Policing citizenship

Norms, forms and affects of urban security in Recife, Brazil

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

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Carolina M. Frossard

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ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
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ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
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Foreword

The doctoral research that resulted in this thesis was funded by a Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) VIDI grant, under the project titled "The Politics of Security: The Impacts of Public-Private Security Assemblages on Governance and Citizenship". This project was developed in articulation with the "Transforming Citizenship through Hybrid Governance: The Impacts of Public-Private Security Assemblages" project, funded by an ERC Starting Grant. Led by Prof. dr. Rivke Jaffe, the two projects explored different dimensions of urban security governance in relation to citizenship, in five different cities: Miami, Kingston, Recife, Nairobi, and Jerusalem. The other researchers who participated in this endeavour are Francesco Colona, Thijs Jeursen, Lior Volinz, Tessa Diphoorn, Erella Grassiani, Francesca Pilo', Frank Müller and Patrick Weir.

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List of Figures

All the illustrations in this thesis were developed in collaboration with architect Andrés Novo. Unless stated otherwise, these were based on photographs and screenshots taken by the author.

List of Acronyms

ACS-PE	Associação de Cabos e Soldados de Pernambuco (Pernambuco's Association of Privates and Corporals)
ACIDES	Academia Integrada de Defesa Social (Integrated Academy of Social Defence)
BNH	Banco Nacional de Habitação (National Housing Bank)
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CIODS	Centro Integrado de Operações de Defesa Social (Centre of Integrated Social Defence Operations)
DOR	Programa De Olho na Rua (With an Eye on the Street)
FIESP	Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo)
EMLURB	Empresa de Manutenção e Limpeza Urbana (Urban Maintenance and Cleaning Company)
MCMV	Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life Programme)
PAC	Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Programme for Growth Acceleration)
PJES	Programa de Jornada Extra em Segurança (Security Overtime Programme)
PM	Polícia Militar (Military Police)
PPO	Posto de Policiamento Ostensivo (Ostensive Policing Post)

PREZEIS	Plano de Regularização das Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social (Regularization Plan of Special Social Interest Zones)
PSB	Partido Socialist Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party)
SDS	Secretaria de Defesa Social (Secretariat of Social Defence)
SECOVI-PE	Sindicato da Habitação – Pernambuco (Housing Sector Union – Pernambuco)
SINDESV-PE	Sindicato dos Vigilantes – Pernambuco (Security Guards Union – Pernambuco)
SUDENE	Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (Superintendence for Development of the Northeast)
URB	Autarquia de Urbanização do Recife (Recife Urban Development Corporation)
UPP	Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Unit)
ZEIS	Zona Especial de Interesse Social (Special Social Interest Zones)

Chapter One

Introduction: Policing Citizenship

On an early April day, in 2017, hundreds of smartphones chimed and buzzed to the same WhatsApp message. The vast majority of devices belonged to residents of the Brazilian city of Recife, all of whom had at some point been added to messaging groups dedicated to policing their respective South Zone neighbourhoods. Some were owned by the military police (PM) officers who drew on these very groups for information about activities deemed suspicious or criminal. One of the mobile devices belonged to me, a Brazilian doctoral researcher who had just returned to Amsterdam, after five and a half months of fieldwork in Recife, the capital city of Pernambuco, in the north-east of the country. The WhatsApp message had been sent by a high-ranking officer of the local military police battalion, an enthusiast of the use of this digital tool for strengthening the ties between civilians and state policing. In the message, he emphasized how much law enforcement needed the participation of the community – "the *good* community". Participation, he explained, consisted of sharing detailed information on criminal occurrences, such as the specific location, height, clothing and number of "elements", whether they were armed, and so on. This was what the police needed, according to him, in order to act quickly and surgically. "This Battle is ours", he wrote, "and together we will win".

The message went on to highlight, however, that the military police also had its limitations. Even though they were on the job 24 hours a day, they could not be everywhere at the same time. Unlike "the good community". In addition to passing on information, the officer instructed the omnipresent mass of "good citizens" to adopt preventive behaviours, in order to reduce the risk of becoming potential victims. Avoiding ostentatious displays of

pricey belongings, for instance, was one of the safety instructions the officer shared. "In case you have not seen them yet", he wrote, "and you wish to receive some security tips, all you have to do is ask and we will gladly share them". He signed off with *um forte abraço para a comunidade do bem* – a strong hug, addressed again to "the good community" or, more precisely, to "the community *of the good*".

The WhatsApp users on the receiving end of the policeman's "big hug" were unevenly distributed across two areas that were seldom lumped together as members of a shared collective when it came to matters of (in)security. One set among the celebrated neighbourhood surveillance groups "covered" Jardim[1] – a mostly upper- and middle-class area where vertical residential condominiums clustered, often named after fancy-sounding foreign words and places. On a single Jardim street, for instance, one might find the Château de Malmont, alongside the Lake View Residential, and the Villa Felicittá. Another group, more recent and much smaller than the first, connected residents of União, a densely populated working-class area framed as a *comunidade* within and beyond state policing circles. Even though *comunidade* is often used as a substitute for the term *favela* in an attempt to avoid the stigma associated with the latter word (Valladares, 2016 [2005]), both monikers are ordinarily deployed to refer to urban spaces that are deemed marginal to the "formal" city, and that are predominantly occupied by low-income, negatively racialized populations. In sum, even though Jardim and União are close enough to share a military police area battalion, within dominant spatial imaginaries of Recife, they are worlds apart.

In spite of the two areas' very different positioning in the city's official crime mappings, and in everyday representations of violence and security, with a few taps of the officer's fingers on the touchscreen of his smartphone, WhatsApp users in Jardim and União were fleetingly grouped together as one single – and "good" – community. In the officer's message, their *goodness* stemmed from their adoption of behaviours related to policing their

1 Throughout this thesis, I anonymize the research sites, a move that I discuss at the end of this chapter. "Jardim" is one of such place pseudonyms.

surroundings and themselves: specifically, their willingness to share detailed information with street-level police officers, while taking on a share of the responsibility for self-policing. As he instructed them on what "good" behaviour consisted of, he also celebrated their decision to join fellow citizens and military police, in the first place, in these recently inaugurated digital spaces for urban surveillance. Who and what they were fighting against was left implicit, but "*together they would win*".

This opening vignette introduces the topic of this thesis, which analyses *how norms and values pertaining to citizenship and authority are shared, negotiated and performed in the everyday spaces, practices and encounters that make up urban security in Recife*. Throughout this dissertation, I seek to understand in particular *how* this happens: how are citizenship and authority normativities produced and reproduced by the people and things enrolled in securing Recife? In other words, how are notions of "good" and "bad" citizens and policing, broadly understood, performed within urban security arrangements – such as the described WhatsApp policing groups? Understanding what these citizenship and authority norms consist of, and how they are produced, maintained and contested within the realm of urban security, is not an end in itself, though. Here, it serves as a fresh entry point into understanding *how security practices and narratives affect the production and maintenance of difference and inequality in Recife* – currently ranked as the most unequal amongst Brazil's state capitals (Agência IBGE, 2020).

To illustrate how I approach this broader question on urban inequality, I return to the WhatsApp policing groups dedicated to Jardim and União. In Jardim, the "good community" of WhatsApp participants kept growing in numbers and its members are still – in mid-2021, as I write these pages – very much active in sharing multimedia content they value as security-relevant with their neighbours and state security actors. The group that started out as "Policing União", though, had a very different fate. In late 2019, roughly two and a half years after it was first introduced, an União resident shared a video that created a digital stir, breaking the digital, real-time connection between the group's resident-participants and military police officers. In the roughly four-minute video, three policemen are shown in a tussle with a

man who seems to be resisting arrest on one of União's busiest streets. The scene is a hectic one. In the short and shaky footage – filmed with a handheld smartphone that frantically tried to follow the action as it happened – three policemen attempt to get a man into their car, while surrounded by civilians. While they do not physically intervene, the rallying witnesses watch closely as they protest the arrest and the forcefulness with which it is carried out. Some are filming with their phones, while overlapping, yet distinguishable, objections to the scene are yelled repeatedly in the background:

This is wrong!

He's a worker (*trabalhador*)!

You're going to break his arm!

You can't do that!

You are wrong!

That's cowardly!

As soon as the trio of military police officers manage to shove the União resident into the back of the police car, they slam the doors shut and drive off, without addressing the active bystanders. The video ends abruptly and a curse, shouted at the police car as it drives away and out of sight, is left hanging: "SONS-OF-A-".

Later that day, the video of the arrest was forwarded into the "Policing União" WhatsApp group, which I had been a part of since its inauguration in 2017. It sparked a lively discussion. Without naming him, one participant vouched for the arrestee's character, confirming he was indeed "a worker" (*trabalhador*) – which, in this context, was a way to affirm that he was not a criminal (*bandido*). Another commented that policemen on the streets were sometimes unprepared, implicitly suggesting that this could cause situations to escalate, unintentionally. Other participants recorded audio

messages and typed up questions, asking for more information on what had prompted the arrest, and why the use of force had been deemed necessary. Not all participants were as diplomatic as the ones stating that they were too uninformed to judge the situation, though. "What happened was simply abuse of authority", one resident intervened, ending with: "This is not the police I want in my neighbourhood".

One policeman in the group responded by saying that it was very hard for them to work with "a resistant population" and that the man must have done something to justify the treatment he had received from law enforcement: "those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear" (*quem não deve não teme*). As the back-and-forth escalated into more polarized positions on what the group had watched collectively, one military police officer decided to leave the group, stating that he would not accept criticism from people who did not believe in police work and who "threw stones" before knowing the reasons behind police actions. Without saying or typing anything further, other PM officers followed his example.

[+55 81 8456-XXXX left]

[+55 81 8765-XXXX left]

[+55 81 8564-XXXX left]

[+55 81 8234-XXXX left]

Once most police officers had left the group in protest of the protesting civilians, the shared digital policing space lost its intended purpose. The next day, the group was flooded with pictures that had little to do with security: they advertised a resident's homemade *bolos de rolo* (guava roll cakes). Even though many participants trickled out of it from then onwards, the WhatsApp group and its media archive still exist today, as a mostly static artefact of a security arrangement no longer in use. That arrangement broke down with the mediated clash between policemen and civilians over what the shared space ought to be used for, and how they ought to perform

their respective roles within it. The "oughtness" (Barnett, 2014, p. 152) that the Jardim and União WhatsApp activities performed started out on the same note, aligned with the (self-)policing norms that the military police officer enunciated for the community in his message to the "good" people in both areas. However, the exchange that took place in the União group over whether a recorded security encounter had been legitimate, and who was in the position to question this, enacted clashing positions. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, this normative rift put into question whether the military police and the residents of União could ever fully be on the same side of a security "battle". The classed and racialized sociospatial inequalities reflected in the video and its heated reception existed both offline and online. In the end, the video's aesthetics were key in generating an affective intensity that fuelled the WhatsApp group's *de facto* dissolution.

Together, the two digital ethnography events described above efficiently encapsulate this dissertation's approach to its two overarching questions: *How are norms of citizenship and authority (re)produced through everyday urban security practices? How do these practices affect the production and maintenance of sociospatial difference and inequality in Recife?* As suggested above, the citizenship and authority norms performed in – and in reaction to – urban security's aesthetic forms do not stay put. Much like state and non-state security actors, and the ordinary citizens enrolled in securing Recife, these norms circulate, and often across spaces that *recifenses* and policing workers commonly perceive and enact as different worlds, when it comes to law-breaking and law-enforcing. As the vignettes illustrate, though, this circulation of norms – this processual and relational crafting of commonality – is far from smooth, or frictionless, serving as a fruitful entry point into how security reflects and reproduces unequal urban orders. In this dissertation, I argue that, in Recife's highly fragmented and unequal urban landscape, city-level security arrangements enact shared normative horizons – common "battles" and sides within it – even as they deepen the material and symbolic divides between the city's "fragments". As I argue throughout this dissertation, urban security's forms and affects are key to this normative circulation *and* to its multiple chokepoints.

This dissertation builds on earlier urban studies insights into how "divided city" tropes may obscure more than they reveal. Dualisms such as centre vs. periphery, formal vs. informal, *morro* vs. *asfalto* ("hill" vs. "asphalt", a contrast that is key to Rio de Janeiro) do not leave much space – in our conceptual frames and dominant spatial imaginaries – for the longstanding economic, political and cultural connections between these polarities (see, for instance, Leeds and Leeds, 2015 [1978]; Perlman, 1977; Telles, 2010; Valladares, 2016 [2005]). When it comes to the realm of urban (in)security, the role of policing in maintaining and aggravating racialized and classed inequalities in urban Brazil has been the focus of a significant body of scholarship (see Alves, 2014a, 2014b, 2016; Costa Vargas and Alves, 2010; Wacquant, 2008, alongside many others cited throughout this dissertation). However, as this dissertation shows, urban security repertoires also rely on and engender a *shared* normative language for sorting through urban citizens, authorities, and spaces – dynamics that have often receded into the background of scholarly engagements with policing.

My approach to the norms performed by urban security forms and the affects they engender draws on Jacques Rancière's (2013) "distribution of the sensible". This concept refers to "the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it" (Rancière, 2013, p. 7). Different dimensions of what we would loosely call *art* have been central in the author's scholarship. However, for Rancière (2015, p. 8), the realm of *aesthetics* is broader than the formal attributes of artworks. In fact, it encompasses "the sensible" in a wide sense, as that what is perceptible. To engage the sensible as a matter of distribution/partition (Chambers, 2013) is to think through how a commonality is established, and of who may partake in this process and how. It involves recognizing how sensible, aesthetic forms are central to processes of political subject formation, or *subjectification* (Rancière, 1999, p. 35).

Geographer Asher Ghertner (2015) has productively translated Rancière's understanding of the partition of the sensible into the field of urban studies and the theme of urban development. More specifically, through this lens,

he was able to analyse the making of New Delhi into a "world-class city" as a process ruled by an "aesthetic normativity", rather than by techniques of mapping and counting (Ghertner, 2015, p. 185). This means that carrying out a series of large-scale urban transformations required what Ghertner (ibid.) frames as the cultivation of a shared – and appealing – image for the city's future, and, concomitantly, of a "viewing public" that partakes in such an image. This is a proposition that resonates with this thesis' engagement with the norms enacted in urban security's multiple sensible forms. Throughout the thesis, I am interested in understanding how crafting the *look and feel* of security is a process that involves the making of subjects, who share a common *sense* of what security is, or should be.

This *aesthetic normativity* that Ghertner (2015) refers to – shared even among those who are adversely impacted by its city-level effects – echoes what Rancière (2015, p. 44) frames as the "police order", a distribution of the sensible that lies in stark opposition with politics. Here, "the police" does not refer to state policing actors. It is, rather, a metaphor deployed to refer to a partitioning of the sensible in which society "is made up of groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places" (Rancière, 2015, p. 44). The "neatness" of this sensible distribution – or this aesthetic *consensus* – contrasts with politics as *dissensus* (Rancière, 2015), as a contingent disruption or intervention in what can be perceived and expressed, that cannot be institutionalized. The "police order" can be, perhaps, tethered to policy, but is antithetical to politics.

This contrast is evident in the two vignettes that this chapter started with. In the first one, the emoji-filled message that made its way into the intimate spaces between Recife citizens and their smartphones was a sensible instance of the police order, both literally and metaphorically. As the people and places on the receiving end of the message were placed on a single side of a diffuse security battle, any tensions between them were smoothed over. The perfectly complementary parts of police and "community" were clearly ascribed, while the officer's message also delineated unambiguously what content should be visible and sharable within the group, as citizens went

about their daily lives. In the second ethnographic illustration, the recording of a contested arrest by the military police intervened in, and briefly disrupted, this partition. The debate that ensued performed what Rancière (2015, p. 45) would perhaps frame as *dissensus*, or "two worlds in one". While those who participated in the group had been included for their "good citizenship" (more on this in Chapter Four) and their desire to improve their ties with the military police, they also identified with those victimized by aggressive military police practices – a tension that disrupted the WhatsApp group's premise and permanently interrupted the digital policing space.

These digital policing encounters also involve an evident affective component – a dimension that is incidental within the work of both Rancière (2013, 2015) and Ghertner (2015), but that has been central to the scholarship of many feminist social theorists, human geographers, and anthropologists (e.g., Ahmed, 2004; Anderson, 2014; Bargetz, 2015; Fregonese, 2017; Jaffe et al., 2020; Navaro-Yashin, 2012; Osbourne, 2018; Stewart, 2007). This affective element is key, I suggest, to both the police order and its disruption. More specifically, it is a central element in the everyday crafting of security. In the empirical cases that I analyse in this thesis – which include, but are not limited to, the use of WhatsApp for neighbourhood-level policing and surveillance in Jardim and União – urban security norms and forms not only emerge in response to a collective sense of urban *insecurity*. They are also mobilised to actively engender affective atmospheres (Anderson, 2014) of *safety*. At the same time, the sensible elements through which security is both perceived and expressed also produce additional affects such as despondency, indignation, and – most importantly here – an affective "sense of inequality" (cf. Bottero, 2019). As will become clear, this shared *sense of inequality* does not necessarily lead to emancipatory political outcomes in reaction to Recife's deep-seated social inequities. However, this political affect – which reproduces inequality and a differentiated subjectivity in relation to security in urban space – is an important piece of the puzzle of how the field of urban security shapes citizenship norms, and in so doing affects the (re)production of social and spatial differentiation in the city.

The approach that I develop here – with its focus on norms, forms and

affect – builds on and extends urban studies literature on the relationship between urban policing and sociospatial inequalities, understood broadly (e.g., Caldeira, 2000; Dinzey-Flores, 2013; Low, 2003). Where these discussions have been largely tethered to the symbolic and discursive dimensions of spatial separation, this thesis takes on the shared citizenship norms that circulate through ubiquitous forms of urban security in Recife. In so doing, it foregrounds the material, embodied and affective experiences of citizens, policing workers, and "policing citizens". My emphasis on the production of commonality through the city-wide circulation of these norms, forms and affects does not mean to suggest that an emancipatory, equalizing political project is developing in Recife, pushed forward by "good" citizens and "good" policing actors, fighting the "good" battle. Rather, by interrogating how these "goods" are performed, negotiated, and resisted through urban security aesthetics and affects, I seek to extend our understanding of how securing the city reproduces and upholds unequal urban orders. While this dissertation does not suggest that urban divides will be dismantled under the guise, or as a reaction to, urban (in)security, a focus on shared norms, forms and affects reveals possible openings in the seemingly impenetrable material and affective barriers that divide the city both socially and spatially.

Urban policing and the making of unequal orders

The remainder of this chapter delves further into the elements introduced above. In what follows, I discuss the scholarly debates on security, citizenship and authority that this dissertation aims to extend; outline the theoretical framework that grounds my intervention into these debates; and describe the methodological and representational choices that shaped this research. As I outline below, this first section introduces contemporary scholarship on urban security in/and unequal citizenship regimes, focusing on three main clusters of research. While the first foregrounds *who polices* (e.g., Beall et al., 2013; Davis, 2010, 2020; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007, 2015; Muggah, 2014), and the second *who is policed* (e.g., Alves, 2014a, 2014b, 2016,

2018; Costa Vargas, 2018; Hansen, 2006; Denyer Willis, 2015; Mbembe, 2003), the third cluster explores how authority and citizenship are performed and negotiated relationally in everyday *policing encounters* (e.g., Fassin, 2013; Harriott and Jaffe, 2018).

I go on to contend that a focus on the norms, forms and affects of urban security, in bringing to the fore the subjective, normative groundings of citizenship and authority, adds grain to our understanding of how security encounters work to both normalize and unsettle citizenship differentiation. As this thesis shows, such encounters are not restricted to interactions between police and policed: in addition to enrolling a range of state and non-state actors, these encounters are mediated by security materialities, technologies, and the affects and atmospheres these engender. My conceptualization of the politics of urban policing combines an anthropological engagement with everyday processes of subject and community formation (specifically as developed within the anthropology of citizenship, e.g., Holston, 2008; de Koning et al., 2015; Lazar, 2013; Isin, 2008; Ong, 1996) with recent approaches to the political that foreground its aesthetic and affective dimensions (e.g., Adey, 2014; Bargetz, 2015; Anderson, 2014; Ghertner, 2014; Ghertner et al., 2019; Rancière, 2013, 2015).

