Supplemental Material (not copyedited or formatted) for: Bert N. Bakker, Gijs Schumacher, Matthijs Rooduijn. 2021.
"The Populist Appeal: Personality and Antiestablishment Communication." The Journal of Politics 83(2). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/710014.

Appendix part of: *"The Populist Appeal: Personality and Anti-establishment Communication"*

Contents

A. Study 1: Cross-country, cross-continent test of the correlation between Agreeableness and support for populists **5**

Populists and their ideology **5**

A.1: Understanding Society Study in U.K. **6**
Acknowledgement . . . 6
Respondents . . . 6
Measures . . . 6
National representative sample . . . 7
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 8
Does decomposing the dependent variable change the results? . . . 10

A.2: British Election Studies 2015 **12**
Respondents . . . 12
Measures . . . 12
National representative sample . . . 13
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 15
Agreeableness and favorability of all parties . . . 16
Controlling for Authoritarianism . . . 17

A.3: GESIS Panel Germany **19**
Respondents . . . 19
Measures . . . 19
National representative sample . . . 20
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 22
Analyzing Die Linke and AfD separately . . . 23

A.4: Danish Election Study 2010-2011 **24**
Acknowledgement . . . 24
Respondents . . . 24
Measures . . . 24
National representative sample . . . 26
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 28

A.5: Dutch National Elections 2012 **29**
Acknowledgement . . . 29
Respondents . . . 29
Measures . . . 29

National representative sample . . . 31
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 32

A.6: EU Election Study in the Netherlands **34**
Acknowledgement . . . 34
Respondents . . . 34
Measures . . . 34
National representative sample . . . 36
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 36

A.7: Dutch National Elections 2017 **38**
Respondents . . . 38
Measures . . . 38
National representative sample . . . 40
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 41

A.8: Swiss Household Panel 2009 **43**
Acknowledgement . . . 43
Respondents . . . 43
Measures . . . 43
National representative sample . . . 44
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 45

A.9: Swiss Household Panel 2015 **47**
Acknowledgement . . . 47
Participants . . . 47
Measures . . . 47
National representative sample . . . 47
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 49

A.10: Swiss Election Study 2015 **50**
Participants . . . 50
Measures . . . 50
National representative sample . . . 50
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 52

A.11: Spanish Election Study **54**
Respondents . . . 54
Measure . . . 54
National representative sample . . . 55
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 56

A.12: LAPOP Survey Venezuela **57**
Participants . . . 57
Measures . . . 57
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 59

A.13: American National Election Studies 2016 **60**
Acknowledgement . . . 60
Respondents. . . . 60
Measures . . . 60
National representative sample . . . 61
Results belonging to Figure 1 . . . 63
Controlling for partisanship . . . 64

A.14: Pooled-analysis reported in Figure 1 **65**
Cynicism and populism . . . 66
The other Big Five traits and populism . . . 66

A.15: SSI sample in United States **67**
Respondents . . . 67
Measures . . . 67
National representative sample . . . 68

A.16: US Personality and favorability of US politicians **69**
Agreeableness and favorability of US politicians . . . 69
Authoritarianism and favorability of US politicians . . . 69
Agreeableness, authoritarianism and feelings towards populists . . . 70

A.17: Alternative specifications belonging to Figure 1 **72**
Not controlling for political cynicism . . . 72
Not controlling for left-right ideology . . . 72

A.18: Agreeableness, populism and turn-out **75**
1. Agreeableness and turn-out . . . 75
2. Agreeableness, populism and abstention . . . 76

A.19: Agreeableness and anti-incumbency? **78**

B.1: Study 2 - Conjoint experiment **80**
Participants . . . 80
Measures of moderators . . . 80
Systematic drop-out . . . 81
Treatments . . . 81

B.2: Study 2 - Randomization check **84**

B.3: Study 2 - Main effects of the conjoint experiment **85**
Vote choice . . . 85
Feeling . . . 85

B.4: Study 2 - Results belonging to Figure 2 **87**
Feelings towards the politicians . . . 90

B.5: Study 2 - Testing the assumed linearity **92**

B.6: Study 2 - Analyses using a populism scale **94**

B.7: Study 2 - Controlling for Party Identifcation **94**

B.8: Study 2 - Anti-establishment, Agreeableness and sub-groups **98**
Gender differences 98
Age differences 100

B.9: Study 2 - Anti-establishment, Agreeableness and the host ideology **101**

B.10: Evidence that Agreeableness is stable **104**

References **105**

Supplemental Material (not copyedited or formatted) for: Bert N. Bakker, Gijs Schumacher, Matthijs Rooduijn. 2021.
"The Populist Appeal: Personality and Antiestablishment Communication." The Journal of Politics 83(2). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/710014.

A. Study 1: Cross-country, cross-continent test of the correlation between Agreeableness and support for populists

Populists and their ideology

The populist parties and leaders we studied in this paper, have very different ideological backgrounds. In Table A1 we provide a systematic overview of the differences between the populists in our study. According to the most recent data coming from the MARPOR (Political Representation, Parties, and Presidents Survey) database, the party families range from communist to special issue, and from agrarian to nationalist. Moreover, on a scale that theoretically ranges from -100 (left) to 100 (right), some parties score very low/left-wing (e.g. Die Linke and Podemos), while others score very high/right-wing (e.g. Trump's Republicans and the SVP). The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data (second column) provide a similar picture. On a scale from left (0) to right (10), some parties, like for instance Podemos in Spain, score very low/left-wing, while other parties, like the Dutch PVV, score very high/right-wing. The CHES data also provide us with a GAL/TAN index, which measures how Green-Alternative-Libertarian or Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist a party is. The GAL/TAN index shows that parties like UKIP and AfD are strongly TAN, whereas a party like Podemos is strongly GAL. Finally, Table A1 shows that Hugo Chávez's party PSUV is strongly left-wing according to the Political Representation, Parties, and Presidents Survey (PREPPS). To summarize, while all parties and leaders are populist, their "host ideology" differs on various ideological dimensions.

Table A1
Populist parties included in this study and their ideology

		MARPOR		**CHES**		**PREPPS**
Country	*Populist*	*Party family*	Left (-100) - Right (100)	Left (0) - Right (10)	Gal (0) - Tan (10)	Left (1) - Right (20)
UK	UKIP	Special issue	2	8.6	9.2	
Germany	Die Linke	Communist	-41.9	1.4	4.1	
Germany	AfD	Special issue	17.4	9.2	9.5	
Denmark	DPP	Nationalist	30.9	6.9	8.4	
NL	PVV	Nationalist	20	9.3	7.1	
Switzerland	SVP	Agrarian	35.2			
Spain	Podemos	Communist	-33	2.4	1.2	
Venezuela	Chavez					3.8
US	Trump	Conservative	33			

Note: the data come from the latest versions of: MARPOR (Manifesto Research on Political Representation); CHES (Chapel Hill Expert Survey); PREPPS (Political Representation, Parties, and Presidents Survey). For Chavez we relied upon ratings from his party the PSUV. Similarly for Trump we relied upon the ideology of the Republican party. Blank spaces indicate that this party/politician was not available in the particular dataset.

A.1: Understanding Society Study in U.K.

Acknowledgement

Understanding society is an initiative funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and various Government Departments, with scientific leadership by the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, and survey delivery by NatCen Social Research and Kantar Public. The research data are distributed by the UK Data Service.

Respondents

The Understanding Society survey (2019) is a yearly face-to-face survey among a large panel of citizens in the United Kingdom. Wave 3 was collected between January 2011 and December 2012 and wave 6 was collected between January 2014 and December 2015 (data: http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-12). In total our sample consists of 21,398 respondents who completed the survey at two time-points. Respondents living in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland were excluded because of the presence of regional populist parties.

Measures

Populist support. Support for UKIP was measured in wave 6 of the survey. Respondents were first asked whether they supported a particular political party or felt closer to one party than the others. If they indicated they did, they were asked which party they felt closest too. We coded whether participants felt close to UKIP (1) or any other party (0). Participants that indicated that they did not feel close to any party, were asked "If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?". We coded whether respondents would vote for UKIP (1) or any other party (0). We merged the responses to both questions, so that we get a measure of support for the populist party (1) or any other party (0). We created a dummy variable with support for UKIP (1) or any other party (0).

Agreeableness. The third wave of the Understanding Society panel included a measure of Agreeableness which is part of the valid and reliable Big Five Inventory Short Version (Hahn, Gottschling, & Spinath, 2012). Participants received the following instructions: "*The following questions are about how you see yourself as a person. Please choose the number which best describes how you see yourself, using a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means "does not apply to me at all" and 7 means "applies to me perfectly".*" Agreeableness was measured using the items (1) "Rude", (2) "Forgiving nature" and (3) "Kind" scored on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means "does not apply to me at all" and 7 means "applies to me perfectly.' Upon recoding the reversed coded item, we created an Agreeableness scale (M=.77, SD=.17, Cronbach's α=.57).

Other Big Five traits. The Understanding Society panel contained the Big Five Inventory Short Version and allows us to measure the other Big Five traits Openness using the items "*is original*", "*artistic*" and "*active imagination*" (M=.60, SD=.21, Cronbach's α=.66); Conscientiousness using the items: "*does a thorough job*", "*efficient*" and "*lazy*" (reverse coded) (M=.75, SD=.18, Cronbach's α=.53); Extraversion using the items: "*talkative*", "*is sociable*" and "*reserved*" (reverse coded) (M=.60, SD=.21, Cronbach's α=.62); and Neuroticism using the items "*worries a lot*", "*nervous*" and "*relaxed*" (reverse coded) (M=.43, SD=.23, Cronbach's α=.70). The results from a confirmatory factor analysis can be derived from the replication file.

A confirmatory factor analysis shows that the items generally load high on the designed factor (Table A2). Table A3 shows that key independent variables correlate only modestly with each other.

Table A2
Big Five: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.28	0.00
Agreeableness item 2	0.56	0.00
Agreeableness item 3	0.87	0.00
Openness item 1	0.70	0.00
Openness item 2	0.49	0.00
Openness item 3	0.70	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.57	0.00
Conscientiousness item 2	0.29	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.80	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.63	0.00
Extraversion item 2	0.88	0.00
Extraversion item 3	0.25	0.00
Neuroticism item 1	0.59	0.00
Neuroticism item 2	0.60	0.00
Neuroticism item3	0.79	0.00

Table A3
Understanding Society: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1. Agreeableness	2. Openness	3. Conscientiousness	4. Extraversion	5. Neuroticism
1. Agreeableness	1	0.20	0.34	0.17	-0.06
2. Openness		1	0.21	0.25	-0.11
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.20	-0.17
4. Extraversion				1	-0.18
5. Neuroticism					1
6. Cynicism					

Covariates. In line with the other samples in Study 1, we include sex (female or male), age (in years), education (No degree; degree; higher degree; A-level; GSCE-level; other qualification) and income (gross personal income in pounds) as covariates in our models which were measured in wave 6. Income was recoded to range beween 0 (lowest reported gross personal income) and 1 (highest reported gross personal income) – there were no missing values for income. Descriptive statistics can be derived from the replication files.

Political cynicism. Wave 6 also allowed us to create a measure of political cynicism using two items, namely "*People like me don't have any say in what the government does*" and "*Public officials don't care much about what people like me think.*" Both items were scored on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from "strongly agree" (1) through "strongly disagree" (5). We created an additive scale ranging from low cynicism (0) to high cynicism (1) – note that correlation between the two items is high and positive (r=.63; M=.58, SD=.23).

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 51, while the median age in the UK in 2014 was estimated to be 40 (UK census 2015). The sample is thus a bit older. In the population there is a 49.6% male and 50.3% female distribution (2010 census). In the Understanding Society Study woman are somewhat over represented (Table A4). The sample is also a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that finished at least a A-level training (or higher) is larger than the 41% reported by the Department of Statistics. The covariates indicate that older, female and and higher educated persons are a bit over represented compared to the population but the sample is roughly comparable to the population.

Table A4
Descriptive statistics Understanding Society sample

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	N	Min	Max
Populist vote	0.08	0.27	0	20,753	0	1
Agreeableness	0.77	0.17	0.78	20,753	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.60	0.21	0.61	20,753	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.75	0.18	0.78	20,753	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.60	0.21	0.61	20,753	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.43	0.23	0.39	20,753	0.00	1.00
Female	0.56	0.50	1	20,753	0	1
Age	50.92	17.04	51	20,753	18	102
Other qualification	0.10	0.29	0	20,753	0	1
GSCE-level	0.20	0.40	0	20,753	0	1
A-level	0.20	0.40	0	20,753	0	1
Higher degree	0.13	0.33	0	20,753	0	1
Degree	0.28	0.45	0	20,753	0	1
Education missing	0.001	0.04	0	20,753	0	1
Income	0.08	0.07	0.07	20,753	0.00	1.00
Political cynisism	0.58	0.23	0.50	20,753	0.00	1.00

Results belonging to Figure 1

We calculated the odds ratio of supporting UKIP among respondents that score one standard deviation above and below the mean. This calculation was based upon the full model (labelled Figure 1) projected in Table A5. We find that those respondents that score low (1 SD below the mean) on Agreeableness are 1.43 more likely to vote for UKIP compared to those that score high (1 SD above the mean) on Agreeableness. The Base model of Table A5 shows that the association between Agreeableness is not affected by the covariates.

Table A5
Understanding Society: Support for UKIP

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.543*	0.500*
	(0.089)	(0.083)
Openness	0.495*	0.840
	(0.063)	(0.113)
Conscientiousness	1.646*	1.594*
	(0.266)	(0.260)
Extraversion	1.789*	1.515*
	(0.232)	(0.201)
Neuroticism	1.381*	1.127
	(0.163)	(0.134)
Female	0.595*	0.582*
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Age	1.018*	1.013*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Other qualification		1.149
		(0.114)
GSCE-level		1.246*
		(0.114)
A-level		0.999
		(0.097)
Higher degree		0.876
		(0.096)
Degree		0.396*
		(0.046)
Education missing		0.671
		(0.497)
Income		0.176*
		(0.087)
Political cynisism		8.114*
		(1.007)
Constant	0.043*	0.019*
	(0.008)	(0.004)
Observations	21,279	20,753
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,398.440	10,621.120
Note:	Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05	

Does decomposing the dependent variable change the results?

We combined our measures "populist attachment" and "populist vote" into one dependent variable "populist support" to leverage all the observations in the dataset. Yet, one might wonder whether our results are conditional upon the two measures. To test this, we regressed "populist attachment" and "populist vote" on Agreeableness and the covariates used in Figure 1. We present the results in Table A6 and find that low agreeable respondents are more likely to report that they attach to the populist party (model 1, of Table A6) and they are more likely to vote for the populist party (model 2 of Table A6). The effect sizes, are similar: those that score a standard deviation below the mean on Agreeableness are 1.53 times more likely to support a populist compared to those that score a standard deviation above the mean on Agreeableness when we use the "populist attachment". Using the measure op "populist vote" we find that those that score a standard deviation below the mean on Agreeableness are 1.57 times more likely to vote for a populist compared to those that score a standard deviation above the mean.

Table A6
Understanding Society: Support for UKIP

	Dependent variable:	
	Attach (1)	Vote (2)
Agreeableness	0.615*	0.404*
	(0.142)	(0.097)
Openness	1.013	0.702
	(0.190)	(0.135)
Conscientiousness	1.255	1.964*
	(0.279)	(0.477)
Extraversion	1.450*	1.622*
	(0.263)	(0.317)
Neuroticism	1.169	1.099
	(0.194)	(0.189)
Female	0.670*	0.493*
	(0.053)	(0.042)
Age	1.004	1.027*
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Other qualification	1.167	1.222
	(0.162)	(0.175)
GSCE-level	1.173	1.446*
	(0.152)	(0.189)
A-level	0.979	1.099
	(0.134)	(0.155)
Higher degree	0.883	0.937
	(0.132)	(0.153)
Degree	0.358*	0.487*
	(0.058)	(0.084)
Education missing	0.941	0.00002
	(0.719)	(0.003)
Income	0.046*	0.968
	(0.033)	(0.663)
Political cynisism	14.751*	3.789*
	(2.583)	(0.682)
Constant	0.021*	0.017*
	(0.007)	(0.005)
Observations	11,901	8,852
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,614.256	4,925.254

Note: Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05

A.2: British Election Studies 2015

Respondents

We rely upon wave 4 and 6 of the British Election Studies. Wave 6 was conducted by YouGov between 8th May 2015 and 26th May 2015 (N=30,073) (Fieldhouse et al., 2015b). Immigration attitudes were measured in wave 4 – which was collected in March 2015 (Fieldhouse et al., 2015a). In line with the Understanding Society sample (Appendix A.1), respondents living in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland were excluded because of the presence of regional parties. Here we rely upon participants who completed all relevant measures in wave 4 and wave 6.

Measures

Populist vote. We rely upon the self-reported vote choice in the post-election survey (wave 6). Participants were asked the question "*Which party did you vote for?*". 14% of the respondents indicated that they had voted for UKIP. One could argue that the British National Party (BNP) is also a populist party. Yet, only 14 respondents indicated that they had voted for this party. Inclusion of these respondents does not change the conclusions – results can be derived from the replication files. Accordingly, we focus upon the vote for UKIP. We created a variable whether respondents voted for UKIP (1) or not (0).

In order to disentangle whether support for populists is indeed negatively correlated with Agreeableness, we also analyze a second set of dependent variables tapping into the favorability towards each party in the U.K. Specifically, in wave 6 respondents were asked the question "*How much do you like or dislike each of the following parties?*" Respondents answer this question for each party on a scale ranging from "Strongly dislike" (0) to "Strongly like" (10) with a separate "don't know". We focus upon the evaluation of the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens, BNP and UKIP For each party we recode the favorability from "strongly dislike" (0) to "strongly like" (1) while we set don't know responses to missing. The descriptive statistics of the favorability ratings are provide in Table A7.

Agreeableness. Agreeableness was part of the background variables of the British Election Studies. Yougov measures Agreeableness as part of the Ten Item Personality Inventory which is used to measure the Big Five traits using two items per trait (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). We cannot assess the psychometric properties of Agreeableness as the publicly available data only consists of a latent Agreeableness dimension but not the individual items. Yet, the descriptives (M=.61, SD=.18) and the correlation coefficients are similar to those acquired in the American National Election Studies 2016 (see Appendix A.13, Table A50) and earlier studies that relied upon the TIPI (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010).

Covariates. The other Big Five traits were also only included as latent traits for Openness (M=.55, SD=.17), Conscientiousness (M=.68, SD=.19), Extraversion (M=.41, SD=.22) and Neuroticism (M=.37, SD=.22) The covariates – measured in wave 6 – were sex (male=0, female=1), age (in years), education (No qualification; GSCE D-G; GSCE A-C; A-level; Undergraduate; Post graduate) and income as covariates in our models. Income was measured using the gross household income per year in categories ranging from 5000 Pound per year (1) to More than 150,00 Pound per Year (15) with separate "Don't know" and "Prefer not to say" categories. We recoded income to range from the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1) and set don't know/refuse to say to a value of 2. We created a dummy variable capturing whether income was missing (1) or not (0). Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A7.

Economic conservatism was measured using one item. Respondents were asked: "*Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's*

incomes are. Where would you place yourself and the political parties on this scale?" The scale ranged from "Government should try to make incomes equal" (0) to "Government should be less concerned about equal incomes" (10) with a separate "don't know" option. We recoded the scale to range from "Government should try to make incomes equal" (0) to "Government should be less concerned about equal incomes" (1) and set don't know to missing (M=.45, SD=.31).

Social conservatism was measured with three items, namely: *"Immigration undermines cultural life" (1) or "Immigration enriches cultural life" (7)*; *"Immigration is bad for economy" (1) or "Immigration is good for the economy" (7)*; and *"Immigrants are a burden on the welfare state"*. The latter item was scored on a scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) through "strongly agree" (5) with a separate "don't know" answer category. We recoded the reverse coded items which are internally consistent ($\alpha = 0.89$) and we created an additive scale which we recoded to range from pro-immigration (0) to anti-immigration (1; M=.56, SD=.29). There is a positive association between economic and social conservatism (r=0.16).

Political cynicism. We measured political cynicism (M=.64, SD=.27) using one item which asked respondents "*Politicians don't care what people like me think*" which was scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging "Strongly disagree" (0) through "Strongly agree" (1) and we set don't know responses to missing. We recoded the cynicism measure to range from low cynicism (0) to high cynicism (1) and set don't know responses to missing.

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 49, while the median age in the UK in 2014 was estimated to be 40 (UK census 2015). The sample is thus a bit older. In the population there is a 49.32% male and 50.68 % female distribution (2010 census). Our sample reflects this gender balance (see Table A7). The sample is also a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that finished at least a A-level training (or higher) is larger than the 41% reported by the Department of Statistics. The median income in the sample is £25,000 to £29,999 pound per year which is comparable to the the roughly £26,000 pound estimated by the bureau of statistics. The covariates indicate that older persons and those with a higher educated persons are a bit over represented compared to the population.

Table A7
Descriptive statistics British Election Studies sample

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	N	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.14	0.35	0	13,673	0	1
Agreeableness	0.61	0.18	0.60	13,673	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.55	0.17	0.50	13,673	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.68	0.19	0.70	13,673	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.41	0.22	0.50	13,673	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.37	0.22	0.30	13,673	0.00	1.00
Female	0.51	0.50	1	13,673	0	1
Age	44.66	20.02	49	13,673	17	95
Age missing	0.23	0.42	0	13,673	0	1
GCSE D-G	0.05	0.22	0	13,673	0	1
GCSE A-C	0.23	0.42	0	13,673	0	1
A-level	0.20	0.40	0	13,673	0	1
Undergraduate	0.33	0.47	0	13,673	0	1
Postgraduate	0.10	0.30	0	13,673	0	1
Income	0.78	0.70	0.50	13,673	0.00	2.00
Income missing	0.23	0.42	0	13,673	0	1
Political cynicism	0.64	0.27	0.75	13,673	0.00	1.00
Social conservatism	0.56	0.29	0.56	13,673	0.00	1.00
Economic conservatism	0.45	0.31	0.50	13,673	0.00	1.00

Table A8
British Election Studies: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Agreeableness	1	0.09	0.24	0.04	-0.25	-0.01	0.02	-0.09
2. Openness		1	0.06	0.29	-0.11	0.02	-0.16	-0.08
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.03	-0.32	-0.05	0.09	0.09
4. Extraversion				1	-0.14	-0.06	-0.01	0.0002
5. Neuroticism					1	0.08	0.02	-0.10
6. Cynicism						1	0.14	-0.27
7. Social conservatism							1	0.16
8. Economic conservatism								1

Results belonging to Figure 1

The odds ratio reported in Figure 1 of the main text is calculated based upon the model labelled "Figure 1" in Table A9. We find that those that score low (1 SD below the mean) on Agreeableness are 1.81 times more likely to vote for UKIP compared to those that score high (1 SD above the mean) on Agreeableness. The base model in Table A9 shows that the association between Agreeableness is not substantively affected by the covariates.

Table A9
British Election Study: Support for UKIP

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.540*	0.588*
	(0.069)	(0.101)
Openness	0.509*	0.995
	(0.066)	(0.175)
Conscientiousness	1.188	0.845
	(0.145)	(0.140)
Extraversion	0.966	0.810
	(0.097)	(0.111)
Neuroticism	1.032	0.699*
	(0.111)	(0.100)
Female	0.716*	0.628*
	(0.031)	(0.037)
Age	1.017*	1.006*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age missing	1.441*	1.108
	(0.117)	(0.131)
GCSE D-G		1.078
		(0.144)
GCSE A-C		1.131
		(0.105)
A-level		0.890
		(0.092)
Undergraduate		0.872
		(0.089)
Postgraduate		0.751
		(0.113)
Income		0.754
		(0.111)
Income missing		1.499
		(0.373)
Political cynicism		10.596*
		(1.318)
Social conservatism		73.657*
		(10.012)
Economic conservatism		2.284*
		(0.213)
Constant	0.151*	0.002*
	(0.026)	(0.001)
Observations	19,414	13,673
Akaike Inf. Crit.	15,547.500	8,456.715
Note:	Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05	

Agreeableness and favorability of all parties

Next, we turn to the association between Agreeableness and favorability of the different parties. Figure A1 clearly shows that Agreeableness is only negatively associated with UKIP and BNP – a small far-right and populist party. The association between Agreeableness and the other parties is positive. There are positive associations between Agreeableness and support for the left-wing and/or progressive parties Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens and the Scottish National Party. The results confirm that Agreeableness is negatively associated with support for populist parties which means that low agreeable respondents are more supportive of populist parties compared to high agreeable parties.

