A golden key can open any door? Public funding and interest groups' access

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Online Appendices

Appendix 1 – Robustness check: mixed effects multilevel model predicting various types of access to policymakers by government funding (N=2,159 interest groups)

	Low threshold	**High threshold**
Independent variable		
Subsidy received	0.504	1.662***
	(0.640)	(0.497)
Control variables		
IG type		
Business (ref.)	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Citizen	-1.275	-1.378
	(0.777)	(0.604)
Other	-1.472**	-0.911
	(0.702)	(0.544)
Budget	2.092***	1.516***
	(0.157)	(0.122)
Professionalization	0.228	0.417***
	(0.162)	(0.126)
Representation	4.530***	2.360***
	(0.758)	(0.592)
Competition	-0.162	-0.556***
	(0.250)	(0.194)
Age	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.007)
Diagnostics		
Constant	19.749***	-13.362*
	(2.094)	(0.152)
Country level intercept	0.896	1.664
	(0.760)	(0.784)
Level 1 residual	159.04	94.87
	(4.845)	(2.898)
Log-likelihood	-8538.68	-7941.55
N	2,159	2,148

*Notes: The model is a mixed-effects linear regression which estimates a random intercept for each 5 political systems (not shown). Standard errors in parentheses and significance are presented, whereby: *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01.*

Appendix 2 – Robustness check: attitude towards government included in model

	Low threshold	High threshold
Independent variable		
Subsidy received	-0.011	0.167***
	(0.066)	(0.069)
Control variables		
IG type		
Business (ref.)	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Citizen	0.037	-0.055
	(0.078)	(0.083)
Other	-0.103	-0.081
	(0.070)	(0.074)
Budget	0.263***	0.298***
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Professionalization	0.006	0.033***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Representation	-0.995***	-0.748***
	(0.102)	(0.110)
Competition	-0.037	-0.053
	(0.025)	(0.027)
Age	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Attitude		
Very co-operative	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Moderately co-operative	-0.343***	-0.557***
	(0.070)	(0.074)
Moderately conflictual	-0.115	-0.605***
	(0.096)	(0.102)
Very conflictual	0.010	-0.815***
	(0.168)	(0.191)
Country/region		
European Union (ref.)	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Belgium	-0.163**	0.223**
	(0.059)	(0.088)
Netherlands	-0.070	0.481***
	(0.066)	(0.091)
Slovenia	-0.308***	-0.094
	(0.077)	(0.124)
Italy	0.052	0.164*
	(0.069)	(0.097)
Diagnostics		
Constant	-1.661***	-2.462***
	(0.247)	(0.265)
Log-likelihood	-5388.14	-4493.20
N	1,760	1,754

*Notes: Negative binomial regression; S.E in parentheses; significance: *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01.*

Appendix 3 – Robustness check: size of grant and effect on low and high threshold access.

	Low threshold	**High threshold**
Independent variable		
Size of grant received	0.092**	0.251***
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Control variables		
IG type		
Business (ref.)	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Citizen	0.309**	-0.509***
	(0.142)	(0.151)
Other	-0.496***	-0.631***
	(0.146)	(0.157)
Budget	0.307***	0.324***
	(0.029)	(0.031)
Professionalization	0.034	0.055**
	(0.024)	(0.026)
Representation	1.016***	0.757***
	(0.062)	(0.143)
Competition	-0.133***	-0.146***
	(0.044)	(0.018)
Age	-0.003**	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Country/region		
European Union (ref.)	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Belgium	-0.460***	0.210
	(0.129)	(0.139)
Netherlands	-0.036	0.393***
	(0.133)	(0.141)
Slovenia	-0.421***	-0.509***
	(0.157)	(0.167)
Italy	-0.118	0.168
	(0.182)	(0.197)
Diagnostics		
Constant	-2.615***	-2.646***
	(0.476)	(0.502)
Log-likelihood	-1968.87	-1757.46
Chi2	304.74	280.38
Prob.>Chi2	0.00	0.00
N	664	660

*Notes: the model is a negative binomial regression; standard errors in parentheses and significance are presented, whereby: *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01.*

Appendix 4 – Robustness check: predicted plots for interaction budget of an organization and obtainment of government funding



Notes: the model is based on a negative binomial regression (see Table 4), whereby an interaction is made between resources and subsidies.