Plural policing, urban fractures

For the past several years, cities – especially those in the so-called "Global South" – have been at the centre of academic debates on conflict and (in)security, drawing a level of attention and concern that, in the past, might have been dedicated to the nation-state (Beall et al., 2013; Graham, 2010). Echoing earlier debates on the "fragile state", the emergence of the term "fragile city" (Koonings and Kruijt, 2015; Muggah, 2014) is indicative of this move. Robert Muggah suggests that the "fragility" of cities is intimately connected to *who* governs and provides security: in these contexts, "[u]rban elites – especially elected and appointed political authorities – may lose the ability to formally regulate, much less monopolize, the legitimate use of violence" (Muggah, 2014, p. 347). However, this fragility is not equally distributed

across the urban environments that the term is deployed to characterize. It tends to be mapped onto specific neighbourhoods, where coercive power is not restricted to state actors, but where policing authority may be contested by different state and non-state entities (Davis, 2006, 2020; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Muggah, 2014).

Influential analyses of *who* does the securing, often focusing on Latin American cities, have attributed high levels of violence and criminality to low degrees of state presence (O'Donnell, 1993), or "governance voids" (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007: 3). Such scholarship often regards this absence of state actors, or their failure to safeguard the rule of law, as a key factor in the emergence of parallel sources of authority (Leeds, 1996) at the urban margins, seen as challenges to formal governance structures. In areas deemed lacking in state control, illicit and transnational networks may constitute alternative sources of authority at the local level, eliciting alternate loyalties from citizens with little reason for trusting the state system (Davis, 2020, p. 211). At the city level, the fragmentation of territorial control (Davis, 2010, 2020) is often analysed in relation to processes of socio-spatial fragmentation and differentiation (Glebbeek and Koonings, 2016) or the emergence of "dual cities" (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007). "Plural policing" – the co-existence of multiple state and non-state security actors – is seen to both reflect and worsen such socio-spatial developments. This scholarship has also examined neoliberal policies at the macro level as important aggravators of such inequalities, as austerity measures that limit public spending constrain the state's capacity to protect the urban poor (Davis, 2020; Koonings and Kruijt, 2015).

More recently, another set of attempts at making sense of how (in)security is governed in cities regarded as chronically violent, in and beyond Latin America, began calling the notion of "state absence" into question. Similarly concerned with the production of socio-spatial difference, and often ethnographically oriented, this scholarship has drawn our attention to the many ways that the state is very much present at the urban margins (Auyero et al., 2014; Koonings and Kruijt, 2015; Rodgers, 2006; Sotomayor, 2017), even if this presence is largely harmful to the residents of these areas. Such recent

engagements with the state's role in governing and policing areas where other violent actors operate have challenged the "separateness" implied in conceptualizations of *parallel*, or *alternative*, forms of governance, foregrounding the entangled nature of security provision in the city (Albrecht and Kyed, 2015; Kyed, 2019; Telle, 2013). Rather than necessarily at odds with each other, state and non-state violent actors may coexist durably within contemporary, *violent* democracies (Arias and Goldstein, 2010).

Within these plural policing orders, the boundaries between formal and informal, state and non-state, are often blurred (Grassiani and Diphoorn, 2019). Drawing from the case of garrison communities in Kingston, Jamaica, Rivke Jaffe (2013) contends that the entanglements of criminal leaders and state governance actors is generative of a "hybrid state", whose duties include, but are not limited to, the ordering of (in)security in the city. The literature on policing beyond the state has also shed light on actors beyond criminal authorities, such as commercial private security companies (Diphoorn, 2016), but also *citizens*, ranging from vigilant (Jeursen, 2019) to vigilante (Telle, 2013).

Citizenship, more broadly, has been deployed as a frame to make sense of the inequalities that emerge from plural policing orders. From the mostly regional and development studies debates that zoom in on cities deemed dual, fractured, and so on, adjectives such as *differentiated, second-class*, *resilient*, *authoritarian*, and *resistant* have been deployed to qualify "citizenship" in relation to (in)security (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007, 2015; Pearce, 2017). These complements have foregrounded what Engin Isin (2008) has called the *content* of citizenship – which refers to rights and responsibilities – as well as its habitual *practices*. "Differentiated citizenship", for instance, "uses social differences that are *not* the basis of national membership – primarily differences of education, property, race, gender, and occupation – to distribute different treatment to different categories of citizens" (Holston, 2008, p. 7). In this influential conceptualization, which is grounded empirically in James Holston's anthropological and historical engagement with Brazil's citizenship regime, the social differences he lists intersect to separate the "deserving" members of the nation's political community, from those who

are equal in terms of citizenship *status*, but not in their substantial access to rights and entitlements. Similarly, "second-class citizenship" (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007: 8) points to the rights that many are excluded from enjoying fully, even while included in terms of legal status.

Insurgent, resilient, resistant and authoritarian citizenship are terms that seek to conceptualize how these same populations "make do" in, or react to, their differentiation into second-classness, in contexts often marked by failures in security governance. Insurgent citizenship "disrupts established formulas of rule, conceptions of right, and hierarchies of social place and privilege" (Holston, 2008, p. 274). Focusing more directly on insecurity, resilient citizenship emerges through everyday practices that range from *coping with* to *transforming* violently unequal urban orders (Koonings and Kruijt, 2015). And while authoritarian citizens are those who deny the rights of others in the name of their own security, their resistant counterparts go against the grain to denounce violent systems, and formulate solutions aimed at interrupting their dynamics (Pearce 2017, p. 127).

This scholarship on plural policing and fractured cities emphasizes that substantive access to the full range of entitlements and obligations that (should) accompany citizenship as a socio-legal status is elusive to many. Full citizenship rights are, nonetheless, presented as a worthwhile pursuit for second-class citizens of fractured urban contexts – be it through their resilient tactics or resistant claims. This literature implicitly or explicitly suggests that second-class citizens can be included in the polity and that policing and security policies can be reformed. This does not hold within the debate I sketch out in the following section, in which the focus on who is (lethally) policed draws our attention to fundamental limits of the *extent* of citizenship (Isin, 2008, p. 37), that is the terms for inclusion and exclusion.

Punitive projects, killable subjects

A body of literature distinct from that discussed in the previous section is also concerned with analysing the "spatial differentiation of policing"

(Glebbeek and Koonings, 2015, p. 7). In contrast to the often more development-oriented literature, the scholarship that I discuss in this section focuses not so much on who is involved in policing, but on *who is policed*, or fatally victimized, by different forms of policing authority. It frames the unequal distribution of (in)security as a political *project*, rather than as a symptom of urban governance fractures, failures, or constraints exacerbated by neoliberal restructuring. This literature frequently mobilises Giorgio Agamben's (1998, p. 12) approach to sovereign power, which centres its relation to "bare life", or "that whose exclusion founds the city of men" – a conceptual lens that has proved influential amongst political theorists (e.g., Mbembe, 2003) and anthropologists of the state (e.g., Hansen and Stepputat, 2005; Hansen, 2006). In other words, this scholarship is less interested in who *polices*, and more in the subjects that are consistently construed as "killable" by state and non-state violent actors. The making of "killable" subjects and states of exception, as Agamben (1998) contends, is not external to (Western) political orderings and communities, but key to their maintenance.

Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 39) develops this approach in starting from the assumption that "the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die" (Mbembe, 2003, p. 11). In his formulation of "necropolitics", or the "contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death", Mbembe (2003, p. 11) explores historical and contemporary forms of colonial occupation and the politics of racialization. This approach both influences and resonates with recent attempts to make sense of these dynamics in relation to who lives and who dies in contemporary cities.

This understanding of necropolitics is articulated explicitly in Jaime Amparo Alves' *The Anti-Black City* (2018), which revolves around the anti-Blackness that produces the racialized geography of police violence in the Brazilian metropolis of São Paulo, and the forms of resistance it triggers. As Alves (2018: 3) argues, "police terror is a symptom of neither dysfunctional nor failed democracies; rather, anti-black policing creates conditions of possibility for the making of the 'city of man' … an anti-black social formation where whites exercise their civil rights". In a somewhat similar vein, but

with a slightly different focus, Loïc Wacquant (2008, p. 56) frames the militarized security measures taken against stigmatized spaces and racialized populations of urban Brazil as part of a "punitive containment" strategy that is not a *side effect* of neoliberalism, but a policy integral to its expansion. According to these and other authors, not only is the state present at the racialized urban margins, but punitively and lethally so (Alves, 2014a, 2014b, 2016, 2018; Costa Vargas, 2018; Wacquant, 2008).

Urban security authorities that are part of the state system are not the only actors upholding the division between subjects who are "killable" and those who are not, however. As Graham Denyer-Willis (2015, p. 12) contends, drawing on the convergences between how police and organized crime (de)legitimate certain violent deaths in São Paulo, "rightful" killing "can be defined and carried out by multiple and seemingly antagonistic actors at the same time, and in quiet, routine, and everyday ways". This does not mean to imply, like others have in the past, that there are many and fragmented forms of authority that rule over discrete governance formations. Rather, in his formulation of the "killing consensus", Denyer-Willis (2015, p. 12) aims to foreground that lives deemed "disposable" by the state may be "disposed of" by a multiplicity of actors, who tend to converge around dominant – and expansive – notions of "deservedness", which correlate strongly with racialized and classed spatial markers.

In this exploration of how state police and the organized crime group Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) regulate both life and death in São Paulo, Denyer-Willis (2015) calls for scholarly analyses to engage groups such as the PCC as more than marginal. While acknowledging that PCC results from social and economic marginality, the author highlights its influence and importance over São Paulo's "margins" *and* its "centres" (Denyer-Willis, 2015, p. 9). Alves (2018, p. 168) also calls for a reframing of how we engage PCC, but is less concerned with acknowledging the criminal group as a relevant urban governance actor than he is with recognizing "the criminal agency of young black men". With this analytical move, he aims to add to the scholarship that has extensively dealt with the victimization of Black men in urban Brazil, while disregarding their roles in urban forms of resistance.

While dedicated to how life and death are inequitably regulated by state and non-state actors in urban Brazil, both Denyer-Willis (2015) and Alves (2018) attempt to go beyond the identification of bare life; they also locate power and resistance in spaces and amongst populations that are often reduced to their assumed "marginality". When it comes to citizenship, though, the literature focused on who dies at the hands of state and non-state urban security actors tends to focus on the making of *non-citizens*. In what Costa Vargas and Alves (2010, p. 612) refer to as a "racialized regime of (non)citizenship", non-citizens may be able to contest, or resist (Alves, 2018), inherently discriminatory urban security regimes. The pursuit of inclusion, however, is ontologically futile, since its normative grounds are already embedded in a political project built on the exclusion of killable subjects.

Policing encounters, subjectivities and communities

The making of subjects deemed disposable is a key part of how urban policing differentiates amongst citizens in its maintenance of unequal orders. As this section discusses, though, it does not exhaustively account for the interplay of urban policing and (non-)citizenship. While the scholarship discussed above focuses on how security provision shapes citizenship as membership of a particular, pre-existing political community, the largely anthropological literature presented here foregrounds the ongoing *making* of political communities and subjects through security practices and encounters. Rather than departing from normative assumptions regarding how state and non-state forms of policing shape inclusion in the urban or national polity and access to the associated citizenship rights, political anthropologists have tended to foreground how citizenship and the state are lived, performed, and negotiated in everyday life (e.g., Das and Poole, 2004; Fassin, 2013; Harriott and Jaffe, 2018; Jaffe, 2013; Telle, 2013). Centring the everyday relationships and encounters between policing actors and those policed, this debate adds a processual understanding of how the citizenship typologies and inequalities presented earlier shape lived experiences.

For instance, in his influential ethnography of French police in the Parisian *banlieues*, anthropologist Didier Fassin (2013) engages the productive nature of policing in relation to subject formation, drawing on Louis Althusser's (1976) notion of interpellation and state ideology. The allegory is a simple, but evocative one: a police officer hails an individual on the street and, by turning around, the person submits to the policeman's authority (Fassin, 2013, p. 6, drawing on Althusser, 1976). Subjection to a form of domination, as Fassin (2013) explains, aided by Foucault (1982), is one piece of the puzzle of how authority makes subjects out of individuals: one's submission to power also involves subjectification, or how one self-identifies and self-constructs, in relation to the role assigned. This allegorical framing of interpellation travels well as an entry point into actual urban policing work. More often composed of boring patrols than of spectacles of lethal violence (Fassin 2013, p. 68), ordinary policing routines have emerged as fruitful entry points into how political subjects self-make – and are made – in relation to authority (cf. Ong, 1996).

The notion of "security encounter", as discussed by Anthony Harriott and Rivke Jaffe (2018) grounds this dynamic usefully. In an approach that echoes Begoña Aretxaga (2003, p. 398) on the state as a reality produced through interactions that take place in the everyday, encounters between security providers and the public are sites in which both authority and citizenship are negotiated, as the parties involved "claim or reject their positioning as threatened, threatening, or protector" (Harriott and Jaffe, 2018, p. 82). As the authors note, these political performances are ways into understanding how policing actors enact their authority over people and places, and the citizenship inequalities they produce in the process (ibid.). At the same time that they reflect blatant power asymmetries, they also provide "some room for creatively negotiating and reconfiguring them" (Harriott and Jaffe, 2018, p. 83). Acknowledging this room for manoeuvre does not negate that there are citizens whom governing entities, and society at large, consistently construe as killable. However, it does call attention to the fact that the exercise of power – like that of citizenship – is not just a matter of fact, but one of contested claims, performances and practices (Harriott and Jaffe, 2018; Telle, 2013).

Anthropologies of the state more generally, and of citizenship in particular, have generated fine-grained accounts of how urban security shapes the (self-)making of political subjects and communities under a wide array of citizenship regimes. In so doing, this approach has added processual and relational grain to the differentiated citizenship typologies highlighted in the previous two sections. While my research is also interested in understanding who polices and who is policed, throughout this dissertation, I draw on this anthropological literature's sensitivities to the everyday, unpacking how different notions of "good citizenship" are enacted and negotiated in practices of security.

However, my research also seeks to extend the three distinct if interrelated bodies of literature discussed here. Specifically, my approach foregrounds elements that have so far been incidental to the urban studies literature on the citizenship-security nexus: the norms, forms and affects through which city dwellers experience security and the inequalities that they (re) produce. As I argue and demonstrate throughout this thesis, urban security aesthetics and the affective atmospheres they engender are central to the circulation of citizenship norms, which produce commonality as well as difference. The conceptual building blocks of this intervention are detailed in the next section.

Norms, forms and affects of urban security and citizenship

Norms

Anthropologist Sian Lazar (2013, p. 1) contends that, to "study citizenship is to study how we live with others in a political community". And to live with others and with ourselves, as Clive Barnett (2014) outlines, drawing on Georges Canguilhem (1991), is a normative activity – in a mundane, practical sense. Inspired by social science engagements that have, over the last decade, called attention to norms and morals in the everyday (e.g., Fassin, 2012;

Barnett, 2014; Heintz, 2009; Zigon, 2008; Sayer, 2011), also through frames such as "lay normativity" (Sayer, 2011) and "ordinary ethics" (Das, 2012), I explore what we might gain from investigating the citizenship-security nexus through everyday normative practices.

Recently, Anouk de Koning, Rivke Jaffe and Martijn Koster (2015, p. 121) have engaged the normative dimension of citizenship through what they termed as "citizenship agendas", which they define as "normative framings that prescribe what norms, values, and behaviour are appropriate for those claiming membership of a political community". This is an explicit reference to the converging, contrasting and ever-shifting value-laden articulations of what defines a "good citizen", both on paper and in practice, within a given citizenship regime. The (self-)governing of populations through the fostering of shared norms and codes of conduct was already quite central in Foucault's formulation of governmentality (Gordon, 1991), which has proven influential in studies of citizenship as subject formation (Ong, 1996, 2006), and its normative dimension (de Koning et al., 2015). The making of "good citizens" has been explored in various different ways: as a state project to foster love for the nation through the education of children (Benei, 2008); as a negotiated process between state, market actors, and citizens that also enrols material mediators (Pilo', 2020), and as the aim of a security policy assemblage targeting negatively racialized urban youth (de Koning, 2015) – to name just a few. From this diverse literature, the "good citizen" emerges as a productive category to think through the norms and values of dominant citizenship agendas in a given context, and how these are relationally tied to ideas of deviant and dangerous others, to political communities at different scales, and to state and non-state forms of authority.

Citizenship agendas, or the normative frames that shape how citizens ought to be within a political community, involve two relational dimensions that tie to a Foucauldian framing of subjectification (Ong, 1996, p. 79). At the same time that these agendas contain imposed norms to which a population is subjected, they also function as benchmarks that affect – though do not fully determine – how subjects valuate their actions and perform their self-worth. Here, I suggest that how people enact and navigate the

normative dimensions of citizenship does not fundamentally differ from broader everyday practices of normative valuation. Subjects' everyday normative lives – their everyday reasonings and sensitivities regarding good and bad, just and unjust, appropriate and inappropriate – are not detached from dominant social norms and conventions. However, echoing a point made earlier on how the "security encounter" (Harriott and Jaffe, 2018) is a site where political subjects are formed, hegemonic (citizenship) norms and normativities are not given, but are performed, negotiated and resisted in the everyday.

Teasing out the normative underpinnings of citizenship allows us to trace how the differentiation between "good" and "bad" citizens is enacted and subverted in ordinary encounters and relations, beyond those between citizens and the state. As Holston (2008, p. 256) points out, in reference to Teresa Caldeira (1984), amongst ordinary residents of a São Paulo periphery, being a citizen in legal terms was important to their sense of "deservingness", but so was being a morally decent worker (*trabalhador*). In terms of how they work to enact social difference and inequality, legal norms and everyday moralities may mutually inform each other, blurring the lines between "good citizen" and "decent person". Conversely, as Holston's analysis (2008, p. 253) also highlights, dominant citizenship agendas, even when inscribed into national legislative and institutional frameworks, can be unsettled by insurgent claims – to rights, land, the city – that perform alternative notions of (self-)worth.

A sensitivity to different normative articulations of citizenship may, thus, enable us to observe the ways in which these may coexist, in tension or coherence, within a single citizenship regime. For instance, the insurgent citizenship claims that emanated from the peripheries of São Paulo, as Holston (2008) explains, did perpetuate some of the normative underpinnings of differentiated citizenship, such as the centrality of property ownership – even as it unsettled deep-seated societal norms and political structures. This coexistence resonates with Evelina Dagnino's (2007a, p. 2471) argument on the "perverse confluence" that took place in Brazil's democratic transition, between the citizenship ideals that formed the basis of social movement

struggles, and the neoliberal project that also nested in the process. Though they shared a vocabulary that contained "citizenship", "participation", and "civil society" as "goods" to be sought, these were two quite different citizenship agendas, in dispute within and over one regime. The coexistence of antagonistic framings of "good citizenship" in relation to the same political community – in these two cases, urban and national Brazilian contexts, respectively – highlights the importance of going beyond the often deceptively cohesive vocabulary that these agendas mobilise, in order to understand the ways these are actualized and performed.

Practices of policing and urban security are central to how citizenship agendas are enforced and disseminated. Differentiating "bad" citizens from "good" ones – or assumed threats from vulnerable subjects who are worthy of protection – is key to how security practices produce and reproduce urban inequalities that are classed, gendered, and racialized. This normative division resonates quite clearly with the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy that debates I introduced earlier have grappled with. While the making of non-citizen – or "bad citizen" – has been central to thinking through how inequality and difference are produced and maintained in relation to policing, the "good citizen", or *cidadão de bem*, is usually taken for granted or left implicit. In this dissertation, I foreground how this normative category is performed relationally. Critically, I concentrate on *how* this relational performance takes shape, moving beyond a core focus on narratives to also include a consideration of urban security forms and the affects they elicit.

Forms

To speak of norms, or "the normative" (Miller, 2010), in terms of practice or performance is to imply that they are not (just) metaphysical abstractions, but things that take shape and form. In this dissertation, the forms in question are those of security encounters, repertoires and materialities, whose aesthetics enact circulating norms that differentiate between good and bad citizens and spaces. In other words, they consist of the sensorial and affective qualities that render norms intelligible. In this thesis, I extend the

scholarship on security's material forms by engaging their aesthetic attributes and how these relate to the antagonistic orders of politics and police (Rancière, 2015). In reference to Althusser's parable, in which an individual becomes a subject upon being hailed by the police, Jacques Rancière (2015) suggests an alternative allegory for the police's street-level political function. He contends that "police interventions in public spaces consist primarily not in *interpellating* demonstrators, but in *breaking up* demonstrations" (Rancière, 2015, p. 45, my emphasis). Instead of the "Hey, you there!" through which Althusser illustrates the capacity of policing to form subjects, Rancière points to "Move along! There is nothing to see here!" as the most adequate slogan for how policing orders society (ibid.).