Figure A1. British Election Studies 2015: Agreeableness and Party Favorability



Note: Agreeableness and the favorability of UKIP, BNP, the Tories (Conservatives), Liberal Democrats, Labour, and the Greens (see Table A7 for descriptive stiatics). We predicted individual evaluations of each political party with Agreeableness and several control variables using OLS regression. The dots are the regression coefficients of Agreeableness, the vertical line is the 95% confidence interval. The range of the dependent variable is 0 to 1. Regression output can be derived from the replication file.

Controlling for Authoritarianism

In wave 7 of the British Election Studies a measures of authoritarianism was included (Fieldhouse et al., 2016). By including the seventh wave of the British Election Studies we also lose a substantive number of observations. Our full models now only includes 2,939 respondents. Yet, we show that the association between Agreeableness and voting for UKIP is not affected by controlling for these covariates.

Authoritarianism is measured using four items that were also used in the ANES 2016 (α=0.68; M=0.44; SD=0.35).

We ran similar models as presented earlier in this Appendix. Yet, we exclude the ideological variables and political cynicism because we otherwise loose too many observations due to the fact that different respondents have completed different waves of the British Election Studies. Agreeableness correlates low with authoritarianism (r=0.03, p<0.001). In model 1 (base) of Table A10, we find a positive association between authoritarianism and voting for UKIP. Accordingly, more authoritarian voters are *more likely* to vote for UKIP. Importantly, controlling for Authoritarianism does not change the negative association between Agreeableness and voting for UKIP. The associations between voting for UKIP and Agreeableness as well as Authoritarianism are not substantively affected by the inclusion of a set of covariates in model 2 (labelled full model) of Table A10.

Next, we regressed the favorability towards the different political parties on Authoritarianism, Agreeableness and the same covariates used in the other models in this sample. In Figure A2 we plot the association between Authoritarianism and support for the different political parties in the U.K. As can be seen, Authoritarianism correlates positively with support for UKIP but Authoritarianism also correlates positively with support for the Tories – the mainstream right-wing conservative party in the UK. Moreover, the association between Authoritarianism and UKIP is not significantly stronger than the strength of the association between Authoritarianism and support for the Tories. This is an indication that Authoritarianism correlates with voting behaviour along the lines of the host ideology of a populist party. Further support is found for this claim when we turn to the association between Authoritarianism and support for the left-wing and/or progressive parties. Here, Authoritarianism is consistently negatively associated with support for these parties.

To summarize, the results for Authoritarianism in the UK suggest that the trait correlates with support for a populist party because of the host ideology.

Table A10
British Election Study: Support for UKIP controlling for Authoritarianism

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Full model
Agreeableness	0.526*	0.454*
	(0.156)	(0.153)
Authoritarianism	2.595*	1.742*
	(0.374)	(0.298)
Openness	0.667	0.605
	(0.207)	(0.213)
Conscientiousness	0.800	0.799
	(0.233)	(0.262)
Extraversion	0.888	0.864
	(0.217)	(0.241)
Neuroticism	0.998	0.712
	(0.253)	(0.202)
Female	0.713*	0.679*
	(0.073)	(0.079)
Age	1.020*	1.019*
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age Missing	6.895*	9.232*
	(4.497)	(7.762)
GCSE D-G		0.975
		(0.252)
GCSE A-C		1.004
		(0.177)
A-level		0.742
		(0.148)
Undergraduate		0.523*
		(0.104)
Postgraduate		0.344*
		(0.107)
Income		0.958
		(0.282)
Income missing		1.257
		(0.627)
Don't know		9.293*
		(2.237)
Political cynicism	0.096*	0.047*
	(0.037)	(0.025)
Observations	3,512	2,939
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,823.633	2,235.882
Note:	Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05	

Figure A2. British Election Studies 2015: Authoritarianism and Party Favorability



Note: Authoritarianism and the favorability of UKIP, BNP, the Tories, Liberal Democrats, Labou and the Greens. We predicted individual evaluations of each political actors with Authoritarianism and several control variables using OLS regressions. The dots are the regression coefficients of Authoritarianism, the vertical line is the 95% confidence interval. The range of the dependent variable is 0 to 1. Regression output can be derived from the replication file.

A.3: GESIS Panel Germany

Respondents

The GESIS panel is a probability-based mixed-mode access panel – participants can participate using an online (web-based) or offline (by mail) survey (GESIS, 2019) – for more information Bosnjak et al. (2018). The first wave was fielded February 2014 among 4,400 people of the German-speaking population aged between 18 and 70 years (at the time of recruitment) and permanently resident in Germany. Every two months participants answer a 20 minute survey in return for a small financial compensation. It is beyond the scope of this study – and appendix – to explain the complete research design of the GESIS panel. For detailed information about the GESIS panel, see https://www.gesis.org/en/gesis-panel/documentation/

Here, we use data from three consecutive waves: the Big Five personality inventory which contained our measure of Agreeableness, economic conservatism and social conservatism, were measured in the wave fielded between June and August 2017 (data: http://doi.org/10.4232/1.13301). Vote intention for the populist parties, the probability to vote for the separate parties and left-right ideological self-placement were not asked in the June-August 2017 wave but in the next wave which was fielded between August and October 2017. Finally the socio-economic background variables – gender (male, female), age (in years), education and income – were measured in the wave fielded between December 2017 and February 2018. We don't think it is a problem that the socio-economic background variables are asked *after* the vote intention as these will most likely not be affected by the vote choice and they only serve as covariates in this study. We only include respondents who provided their responses in all three waves. This leaves us with a sample of 3,942 respondents.

Following the directions from the GESIS panel in Germany (Kolb & Weyandt, 2018), we weight the data using a normalized design weight that enables the integration of the two cohorts of the panel.

Measures

Populist support: Support for the populist parties was measured using the item "*Which party would you vote for next Sunday?*". We created a dummy variable that captures whether respondents voted for the AfD or Die Linke (1) or any other party (0).

Agreeableness: The GESIS panel contains the 30-item German version of the Big Five Inventory Short Version (Soto & John, 2017). Participants received the following instructions: "*In the following, there is a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.*" Each statement was scored on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree". Agreeableness was measured using six items, namely: "*I am sensitive*", "*Easily trusts others*", "*Is respectful*", "*Is sometimes rude to others*' (reverse coded), "*Can be cold*" (reverse coded) and "*Tends to criticize others*" (reverse coded) (M=.67, SD=.12, α=.62).

Other Big Five traits: Openness was measured using six items (M=.57, SD=.16, α=.66), namely: ''*Has few interest in arts*", "*Is original*", "*Is complex*", "*Has little interest in abstract ideas*" (reverse coded), ''*I'm not interested in art*" (reverse coded) and "*Has little creativity*" (reverse coded). Conscientiousness was measured using six items (M=.70, SD=.15, α=.76), namely: " *Is reliable*", "*Keeps things neat and tidy*", "*Is pesistant*", "*Am messy*" (reverse coded), "*Has difficulty getting started tasks*" (reverse coded) and "*I'm negligent*" (reverse coded). Extraversion was measured using six items (M=.54, SD=.14, α=.68), namely: " *Is dominant, acts as leader*", "*Is full of energy*", "*Is outgoing*", "*Am quiet*" (reverse coded), "*Prefers to have others to take charge*" (reverse coded) and "*Is less active than other people*" (reverse coded).

Neuroticism was measured using six items (M=.40, SD=.16, α=.78), namely: "*Worry a lot*", "*Tends to feel depressed*", "*Is temperamental*", "*Is emotionally stable*" (reverse coded) , "Is relaxed" (reverse coded) and "*Feels secure*" (reverse coded) . A confirmatory factor analysis showed that the items load high on the designated trait (see Table A12) and the traits correlate with each other in a meaningful manner (see Table A13).

Social conservatism is measured using six items tapping into attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, specifically: (1) "*The practice of Islamic faith in Germany should be constrained*"; (2) "*Islam fits into German society*" (reverse coded); (3) "*The presence of Muslims in Germany leads to conflicts*"; (4) "*Islamic communities should be subject to surveillance by the state*"; (5) "*I would have no objection to having a Muslim mayor for our town/village*" (reverse coded); (6) "*I've got a notion that among Muslims living in Germany there are many religious fanatics*" that were answered on a Likert-type scale ranging from "fully disagree" (1) to "fully agree" (7). We created a scale to range from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative; M=.56, SD=.25, α=.87). *Economic conservatism:* was measured using one item "*the federal government had to decide between reducing taxes or spending more on social services, which do you think it should do: Reduce taxes or spend more on social services?*" that people answer with either "Provide more money for social services" (0) or ""Decrease taxes" (1; M=.44, SD=.50).

Ideology was also measured using a one-item ideological self-placement scale. Respondents were asked "*Where would you place yourself on this scale from "left"to "right"?*" which they could answer on a scale ranging from "left" (1) to "right" (7) with a separate "don't know" option. We recoded the scale to range from 0 (left) to 1 (right) and set don't know to a value of 2.

The socio-economic background variables included were sex, age (in years), education and income. Education was coded as having a university degree (1) or not. Income was measured as the net household income in categories ranging from below "€900" (1) to "€6000" or more (9). We recoded income to range between 0 (lowest observed income) and 1 (highest observed income (1) and set missing values to a value of 2. We also created a dummy variable capturing whether respondents' income was missing (1) or not (0).

National representative sample

The descriptive statistics are provided in Table A11. The extent to which the panel is representative of the German population is extensively documented in the GESIS panel documentation to which we refer interested readers: https://www.gesis.org/en/gesis-panel/documentation/.

Table A11
GESIS Panel: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	N	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.11	0.31	0	3,378	0	1
Agreeableness	0.67	0.12	0.67	3,378	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.57	0.16	0.55	3,378	0.05	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.70	0.15	0.71	3,378	0.12	1.00
Extraversion	0.54	0.14	0.54	3,378	0.04	1.00
Neuroticism	0.40	0.16	0.38	3,378	0.00	1.00
Female	0.48	0.50	0	3,378	0	1
Age	52.05	14.18	53	3,378	22	74
Income	0.62	0.48	0.56	3,378	0.00	2.00
Income missing	0.09	0.28	0	3,378	0	1
Education	0.38	0.48	0	3,378	0	1
Economic conservatism	0.44	0.50	0	3,378	0	1
Social conservatism	0.56	0.25	0.53	3,378	0.00	1.00
(weights)	0.93	0.37	0.92	3,378	0.71	3.62

Table A12
GESIS Panel: Big Five Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.48	0.00
Agreeableness item 2	0.64	0.00
Agreeableness item 3	0.26	0.00
Agreeableness item 4	0.50	0.00
Agreeableness item 5	0.48	0.00
Agreeableness item 6	0.48	0.00
Openness item 1	0.38	0.00
Openness item 2	0.69	0.00
Openness item 3	0.54	0.00
Openness item 4	0.36	0.00
Openness item 5	0.39	0.00
Openness item 6	0.57	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.45	0.00
Conscientiousness item 2	0.57	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.60	0.00
Conscientiousness item 4	0.66	0.00
Conscientiousness item 5	0.63	0.00
Conscientiousness item 6	0.67	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.50	0.00
Extraversion item 2	0.64	0.00
Extraversion item 3	0.58	0.00
Extraversion item 4	0.19	0.00
Extraversion item 5	0.53	0.00
Extraversion item 6	0.58	0.00
Neuroticism item 1	0.54	0.00
Neuroticism item 2	0.65	0.00
Neuroticism item 3	0.58	0.00
Neuroticism item 4	0.69	0.00
Neuroticism item 5	0.63	0.00
Neuroticism item 6	0.65	0.00

Table A13
GESIS Panel: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.19	0.28	0.12	-0.28	-0.13	-0.12
2. Openness		1	0.13	0.33	-0.24	-0.22	-0.09
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.27	-0.28	0.17	0.05
4. Extraversion				1	-0.33	-0.01	0.03
5. Neuroticism					1	0.07	0.01
6. Social conservatism						1	0.25
7. Economic conservatism							1

Results belonging to Figure 1

Table A14 provides the regression output of the model that was used to generate Figure 1 and the baseline model without the endogenous variables. Based upon the model used in Figure 1, we estimate that those who score a standard deviation below the mean on Agreeableness are 1.46 times more likely to vote for a populist party compared to those that score a standard deviation above the mean on Agreeableness.

Table A14
GESIS panel 2017: Support for Populist Parties

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.162*	0.226*
	(0.081)	(0.123)
Openness	1.895	3.075*
	(0.703)	(1.245)
Conscientiousness	1.119	0.664
	(0.477)	(0.307)
Extraversion	1.293	1.219
	(0.588)	(0.590)
Neuroticism	0.954	0.671
	(0.388)	(0.289)
Female	0.560*	0.584*
	(0.069)	(0.077)
Age	0.990*	0.986*
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income		1.021
		(0.308)
Income missing		0.580
		(0.301)
Education		0.939
		(0.128)
Economic conservatism		0.797
		(0.101)
Social conservatism		5.797*
		(1.571)
Constant	0.432	0.244*
	(0.240)	(0.155)
Observations	3,942	3,378
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,634.269	2,335.271
Note:	Unstandardized coefficients from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05	

Analyzing Die Linke and AfD separately

To test whether the results are driven by one of the two populist parties, we created a categorical variable capturing whether respondents had the intention to vote for all other German parties (0), Die Linke (1) or the AfD (2). Using a multinomial regression model, we regressed this categorical variable on Agreeableness and the same set of covariates whereby the voters for all other German parties were set as the baseline category. This model allows us to test whether voters from Die Linke and/or the AfD score lower on Agreeableness compared to voter from voters for all other German parties. Table A15 provides the results of the multinomial regression model (relative risk ratios are reported). We find statistically significant relative risk ratio's that are below 1 when we compare Agreeableness of voters for all other parties compared to voters for Die Linke or the AfD. Take for instances Die Linke: we find that keeping all other variables constant, if Agreeableness increases with one unit, a person is .23 times more likely to vote for one of the other parties. We find a coefficient of similar effect size when we look at the AfD.

Table A15
GESIS panel 2017: Support for Die Linke or AfD versus all other Parties

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke	AfD
Agreeableness	0.226**	0.267*
	(0.742)	(0.791)
Openness	8.205**	0.643
	(0.543)	(0.607)
Conscientiousness	0.566	0.836
	(0.612)	(0.685)
Extraversion	0.591	2.441
	(0.630)	(0.724)
Neuroticism	0.507	0.849
	(0.574)	(0.635)
Female	0.687**	0.500**
	(0.171)	(0.205)
Age	0.997	0.973**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Income	0.687	1.629
	(0.385)	(0.478)
Income missing	0.804	0.339
	(0.703)	(0.790)
Education	1.003	0.829
	(0.175)	(0.220)
Economic conservatism	0.480**	1.452*
	(0.189)	(0.194)
Social conservatism	0.874**	2.640**
	(0.062)	(0.088)
Constant	0.456	0.003**
	(0.861)	(1.026)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,224.329	2,224.329
Note:	Relative risk ratios from Multinomial regression model; **p<0.05; *p<0.1	

A.4: Danish Election Study 2010-2011

Acknowledgement

We thank Robert Klemmensen for providing access to this dataset.

Respondents

The Danish Election Study 2010-2011 consists of two waves collected in 2010 and 2011. Between May 25 2010 and June 6 2010 Gallup Denmark invited 8,012 panel members out of their 400,000-member Internet panel to take the survey. The sample was stratified by gender, age, region and education. 3,612 Danish adults completed the questionnaire, which equals a 45% response rate. Wave 2 was fielded in 2011 between October 26 and November 15. This was a month after the general election on September 15. In total 2,840 of the 3,612 respondents who were still active in the panel were invited to participate in wave 2. 1,972 persons from the first wave completed the survey (69% response rate). Drop-out was not systematically (see, Bakker, Klemmensen, Nørgaard, & Schumacher, 2016).

Measures

Populist support: In *Wave 1* Support for the populist party was measured using the item "*Which party would you vote for if if elections were held today?*". We created a dummy variable that captures whether respondents voted for the Danish Peoples Party (1; N=348, 11%) or any other party (0; N=3108, 89%). In *Wave 2* vote choice was measured using the question: "*Which party did you vote for in the last election?*" Again, we created a dummy variable capturing vote choice for the Danish People's party (1) or not (0).

Agreeableness: We used the 60-item Danish version of the NEO PI-R Short Version to measure personality (Skovdahl-Hansen, Mortensen, & Schiøtz, 2004). Agreeableness was measured using the following twelve items (M=.63, SD=.13, α=.73): "Some people think I'm selfish and self-absorbed" (reverse coded); "Some people consider me to be cold and calculating" (reverse coded); "I would rather cooperate with others than compete against them"; "I am stubborn and obstinate" (reverse coded); "I do not mind bragging about my skills and performance" (reverse coded); "I am better than most people - and I know it" (reverse coded); "If necessary I am willing to manipulate people to achieve what I want" (reverse coded); "Sometimes I flatter people to do what I want" (reverse coded); "I think that most people will use one if they can get away with it" (reverse coded); "I am inclined to believe the best about people"; "We can never do too much too old and poor"; "All people deserve respect".

Openness (M=.52, SD=.15, α=.73) was measured using the following items: I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or a daydream and let it grow; Poetry does not tell me much (reverse coded); Sometimes when I read a poem or looking at art, I feel a puff of pitch (reverse coded); I rarely experience strong emotions; It is the strangest thing - such as special scents or the names of distant places; I often try new and unfamiliar food; I find myself better in familiar surroundings; I think that philosophical discussions are boring (reverse coded); I have little interest in speculating over the universe mysteries or man (reverse coded); I think that controversial speakers only serve to confuse (reverse coded); I think that other people's perception of what is right and wrong can differ.

Conscientiousness (M=.59, SD=.14, α=.79) was measured with the following twelve items: I am not a very methodical and systematic person (reverse coded); I seem never able to get things right (reverse coded); I have some clear goals and work systematically towards them; I work hard to achieve my goals; I think things through before I decide; I always consider the consequences before I act; I am a productive person who always gets its work done; I find it

hard to pull myself together to do the things I ought to do; I am known for my discernment and common sense; I bring myself often in situations where I'm not properly prepared (reverse coded); Sometimes I'm not as reliable as I should be (reverse coded); I try to do my work carefully so not to do it again.

Extraversion (M=.57, SD=.15, α=82) was measured with the following twelve items: I usually leave others to speak at meetings (reverse coded); I do not find it easy to take control of a situation (reverse coded); I like having many people around me; I enjoy partying with lots of people; I really like to talk to people; I find it easy to smile and be outgoing with strangers; I like being in the heart of attention; I like to be among the crowd at sporting events; I am a happy and cheerful person; I have ready laugh; I'm not as lively as mercury and other people (reverse coded); I am a very active person.

Neuroticism (M=.41, SD=.15, α=.85) was measured with the following twelve items: I rarely feel anxious or uneasy (reverse coded); I often feel tense and nervous; I am a balanced person (reverse coded); Even minor annoyances can make me frustrated; Sometimes I feel that I am not fit for anything; I am rarely depressed or sad (reverse coded); Sometimes I do something impulsively that I later regret; I am always able to control my emotions (reverse coded); Sometimes I have shamed myself so much that I just wanted to disappear; Compared to others I have often feelings of inferiority; When I am under great pressure, I feel sometimes that I'm about to break; It is often hard for me to decide.

The factor structure of the Big Five Traits was acceptable. Table A18 provides the standardized factor loadings of the Big Five traits based upon a confirmatory factor analysis. All items load satisfactory on the designated latent dimension. Moreover, the internal consistency coefficients of the Big Five traits were acceptable and the traits correlate with each other in line with earlier studies (see Table A17).

Covariates. We control for sex (male=0; female=1), age (in years), education (primary school; vocational education; upper secondary; short-cycle secondary tertiary education; medium-cycle tertiary education; long-cycle tertiary education) and income. Income was measured using the self-reported household income before taxes. Respondents were asked "*What is the household's total current income before tax?*" and could answer using 11 categories ranging from "max 99.999 DKK" (1) to "1.000.000 DKK or more" (11) with a separate category for "don't know". We recoded income to range from the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1). Missing values for income were recoded to a constant, namely 2. We created a dummy variable capturing whether income was missing (1) or not (0). See Table A16 for the descriptive statistics.

Ideology is treated as a two-dimensional concept that consist of social and economic attitudes (Treier & Hillygus, 2009; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Seven items measure *social conservatism*, namely (1) "Violent crimes should be punished much harder"; (2) "We should preserve our national customs in Denmark"; (3) "Crime is better prevented with prevention and guidance than with harsh penalties"; (4) "Preventing the environment should not harm business"; (5) "Homosexuals should have the same rights as everyone else"; (6) "The green taxes on gasoline should be increased"; (7) "Religious extremists should be allowed to hold public meetings". Two items measure economic ideology, namely: (1) "High income earners pay too little taxes"; (2) "Income inequality is too great in this country. The greatest pay raise should be given to the low income people." All items were scored on a five point Likert scale ranging from "agree completely" (1) through "completely disagree" (4). After recoding the reversed scored items, we created an social conservatism dimension (α=.74, M=.54, SD=.19) and an economic conservatism dimension (α=.78 M=.46, SD=.30) which we recoded from the lowest observed score on the dimensions (0) to the highest observed score on the dimension (1). The two dimensions are in line with the literature modestly correlated (r=.15, p<.05).

Cynicism was measured using three items: (1) "People like me have no influence on government decisions"; (2) "Government do not care about what people like me think" and (3) "People like me have no influence on local government decisions" all scored on a four point likert scale ranging from "Agree completely" (1) to "Completely disagree". After reverse coding the three items, we created an index of cynicism ranging from the lowest level of cynicism (0) to the highest level of cynicism (1) (M=.56, SD=.25, α=.82).

National representative sample

For a discussion of the extent to which the sample is representative of the population, see Bakker (2017); Bakker et al. (2016); Dinesen, Klemmensen, and Nørgaard (2016).