Appendix 5 – Negative binomial regressions per country predicting various types of access to EU institutions

	EU		BE		NL		IT		SL	
	Low tr.	*High tr.*	*Low tr.*	*High tr.*	*Low tr.*	*High tr.*	*Low tr.*	*High tr.*	*Low tr.*	*High tr.*
Indep. variable										
Subsidy received	-0.086	0.315***	0.033	0.221**	0185	0.474***	-0.000	0.359*	-0.162	0.002
	(0.118)	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.139)	(0.154)	(0.997)	(0.209)	(0.180)	(0.225)
Control variables										
IG type										
Business (ref.)	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Citizen	0.026	-0.315**	-0.218	-0.309**	-0.075	-0.138	-0.130	0.239	0.163	0.019**
	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.169)	(0.182)	(0.206)	(0.227)	(0.317)	(0.352)
Other	-0.222*	-0.325**	-0.079	0.131	-0.240	-0.230	-0.032**	0.161	-0.037	0.064
	(0.127)	(0.136)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.160)	(0.177)	(0.164)	(0.191)	(0.277)	(0.320)
Budget	0.314***	0.288***	0.240***	0.262***	0.352***	0.392***	0.220***	0.384***	0.255***	0.366***
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.055)
Professionalization	-0.005	0.080**	0.013	0.056*	0.048	0.018	-0.078	-0.008	0.078	0.015
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.063)
Representation	1.772***	1.616***	1.110***	0.981***	0.605**	0.665**	0.860***	0.524**	1.091***	0.856***
	(0.268)	(0.290)	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.285)	(0.314)	(0.241)	(0.262)	(0.182)	(0.210)
Competition	0.069	-0.048	-0.147***	-0.147	-0.031	-0.048	-0.086	-0.017	-0.084	-0.138
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.086)	(0.099)
Age	-0.001	-0.000	-0.004***	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.006**	-0.008***	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Diagnostics										
Constant	-3.476***	-3.427***	1.592***	2.136***	-2.936***	-3.747**	-1.369**	-3.780**	-2.471***	-3.862***
	(0.566)	(0.603)	(0.406)	(0.444)	(0.534)	(0.608)	(0.547)	(0.629)	(0.558)	(0.662)
Log-likelihood	-1827.59	-1483.37	-1680.09	-1447.41	-1112.97	-1031.53	-930.01	-730.01	-584.25	-454.62
Chi2	114.24	119.03	176.90	186.79	156.50	152.74	67.48	90.52	122.37	101.20
Prob>Chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	558	556	623	616	362	363	309	309	307	304

*Notes: The models are negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses; significance are presented, whereby: *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01.*

Appendix 6 – Extensive description of control variables

The project's objective is to develop systematic knowledge about the organizational development as well as the political strategies of civil society organizations, interest groups, lobby groups and advocacy organizations. The aim is to achieve a better understanding of the daily operations of civil society organizations across different national settings. For this purpose, the project involves various surveys and the systematic mapping of the interest group populations in different European countries, including the EU-level. At this moment large surveys have been conducted in Slovenia, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Italy, and the EU-level in the first phase. In the second stage Poland and Spain were included, and additional surveys are planned for the Czech Republic, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Table A1. Distribution among group types across countries (in %)

Type	BE	NL	SL	IT	EU
Business	42	33	41	40	56
Union	2	1	8	17	1
Identity	15	22	14	17	11
Public	14	14	8	18	15
Leisure	20	13	22	3	2
Institutional	3	16	2	5	8
Rest	5	0	2	0	7
N	958	875	439	478	892

In all countries, samples of organizations were collected in the same rigorous manner. That is, the mapping was done based on at least two sources. One focusing on registries not necessarily related to lobbying, such as a register of all public affairs officials in a country. The second source is a list of lobbyists of which we know that they were lobbying, such as parliament registry files. In combination they provide us the most accurate set of actors which have a (potential) interest in lobbying. Moreover, as the procedures were similar in all countries, it allowed us to compare the data sources across countries. The response rate is quite evenly distributed across countries in our analysis. More precisely, response rates were as follows, from lowest to highest: Italy (32%); Slovenia (36%); EU (36%); Netherlands (38%); Belgium (41%).