With this evocative illustration, which is part of an all too familiar policing repertoire, Rancière suggests that it is not direct coercion, or control, that defines the police's primary purpose. Rather, its purpose is dividing up the sensible – what can be seen or conversely rendered invisible ("nothing to see here"), what can be said and heard – in a way that is antithetical to politics. It is to uphold an aesthetic order in which what the collective consists of, and how each one is to be within it, is so neat in its self-evidence that it averts dissensus, the spillage that enacts politics. To go back to the terms introduced earlier, the police's part in the distribution of the sensible is to enact this sensory ordering matter-of-factly, defining both the boundaries around a political community, and each of its subjects' duties and rights within it. I use this framing as a lens through which to refract how the forms and affects of urban security, understood broadly, work to either solidify or upset normative articulations of citizenship – and citizenship differentiation (to echo Holston, 2008).

Different conceptual elements from the Rancièrian toolbox have informed urban studies debates, most notably around art and popular culture (Jones, 2011; van Leerzem et al., 2016), social movements (Uitermark and Nicholls, 2014), and urban (post-)politics, more broadly (Dikeç, 2002, 2005; Kaika and Karaliotas, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2015, 2018; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015). Analyses that grapple with the politics of aesthetics have fruitfully drawn on Rancière (2013) to approach artistic practices as "part of a contest for

political subjectivity, about how the daily life of some is valued or dismissed by others and how that power can be challenged" (Jones, 2011, p. 703). In addition to offering a vocabulary for the intersections of politics and aesthetics, Rancière also provides a lens for understanding how *depoliticization* works aesthetically, through his use of the term police: "an aesthetic affair that renders and sustains certain things, places, utterances, and conditions as common sense, while others remain in the register of non-sense" (Swyngedouw, 2018, p. 49). It is not hard to see how the rule by (aesthetic) consensus that the police order suggests provides an analytical key for grappling with what urban scholars have taken to calling "post-political" forms of urban governance, in which "political contradictions are reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and legitimated through participatory processes in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in advance" (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015, p. 6). How post-politics seeps in, and is sustained by, sensible security arrangements – such as the WhatsApp policing groups that this chapter starts with – is a theme that emerges in different ways from this thesis' empirical chapters.

The forms of urban security, and how these shape social and spatial relations, have also featured in urban studies literature before. In Teresa Caldeira's (2000) influential analysis of the privatization of security and spatial inequality in São Paulo, for instance, changes to the built environment – e.g., the walls that fortify enclaves – work as potent symbolic and material signifiers for the erosion of democratic citizenship values. Gates and walls have been similarly dealt with in relation to fortified residential communities located elsewhere in urban Brazil (Souza, 2008), Puerto Rico (Dinzey-Flores, 2013), and the United States (Low, 2003). Drawing on the Nicaraguan capital of Managua, Dennis Rodgers (2004) has used a related conceptual grammar to discuss the disembedding of the city's elite from the urban fabric through "fortified networks", and not just self-contained walled enclaves. More recently, drawing on science and technology studies' conceptual lenses and methodological sensitivities, Francesco Colona (2019) analysed security materialities beyond their symbols and cultural meanings, foregrounding how they are enrolled in enactments of the state and its subjects in Nairobi, Kenya.

In this thesis, I develop a different approach, drawing on Rancière (2015) to analyse the sensorial dimension of urban security forms. I analyse such security forms – the securing of the built environment, the multimedia repertoires of digital policing spaces, and the embodied presence of street-level providers – as *aesthetic* forms that produce and are produced by differentiated citizenship norms. This purposefully broad approach to security aesthetics also draws on D. Asher Ghertner, Hudson McFann and Daniel Goldstein (2019, p. 4) in their treatment of aesthetics "as the domain of sense perception", which encompasses the range of sensorial registers that security practices and materials may comprise. The distribution of the sensible, as Ghertner (2015, p. 17) explains, connects the normative to the sensorial by proposing that "any social order – the distribution of parts and positions in a community – produces and is produced by an aesthetic order".

The risk of this framing, perhaps, would be to approach the mapping of dominant citizenship norms onto security's aesthetic forms as given, cementing the impression that there is no outside to the police order. The idea here is certainly not to approach a given distribution of the sensible, in which social groups are perfectly aligned with their social places and functions, as fixed. Indeed, as signalled earlier through this chapter's opening vignettes, such a theorization of aesthetics and politics always contains the possibility of dissensus, the transient moments in which "those without part" (Rancière, 2015, p. 43), those relegated to the margins of the polity, appear and *partake* as citizens. However, while making conceptual space for the political is important, more often than not, it is "the normal order of things" (ibid.) that prevails.

The Rancièrian difference between police and politics resonates helpfully with how Egin Isin (2008) distinguishes citizenship practices from acts of citizenship. Where citizenship practices refer to the habitus of citizenship, or the everyday and embodied reproduction of values that are learned and cultivated, the concept of acts of citizenship aims to capture disruptions to the habitual, in which subjects "with no part" enact themselves as citizens – e.g., the insurgent marginalized subjects that James Holston (2008) has drawn on. As this thesis shows, the multiple forms that hang together under

"urban security" in Recife very rarely enact norms outside of the "normal". However, by approaching the habitual through the practices and relations that make it "normal", we are able to engage some of the tensions and frictions that may – even if they rarely do – lead to acts of citizenship that disrupt security's normative/aesthetic order. As I unpack below, the affective intensities engendered in relation to urban security are key to both the maintenance of differentiated citizenship orders, and to the possibilities of their disruption.

Affects

Attempts to engender a feeling of safety among subjects rendered worthy of protection cut across urban security forms and formations. Conversely, the shared experience of fear of urban violence may trigger demands for more policing, or for access-control and surveillance materialities to be deployed around particular locations. Fear of crime, certainly more than feelings of safety, has featured in the literature on urban (in)security in myriad ways. For instance, it has been analysed as part of the gendered discourses of real-estate marketeers (Kern, 2010); as a key talking point among urban dwellers seeking to make sense of a changing social reality (Caldeira, 2000); and as a situated emotional response that aggravates social and spatial forms of exclusion (Pain, 2000). Across different works on the topic, fear tends to appear as discourse, or as a black-boxed psychosocial response that is then engaged in terms of its causes and effects. More recently, though, the so-called "affective turn" (Clough, 2008) has enriched our conceptual toolbox when it comes to taking affects and emotions seriously as (part of) social, political, and spatial processes. In relation to (in)security specifically, this has enabled analytical engagement with the affective atmospheres that security practices engender (Adey, 2014; Anderson, 2009, 2014), and with security affects beyond fear (Anderson, 2015). I draw on these two developments to push urban scholarship to consider how security affects circulate within urban space, and how these affective experiences (re)produce inequalities of citizenship.

Geographer Peter Adey (2014) draws on Ben Anderson's (2009) take on affective atmospheres as collective affects that envelope life as a helpful frame through which to study security. Adey's conceptualization of "security atmospheres" emphasizes the atmospherically immersive, sensorial dimension of security and the ways in which safety and danger are often "more felt than known" (Adey, 2014, p. 836). It also seeks to move beyond the predominantly *visual* focus of studies on security architectures and aesthetics (e.g., Coaffee et al., 2009), by fostering "an embodied, intimate, material-affective, and phenomenological examination" (Adey, 2014, p. 836) that also attends to the sonic, tactile or even olfactory dimensions of how safety is sensed. Drawing on such insights, I suggest that the affective atmospheres engendered by urban security practices and interventions are central to how security enters the realm of sense perception and – consequently – our everyday urban lives.

Present in both Adey (2014) and Anderson (2009) is the idea that affective atmospheres do not just appear out of nowhere – they are "emergent from specific material arrangements" (Adey 2014), which "do not float free from the bodies that come together and apart to compose situations" (Anderson, 2009, p. 80). Additionally, and especially when it comes to security, they may also be the object of direct intervention. For instance, Anderson (2009, p. 80) invites us to think of "how atmospheres are sealed off through protective measures such as gated communities or certain types of building design". Meanwhile, Adey (2014, p. 840) highlights how security measures become increasingly dedicated to engendering a "climate of security". Throughout this thesis, intentional attempts to shape the look and feel of spaces of residence, leisure, and circulation according to an *aesthetic normativity* (cf. Ghertner, 2015) of urban security abound. However, even though I take gestures aimed at curating affective atmospheres of security seriously, especially in terms of the citizenship norms they enact, there is an undeniable openness to affective life (Anderson, 2014, p. 16), which is never finished, or predetermined.

This openness prevents us from categorically isolating specific affects in order to fully account for their causes, pin down their effects, and delineate

their meanings. However, it also provides a compelling language for thinking about social, spatial and material relations – one that sheds light on how bodily sensations reverberate within specific urban environments. While there might be a tendency to approach affect as the stuff of inner, emotional lives, scholars thinking with the affective have written against this line of thinking. Avoiding the inside/outside binary, Katherine Stewart (2007, p. 1) centres the relationality and dynamism of "ordinary affects": "the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergencies". Similarly, Yael Navaro-Yashin (2012, p. 27) has proposed that we think through the affects emanating from material spaces and processes as imbricated with our inner subjectivities, in an affect-subjectivity continuum. This approach seeks to capture the "in-betweenness" of the affective, as emerging from interactions between subjects and their environments.

What, then, might the conceptual grammar around affect clarify in relation to the maintenance of citizenship norms and divisions? I suggest that unpacking what "feels safe" might reveal important underlying linkages between the affective and the normative that we often naturalize. Even though one does not *fully* determine the other, there is an undeniable resonance between affects and the familiar histories and discourses of social and political differentiation. Spatial interventions that attempt to engender affective atmospheres of safety are illustrative of this: more often than not, they are designed and organized to appease some, while eliciting the discomfort of "Others". In order to generate a collective sense of safety for "good", full citizens, sensible forms of security organize the relations between bodies, objects and spaces in ways that reproduce entrenched norms of differentiation – often grounded in classed and racialized divides.

Throughout this thesis' empirical chapters, my focus on affective atmospheres mainly concerns how the affects that emerge in relation to urban security forms contribute to the maintenance of differentiated citizenship norms. However, I would also like to make conceptual space for the *affective sense of inequality* (cf. Bottero, 2019) that emerges when subjects are confronted, time and again, with the sensible reality of sociospatial differentiation,

which urban security forms so often work to intensify. This affective sense of inequality is not necessarily conducive to acts of citizenship (Isin, 2008) able to disrupt the police order. However, in the right intensity, it may challenge the normative grounds that this aesthetic order stages, providing us with glimpses of politics.

Ordinary places, relational sites and invisible cities

Brazilian cities – especially the south-eastern megacities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro – have featured prominently and frequently in studies on urban (in)security. This is not by chance: the 2020 annual report published by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP) registered 47,769 intentional violent deaths[2] in Brazil in 2019, resulting in a rate of lethal violence of 22.7 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (FBSP, 2020). Even though these numbers represent a decrease of 17.7 per cent in comparison to 2018, the figures started to rise again in early 2020: the 7.3 per cent increase in relation to the first six months of 2019 meant that one person was murdered every 10 minutes in the first half of 2020 (ibid.). Though comparison across countries often proves tricky due to variations in the quality and availability of homicide data, as well as in what exactly gets counted and how, Brazil's rates rank high in an international context. According to a ranking compiled with 2017 data, for instance, it was the country with the ninth highest homicide rate in the world (Roser and Ritchie, 2013).

Unsurprisingly, these numbers are not distributed equally in demographic terms. In 2019, 74.4 per cent of lethal violence victims in the country were Black. Amongst those killed violently and intentionally, 91.2 per cent were men, and 51.4 per cent were under the age of 30 (FBSP, 2020). This bleak

2 As explained by the FBSP (2020), the category "Intentional Violent Deaths" includes victims of intentional homicide, robbery followed by death, bodily injury followed by death, and deaths resulting from police interventions – on- and off-duty.

scenario is what underlies present-day discourses around the ongoing genocide of Black youth (e.g., Flores, 2016) – a critical frame championed by social movements, activists and scholars that calls particular attention to the lethal violence perpetrated by state policing forces. According to the FBSP (2020), 6,357 citizens died as a result of police intervention, of whom 79.1 per cent were Black, 99.2 per cent were male, and 74.3 per cent were under 30.

The uneven distribution of lethal violence can also be observed geographically, within the country. In Brazil's annual Atlas of Violence (e.g., Ipea, 2020), such varying concentrations of fatal violence are represented visually through maps that colour states and municipalities in shades that range from light pink to burgundy. The state of Pernambuco emerges from this mapping as a distinctively crimson zone, matching the palette usually attributed to its capital city Recife in comparisons of municipal rates of intentional violent deaths (e.g., Ipea, 2017, 2018). Significant differences in lethal violence rates between regions, states, and municipalities are easily spotted. For instance, while the 2019 rate of intentional violent deaths stayed at 15.8 victims per 100,000 inhabitants in the Brazilian southeast,[3] it rose to 32.1 in the northeast[4] (FBSP, 2020). This trend continues at the state level: while the state of São Paulo presented a rate of 8.9 violent deaths per 100,000 residents in 2019, Pernambuco's rate was 36.3 for the same period. When it comes to Brazil's major cities, Recife's numbers rank similarly high. With a rate of 58.4, the north-eastern city was ranked seventh – out of 27 capitals – in terms of lethal death rates in 2017 (G1 PE, 2019).

Even though lethal violence numbers have been on the rise in Pernambuco, the state's public security policy was previously a success story: from 2007 to 2013, homicide rates fell by 55 percent in Recife's metropolitan area, and by 39 percent in the state (Daudelin and Ratton, 2018). This achievement

3 The Southeast of Brazil (região Sudeste) comprises the states Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

4 The Northeast of Brazil (região Nordeste) encompasses the states of Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe.

was largely attributed to the Pacto pela Vida (Pact for Life), a comprehensive state-level security policy aimed at crime control and prevention, and to the economic growth of that period – which fuelled the programme directly and indirectly. Inaugurated in 2007 by governor Eduardo Campos of the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB, Brazilian Socialist Party), the programme introduced a "management-led approach to public security" (Hoelscher, 2017, p. 867) that prioritised the reduction of intentional lethal violence. Coordinated from the Planning Secretariat, in addition to bringing together the military and civil branches of state policing, the programme's managerial guise included Pernambuco's District Attorney's Office (Ministério Público), and representatives from the judicial and carceral systems[5] (Daudelin and Ratton, 2018; Hoelscher, 2017). Even though the Pact's institutional framework is still officially in place, its results were not sustained once Campos left the Pernambuco state government to run for president, in 2014.[6] While the tangible and quantifiable results yielded early on are still acknowledged, the Pact has lost its initial steam, and homicide rates have been increasing year after year (see Cavalcanti, 2020; Daudelin and Ratton, 2018; Hoelscher, 2017; Hoelscher and Nussio, 2016; Ratton et al., 2014).

In this section, which presents my research methods and positioning towards my research sites, I move from these disturbing figures to tease out a tension in empirical approaches to (in)security. On the one hand, homicide rates and rankings function to reaffirm the worrisome levels and patent inequalities that characterize lethal violence in Brazil, Pernambuco and Recife. While informing the pervasive security concerns that feature throughout this thesis, these statistics also highlight how violence and insecurity reproduce and aggravate citizenship inequalities along the lines of

5 Though the Pact initially included a range of initiatives that balanced crime prevention and repression, the programme ended up tipping towards repression – a dimension that yielded quicker returns than crime prevention (Daudelin and Ratton, 2018) – to the discontent of civil society representatives (Ratton et al., 2014).

6 Campos was killed in a plane crash during his electoral campaign, in August 2014 (Folha de São Paulo 2014).

race, gender, age, and address. On the other hand, thinking through these topics by focusing on where crime clusters geographically may resonate with – or propagate – a strand of "hotspot" thinking that often works to obscure the broader structural causes of such spatial concentrations, and legitimate targeted and militarized policing interventions (Jefferson, 2020). By consistently painting specific countries, regions, cities and neighbourhoods red, we run the risk of perpetuating stigmatizing forms of representation that naturalize and solidify the very inequalities we aim to denounce and unpack. Additionally, we might miss *quieter* developments – to paraphrase Jefferson (2017, p. 787) – within the realm of urban policing and (in)security that also stem from, and result in, sociospatial differentiation.

In considering this tension surrounding research on insecurity "hotspots", my approach resonates with Jennifer Robinson's (2006) proposition for urban scholars to approach all cities as "ordinary cities", rather than through normative categories such as "global", "Western", "developed", or "developing". In her call for a postcolonial approach to urban spaces and theory, Robinson (2006) sought to bridge the divide between globalization debates tethered to a handful of cities deemed "global", and the developmentalist literature that focused on cities seen as peripheral to the globalizing circuit of Western modernity. Her proposal for overcoming these conceptual and methodological divides, which (re)produce inter- and intra-urban hierarchies, is to engage cities as *ordinary*, as similarly "diverse, contested, distinctive" (Robinson, 2006, p. 114) sociospatial formations. I suggest that this approach is also of value to scholarship on cities (whether or not located in the "Global South"[7]) infamous for their high levels of violence. As a research topic, by "signalling urgency and promising relevance", violence often monopolises our scholarly attention, obscuring other aspects of the social that are as important, albeit less sensational (Zeiderman, 2016, p. 79).

7 AbdouMaliq Simone's (2020, p. 605) recent review of how "cities of the Global South" have been mobilised within social science scholarship also points to instances in which the South acts as a trope "for a divergent urbanism, an ontologically distinct amalgam of urban zones constituted by shared subjections to colonialism and underdevelopment". This assumed and *a priori* ontological difference is what the *ordinary cities* approach reframes.

When researching topics often connected to urban violence, such as urban security and policing, approaching urban places as *ordinary* – that is, as diverse, contested and distinctive – may allow us to engage how (in)security is experienced by urban residents without necessarily reproducing homogenizing tropes such as "homicide capitals" and "crime hotspots".

Approaching Recife as *ordinary* in relation to the substantive topics of this thesis, and not as a prime or exceptional example of a "Global South city" ravaged by lethal violence perpetrated by state and non-state actors, was not an act of wilful "ethnographic refusal" (Ortner, 1995) on my part. Rather, echoing Rivke Jaffe (2019, p. 393) in her reflection on writing around violence in Kingston, Jamaica, it was a "decentering and de-exceptionalizing" of the high murder rates, in order to make conceptual and methodological space for other potent, albeit less spectacular, signifiers of how (in)security makes and maintains difference and inequality in the city. In more practical terms, in my research process, this approach also meant posing research questions – on security-related norms of citizenship and authority – that could be asked of any city (or of any part of the city) and not just those framed as "hotspots" by the official ratings or in popular imaginaries. This yielded answers that reflected the various ways in which lived experiences of Recife are shaped by apprehensions concerning urban violence, but not *only* violence. In line with this approach, the specific places within Recife that I selected as my main research sites were also approached as *ordinary places*, as I discuss in the next section.

Jardim, União and Vista Nova: Researching relational sites

I spent roughly 11 months conducting fieldwork in Recife, split into two 5.5-month stays in the period 2015-2017. This fieldwork was largely tethered to sites in the city's South Zone. As becomes clear in this thesis' empirical chapters, the security practices and narratives I present and analyse seldom cohere primarily or exclusively to the territorial unit of "the neighbourhood". In this section, however, in order to situate what comes next,

I contextualize the South Zone within Recife's urban landscape in general terms, and zoom into important specifics of the areas that feature most frequently in the chapters that follow: Jardim, União, and Vista Nova. To protect the anonymity of the people and places I write about in this dissertation, the three monikers are pseudonyms. This effort to anonymize the empirical material has also entailed supressing several place-specific details from this section and subsequent chapters – a trade-off I unpack in the ethics reflection below.

The South Zone of Recife (see Figure 1) is a heterogenous area that became a key focus of real estate development in the 1970s, when the state – via the now defunct National Housing Bank (BNH) – made vast amounts of credit available for new housing units targeted at the urban middle classes (Lacerda et al., 2018). The area's densification was accelerated by high-rise housing developments aimed at middle- and upper-class residents, which promptly began to cast their shadows on the Boa Viagem beach, one of the city's best-known attractions. By 1982, the beachfront neighbourhood and vicinities already boasted a built-up area larger than that of the twelve North Zone neighbourhoods[8] towards which the city had started to expand from central Recife from the mid-1930s onwards (Lacerda et al., 2018). By 2014, this area had tripled (ibid.).

8 This difference was made starker by new building parameters inaugurated in 2001, which, among other things, sought to limit the densification and verticalization of a large and mostly middle- and upper-class area of the city's North Zone, on account of concerns with urban mobility, infrastructure, architectural heritage, and general livability (see Lacerda et al., for a detailed discussion of what this process entailed).



Figure 1. In this map, Recife's municipal borders are outlined, while its South Zone is emphasized in black. The ocean waterfront and main waterways are displayed as dotted. Source: Miranda (2005).