Table A16
Danish Election Study: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.11	0.31	3,438	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.63	0.13	3,438	0.63	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.52	0.15	3,438	0.51	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.59	0.14	3,438	0.61	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.57	0.15	3,438	0.58	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.41	0.15	3,438	0.40	0.00	1.00
Female	0.46	0.50	3,438	0	0	1
Age	52.50	16.12	3,438	54	18	90
Education (Ref: primary): Vocational	0.37	0.48	3,438	0	0	1
Upper secondary	0.08	0.27	3,438	0	0	1
Professional	0.15	0.35	3,438	0	0	1
Bachelor or higher	0.10	0.31	3,438	0	0	1
Income	0.54	0.46	3,438	0.40	0.00	2.00
Income missing	0.07	0.25	3,438	0	0	1
Economic conservatism	0.46	0.30	3,438	0.3	0	1
Social conservatism	0.54	0.19	3,438	0.57	0.00	1.00
Political cynicism	0.56	0.25	3,438	0.56	0.00	1.00

Table A17
Danish Election Study: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.09	0.13	0.05	-0.10	-0.01	-0.17
2. Openness		1	0.07	0.36	-0.03	-0.22	-0.43
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.34	-0.53	-0.11	0.08
4. Extraversion				1	-0.44	-0.20	-0.06
5. Neuroticism					1	0.14	-0.06
6. Cynicism						1	0.20
7. Social conservatism							1
8. Economic conservatism							

Table A18
Big Five: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.64	0.00
Agreeableness item 2	0.32	0.00
Agreeableness item 3	0.19	0.00
Agreeableness item 4	0.47	0.00
Agreeableness item 5	0.60	0.00
Agreeableness item 6	0.22	0.00
Agreeableness item 7	0.07	0.00
Agreeableness item 8	0.15	0.00
Agreeableness item 9	0.59	0.00
Agreeableness item 10	0.37	0.00
Agreeableness item 11	0.16	0.00
Agreeableness item 12	0.55	0.00
Openness item 1	0.50	0.00
Openness item 2	0.39	0.00
Openness item 3	0.53	0.00
Openness item 4	0.57	0.00
Openness item 5	0.50	0.00
Openness item 6	0.35	0.00
Openness item 7	0.31	0.00
Openness item 8	0.20	0.00
Openness item 9	0.58	0.00
Openness item 10	0.34	0.00
Openness item 11	0.45	0.00
Openness item 12	0.22	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.57	0.00
Conscientiousness item 2	0.43	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.65	0.00
Conscientiousness item 4	0.48	0.00
Conscientiousness item 5	0.68	0.00
Conscientiousness item 6	0.50	0.00
Conscientiousness item 7	0.36	0.00
Conscientiousness item 8	0.49	0.00
Conscientiousness item 9	0.45	0.00
Conscientiousness item 10	0.55	0.00
Conscientiousness item 11	0.25	0.00
Conscientiousness item 12	0.25	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.51	0.00
Extraversion item 2	0.57	0.00
Extraversion item 3	0.63	0.00
Extraversion item 4	0.58	0.00
Extraversion item 5	0.57	0.00
Extraversion item 6	0.53	0.00
Extraversion item 7	0.47	0.00
Extraversion item 8	0.55	0.00
Extraversion item 9	0.47	0.00
Extraversion item 10	0.20	0.00
Extraversion item 11	0.64	0.00
Extraversion item 12	0.47	0.00
Neuroticism item 1	0.53	0.00
Neuroticism item 2	0.59	0.00
Neuroticism item 3	0.59	0.00
Neuroticism item 4	0.32	0.00
Neuroticism item 5	0.70	0.00
Neuroticism item 6	0.57	0.00
Neuroticism item 7	0.66	0.00
Neuroticism item 8	0.51	0.00
Neuroticism item 9	0.73	0.00
Neuroticism item 10	0.28	0.00
Neuroticism item 11	0.61	0.00
Neuroticism item 12	0.59	0.00

Results belonging to Figure 1

The results presented in Figure 1 for the data in 2010 and 2011 are presented in Table A19. We find in 2010, that those respondents that score low on Agreeableness are 1.51 more likely to vote for Danish compared to those that score high on Agreeableness. The effect size in 2011 is roughly comparable to the one acquired in 2010. The base models (column 1 and 3) of Table A19 show that the association between Agreeableness and populist support are not affected by the inclusion of covariates.

Table A19
Danish Election Study: Support for Danish People's Party

	Dependent variable:			
	Base - 2010	Figure 1 - 2010	Base - 2011	Figure 1 - 2011
Agreeableness	0.056*	0.118*	0.030*	0.051*
	(0.026)	(0.058)	(0.020)	(0.037)
Openness	0.089*	1.912	0.194*	2.468
	(0.038)	(0.950)	(0.117)	(1.741)
Conscientiousness	5.698*	4.352*	8.072*	8.651*
	(2.784)	(2.297)	(5.727)	(6.564)
Extraversion	0.573	0.275*	0.349	0.210*
	(0.264)	(0.136)	(0.231)	(0.146)
Neuroticism	1.261	0.799	3.631	2.573
	(0.627)	(0.422)	(2.590)	(1.968)
Female	0.883	0.975	0.995	1.060
	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.175)	(0.200)
Age	1.023*	1.007	1.023*	1.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education (Ref: primary): Vocational		0.888		0.918
		(0.118)		(0.170)
Upper secondary		0.430*		0.418
		(0.151)		(0.219)
Professional		0.656		0.464*
		(0.148)		(0.177)
Bachelor or higher		0.448*		0.211*
		(0.144)		(0.130)
Income		0.703		0.259*
		(0.205)		(0.118)
Income missing		1.968		11.519*
		(1.027)		(9.444)
Economic conservatism		0.767		0.836
		(0.169)		(0.267)
Social conservatism		265.303*		108.719*
		(119.063)		(70.417)
Political cynicism		1.276		0.788
		(0.330)		(0.295)
Constant	0.320	0.009*	0.157*	0.018*
	(0.194)	(0.007)	(0.142)	(0.020)
Observations	3,492	3,438	1,972	1,944
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,299.798	2,052.263	1,129.650	1,028.762

Note: Odds ratios and standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.05

A.5: Dutch National Elections 2012

Acknowledgement

The LISS panel data were collected by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands) through its MESS project funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research

Respondents

We make use of data of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel in the Netherlands administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands), see https://www.lissdata.nl/. The LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based ona true probability sample of households drawn from the population register. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and Internet connection. A longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality. More information about the LISS panel can be found at: www.lissdata.nl.

The post-election study was fielded between September 13 and September 29, 2012 – one day after the September 12 elections, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-27d-qw68 (Elshout, 2012). 5,333 (77.3%) of the 6,899 completed the survey. The LISS panel collects measures of personality in May of every year – https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x5h-4cxd (Das & Marchand, 2008) – and we used responses of the May 2011 and May 2012 survey to have measures of personality of the largest possible group. The "politics and values" questionnaire taps into political attitudes and voting behavior is fielded every December. We used data from December 2011 and December 2012, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zms-r5rz (Das & Elshout, 2007). Socio-economic background was measured in September 2012, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xv3-8tvs (Das & Elshout, 2015). Merging these datasets, we have a sample of 3,831 respondents that completed the 2012 post election survey and at least one time the personality battery and the attitudes questions.

Measures

Populist support. Support for the populist party was measured using the question "*Which party would you vote for if elections were held today?*" We analyzed the vote for the PVV and created a dummy variable with: vote for the PVV (1), and vote for all other parties (0).

Agreeableness. Agreeableness is measured using ten items that are part of the 50-item International Personality Item Pool – Five Factor Model (IPIP-FFM), which measures each trait using ten items (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006), namely: (1) "Feel little concern for others" (reverse coded), (2) "Am interested in people"; (3) "Insult people" (reverse coded), (4) "Sympathize with others' feelings", (5) "Am not interested in other people's problems" (reverse coded), (6) "Have a soft heart", (7) "Am not really interested in others" (reverse coded), (8) "Take time out for others", (9) "Feel others' emotions", (10) "Make people feel at ease" (M=.66, SD=.14, α=78).

Table A21 shows the factor loadings and indicates that the Agreeableness items load sufficiently high on the latent dimension. Moreover, Table A20 shows that Agreeableness correlates in roughly comparable manners with the other Big Five traits as well as the ideology dimensions as documented in other samples in this study and the literature.

Other Big Five traits. The traits Openness (M=.54, SD=.15, α=.77), Conscientiousness (M=.65, SD=.14, α=.79), Extraversion (M=.56, SD=.16, α=.87) and Neuroticism (M=.38, SD=.17, α=.88) were all measured with 10 items. See Table A21 column 1 for item wording.

Table A20
Dutch Election Study: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.26	0.27	0.41	-0.06	0.07	-0.08
2. Openness		1	0.23	0.34	-0.18	0.19	-0.16
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.10	-0.23	0.01	0.06
4. Extraversion				1	-0.25	0.10	0.005
5. Neuroticism					1	-0.09	0.05
6.Cynicism						1	-0.22
7. Social conservatism							1
8. Economic conservatism							

A factor analysis shows that the items belonging to each trait load highly on the designated latent variable (see, Table A21).

Social conservatism We measure social conservatism using one item. Respondents were asked: "*In the Netherlands, some people believe that immigrants are entitled to live here while retaining their own culture. Others feel that they should adapt entirely to Dutch culture. Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that immigrants can retain their own culture and 5 means that they should adapt entirely?*" We recoded the scale to range from "immigrants can retain their own cultural (0) to "immigrants should adapt entirely to Dutch culture" and set "don't know" responses to missing (M=.68, SD=.24).

Economic conservatism was measured using one item, namely: "*Some people believe that differences in income should increase in our country. Others feel that they should decrease. Still others hold an opinion that lies somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that differences in income should increase and 5 means that these should decrease?*" We recoded the scale to range from liberal (0, differences in income should decrease) to conservative (1, differences in income should increase; M=.28, SD=.24). The two ideology dimensions correlated weakly with each other (r=0.03).

Political cynicism. We measured political cynicism using three items: (1) "Parliamentarians do not care about the opinions of people like me"; (2) "Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion"; "People like me have no influence at all on government policy." All three items were scored on "agree" (1) or "disagree" (2) scale. We recoded the cynicism measure to range from low cynicism (0) to high cynicism (1) and set don't know responses to missing (M=.34, SD=.39, α=.77).

Covariates. In line with the other samples in Study 1, we include sex (male=0; female=1), age (in years), education (categories: primary school; intermediate secondary; higher secondary; intermediate vocational; higher vocational; university) and income as covariates in our models. Income is measured in personal net monthly income in categories ranging from "no income" (0) to "more than €7,500" (13) with separate "don't know" and "prefer not to say" categories. We recoded income from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) observed income. Missing values – those that preferred not to say or did not know their income – for income were recoded to a constant, namely 2. We also created a dummy variable capturing whether income was missing (1) or not (0).

Table A21
Dutch Election Study 2012: Big Five Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
A1: Am interested in people	0.69	0.00
A2: Sympathize with others feelings	0.71	0.00
A3: Have a soft heart	0.20	0.00
A4: Take time out for others	0.66	0.00
A5: Feel others emotions	0.62	0.00
A6: Make people feel at ease	0.57	0.00
A7: Feel little concern for others	0.54	0.00
A8: Insult people	0.33	0.00
A9: Am not interested in other peoples problems	0.59	0.00
A10: Am not really interested in others	0.68	0.00
O1: Have a rich vocabulary	0.54	0.00
O2: Have a vivid imagination	0.45	0.00
O3: Have excellent ideas	0.63	0.00
O4: Am quick to understand things	0.60	0.00
O5: Use difficult words	0.37	0.00
O6: Spend time reflecting on things	0.33	0.00
O7: Am full of ideas	0.66	0.00
O8: Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas	0.55	0.00
O9: Am not interested in abstract ideas	0.48	0.00
O10: Do not have a good imagination	0.42	0.00
C1: Am always prepared	0.40	0.00
C2: Pay attention to details	0.38	0.00
C3: Get chores done right away	0.51	0.00
C4: Like order	0.62	0.00
C5: Follow a schedule	0.46	0.00
C6: Am exacting in my work	0.30	0.00
C7: Leave my belongings around	0.64	0.00
C8: Make a mess of things	0.63	0.00
C9: Often forget to put things back in their proper place	0.68	0.00
C10: Shirk my duties	0.52	0.00
E1: Am the life of the party	0.61	0.00
E2: Feel comfortable around people	0.63	0.00
E3: Start conversations	0.73	0.00
E4: Talk to a lot of different people at partie	0.70	0.00
E5: Do not mind being the center of attention	0.55	0.00
E6: Do not talk a lot	0.66	0.00
E7: Keep in the background	0.68	0.00
E8: Have little to say	0.62	0.00
E9: Do no like to draw attention to myself	0.46	0.00
E10: Am quiet around strangers	0.69	0.00
N1: Get stressed out easily	0.70	0.00
N2: Worry about things	0.51	0.00
N3: Am easily disturbed	0.65	0.00
N4: Get upset easily	0.73	0.00
N5: Change my mood a lot	0.72	0.00
N6: Have frequent mood swings	0.75	0.00
N7: Get irritated easily	0.60	0.00
N8: Often feel blue	0.77	0.00
N9: Am relaxed most of the time	0.59	0.00
N10: Seldom feel blue	0.54	0.00

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 54, while the median age in the Netherlands in 2015 was estimated to be 42.1. The sample is thus a bit older. In the population there is a 47.20% male and 52.80% female distribution (2016 census). In this sample, there are more women than men (see Table A22). The sample is a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that reported to have finished some college or university is a bit higher than the 29.2% reported by the Ministry of Education in 2016. The median personal income in the sample is "€1001 to €1501" which is a bit lower than the median income in the Netherlands. The covariates indicate that older persons, woman and those with a higher education are a bit over represented compared to the population.

Table A22
Descriptive statistics Dutch Election Study 2012

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.08	0.26	3,831	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.66	0.14	3,831	0.65	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.54	0.15	3,831	0.55	0.03	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.65	0.14	3,831	0.67	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.56	0.16	3,831	0.55	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.38	0.17	3,831	0.38	0.00	1.00
Female	0.52	0.50	3,831	1	0	1
Age	52.84	16.27	3,831	54	18	92
Education(Ref: primary):Intermediate secondary	0.25	0.43	3,831	0	0	1
Higher secondary education	0.11	0.32	3,831	0	0	1
Intermediate vocational education	0.23	0.42	3,831	0	0	1
Higher vocational education	0.25	0.43	3,831	0	0	1
University	0.10	0.29	3,831	0	0	1
Income	0.37	0.40	3,831	0.33	0.00	2.00
Income missing	0.05	0.22	3,831	0	0	1
Economic conservatism	0.28	0.24	3,831	0.25	0.00	1.00
Social conservatism	0.68	0.24	3,831	0.75	0.00	1.00
Political cynicism	0.34	0.39	3,831	0.3	0	1

Results belonging to Figure 1

The results belonging to Figure 1 are projected in Table A23. The results show that there is a negative but non significant (p=.09) association between Agreeableness and voting for the PVV. In the baseline the association is negative and significant (p<.05). In the full model we find that those lower on Agreeableness (1 SD below the mean) are 1.57 times more likely to vote for a populist party compared to those that score higher on Agreeableness (1 SD above the mean).

Table A23
Dutch Election Study 2012: Support for the PVV

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.304**	0.391*
	(0.146)	(0.218)
Openness	0.093**	0.545
	(0.041)	(0.286)
Conscientiousness	2.214*	1.255
	(0.977)	(0.654)
Extraversion	4.920**	3.173**
	(2.079)	(1.561)
Neuroticism	3.514**	1.997*
	(1.272)	(0.810)
Female	0.647**	0.681**
	(0.082)	(0.106)
Age	0.993*	0.988**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education(Ref: primary):Intermediate secondary		0.927
		(0.211)
Higher secondary education		0.656
		(0.195)
Intermediate vocational education		0.678
		(0.169)
Higher vocational education		0.311**
		(0.097)
University		0.266**
		(0.123)
Income		1.011
		(0.539)
Income missing		0.640
		(0.632)
Economic conservatism		0.797
		(0.223)
Social conservatism		57.116**
		(21.813)
Political cynicism		0.296**
		(0.070)
Constant	0.159**	0.015**
	(0.073)	(0.010)
Observations	4,432	3,831
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,351.503	1,728.990
Note:	Odss ratios with standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.1, **p<0.05	

A.6: EU Election Study in the Netherlands

Acknowledgement

We thank Claes de Vreese for providing access to this dataset.

Respondents

The Dutch sample is an online-survey collected by TNS NIPO as part of the 2014 European Parliament election. Wave 1 of the survey (December 2013) contains vote intention and covariates, wave 4 (May 2014) contains the vote choice in the EU election and Wave 5 (June 2014) included a Big Five personality inventory. We rely upon those respondents who completed wave 5 (N=1,174). For a detailed description of the sample, see (De Vreese, Azrout, & Möller, 2014).

Measures

Populist support: In wave 1 support for the populist party was measured using the item "*Which party would you vote for if there were national parliamentary elections to in the Netherlands tomorrow?*". We created a dummy variable that captures whether respondents voted for the PVV (1; N=168, 14%) or any other party (0; N=1006, 86%). Vote choice in the 2014 election for the populist party was measured using the item "Which party did you vote for in the EU elections?" This question was only asked to people who indicated that they had voted in the election. Again, we created a dummy variable that captures whether respondents voted for the PVV (1; N=77, 12%) or any other party (0; N=562, 88%).

Agreeableness: Agreeableness is measured as part of the Mini-IPIP which is a valid and reliable measure of personality (Bakker & Lelkes, 2016; Donnellan et al., 2006), which measure the trait using four items: (1) "Sympathize with others' feelings"; (2) "Feel others' emotions"; (3) "Am not interested in other people's problems" (reverse coded); (4) "Am not really interested in others" (reverse coded) "Respondents answer on a five point scale ranging from "Very inaccurate" (1) to "Very accurate" (5). The items were internally consistent (M=.70, SD=.18, α=.77) and we created a scale ranging from low (0) to high (1) Agreeableness.

Other Big Five traits. Openness was measured using the items (M=.60, SD=.17, α=.58): "Have a vivid imagination"; "Am not interested in abstract ideas" (reverse coded); "Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas" (reverse coded); "Do not have a good imagination" (reverse coded) Conscientiousness was measured using the items (M=.71, SD=.18, α=.71). "Get chores done right away"; "Like order"; "Make a mess of things" (reverse coded); "Often forget to put things back in their proper place" (reverse coded). Extraversion was measured using the items (M=.55, SD=.20, α=.77): "Am the life of the party"; "Talk to a lot of different people at parties"; "Don't talk a lot" (reverse coded); "Keep in the background" (reverse coded). Neuroticism was measured using the items (M=.38, SD=.20, α=.76): "Get upset easily"; "Have frequent mood swings"; "Am relaxed most of the time" (reverse coded); "Seldom feel blue" (reverse coded).

Table A26 provides the standardized factor loadings of the Big Five traits based upon a confirmatory factor analysis. All items load satisfactory on the designated latent dimension. Moreover, the internal consistency coefficients of the Big Five traits were acceptable and the traits correlate with each other in line with earlier studies (see Table A25).

Political cynicism. We measured political cynicism using four items: (1) "Almost all politicians will break their promises as soon as they are elected"; (2) "Most politicians are active in politics for their own self-interest"; (3) "Most politicians are honest towards their voters." (reverse coded); (4) "Most politicians are dedicated and we should be thankful for

the work they do." (reverse coded). The four items were scored on a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) through "strongly agreee" (7). After reverse coding the necessary items (see above), we created a scale ranging from not cynical (0) to very cynical (1, M=.63. SD=.20, α=.79). *Social conservatism.* We measured social conservatism using five items tapping into anti-immigration attitudes: (1) "Immigrants abuse the Dutch social welfare system, because they take more out than they put in"; (2) "Immigrants are a threat to the security of Dutch people"; (3) "The religious practices of immigrants are enrich the Dutch way of life and its traditions." (reverse coded); (4) "Immigrants are an important cause of crime in the Netherlands.; (5) "Immigration is good for the Dutch labour market." (reverse coded). The five items were scored on a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) through "strongly agreee" (7). After reverse coding the necessary items (see above), we created a scale ranging from lowest observed score on the scale (0) to the highest observed score on the scale (1, M=.57, SD=.23, α=.82).

Covariates. The covariates were measured in wave 1. In line with the other samples in Study 1, we include sex (male=0; female=1, age (in years), education (prepatory secondary education; high school; secondary vocational; some college; college; university) and income as covariates in our models. Note that income is measured as the monthly household income ranging "no income to €1,000 a month" (1) to "€10,001 or more a month" (9). We recoded the income variable to range between the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1). We coded missing income with a value of 2. We created a dummy variable capturing whether respondents reported their income (1) or not (0). The descriptive statistics are provided in Table A24.

Table A24
Descriptive statistics Dutch EU Election Study 2014

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.14	0.35	1,174	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.70	0.18	1,174	0.75	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.60	0.17	1,174	0.62	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.71	0.18	1,174	0.75	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.55	0.20	1,174	0.56	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.38	0.20	1,174	0.38	0.00	1.00
Female	0.51	0.50	1,174	1	0	1
Age	49.21	17.11	1,174	50	18	87
Prepatory secondary education	0.15	0.36	1,174	0	0	1
High school (first 3 years)	0.05	0.22	1,174	0	0	1
Secondary vocational	0.35	0.48	1,174	0	0	1
Some college	0.05	0.22	1,174	0	0	1
College	0.25	0.43	1,174	0	0	1
University	0.11	0.31	1,174	0	0	1
Income	0.77	0.70	1,174	0.50	0.00	2.00
Income missing	0.23	0.42	1,174	0	0	1
Political cynicism	0.63	0.20	1,174	0.62	0.00	1.00
Social conservatism	0.57	0.23	1,174	0.57	0.00	1.00

Table A25
Dutch EU Election Study 2014: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.16	0.27	0.22	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08
2. Opennesss		1	0.07	0.21	-0.16	-0.06	-0.12
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.07	-0.16	-0.05	-0.01
4. Extraversion				1	-0.20	0.0003	0.01
5. Neuroticism					1	0.06	0.06
6. Social conservatism						1	0.26
7. Economic conservatism							1

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 50, while the median age in the Netherlands in 2015 was estimated to be 42.1. The sample is thus a bit older. In the population there is a 49.57% male and 50.43% female distribution (2016 census). In the sample men and woman are roughly comparable represented (see Table A24). The sample is a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that reported to have finished some college or university is a bit higher than the 29.2% reported by the Ministry of Education in 2016. The median income in the sample is 2,001 Euro to 2,500 Euro per month which is a little lower than than the 2,816 Euro estimated by the bureau of statistics. The covariates indicate that older persons, those with a higher education are a bit over represented compared to the population.

Table A26
Dutch EU Election Study 2014: Big Five Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.61	0.00
Agreeableness item 2	0.56	0.00
Agreeableness item 3	0.72	0.00
Agreeableness item 4	0.80	0.00
Openness item 1	0.24	0.00
Openness item 2	0.66	0.00
Openness item 3	0.82	0.00
Openness item 4	0.34	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.57	0.00
Conscientiousness item 2	0.62	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.65	0.00
Conscientiousness item 4	0.63	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.62	0.00
Extraversion item 2	0.65	0.00
Extraversion item 3	0.73	0.00
Extraversion item 4	0.70	0.00
Neuroticism item 1	0.64	0.00
Neuroticism item 2	0.72	0.00
Neuroticism item 3	0.66	0.00
Neuroticism item 4	0.64	0.00

Results belonging to Figure 1

We calculated the odds ratio of supporting PVV among respondents that score one standard deviation above and below the mean. This calculation was based upon the full model projected in Table A27. We find that in 2014 those that score low on Agreeableness are 1.67 more times likely to vote for the PVV compared to those that score high on Agreeableness. The effect size in 2015 (column 4) is roughly of the same size. Model 1 of Table A27 shows that the association between Agreeableness is negative and has a p-value of .05. We replicate the findings when we focus upon the vote choice in the EU elections (see column 3 [baseline model] and column 4 [full model reported in Figure 1]).

Table A27
Dutch EU Election Study 2014; Vote for PVV

	Dependent variable:			
	Base - 13	Figure 1 - 13	Base - 14	Figure 1 - 14
Agreeableness	0.357	0.270*	0.170*	0.105*
	(0.188)	(0.157)	(0.130)	(0.093)
Openness	0.209*	0.536	0.690	2.402
	(0.111)	(0.338)	(0.504)	(2.224)
Conscientiousness	1.100	1.448	0.351	0.432
	(0.540)	(0.785)	(0.249)	(0.352)
Extraversion	3.233*	2.082	4.044*	3.839
	(1.538)	(1.112)	(2.705)	(3.074)
Neuroticism	0.354*	0.204*	0.505	0.270
	(0.169)	(0.108)	(0.334)	(0.204)
Female	0.944	0.914	0.923	0.849
	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.250)	(0.263)
Age	0.975*	0.966*	0.994	1.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Prepatory secondary education		0.758		0.517
		(0.330)		(0.360)
High school (first 3 years)		1.395		0.371
		(0.742)		(0.322)
Secondary vocational		0.963		0.779
		(0.395)		(0.505)
Some college		0.193*		0.390
		(0.144)		(0.396)
College		0.233*		0.154*
		(0.113)		(0.117)
University		0.319		0.204
		(0.188)		(0.168)
Income		0.418		1.175
		(0.217)		(0.940)
Income missing		2.697		0.942
		(2.352)		(1.263)
Political cynicism		83.523*		487.805*
		(46.356)		(426.394)
Social conservatism		3.629*		2.843
		(1.457)		(1.773)
Constant	2.001	0.136*	1.024	0.008*
	(1.232)	(0.120)	(0.926)	(0.011)
Observations	1,174	1,174	639	639
Akaike Inf. Crit.	931.851	776.387	469.232	373.529

Note: Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05

A.7: Dutch National Elections 2017

We make use of data of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel in the Netherlands administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands), see https://www.lissdata.nl/. TheLISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based ona true probability sample of households drawn fromthe population register. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and Internet connection. A longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality. More information about the LISS panel can be found at: www.lissdata.nl.

