did indeed relocate to Wrocław for economic reasons, however, importantly, this was more about *reducing costs*, as opposed to increasing earnings.

Second, the uneven, international, politico-institutional environment also plays a role. Owing to its unevenness, it grants certain migrants with certain privileges, while unfairly assigning disadvantages to others. Such privileges or disadvantages then influence migrants’ motivations for migrating. For example, migrants from periphery-states (notably, Ukraine) were motivated to move to Wrocław for its comparatively safe environment with ‘rule-of-law’. For those from core-states, by contrast, whereby their home country environments can also be considered to be safe with ‘rule-of-law’, this was not a motivating factor. Further, within such an uneven environment, migrants experience variation in their politico-institutional mobility, which is based almost entirely upon their citizenship. For those from core-states, it is often relatively easy to travel and work around the world. For those from periphery-states, however, they regularly face legal barriers which curtails their ability to travel and work (Sklair 2012). This is illustrated by how many of the periphery-state migrant entrepreneurs in this study chose Poland because they could not legally migrate to other third party countries such as Germany. This, combined with Polish national legislation allowing them to immigrate and work, contributed to them choosing Poland. Wrocław, in other words, was not their first choice. This highlights how migrants’ aspirations can be restricted by their capabilities (De Haas 2011) and, importantly, how such capabilities are a reflection

of migrants' privileged or disadvantaged position within an uneven, international uneven, international politico-institutional environment.

Let us now consider the variation in migrants' motivations for starting their own business. As seen in Chapter 3, many of those from the core-states subject group talked about how opening a business was a way of escaping 'meaningless' corporate employment and a way of having more agency, whereby money was not the main motivation. Those from the periphery-states subject group, by contrast, spoke more about how entrepreneurship was a pathway to exactly that, namely, *more money*. Here, once again, I argue that migrants' varying Global-embeddendesss, and their subsequent variation in their composition of privileges and disadvantages, can serve as a way of understanding such variation. As mentioned previously, those from core-states are granted the privilege of finding it easier to secure relatively well-paid positions within the mainstream labour market. It stands to reason, therefore, that if a migrant already has a well-paid job, that they would then be less likely to be motivated to open their own business for financial reasons. Conversely, for those from periphery-states, who face more barriers to securing well-paid employment in the mainstream labour market (Grand & Szulkin 2002), it should not come as a surprise that they are more likely to be motivated by the relatively higher earnings offered by an entrepreneurial trajectory (Light 1979; Johnson 2000; Clark & Drinkwater 2010). As such, it reveals how motivations themselves seem to reflect broader inequalities in the environment and the embeddedness of migrants and their resources (i.e. their 'Global-embeddedness') within this environment.

8.4.3. Variation in migrants' location of (accessed) opportunity structures

In Chapter 5, I detailed the variation in the geographical location of migrant entrepreneurs' opportunity structures whereby those from core-states seem more likely to access *international* opportunity structures in core-states, while those from periphery-states seem more likely to access *local* opportunity structures in Wrocław. Here I argue, once again, that adopting a Global-embeddedness Approach enables us to account for variations between the two subject groups. First of all, by situating migrant entrepreneurs within global economic hierarchies, we can account for *why* migrant entrepreneurs would even *want* to access opportunity structures in core-states. Within this uneven, economic landscape, whereby wealth is concentrated in core-states, clients there can 'pay more', so there is an *economic incentive* to target them. Likewise, it explains why almost no migrant entrepreneurs (from either subject group) were observed accessing opportunity structures in (comparatively less affluent) periphery-states. Second, it provides a mechanism to explain *how* they access such markets. This can be done by situating migrant entrepreneurs within the other layers (technological, socio-cultural, and politico-institutional) of the global environment. In terms of the technological environment, as seen above