In demographic terms, according to the 2010 census, almost a quarter of Recife's more than 1.5 million inhabitants are concentrated in the city's South Zone.[9] The convergence of urban mobility options and large commercial developments – backed by real estate financiers from the 1980s onwards – turned the centre of the South Zone into a "secondary centre" of Recife, generating a demand for labour that also attracted working-class city-dwellers to the area (SANEAR, 2014). Self-built settlements peopled by the urban working classes had been part of the city's expansion towards its southern limits since the mid-20th century, however: for several decades, low-income enclaves have existed in close proximity of middle- and upper-class ones in Recife's South Zone. This socioeconomic heterogeneity is evident when we consider Jardim, União, and Vista Nova in relation to each other.

Jardim is a mostly middle- and upper-class area where the gated residential high-rise is the most common housing typology. It is part of a slice of Recife where the average monthly earnings per household were almost 14 times the 2010 minimum wage (Prefeitura do Recife, 2010) – an amount that would have placed a household amongst the city's 15 percent top earners that year (IBGE, 2010). It is also an area where most inhabitants self-identify as white, in contrast with the urban majority, who self-identify as either Brown or Black (*pardos* or *pretos*) (IBGE, 2010). Though its crime-related numbers were comparatively low, Jardim was home to a resident-led security initiative, detailed in Chapter Three, that was mentioned favourably whenever it came up in conversations with military police officers. "They (Jardim residents) do security amongst themselves, and the police comes in as a secondary actor", Mancini, a high-ranking officer from the local battalion, told me.

9 In 2020, the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) estimated Recife's population at 1,653,461 people (IBGE, n.d.a). The South Zone is the last of the six Political Administrative Regions (RPA, in the original acronym) that make up the municipality of Recife: RPA 6.



Figure 2. A view of Jardim.

By praising the self-helping character of Jardim citizens, Mancini was also sharing his discontent towards residents from the low-income area of União who, he felt, approached the military police with their security *problems*, but not with their *solutions*. His comment pointed to the claims that União's community leaders and ordinary residents had been making on the military police to solve their security concerns, which diverged from Jardim's in many ways, as Chapter Four details. In contrast to Jardim, the majority of União's population self-identified as Brown or Black, and the area's average monthly income per household was less than a fifth of the area where Jardim was located (IBGE, 2010). União grew out of a self-built occupation that was later formally established as a Special Zone of Social Interest (ZEIS), a status – explained in Chapter Two – that protected it, for the time being, from the pressures of the real estate market. When I first arrived in the area, in 2015, "real estate speculation" was explicitly cited by one of its community leaders as their main problem. As time passed, though, more immediate

sources of insecurity, such as muggings, became part of their evident and pressing concerns – a process I was able to follow during my time in Recife.



Figure 3. A view of União.

When compared to Jardim and União, Vista Nova's social and economic indicators are somewhere in between those of the other two areas. This camouflages the fact that it is largely a patchwork of high- and middle-income condominiums and self-built enclaves, which produces quantitative "averages" that are not representative of the area's street-level reality. The parts of Vista Nova that I discuss in this thesis are particularly illustrative of an urban development process that has been largely driven by the speculative interests of Pernambuco's real estate corporations, which have been profoundly shaping the sociospatial make-up of Recife and its metropolitan region (Almeida Souza and Bitoun, 2015). In addition to high-end residential and commercial developments, low-rise working-class settlements, and self-built occupations, Vista Nova also features state-provided housing

estates built in the last decade. These estates were developed to re-house former residents of riverside settlements, after they were forcefully removed to make way for urban renewal and infrastructure projects. As this thesis discusses, the diversity of housing typologies and socioeconomic profiles living in close proximity to one another has tangible effects in the local security constellation, which, as elsewhere in Recife and beyond, enrols state and non-state actors, technologies, and materialities.

My methodological approach to the areas and themes that anchor this dissertation was one that centred *emplaced relations and processes* – a tactic that I situate in-between self-imposed limitation to bounded field-sites (Candea, 2007) and an un-bounded practice of relational ethnography (Desmond, 2014). In reaction to calls for "multi-sitedness" that questioned traditional, place-bound ethnographies, Matei Candea (2007) discusses the value of clearly limiting one's "field". By drawing on explicitly "arbitrary locations" (Candea, 2007, p. 167), one can be unequivocal regarding the partiality, incompleteness – and arbitrariness – of ethnographic sites. In my own case, tethering this research to a narrow range of areas was, indeed, an authorial move that recognizes its partiality, helpfully limiting my practical possibilities, while allowing me to think through the importance of place and location in relation to urban security and citizenship norms.

At the same time, though, my decision to approach security arrangements through these three areas connected to what Matthew Desmond (2014) has called a "relational" approach to ethnographic research. Instead of zooming in on a clearly outlined group, or place, Desmond (2014, p. 547) explains, this approach centres "processes involving configurations of relations between actors and institutions". In practice, aligned with the conceptual language that underlies this dissertation, my approach involved tracing the different associations, relations and processes that congealed around urban security in different ways, and in *shifting locations* (to echo Gupta and Ferguson, 1997 on this theme). While starting from specific locales, this approach would often lead me elsewhere throughout Recife.



Figure 4. Housing estate Capibaribe I, in Vista Nova.

This relational and processual approach involved participant observation in a range of practices and events associated with security, understood broadly. A range of emplaced ethnographic encounters make up this thesis' authored *sitings* (Yates-Doerr, 2017), assembled in the Recife-based data-gathering process, as well as in the textual and visual forms of representation that compose this dissertation. Within the three main research areas, I attended security-related community meetings and mobilisations that took place in Jardim and União, joined staff during their shifts at fixed state and non-state policing posts in Vista Nova, and spent long stretches of time "hanging out" with residents and security-related staff at many different residential enclaves and houses. In addition to many informal conversations, I conducted 68 formal, recorded interviews with residents and state and non-state security professionals. Outside these three main areas, I spent time in video- and radio-surveillance control rooms, rallies of policemen protesting for better pay and working conditions, trainings offered by state policing to condominium doormen, and WhatsApp neighbourhood surveillance

groups that I am still a part of.

The use of WhatsApp also evidently reconfigures "the field". Niels van Doorn (2013, p. 392) has written on how the smartphone mediates "social and affective proximities/distances during the process of 'data collection'", a point that I can very much relate to. Being a participant in area-based WhatsApp groups on security reconfigured the temporal and spatial dimensions of fieldwork-ing. Not only did these groups shape my affective sense of closeness to Recife's South Zone by constantly feeding me with emplaced exchanges and multimedia content; they also stretched the temporalities of empirical data-gathering by continuing to afford "co-created field events" (Ahlin and Li 2019, p. 18). As an alternative to more traditional place-bound formulations of the field site, the field event captures how digital technologies such as WhatsApp allow research interlocutors and situations to "sporadically punctuate the time since the beginning of the fieldwork until the ethnographer decides to 'cut' it" (ibid.). Since I have not (yet) chosen to "cut it", Whatsapp-mediated encounters with Recife have been humming in the background of my everyday life in Amsterdam, allowing me to observe and participate in occasional field events and to actively engage with these events as "data".

From Rio to Recife, through Amsterdam: Positionality and ethics

When asking students to introduce themselves in the first session of a graduate course on urban inequalities, my co-lecturer and I would ask students to share what they considered their *invisible city* to be. The reference was Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities* (1972), a book in which Venetian explorer Marco Polo told colourful, fantastic tales of the many cities he had seen to Mongolian emperor Kublai Khan. When asked by the attentive listener why he never spoke of Venice, his city of origin, Polo answered: "What else do you believe I have been talking to you about?" (Calvino, 1972, p. 86). Within the narrative woven by Calvino, in order to discriminate the attributes of other cities, Polo stated, he must speak "of a first city that remains implicit",

and, for him, this was Venice (ibid.). When asking students about their invisible cities, we wanted to know what their respective "Venices" were: the cities they implicitly measured other cities against. For students beginning to engage with urban studies, this ice-breaking exercise led to fruitful reflections on our "situatedness" as knowers and narrators of cities. In this section, I reflect on these epistemological and representational issues and some of the ethical responsibilities they entail.

When I first embarked on this doctoral research project, which began in Amsterdam in 2014, my hometown of Rio de Janeiro was the city that often remained implicit when I situated myself in relation to any other urban environ, including the northeast Brazilian capital where I would conduct my fieldwork. "Like Rio", or "unlike Rio", bookended many of my earlier musings about Recife. During my first stretch of fieldwork, in 2015, I might have been ready to let go of these comparative crutches for myself, but they were not only mine. It turned out that my "invisible city" was not so invisible after all: in addition to providing an urban point of reference that influenced how *I* made sense of and experienced Recife in more ways than I can account for, Rio also provided a frame for *recifenses* to address me through. On account of the rather spectacular forms of state and non-state violence/security that take place in Rio but circulate both nationally and internationally (see Robb Larkins, 2015), my research interlocutors would often draw on their imaginaries of urban warfare in the so-called "marvellous city" when we talked about (in)security in Recife. "Like Rio" and "unlike Rio" also bracketed many of my interlocutors' perceptions of their city, which they tended to describe as an unequivocally safer place, for policing actors and ordinary citizens alike. Even though this perception of Rio as many times more violent than the capital of Pernambuco was not reflected in official violence indicators, or by comparative studies of criminality in both cities (Wolff, 2015), it provided generative entry points into understanding what forms of (in) security were deemed to be within or outside nationally circulating norms, and the apprehensive, affective reactions these forms elicited.

Even though the imagery evoked by Amsterdam[10] was less vivid than that of Rio, it functioned similarly as a point of reference, not just for myself, but also for many *recifenses* I encountered. In contrast with the south-eastern metropolis that I came from originally, though, the European city where I lived was largely framed as a "better" place when it came to the substantive topics of this thesis. It was not uncommon, for instance, for military policemen I was in dialogue with to loosely evoke European countries as they tried to justify police brutality in Brazil: while Europe could afford to have "softer" police, street-level security forces in Brazil *needed* a tough stance. These somewhat abstract, but pervasive, imaginaries of "first-worldliness" also added to other markers that situated me in terms of class and looser notions of social status. Not only was I a white, highly-educated woman pursuing a doctorate: I was doing so while enjoying a level of international mobility that was inaccessible to the vast majority of *recifenses* I encountered.

Here, my intention is not to provide an exhaustive account of all of the ways that these spatial and social reference points have shaped my fieldwork interactions, and how I made sense of them. In fact, as Gillian Rose (1997, p. 311) cautions, claiming to possess such an all-encompassing knowledge of one's positionality would be too close for comfort to "the god trick of

10 Additionally, Amsterdam was understandably associated with the narrative and material remnants of Dutch colonization in north-eastern Brazil (1630-1654) – a period during which Recife's main island was named Mauritsstad (Assies, 1992). In spite of the violence necessarily implied in colonial occupation, local references often presented "os holandeses" (the Dutch) in a benevolent light. Once I explained my affiliation to the University of Amsterdam, some interlocutors even assumed, rather favourably, that my presence in the city was a product of an enduring Dutch interest in Pernambuco. The fact that the broader project I was part of (see Foreword) sited Recife as one of its cases did not stem – at least not directly – from the historical and unequal relations that connected Pernambuco and the Netherlands. However, in addition to the impressions shared with me directly, material and discursive references to Dutch colonial figures such as Maurício de Nassau are still visible in Recife's urban landscape, serving as not-so-subtle reminders of the colonial histories that connect the two cities I was traveling between, and the political, economic and epistemic asymmetries that endure today.

seeing everything from nowhere" (Haraway 1988, p. 581) that so many feminist scholars have worked hard to challenge. On a much more modest note, though, which connects directly to my interest in the practiced norms that differentiate threatening subjects from vulnerable ones, I can safely assert that I was consistently and explicitly enacted as a vulnerable subject. Concerns for my safety were performed both verbally and non-verbally in my research encounters. This was helpfully and explicitly illustrated by Jorge, a União interlocutor introduced in Chapters Four and Five. After hearing that I was planning to go home by foot late at night, he turned to the two policemen we were in conversation with and said: "I worry about her", explaining that it was due to my "bourgeois [*burguezinha*] face": a term that articulated concisely the classed, racialized and gendered markers that I embodied, and which combined to produce a person in need of – and perhaps entitled to? – protection in that context. That particular evening, this protection involved a ride home in the back of a police car.

While enacted as vulnerable by performances of protection that commonly entailed lifts home by car or motorcycle, or verbal warnings regarding dangerous zones and times, I also grappled with the ways that my research could put the people and places represented in its output at risk. I continued to consider the ethics of my data-gathering and representational choices beyond the encounters that took place "in the field". Though few of my research interlocutors expressed a concern with anonymity, due to the sensitive nature of (in)security as a thematic entry point, I chose to anonymize the people written into these pages, a decision that also involved withholding the names of neighbourhoods, companies, and commercial establishments. This choice "comes at the cost of a lack of openness" concerning the sources of data (AISSR, 2019, p. 3), of course. Grappling with this insoluble tension entailed "an ongoing working compromise" (Saunders et al., 2015, p. 627): between sufficient integrity regarding the empirical material I was dealing

with, and ensuring that research interlocutors were "anonymous enough".[11]

I took additional measures regarding the digital ethnographic material that derived from my presence in WhatsApp groups formed for neighbourhood surveillance. Though I was added by group administrators who knew me "offline", were informed of my research, and consented to my presence in these digital spaces for its stated purposes, "the fluidity of belonging and participation" that characterizes membership to these (often very large) groups prevent the attainment of consent from each individual participant (Barbosa and Milan, 2019, p. 50). Drawing on Sergio Barbosa and Stefania Milan's (2019) recent propositions for an ethical approach to research in and on private chat apps, I avoid quoting from the Portuguese chats directly – instead, paraphrasing and translating loosely to English – or using visual media in an identifiable way. Even though WhatsApp communication is secured by end-to-end encryption, as the authors note, due to rapid and ongoing changes to digital infrastructures, encryption is far from "future-proof".

The ethical concerns related to this thesis' representational tactics also raised many procedural questions concerning the use of images. As was to be expected in a moment of ubiquitous digital image-capture, I returned to Amsterdam from Recife with hundreds of photographs and several short films, which featured many of the sites and situations described in these pages. However, there are no photos of Recife in this dissertation, which instead uses hand drawings (produced in collaboration with architect Andrés Novo) as illustrations. While these are mostly based on photographs taken between 2015 and 2017, they occasionally draw on official mappings, "screenshots" from my smartphone, and historical depictions of Recife. Considering earlier remarks on maintaining people and places "anonymous enough", there is a clear, practical value to the illustrations that fill these pages: when tracing over photos with a black fine-tip pen, it is easy to

11 This gestures to the fact that fault-proof and future-proof anonymity is an unattainable ideal (Nespor, 2000), which should not prevent us, however, from striving to keep our research respondents as difficult to identify as feasible and desirable (Saunders et al., 2015; Barbosa and Milan, 2019).

omit faces, street signs, and other identifiable elements.

Considering the centrality of aesthetic forms in how this thesis approaches the enactment and circulation of norms pertaining to policing and citizenship, though, there is more to these images than the quest for anonymity. After all, this privacy effect could have been equally attained by subjecting photographic material to strategic cropping and blurring. Here, I propose these forms of visual representation as an intentional step *away* from the usual poetics of urban security and surveillance – fields in which static and moving images captured by smartphones and digital cameras are still treated and received as objective and neutral evidence, despite long-standing challenges to this persistent imaginary (e.g., Azoulay, 2008; Sontag, 1977). In their hand-drawn aesthetic, the images I include here highlight what camera-captures might have occluded: the embodied, partial, situated, and authored ways through which I came to know and represent Recife.

The chapters

Where this first introductory chapter has clarified how this thesis seeks to intervene in theoretical debates on urban security and citizenship, in Chapter Two, I provide more background on the urban context of the research, outlining Recife's history of urban development and socio-spatial inequality. Titled "Of Mud, Marble, and Mirrors", the chapter discusses key socio-spatial dualities that have cut across academic and non-academic framings of development and difference in Recife, such as dry/wet; formal/informal; and high/low. These pairings index a range of political, spatial and material divides and relations that have anchored readings of and writings on Recife, while resonating with popular imaginaries of inequality in the city.

The following three chapters each concentrate on one main norm-form-affect cluster: the vertical condominium, WhatsApp neighbourhood surveillance groups, and street-level ("ostensive") policing practices, respectively. In Chapter Three, titled "Condoscapes", I zoom in on, and then out of,

condominiums in Jardim and Vista Nova, explaining how they make *condoscapes* out of the areas they tower over, while also shaping the look and feel of security elsewhere. A dwelling typology central to imaginaries of "safe" living in urban Brazil, the condominium is, in itself, a securityscape, shaped by normative linkages between classed and racialized separation and safety. It is also an easily recognizable urban form, characterized by its access control materialities, and its verticality. The material and spatial attributes of its built environment are curated to produce an affective atmosphere of safety through the feel of exclusivity. The norms enacted by condominium forms and the affects they (attempt to) engender are not contained by the official limits of individual condominiums, though. In this chapter, I follow the norms and forms of middle- and upper-class condominium into other securityscapes: the broader area of Jardim and a state-provided housing estate in Vista Nova. This chapter shows how the material and affective attributes of condominiums shapes securityscapes in and beyond condominium walls. At the same time, it also teases out the tensions that emerge in spaces where condominium norms and forms are present, but feel "out of place", such as in the Capibaribe I housing estate.

In Chapter Four, "Smart Phones, Good Communities", I focus on WhatsApp groups assembled for the surveillance of specific territories. Drawing on WhatsApp-based policing in União and Jardim, I discuss the practices of seeing and sharing (in)security that these groups *afford* across digital and urban divides. Furthermore, the chapter also shows how such practices are enabled, or constrained, according to users' positioning within Recife's broader socio-political landscape. In the mediated security encounters that the smartphone affords, citizenship and policing norms are tacitly enacted and explicitly negotiated, taking the form of textual messages, pictures, videos, and audio recordings. The production, reception and circulation of multimedia security information do not stay "inside" the screen, though: the aesthetics that smartphones and WhatsApp afford for policing has consequences in how military and civilian participants feel about the spaces they move through, and for how they assess and enact "good" citizenship, and "good" policing.

Chapter Five shows how affective labour is enrolled in the ways through which street-level actors involved in "ostensive policing" – the "Boundary Citizens" that give the chapter its title – sort citizens from non-citizens across União and Vista Nova. Analysing the bordering work of policing in terms of affective labour, this chapter calls attention to the processes through which police and private security guards sort populations into citizens, clients, or threats. Drawing on the everyday experiences of those with very clear "norm-enforcement" duties, this chapter also discusses how state and non-state violence workers are relationally produced as other-than-citizens, or other-than-civilians, and the effects of this on the bounding together of security communities. The chapter analyses the aesthetic and affective dimensions that bound these communities together, discussing the challenges that this poses to authority and citizenship norms.

In the conclusion, I return to this dissertation's overarching questions – and to how the conceptual approach presented in this introduction has informed the substantive answers provided in Chapters Three through Five. I relate these different chapters to each other by teasing out key themes that cut across them, and that relate to the aesthetic and affective substance of the security practices and encounters through which citizens and policing authorities appear as complementary – as well as to the tensions that emerge from this unequal ordering. I close by reflecting on how the conceptual propositions of this thesis might be of use in how we make sense of the making and unmaking of political and post-political orders and subjects in contemporary Brazil, beyond security, and beyond the urban.

Chapter Two

Of Mud, Marble and Mirrors

Arrival stories

I had not yet recovered from the jetlag that followed my transatlantic flight from the Netherlands when I called for a taxi from the flat where I landed, in the West of Recife. At the time, I moved around mostly by bus, but on that mid-April afternoon, in 2015, I was in a hurry to reach the Municipal Chamber of Recife, where a public hearing on a major and contested urban development project was to be held. The driver, named Milton, arrived promptly and drove carefully, as per the company's slogan: "Go with security, go with Teletaxi". As the motto signalled, security was not only a research interest of mine, but also a topic that fit within the realm of acceptable small talk. As we drove through the city, where he had been working as a taxi driver for the last twenty-eight years, Milton sorted the places we passed through in terms of how unsafe he perceived them to be or, in his words, how "*poluídos*" (polluted) they appeared. He was not referring to any form of environmental pollution specifically, but to a broader, more diffuse sense of what "bad", crime-ridden zones looked and felt like to him. As we moved from Iputinga to Boa Vista through the Avenida Caxangá, one of Recife's main traffic arteries, he drew my attention to the little side streets where he considered mugging to be a certainty, and to the "*comunidades*" he framed as dangerous, hidden behind commercial and residential buildings from the sight of those driving and being driven on the main road.