Respondents

Like Appendix A.5, we draw here upon the Dutch LISS panel. The post-election study was fielded between March 16 and March 28, 2017 – one day after the March 15 2017 parliamentary elections, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-25p-xv9b (Das, 2018). In total 5,888 (84.4%) of the 6,975 people invited completed the survey. The LISS panel collects measures of personality in May of every year and we used responses of the May 2016 survey, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x5h-4cxd (Das & Marchand, 2008). The "politics and values" questionnaire taps into political attitudes is fielded every December. We us the data collected in December 2016, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zms-r5rz (Das & Elshout, 2007). Socio-economic background was measured in March 2017, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xv3-8tvs (Das & Elshout, 2015). In Figure 1, we report the results of the 4,506 respondents that completed the 2017 post election survey and at least one time completed the personality battery and the attitudes questions.

The post-election study was fielded between September 13 and September 29, 2012 – one day after the September 12 elections, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-27d-qw68 (Elshout, 2012). 5,333 (77.3%) of the 6,899 completed the survey. The LISS panel collects measures of personality in May of every year – – and we used responses of the May 2011 and May 2012 survey to have measures of personality of the largest possible group. The "politics and values" questionnaire taps into political attitudes and voting behavior is fielded every December. We used data from December 2011 and December 2012, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zms-r5rz (Das & Elshout, 2007). Socio-economic background was measured in September 2012, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xv3-8tvs (Das & Elshout, 2015). Merging these datasets, we have a sample of 3,831 respondents that completed the 2012 post election survey and at least one time the personality battery and the attitudes questions.

Measures

We have exactly the same measures in this sample as the 2012 election study. *Populist support* is not only capturing the vote for the PVV but also the vote for populists parties that entered the political arena since 2012 such as: GeenPeil, FvD, Voor Nederland and Nieuwe Wegen. *Agreeableness* is measured using the same 10 items as in the 2012 Dutch Election Study presented in Appendix A.5 (M=.70, SD=.14, α=.83).

We again include measures of the other Big Five traits Openness (M=.62, SD=.13, α=.77), Conscientiousness (M=.62, SD=.16, α=.78), Extraversion (M=.56, SD=.15, α=.88) and Neuroticism (M=.38, SD=.18, α=.89). See Table A29 for the factor loadings based upon a confirmatory factor analysis and Table A28. Using the same item wording as in 2012, we sex, age, education, income as well as social conservatism (M=.68, SD=.24), economic conservatism

(M=.29, SD=.25), and political cynicism (M=.33 SD=.38, α=.76). See Table A30 for the descriptive statistics.

Table A28
Dutch Election Study 2017: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.25	0.29	0.35	-0.08	0.05	-0.08
2. Openness		1	0.23	0.35	-0.18	0.23	-0.16
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.14	-0.27	0.02	0.09
4. Extraversion				1	-0.23	0.10	-0.005
5. Neuroticism					1	-0.09	-0.01
6. Cynicism						1	-0.24
7. Social conservatism							1
8. Economic conservatism							

Table A29
Dutch Election Study 2017: Big Five Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.70	0.00
Agreeableness item 2	0.72	0.00
Agreeableness item 3	0.23	0.00
Agreeableness item 4	0.63	0.00
Agreeableness item 5	0.64	0.00
Agreeableness item 6	0.58	0.00
Agreeableness item 7	0.56	0.00
Agreeableness item 8	0.35	0.00
Agreeableness item 9	0.61	0.00
Agreeableness item 10	0.69	0.00
Openness item 1	0.54	0.00
Openness item 2	0.48	0.00
Openness item 3	0.64	0.00
Openness item 4	0.60	0.00
Openness item 5	0.39	0.00
Openness item 6	0.32	0.00
Openness item 7	0.66	0.00
Openness item 8	0.56	0.00
Openness item 9	0.49	0.00
Openness item 10	0.37	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.40	0.00
Conscientiousness item 2	0.40	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.51	0.00
Conscientiousness item 4	0.59	0.00
Conscientiousness item 5	0.47	0.00
Conscientiousness item 6	0.27	0.00
Conscientiousness item 7	0.63	0.00
Conscientiousness item 8	0.63	0.00
Conscientiousness item 9	0.65	0.00
Conscientiousness item 10	0.53	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.62	0.00
Extraversion item 2	0.63	0.00
Extraversion item 3	0.74	0.00
Extraversion item 4	0.72	0.00
Extraversion item 5	0.53	0.00
Extraversion item 6	0.67	0.00
Extraversion item 7	0.71	0.00
Extraversion item 8	0.63	0.00
Extraversion item 9	0.47	0.00
Extraversion item 10	0.75	0.00
Neuroticism item 1	0.73	0.00
Neuroticism item 2	0.54	0.00
Neuroticism item 3	0.67	0.00
Neuroticism item 4	0.77	0.00
Neuroticism item 5	0.69	0.00
Neuroticism item 6	0.74	0.00
Neuroticism item 7	0.61	0.00
Neuroticism item 8	0.77	0.00
Neuroticism item 9	0.62	0.00
Neuroticism item 10	0.52	0.00

National representative sample

The descriptive statistics are provided in Table A30. The median age in the sample is 55, while the median age in the Netherlands in 2017 was estimated to be 42. The sample is thus a bit older. There are a little bit more woman 52% than man 48% in the sample compared to the (2016 census). The sample is a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that reported to have finished some college or university is higher than the 29.2% reported by the Ministry of Education in 2016. The median personal income in the sample is between €1001 and €1500 per month.

Table A30
Descriptive statistics Dutch Election Study 2017

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Median	Min
Populist Vote	0.09	0.29	4,506	0	0
Agreeableness	0.70	0.14	4,506	0.71	0.00
Openness	0.62	0.13	4,506	0.62	0.10
Conscientiousness	0.62	0.16	4,506	0.64	0.00
Extraversion	0.56	0.17	4,506	0.55	0.00
Neuroticism	0.38	0.18	4,506	0.35	0.00
Female	0.52	0.50	4,506	1	0
Age	52.93	17.80	4,506	55	16
Education (Ref: primary): Intermediate secondary education	0.22	0.41	4,506	0	0
Higher secondary education	0.11	0.32	4,506	0	0
Intermediate vocational education	0.23	0.42	4,506	0	0
Higher vocational education	0.25	0.43	4,506	0	0
University	0.12	0.32	4,506	0	0
Income	0.39	0.42	4,506	0.33	0.00
Income missing	0.05	0.23	4,506	0	0
Economic conservatism	0.29	0.25	4,506	0.25	0.00
Social conservatism	0.68	0.24	4,506	0.75	0.00
Political cynicism	0.33	0.38	4,506	0.3	0

Results belonging to Figure 1

The results belonging to Figure 1 are projected in Table A31. The results show that there is a negative and significant association between Agreeableness and voting for a populist party. Those the score one standard deviation below the mean on Agreeableness are 1.48 times more likely to vote for a populist party compared to those that score a standard deviation above the mean. In the baseline the association is negative and significant ($p<.05$). In the third model and fourth model (*PVV only)*, we regressed vote for the PVV (1) versus all other parties (0). Again, we find a negative and statistically significant association between Agreeableness and voting for the populist party with more or less equal effect sizes for the association between Agreeableness and populist support. The inclusion of a few other small populist parties is not biasing our results.

Table A31
Dutch Election Study 2017: Support for Populist Parties

	Dependent variable:			
	Base	Figure 1	PVV only base	PVV only full
Agreeableness	0.073*	0.112*	0.064*	0.102*
	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.050)
Openness	0.212*	2.082	0.170*	1.850
	(0.090)	(1.076)	(0.078)	(1.044)
Conscientiousness	2.519*	1.094	2.423*	1.032
	(0.843)	(0.429)	(0.880)	(0.443)
Extraversion	4.662*	3.682*	4.104*	2.870*
	(1.542)	(1.389)	(1.473)	(1.181)
Neuroticism	2.387*	1.525	2.739*	1.647
	(0.710)	(0.519)	(0.882)	(0.610)
Female	0.754*	0.670*	0.782*	0.658*
	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.094)
Age	1.004	0.995	1.008*	0.999
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Education (Ref: primary): Intermediate secondary education		1.415		1.344
		(0.297)		(0.293)
Higher secondary education		0.810		0.689
		(0.211)		(0.196)
Intermediate vocational education		1.017		0.917
		(0.220)		(0.209)
Higher vocational education		0.519*		0.424*
		(0.132)		(0.118)
University		0.307*		0.300*
		(0.111)		(0.120)
Income		0.839		0.711
		(0.361)		(0.339)
Income missing		1.287		1.473
		(1.000)		(1.277)
Economic conservatism		1.220		0.961
		(0.270)		(0.234)
Social conservatism		18.986*		21.009*
		(5.651)		(6.933)
Political cynicism		0.241*		0.209*
		(0.050)		(0.050)
Constant	0.244*	0.029*	0.206*	0.028*
	(0.098)	(0.016)	(0.090)	(0.017)
Observations	5,523	4,506	5,523	4,506
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,245.780	2,376.457	2,868.216	2,063.102

Note: Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic Regression models; *p<0.05

A.8: Swiss Household Panel 2009

Acknowledgement

The Swiss Household Panel has been realized using the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (data: http://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-932-2).

Respondents

We report the results of the Swiss Household Panel 2009 (dataset: SHP Data Waves 1-9, https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-932-2) conducted between September 3 2009 and February 8 2010 among Swiss adults (N=6,177). The main mode of the survey is a computer-assisted telephone interview.

Measures

Populist support. Participants were asked "Which party would you vote for if elections were held tomorrow?" We created a dummy variable indicating whether participants voted for the SVP (1) or any other party (0).

Agreeableness. Agreeableness is measured using two items that are part of a Swiss version of the Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007). Specifically, respondents were asked "I see myself as someone who..". Agreeableness was intended to be measured using the following two items: (1) "is generally trusting" and (2) "tends to find fault with others" (reverse coded) scored on a Likert-type scale ranging from (0) "completely disagree" to "Completely agree" (10). After reverse coding the second item, we recoded the scales. We created a scale ranging from the lowest level of Agreeableness (0) to the highest level of Agreeableness (1, M=.68, SD=.14, α=.14). Descriptive statistics are also provided in Table A33.

Other Big Five traits. Openness was measured using the items: "Has few artistic interests" (reverse coded) and "have an active imagination" (M=.63, SD=.19, α=.34), Conscientiousness wit the items: "Tends to be lazy" (reverse coded) and "Does a thorough job" (M=.75, SD=.15, α=.37), Extraversion with the items "is reserved" (reverse coded) and "is outgoing, sociable" (M=.66, SD=.19, α=.49) and Neuroticism was measured using the items "Is relaxed, handles stress well" (reverse coded) and "Get nervous easily" (M=.35, SD=.17, α=.52). The correlation between the variables is provided in Table A32. Note that we don't provide results of a confirmatory factor analysis as the model with 2 items per trait would not be identified.

Ideology. Social conservatism was measured using the item: "*Are you in favour of Switzerland offering foreigners the same opportunities as those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favour of Switzerland offering Swiss citizens better opportunities?*" The response categories were "in favour of equality of opportunities" (0), "neither" (.5) or "in favour of better opportunities for Swiss citizens" (1; M=.33, SD=.45). Economic conservatism was measured using the item "*Are you in favour of an increase or in favour of a decrease of the tax on high incomes*" scored using the following three categories: "in favour of a decrease", (0) "neither", (.5) "in favour of an increase" (1; M=.19, SD=.32).

Covariates. We control in our models for sex (male=0; female=1), age (in years), education and income and language in which the survey was collected (French; German; Education) Education was measured in categories: no education or first stage primary education; 2: lower secondary; 3A: upper secondary (preparation for tertiary education); 3B: upper secondary (preparation for further prof. education); 3C: upper secondary (entrance into the labor market); 4A: post secondary (preparation for an institution for higher education); 5A: first stage of

tertiary education (general education); 5B: first stage of tertiary education (professional education); 6: second stage of tertiary education. Income was measured using the total household income. We recoded income into 13 categories ranging from "below 2,000 Swiss Francs" (1) to above "150,000 Swiss Francs" (13). We recoded income to range from the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1), while missing values were set to the value of 2. We created a dummy variable capturing whether respondents reported their income (1) or not (0). The descriptive statistics for the socio-economic covariates are provided in Table A33.

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 49, while the median age in the Switzerland in 2009 was estimated to be 41. The sample is thus a bit older. The sample is 44% male and 56% female, while in the population gender is more balanced. Just like other samples in Study 1, the sample is a bit higher educated and the income is also little higher than in the general population.

Table A32
Swiss Household Panel 2009: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Agreeableness	1	0.06	0.28	0.20	-0.27	-0.03
2. Opennesss		1	0.09	0.17	-0.09	-0.11
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.19	-0.26	0.08
4. Extraversion				1	-0.20	0.02
5. Neuroticism					1	0.004
6. Social conservatism						1
7. Economic conservatism						

Table A33
Descriptive statistics Swiss Household Panel 2009

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.12	0.32	6,177	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.68	0.14	6,177	0.70	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.63	0.19	6,177	0.65	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.75	0.15	6,177	0.75	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.66	0.19	6,177	0.65	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.35	0.17	6,177	0.35	0.00	1.00
Female	0.56	0.50	6,177	1	0	1
Age	49.06	16.87	6,177	49	18	94
Language (ref: French): German	0.71	0.45	6,177	1	0	1
Language: Italian	0.04	0.19	6,177	0	0	1
2: Lower secondary	0.08	0.27	6,177	0	0	1
3A: Upper secondary	0.09	0.28	6,177	0	0	1
3B: Upper secondary	0.40	0.49	6,177	0	0	1
3C: Upper secondary	0.06	0.24	6,177	0	0	1
4: Post-secondary education	0.01	0.12	6,177	0	0	1
5A: First stage of tertiary education	0.14	0.34	6,177	0	0	1
5A: First stage of tertiary education	0.17	0.38	6,177	0	0	1
6: Second stage of tertiary education	0.03	0.17	6,177	0	0	1
Income	0.68	0.56	6,177	0.50	0.00	2.00
Income missing (0-1)	0.12	0.33	6,177	0	0	1
Social conservatism	0.33	0.45	6,177	0	0	1
Economic conservatism	0.19	0.32	6,177	0	0	1

Results belonging to Figure 1

Table A34 provides the results belonging to Figure 1. There is a negative and statistically significant association between Agreeableness and voting for the Swiss People's Party in the full model – reported in Figure 1 – and the baseline model. In the full model, respondents that score a standard deviation below the mean on Agreeableness are 1.5 times more likely to vote for the populist party compared to those that score a standard deviation above the mean on Agreeableness.

Table A34
Swiss Household Panel 2009: Vote for Swiss People's Party

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.400*	0.463*
	(0.119)	(0.144)
Openness	0.284*	0.587*
	(0.060)	(0.133)
Conscientiousness	3.754*	2.568*
	(1.122)	(0.804)
Extraversion	1.764*	1.496
	(0.410)	(0.365)
Neuroticism	0.621	0.677
	(0.157)	(0.178)
Female	0.676*	0.530*
	(0.054)	(0.051)
Age	0.998	0.995
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Language (ref: French): German	3.074*	2.894*
	(0.389)	(0.382)
Language: Italian	0.946	0.736
	(0.313)	(0.249)
2: Lower secondary		1.327
		(0.382)
3A: Upper secondary		0.535
		(0.173)
3B: Upper secondary		1.239
		(0.333)
3C: Upper secondary		0.798
		(0.251)
4: Post-secondary education		0.958
		(0.397)
5A: First stage of tertiary education		0.283*
		(0.096)
5A: First stage of tertiary education		0.728
		(0.209)
6: Second stage of tertiary education		0.243*
		(0.131)
Income		0.676
		(0.142)
Income missing (0-1)		1.863
		(0.647)
Social conservatism		3.355*
		(0.300)
Economic conservatism		1.977*
		(0.240)
Constant	0.083*	0.068*
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Observations	6,584	6,177
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,457.246	3,886.833
Note:	Odds ratios and standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.05	

A.9: Swiss Household Panel 2015

Acknowledgement

The Swiss Household Panel has been realized using the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-932-2

Participants

We report the results of the Swiss Household Panel 2015 conducted between September 2015 and February 2016 among Swiss adults (dataset: SHP Data Waves 1-9, https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-932-2). The results reported in Figure 1 of the main text are based upon the 5,635 respondents who completed all measures necessary in this model.

Measures

Populist support. Participants were asked "Which party would you vote for if elections were held tomorrow?" We created a dummy variable indicating whether participants voted for the SVP (1) or any other party (0).

Agreeableness. Agreeableness is measured using three items that are part of a Swiss version of the Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007). Specifically, respondents were asked "*I see myself as someone who...*". Agreeableness was intended to be measured using the following two items: (1) "Rude" (reverse coded), (2) "Forgiving" and (3) "Kind" scored on a Likert-type scale ranging from (0) "completely disagree" to "Completely agree" (10). After reverse coding the second item, we recoded the scales. We created a scale ranging from the lowest level of Agreeableness (0) to the highest level of Agreeableness (1, M=.69, SD=.14, α=.48).

Other Big Five traits. Openness was measured using the items: "Original", "Artistic" and "Imagination" (M=.65, SD=.15, α=.66), Conscientiousness wit the items: "Thorough", "Lazy" (reverse coded) and "Efficient" (M=.68, SD=.16, α=.62, Extraversion with the items "Talkative", "Sociable" and "Reserved (revsere coded; M=.52, SD=.14, α=.29) and Neuroticism was measured using the items "Worry", "Nervous" and "Relaxed" (reverse coded; M=.43, SD=.16, α=.64). The CFA shows that the items – on average – load highest on the designated latent dimension (see Table A35). In Table A36 we also show that the Big Five traits correlate with each other – and with ideology – as expected.

Ideology. We include an item tapping into left-right ideological self-placement scored to range from left (0) to right (1) on a 11-point Likert-typ scale (M=.50, SD=.21).

Covariates. Sex, age, education, income and language are measured in the same way as in the 2009 Household Panel (see Appendix A.8 for item wording). The descriptive statistics for the socio-economic covariates are provided in Table A37.

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 53, while the median age in the Switzerland in 2015 was estimated to be 41. The sample is thus a bit older. The sample is 47.3% male and 52.6% female, while in the population gender is more balanced. Just like other samples in Study 1, the sample is a bit higher educated and the income is also little higher than in the general population.

Table A35
Swiss Household Panel 2015: Big Five Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.43	
Agreeableness item 2	0.00	0.12
Agreeableness item 3	0.00	0.41
Openness item 1	0.59	
Openness item 2	0.43	0.00
Openness item 3	0.84	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.44	
Conscientiousness item 2	0.65	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.64	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.42	
Extraversion item 2	-0.00	0.41
Extraversion item 3	-0.00	0.28
Neuroticism item 1	0.45	
Neuroticism item 2	0.77	0.00
Neuroticism item 3	0.51	0.00

Table A36
Swiss Household Panel 2015: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Agreeableness	1	0.13	0.27	-0.40	-0.24
2. Opennesss		1	0.13	0.20	-0.04
3. Conscientiousness			1	-0.01	-0.19
4. Extraversion				1	-0.02
5. Neuroticism					1
6. Left-Right Ideology					

Table A37
Descriptive statistics Swiss Household Panel 2015

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Median	Min	Max
Populist vote	0.15	0.36	5,635	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.69	0.14	5,635	0.70	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.65	0.15	5,635	0.67	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.68	0.16	5,635	0.70	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.52	0.14	5,635	0.53	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.43	0.16	5,635	0.43	0.00	1.00
Female	0.53	0.50	5,635	1	0	1
Age	51.02	18.11	5,635	52	18	100
Language: (Ref: French) German	0.71	0.45	5,635	1	0	1
Language: Italian	0.03	0.18	5,635	0	0	1
2: Lower secondary	0.05	0.23	5,635	0	0	1
3A: Upper secondary	0.09	0.28	5,635	0	0	1
3B: Upper secondary	0.36	0.48	5,635	0	0	1
3C: Upper secondary	0.05	0.23	5,635	0	0	1
4: Post-secondary education	0.02	0.15	5,635	0	0	1
5A: First stage of tertiary education	0.18	0.39	5,635	0	0	1
5A: First stage of tertiary education	0.18	0.39	5,635	0	0	1
6: Second stage of tertiary education	0.03	0.18	5,635	0	0	1
Income	0.69	0.53	5,635	0.58	0.00	2.00
Income missing (0-1)	0.11	0.31	5,635	0	0	1
Left-right ideology	0.50	0.21	5,635	0.50	0.00	1.00

Results belonging to Figure 1

The results in Table A38 show the results used in Figure 1. They show an odds ratio below 1 for the Agreeableness and voting for the SVP (odds ratio=.96) but the association is non-significant. This is the case in the full model and in the baseline model.

Table A38
Swiss Household Panel 2015: Vote for Swiss People's Party

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.760	0.961
	(0.241)	(0.392)
Openness	0.216*	0.453*
	(0.053)	(0.145)
Conscientiousness	3.487*	1.391
	(0.869)	(0.436)
Extraversion	3.995*	1.501
	(1.270)	(0.592)
Neuroticism	1.599	1.435
	(0.393)	(0.453)
Female	0.665*	0.799*
	(0.051)	(0.086)
Age	1.003	0.996
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Language: (Ref: French) German	2.513*	2.426*
	(0.257)	(0.313)
Language: Italian	0.701	0.653
	(0.198)	(0.224)
2: Lower secondary		0.849
		(0.310)
3A: Upper secondary		0.252*
		(0.100)
3B: Upper secondary		0.820
		(0.273)
3C: Upper secondary		0.729
		(0.274)
4: Post-secondary education		0.578
		(0.237)
5A: First stage of tertiary education		0.188*
		(0.070)
5A: First stage of tertiary education		0.535
		(0.186)
6: Second stage of tertiary education		0.109*
		(0.069)
Income		0.648*
		(0.140)
Income missing (0-1)		2.348*
		(0.830)
Left-right ideology		4,303.445*
		(1,333.389)
Constant	0.048*	0.002*
	(0.019)	(0.001)
Observations	6,322	5,635
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,937.473	3,185.663
Note:	Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.05	

A.10: Swiss Election Study 2015

Participants

We report the results of the Swiss Election Study 2015, see https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-828-3. We rely upon the survey wave that was conducted between October 19 2015 and December 12 2015. This was right after the Swiss elections of October 18, 2015 among Swiss adults (N=7,322).

Measures

Populist support. We measure populist with the self-reported vote choice in the last Swiss elections. We created a dummy variable indicating whether participants voted for the SVP (1) or any other party (0).

Agreeableness. Agreeableness is measured using three items that are part of a Swiss version of the Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007), namely (1) "At times too harsh with others" (reverse coded), (2) "is able to forgive" and (3) "considerate and friendly with others" (M=.72, SD=.16 , α=.46).

Other Big Five traits were measured with three items each. Specifically, Openness was measured with the items "original and has new ideas", "appreciates artistic experiences" and "highly imaginative" (M=.64, SD=.18, α=.56), Conscientiousness with the items "works thoroughly", "rather lazy" (reverse coded) and "completes tasks effectively" (M=.75, SD=.16, α= .59), Extraversion with the items "talkative", "sociable" and "reserved" (reverse coded)(M=.62, SD=.17, α=.66) and Neuroticism with the items "worries often", "easily nervous" and "relaxed and deals well with stress" (M=.45, SD=.19, α= .62). The CFA shows that the items – on average – load highest on the designated latent dimension (see Table A40). In Table A39 we also show that the Big Five traits correlate with each other as expected.

Social conservatism was measured using one item that taps into the opinion towards immigration and ranged from "strongly in favor" (0), "Rather in favor" (.25), "Neither in favor nor against" (.5), "Rather against" (.75) to "strongly opposed (1; M=.60, SD=.33). *Economic conservatism* was measured using a similar scale and scored to range from strong in favor (0) to strongly opposed (1) to the increase of social expenses (M=.54, SD=.28).

Covariates. We control for sex (male=0; female=1), age (in years), education, income and language (French; German or Italian). Education is operationalized in categories: secondary school or less; Basic vocational training (with contract); Apprenticeship or vocational school; Diploma school; Trading school; Secondary school vocational diploma; High school or school preparing for the baccalaureate; Higher vocational education with master diploma; Higher vocational college for technology, economy, social is; University of Applied Sciences, University or Federal Institute of Technology; other. Income is measured using the total gross monthly household of the respondent in categories ranging from "less than 2,000 Swiss Francs" (1) to "more than 15,000 Swiss Francs" a separate "don't know" category. We recoded income to range between the lowest observed income (0) and the highest observed income (1) and coded missing values as 2. We also created a dummy variable capturing whether income was missing (1) or not (0). The descriptive statistics for the socio-economic covariates are provided in Table A41.