While such response rates are quite good for interest groups surveys (Marchetti, 2015), an important condition is that the responses are equally distributed among key group types. For this reason, all country teams spent many resources in generating response rates reflected in the overall sample. For instance, respondents were called in case they did not respond to requests to motivate them to fill in the survey. Hereby certain underrepresented groups were prioritized to make sure the sample is as valid as possible. The distribution across group type is listed in Table A1. Overall, the distribution among group type reflects other mapping studies, whereby business groups are the largest set of interest groups (ranging between 33 to 51 percent), followed by NGOs (identity and public interest groups). Moreover, we also see that the percentage of business groups in the EU is at 56 percent, which is line with other studies highlighting that that business groups dominate interest group communities more at the EU level than at the national level. This is a first indication that any biases in the selection and/or response rates of group types should not be preoccupying.

Another indication that our results (see results of control variables) do not suffer from excessive bias is given by comparisons with other existing research, which uses different datasets. Most studies (like ours) find that there is little variation in access between business groups and NGOs (see Hanegraaff and Berkhout, 2019) and that instead more resourceful and professionalized organizations gain more access (Dür and Mateo, 2016). This strengthens our confidence that we are working with a valid sample.

In short, the samples are certainly not perfect, but the best available and representative of European interest communities, at least as far as the above factors are concerned. Moreover, based on the results we have no indication that there is a systematic bias in our data to invalidate our claims made in this paper compared to findings in other projects. We are therefore confident that the claims we make in this paper can be generalized to the populations of the respective countries under study.

Appendix 7 – Extensive description of control variables

Control Variable	**Questions/coding scheme**
Type of organization	Eight categories stemming from the INTERARENA coding scheme (Binderkrantz et al. 2014; see http://interarena.dk/): business groups, professional associations, labour unions, identity groups, cause groups, leisure groups, associations of institutions and public authorities (labelled institutional associations). We group together the business groups (business and professional organizations), citizen groups (identity and cause groups) and a rest category grouping together the rest.
Budget	We asked about the annual operating budgets of the organizations for 2016 in euros. The answering categories range from less than 10,000 euros (=1) to 10 million euros (=8). We know from previous research that there is a correlation between an organization's budget and the attainment of funding (Persson and Edholm 2018, Crepaz and Hanegraaff 2019) and we therefore checked whether the association between these variables was high. The association is 0.19 (Cramer's V; $Chi^2 = 0.000$), which is a robust but not an overly strong association.
Professionalization	The index is based on the following questions: '*Organizations like yours can make decisions in different ways, such as consensus among individual members or board members or by voting procedures. Can you please indicate below how your organization primarily takes decisions in the following areas?*' Responses were recoded into decisions made by members, board members or senior staff. '*In general, when organizations like yours recruit new staff, they often seek to ensure that the following criteria are met: (a) "an understanding of and a commitment to organizational objectives" and (b) "professional qualification and expertise". If a candidate does not meet these criteria equally well, which of them do you prioritize?*' Then: '*Does your organization engage in staff*

	development activities?' Listed items were answered with no or yes. Finally: '*In general, does staff tend to advance their careers through your organization or leave it for positions in other organizations?*' Responses were recoded 0 for leaving for other organizations and 1 for advancing a career in the organization. All measures were standardized and then combined into index of professionalization.
Representation	We rely on a question concerning the extent to which an organization recognised its 'involvement in representing members' as one of its key objectives. Groups that answered positively are used as the reference category.
Competition	We rely on the following question: '*In general, how much competition does your organization face from other organizations in its attempts to recruit members, increase donations, or obtain EU or national government funding?'* Respondents could choose between five categories, ranging from 'no competition' (=1) to 'very strong competition' (=5).
Age	Number of years an organization exists (2017 minus year of constitution)
Robustness checks	**Questions/coding scheme**
Attitude	Attitudes towards the government are measured through the following question: "In general, how would you characterize the relationship between your organization and the national government authorities? (Note: for the EU organizations the question relates to EU government authorities). Answers vary between very co-operative, moderately co-operative, moderately conflictual, to very conflictual.
Size of grant	What was the annual operating budget of your organization in [year of survey] in Euros? Under 100,000 (1); 100,000 - 500,000 (2); 500,000 - 1 million (3); 1 million - 5 million (4); 5 million - 10 million (5); Over 10 million (6); Don't know (7). This was

	multiplied by the size of the grant as the percentage of the total budget: Many organizations get financial support from different sources. Please indicate the percentage of your organization's 2014 budget that came from the various sources listed below: Funding from national governments (for EU sample: Funding from the European Union).

References

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