(and in Chapter 5), certain industries, in particular those in the tertiary sector, seem to lend themselves better to international distribution. Migrant entrepreneurs from core-states are more likely to be located within such industries, which helps to explain *how* they are able to service clients internationally. Turning now to the role of the socio-cultural layer of the global environment, the acquisition of core-state social and cultural capital can act as a bridge to core-state markets. Unsurprisingly, it seems that clients situated in core-states are more likely to conduct business with people they know and in a language they know. It follows then, that migrant entrepreneurs from core-states, who have usually spent much of their lives acquiring core-state social and cultural capital, are more likely to possess the socio-cultural capital necessary to bridge this gap. Last, but not least, the international politico-institutional layer of the global environment also helps to account for the 'how'. As seen above, the international politico-institutional landscape is *uneven*. While most migrant entrepreneurs from core-states can travel and conduct business internationally with relative ease, those from the periphery-states seem to face more restrictions. This uneven landscape can restrict migrant entrepreneurs from periphery-states from moving freely to core-states,⁹¹ subsequently curtailing their ability to acquire social and cultural capital in these countries, with the end result that they are less likely to be able to 'bridge' themselves to clients situated in core-states. The migrants, in other words, owing to their Global-embeddedness, inherit a specific composition of privileges and/or disadvantages which, in turn, enables or restricts the opportunity structures which they are able to access.

8.4.4. Variation in migrants' ethnic division of labour

Last of all, I argue that migrants' varying Global-embeddedness, in conjunction with its subsequent shaping of migrants' privileges, motivations, and opportunity structures (as outlined above), can account for the variations in the subject groups' ethnic division of labour. As a reminder, this study found that migrants from core-states, in contradiction to Ethnic Enclave Theory (Wilson & Portes 1980; Light et al 1994; Portes & Shafer 2006), were less likely to source employees from a plentiful supply of affordable co-ethnic labour (as it was neither plentiful nor affordable) and, instead, often opted to hire native, Polish labour. Here, I will subdivide my explanation into three key questions: 1. Why is core-state labour less plentiful? 2. Why is core-state labour less affordable? And 3. If periphery-state labour is more affordable, then why doesn't everyone access this labour supply? Starting

91 This restriction of international mobility might also help to explain why, in many studies (for example, Kloosterman et al. 1999), (semi)-periphery-to-core migrant entrepreneurs seem less likely to access international opportunity structures. After all, once inside a core-state, such a restriction of international mobility might discourage them from further moving around, subsequently encouraging them to focus on business opportunities within the core-state host country.

with the first question, an uneven global environment inherently creates ‘spatial opportunity differentials’ (De Haas 2011: 20) which, as seen above, underlies migrants’ motivations for migrating. Such motivations, combined with migrants’ varying capability to migrate to a location of their choosing (i.e. their position within an uneven politico-institutional global environment), have resulted in relatively high numbers of migrants from certain periphery-states (notably, Ukrainians) migrating to Wrocław. Conversely, only a small number of migrants from core-states have relocated to Wrocław. This helps to explain why, for those from core-states, co-ethnic labour is *not plentiful*.

I turn now to the second question, which concerns itself with why core-state labour is less affordable. Again, by considering the international context, we can begin to understand why this may be. Within the context of Wrocław’s BPO economy, which itself is positioned within a global economy, serving predominantly core-state clients, those who possess core-state cultural capital are often highly desirable within the labour market. This demand of core-state labour, combined with its lower supply within Wrocław, provides a mechanism for explaining its relatively higher cost.

Third, and finally, there is the question of why both subjects groups do not access the same labour supply. By this I mean, if periphery-state labour is more affordable, then why were those from the core-states subject group rarely found to access it and, instead, more often found to be hiring native, Polish labour? Here, I argue that the answer can be found in one of the only privileges of migrants from periphery-states, namely, their privileged access to periphery-state labour. While those from core-states are able to leverage their core-state cultural and social capital to access profitable opportunity structures in core-states, those from periphery-states, conversely, are able to leverage their periphery-state social and cultural capital to access an affordable supply of periphery labour.

8.5. Conclusions

In this chapter, I attempted to answer the third and final research question, namely: ‘How can these variations and interactions (encountered in Chapters 3 to 7) be theoretically explained?’ In order to do so, I first outlined the presence of an uneven, macro environment which exists on a *global scale* and consists of multiple layers (economic, technological, politico-institutional, and socio-cultural). I then, subsequently, argued that the variations and interactions encountered in this study can be understood by situating migrants (and their motivations, and access to resources) within this global environment. In doing so, I proposed the concept of ‘Global-embeddedness’. Finally, I demonstrated how this concept can help us to understand four specific variations identified in this study, namely: 1. variations in motivations; 2. variations in the locations of (accessed) opportunity

structures; 3. variations in the ethnic division of labour; and 4. variations in privilege and disadvantage. These variations, I proposed, are not all equal, as the latter (migrants composition of privileges and disadvantages) seems to play a prominent role in shaping migrants' motivations and opportunity structures which, in turn, influences their ethnic division of labour.