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 52, while the median age in the Switzerland in 2015 was estimated to be 41. The sample is thus a bit older. The sample is 54% male and 46% female,

while in the population gender is more balanced. Just like other samples in Study 1, the sample is a bit higher educated and the income is also little higher than in the general population.

Table A39
Swiss Election Study 2015: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.11	0.23	0.05	-0.15	-0.06	-0.06
2. Opennesss		1	0.13	0.28	-0.05	-0.12	-0.12
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.21	-0.13	0.13	0.10
4. Extraversion				1	-0.20	0.01	0.01
5. Neuroticism					1	0.02	-0.09
6. Social conservatism						1	0.27
7. Economic conservatism							1

Table A40
Swiss Election Study 2015: Big Five Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
Agreeableness item 1	0.36	
Agreeableness item 2	0.33	0.00
Agreeableness item 3	0.94	0.00
Openness item 1	0.50	
Openness item 2	0.42	0.00
Openness item 3	0.90	0.00
Conscientiousness item 1	0.68	
Conscientiousness item 2	0.32	0.00
Conscientiousness item 3	0.75	0.00
Extraversion item 1	0.54	
Extraversion item 2	0.95	0.00
Extraversion item 3	0.28	0.00
Neuroticism item 1	0.36	
Neuroticism item 2	0.48	0.00
Neuroticism item 3	0.86	0.00

Table A41
Descriptive statistics Swiss Election Study 2015

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.22	0.42	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.72	0.15	0.73	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.64	0.18	0.63	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.75	0.16	0.77	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.62	0.17	0.63	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.45	0.19	0.47	0.00	1.00
Female	0.46	0.50	0	0	1
Age	51.02	16.34	52	17	95
Language: (Ref: French) German	0.20	0.40	0	0	1
Language: Italian	0.04	0.20	0	0	1
Basic vocational	0.01	0.08	0	0	1
Apprenticeship	0.29	0.46	0	0	1
Diploma school	0.02	0.14	0	0	1
Trading school	0.06	0.23	0	0	1
Secondary school	0.02	0.15	0	0	1
High school	0.08	0.27	0	0	1
Higher vocational (Master)	0.11	0.32	0	0	1
Higher vocational (College)	0.07	0.25	0	0	1
University of Applied Sciences	0.12	0.32	0	0	1
University	0.19	0.39	0	0	1
Other	0.001	0.03	0	0	1
Income	0.54	0.37	0.50	0.00	2.00
Income missing	0.03	0.17	0	0	1
Economic conservatism	0.54	0.28	0.50	0.00	1.00
Social conservatism	0.60	0.33	0.8	0	1

Results belonging to Figure 1

We show in Table A42 the results belonging to Figure 1. In the full model we find that respondents that score one standard deviation below the mean on Agreeableness are 1.55 times more likely to for the Swiss People's Party compared to those respondents that score a standard deviation above the mean on the trait. Excluding the covariates does not affect the association between Agreeableness and populist support (see base-model).

Table A42
Swiss Election 2015: Vote for Swiss People's Party

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.303*	0.520*
	(0.072)	(0.149)
Openness	0.325*	1.403
	(0.065)	(0.342)
Conscientiousness	10.240*	3.027*
	(2.482)	(0.856)
Extraversion	2.397*	1.836*
	(0.535)	(0.495)
Neuroticism	1.595*	1.541
	(0.313)	(0.366)
Female	0.766*	0.819*
	(0.056)	(0.074)
Age	0.998	0.986*
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Language: (Ref: French) German	0.496*	0.552*
	(0.049)	(0.066)
Language: Italian	0.451*	0.304*
	(0.098)	(0.076)
Basic vocational		3.892*
		(1.946)
Apprenticeship		1.415
		(0.330)
Diploma school		0.596
		(0.230)
Trading school		1.259
		(0.344)
Secondary school		0.981
		(0.336)
High school		0.550*
		(0.157)
Higher vocational (Master)		0.911
		(0.230)
Higher vocational (College)		0.695
		(0.197)
University of Applied Sciences		0.446*
		(0.122)
University		0.339*
		(0.093)
Other		1.433
		(1.811)
Income		0.440*
		(0.079)
Income missing		4.814*
		(1.742)
Economic conservatism		6.583*
		(1.112)
Social conservatism		110.098*
		(23.028)
Constant	0.152*	0.004*
	(0.048)	(0.002)
Observations	4,985	4,956
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,056.170	3,590.221

Note: Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.05

A.11: Spanish Election Study

Respondents

The face-to-face survey was conducted by the Spanish Center for Sociological Research following the June 26, 2016 parliamentary elections in Spain. The data was collected between September 28 and October 31, 2016.

Measure

Populist support. We focus upon the self-reported vote choice in the June 26 2016 parliamentary elections. Specifically participants were asked "*Could you tell me for which party or coalition you voted?*" We created a dummy variable indicating whether participants voted for Podemos (1) or any other party (0).

Agreeableness. Agreeableness was measured using two items that are part of a Spanish version of the Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007). Specifically, respondents were asked "Thinking about how you are, tell me, please, to what extent the following phrases describe you". Agreeableness was intended to be measured using the following two items: "Find it easy to get into the feelings of others" and "Has a tendency to criticize others" (reverse coded). The items were answered on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from " Yes, completely" (1), "Rather yes" (2), "Neither yes nor no", "Rather not" (4) and "Not at al" (5). After reverse coding the second item, we recoded the scales to range from "not at all" (0) to "yes, completely" (1). Unfortunately, the two items only correlate very weakly with each other (r= .08). Following Gallego and Oberski (2012), inspection of the correlations between the two items and the other traits suggest that the item "Has a tendency to criticize others" measures Agreeableness more validly and consequently this item is used (M=.71, SD=.26).

Other Big Five traits. Openness was measured using "Has little artistic interests" (reverse coded) and "Have a lot of imagination" (M=.37, SD=.24, α=.38), Conscientiousness with "Tends to be lazy" (reverse coded) and "Perform conscientiously the things you have to do" (M=.78, SD=.19, α=.41), Extraversion with the items "I tend to be reserved" and "I am extroverted and sociable" (M=.65, SD=.24, α=.53) and Neuroticism with the items "I am dominated by stress" and "Get nervous easily" (M=.38, SD=.25, α=.64). In Table A43 we also show that the Big Five traits correlate with each other as expected.

Table A43
Spanish Election Study: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	-0.005	0.15	-0.02	-0.17	0.01	-0.01
2. Opennesss		1	-0.11	-0.20	0.03	0.12	0.05
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.14	-0.17	0.001	0.04
4. Extraversion				1	-0.10	-0.06	0.01
5. Neuroticism					1	-0.01	0.09
6. Left-Right ideology						1	-0.06
7. Cynicism							1

Ideology. Respondents were asked "*When talking about politics, left and right expressions are normally used. This card has and a series of boxes that go from left to right. In which box would you place yourself?*". Respondents could tick a box ranging from left (1) to right (11) with a separate "don't know" category. We recoded the scale to range from left (0) to right (1) and set don't know responses to missing (M=.40, SD=.25).

Covariates. We control in our models for sex (male=0; female=1), age (in years), education and income. Education measured in categories: Primary school; lower secondary education; upper secondary education; post secondary education; tertiary education; education missing. Income was measured by asking respondents to report their average monthly household income after tax deduction. Respondents could answer in categories ranging from "no income of any kind" to "more than €6,000" and a separate category for "don't know/prefer not to say". We recoded income from the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1) and set missing values to 2. We also created a dummy variable capturing whether income was missing (1) or not (0). The descriptive statistics for the socio-economic covariates are provided in Table A44.

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 49, while the median age in the Spain in 2015 was estimated to be 49. In the population there is a 49.08% male and 50.92% female distribution (in 2017). In Spain men and woman are roughly comparable represented (see Table A44). The sample is a bit higher educated and have a bit higher income compared to the population.

Table A44
Descriptive statistics Spanish Election Study

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.20	0.40	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.71	0.26	0.75	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.37	0.24	0.38	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.78	0.19	0.75	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.65	0.24	0.62	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.38	0.25	0.38	0.00	1.00
Female	0.51	0.50	1	0	1
Age	49.94	17.22	49	18	96
Education (Ref: primary): Lower secondary	0.98	0.72	0.6	0	2
Upper secondary	0.32	0.47	0	0	1
Post secondary	0.19	0.39	0	0	1
Tertiary	0.27	0.45	0	0	1
Education missing	0.03	0.18	0	0	1
Income	0.28	0.45	0	0	1
Income missing	0.002	0.04	0	0	1
Left-right ideology	0.40	0.24	0.33	0.00	1.00
Political cynicism	0.68	0.24	0.67	0.00	1.00

Results belonging to Figure 1

The results belonging to the Spanish data reported in Figure 1 are presented in Table A45. We present unstandardized regression coefficients here. The effect in the full model is negative and significant. In the baseline model the coefficient for Agreeableness is negative but not statistically significant at conventional level (p<.1). In the full model the association between Agreeableness and support for Podemos is negative and statistically significant. Those lower on Agreeableness (1 SD below the mean) are 2.16 times more likely to vote for the populist party compared to those that score higher on Agreeableness (1 SD above the mean).

Table A45
Spanish Election Study: Support for Podemos

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	-0.200^{*}	-0.310^{**}
	(0.107)	(0.155)
Openness	-1.241^{**}	-0.718^{**}
	(0.187)	(0.263)
Conscientiousness	-0.489^{**}	-0.603^{**}
	(0.165)	(0.236)
Extraversion	0.351	0.120
	(0.240)	(0.292)
Neuroticism	0.102	0.119
	(0.159)	(0.200)
Female	-0.276^{**}	-0.226^{**}
	(0.072)	(0.080)
Age	-0.029^{**}	-0.020^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education (Ref: primary): Lower secondary		−0.554
		(0.376)
Upper secondary		0.824
		(0.514)
Post secondary		0.316
		(0.248)
Tertiary		0.541^{**}
		(0.180)
Education missing		0.477
		(0.301)
Income		0.595^{**}
		(0.253)
Income missing		2.162^{**}
		(0.326)
Left-right ideology		-5.538^{**}
		(1.004)
Political cynicism		0.179
		(0.276)
Constant	0.742^{**}	1.955^{**}
	(0.328)	(0.609)
Observations	4,157	3,825
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,839.972	3,025.527
Note:	Unstandardized coefficients (logit) and standard errors (clustered at region); *p<.1, **p<.05	

A.12: LAPOP Survey Venezuela

The data from Venezuela were supplied by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, which takes no responsibility for any interpretation of the data.

Participants

In total 1510 participants completed the study in 2007 which had a national probability design. More information on the design can be found on the website of the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, click here).

Measures

Populist support. Respondents were asked "*For whom did you vote in the last Presidential elections?*" and could choose out of the main candidates. We recoded the variable into vote for populist (1; Chavez) or not (0).

Agreeableness was measured using two items. Participants received the following instructions "*Now I'm going to read you a series of pairs of opposite words, and I'm going to ask you to tell me, for each pair, which end is closest to you. On a scale that goes from 0 to 10, tell me what word best describes you. For example, if 0 means "relaxed" and 10 means "tense," the number 5, which is exactly in the middle means neither relaxed nor tense. You can use any number from 0 to 10.*". The two items for Agreeableness were: (1) "nice vs. unfriendly" (reverse coded) and (2) "discourteous vs. kind" and we recoded the scale to range from the lowest observed level of Agreeableness to the highest observed level of Agreeableness (1; M=.84, SD=.19, α=.47).

The other Big Five traits were also measured using two items per trait. Openness was measured with the items "thoughtful vs. impulsive" (reverse coded) and "pragmatic vs. intellectual" (M=.65, SD=.23, α=0). Conscientiousness was measured with the items "worker vs. lazy" (reverse coded) and "messy vs. ordered" (M=.84, SD=.19, α=.21), Extraversion with the items "talkative vs. shy" (reverse coded) and "introverted vs. outgoing" (M=.50, SD=.26, α=.44), Neuroticism is measured with the items "relaxed vs. tense" and "nervous vs. relaxed" (reverse coded) (M=.34, SD=.25, α=.27). In Table A46 we show that the Big Five traits correlate with each other as expected.

Ideology. Respondents were asked "When talking about politics, left and right expressions are normally used. This card has and a series of boxes that go from left to right. In which box would you place yourself?". Respondents could tick a box ranging from left (1) to right (11) with a separate "don't know" category. We include a separate dummy for missing values on the left-right ideology scale.

Covariates. We control for sex (male=0; female=1), age (in years), education (in years), income. Income was measured using the question "In which of the following ranges are the monthly family income of this household, including remittances from abroad and the income of all working adults and children?" Participants could answer on categories ranging from "no income of any kind" (1) to "more than 1,360,000 Bolivar" (11). We recoded income to range from the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1) and coded mising value as 2. We created an dummy variable capturing whether income was missing (1) or not (0).

The descriptive statistics for the socio-economic covariates are provided in Table A47. The descriptive statistics also show that this is a diverse sample.

Table A46
LAPOP Venezuela: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Agreeableness	1	0.20	0.35	0.01	-0.21	-0.02
2. Openness		1	0.21	-0.09	-0.16	0.03
3. Conscientiousness			1	-0.04	-0.12	-0.02
4. Extraversion				1	-0.06	-0.01
5. Neuroticism					1	0.06
6. Left-Right Ideology						1

Table A47
Descriptive statistics LAPOP Venezuela

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
Populist vote	0.75	0.43	1	0	1
Agreeableness	0.84	0.19	0.89	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.65	0.23	0.6	0	1
Conscientiousness	0.84	0.19	0.90	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.50	0.26	0.50	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.34	0.25	0.35	0.00	1.00
Female	0.50	0.50	1	0	1
Age	37.98	13.71	36	18	89
Income	0.86	0.45	0.80	0.00	2.00
Income missing (0-1)	0.10	0.30	0	0	1
Education (years)	10.54	4.60	11	0	20
Left-right ideology	5.59	3.51	5	1	11
Ideology missing	0.09	0.29	0	0	1

Results belonging to Figure 1

The results used in Figure 1 are presented in Table A48. Note that we report unstandardized coefficients from logistic regression models with standard errors clustered at the regional level. In the baseline and the full model the coefficients for Agreeableness are negative but fail to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance: i.e., p<.1 instead of p<.05. We find that those lower on Agreeableness (1 SD below the mean) are 1.53 times more likely to support the populist compared to those that score higher on Agreeableness (1 SD above the mean).

Table A48
Venezuela 2007: Vote for Chavez

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	−0.700*	−0.716*
	(0.405)	(0.431)
Openness	0.438	0.936**
	(0.342)	(0.317)
Conscientiousness	1.203**	1.375**
	(0.405)	(0.401)
Extraversion	−0.106	0.112
	(0.342)	(0.351)
Neuroticism	−0.231	−0.075
	(0.344)	(0.374)
Female	−0.078	−0.105
	(0.115)	(0.118)
Age	−0.003	−0.018**
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Income		0.006
		(0.393)
Income missing (0-1)		0.305
		(0.518)
Education (years)		−0.096**
		(0.024)
Left-right ideology		−0.297**
		(0.075)
Ideology missing		0.657*
		(0.390)
Constant	0.701	3.527**
	(0.548)	(0.872)
Observations	977	976
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,095.099	949.760
Note:	Unstandardized coefficients (logit) and clustered standard errors; *p<.1, **p<0.05	

A.13: American National Election Studies 2016

Acknowledgement

The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). These materials are based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant numbers SES 1444721, 2014-2017, the University of Michigan, and Stanford University.

Respondents.

We rely upon the American National Election Studies (henceforth, ANES) 2016. For our analyses we rely upon December 18, 2018 version of the dataset. The ANES is a two-wave dual-mode survey consisting of a face-to-face and internet sample of U.S. eligible voters. We rely upon the pre-election and post-election wave because key variables are only measured in one wave or the other. The pre-election survey was collected two months prior to the November 8 2016 elections. The post-election survey was collected between November 9 and January 2017. In total 4,271 respondents completed the pre-election survey, while 3,649 respondents (85.44%) completed the pre-election and the post-election survey. We rely upon respondents that completed both waves because we draw upon variables that were collected in the two surveys. 2,860 people completed all necessary items and were part of the sample.

Measures

Populist support. We rely upon self-reported vote choice from the post-election survey. We code this variable as a vote for Trump (1) or all other candidates (0).

Feeling thermometers. We measure feelings towards Donald Trump (M=.37, SD=.35), Hillary Clinton (M=.42, SD=.34), Barack Obama (M=.53, SD=.37) and the Republican Party (M=.44, SD=.27) (GOP). Answers were scored on a scale from 0 (Very cold or unfavorable feeling) to 1 (Very warm or favorable feeling), while participants who skipped a question were set to missing. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and the covariates in this study are provided in Table A49.

Agreeableness. Agreeableness is measured using two items that were part of the Ten Item Personality Inventory (henceforth, TIPI Gosling et al., 2003).The items tapping into Agreeableness were "critical, quarrelsome" (reversed coded) and "sympathetic, warm". Specifically, respondents were asked: "We're interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other." Participants indicate their answer on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from "Extremely poorly" (1) through "Extremely well" (7). The two items correlated positively – after reverse coding the item "critical, quarrelsome" – with each other (r=0.21) and have an internal consistency and we created a scale from low (0) to high (1) Agreeableness (M=.71, SD=.19, α=0.35).

We compute the average score of the measures (on the original 7 point scale), and then, for the sake of comparability, rescale to lie between 0 and 1 by subtracting the minimum score (1), and then dividing by the maximum minus the minimum (6). See Table A50 for the correlation between Agreeableness and some of the key covariates in this study.

Other Big Five Traits. The ANES 2016 contained the TIPI and allows us to control for the other Big Five traits, namely Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion and Neuroticism. Each Big Five trait is measured using two items, namely: "Open to new experiences" and "Conventional, uncreative" (reversed coded) for Openness (M=.55, SD=.14, α=0.38, r=.24); "Dependable, self-disciplined" and "Disorganized, careless" (reversed coded) for Conscientiousness (M=.80, SD=.18, α=0.54, r=.37); "Extraverted, enthusiastic" and "Reserved, quiet" (reversed coded) for Extraversion (M=.54, SD=.24, α=0.54, r=.36); "Anxious, easily upset" and "Calm,

emotionally stable" (reversed coded) for Neuroticism (M=.32, SD=.21, α=0.56, r=.39). After reverse scoring the appropriate items, we averaged each set of two item responses to form the Big Five traits. In Table A49 we show the descriptive statistics of the these traits.

Covariates. We control for sex (male, female), age (in years) and race (White; Black; Indian; Asian; Hawaiian; Other). We also control for education coded in categories: less than high school; high school graduate; some college; 2 years degree; 4 years degree; professional degree; doctorate; other education. Finally, income is reported by respondents in categories ranging from Under $5,000 (1) to above Under $250,000 (28). We recoded the variable to range from 0 (lowest reported income) to 1 (highest reported income) and coded missing values a 2. We also created a dummy variable capturing whether income is missing (1) or not (0).The descriptive statistics for all covariates are provided in Table A49.

Authoritarianism. In the ANES 2016 Authoritarianism is measured using the same four items that we included in SSI sample (see SI A.15; M=.45, SD=.21, α=0.64).

Ideology. We measured ideology using one item tapping into liberal-conservative self-placement scored on a scale ranging from "extremely liberal" (1) to "extremely conservative (7) and recoded to range from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (1).

National representative sample

The median age in the sample is 53, which is higher than the median age in the US population (Median is 37.9). Turning to income, the median income in the ANES ($60,000-$64,999) is a bit higher compared to estimated median income in the 2016 census of $53,889. The sample is also a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that finished some for of college is higher than the 2016 population estimate of 29.8%. Whites are also a bit over represented in the ANES, while African Americans are a bit underrepresented (13.3% in the 2016 census estimates) just like the other minority groups.

Table A49
Descriptive statistics ANES US

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
Populist Vote	0.45	0.50	0	0	1
Agreeableness	0.71	0.19	0.75	0.00	1.00
Openness	0.55	0.14	0.50	0.00	1.00
Conscientiousness	0.80	0.18	0.83	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	0.54	0.24	0.50	0.00	1.00
Neuroticism	0.32	0.21	0.33	0.00	1.00
Authoritarianism	0.45	0.21	0.50	0.00	1.00
Female	0.52	0.50	1	0	1
Age	51.14	17.09	53	18	90
Black	0.09	0.28	0	0	1
American Indian	0.03	0.16	0	0	1
Asian	0.03	0.17	0	0	1
Native Hawain	0.01	0.08	0	0	1
Other	0.03	0.18	0	0	1
High school graduate	0.14	0.35	0	0	1
Some college	0.19	0.39	0	0	1
2 years degree	0.13	0.34	0	0	1
4 years degree	0.29	0.45	0	0	1
Professional degree	0.18	0.39	0	0	1
Doctorate	0.03	0.17	0	0	1
Other	0.78	0.36	0.76	0.00	2.00
Income	0.05	0.22	0	0	1
Income missing	0.52	0.27	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table A50
ANES: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Agreeableness	1	0.01	0.27	-0.01	-0.34	-0.01	-0.02
2. Openness		1	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	0.02
3. Conscientiousness			1	0.14	-0.37	0.02	0.08
4. Extraversion				1	-0.07	-0.01	0.002
5. Neuroticism					1	0.01	-0.07
6. Authoritarianism						1	0.24
7. Ideology							1

Results belonging to Figure 1

Table A51 shows the results belonging to Figure 1 and the baseline model once we exclude potentially endogenous variables from the model (i.e., education, income and ideology).

Table A51
US 2016: Vote for Donald Trump

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.515*	0.559
	(0.138)	(0.226)
Openness	0.459*	0.497
	(0.142)	(0.227)
Conscientiousness	1.181	0.848
	(0.323)	(0.349)
Extraversion	1.041	1.325
	(0.198)	(0.380)
Neuroticism	0.540*	0.539
	(0.133)	(0.199)
Authoritarianism	7.152*	1.175
	(1.541)	(0.367)
Female	0.829*	0.961
	(0.077)	(0.135)
Age	1.015*	1.013*
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Black	0.045*	0.046*
	(0.013)	(0.018)
American Indian	1.017	1.122
	(0.294)	(0.452)
Asian	0.431*	0.571
	(0.123)	(0.227)
Native Hawain	0.622	0.977
	(0.357)	(0.731)
Other	0.443*	0.456*
	(0.107)	(0.157)
High school graduate		1.556
		(0.579)
Some college		1.777
		(0.659)
2 years degree		1.830
		(0.702)
4 years degree		1.142
		(0.416)
Professional degree		0.749
		(0.289)
Doctorate		0.861
		(0.474)
Other		0.692
		(0.233)
Income		1.723
		(0.910)
Income missing		5,495.711*
		(2,089.897)
Ideology	0.561	0.011*
	(0.217)	(0.008)
Observations	2,423	2,139
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,949.582	1,554.206
Note:	Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.05	

Controlling for partisanship

One might wonder whether the results reported here change once we control for partisanship instead of ideology. To do this, we rely upon the standard 7-point party identification measure from the ANES that ranges from "strong Semocrat" (1) to "strong Republican" (7; M=3.96, SD=2.15, Min=1, Max=7). We re-estimate the model used to derive the results in Figure 1, but now control for partisanship instead of ideology. As can be seen in Table A52, the coefficient for Agreeableness is still lower than 1 but not statistically significant (odds ratio = .839, se = .252). Not surprising, there is odds ratio higher than 1 (odds ratio = 2.108, se = .061) for partisanship. This means that Republicans are more likely to vote for Trump.