Arriving at the 19th-century building that housed the municipal legislative chamber, I elbowed my way into the busy public meeting that had been called to discuss the latest urban plan elaborated by the municipality for

the José Estelita Wharf and its surroundings. A waterfront redevelopment process had been planned for the area covered by the proposed regulatory framework, predicated on the demolition of the old warehouses located between the city centre and its South Zone. Their value as heritage, or the lack thereof, was part of a heated political dispute involving real estate developers, the municipal government and urban social movements. The issues that Recife-dwellers brought to that mid-April meeting, however, went well beyond the scope of any single urban renewal operation. The assembly brought to light that the dispute – which had culminated in the occupation of the wharf in 2014 by local activists mobilising for its preservation – was tethered to a broader and more fundamental disagreement over urban development's aesthetic forms and the exclusive norms they enacted. Residents who were situated differently within Recife's sociospatial landscape shared grievances old and new, which reverberated onto the walls of the packed room. They called attention to the vested values that both produced and were aggravated by the high-rise buildings that represented dominant forms of imagining and materializing "development" at the city level – both the high-rises that already towered over the city and those that still only existed as 3-D renderings. The many references to past struggles suggested that these were not solely present-day tensions, but involved spatial politics that had developed over time, leaving traces that were material, as well as symbolic.

At the hearing that day, the most vocal participants referenced a range of "old" issues as they protested the Novo Recife plans. I draw on these spatial narratives as evocative ports of entry into Recife's urban development and spatial differentiation, the two interconnected themes that anchor this contextual chapter. In reference to the aesthetics of the project's mirrored waterfront high-rises, an activist from a local movement called Direitos Urbanos (Urban Rights) scoffed: "We are not Miami, we are Recife". Another activist, from Ocupe Estelita (Occupy Estelita), described the residential and commercial buildings that had already transformed the city's South Zone as the notorious result of a gentrification history that was bound to repeat itself, engulfing the wharf and its vicinities. Others denounced the existing beachfront condos, not only as places of dwelling for the exclusive elite that

benefited from a privatizing city, but as active hindrances to the enjoyment of public space. On account of their long shadows, "At noon there's no more sun on the sand of the Boa Viagem beach!", one speaker exaggerated. Via Mangue, the elevated highway recently built to improve (auto-)mobility, particularly in Recife's central and southern zones, generated similar indignation: "It works to connect a mall to another mall".

Discriminatory security practices also emerged as part of this oral cartography of urban change. Hearsay was going around about the military police having started to stop-and-frisk those entering the historical centre known as Recife Antigo (Old Recife) to enjoy its nightlife. "I'm white and middle-class, so this doesn't affect me", a local activist noted, pointing out the racialized and classed implications of the rumoured policing practices. Another participant, an academic, argued that such forms of policing fit within a broader urban development model that worked according to a pervasive and exclusive "hygienist logic", aimed at "cleansing" parts of Recife of the urban poor.

In addition to the places and politics associated with Recife's middle and upper classes, Coque, a low-income community located in a central area of the city, came up repeatedly at the public hearing. This neighbourhood in particular was presented as a future casualty of the unbridled real-estate speculation that many participants condemned. One of Coque's community leaders hit many of the meeting's keywords as he voiced concerns over "the privatization of Recife". Again referencing policing, he called it a city whose "justice only works to arrest us", in spite of its modest origins as "a city of hawkers and street vendors".[12] He contrasted the top-down, market-driven, venture that Novo Recife signified with the logics of the self-built area: "Coque is ours! We made it! We altered it!" Another Coque resident spoke of the stigma attached to her community, its residents and its built environment. "Only someone who is from Coque employs someone who is from Coque, because we are Black, we live in favelas, we live in alleys", she asserted. Applause and vigorous nods followed. Despite the lively atmosphere

12 "Uma cidade de camelô e mascate", in the speaker's original statement in Portuguese.

generated by the roughly 90 participants, all in seeming agreement, Coque activists and community leaders also spoke of how hard it was to organize resistant masses. "We need to call on the [community] leaderships, on the social movements!", one of them shouted. In a resigned tone, another noted: "Mobilising is hard these days."

Out of the many arrival scenes (cf. Pratt, 1986) I could have sketched in order to introduce readers of this thesis to Recife's urban setting, this plenary is perhaps the most efficient at signposting the social and spatial processes that shape the unequal urban landscape of contemporary Recife, and the security practices deployed to secure it. The classed and racialized divides that were read off mirrored high-rises and self-built settlements speak of politics that are not just central to this thesis, but that are recurrent themes in how Recife is imagined and represented in scholarly accounts and popular culture.

In this contextualizing chapter, I discuss Recife's social and spatial inequalities, tracing the development processes and agendas that have shaped them from the early 20th century until the present. In resonance with the conceptual grammar of this thesis, my discussion of these processes and agendas draws on recent attempts to link the values that orient urban interventions, and the contestations these interventions trigger, to the realm of sense perception (Birdsall et al., 2021; Ghertner, 2014). Tying this discussion to this dissertation's larger focus on urban security and citizenship, I explore how values attached to different visions of the "good" city have sedimented materially in Recife, legitimating the exclusion of the people and places deemed at odds with such norms, and fuelling discourses and experiences of safety and danger. After briefly introducing influential "origin stories" that situate the capital of Pernambuco within Brazil's colonial and developmental histories, this chapter expands on three dichotomies that have been key to processes, agendas and interventions that have made and remade Recife's urban form: dry/wet, formal/informal, and high/low. These binaries, which are sensed and made sense of through their classed and racialized connotations, are enmeshed with values that pertain to urban security.

Origin stories

Plantation metropole

The marshy terrain that was named Povoação dos Arrecifes (Township of the Reefs) shortly after colonial occupation by the Portuguese in the early 1500s was initially peripheral to the plantation-based economy of the region, and to the colonial government centred in Olinda, the neighbouring city to the North that was the capital of the hereditary Captaincy of Pernambuco (Capitania de Pernambuco) from 1537 (Assies, 1992). Nonetheless, the coastal settlement was in no way outside of the political and economic systems of early colonial occupation (Bernardes, 2003). The most evident reason for this was its function as a port – a critical piece of infrastructure for the mercantile economy in which Brazil was embedded from the 16th century onwards. A second, and perhaps less obvious, linkage between colonial wealth and Recife stemmed from the early commodification of land in the expanding city, and its concentration in the hands of rural oligarchs. As historian Denis Bernardes (2013, p. 25) explains, colonial settlers who were granted the political possibility to own farmland in the 16th and 17th centuries understood the value of land near the port: that slice of unproductive soil contributed to the consolidation of their fortunes, as did the houses and buildings constructed for commercial gain. This meant that the same group of oligarchs controlled both agrarian and urban economic activities. In other words, Recife's growing urban economy was largely predicated on the power and wealth concentrated amongst a select few, based in the rural hinterlands (Bernardes, 2013, p. 25).

In popular and academic accounts, it often seems as though Recife's urban history started under Dutch rule (1630-1654), the period during which the city's main island was named Mauritsstad (Assies, 1992). This is usually illustrated through references to the material infrastructure built during this period, and to the cultural, commercial and political development associated with Dutch colonization (e.g., Assies, 1992, p. 44; Freyre, 2004a [1937]). Bernardes complicates this narrative of Recife under Maurício de Nassau,

as the governor of "Dutch Brazil" is known in Portuguese, arguing that the processes that increased Recife's political and economic importance under colonial occupation were intensified, but not inaugurated, by the Dutch invasion:

> The *Povoação dos Arrecifes*, for its port function, for its position as an intermediary between the rural sector and the metropolitan market, and its resulting capacity to appropriate part of the wealth generated in the colony, presented the conditions for its own expansion, feeding a process of differentiation that would reflect equally the dynamic of the rural sector and the deepening of the global market mechanisms it was subjected to. Consequently, the potential for, and the limits to, its growth derived from its insertion in the framework of the colonial system and from its capacity, as a differentiated space, to offer business opportunities that had relative autonomy vis-à-vis the rural sector. (Bernardes, 2003, p. 33, my translation)

The city's position in between the local plantation economy and the global market contributed to Recife's continuing urban expansion, beyond the Dutch colonial moment in the Brazilian Northeast. By the time the Portuguese colonial administration resettled in Olinda, Recife's population had already surpassed that of its northern neighbour (Assies, 1992). Due to its proximity to the harbour and the easy access it afforded to the Capibaribe floodplain, where a significant part of the region's sugar was produced, Portuguese merchants opted to stay in Recife (Loureiro and Amorim, 2000, p. 27). The ruling classes of the two settlements, the plantation owners who converged in Olinda and the outward-looking traders of Recife, became embroiled in a dispute over political centrality (ibid.). Derogatorily called *mascates* (hawkers) by Olinda's elites, Recife's traders emerged victorious from the conflict: Recife grew into Pernambuco's *de facto* capital and was decreed the state's official administrative centre in the years following Brazil's independence, in 1822 (Assies, 1992).

An in-depth account of Recife's trajectory as an important node of mercantile networks under Dutch and Portuguese occupation falls outside the scope of this chapter. I briefly introduce this history here, however, because

the relations that made the city a "plantation metropole" (Davies, 2020, p. 4) have enduring relevance for present-day forms of social and spatial differentiation. With time, Pernambuco's sugar mills (*engenhos de açúcar*) diminished in importance, but they remained materially and symbolically present in Recife's urban landscape. The deactivated *engenhos* that were once at the city's limits were engulfed by its expansion, while they lived on as the names of upper-class North Zone neighbourhoods such as Casa Forte, Apipucos and Madalena (Barros, 2004; Cortês de Lima, 2005). Colonial plantation houses and the titles of the estates where they once stood are not the only lingering heritage of the old *engenhos*, however. More broadly, the racialized hierarchies that organised Pernambuco's plantation economy continued to structure Recife as it grew into the urban centre of the Northeast – a process that the next section discusses.

Regional metropolis

The anglophone urban studies literature on Brazil does not always clearly situate the country's cities within their regional contexts. Due to its convergence around Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, this scholarship – and especially the literature on violence and policing – has overwhelmingly focused on the Southeast of Brazil (Garmany, 2011), even though this skewed focus is rarely made explicit. These two mega-cities might be the most internationally known, certainly in relation to issues concerning urban insecurity and inequality. Yet within Brazilian academic and popular discourse, the diverse states grouped together as "the Northeast" have long been constructed as highly distinct. This region has historically been represented in simplistic and generalizing terms: as a drought-stricken land of extreme poverty, a timeless hotbed for national culture, or a development problem to be solved.



Figure 5. Southeast/Northeast. Source: IBGE (n.d.b).

This discursive process is what historian Durval Muniz de Albuquerque Jr.[13] (2011, p. 32) has analysed and politicized as the "invention of the Northeast": the emergence of the *Nordeste* as an "object of study and a space of power". As the author discusses, the non-linear emergence of the region as a development issue,[14] defined in terms of what it *lacked*, occurred in tandem with historical, sociological, and artistic depictions that framed it as

13 Approaching the region "as a grouping of enunciations and images that repeat themselves, with some regularity, in different discourses, in different epochs, with different styles", Albuquerque Jr. (2011: 35, my translation) unpacks spatial imaginaries of the Northeast – and their origins – in national-level policymaking, academic texts, press resources, and literature and other artforms.

14 The *Nordeste* began to be distinguished from what was known broadly as "the North" around the 1920s, when the Federal Inspectorate of Works Against Droughts (IFOCS) named the Northeast as a separate region of intervention (Albuquerque Jr., 2011). From the early 20th century, the struggle against the aridity that afflicted the region's hinterlands, and the violent repression to the rural banditry known as *cangaço* (see Pericás, 2018), were amongst the main themes that put the region on the map for populations located in the industrializing South (Albuquerque Jr., 2011).

a romantic cradle of culture, history, and tradition representative of "the real" or "deep" Brazil. Recife is central to both processes. At the same time that the city was a key target of federal interventions designed to foster development and further connect the region to the Southern states of the country (Garmany, 2011; Vieira, 2004), it was also where many intellectuals converged around a shared "regionalist" perspective, tethered to history and tradition (Albuquerque Jr., 2011).

Within what was progressively consolidated as the Northeast, Recife continued to concentrate much of the region's industrial, financial and port activities into the 20th century (Cortês de Lima, 2005). As the headquarters of the Superintendence for Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), founded in 1956, Recife became central to the national project of developing the region, which also sought to deepen its connections to the South of the country (Garmany, 2011, p. 48). Additionally, it was also where many of the heirs of colonial political and economic elites from Pernambuco and neighbouring states converged for their education, contributing to the forging of shared narratives on the region and its relation to Brazil, and to Brazilianness. As the region became increasingly subordinate within national political and economic structures centred on the Centre-South, a sense of loss circulated amongst traditional north-eastern elites, fuelling a nostalgic "spatial fable" tethered to memories of the rural past, but largely assembled from the regional metropolis of Recife (Albuquerque Jr., 2011., p. 91).

Though Albuquerque Jr. (2011) names many authors and artists as producers of such narratives and imagery, *recifense* Gilberto Freyre was one of the most significant – and persistent – 20th-century advocates of thinking Brazilian history and society from and with its regions, initially from and with Pernambuco's *engenhos,* and later from its *sobrados* (townhouses) and *mocambos* (shanties). Although the term is not introduced explicitly in Freyre's (1933) most notorious work, *Casa-Grande e Senzala* (*The Masters and the Slaves*), the book and its author are most widely remembered for framing Brazil as a "racial democracy". Freyre's celebration of "racial mixing" (*miscigenação*) may have gone against the eugenics of the time (Schwarcz, 2012). Yet his emphasis on mixing – and his contribution to framing Brazil's

experience of enslavement as "more positive than negative" (Schwarcz, 2012, p. 51) – elided the racialized violence that structured relations between white plantation masters and enslaved Africans, and their descendants (Melo, 2009). Through its role in this influential work, Recife was central to the formation and circulation of discourses that sought to make sense out of the deep-seated inequalities stemming from Brazil's colonial past – even if the narratives that emerged from these efforts directly evidenced colonial modes of thought, romanticizing forms of racialized violence and inequalities that endure today (Moraes, 2020).

In tandem with such early 20th-century efforts to forge a post-colonial Brazilian identity, the capital of Pernambuco continued to expand in a polarized manner, shaped by the enduring legacies of enslavement and the influx of a poor rural populace from the backlands of Pernambuco and its vicinities (Cortês de Lima, 2005). The city's white elites considered those areas where low-income, Black and Brown populations settled during this expansion as the "unruly" side of Recife. The forms of living and working developed in these areas affronted the (implicitly or explicitly white) aesthetic norms associated with the "good" city, norms drawn from the Southeast of the country, and from Europe (Pontual, 1999). In the first decades of the 20th century, such values were performed in hygienist approaches to the riverside dwellings where marginalized populations settled, and which stood in stark contrast with the townhouses of the upper classes (Cortês de Lima, 2005; Davies, 2020). As I outline in the following sections, these classed and racialized understandings of urban development have remained relevant throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, informing a largely durable consensus on which urban forms should be combatted, and which should be cultivated.

Dry/wet

If the *Nordeste*'s severe droughts (*secas*) and the rural population they forced into migration (*retirantes*) were central to how those looking from the Centre-South perceived poverty and "underdevelopment" (Vieira, 2004),

within Recife the hierarchies between the dry and wet were reversed. Built on the sedimentary area from which the Capibaribe and the Beberibe rivers flowed, the city encompassed vast wetland areas in which the mangrove ecosystem flourished (Santos and Gomes, 2016). As the local population grew, those who could not access the formal housing market occupied parts of the city's muddy riverbanks. Often relying on manual landfills, the lower classes advanced into the swamplands, devoid of real estate value during much of the 20th century, where they constructed the self-built houses known as *mocambos* (Cortês de Lima, 2005; Davies, 2020).

Figure 6. Mocambos/sobrados. Based on painting by D. Ismailovitch (left) and lithography by Franz Heinrich Carls (right). Source: Freyre, 2004b, p. 320-321.

Wetland imaginaries

While in Rio de Janeiro the opposing topographies of hill (*morro*) and asphalt (*asfalto*) point to the unequal dwelling spaces of the poor and the rich, respectively, the contrast between the wet riversides and the dry terrains[15] represents an analogous form of spatial differentiation in Recife's central

15 Topography also matters in Recife, outside of its coastal and central neighbourhoods: hillsides at the urban margins (often known as *altos*) have also been occupied by low-income *recifenses*.

neighbourhoods. The mud (*lama*) and the mangroves (*mangues*) have featured in local imaginaries as the "pre-hygienic" (Lira, 1994, p. 751) but romantic realm of the urban poor, as products of violent socioeconomic structures, and as political sites of resistance. I draw on *recifenses* Gilberto Freyre, Josué de Castro, and Chico Science, respectively, to exemplify these three competing iterations. I start with a short excerpt from Freyre's *Sobrados e Mucambos* (*The Mansions and the Shanties*, in the English translation), originally published in 1936:[16]

> There are ... the *mucambos* built inside the mud. Some, the happier ones, perched on stilts over the swamps and mangroves, even have the sweet appearance of lakeside huts: they keep a hygienic distance from the wet ground and rotten water. But others allow themselves to stay well inside the rot, their residents in a sick intimacy with the mud ... The problem is an ecological one, of unequal human distribution, the rich spreading themselves on good and dry soil, the poor – usually *mestiço*, *mulato* or Black – distressingly sardined in the mud. (Freyre, 2004, p. 783, my translation)

In this fragment, Freyre romanticizes and pathologizes riverside shanties, differentiating them according to the distance their inhabitants keep from the mud. More broadly, he distinguishes the mud dweller from the dry land inhabitant in terms of class and culture, but also of race: although the presumable whiteness of the latter is left unstated, the former is racialized, using the categories that were current at the time. Freyre's folkloric take on the social gulf between the dry soil and the wetlands of Recife is less of a call for equality or emancipation, and more one for equilibrium and conciliation – similar to the one he thought possible between the enslavers and the

16 This quotation and those that follow were translated by the author, prioritizing meaning over literal correspondence with the original text.

enslaved (Strieder, 2001).[17]

Not all 20th-century academic and popular accounts on the matter naturalized and culturalized the differentiated living conditions afforded by Recife's mangrove *mocambos* and dry land *sobrados* (upper-class townhouses). The author Josué de Castro presents wetland dwellings and townhouses relationally, as divergent results of the same unequal and unjust urbanization process. In his autobiographical novel *Homens e Caranguejos* (*Men and Crabs*), Castro (1967, p. 69) writes: "[O]n one side, the houses were growing more and more at a distance, until they became sky-scrapers in the city centre ... On the other, the houses were shrinking, getting lower with distance, turning into *mocambos* and *latados* [tin shanties], until they disappeared completely into the mud". Castro describes the *mangue* dwellers with the same critical lyricism with which he frames their places of dwelling. Calling attention to how their subsistence depended on the mangrove fauna, Castro (1967, p. 28-29) outlines the "cycle of the crab":

> The mud, mixed with urine, excrement and other residues that the tide brings, even when it is not yet crab, it will be. The crab is born of it, lives of it. It grows eating the mud, getting fat from its waste ... On the other hand, the people there live from catching crab, from sucking its legs, eating and licking its shells until they are clean as a glass. There are two hundred thousand individuals, two hundred thousand citizens, made of crab meat. What the organism rejects returns as waste to the mangrove mud, to become crab again. In the apparent placidity of the swamp, the tragic and silent cycle of the crab unfolds. The cycle of famine that devours men and crabs, all of them stuck to the mud.

Known for his dedication to revealing and denaturalizing the violence of

17 The quote is part of a broader account in which Freyre narrates the development of an urban society in Brazil, following the decline of the rural oligarchy, which he explored in the aforementioned *Casa-Grande e Senzala* (1933). The contrasts that Freyre outlines in this short passage should be read as part of a regionalist narrative that considers "racial mixing" (*miscigenação*) in Brazilian society, alongside the social mobility afforded by the city, as positive and desirable "softeners" of antagonisms amongst social extremes (Rezende, 2001).

hunger in Brazil by highlighting the unequal social and economic relations at its roots (Melo Filho, 2003, p. 511), Castro approaches the "cycle of the crab" through a similar lens. The author's influence was felt beyond scholarly representations of inequality in Recife. In the early 1990s, the *recifense* counterculture movement called manguebeat appropriated the metaphorical imagery of mud, mangroves and crabs, which re-emerged with renewed political potency. Unlike the crab-men Castro depicted, manguebeat's crabs were not passive subjects stuck in the mud of structural inequality. The movement's manifesto, titled "Crabs with Brains" (Zero Quatro, 1992), made this point by inaugurating their symbol: a parabolic antenna sticking out of the mud, connecting the mangrove to wider urban politics and aesthetic movements. Crab-people as mobile political subjects, and the *mangue* as a site of action and resistance to "a cynical idea of *progress*" (Zero Quatro, 1992), are central to the poetics of Chico Science e a Nação Zumbi, manguebeat's most prominent band. This appears in the first verses of the song "Da Lama ao Caos" ("From Mud to Chaos"), in which the lead singer professes: "I can get out of here to get organized/I can get out of here to disorganize" (Science, 1994).