Table A52
US 2016: Vote for Donald Trump controlling for partianship

	Dependent variable:	
	Base	Figure 1
Agreeableness	0.515*	0.623
	(0.138)	(0.242)
Openness	0.459*	0.464
	(0.142)	(0.208)
Conscientiousness	1.181	1.107
	(0.323)	(0.442)
Extraversion	1.041	1.376
	(0.198)	(0.385)
Neuroticism	0.540*	0.774
	(0.133)	(0.280)
Authoritarianism	7.152*	3.053*
	(1.541)	(0.931)
Female	0.829*	0.956
	(0.077)	(0.131)
Age	1.015*	1.021*
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Black	0.045*	0.137*
	(0.013)	(0.048)
American Indian	1.017	0.800
	(0.294)	(0.309)
Asian	0.431*	0.575
	(0.123)	(0.212)
Native Hawain	0.622	0.624
	(0.357)	(0.440)
Other	0.443*	0.733
	(0.107)	(0.244)
High school graduate		1.328
		(0.473)
Some college		1.187
		(0.410)
2 years degree		1.162
		(0.423)
4 years degree		0.594
		(0.207)
Professional degree		0.428*
		(0.158)
Doctorate		0.341*
		(0.175)
Other		0.611
		(0.205)
Income		2.743
		(1.458)
Income missing		2.689*
		(0.103)
Ideology	0.561	0.011*
	(0.217)	(0.008)
Observations	2,423	2,420
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,949.582	1,637.705
Note:	Odds ratios with standard errors from logistic regression models; *p<0.05	

A.14: Pooled-analysis reported in Figure 1

Table A53 below presents the results from the pooled-analysis. We conducted a pooled-analysis over our samples and estimated a mixed-effects logistic regression model with fixed effects for the studies and random intercepts for the samples and individuals to account for clustering.

Table A53
Meta-analysis: samples from UK, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Venezela and U.S.

	Dependent variable:
Agreeableness	−0.574*
	(0.069)
Openness	−0.646*
	(0.064)
Conscientiousness	0.501*
	(0.072)
Extraversion	0.405*
	(0.060)
Neuroticism	−0.084
	(0.059)
Age	0.001
	(0.001)
Female	−0.434*
	(0.024)
Education	−0.833*
	(0.042)
Income	−0.470*
	(0.061)
Income missing	0.782*
	(0.103)
Social conservatism	1.726*
	(0.047)
Economic conservatism	0.429*
	(0.041)
Cynicism	1.000*
	(0.054)
L-R placement	0.608*
	(0.061)
Sample: UK Election	3.697*
	(0.099)
Sample: Germany	3.836*
	(0.118)
Sample: Denmark 2010	3.339*
	(0.113)
Sample: Denmark: 2011	3.037*
	(0.128)
Sample: NL 2012	3.110*
	(0.115)
Sample: NL 2014	3.087*
	(0.113)
Sample: NL 2015	3.014*
	(0.146)
Sample: NL 2017	3.427*
	(0.110)
Sample: Swiss Household 09	1.016*
	(0.120)
Sample: Swiss Household 15	0.337*
	(0.135)
Sample: Swiss Elections	2.813*
	(0.121)
Sample: Spain	1.583*
	(0.104)
Sample: Venezuela	3.498*
	(0.153)
Sample: US	8.191*
	(0.172)
Intercept	−7.660*
	(0.203)
Observations	78,036
Log Likelihood	-26,545.740
Akaike Inf. Crit.	53,151.480
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	53,429.420
Note:	*p<0.05

Cynicism and populism

We find inconsistent associations between cynicism and support for populist parties (see also, Rooduijn, 2018). In some samples we find positive associations between cynicism and voting for populist parties (i.e., Understanding Society Study [Appendix A.1]; British Election Studies [Appendix A.2]; Dutch EU Election Studies 2014 [Appendix A.6]) but in other samples the association is negative (Dutch Election studies 2012 [Appendix A.5] and Dutch Election Study 2017 [Appendix A.7]) or not significant (Danish Election Studies [Appendix A.4], Dutch EU Election Studies 2015 [Appendix A.6], Spain [Appendix A.11). Results can be derived from the appendixes belonging to the samples discussed here.

The other Big Five traits and populism

It is not very useful to interpret the results from the pooled-analysis for the other Big Five traits as we expect them to correlate with the host ideology, while the pooled-analysis groups populists with different host ideologies together. Here we discuss the results per trait.

Openness was negatively associated with voting for the Swiss People's Party in all three samples, the association between Openness and voting for a populist party was not significant (i.e., ANES2016, Understanding Society, British Election, Denmark, NL EU election, Dutch National Election 2012, Dutch National Election 2017 and Spain), while the association between Openness and voting for populists in Germany and Venezuela Chavez was positive. With 3 negative, 2 positive and 10 non-significant associations, we can conclude that there is no meaningful association between Openness and support for populists.

Turning to Conscientiousness, we find positive associations between Conscientiousness and support for populists is positive in the following five samples: Understanding Society, Denmark (both waves), Swiss Household Panel 2009, Swiss Household Panel 2015, Swiss Election 2015 and Venezuela. While Conscientiousness was not significantly associated with support for populists in the ANES 2016, Germany, British Election, NL EU election (both waves), Dutch National Election 2012, Dutch National Election 2017 and Spanish Election. The evidence for an association between Conscientiousness and support for populists is at best suggestive.

The evidence for a meaningful pattern of associations between Neuroticism and support for populists is absent. In 12 out of the fifteen samples, we see no significant association between Neuroticism and support for populists and negative associations between the trait and support for populists in the British Election Studies 2015 and the Dutch EU Election Study. These findings do not suggest that Neuroticism has a meaningful association with populist support.

Finally, the results for Extraversion are mixed. There is a negative association between Extraversion and support for the Danish People's Party, a positive association in the ANES 2016, Understanding Society, Dutch National Election 2012, Dutch National Election 2017, Swiss Election 2015 but non-significant associations in the British Election, Germany, NL EU Election (both waves), Swiss Household Panel 2009, Swiss Household Panel 2015, Spain, Venezuela.

Compared to the very consistent pattern for Agreeableness and support for populists, the other Big Five traits do not seem to correlate in a meaningful manner with support for populist parties.

A.15: SSI sample in United States

Respondents

Data was collected by Survey Sampling International in July 2016 (N=1,176). In exchange for participation, SSI panelists receive points which they can exchange for various rewards.

Measures

Agreeableness. Is measured using ten items. Participants received the following instruction: "*Please use the rating scale next to each phrase to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age.*" The provide their answers to the following ten items: (1) "Have a good word for everyone"; (2) "Have a sharp tongue" (*reverse coded*); (3) "Believe others have good intentions"; (4) "Cut others to pieces" (*reverse coded*; (5) "Respect others"; (6) "Suspect hidden motives in others" (*reverse coded*); (7) "Accept people as they are"; (8) "Get back at others" (*reverse coded*); (9) "Make people feel at ease"; (10) "Insult people" (*reverse coded*).

The items are scored on a five point scale ranging from "very inaccurate" (1) to "very accurate" (5). The items are internally consistent (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.76$) and were added together in an additive scale and recoded to range from 0 (lowest observed value) and 1 (highest observed value). A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the factor loadings of the 10 items are acceptable (see Table A54).

Table A54
Agreeableness: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.42	0.00
2	0.76	0.00
3	0.41	0.00
4	0.60	0.00
5	0.83	0.00
6	0.26	0.00
7	0.23	0.00
8	0.33	0.00
9	0.28	0.00
10	0.27	0.00

Authoritarianism was measured using 4 items. Each item asked "Which one is more important for a child to have"

- Being considerate vs. well behaved
- Obedience vs. self-reliant
- Curiosity vs. Good manners
- Independence vs. Respect for elders

The items were internally consistent (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.53$) and coded to range from the lowest observed value on the trait (0) to the highest observed value on the trait (1; M = 0.50 ; SD = 0.31).

Education was measured by the highest level of school the respondent has completed, namely: less than high school (N = 29; 2.47%); high school graduate (N = 206; 17.52%); some college (N = 265 ; 22.53%); 2 years degree (N = 145; 12.33%); 4 years degree (N = 327; 27.81%); professional degree (N = 176; 14.97%); doctorate (N = 28; 2.38%). *Income* was measured as the total household income in 12 categories ranging from "less than 10,000 Dollar" (1) through "more than 150,00 Dollar" (12) per year (Median = 50,000$ – 59,999$; M=6.49; SD=3.38). We recoded income so that the income ranged from the lowest observed income (0) to the highest observed income (1). *Race.* Participants indicate their *race* as being White (N=955; 81.21%); Black or African American (N=113; 9.61%); American Indian or Native Alaskan (N=6; 0.51%); Asian (N=58; 4,93%), Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (N=2; 0.171%); Other (N=42; 3.57%). *Age* was measured in years (M=41; SD=13) *Sex.* There were fewer men than women in the sample: 494 men (42%) and 682 (58%) women. *Partisanship.* We measured partisanship using a series of questions used in the ANES that we coded to a scale ranging from "strong Democrat" (1), "weak Democrat" (2), "leaning Democrat" (3), "neutral" (4), "leaning Republican" (5), "weak Republican" (6) and "strong Republican" (7) (M=3.60, SD=2.15, min=1, max=7).

National representative sample

The median age of 39, while the median age in the US population is 37.9 (US census 2015). The median income in the SSI sample ($50,000-$59,999) is grossly comparable to the 2016 estimate of $53,889. The sample is also a bit higher educated as the percentage of people that finished some for of college is higher than the 2016 population estimate of 29.8%. The covariates indicate that sample is fairly representative of the population, while white, female and higher educated persons are a bit over represented compared to the American population. This is not per se problematic for the nature of our study.

A.16: US Personality and favorability of US politicians

Here we present the results of the associations between personality and favorability of US politicians and parties that were briefly discussed in Study 1 in the main text.

Agreeableness and favorability of US politicians

In the pre-election and post-election surveys of the ANES, respondents were asked how they would rate politicians on a scale ranging from "very cold or unfavorable" (0) to "very warm or favorable" (100). Using separate OLS regression models, we regressed the favorability – recoded to range from 0 (unfavorable) to 1 (favorable) – of each politician (or party) on Agreeableness, the Big Five, Authoritarianism and the other covariates. In each panel of Figure A3 we project the unstandarized regression coefficients – including the 95% confidence intervals – of Agreeableness (top-row) and Authoritarianism (bottom-row).

In the pre-election survey, we find a negative association between Agreeableness and favorability for Donald Trump (b=-.06, se=.03, p=.02), while there are *positive* but not significant associations between Agreeableness and favorability of the Republican Party (b=.02, se=.02, p=.45), Hillary Clinton (b=.03, se=.02, p=.20), Barack Obama (b=.02, se=.03, p=.52) and the Democratic Party (b=.03, se=.02, p=.23) – see upper left panel of Figure A3.

The post-election survey again asked participants to report their favorability of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. We run the same models and present the unstandardized regression coefficients in the upper middle panel of Figure A3. Again, we find that Agreeableness is negatively – and marginally significantly – associated with being more favorable about Trump (b=-.05, se=.03, p=.07). In line with the pre-election study, Agreeableness was positive but not statistically significant associated with favorability of Hillary Clinton (b=.03, se=.03, p=.23).

Finally, we use our original SSI sample collected in the U.S in 2016. In this sample we measured the favorability of Donald Trump, as well as Paul Ryan, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. We asked respondents "*Please indicate if you have a Very Favorable (1), Somewhat Favorable (2), Somewhat Unfavorable (3), or Very Unfavorable (4) or Don't know (5) opinion of each of the following individuals.*" We set "don't know" responses to missing and for each of the four politicians we created a favorability rating ranging from very unfavorable (0) to very favorable (1). As can be seen in the upper right-hand panel of Figure A3, Agreeableness is negatively associated with favorability of Trump (b=-.17, se=.05, p=.002) and unrelated to favorability of Ryan (b=-.01, se=.06, p=.79), Clinton (b=-.07, se=.05, p=.80) and Obama (b=-.04, se=.05, p=.53). Comparing the sizes of the coefficients of Agreeableness across the politicians, we find that the association between Agreeableness and favorability of Trump is stronger compared to the association between Agreeableness and favorability of Ryan (p=.011) although not significantly stronger in comparison to Clinton (p=.103) and Obama (p=.183).

Authoritarianism and favorability of US politicians

Using the pre-election and post-election study of the ANES 2016 we find that Authoritarianism is positively associated with favorability of Trump in the pre-election (b=.16, se=.01, p<.001) and post-election survey (b=.17, se=.01, p<.001) – see bottom left panel of Figure A3. Yet, Authoritarianism is also positively associated with favorability of the Republican party (b=.12, se=.01, p<.001) in the pre-election survey. At the same time, Authoritarianism is negatively associated with favorability of Clinton in both the pre-election (b=-.05, se=.01, p<.001) and post-election study (b=-.06, se=.01, p<.001) as well as Obama (b=-.06, se=.01, p<.001) but isn't associated with favorability of the Democratic Party (b=-.00, se-.01, p=.97).

Our original SSI sample replicates the finding from the ANES that Authoritarianism is positively associated with support for Trump (b=.22, se=.03, p<.001). However, authoritarian

respondents are also more supportive of Paul Ryan – who is not a populist (b=.09, se=.03, p=.007). Further, Authoritarianism is negatively related to support for Obama (b=-.11, se=.03, p<.001) and unrelated to support for Clinton (b=.04, se=.03, ns). Comparing the strength of the associations between Authoritarianism and support for these politicians, we find that the positive association between Authoritarianism and support for Trump is stronger than the association between Authoritarianism and support for Ryan (p=0.008), as well as Clinton (p<0.001) and Obama (p<0.001).

Agreeableness, authoritarianism and feelings towards populists

The additional analyses presented here, show that low agreeable participants are more favorable towards Trump. Yet, Agreeableness is unrelated to the favorability of Paul Ryan, the Republican Party, Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama or the Democratic. That Agreeableness is unrelated to support for Ryan and the Republican Party indicates that there is no link between Agreeableness and a general preference for Republican politicians and/or the party. This is in line with Fortunato, Hibbing, and Mondak (2018) who show that in the 2016 presidential Republican primaries Trump supporters stood as disagreeable. That Agreeableness is not associated with support for Clinton, Obama or the Democratic Party, suggests that Agreeableness is not related to support for Democrats either. These additional analyses, provide further evidence that low agreeable respondents in the U.S. are also more favorable of Trump.

Additional analyses using the ANES and SSI sample confirm that Authoritarianism is positively associated with favorability of Trump but also other Republican actors, namely Paul Ryan (who is part of the establishment) and the Republican Party, while Authoritarianism correlates negatively with favorability for the Democrats Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama as well as the Democratic Party. These analyses suggest that Authoritarianism is not a correlate of populism, but that it relates to support for parties and politicians along the lines of their "host" ideology.

Figure A3. Study 1: Agreeableness, Authoritarianism and favorability of Trump, Ryan, Republican Party, Clinton & Obama



Note: Agreeableness, Authoritarianism and favorability of U.S. politicians and parties controlling for Authoritarianism, the other Big Five traits (ANES only), sex, age, education, income, race and party identification. Each dot is an unstandardized regression coefficient and each vertical line is the 95% confidence interval belonging to the regression coefficient. The range of the dependent variable is 0 (very unfavorable) to 1 (very favorable). Regression output can be derived from the replication files.

A.17: Alternative specifications belonging to Figure 1

Not controlling for political cynicism

Here, we show the results of the association between Agreeableness and populist support when we **do not** control for cynicism. Note that this means that we re-estimated our models for the samples in the UK, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain and our pooled analyses. Other than excluding cynicism as a covariate, our specifications are similar to the one used to generate Figure 1. As can be seen in Figure A4, we find that the association between Agreeableness and populist support is basically unaffected when we don't control for cynicism. Obviously, the coefficients differ slightly, but this is the consequence of excluding a control variable.

The best illustration is the result in the pooled analyses. Here we pooled all data from our all samples and don't control for cynicism. As can be seen in Figure A4, the odds ratio is basically unaffected. In this re-specified model, the odds ratios is statistically significant and lower than one (odds ratio = .62, [95%CI=.54, .71]). This odds ratio is very similar to the one odds ratio reported in the main text, where we do control for cynicism (odds ratio=.56 [95%CI=.49, .65])

Not controlling for left-right ideology

In study 1 we used secondary survey data. With the exception of the Understanding Society sample, we could include at least *a measure of ideology* in all samples. Yet, there is no scenario where – using secondary data – we would have fully equivalent measures of ideology across all our samples. Sometimes left-right was present as a variable, other times it wasn't.

Here, we show that our results do not change once we control for left-right ideology instead of social conservatism and economic conservatism. We could do this in Germany, the Netherlands (Election Study 2012 and 2017) and the British Election Study. In Figure A5, we show that the results for these samples are highly similar controlling for left-right ideology versus the ideology measures used in Figure 1 in the main text.

Figure A4. Study 1: Agreeableness and voting for populists not controlling for political cynicism



Note: Odds ratios of the effect of Agreeableness on voting for populists not controlling for political cynicism. The models do control (if possible) for the other Big Five traits, sex, age, education, income as well as ideology (see Table 1 main text). The dots are the odds ratios, the horizontal lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Full regression output for the tests presented here can be derived from the replication file.

Figure A5. Study 1: Agreeableness and voting for populists controlling for left-right ideology



Note: Odds ratios of the effect of Agreeableness on voting for populists controlling for left-right ideology. The models do control for the other Big Five traits, sex, age, education and income. The dots are the odds ratios, the horizontal lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Full regression output for the tests presented here can be derived from the replication file.

A.18: Agreeableness, populism and turn-out

Here we discuss the association between Agreeableness and turn-out (section 1) and the extent to which low agreeable are more likely to vote for populist *and* abstain their vote compared to voters of non-populist parties (section 2).

1. Agreeableness and turn-out

Earlier studies have documented inconsistent associations between Agreeableness and self-reported turnout (e.g., Brandstätter & Opp, 2014; Dinesen, Nørgaard, & Klemmensen, 2014; Gallego & Oberski, 2012; Gerber et al., 2011; Mondak & Halerpin, 2008; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson, 2010; Schoen & Steinbrecher, 2013). We analyzed whether those lower on agreeableness were likely to abstain (1) or vote (0). We did this by regressing a dummy variable capturing whether voters indicated that they did not vote (1) or voted (0) on Agreeableness. If low agreeable were more likely to abstain, then we should expect odds ratios below one that are statistically significant. We re-estimated the models used to create Figure 1 in the main text using the turnout variable. We only do this in the samples where turnout was collected and available. This means we cannot test the association between Agreeableness and turn out in the Understanding Society Study in the UK, the 2010 wave of the Danish Election Study and the Dutch EU election study in the Netherlands (2014-2015).

We plot the results of these tests in Figure A6. We find only one statistically significant association in the Netherlands in 2012: low agreeable are in this sample less likely to vote. In the other samples the points estimates of the odds ratios are above 1 (UK, Switzerland, Spain and Venezuela) or below 1 (Germany, Denmark and US) but in non of these tests the association is statistically significant.

To conclude, across *nine* tests in *eight* countries we find no systematic evidence that those lower on Agreeableness are more likely to abstain.

Figure A6. Study 1: Agreeableness and abstaining (1) or voting (0) in the U.K., Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, and the United States



Note: Odds ratios (dots) of the effect of Agreeableness on not voting (1) or voting (0), controlling (if possible) for the other Big Five traits, gender, age, education, income as well as ideology and cynicism (see Table 1 of main text). The horizontal lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Full regression output for the tests can be derived from the replication files.

2. Agreeableness, populism and abstention

We have shown in this paper that low-agreeable voters are more likely than highly agreeable voters to vote for populists. Yet, one might also argue that those lower on Agreeableness are more likely to abstain at elections compared to those voting for a non-populist party. To test this, we use the subset of samples presented in this Appendix.

We created a dependent variable capturing whether people voted for non-populist parties (1), the populist party (2) or did not vote (3).

We used multinomial regression models because the dependent variable is categorical whereby the vote for the non-populist parties/candidates is set as the reference category. To interpret the results across the samples, we calculate for each test the odds ratios of Agreeableness and their 95% confidence intervals. These coefficients are projected in Figure A7 whereby results for each country are plotted in a separate horizontal panel and the coefficients based upon the different samples are provided within the panel of the country from which the sample was drawn. The left-hand panel of Figure A7 provides the odds ratio of voting for a populist party versus non-populist parties. The right-hand panel of Figure A7 provides the odds ratio of abstaining versus voting for a non-populist parties.

In the left-hand panel we observe similar findings as reported in Figure 1 of the main text. Note that the results for in some countries differ slightly because of the slightly different specification in the multinomial model compared to the models used in Figure 1.

Of more interest in this appendix are the findings in the right-hand panel of Figure A7 where we compare those that abstain to those that vote for non-populist parties. The findings across the panels are mixed. Across nine tests in eight countries we observe eight odds ratios below 1 but only three are statistically significant. The pooled analysis – perhaps the most comprehensive test – results in a statistically significant odds ratio below 1 (Odds ratio = .77, 95%CI[.64, .92]). This means that low agreeable voters, compared to high agreeable voters, are more likely to abstain compared to voters who vote for non-populist parties.

To summarize, while section 1 showed that there is no general association between Agreeableness and turn-out, the second section of this appendix showed that low agreeable voters are – compared to voters of non-populist parties – more likely to abstain their vote.

Figure A7. Study 1: Agreeableness and voting for non-populist parties (1), populist parties (2) or abstaining (3) in the U.K., Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Venezuela and the United States



Note: Odds ratios (dots) of the effect of Agreeableness on voting for populist parties (2) or abstaining (3) compared to voting for non-populist parties. In the multinomial regression models, we control for (if possible) for the other Big Five traits, gender, age, education, income as well as ideology and cynicism (see Table 1 of main text). The horizontal lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Full regression output for the tests can be derived from the replication files.

A.19: Agreeableness and anti-incumbency?

A relevant question, is the question whether voters who are low in agreeableness generally support challengers, or only populists? One might argue that opposition parties may sometimes resemble populists in terms of negativity and distrust towards the government. But this is not a generic response. Other opposition parties may be much less antagonistic towards the government, and may even help the government to obtain parliamentary majorities.

Here, we test whether low agreeable respondents generally oppose challengers or populist parties in particular. We do this in the in our sample that are taken from a multi-party system and where parties form government coalitions. This leave us with data from the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands (2012, 2014 and 2017).[1] Here, we report the test results for all these countries.

Let's start with the results in the U.K. using the British Election Study. From 2010 the UK was led by a coalition from the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. We compared voters for UKIP with those that government parties and those that supported all other parties (Labour, Greens, Other or don't know) using a multinomial regression model. We provide the results Figure (Figure A8): in each panel (one per sample) we plot the odds ratios with 95 percent confidence intervals of voting for the government parties or the opposition parties versus voting for the populist party. As can be seen in the top-left panel of Figure A8, we find a statistically significant odds ratio above 1 when we compare Agreeableness of UKIP voters compared to those that voted for the government parties or for the opposition parties. We find that keeping all other variables constant, if Agreeableness increases with one unit, a person is 1.62 times more likely to vote for the government parties compared to UKIP. Likewise, we find that keeping all other variables constant, if Agreeableness increases with one unit, a person is 1.93 times more likely to vote for the opposition parties compared to UKIP. The results for the UK show that voters for UKIP are less agreeable than those of the opposition and government parties and that agreeableness is not linked with a general anti-incumbency.

Turning to the tests in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, we find – with the exception of the Netherlands 2014 – odds ratios above 1 when we compare voters for the populist parties to those that vote for the government parties or the opposition parties. Across our 12 tests (6 government and 6 opposition), we find that 9 out 12 odds ratios are above 1 and statistically significant, while 2 are above 1 but not statistically significant (see Figure A8).

Perhaps the most powerful test is when we pool the data and code whether respondents supported the populist party (1), one of the parties currently in government (2) or an opposition party (3). We present the results in the bottom panel of Figure A8. The results from the pooled analyses show that populist supporters score lower on Agreeableness – keeping the covariates constant – compared to those that support the government or other opposition parties. Specifically, an increase in one unit of Agreeableness increase the odds of voting for the government party by 2 (95%CI[1.50, 2.66]) and the odds of voting for the opposition parties by 2.79 (95%CI[2.08, 3.74]).

To conclude, our models show powerful evidence that Agreeableness is not linked with anti-incumbency in general. Instead low agreeable voters are less likely to vote for incumbents (government parties) as well as other opposition parties.

[1] We do not analyze the Spanish data as Spanish elections of 2016 was held following the 2015 elections in which non of the parties was able to secure a majority. So it was less clear which party was the government or the opposition party

Figure A8. Study 1: Agreeableness and voting for populists, government or opposition parties in the U.K., Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands



Note: Odds ratios (dots) of the effect of Agreeableness on voting for government and oppositions parties compared to the populist party, controlling (if possible) for the other Big Five traits, gender, age, education, income as well as ideology and cynicism (Table 1 of main text). The horizontal lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Full regression output can be derived from the replication file.

B.1: Study 2 - Conjoint experiment

To assess whether support for populists is driven by the anti-establishment message we conducted a conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014). Compared to regular survey-experiments, conjoint experiments allow researchers to estimate the effects of various attributes in an experiment (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Accordingly, conjoint-experiments are becoming increasingly popular to study the effects of political communication on citizens political behaviour such as voting (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Following the state-of-the-art, we present participants with a series of elections in which they have to choose between two political candidates. In the experiment the choice for the politician is the dependent variable. We can estimate the causal effect of the communication of these politicians because we randomly assign that what the political candidate communicates. The attributes – that what the politicians communicates – are randomly assigned to each politician. In doing so, we can estimate the effect of different treatments (the attributes) per dimension.

Participants

Data was collected by Survey Sampling International in July 2016 (N=1,176). In exchange for participation, SSI panelists receive points which they can exchange for various rewards. Note that this same survey that we used to assess the associations between Agreeableness and support for Donald Trump as reported in the main text of the paper and SI A.15. In total 869 (73.89%) of the 1,176 respondents were randomly assigned to participate in this experiment (see SI A.15 for the descriptive statistics of the full sample).

Measures of moderators

Agreeableness. Is measured using ten items. Participants received the following instruction: "Please use the rating scale next to each phrase to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age." The provide their answers to the following ten items: "Have a good word for everyone"; "Have a sharp tongue" (*reverse coded*); "Believe others have good intentions"; "Cut others to pieces" (*reverse coded*; "Respect others"; "Suspect hidden motives in others" (*reverse coded*); "Accept people as they are"; "Get back at others" (*reverse coded*);" Make people feel at ease"; "Insult people" (*reverse coded*).

The items are scored on a five point scale ranging from "very inaccurate" (1) to "very accurate" (5). The items are internally consistent (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.76$) and were added together in an additive scale and recoded to range from 0 (lowest observed value) and 1 (highest observed value). A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the factor loadings of the 10 items are acceptable (see Table A54 in Appendix A.15).

Authoritarianism was measured using 4 items. Each item asked "Which one is more important for a child to have"

- Being considerate vs. well behaved
- Obedience vs. self-reliant
- Curiosity vs. Good manners
- Independence vs. Respect for elders

The items were internally consistent (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.53$) and coded to range from the lowest observed value on the trait (0) to the highest observed value on the trait (1; M = 0.50 ; SD = 0.31).

Systematic drop-out

We created a dummy variable indicating whether respondents participated in the conjoint-experiment (1) or not (0). We regressed this dummy variable – using a logistic regression model – on Agreeableness, Authoritarianism and a set of covariates. We find no significant associations between any of the variables and the dummy variable which indicates that the participants in the conjoint experiment did not differ significantly from the participants that did not participated in the conjoint experiment. Results can be derived from the replication files

Treatments

Participants received the following instruction "*Candidate A and B are two political candidates that run for one seat in the House of Representatives in an upcoming election. You will be introduced to two candidates. We would like to ask you for which candidate you would vote. The candidates are introduced below. Please read the description of the two candidates and make a choice between these two representatives.*"

By employing a conjoint experiment, we can estimate the causal effect of various dimensions of populist communication on the vote choice of citizens. Specifically, we estimate the effect of the two most common components of populist rhetoric, namely the anti-establishment message and the tendency to place the people central. Moreover, we vary a set of other characteristics of the politicians indicating whether or not they are cooperative, their policy stances and their background.

Here, we discuss the rational for including the different dimensions with the different attributes. Table B55 provides an overview of our treatments in the conjoint experiment. Figure B9 shows a screen shot of the conjoint-experiment.

Anti-establishment message. The anti-establishment message is a prototypical populist message. This survey is fielded in the United States and the anti-establishment message is the following:"The House of Representatives is mostly full of Washington insiders who only care about them-self." The pro-establishment message "The House of Representatives is mostly full of honest and hard-working people who care for ordinary Americans." In line with our theoretical argument, we expect that the anti-establishment message is especially effective among the low agreeable respondents.

People-centrism. Another important part of a populist message stresses the "centrality of the people". Populists are said to worship the people and to emphasize the people's fundamental position at the centre of politics. Here, we define the people as the people in a country. The statement which places the people central states *"I will do everything the American people want."*, which we compare with a anti-centralist statement, namely *"I will do what is best for America even if the people disagree."* We do not expect that Agreeableness moderates the effect of this message as the core of the message does not resonate with Agreeableness.

Conflict. Agreeableness also encapsulates the tendency to be compliant and cooperate with others, while low agreeable are less cooperative and more likely to engage in a conflict with other people. One might wonder whether a message stressing the importance of cooperation is more effective among respondents who like to cooperate. A message that stresses the importance of conflict should be less effective among the high agreeable respondents. Therefore, the factor *cooperation* varies the tendency of a politician to seek cooperation and consensus of the politicians. The anti-cooperation message states that "*I will fight my opponents to get my proposals accepted in the House.*", while the pro-cooperation states "*I will cooperate with other Representatives to get my proposals accepted in the House.*"

Anti-immigrant messages. We do not expect that Agreeableness per se interacts with anti-immigrant standpoints. Yet, we do expect that Authoritarianism should moderate the

effect of anti-immigrant messages. Authoritarian citizens are expected to increase support for a politician when the anti-immigrant message is threatening (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). We formulated two threatening anti-immigrant messages, namely: "America is for Americans. Therefore, we should stop immigration!" and "Immigrants steal jobs from ordinary Americans. We should stop immigration!" We expect that these messages increase support for a politician compared to the two non-threatening and positive messages towards immigrants "Immigrants from countries that are torn apart by war or natural disaster should be welcomed in America." and "Immigration is good for our economy. Immigrants can take-up vacant jobs and bolster economic growth."

We also estimate the effect of the policy positions towards the increase of taxation (see Table B55) as this is an important economic policy issue. A similar argument is employed to vary the background of the politicians (see Table B55).

Figure B9. Screen shot of Conjoint Experiment

Suppose you need to make another choice between two other candidates that run for one seat in the House of Representatives in an upcoming election. You will again be introduced to two candidates - again called A and B. We would like to ask you for which candidate you would vote. The candidates are introduced below. Please read the description of the two candidates and make a choice between these two representatives.

	A	B
Immigration	America is for Americans. Immigrants are threatening our way of life.	Immigrants from countries that are torn apart by war or natural disaster should be welcomed in America.
Taxation	Since a tax hike will not lower the federal deficit, increasing American's tax burden amounts to stealing.	Since a tax hike will not lower the federal deficit, increasing American's tax burden amounts to stealing.
Representation	I will do what is best for America even if the people disagree	I will do everything the American people want
Washington	The House of Representatives is chock full of honest and hard-working people who care for ordinary Americans	The House of Representatives is chock full of Washington insiders who only care about protecting special interests.
Background	I have been a politician for most of my career.	I have been a politician for most of my career.
House	I will fight my opponents to get my proposals accepted in the House	I will fight my opponents to get my proposals accepted in the House

Which candidate do you prefer?

○ Candidate A ○ Candidate B

>>

At two points in the survey participants are asked to cast a vote for a politician A or B (Hainmueller et al., 2014). In total 869 respondents participated in round one and 868 respondents in round 2. Because each respondent makes a choice between two candidates in two rounds, we obtain 1738 choices.

Following Hainmueller et al. (2014), we pooled analyses at the individual level, which means that the data set is organized in the long format and choices are stacked – resulting in 3,476 observations in the analyses. The standard errors are clustered by respondents in order to reflect that the choices are not independent. We include a dummy variable for the round in order to account for the fact that the choice in round one influences the choice in round 2. Note that the order of the seven dimensions are varied across the respondents and per round. In doing so, the choice in the experiment cannot be a function of the order in which the dimensions are presented to the respondent.

Table B55
Conjoint Experiment: Dimensions and Treatments

Dimension	Treatments
Anti-establishment	1. The House of Representatives is mostly full of Washington insiders who only care about themself. 2. The House of Representatives is mostly full of honest and hard-working people who care for ordinary Americans.
People centrism	1. I will do everything the American people want. 2. I will do what is best for America even if the people disagree.
Cooperation	1. I will fight my opponents to get my proposals accepted in the House. 2. I will cooperate with other Representatives to get my proposals accepted in the House
Immigration Attitudes	1. Immigrants from countries that are torn apart by war or natural disaster should be welcomed in America. 2. Immigration is good for our economy. Immigrants can take-up vacant jobs and bolster economic growth. 3. Immigrants steal jobs from ordinary Americans. We should stop immigration! 4. America is for Americans. Therefore, we should stop immigration.
Taxation	1. We should tax the rich more because the wealthiest households do not pay their fair share. 2. We should increase taxes for all Americans because we need to lower the federal deficit. 3. Increasing taxation of the rich is theft because the rich contribute more to economic growth. 4. Increasing taxation for all Americans is theft because taxation is never a solution to lower the federal deficit.
Background	1. I have been a politician for most of my career. 2. I worked as an economic advisor of the federal government before running for office. 3. I worked as a management consultant before running for office. 4. I worked as a social worker before running for office.

B.2: Study 2 - Randomization check

To test whether the randomization was successful, we regressed Agreeableness on indicators of the different treatments. Generally, the results in Table B56 show the randomization was successful as most of the indicators of the treatment are not statistically significant. There was a very small (b=.01, se=.006) and significant effect of the anti-establishment treatment on Agreeableness but this effect is negligible. In the second model, we also show that Authoritarianism is randomly distributed over the different treatment conditions (see model 2, Table B56).

Table B56
Conjoint experiment: randomization checks

	Dependent variable:	
	Agreeableness	Authoritarianism
	(1)	(2)
Anti-establishment	0.014*	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.010)
People's centrism	−0.003	0.020
	(0.007)	(0.011)
Conflict	0.009	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.011)
Immi 2: Immigration is good for economy	0.005	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Immi 3: Immigrants steal jobs	−0.006	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.016)
Immi 4: America is for American	0.003	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Economy 2: Tax all Americans	0.010	−0.023
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Economy 3: Rich contribute more	0.008	−0.024
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Economy 4: No solution to lower the deficit	0.007	−0.008
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.0004	−0.006
	(0.009)	(0.014)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.007	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Background 4: Social worker	0.003	−0.006
	(0.009)	(0.015)
Round 2	−0.0002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.573*	0.500*
	(0.012)	(0.020)
Observations	3,462	3,440
R^2	0.003	0.002
Note:	OLS Regression models; *p<0.05	

B.3: Study 2 - Main effects of the conjoint experiment

Vote choice. We showed in the paper and this SI that the extent to which Agreeableness and Authoritarianism moderate the treatment effects in the conjoint experiment. Here we also provide the main effects of the experiments. Table B57 provides the unstandardized regression coefficients with the standard errors. As can be gleaned from Table B57 there is no main effect of the anti-establishment message on vote choice vote. Politicians that emphasize that they will not cooperate but fight ("Conflict" coefficient), receive less votes, while those that indicate that they will represent the American people are more popular ("people's centrism" coefficient). Moreover, the traits Agreeableness and Authoritarianism are unrelated to vote choice in the experiment.

Politicians that express anti-immigrant messages receive somewhat less votes compared to those politicians that communicate that the U.S. should take care of refugees. Finally, opposition to increased taxation leads to substantially more votes for a politician compared to a politician supporting more taxation. Note that compared to a career politician, the social worker or economic advisor received somewhat more voters, while the round of the election did not affect the vote choice.

Feeling. The results for the feelings towards the politicians are slightly different. Agreeable participants report more negative feelings towards the politicians – but the effect is small. Like the vote choice, the conflict message as well as anti-immigration stance lead to more negative feeling towards the politician.

Table B57
Conjoint experiment: main effects

	Dependent variable:	
	Vote Choice	Feeling
	(1)	(2)
Agreeableness	0.006	−0.095*
	(0.008)	(0.034)
Authoritarianism	0.003	0.014
	(0.005)	(0.020)
Anti-establishment	−0.012	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.010)
People's centrism	0.034	−0.009
	(0.017)	(0.009)
Conflict	−0.057*	−0.023*
	(0.017)	(0.010)
Immi 2: Immigration is good for economy	0.010	−0.020
	(0.024)	(0.013)
Immi 3: Immigrants steal jobs	−0.043	−0.041*
	(0.025)	(0.014)
Immi 4: America is for American	−0.065*	−0.078*
	(0.025)	(0.014)
Economy 2: Tax all Americans	−0.025	−0.015
	(0.024)	(0.014)
Economy 3: Rich contribute more	0.062*	−0.002
	(0.025)	(0.014)
Economy 4: No solution to lower the deficit	0.123*	0.030*
	(0.024)	(0.014)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.056*	0.016
	(0.025)	(0.013)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.027	0.013
	(0.025)	(0.013)
Background 4: Social worker	0.066*	0.015
	(0.025)	(0.014)
Round 2	−0.007*	−0.009
	(0.003)	(0.006)
Constant	0.466*	0.588*
	(0.031)	(0.030)
Observations	3,462	3,440
R^2	0.023	0.022
Note:	OLS Regression models; *p<0.05	

B.4: Study 2 - Results belonging to Figure 2

We theorized that Agreeableness should moderate the effect of the anti-establishment message, while Authoritarianism should moderate the effect of the anti-immigrant on vote choice. Therefore, we interact Agreeableness and Authoritarianism with all treatment indicators. Note that the correlation between Agreeableness and Authoritarianism is very low (r=0.06) so we do not include an interaction term between the two personality characteristics.

Aside from the results discussed in the main text of the paper, we find that Agreeableness moderates the effect of the anti-immigration message. Specifically, we find a negative marginal effect of the message "*Immigrants steal jobs from ordinary Americans. We should stop immigration*" compared to the message "*Immigrants from countries that are torn apart by war or natural disaster should be welcomed in America*" on support for a politician (see also Table B58). This is not surprising as high agreeable respondents hold more liberal economic policy positions (Bakker & Lelkes, 2018). Accordingly, for the high agreeable respondents an economic anti-immigrant position is not very effective.

Figure B10. Vote Choice: "Immigrants steal jobs from ordinary Americans. We should stop immigration" and Agreeableness



Turning to Authoritarianism, we find that the trait does not moderate the effect of the

anti-establishment message, the centrality message or the cooperation message (see Table B58). However, in line with our expectations, we find that Authoritarianism moderates the effect of anti-immigrant on candidate support. Specifically, the messages that "*Immigrants steal jobs from Americans*" and "A*merica is for Americans*" lead to more votes for a political candidate among the high authoritarian respondents compared to a politician who states that "*Immigrants from countries that are torn apart by war or natural disaster should be welcomed in America.*" For instance, Figure B11 shows that among the high scorers on Authoritarianism there is more support for a politician who expresses that America is for Americans compared to a politician who communicates that the US should take care of immigrants. A similar interaction effect is reported for the message that immigrant steal jobs (Figure can be derived from replication file).

Figure B11. Vote Choice: "America is for Americans" and Authoritarianism



Table B58
Study 2: Effect of Anti-establishment messages on Vote Choice and Feelings contiditional upon Agreeableness

	Dependent variable:	
	Vote Choice	Feeling
	(1)	(2)
Agreeableness	0.429* (0.140)	−0.040 (0.083)
Anti-establishment	0.157* (0.062)	0.048 (0.035)
People's centrism	−0.063 (0.064)	−0.039 (0.035)
Conflict	0.002 (0.060)	−0.034 (0.034)
Immi 2: Immigration is good for economy	0.133 (0.090)	−0.003 (0.049)
Immi 3: Immigrants steal jobs	0.029 (0.086)	−0.059 (0.051)
Immi 4: America is for American	−0.024 (0.091)	−0.097 (0.052)
Economy 2: Tax all Americans	−0.014 (0.092)	−0.020 (0.052)
Economy 3: Rich contribute more	0.175 (0.093)	0.008 (0.052)
Economy 4: No solution to lower the deficit	0.127 (0.089)	0.030 (0.054)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.053* (0.025)	0.016 (0.013)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.029 (0.025)	0.013 (0.013)
Background 4: Social worker	0.063* (0.025)	0.015 (0.014)
Authoritarianism	−0.194* (0.082)	−0.065 (0.051)
Round 2	−0.007 (0.004)	−0.009 (0.006)
Agreeableness * Anti-establishment	−0.240* (0.089)	−0.058 (0.051)
Agreeableness * People's centrism	0.129 (0.092)	0.014 (0.050)
Agreeableness * Conflict	−0.152 (0.086)	−0.0003 (0.048)
Agreeableness * Immigration 2	−0.185 (0.129)	−0.027 (0.071)
Agreeableness * Immigration 3	−0.311* (0.126)	−0.015 (0.076)
Agreeableness * Immigration 4	−0.236 (0.130)	−0.039 (0.076)
Agreeableness * Economy 2	−0.103 (0.125)	0.004 (0.072)
Agreeableness * Economy 3	−0.205 (0.127)	−0.016 (0.074)
Agreeableness * Economy 4	−0.128 (0.125)	−0.037 (0.077)
Authoritarianism * Anti-establishment	−0.053 (0.055)	−0.007 (0.032)
Authoritarianism * People's centrism	0.045 (0.056)	0.045 (0.031)
Authoritarianism * Conflict	0.064 (0.053)	0.024 (0.032)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 2	−0.025 (0.074)	−0.001 (0.042)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 3	0.232* (0.078)	0.057 (0.046)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 4	0.208* (0.078)	0.087* (0.044)
Authoritarianism * Economy 2	0.101 (0.080)	0.004 (0.047)
Authoritarianism * Economy 3	0.015 (0.080)	−0.0002 (0.045)
Authoritarianism * Economy 4	0.149 (0.078)	0.045 (0.046)
Intercept	0.311* (0.100)	0.593* (0.061)
Observations	3,462	3,440
R^2	0.038	0.025

Note: Unstandardized OLS coefficient; *p<0.05

Feelings towards the politicians

After casting their vote, participants were asked to report their feelings towards the politician on a scale from very unfavorable (0) to very favorable (100), which we recoded to range from 0 (favorable) to 1 (favorable). We re-ran the same model that we used for vote choice – using an OLS model (Hainmueller et al., 2014). The interaction effect between the treatment (anti-establishment versus pro-establishment message) and Agreeableness is negative but not statistically significant (b=-.06, se=.05, p=.23). Inspection of the interaction effect, we find in line with the results for vote choice that those lower on Agreeableness express more positive feelings towards a politician who expresses an anti-establishment message compared to a politician who employs a pro-establishment discourse (see Figure B12).

We do note that the congruence between the anti-establishment message and low agreeableness has a weaker effect on feelings towards the politicians compared to the vote choice and not statistically significant at conventional levels. As can be seen by the fact that the slope of the interaction effect is less steep compared to the vote choice model and the confidence intervals overlap with zero (presented in the main text).

Like the model for vote choice, we find no evidence that Agreeableness moderates the effects of communicating a people-centrist discourse (b=.01, se=.05). The center panel of Figure B12 shows a positive slope, and confidence intervals both below and above zero. In sum, low and high agreeable people are equally likely (or unlikely) to support politicians that make people-centrism claims.

The right panel of Figure B12 shows the results for the conflict statement. Politicians stating that they will fight their opponents are less popular among high agreeable respondents than politicians stating that they will seek cooperation (b=-.00, se=.05). Here we see approximately a 5 percentage point drop in popularity of candidates seeking conflict if we move from low Agreeable respondents (2 standard deviations below the mean) to high Agreeable respondents (2 standard deviations above the mean).

To summarize the results using the feelings towards the politicians broadly align with the results using vote choice.

Figure B12. Study 2: Effect of three populist messages on feelings towards the politicians conditional on Agreeableness



Note: Note: The solid line is the predicted marginal effect on feeling towards the politician and the blue (gray) area is the 95% confidence interval. Left-hand panel displays the marginal effect of the anti-establishment – compared to the pro-establishment message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The middle-panel displays the marginal effect of the pro-centralist message – compared to the anti-centralist message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The right hand panel displays the marginal effect of the conflict-message – compared to the cooperation message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. Regression results belonging to the interaction effects are provided in Table B58.

B.5: Study 2 - Testing the assumed linearity

We code agreeableness into three categories, namely the highest third (0), the middle third (1) and lowest third (2) on the scale. We interact this categorical variable with all treatment indications. In Table B59 we show that in the vote choice model (model 1) low (b=0.11, se=0.04, p=.008) *and* modest (b=0.11, se=0.04, p=0.008) agreeable people are approximately 11 percent more likely to vote for a candidate with an anti-establishment message compared to highly agreeable respondents. The results for the model using feelings towards the candidates point in the same direction. Those low agreeable respondents are 3% more favorable towards the a candidate with an anti-establishment message compared to highly agreeable respondents (b=.03, se=.021, p=.17). Do note that the results in the latter model are not significant at conventional levels, i.e., p<.05.

Turning to people's centrism: the vote choice and feelings models don't provide any indication that the effects of Agreeableness are non-linear: the interaction effects are negative and not significant. Finally, the interaction effect between conflict and Agreeableness suggest that the high agreeable are less supportive of a politician who advocates conflict (b=-.08, se=.04, p=.06).

To conclude, there is no indication that the moderation effect of Agreeableness is non-linear.

Table B59
Study 2: Testing linearity assumption

	Dependent variable:	
	Vote Choice	Feeling
	(1)	(2)
Agreeableness: Modest	−0.054 (0.067)	−0.004 (0.040)
Agreeableness: Low	−0.205* (0.066)	0.012 (0.038)
Anti-establishment	−0.061 (0.042)	−0.004 (0.024)
People's centrism	0.056 (0.041)	−0.024 (0.021)
Conflict	−0.117* (0.040)	−0.044 (0.023)
Immi 2: Immigration is good for economy	−0.022 (0.054)	−0.027 (0.032)
Immi 3: Immigrants steal jobs	−0.180* (0.059)	−0.077* (0.034)
Immi 4: America is for American	−0.213* (0.059)	−0.148* (0.033)
Economy 2: Tax all Americans	−0.106 (0.055)	−0.028 (0.033)
Economy 3: Rich contribute more	0.032 (0.056)	0.015 (0.033)
Economy 4: No solution to lower the deficit	0.017 (0.058)	−0.001 (0.032)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.053* (0.025)	0.016 (0.013)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.028 (0.025)	0.014 (0.013)
Background 4: Social worker	0.062* (0.025)	0.014 (0.014)
Authoritarianism	−0.181* (0.082)	−0.066 (0.051)
Round 2	−0.006 (0.004)	−0.009 (0.006)
Agreeableness: Modest * Anti-establishment	0.111* (0.044)	0.013 (0.025)
Agreeableness: Low * Anti-establishment	0.108* (0.043)	0.032 (0.024)
Agreeableness: Modest * People's centrism	−0.052 (0.044)	−0.008 (0.024)
Agreeableness: Low * People's centrism	−0.068 (0.043)	−0.012 (0.023)
Agreeableness: Modest * Conflict	0.012 (0.041)	0.025 (0.025)
Agreeableness: Low * Confict	0.078 (0.041)	0.006 (0.023)
Agreeableness: Low * Immigration 2	0.039 (0.059)	0.004 (0.034)
Agreeableness: Modest * Immigration 2	0.106 (0.058)	0.023 (0.032)
Agreeableness: Low * Immigration 2	−0.037 (0.065)	0.002 (0.036)
Agreeableness: Modest * Immigration 3	0.111 (0.061)	0.029 (0.035)
Agreeableness: Low * Immigration 3	0.040 (0.063)	0.048 (0.035)
Agreeableness: Modest * Immigration 4	0.107 (0.061)	0.037 (0.035)
Agreeableness: Low * Immigration4	0.004 (0.061)	0.018 (0.035)
Agreeableness: Modest * Economy 2	0.083 (0.060)	0.009 (0.035)
Agreeableness: Low * Economy 2	−0.007 (0.062)	−0.046 (0.034)
Agreeableness: Modest * Economy 3	0.067 (0.060)	−0.011 (0.035)
Agreeableness: Low * Economy 3	0.009 (0.062)	0.018 (0.036)
Agreeableness: Modest * Economy 4	0.094 (0.060)	0.009 (0.034)
Agreeableness: Low * Economy 4	−0.051 (0.055)	−0.007 (0.032)
Authoritarianism * Anti-establishment	0.044 (0.056)	0.047 (0.031)
Authoritarianism * People's centrism	0.059 (0.053)	0.021 (0.032)
Authoritarianism * Conflict	−0.036 (0.074)	−0.004 (0.042)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 2	0.224* (0.078)	0.053 (0.046)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 3	0.201* (0.078)	0.084 (0.044)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 4	0.095 (0.080)	0.007 (0.047)
Authoritarianism * Economy 2	0.012 (0.080)	0.006 (0.046)
Authoritarianism * Economy 3	0.139 (0.078)	0.046 (0.046)
Authoritarianism * Economy 4	0.651* (0.062)	0.566* (0.035)
Observations	3,462	3,440
R^2	0.040	0.030

Note: Unstandardized OLS coefficient; *p<0.05

B.6: Study 2 - Analyses using a populism scale

We created a three-step populism scale, and interacted it with Agreeableness in our models for vote choice and feelings towards the politicians. We do find the expected pattern that in cases where a candidate had no populist features (scale=0) high agreeable people were more likely to vote fore a candidate than low agreeable people. Reversely, a "fully' populist candidate (scale=3) was supported by low agreeable individuals but not high agreeable ones. However, these effects were markedly weaker than the individual effect of the anti-establishment message on vote choice (b=-.08, se=.05, p=.10) and feelings towards the politician (b=-.03, se=.03, p=.20) – full regression results can be derived from the replication files. Fig B13 plots the marginal effect of the populism scale on vote choice (left-hand panel) and feelings towards the politician (right-hand panel). The results confirm that the effects of the populism are line with the pattern documented in the main text but they are a lot weaker compared to the anti-establishment * agreeableness interaction.