These different framings of the wet/dry divides of Recife have been influential in shaping the cultural meanings and valuations of the mangrove in relation to the city's urban politics and subjects. Installed at a central spot of the Capibaribe riverbank, a giant crab sculpture titled "Carne da minha perna" (Meat from my leg), for instance, celebrates the city's mangroves, Josué de Castro, and the manguebeat movement (Lins, 2016) as part of Recife's natural and artistic heritage. However, the early 20th-century urban regeneration agendas that rendered *mangues* and *mocambos* as sites of abjection, according to the hygienic, moral, and aesthetic values championed by the state and local elites, have perhaps left a longer-lasting impression on the city's material landscape, as I outline below.

Unmaking *mucambópolis*

Deemed at odds with Eurocentric norms of "the modern city" since the late

1800s (Cortês de Lima, 2005; Moreira, 1992), a systematic campaign for the eradication of Recife's *mocambos* was first pushed forward in 1937 (Lira, 1994). While the removal of Recife's self-built riverside settlements spoke to interests of local political and financial elites, it also aligned with the modernizing – and moralizing – orientation of Brazil's authoritarian Estado Novo[18] (New State) period (1937-1945), embodied in Pernambuco by Agamenon Magalhães, the state governor appointed by the regime (Fischer, 2019). If, in this context, São Paulo was rendered the great national metropolis, Recife was its *mucambópolis*[19] (Fischer, 2020, p. 6) – a status that hygienist urban development agendas would try to "undo" (Moreira, 1992).

Although this was rarely made explicit in the dominant imaginaries that have historically framed Recife's mangroves and its dwellers, the wet/dry divide was always both racialized and classed (Davies, 2020), as the origin of the word *mocambo* itself indicates.[20] While its meanings in Brazil shifted with use, the term originally indicated the hiding place, or refuge, of fugitive enslaved Africans (Lira, 1994, p. 733), communities that later became more widely known as *quilombos* (Gomes, 2015, p. 10). As geographer Archie Davies (2020, p. 5) has recently argued: "The geography of *quilombos* – near but hidden, in forests, marshes, and along rivers – is mirrored in the relationship between visions of urban modernity and the *mocambos*. As much as it functioned as an architectural and spatial designation, the word – like

18 Spanning from 1937 to 1945, the Estado Novo was an authoritarian period of Brazil, coloured by its anti-communist stance. Led by Getúlio Vargas – nicknamed "father of the poor" by state propagandists – this period was oriented towards state-led modernization and industrialization, while a wide-ranging set of workers' and social rights were also put in place (Braga, n.d.).

19 Brodwyn Fischer draws on *recifense* writer Mário Melo (1940) for this term.

20 According to Flávio dos Santos Gomes (2015, p. 10, my translation): "[M]ocambo, or *mukambu* in both kimbundu and kicongo (languages spoken in various parts of Central Africa), meant a type of support with spikes used to build huts in the camps". In other words, before it became associated with those who escaped enslavement in Brazil, the term described the material basis for hut-building.

favelas – designated a racially marked site of (potential, imagined, and real) political resistance and revolution". In 20th-century Recife, and particularly during the Estado Novo period, the predominantly white local elites and state authorities perceived the self-built settlements along the city's many waterways as threats to the urban, sanitary, economic, political, moral *and* racial orderings that they wished to engender (Davies, 2020; Fischer, 2020).

Created in 1939, the Social League Against the *Mocambo* (Liga Social Contra o Mocambo) was perhaps the most notorious initiative aimed at ridding the city of the *mocambo*, the housing typology associated with the city's wetlands (Lira, 1994). According to Brodwyn Fischer (2019, p. 26), the League "fused crusading authoritarian reformism with pioneering emphasis on empirical research and quantification". Alongside the measuring technologies deployed in their mission, though, the League's campaigning for working-class housing that would replace the *mocambos* and "civilize" *mocambeiros* (*mocambo*-dwellers) also appealed to aesthetic sensitivities and discourses (Lira, 1994). *Mocambos* were associated with the shame and malaise of elite *recifenses*, and considered a blemish in "the landscape of the American Venice" (Lira, 1994, p. 749, my translation).

The League did not achieve its stated objectives: although it managed to remove roughly a third of the *mocambos* counted in the 1939 census, it did not come close to providing sufficient replacement units to rid Recife of its precarious riverside dwellings (Fischer, 2019, p. 29). In Fischer's analysis, however, the anti-*mocambo* campaign had lasting impacts on how urban authorities and narrators made sense of the *mocambo* itself, and of inequality more generally. In relation to *mocambos*, and other informal dwelling typologies, Fischer (2019, p. 29) argues that the League

> ... pioneered censusing techniques that emphasized the sociological features of informal residents as well as the material features of their dwellings. They further denaturalized the *mocambos*, cleanly excluding them from Recife's legal and administrative fabric. They conceptualized *mocambos* as atomized units bereft of community or solidarity, facilitating a mode of governance that re-enforced direct, paternalistic, and highly unequal power relations. The Liga thus helped

> to create a distinctive and unequal urban geography, wherein *mocambos* persisted but were dispersed or peripheralized, excluded from urban citizenship and the public resources it implied.

An additional legacy of the league's orienting values and methodologies had to do with the terms of the conversation around urban inequality more broadly, which encompassed a range of contending positions, but coalesced around a narrow set of analytical dichotomies: poor/rich, sickly/healthy, rural/urban, and familial/promiscuous (Fischer, 2020, p. 31). An important effect of the contrasts mobilised by the anti-*mocambo* agenda was what Fischer frames as a *silence* around racialized differences and inequalities: "Racism, like racial and cultural consciousness, continued to operate, but in a sinuous form and, above all, without an explicit political language" (ibid.). She argues that this silence continued to be the norm amongst the dominant narratives of Recife's urban planning, politics, and insurgencies well into the late 20th century, making racialization a ubiquitous, yet veiled, dimension of the city's inequality (Fischer, 2020, p. 32).

While somewhat implicit in the context of modernization, sanitation, and familial morals, the racial othering of *mocambo*-dwellers was performed less discretely in state policing practices. Since the late 1800s, the persecution of individuals who saw in the growing city of Recife an opportunity to escape enslavement had been amongst the police's key tasks – which also encompassed repressing the forms of resistance and "disorder" associated with "Afro-Brazilianness", such as capoeira (Nunes, 2001). Relatedly, *mocambos* had been key targets of police control since the late 19th century (Valença, 2018), a condition that intensified during the Agamenon Magalhães years (Lopes, 2003). The racialized dimension of rendering *mocambos* objects of police surveillance was made explicit in the highly publicized fight against so-called "African sects" – African-Brazilian religious practices – during the Estado Novo (Campos, 2009, p. 301). The threat to Christian values posed by the spiritual practices described with the derogatory term *catimbó* was lumped together with other practices that the regime deemed threatening, from loitering to "subversive" political organizing (ibid.). By focusing their repression on the *mocambos* and their "disorderly" inhabitants, state

policing entrenched the divides that oriented the hygienist redevelopment agenda laid out previously.

Formal/informal



Figure 7. Riverside settlement, by an overpass.

As noted in the previous section, the anti-*mocambo* campaign that was particularly active from the late-1930s to the mid-1940s did not rid Recife of its informal, working-class housing, though it did contribute to the displacement of low-income residents. Those who had been evicted from the city's central region, as well as newcomers from the rural areas of the Northeast, were driven towards the devalued hills of the city's North and South zones, where *favelas* and state-provided housing projects proliferated (Cortês de Lima, 2005). By the early 1960s, Recife's stock of informal housing units had more than doubled since their initial quantification in the late 1930s (Fischer, 2020, p. 30). During the decades that followed the Estado Novo, the social tensions encompassed in the dry/wet dichotomy – which had been central to how urban spaces and citizens were valued in Recife – were amplified and reconfigured, giving rise to urban policies and movements that both reified and challenged the divide between the formal and the informal

city. In this section, I discuss, in broad brushstrokes, how, from the mid-20th century, top-down redevelopment initiatives and bottom-up political mobilisations around the formal/informal dichotomy shaped Recife's urban form according to competing ethics and aesthetics.

After the fall of Vargas' Estado Novo in 1945, catalysed by the end of World War II, Recife's informality acquired different names, and began to occupy new geographical and political spaces: "The folkloric *mocambo* became the stigmatized *favela*, or the politically idealized *comunidade*" (Fischer, 2020, p. 32). The waterside settlements discussed in the previous section were never *outside* the ideological disputes of the time: in fact, under Magalhães, they had been dealt with violently, as "dangerous" breeding grounds for communist organizing (Davies, 2020). From the mid-1940s onwards, however, working-class mobilisations around the right to the city gained unprecedented momentum and reach, across the self-built settlements that proliferated in Recife's flatlands, wetlands, and hills (Cortês de Lima, 2005, p. 77). As chronicled by Willem Assies (1992), the popular politics around the right to (stay in) the city mobilised a range of social movements and organizations in Recife, including the more progressive segments of the Catholic Church. Although the civil-military coup of 1964 dampened Recife's leftist front, which had achieved great national relevance from the mid-1950s, neighbourhood-level organizations endured, with the support from the Catholic Church (Fischer, 2020, p. 32).

The neighbourhood associativism that mobilised residents of Recife's informal settlements around the right to urban land and infrastructure emerged in tandem with a technocratic-modernist form of state-led urbanism, which characterized urban planning agendas under the Brazilian military dictatorship (Santos, 2012, p. 97). In this context, centralized attempts to order the city mostly sought to relocate informal, or illegal, occupations, to social housing units financed by the National Housing Bank (BNH) (Cortês de Lima, 2005). Founded in 1964 to back the National Housing Plan, as well as urban infrastructure projects (Valladares and Hoffman, n.d.), the BNH was the main urban planning instrument at the federal government's disposal (Santos, 2012). Between the 1970s and mid-1980s, several large-scale, vertical

estates were built in peripheral neighbourhoods of Recife with BNH funds. Still standing in and around Recife, the housing projects of this era failed to reach the city's poorest populations, who continued to settle in *favelas* and *palafitas* (the make-shift houses erected on stilts over the water) – the aesthetic antithesis of the modernist blocks that have dotted the city's landscape for over four decades (Nascimento and Bautista, 2016).

As flagged previously, the relocation policies pushed by this technocratic form of urbanism were not only insufficient, in terms of replacing informal settlements; they were also met with great resistance. The movements mentioned earlier challenged the "informal" status pinned onto them, as they pushed for the regularization and infrastructural development of irregular occupations and settlements rendered "subnormal". As Maria Angela de Almeida Souza and Jan Bitoun (2015, p. 31) explain, from the mid-1970s to the late-1980s – when the political repression of the military regime softened – this intensified social mobilisation halted the expulsion and "peripherization" of Recife's low-income populations. The regulatory and participatory frameworks that ultimately resulted from this struggle culminated in the Regularization Plan for Special Zones of Social Interest (PREZEIS), instituted in 1987 to legalise irregular occupations and to enable the provision of state-provided services in these areas (de Souza, 2001). Still in place, the PREZEIS – and the many areas it established as Special Zones of Social Interest – reduced eviction threats and valued the rights of users over those of proprietors (Koster, 2020).

Even though the PREZEIS and the participatory mechanisms it established have lost steam over the past couple of decades (Souza and Bitoun, 2015), the protections this plan provided against evictions and real estate speculation have effectively maintained working-class settlements as part of the urban fabric of the city's centres. This has caused the "formal" and the "informal" – terms that evoke aesthetic norms alongside, or in spite of, legal ones – to coexist in close proximity, even in areas of high real estate value. Accordingly, this has also meant that urban inequalities that are explicitly classed – and silently, albeit visibly, racialized (Fischer, 2020) – are acutely perceptible at street-level. Increasingly, these social and spatial forms of differentiation



Figure 8. The ZEIS of Recife are marked in black in this map. Source: Miranda (2005).

have been associated with security-related anxieties, which are productive of hard-to-miss changes to the sensible formation of neighbourhoods and residences (Cruz and Sá, 2006; Santos Jr. and Halley, 2018).

Before I delve into the visible forms of privatized security that have reconfigured the look and feel of Recife's middle- and upper-class areas, especially since the 1990s (Lins and Melo, 2020), I turn to a much more veiled form through which urban policing aggravated the inequalities between the formal and the informal city, under and beyond the civil-military dictatorship. The technocratic and centralizing disposition that the regime demonstrated towards urban planning and development also shaped its security agendas. In 1967 and 1969, national-level legislation unified previously decentralized police forces: first, under state-level secretariats that answered to governors appointed directly by the regime, and, later, under the national military, establishing the Polícia Militar (Military Police), tasked with street-level policing[21] (Huggins, 2002, p. 212). In the authoritarian period that preceded the late-1980s escalation of criminal violence and fear that took place in Recife (Wolff, 2015), and elsewhere in urban Brazil (Caldeira, 2002), a national security ethos oriented state policing practices, even as these practices blurred formal and informal divides (Huggins, 2002). This meant that a militarized war-like logic came to permeate street-level policing, informing its fight against criminal and political "enemies". Though they were not invented by the regime, death squads (*grupos de extermínio*) proliferated during this period, and as long as they enacted the national state's agenda against political subversives, state authorities overlooked the vigilante work they were paid to perform on the side, for private businesses and interests (Huggins, 2002).

21 As Martha Huggins (2002, p. 212) describes, this also demarcated more clearly the scope of action of Brazil's two main police forces: while the Military Police provided ostensive policing at street-level, the Civil Police became the one responsible for criminal investigations. This division can sometimes blur, though. For instance, a recent *chacina* (mass killing) perpetrated by state policing, in the Rio de Janeiro favela of Jacarezinho, was the result of an operation carried out by a special operations unit that is part of the civil police (Olliveira, 2021).

As Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2006, p. 152) remarks, regarding the death squads of urban and rural Brazil, "the demilitarization of Brazil's government was not accompanied by a demilitarization of everyday life". In Recife, even after political "subversives" were no longer of security interest, these extra-legal policing formations – usually, but not solely, composed of off-duty or former military policemen – persisted, targeting and extorting dwellers of the urban margins (Cavalcanti, 2020). In spite of the legalisation feats that extended urban rights to the city's *favelas*, legal and extra-legal policing practices have historically rendered their residents criminalized and killable. This process has maintained the substantive citizenship gap separating the formal city from the labyrinth-like spaces of narrow alleys that challenge state control (Nuijten, 2013).

High/low



Figure 9. High/low.

A few months after the 2015 public hearing at the start of this chapter, Ocupe Estelita activists released a militant music video, which satirized the urban development vision of the previous PSB mayor's administration. The video highlighted the administration's supposed obsession with ceramic, marble

and mirrored façades, which tower over the city oppressively. The comedic protest against Novo Recife, the glossy real estate endeavour aimed at redeveloping the central area where the José Estelita Wharf is located, rewrote local musician Reginaldo Rossi's classic brega[22] hit "Recife, Minha Cidade" ("Recife, My City"). In the original, Rossi (1994) professes: "Recife is like this, dude. Lots of joy, lots of sun, lots of music, lots of beaches".[23] In the more politicized version, a satirical representation of the mayor states: "This is Novo Recife. Lots of cement, lots of ceramic, lots of marble, lots of mirrors" (Ocupe Estelita, 2015, my translation), as a way to mock what the activists regard as the tasteless aesthetics of Recife's skylines in recent decades.

The city described in the political parody is jokingly celebrated as "Brazil's Miami Beach": a modern and upbeat place that is up to FIFA standards, which were still en vogue at the time, due to Recife's host-city status during the 2014 World Cup. In the video's visuals, some of the city's most iconic tourist sites, such as the Boa Viagem beach and the Francisco Brennand sculpture park, are depicted in the midst of a skyscraper invasion: "Within a context that's international / Novo Recife is very vertical" (Ocupe Estelita, 2015, my translation). At the end of the video, four masked figures join "the mayor" in his penthouse, each representing a construction company from the Novo Recife consortium. In the poetics of the protests that opposed the waterfront renewal project, Recife's new and not-so-new buildings became a recurring signifier of an exclusionary urban development process, afforded by public-private entanglements.

The verticalization of Recife did not start with Novo Recife, of course. In fact, one could even argue that its first signs were the skinny *sobrados* (townhouses), built on the dry land that contrasted with the city's mangroves (Lins and Melo, 2020). The modernist and modernizing agendas of the

22 A Brazilian popular music genre. For a discussion of its origins and politics, see Araújo (1988).

23 My translation; "Recife é isso aí, bicho. Muita alegria, muito sol, muita música, muita praia", in the Portuguese original.

authoritarian 1970s intensified this vertical build-up. The state funds made available via the National Housing Bank for the construction of housing and infrastructure supported this process, to the great benefit of private construction companies (Campos, 2013). Though social housing projects for the urban working classes were amongst the vertical dwellings that proliferated in the 1970s, high-rises for the middle- and upper-classes grew taller, and more rapidly, becoming the most popular dwelling form within this segment (Amorim and Loureiro, 2012).

In relation to this broader historical context, Novo Recife – currently underway, in spite of the protests that stalled the needed demolitions – can be read for the ruptures and the continuities it materializes. On the one hand, it reflects a wider trend that has been shaping Brazilian cities since the 1990s, which replace comprehensive urban planning practices with fragmented interventions, driven by the real estate and construction sectors, and facilitated by the state system (Rolnik, 2013). On the other hand, when it comes to who is included in, and who is excluded from, the aesthetic order that this waterfront renewal project stages, a clear thread connects its mirrored high-rises to the eclectic *sobrados* and modernist blocks of previous periods (Santos and Gomes, 2016). The new, Miami-like constructions give concrete shape to the city's enduring classed and racialized hierarchies, now mapped onto the high-rise buildings that tower over the street-level dwellings of the poor, adding a high/low binary to the dry/wet and formal/informal divides discussed in previous sections.

In Brazil, the entrepreneurial turn in urban governance and development, which reflected a broader transnational trend within neoliberalism (see Harvey, 1989), emerged in the late 1980s in tandem with (re-)democratisation. Against the centralised power of authoritarianism, *active citizenship* emerged as an important element within the co-existing agendas of both neoliberalisation and democratisation (Dagnino 2007a, 2007b), but with very different ends: while it supports "substantive" equality in the latter, it is a means for "formal" equality in the former (Caldeira and Holston, 2015, p. 2005). The innovative City Statute of 2001, which followed the democratic Constitution of 1988, is a piece of federal legislation that reflects this tense

co-existence. At the same time that it was aimed at guaranteeing the right of all citizens to the city, this statute also laid out the normative framework for public-private urban development partnerships, which tend to privilege private interests over those of "the public" (ibid.). In Recife, where legislative and participatory instruments for the right to the city were already in place by the time the "Citizen Constitution" and City Statute were sanctioned (Souza and Bitoun, 2015), the tensions and convergences between neoliberal and democratic urban agendas have been felt acutely over the past two decades.

The above comes out, for instance, in Monique Nuijten's (2013) analysis of a *favela* resettlement and upgrading project that took place in Recife's North Zone, from 2003, which points to the often-perverse dynamics that take place once languages of citizenship become entangled with neoliberal logics. Proposed during the first of four Workers Party (PT) municipal mandates, the World-Bank-financed Prometrópole project promised inclusion and participation through a rights-based vocabulary, while enacting an agenda that aimed to produce self-helping, autonomous subjects. This project was part of a broader process that reconfigured state-citizen relations around urban governance during the 2000s. Grassroots movements and neighbourhood-level associations, which had been somewhat dispersed during the 1990s (Souza and Bitoun, 2015), were deemed "outdated", as citizens were encouraged to hold the state to account as individuals, or through state-organized participatory channels (Nuijten et al. 2012, p. 158). The role of working-class community leaders and organizers was, thus, reconfigured: incorporated in the municipal councils established after the 1988 Constitution, they became even more entangled with state governance from the 2000s (Souza and Bitoun, 2015), placing them in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the communities they represented (Koster, 2012). The shrinking of the participatory dimension of the PREZEIS, the PREZEIS Forum, was also part of the recent urban governance shifts that threaten the Special Zones of Social Interest located in areas of significant interest to real estate market and developers (Souza and Bitoun, 2015).

These gradual shifts in urban governance relations took place in tandem

with fragmented interventions in Recife's material landscape, which intensified in the 2000s and 2010s, accelerated by the 2014 World Cup and the economic growth that took place around this period in Pernambuco and Brazil. The city's central and South zones were amongst the most affected by the proliferation of (auto)mobility infrastructure, such as the Via Mangue highway, and commercial and residential high-rises and shopping malls (Albuquerque and Gomes, 2017, p. 55). Geographers Mariana Albuquerque and Edvânia Gomes (2017) suggest that, though they may seem disconnected, these fragmented interventions result from willed and concerted actions, carried out by private developers and managed by the state to (re-) value areas rendered vulnerable or obsolete.[24] Relatedly, Santos and Gomes (2016) present disconnected viaducts, roads and tunnels as what happens when private initiatives are made responsible for the maintenance and development of basic infrastructure. These disconnected materialities, they argue, are legitimated by appearing "under the unquestionable aura of development" (ibid., p. 396, my translation). They embody the dominant aesthetics of urban desirability, while intensifying the fragmentation of Recife's landscape.

The high-rises of Recife are an architecturally eclectic ensemble, reflecting both the different design trends that emerged over time, and the political and economic circumstances of the housing sector (Motta, 2018). Notwithstanding, robust security materialities became a core element of this dwelling form from the 1990s (Lins and Melo, 2020). As in other Brazilian cities (Caldeira, 2000), it was around this time that violence became a generalized source of anxiety amongst Recife-dwellers. The spread of the crack cocaine market across the city's marginalized areas is usually listed amongst the causes of the high homicide numbers from the 1990s

24 Under this light, the authors reinterpret the ZEIS: while created to protect the occupancy rights of low-income populations, they may become a way to "reserve" lands for real estate markets and developers. In this context, the displacement of low-income populations would not only result from state-led resettlement, but also from purchase proposals, "which demobilise resistances, affording the expansion of high-end real estate to historically devalued areas" (Albuquerque and Aguiar Gomes, 2017, p. 41, my translation).

onwards (Cavalcanti, 2020; Wolff, 2015). Around this time, muggings also rose to notoriety in the Recife-based media, alongside murders, impacting the mobility practices of *recifenses*, especially at night (Milfont et al., 2016).

The increase of urban violence, and urban fear, has affected Recife's material landscape over the past few decades, in different ways. Most evidently, perhaps, are the security materials and technologies that have proliferated, especially around middle- and upper-class spaces of residence, leisure, and consumption (Cruz and Sá, 2006; Santos Jr. and Halley, 2018). Less visibly, the violence-related anxieties of the urban elites are projected onto the low-rise settlements of the lower classes, especially when located in high-end neighbourhoods. In order to develop spaces that are marketable and desirable to middle- and upper-class segments, real estate developers apply direct and indirect pressures to displace settlements and subjects deemed dangerous (Cavalcanti, 2020). In the context of Recife's entrepreneurial urban governance, urban security provision has become a public-private affair that, much like the verticalization of its skylines, adds a new dimension to the classed and racialized forms of differentiation that have been articulated by multiple planning regimes and development agendas.

Conclusion: From tree to mangrove

Aimed at providing historical context for the chapters that follow, this chapter has discussed the hygienist, modernist, and neoliberal urban development agendas that shaped Recife over the past century. The aesthetic dichotomies articulated in these agendas – dry/wet, formal/informal, high/low – served as entry points to discuss enduring forms of social and spatial differentiation, and their relation to urban citizenship and security. In dialogue with recent attempts to link urban aesthetics to the norms and values that urban interventions and contestations perform and unsettle (Birdsall et al., 2021; Ghertner, 2014), I explored how different visions of the "good" city – clean, modern, entrepreneurial and safe – have materially sedimented onto Recife, entrenching classed and racialized inclusions and exclusions.

Having situated these successive urban development agendas – and their ramifications for citizenship and security – within the recent history of Recife, and Brazil, I would now like to trouble the linearity of this historical narrative, by going back to the stories through which I arrived. At that 2015 public hearing, competing values mobilised by "past" urban development agendas were still very much present, shaping how resident-narrators of Recife sensed and made sense of its shifting landscapes. Policing practices rumoured to have been restricting access to Recife's historical centre, for instance, were described as "hygienist" by one of the speakers, while Coque residents protested the discrimination they experienced living in the winding alleys they had built and altered themselves. All this while they gathered to oppose a waterfront renewal project that embodied the entrepreneurial urban agendas pushing building height restrictions to their limits.

Although the desire to "contextualize" may have ordered this chapter according to a somewhat linear chronology, the processes and relations that continue to produce and ascribe value to the polarities presented here are not unidirectional, linear, or mutually exclusive. Echoing Martijn Koster and Monique Nuijten (2016), who draw on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2013 [1987]) to problematize the formal/informal divide in urban studies, I suggest that the many norms and forms in this chapter relate to each other – and to many other norms and forms that emerge throughout this thesis – in ways that are more *rhizomatic* than *arboreal*. In other words, rather than offering a single root or fixing a linear order, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari (2003 [1987], p. 7), this chapter offers snapshots of relations that remain active and ongoing throughout the pages that follow. Aptly for Recife, the mangrove – so central to social and political imaginaries of the city – offers a similarly compelling metaphor for the plural and relational *entanglements* I have sought to sketch here (see also Drabinski, 2013, in his reading of Édouard Glissant; Escobar, 2016). I close, then, with the mangrove as a way to flag that, much like this ecosystem's dense and visible networks of aerial roots, this "contextualizing" chapter offers glimpses into material and symbolic associations that are always already entangled – associations that the chapters that follow make and remake.

Chapter Three

Condoscapes

When I first arrived at Condomínio Atlantic Park, in July 2015, I didn't have to wait very long at the gate. As was usually the case in *condomínios* such as this one, there was an electronic communication system in place, connecting those requesting access from the street to the doormen on the inside, tasked with either granting or denying such requests. Once I identified myself, the first gate buzzed open. After I closed it behind me, a second gate allowed me into the *portaria* area, the ground-level buffer between the street and the *condomínio* (condominium). The doorman on duty that afternoon told me that Carlos, the resident elected as the condominium's general administrator (the *síndico*), was already waiting by the elevators. When we met, on the ground floor of his building, the middle-aged lawyer held a cooing baby in his arms. Together, the three of us went up to Carlos' tenth floor apartment and headed to the breezy balcony, where we sat to talk. "When she starts complaining", he said, referring to the baby on his lap, "I can give her to Raquel [their nanny]".

Carolina

So, you are the *síndico* of the building. As *síndico*, do you also have responsibilities that relate to security in the *condomínio*? To the hiring of specific services and the installation of...

Carlos

Yes, each *condomínio* has a statute, a set of rules. ... And these measures, these decisions, are made in an assembly. ... During our last meeting, for example, it was decided that nobody else comes up. Whether they come with medicine, or a pizza, or a...

Carolina
Ah, you mean delivery people?

Carlos
Delivery people. I think…I don't like it. I think it's discrimination. But they understand it as being safer. So, everyone has to go down and pick up [whatever they ordered]. In terms of security [demands, such as] "oh, there must be a camera here", and so on: the body of residents makes the decisions, I just put them in practice.

Slight signs of infant discontent summoned Raquel onto the balcony. In the white uniform that is often compulsory for domestic workers tasked with childcare in Brazil, she carried the baby into the flat and out of sight. My conversation with Carlos resumed.

Carlos
I don't like this *síndico* thing. I took over because the building has just started and there's lots to do. And some time from now it will be full of teenagers. That's the worst time to be *síndico*. So, better I do it now, because I think everyone has to give their contribution. With regard to security, [safety-related] events or the fear that people feel lead to actions being taken.

The vertical condominium is a housing typology that has been reshaping both the street views and the skylines of Recife's South Zone over the past few decades. In early 2020, the city's metropolitan area encompassed approximately 6,000 condominiums (Monteiro, 2020). This particular high-end residential high-rise, Atlantic Park, was indeed new. It had been inaugurated in Vista Nova just over a year prior to my conversation with Carlos, along with a range of other residential and commercial developments that had been reconfiguring the area's sociospatial make-up. In Carlos's view, the new residential condominiums that had sprouted up on his street shared distinctive commonalities, visible at street-level, in terms of how they secured themselves:

Carlos

What do you usually have in condominiums? If you look closely, they are all the same, you see? If you go to that building there, or another on the main avenue, or this one. In the future they will build a cabin there [a security booth, like the one I had crossed, when entering Atlantic Park], so that they open [the door], come in, identify themselves and *then* enter.

His description of the security practices and procedures enrolled in making and maintaining the Atlantic Park securityscape quickly highlighted the specific materialities and rules that were discussed at condominium assemblies. The most recent ruling was one that prohibited delivery services – common in Recife long before the "Uberization" of this sector of the urban economy – from taking the elevator to hand over goods at apartment doors. Explicitly framed as a security measure, this decision implied that, when equipped with a legitimate (often service-related) purpose, strangers could come in, but not go up. Their presence was constrained to the *portaria,* a buffer zone often at the centre of residents and administrators' security concerns.

Carlos

In my opinion, it [the security booth] doesn't change anything. Because a person can jump over that wall whenever they want, see? … But people feel safer with this, don't they? And if anyone has the intention of doing anything [along the lines of "breaking and entering"], they are going to look for whatever is easiest. But if the person *really* wants to enter, they will enter, won't they? And these people that work with delivery? I don't like this thing of not letting them come up for security reasons, because it's discrimination. There might be someone [looking to steal], but most of them are workers. It's a tough job, a tough and underpaid job. So, I don't like it. Whenever these comments arise, I defend this view. But I need to accept the decision made by the majority, and the majority always decides that it's good if they don't come up, "because this disappeared, and that disappeared, and blah-blah-blah".

Over a year later, in September 2016, Carlos and I met again, this time at his law firm, which was a short walk away from his building. Violence

indicators had generally worsened in Recife since we had last spoken, a process that had been heavily publicized in local news outlets. "I'm not very scared, but my wife panics", he stated, coolly. He was still the *síndico* of his single-building vertical condominium and, therefore, still responsible for procuring and arranging the security materials and technologies that the doormen would operate on an everyday basis. Discussing the introduction of access control and surveillance technologies, Carlos presented a risk-reduction rationale, not in relation to crime, but to neighbours' complaints: "As the *síndico*, I'm the one responsible for security in the area. If anything happens, residents will question the lack of electronic security devices, so I installed them". At the time, 17 video surveillance cameras covered the condominium's common areas and external surroundings. To protect residents' privacy, the *síndico* had decided to not place any inside the elevators.

Condomínio Atlantic Park was also part of the De Olho na Rua (DOR) programme.[25] Using an analogue radio network, the programme connected the street-facing entrances of condominiums (or their *portarias*) to each other and to a 24-hour operational base. Through this shared frequency, doormen could inform the base, located at Pernambuco's Centre of Integrated Social Defence Operations (Centro Integrado de Operações de Defesa Social, CIODS), of situations deemed suspicious or threatening. Working under the slogan "safer neighbourhood, safer state", which adorned the DOR base in bold letters, the programme staff would communicate the reported occurrences to the state authorities, most often the military police. The programme's title, which translated to "With an Eye on the Street", echoed Jane Jacobs' (1961) discussion of vigilant neighbours as a key factor in creating safer urban communities. In the context of DOR, though, the "eyes on the street" were not those of watchful residents. This surveillance work was a task taken on by staff stationed at the *portaria*. When I first asked Carlos about whether Atlantic Park took part in DOR, he answered, with a hint of cynicism: "Yes, we have it, but just because everyone else does".

25 A longer discussion of the programme in relation to urban security and technology is provided in Frossard and Jaffe (2019).

Carlos was a sceptical client of security services, a cynical member of policing networks, and a customer of surveillance and access-control devices who was unconvinced of their capacity to deter tenacious threats. He was also, however, a diligent *síndico*. The fact that he did not see or present himself as a fearful subject did not stop him from executing the decisions derived from *condôminos*' collective sense of apprehension concerning urban violence. Nor did it stop him from implementing measures that reflected a shared sense of the norms, practices, technologies and material forms that engendered what "the majority" perceived as safety. As Carlos pointed out himself, such security values, actions and things were not particular to Condomínio Atlantic Park. In fact, their circulation was a significant part of what warranted his perception of condominiums, in Vista Nova and beyond, being "all the same".

In this chapter, I approach the vertical condominiums of Jardim and Vista Nova through the security norms, forms and affects that shape and are shaped by this housing typology, within and beyond the limits of their discrete gate-wall-*portaria*-high-rise arrangements. Central to imaginaries and enactments of "safe" city living in Brazil and elsewhere, I suggest we approach these condominiums as, and in relation to, urban *securityscapes* (Maguire and Low, 2019). Resonating strongly with the norm-form-affect approach I outline in this thesis' introduction, the concept of the urban securityscape is an explicit gesture towards the dynamic spatiality of security – which, as this chapter argues, is important for how citizenship and authority norms are performed and negotiated in and around the condominium. Engaging the condominium as a securityscape in itself implies a processual understanding of how it becomes a bounded, albeit porous, space shaped for the comfort and safety of *condôminos*, as condominium dwellers

are referred to.[26] While governed by explicit formal norms, which seek to manage behaviour within condominium confines, this residential space also enacts more tacit normative connections between residents' safety and classed and racialized separation. Additionally, the condominium is an easily identifiable urban form that affords similarly recognizable security atmospheres. In this chapter, I engage these forms and affective atmospheres through the verticality and street-level buffer areas that characterize most residential condominiums of Recife's South Zone.

The chapter starts with an elaboration of my approach to enclaved urban housing through the concepts of the securityscape and security aesthetics. This is followed by a brief discussion of the meaning of "condominium" in urban Brazil and its development in Recife. I move on to unpack the securityscapes of discrete condominiums in Vista Nova and Jardim. From this section, it becomes clear that the sensible orderings that condominiums and their materialities normalize and solidify are not contained by the formal limits of individual enclaves. In Recife, the clustered proliferation of this housing typology promotes a "partition of the sensible" (Rancière, 2015, p. 44) through which the condominium becomes the norm in terms of the look, feel and organization of security, making *condoscapes* out of the neighbourhoods they tower over. In such condoscapes, being a *condômino*, a condominium resident, becomes the prime form of partaking within this aesthetic order. After engaging this sensible ordering in relation to the condoscapes of Jardim and Vista Nova, I move to include the state-provided housing estate Capibaribe I in the analysis, aiming to understand how this particular distribution of the sensible affects the security practices and people positioned as part of its constitutive outside. When condominium security norms and forms are perceived as "out of place", as I hope to show, they

26 According to condominium legislation, *condôminos* are those who own their units. This matters at times: for instance, at condominium assemblies where changes to the convention are discussed, only proprietors have a vote, officially (Desimone, 2010). In everyday condominium life however, the distinction between "real" *condôminos* and tenants is seldom made, and security practices do not commonly enact a difference between the two kinds of *moradores* (residents).

contribute to what we can think through as an affective sense of inequality (cf. Bottero, 2019). The different analytical threads that this chapter follows contribute to the thesis-wide argument by showing how the built environment and its immaterial attributes enact norms that both enable and constrain specific forms of security authority, while engendering an affective sense of belonging *and* of inequality amongst citizens.

Matters of urban security and distinction

The material and design elements enrolled in urban security have served as fruitful entry points into the production of social distinction and the maintenance of spatial control. Within urban studies, the relationship between the physical layout of urban spaces and behaviour perceived as criminal has been explored in radically different ways. City planner Oscar Newman (1996) famously championed the possibility of designing crime out of low-income residential estates through the creation of "defensible spaces", where residents' enhanced sense of ownership over their surroundings would lead to constant and voluntary lateral surveillance. In less prescriptive approaches to the same theme, specific architectural elements are critiqued as "defensive" or "hostile" when put in place to "cleanse" public spaces of stigmatized behaviours and populations. In Mike Davis' (2010 [1990], p. 197) analysis of Los Angeles, such material elements, which repel "any affinity or sympathy between different architectural or human orders", compose the "archisemiotics of class war". Often resulting from urban renewal processes driven by state actors and real estate investors seeking to deter the homeless from using public space, such physical interventions may be more or less explicit, ranging from armrests that strategically partition public benches to spikes, gates and walls (Smith and Walters, 2018).

The latter two physical barriers have featured prominently in the scholarship on walled urban developments and (the fear of) crime, which has shown how material dividers both result from and deepen classed and

racialized sociospatial divides (e.g. Beall et al., 2002; Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 1996, 2000; Dinzey-Flores, 2013; Low, 2003). In her seminal work on São Paulo, urban anthropologist Teresa Caldeira (1996: 303) coined the term "fortified enclave" as a shorthand for "the privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work", which attract those wishing to abandon "the traditional public sphere of the streets to the poor, 'the marginal', and the homeless". The physical barriers that characterize these spaces, Caldeira (1996, 2000) argues, enabled a new form of segregation and fragmentation, which also reconfigured urban citizens' engagement with the city's public life. The fear of rising crime rates served as a driver and as reasoned justification for this retreat out of the public realms of citizenship and into fortified private spaces (ibid.). Further north, in the United States, Setha Low (1997, 2003) found that similar dynamics were involved in the building of racially divided "fortress cities", which actualized "fortress America" (Blakely and Snyder, 1997).

Drawing on the uneventful suburban areas where US gated communities tend to be located, Low (2003) shows how the increased retreat of white middle- and upper-class citizens into fortified residential areas does not necessarily correlate with rising crime rates. It is, rather, a response to a more generalized anxiety concerning people and places othered as dangerous, as threats to the social status enjoyed by those who gate themselves in. Gates and walls are, Low (2003, p. 137) suggests, the material manifestations of a "social splitting" strategy, which divides residents and residences into "us" and "them", "good" and "bad". In São Paulo, the "city of walls", Caldeira (2000, p. 31) found that similar lines of "classificatory thinking" crystalized through the talk of crime, which offered inhabitants of the megacity a simple language for complex social anxieties and rapid urban change. From San Antonio, Texas, to São Paulo's capital city, (the fear of) crime provides residents with a simple and simplifying language through which to organize the messy social worlds they inhabit. Such discursive barriers, as Caldeira (2000) argues, result in material and spatial partitions: security materials and technologies deployed to protect urban dwellers across social classes.

Beautifying barriers

In addition to the physical separation they afford, guarded gates and fancy fortresses enable symbolic forms of distinction that are also key to the maintenance of unequal social and spatial orders. Barriers and practices with seemingly pragmatic, safety-related functions are also imbued with, and judged against, values that relate to order, beauty and taste. In Low's (2003, p. 152) gated communities, codes of conduct and regulations are put in place, alongside gates and guards, in order to maintain the space according to dominant ideas of "niceness", a value that strongly correlates with middle-class "whiteness". Informed by situated ideas of visual and behavioural propriety, "aesthetic control" (Low 2003, p. 165) ends up (re)producing the same class- and race-based dichotomies that structure crime narratives and access-control procedures.

The symbolic dimension of how security materials divide and order urban space becomes particularly visible once we follow them out of the residential enclaves of the white middle- and upper-classes. Following carefully curated gates and walls into working-class neighbourhoods, Caldeira (2000, p. 293) demonstrated how "the aesthetics of security" had become a "new code of distinction", legible by São Paulo dwellers of all classes. In a more recent analysis, Marie Kolling (2019) follows Caldeira (2001) in her reading of the iron grates and bars that residents put up around their doors and windows in a state-built housing estate in Salvador, Bahia. In addition to their security purposes, Kolling (2019) argues that these objects are valued as aesthetic signifiers of progress, which modify working-class houses in the image of middle- and upper-class homes, setting them apart from their neighbours. As elements of a broader "aesthetic of security", gates and walls can, thus, be analysed as adornments that index the social status of those gating themselves in. Conversely, when they deviate from dominant standards of beauty and conservation, their appearance can also function as a signifier of marginalization and state neglect. Comparing gated enclaves for the rich and the poor in the Puerto Rican city of Ponce, Zaire Dinzey-Flores (2013a, 2013b) highlights the physical and symbolic divides that security materialities and technologies "cement", relating the attractiveness of gates and

estates to forms of segregation based on both race and class. "Gates create a safe and *beautiful* sanctuary for the elite; for the poor, they create an aggressive, often *barren of beauty*, space controlled by government regulations", Dinzey-Flores (2013, p. 26, my emphasis) explains.

When linked to signs of social distinction, studies that engage the aesthetic values that security materialities accrue resonate with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) influential analysis of taste as a class marker. Being able to "consume" a cultural or artistic product, Bourdieu (1984, p. 2) explains, has to do with one's acquired competence, "that is, the code, into which it is encoded". This (de)coding capacity, which integrates broader "programmes for perception" (ibid.), is not innate, or universal, but part of one's socialization and hence profoundly shaped by class positioning. The consumption of art has been a particularly productive context through which to engage the emergence of class-based aesthetic preferences. However, as Bourdieu notes, aesthetic dispositions that detach forms from functions can be applied to anything. After all, "nothing is more distinctive, more distinguished, than the capacity to confer aesthetic status on objects that are banal" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 6). Perhaps two of the most "banal" elements we can spot in many urban environs today, gates and walls are evocative examples of this.