Figure B13. Study 2: Effect of populist scale on vote choice and feelings towards the politicians conditional on Agreeableness



Note: The solid line is the predicted marginal effect on vote choice and the blue (gray) area is the 95% confidence interval. Left-hand panel displays the marginal effect of the populism scale on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The right-hand panel displays the marginal effect of the populism scale on feelings towards the politicians over the range of Agreeableness. Full regression results can be derived from the replication materials.

B.7: Study 2 - Controlling for Party Identifcation

Our treatments do not have any mention of a particular political party nor a candidate to prevent partisan motivated reasoning to bias our treatment effects. However, one might argue that our treatments are more effective among Republican partisans who have been exposed to anti-establishment messages by Donald Trump since his announcement as a political candidate. We believe that our treatments do no per se trigger partisan motivations because there is no party cue offered. Yet, here we offer an empirical assessment of this claim. As part of the survey we also measured party identification. Specifically, we created a seven-point scale ranging from "strong Democrat" (1), "weak Democrat" (2), "leaning Democrat" (3), "neutral" (4), "leaning Republican" (5), "weak Republican" (6) and "strong Republican" (7; M=3.61, SD=2.15, Min=1, Max=7)

Here, we run the same models used in the main text of the paper but now we include a measure of party identification and interact party identification with all treatment indicators. Party identification is basically unrelated to Agreeableness (r=-0.01, p=ns) and Authoritarianism (r=0.00, p=ns) in this sample. Therefore, we do not include interaction effects between party identification and the other two moderators in the model. We present the results in Table B60.

The interaction effect between Agreeableness and the anti-establishment message remains largely unchanged in the vote choice (b=-0.223, se=0.090, p=0.013).

If Republicans would be more likely to be affected by the anti-establishment message, than we should see a significant interaction effect between party identification and the anti-establishment message. However, this interaction effect is not significant in the vote choice (b=0.008, se=0.008, p=ns). Figure B15 provides the marginal effect of the anti-establishment message on vote choice over the range of partisanship. As can be seen by the horizontal line of the predicted marginal effect, partisanship is not moderating the effect of the anti-establishment message. We also find no evidence that partisanship moderates the effect of the people's centrism message (middle panel of Figure B15) or the cooperation message (right-hand panel of Figure B15). Accordingly, our treatments did not trigger the Republican partisans per se.

Party identification does moderate the reliance upon the ideological cues in predictable manner. For instance, there is a positive and significant interaction effect of the message that "Immigrant steal jobs" – compared to "Refugees are welcome" – on the vote choice for a politician among strong Republican respondents in the survey (b=.05, se=.01) – see Figure B14. We find similar interaction effects for the moderation of the economic messages conditional upon party identification.

Figure B15. Study 2: Effect of three populist messages on vote choice conditional on Partisanship



Note: The solid line is the predicted marginal effect on vote choice and the blue (gray) area is the 95% confidence interval. Left-hand panel displays the marginal effect of the anti-establishment – compared to the pro-establishment message – on vote choice over the range of Partisanship. The middle-panel displays the marginal effect of the pro-centralist message – compared to the anti-centralist message – on vote choice over the range of Partisanship. The right hand panel displays the marginal effect of the conflict-message – compared to the cooperation message – on vote choice over the range of Partisanship. See Table B60 for the full regression output.

Table B60
Vote choice based upon candidate characteristics

	Dependent variable:
	Vote Choice
Agreeableness	0.400* (0.137)
Anti-establishment	0.120 (0.070)
People's centrism	−0.017 (0.065)
Conflict	−0.032 (0.071)
Immi 2: Immigration is good for economy	0.083 (0.099)
Immi 3: Immigrants steal jobs	−0.235* (0.096)
Immi 4: America is for American	−0.231* (0.099)
Economy 2: Tax all Americans	−0.123 (0.101)
Economy 3: Rich contribute more	0.034 (0.102)
Economy 4: No solution to lower the deficit	0.129 (0.096)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.052* (0.025)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.026 (0.025)
Background 4: Social worker	0.055* (0.025)
Authoritarianism	−0.183* (0.080)
PID (1-7)	−0.053* (0.012)
Round 2	−0.009 (0.005)
Agreeableness * Anti-establishment	−0.223* (0.089)
Agreeableness * People's centrism	−0.166 (0.085)
Agreeableness * Conflict	0.126 (0.091)
Agreeableness * Immigration 2	−0.170 (0.128)
Agreeableness * Immigration 3	−0.284* (0.123)
Agreeableness * Immigration 4	−0.218 (0.130)
Agreeableness * Economy 2	−0.097 (0.124)
Agreeableness * Economy 3	−0.160 (0.126)
Agreeableness * Economy 4	−0.112 (0.124)
Authoritarianism * Anti-establishment	−0.053 (0.054)
Authoritarianism * People's centrism	0.057 (0.052)
Authoritarianism * Conflict	0.043 (0.055)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 2	−0.032 (0.073)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 3	0.227* (0.076)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 4	0.204* (0.077)
Authoritarianism * Economy 2	0.100 (0.079)
Authoritarianism * Economy 3	0.006 (0.078)
Authoritarianism * Economy 4	0.153* (0.077)
PID * Anti-establishment	0.008 (0.008)
PID * People's centrism	0.008 (0.007)
PID * Conflict	−0.008 (0.008)
PID * Immigration 2	0.011 (0.011)
PID * Immigration 3	0.069* (0.012)
PID * Immigration 4	0.055* (0.011)
PID * Economy 2	0.030* (0.011)
PID * Economy 3	0.033* (0.012)
PID * Economy 4	−0.004 (0.011)
Intercept	0.521* (0.109)
Observations	3,442
R^2	0.059

Note: OLS Regression models; *p<0.05

Figure B14. Effect of the Anti-immigrant message on vote choice over the range of Party Identification.



B.8: Study 2 - Anti-establishment, Agreeableness and sub-groups

Here we present the results of our tests when we analyze sub-groups. While one could think of a number of sub-groups, we chose a couple of relevant sub-groups: men and woman; the young and the old; and Democrats and Republicans. The statistical significance of the results occasionally drops when we analyze sub-groups but this is most likely due to the decreasing power of the analyses (interaction efffects). Importantly, we do not see much evidence that the signs of the associations flip.

Gender differences

Figure B16 presents the results as projected in Figure 2 of the original paper for men (upper row) and woman (bottom row). As can be seen from the two rows, the results are roughly comparable for men and woman. For both men (b=.40, se=.14, p=.005) and woman (b=-.17, se=.12, p=.13) we see that low agreeable respondents are indeed more likely to vote for a politician when they express an anti-establishment message. Do note that, compared to men, the effect for woman is weaker and not statistically significant at conventional levels.

The interaction effect between Agreeableness and people's centrism is positive but non-significant among men (b=.07, se=.14) and woman (b=.19, se=.12) – see middle panel of Figure B16. The right panel of Figure B16 shows the results for the conflict statement. Among men, the effect of the conflict statement is not moderated by Agreeableness (b=.03, se=.14, p=.86). This can be seen by the horizontal slope of the marginal effect of the conflict message compared to the cooperation message on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness in the top-right column of Figure B16. Yet, among woman the effect of the conflict statement is not moderated by Agreeableness (b=.20, se=.07, p=.005). We find that there is a negative and statistically significant marginal effect of the conflict message compared to the cooperation message on vote choice among the high agreeable.

We conclude that – with the exception of the conflict message – the interplay between agreeableness and our treatments is not conditional upon the gender of the respondents.

Figure B16. Study 2: Effect of three populist messages on vote choice conditional on Agreeableness among Men and Woman



Note: The solid line is the predicted marginal effect on vote choice and the blue (gray) area is the 95% confidence interval. Upper row are the results for men, bottom row the effects for woman. In each row, the left-hand panels displays the marginal effect of the anti-establishment – compared to the pro-establishment message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The middle-panels displays the marginal effect of the pro-centralist message – compared to the anti-centralist message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The right hand panels displays the marginal effect of the conflict-message – compared to the cooperation message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. See replications files for the full regression output.

Age differences

Figure B17 presents the results as projected in Figure 2 of the original paper for those that score above the median age (Old; upper row) and those with an age at the median or below (bottom row). As can be seen from the two rows, the results are highly similar for men and woman. We conclude that the interplay between agreeableness and our treatments is not conditional upon the age of the respondents.

Figure B17. Study 2: Effect of three populist messages on vote choice conditional on Agreeableness among the Young and Old



Note: The solid line is the predicted marginal effect on vote choice and the blue (gray) area is the 95% confidence interval. Upper row are the results for the old (above median age), bottom row the effects for the young (at or below median age). In each row, the left-hand panels displays the marginal effect of the anti-establishment – compared to the pro-establishment message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The middle-panels displays the marginal effect of the pro-centralist message – compared to the anti-centralist message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. The right hand panels displays the marginal effect of the conflict-message – compared to the cooperation message – on vote choice over the range of Agreeableness. See replications files for the full regression output.

B.9: Study 2 - Anti-establishment, Agreeableness and the host ideology

Here we assess whether the interaction between Agreeableness and the anti-establishment message was not conditional upon the host-ideology of the politician. To do test this, we divided our taxation and immigration treatments into two dummy variables separating the left-wing economic positions from the right-wing economic ones, and the left-wing immigration positions from the right-wing immigration positions. We then ran a three-way interaction between Agreeableness, anti-establishment and each dummy variable.

First, we find that the combination of an anti-establishment politician with a left-wing economic agenda is slightly more popular (predicted value = 0.51) than an anti-establishment politician with a right-wing economic agenda (predicted value = 0.48). This preference is reversed if the politician is pro-establishment (full regression model in Table B61).

Second, a similar result was obtained for the comparison on immigrant attitudes (full regression model in Table B62). Anti-establishment politicians with an anti-immigrant attitude are preferred slightly over those with a pro-establishment politician. But these differences are extremely small, between 1% and 2% percent in predicted values.

To conclude, this test does not give any reason to assume that the interaction between Agreeableness and the anti-establishment message is conditional upon the host-ideology of the politician.

Table B61
Study 2: Populism, Agreeableness and the "host ideology": Economic ideology

	Dependent variable:
	Vote Choice
Intercept	0.403* (0.142)
Agreeableness	0.241* (0.085)
Anti-establishment	0.148 (0.128)
Right-wing taxation	−0.021 (0.094)
People's centrism	0.053 (0.087)
Conflict	0.139 (0.091)
Immi 2: Immigration is good for economy	0.033 (0.087)
Immi 3: Immigrants steal jobs	−0.043 (0.094)
Immi 4: America is for American	0.056* (0.025)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.031 (0.025)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.066* (0.025)
Background 4: Social worker	−0.138 (0.084)
Authoritarianism	−0.005 (0.003)
Round 2	−0.357* (0.119)
Agreeableness * Anti-establishment	−0.182 (0.178)
Agreeableness * Right-wing taxation	−0.184 (0.129)
Anti-establishment * Right-wing taxation	0.059 (0.133)
Agreeableness * People's centrism	−0.072 (0.134)
People's Centrism * Right-wing taxation	−0.242* (0.119)
Agreeableness * Conflict	−0.091 (0.124)
Conflict * Right-wing taxation	−0.187 (0.131)
Agreeableness * Immigration 2	−0.312* (0.126)
Agreeableness * Immigration 3	−0.204 (0.133)
Agreeableness * Immigration 4	−0.084 (0.075)
Authoritarianism * Anti-establishment	0.015 (0.109)
Authoritarianism * Right-wing taxation	0.080 (0.081)
Authoritarianism * People's centrism	0.051 (0.075)
Authoritarianism * Conflict	−0.025 (0.074)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 2	0.226* (0.078)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 3	0.219* (0.078)
Authoritarianism * Immigration 4	0.256 (0.172)
Agreeableness * Right-wing econ * Anti	0.135 (0.190)
Agreeableness * Right-wing econ * People's	0.168 (0.174)
Agreeableness * Right-wing econ * Conflict	0.061 (0.111)
Authoritarianism * Right-wing econ * Anti	−0.079 (0.111)
Authoritarianism * Right-wing econ * People's	0.026 (0.107)
Authoritarianism * Right-wing econ * Conflict	0.308* (0.097)
Observations	3,462
R^2	0.026

Note: Unstandardized OLS coefficient; *p<0.05

Table B62
Study 2: Populism, Agreeableness and the "host ideology": Social ideology

	Dependent variable:
	Vote Choice
Intercept	0.481* (0.143)
Agreeableness	0.169* (0.084)
Anti-establishment	0.099 (0.125)
Anti-immi	−0.009 (0.092)
People's centrism	0.108 (0.090)
Conflict	−0.011 (0.091)
Economy 2: Tax all Americans	0.176 (0.093)
Economy 3: Rich contribute more	0.121 (0.088)
Economy 4: No solution to lower the deficit	0.052* (0.025)
Background 2: Economic advisor of government	0.028 (0.025)
Background 3: Management consultant	0.064* (0.025)
Background 4: Social worker	−0.217* (0.084)
Authoritarianism	−0.005 (0.004)
Round 2	−0.260* (0.119)
Agreeableness * Anti-establishment	−0.472* (0.180)
Agreeableness * Anti-immi	−0.032 (0.117)
Anti-establishment * Anti-immi	0.068 (0.130)
Agreeableness * People's centrism	−0.108 (0.134)
People's Centrism * Anti-immi	−0.366* (0.121)
Agreeableness * Conflict	−0.185 (0.129)
Conflict *Anti-immi	−0.104 (0.124)
Agreeableness * Economy 2	−0.207 (0.127)
Agreeableness * Economy 3	−0.117 (0.123)
Agreeableness * Economy 4	−0.103 (0.074)
Authoritarianism * Anti-establishment	0.262* (0.109)
Authoritarianism * Anti-immi	0.042 (0.077)
Authoritarianism * People's centrism	0.142 (0.075)
Authoritarianism * Conflict	0.096 (0.080)
Authoritarianism * Economy 2	0.015 (0.080)
Authoritarianism * Economy 3	0.145 (0.077)
Authoritarianism * Economy 4	0.062 (0.164)
Agreeableness * Anti-immi * Anti	0.119 (0.188)
Agreeableness * Anti-immi * People's	0.392* (0.175)
Agreeableness * Anti-immi * Conflict	0.086 (0.105)
Authoritarianism * Anti-immi * Anti	0.012 (0.109)
Authoritarianism * Anti-immi * People's	−0.154 (0.108)
Authoritarianism * Anti-immi * Conflict	0.292* (0.103)
Observations	3,462
R^2	0.040
Note:	Unstandardized OLS coefficient; *p<0.05

B.10: Evidence that Agreeableness is stable

In order to treat Agreeableness as a moderator of the treatment effects in Study 2 we have to know whether the trait is *stable*. Moreover, using the cross-sectional datasets presented in Study 1, we cannot test if a low score on Agreeableness *causes* support for populists. However, the Longitudinal Internet Studies for Social Sciences panel in the Netherlands provides a unique opportunity to assess this issues *stability* of *causality*. In 2008 and in 2014 respondents completed a ten-item Agreeableness inventory (Goldberg et al., 2006), see, https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x5h-4cxd (Das & Marchand, 2008). In 2008 and 2014 respondents also reported their sympathy for the Freedom Party, see https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zms-r5rz (Das & Elshout, 2007). Specifically, in 2008 and in 2014 respondents were asked "What do you think of the PVV?" and could indicate their response on a scale ranging from "very unsympathetic" (0) to "very sympathetic" (10). We recoded the scales to rang from "very unsympathetic" (0) to "very sympathetic" (1) (2008: M=0.28, SD=0.28; 2014: M=0.29, SD=0.27). Sympathy for the PVV is a good dependent variable as recent research is one of the strongest predictor of voting for a populist party (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013).

In total 2,270 completed the Agreeableness battery in 2008 and 2014 as well as the sympathy for the PVV in both years. Figure B18 shows the results of our structural equation model. We present unstandardized path coefficients and italicized coefficients are not significant (N=2,270). The fit of the model is acceptable: Chi-squared = 4359, CFI = 0.97, TFI = 0.96. We observe a negative association between Agreeableness and the sympathy for the PVV in 2008 (-0.260). Our analyses thereby provides additional support for the idea that low agreeable are more supportive of populist parties (see Study 1 in the main text).

The figure also shows that Agreeableness is very stable between 2008 and 2014. The unstandardized stability coefficient of 0.798 which indicates that there is not much change in Agreeableness over a 6 year period. We want to know that supporting a populist party does not make a person less agreeable. First, we find that sympathy for the PVV is relatively stable between 2008 and 2014 (unstandardized stability coefficient of 0.640). Yet, we do not find evidence that becoming a stronger support of the PVV causes a person to become less agreeable (See Figure B18) as is signaled by the not-significant coefficient leading from Sympathy in 2014 to Agreeableness in 2014.

Figure B18. Does a change in sympathy influences Agreeableness.



References

Bakker, B. N. (2017). Personality traits, income, and economic ideology. *Political Psychology*, *38*(6), 1025–1041.

Bakker, B. N., Klemmensen, R., Nørgaard, A. S., & Schumacher, G. (2016). Stay loyal or exit the party? how openness to experience and extroversion explain vote switching. *Political Psychology*, *37*(3), 419–429.

Bakker, B. N., & Lelkes, Y. (2016). Selling ourselves short? how abbreviated measures of personality change the way we think about personality and politics. *The Journal of Politics*.

Bakker, B. N., & Lelkes, Y. (2018). Selling ourselves short? how abbreviated measures of personality change the way we think about personality and politics. *The Journal of Politics*, *80*(4), 1311–1325.

Bosnjak, M., Dannwolf, T., Enderle, T., Schauer, I., Struminskaya, B., Tanner, A., & W., W. K. (2018). Establishing an open probability-based mixed-mode panel of the general population in germany: The gesis panel. *Social Science Computer Review*, *36*(1), 103–115.

Brandstätter, H., & Opp, K.-D. (2014). Personality traits ("big five") and the propensity to political protest: Alternative models. *Political Psychology*, *35*(4), 515–537.

Das, J. (2018). Tilburg election study 2017.
doi: 10.17026/dans-25p-xv9b

Das, J., & Elshout, S. (2007). Politics and values (liss core study).
doi: 10.17026/dans-zms-r5rz

Das, J., & Elshout, S. (2015). Background variables liss panel households.
doi: 110.17026/dans-xv3-8tvs

Das, J., & Marchand, M. (2008). Personality (liss core study).
doi: 10.17026/dans-x5h-4cxd

De Vreese, C., Azrout, R., & Möller, J. (2014). European parliament election campaign study: Data and documentation. *Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam*.

Dinesen, P. T., Klemmensen, R., & Nørgaard, A. S. (2016). Attitudes toward immigration: The role of personal predispositions. *Political Psychology*, *37*(1), 55–72.

Dinesen, P. T., Nørgaard, A. S., & Klemmensen, R. (2014). The civic personality: Personality and democratic citizenship. *Political Studies*, *62*(1), 134–152.

Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). The mini-ipip scales: tiny-yet-effective measures of the big five factors of personality. *Psychological assessment*, *18*(2), 192.

Elshout, S. (2012). Dutch parliamentary election studies 2012 - liss panel questionnaire.
doi: 10.17026/dans-27d-qw68

Feldman, S., & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived threat and authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, *18*(4), 741–770.

Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., G., E., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J., & Prosser, C. (2015a). British election study internet panel wave 4.
doi: 10.15127/1.293723

Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., G., E., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J., & Prosser, C. (2015b). British election study internet panel wave 6.
doi: 10.15127/1.293723

Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., G., E., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J., & Prosser, C. (2016). British election study internet panel wave 7.
doi: 10.15127/1.293723

Fortunato, D., Hibbing, M. V., & Mondak, J. J. (2018). The trump draw: Voter personality and support for donald trump in the 2016 republican nomination campaign. *American Politics Research*, *46*(1), 785-810.

Gallego, A., & Oberski, D. (2012). Personality and political participation: The mediation hypothesis. *Political Behavior*, *34*(3), 425–451.

Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains and political contexts. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(01), 111–133.

Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., Raso, C., & Ha, S. E. (2011). Personality traits and participation in political processes. *The Journal of Politics*, *73*(3), 692–706.

GESIS. (2019). Gesis panel - standard edition. gesis data archive, cologne. za5665 data file version

30.0.0.
doi: 10.4232/1.13301

Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, C. R., & Gough, H. G. (2006). The international personality item pool and the future of public-domain personality measures. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*(1), 84–96.

Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the big-five personality domains. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *37*(6), 504–528.

Hahn, E., Gottschling, J., & Spinath, F. M. (2012). Short measurements of personality–validity and reliability of the gsoep big five inventory (bfi-s). *Journal of Research in Personality*, *46*(3), 355–359.

Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., & Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments. *Political Analysis*, *22*(1), 1–30.

Kolb, J.-P., & Weyandt, K. (2018). Gesis panel data manual. , 1–9.

Mondak, J. J., & Halerpin, K. D. (2008). A framework for the study of personality and political behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science*, *38*(02), 335–362.

Mondak, J. J., Hibbing, M. V., Canache, D., Seligson, M. A., & Anderson, M. R. (2010). Personality and civic engagement: An integrative framework for the study of trait effects on political behavior. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(01), 85–110.

Rammstedt, B., & John, O. P. (2007). Measuring personality in one minute or less: A 10-item short version of the big five inventory in english and german. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *41*(1), 203–212.

Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review*, *10*, 351–368.

Schoen, H., & Steinbrecher, M. (2013). Beyond total effects: Exploring the interplay of personality and attitudes in affecting turnout in the 2009 german federal election. *Political Psychology*, *34*(4), 533–552.

Schumacher, G., & Rooduijn, M. (2013). Sympathy for the 'devil'? voting for populists in the 2006 and 2010 dutch general elections. *Electoral Studies*, *32*(1), 124–133.

Skovdahl-Hansen, H., Mortensen, E., & Schiøtz, H. (2004). Documentation of the danish neo pi-r and neo pi-r short version. *Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Psychological Association*.

Soto, C. J., & John, O. P. (2017). Short and extra-short forms of the big five inventory–2: The bfi-2-s and bfi-2-xs. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *68*, 69–81.

Treier, S., & Hillygus, D. S. (2009, December). The nature of political ideology in the contemporary electorate. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *73*(4), 679–703.

University of essex, institute for social and economic research, natcen social research, kantar public (2017). understanding society: waves 1-7, 2009-2016 and harmonised bhps: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. 9th edition. (2019).

Van Der Brug, W., & Van Spanje, J. (2009, May). Immigration, Europe and the 'new' cultural dimension. *European Journal of Political Research*, *48*(3), 309–334.