Whether implicitly or explicitly explored as part of the "aesthetics of security" (Caldeira, 2000), the perceptible properties of security objects have offered an opening into how enclosed spaces index and maintain symbolic divides, in addition to physical ones. Through this Bourdieusian lens, walls, gates and barred windows can also be valued in terms of taste and style, rather than solely on the basis of their pragmatic purposes. Such materialities are able to communicate social status and distinction, regardless of the security risks they avert or the intruders they keep out from private residences. While effectively demonstrating that security objects also perpetuate symbolic grounds for differentiation, however, this approach to aesthetics lets the material properties and affective reverberations of urban fortification recede into the background. Focusing on the separation of form and function, it also detaches the symbolic from the material, privileging the former.

In my approach to security aesthetics, I develop an analysis of the norms performed by security forms that explicitly considers their materiality and their affective functions.

Fortified areas

In addition to their common interest in the aesthetic dimension of walled residential developments, Caldeira (2000), Low (2003) and Dinzey-Flores (2013) also share an engagement with different iterations of fortified housing. Low followed urban and suburban fortresses through different states and cities within the United States, while Caldeira and Dinzey-Flores traced security materialities out of middle- and upper-class enclaves, and into working-class neighbourhoods of São Paulo and public housing estates in Ponce, respectively. These analyses, like other studies of "gated communities" understood broadly, seek to understand how, and to what effects, elements associated with this urban form travel within and across urban landscapes and national contexts (e.g. Marcuse, 1997; Rosen and Grant, 2011; Costa Vargas, 2006; Webster et al., 2002). This wide-ranging literature engages an array of enclave "types", which respond to and shape context-specific security desires. By drawing on enclosures found in sociospatial contexts as diverse as a Rio de Janeiro favela (Costa Vargas, 2006) and an Israeli settlement (Rosen and Grant, 2011), this debate has shown that the political meanings that saturate security materialities change as they move, in relation to whom and what they are deployed to secure, whom they fence out, and who decides.

While "covering" many different kinds of fortified housing across a wide array of urban and suburban contexts, this literature is characterized by two key trends, in terms of how it understands and represents residential enclaves. First, in this multidisciplinary debate, housing developments are largely featured as neatly bounded private units, or containers, clearly limited by the walls that surround them. The public/private dichotomy that has structured much of the security-related literature on enclaved dwelling around the world has obscured the myriad ways that this urban form and

its occupants intervene in the everyday securing of the broader urban landscape (Tunulka, 2012). Another related but distinct feature present in much of the academic literature on fortified housing forms is their representation of such enclaves as secluded and secured *areas,* and not as three-dimensional *volumes*. As Stuart Elden (2013) has discussed, this tendency to think of space as surface is a prominent aspect of the geographical imagination, especially when security is concerned. It is one that occludes the depth of spaces of security and, perhaps most importantly, their verticality – a central dimension in how spaces are secured and policed (Adey, 2010; Graham, 2016).

In sum, recent literature concerned with how the materialization of security (re)produces social differentiation in contemporary urban environments generally focuses on fortified forms of dwelling, understanding these as privately governed areas, through which fearful citizens retreat from the political openings afforded by public space. While this dominant narrative on gated communities (and the like) has highlighted important dynamics pertaining to urban segregation and fragmentation, it has occluded aspects of security authority, citizenship and inequality that my ethnographic encounters in Recife unpack. As this chapter discusses, the city's vertical and closed condominiums are far from privately governed siloes, when it comes to their security practices and the norms they enact. The material and volumetric dimensions of vertical condominiums are not only key to how security is performed and perceived within their walls; they also have deeply felt impacts on security atmospheres and arrangements in the broader neighbourhoods where they cluster – or "condominium neighbourhoods" (Webb and Webber, 2017). This ambient influence enacts condominium citizenship and security norms beyond their perimeters, a process I explore by thinking, not in terms of secured areas or territories, but of dynamic and three-dimensional *securityscapes*.

The aesthetics of securityscapes

In dialogue with the extensive urban studies literature on how housing

enclaves symbolize and aggravate class-based and racialized forms of differentiation, the chapter's analysis is anchored on two conceptual moves. First, it draws on anthropological approaches to the notion of *securityscape* (e.g., Maguire and Low, 2019), which foreground the different material and immaterial elements that come together to engender three-dimensional spaces of security. Within these spatialized security arrangements, I draw my attention to their *security aesthetics* (Ghertner et al., 2020) through an approach that is less concerned with taste and distinction than with what Jacques Rancière (2004, p. 12) has termed "the distribution of the sensible" (see Chapter One).

Securityscapes

When Hugh Gusterson (2004, p. xxi) first introduced the term "securityscape", it was meant as a "friendly amendment" to Arjun Appadurai's dynamic representation of globalization, which foregrounded the flows that formed transnational "technoscapes", "financescapes", "mediascapes", and so on. Gusterson presented the "securityscape" as shorthand for the unequal distribution of military resources, both material and immaterial, between nation-states. In spite of the transnational spatialities that were central to its origin, and to later deployments of the concept (e.g., Eski 2016; Zilberg, 2011), the "securityscape" translates well to other scales of analysis. For my purposes here, I draw on Mark Maguire and Setha Low's (2019, p. 5) recent discussion of the plural possibilities of the notion, when explored ethnographically. While providing the anthropology of security with a suitably spatial grammar, the concept also "allows one to grapple with a hard-to-define spatio-temporal configuration that includes the affective and imaginary as well as the infrastructural and the concrete" (Maguire and Low 2019, p. 12).

Particularly relevant for this chapter's analytical purposes is Maguire and Low's (2019, p. 12) suggestion that securityscapes may be self-contained ethnographic sites in themselves, while also integrating a "network of spaces and securityscapes that ultimately provide a cultural code for living as

well as a material map of their social and political production". The gated community is mobilised to illustrate this point. While the materials, norms, imaginaries and affects that compose this type of residential enclave can be empirically explored locally, through the practices and narratives that take place within them, they result from and relate to broader social structures, institutions, and housing normativities at other localities and scales (Low, 2019). This is a point that echoes Stephen Graham and Sobia Ahmad Kaker's (2014) suggestion on how to approach urban "enclavisation". Drawing on research in Karachi, they propose engaging enclaves as an "archipelago", or "*ensemble*", in order to understand how they relate to each other as they reshape urban (in)security, politics and relations (Graham and Kaker, 2014, p. 7).

In her revisiting of gated communities and co-op buildings, two distinct types of private residential development, Low (2019) deploys the concept of the securityscape as a way to ground security's elusive character in concrete socio-spatial formations. While her use of the notion sheds light on both the "software" and the "hardware" of such housing prototypes, Low's focus is still on what happens when security is brought into the private, domestic realm. As my own fieldwork encounters have shown, and as I have flagged earlier in this thesis and in this chapter, there is value in analysing the normative and symbolic dimensions of residential security together with its palpable, sensible and affective forms. However, as I demonstrate below, the ways that urban security becomes "sensible" are not so easily and neatly contained within domestic, or residential, confines. Here, instead of breaking the securityscape(s) that this chapter explores into different elements, I zoom into their "hard" and "soft" dimensions as part of a broader condominium security aesthetics, an approach detailed in the following section.

Security aesthetics

As signposted earlier, analyses of the aesthetic dimension of urban security objects and procedures have tended to highlight the symbolic value of aesthetics in producing and maintaining urban inequality. According

to this "Bourdieusian" approach to aesthetic dispositions as being, first and foremost, a result of and a means for class-based distinction, barriers erected around residences can be detached from their immediate functions to be read as signifiers of social status. Here, I draw on Jacques Rancière's (2013) "distribution of the sensible" to understand the politics of aesthetics, as elaborated in this thesis' opening chapter. Intervening in the multidisciplinary literature focused on security's myriad forms and their societal consequences, D. Asher Ghertner, Hudson McFann and Daniel Goldstein (2020, p. 5) similarly draw on the distribution of the sensible to engage "how security, as a form of power, operates through different aesthetic registers, from notions of beauty and taste to style and genre, form and appearance, representation and mimesis, and emotion and affect". Their discussion of *designing fortresses* is particularly relevant to this chapter. As they explain, their deployment of the term "fortress" not only signals "discrete residential, commercial, or governmental structures or territories designed to impose constraints through the environment, but also ... the broader sensory coding of security logics into the design of physical, geographical, and infrastructure milieux" (Ghertner, McFann and Goldstein, 2020, p. 5).

Attuned to the broader norms-forms-affects frame laid out earlier in this dissertation, my approach to the vertical condominiums of Recife can be summed up as one attentive to *securityscape aesthetics*. In other words, I enter the three-dimensional securityscapes – of, around, and beyond – condominiums through the material and immaterial elements that come together to engender sensible spaces of security. Following Rancière on how the sensible is both shared and divided – two aspects captured by the French *partager* (Panagia, 2014), or *partilha* in Portuguese – I analyse how securityscape aesthetics determines what is perceived as "a shared common" and how parts and shares are distributed within it (Rancière, 2015, p. 44). In doing so, I tease out the citizenship and authority norms that the aesthetic ordering of security performs.

The *condomínio* in urban Brazil

After many loose references to different types of secured and collective forms of housing – such as "gated community", "private residential development", "fortified housing", and so on –, here, I briefly discuss what we are writing about when we write about the condominium in the Brazilian context. According to the Michaelis Dictionary (MDBLP, n.d.), the word *condomínio* may refer to different elements of co-ownership and co-living, such as:

> (1) Domain that belongs to two or more people together; co-ownership; ... (3) Undivided thing (building), whose property belongs to two or more people; (4) Administration of an apartment building; (5) Monthly fee paid in equal shares by the *condôminos*, for the expenses of the building where they live; (6) In an apartment building, the common use areas that belong to all the owners.

As the above indicates, the term covers a range of condominium features, from the "thing" that is co-owned and its shared areas, to its management and fees. At the same time, the polysemic word is also a juridically sanctioned form of owning, ordering and governing urban space. As geographers Maria Encarnação Beltrão Sposito and Eda Maria Góes (2013, p. 134) discuss, condominiums belong to the realm of the juridical, as well as of the political. In addition to being framed by specific legal underpinnings that operate at the national, state and municipal levels, however, any multifamily residential space that looks and feels like a condominium tends to be loosely referred to as one in everyday city life – even when at odds with legal definitions. Conversely, the moniker is rarely applied to shopping malls officially ruled by commercial condominium legislation.

Legislation influences the making and ordering of "actually existing" condominiums. However, there is much within the realm of middle- and upper-class closed residential spaces that escapes or trespasses this legal normativity, even if they do not embody the typical markers associated with "urban informality" (see Müller, 2019). Geographer Marcelo Lopes de Souza (2008, p. 232), for instance, argues that many "exclusive condominiums" – in

Rio de Janeiro and beyond – are what he refers to as *pseudocondomínios*. These consist of allotments that are illegally enclosed through a process of fear-fuelled "auto-segregation". In contrast with a "real" horizontal condominium, as typified by Brazilian law, a "fake" one contains public places within its walls, which are then irregularly sealed off from public access.[27] "The pseudocondomínio", Souza (2008, p. 73) argues, "much more than the real horizontal condomínio, matches the individualistic mentality of contemporary middle classes. More than joining in association, together with their class peers, to protect themselves, individuals and families want, deep down, little contact even with their neighbours". In his critique, the author gestures at a widely held and materially performed norm of "good" living as "enclosed" living that, even when at odds with legal norms, continues to produce what is emically perceived as the condominium in Brazilian cities.

Beyond the "real" and "fake" – or legal and illegal – dichotomy, a range of materials, norms, practices and dwellers come together to form what is ordinarily recognized as a condominium in Brazilian cities. For Dunker (2015, p. 47), these condominium elements and dispositions engender a specific atmosphere, which envelopes those who step inside:

> Upon entering one of these modern condominiums, designed with the most recent urban engineering, we have the pacifying feeling that we finally found some order and security. We quickly realize that there exists a way of life in which precariousness, risk and indeterminacy have been abolished. The space is homogeneous, according to certain style rules. Inside, the spots are well distributed, the positions are comfortably occupied.

These social "positions" one can observe through the encounters amongst residents, service providers and domestic workers that take place in the lobbies and elevators of middle-class apartment buildings in São Paulo. As

27 Souza (2008) explains that for the real estate companies behind them, pseudocondominiums are advantageous: pieces of land are sold off individually, unbound by the formal condominium's structure, while proprietors are free to use them and build on them as they please.

James Holston (2008) describes, and as anyone who has spent any amount of time in Brazilian middle and upper-class condominiums has most likely witnessed, such public spaces are designed to produce two different systems of circulation (composed of separate entrances, elevators, hallways). While the "social" areas are meant to be used by residents and guests, the "service" ones exist for domestic workers, condominium staff, delivery people, service providers, and so on. The usage of "social" elevators by those seen as "service" is a given example of a spatial practice that defies the hierarchical social norms designed into the architecture of apartment buildings.[28]

While such accounts have shown that condominium relations are not *devoid* of friction, Dunker (2015) discusses condominium governance as intent on negating conflict, informed by a particular "condominium logic". Under the guise of this *lógica do condomínio*, which the author traces back to the inner ordering and governing of condominium living, complex social and political issues are turned "into mere management problems" (Dunker, 2015, p. 42). Within middle- and upper-class residential enclaves, a sense of order and security is partly derived from the managing of class-based and racialized differences, "which were not touched, but 'resolved' by means of a subtle code of separate circulation and cohabitation between the servants and the residents" (Dunker, 2015, p. 50), echoing Holston's (2008) earlier findings. The flexible figure of the *síndico*, as condominium administrators are called, is a form of authority that synthesizes rationalized condo-logics

28 Interested in the changing dynamics of Brazil's differentiated citizenship regime, Holston (2008, p. 274) describes these interactions and relationships as part of a "quotidian drama" that unfolds in the spaces and routines of middle-class residential buildings as apartment owners and tenants' expectations of these encounters often clash with those of employees. While the former aspires to "maintain the conventions of privilege and deference characteristic of the relationship between boss and employee", the latter increasingly "expect to be treated, if not (yet) with better wages and working conditions, at least as equal citizens in the public spaces of the building" (Holston, 2008, p. 277). While direct verbal disputes are rare, as Holston explains, this tension often plays out in the form of renewed spatial practices, that may defy the segregations inscribed in the layout of the apartment complexes' domestic and public spaces.

well: "Unlike the former systems administrator, who saw methods as safe instruments for capturing and controlling reality, the manager knows that the methods, the metrics, the indices, the balance sheets (that is, the outward expressions) are the only reality that matters" (Dunker, 2015, p. 77).[29]

Dunker's exploration of the condominium, as both a hegemonic aspiration and as a way of life that proliferated in urban Brazil from the early-1970s, grounds what he frames as an important shift in how the everyday is organized. What he describes as the "condominium logic" is not a feature inherent to and contained by "official" *condominial* spaces, but a way to perform, manage and attribute meaning to urban and suburban living that we can follow away from specific residential typologies to explore how they shape spaces, sensitivities and relationships elsewhere. Though the condominium management logic was not precisely what I was looking for in my ethnographic approach to security in Recife's South Zone, it gained importance over time, as I became increasingly attuned to how condominium governance affected what the look and feel of urban security was, and how it was managed, beyond the walls of discrete residential enclaves.

The role of condominiums in shaping Recife's securityscapes is strongly connected to how they fit materially within the city. Much of the (South and Southeast) Brazil-based residential enclave literature has featured urban and suburban gated communities, often described as spaces detached from

29 Even though most *síndicos* also reside in the condominiums they are elected into managing, professional *síndicos* are a growing trend in urban Brazil: employed by service-providing companies, and not by the condominiums directly, these professionals are often able to handle a few condos at once (Anderáos, 2020). While it is a form of authority broadly characterized by its managerialism, the *síndico*'s approach is not fully captured by imaginaries of "the bureaucrat". As Dunker (2015, p. 81) notes, "[W]hile the wall structure is fixed, defined and determined, the *síndico*'s function is plastic, flexible and poorly delimited. He finds the lack and manages the excess, but not in the way of the bureaucrat, whose fundamental interest is always to add a few centimetres to his territory of action".

what we imagine "urbanity" to be, especially when they consist of club-like *horizontal* condos composed of stand-alone, single-family houses. This type of condominium can also be found in specific upper-class neighbourhoods and green areas of Recife's Metropolitan Region, but, as is the case in most contemporary Brazilian capitals, it is neither the most common, nor the most influential. Those enclaves that most deeply affect the city's urban landscape – in terms of security, and beyond – are the ones that materialize as *vertical* walled apartment buildings.

In Recife, it was from the mid-1970s onwards that housing developers – enabled by a favourable (lack of) municipal regulation – turned their attention to upper middle-class Recife-dwellers, kickstarting an intense verticalization process (Amorim and Loureiro, 2012; Lacerda et al., 2018). Urbanists Luiz Amorim and Claudia Loureiro (2012) single out the 1997 Land Use and Occupation Law as particularly helpful in expediting this process, since it did away with regulations geared towards zoning, in favour of densified urban territories that were undifferentiated in terms of use (Amorim and Loureiro, 2012).[30] The densification of Recife following the development of concentrated residential high-rises had noticeable impacts on the city's infrastructure and urban fabric. Until 2000, real estate developments clustered in specific middle- and upper-class areas of Recife's South and North Zones, resulting in a densification of the built environment that strained mobility and sanitation infrastructures. The development of residential high-rises dispersed away from the North Zone after the Law of the 12

30 This convergence between profit-seeking developers and permissive municipal governments – which also benefitted from densification's effect on urban, territorial and building taxes (Amorim and Loureiro, 2012) –, points to the political economy of condominium production. In an early discussion on the proliferation of closed condominiums in Brazil, Maria Monica O'Neill (1983, p. 38) sheds light on this dimension by presenting such production as "less [of] a process of spontaneous or autonomous choice by individuals than the result of the actions of agents who act to give shape and use to urban soil". As O'Neill notes, and the Recife case can attest to, these include real estate developers, investors, financial institutions, landowners, state actors, and residents.

Neighbourhoods[31] (*Lei dos 12 Bairros*). High-rise development intensified in other areas, though, especially in and around the South Zone coastal neighbourhood of Boa Viagem, located outside the 12-neighbourhood radius that the municipal law protected (Lacerda et al., 2018). The South Zone can be, thus, considered an emblematic example of the recent strand of urbanism "that has transformed Brazilian cities into a succession of housing enclaves dispersed along blind streets" (Amorim and Loureiro, 2012, p. 40). In order to engage how this clustering of vertical condominiums influence how security is practiced and imagined in the everyday and at street-level, I now turn to ethnographic encounters and interviews to unpack the workings of securityscape aesthetics.

In and up: The *condomínio* securityscape

"The only way to open that door is to blow it up", said Marcos, as he pointed to the glass and tile construction through which I had just entered Condomínio Asa Branca, a four-block vertical condominium inaugurated in Vista Nova in the early 2010s. Marcos was the employee tasked with the everyday management of Asa Branca, which also entailed keeping an eye on the people and the various objects put in place to secure the middle-class residential enclave. The structure that Marcos described as practically impermeable to trespassers contained a security booth, which afforded a two-stage identification procedure aimed at non-residents. After they announced themselves through an electronic communication system, visitors were let into an antechamber. While sandwiched between two heavy glass doors equipped with magnetic locks, those requesting access could

31 Put in place, in 2001, to protect the territorial identity of traditional neighbourhoods, this law softened verticalization and its homogenizing effects (Lacerda et al., 2018). The details of this regulatory mechanism are outside the scope of this thesis, but a thorough discussion is provided in the book by Lacerda et al. (2018) dedicated to this legislative process and its consequences.

be further inspected by the doorman, seated behind tinted glass. When the first door locked shut, those categorised as welcome visitor, domestic worker or service provider – rather than intruder – would be permitted beyond the second door. Once allowed in, they could proceed upwards, using either the "service" or the "social" elevator.

Access control infrastructures, such as the one described above, are common elements of *portarias*, the buffer areas that separate condominiums from, and connect them to, the street.[32] In contrast with my experience at Atlantic Park, with which I opened this chapter, it was common for my presence in condominiums of Vista Nova and Jardim to stay limited to these buffer zones. At times, this was due to the tacit reluctance of some *síndicos* and ordinary residents with whom I had scheduled interviews to invite me into the intimate spaces of their apartments. At other times, though, I stayed at ground-level because that was where my interlocutors were stationed, on account of their functions as condominium doormen or *encarregados* – the general supervisors of shared areas and staff, more common in high-end enclaves. I met Genésio, the *encarregado* at Condomínio Barão de Lucena, in 2015. It was one of the first condominiums I entered as a researcher in Vista Nova, and also one of the poshest. The door facing the street made a high-pitched sound as it opened, letting me into the small space in between doors. The first time I entered Barão de Lucena, the doormen's head popped up above me as I waited in this glass container (Figure 10). Through a small window, he asked me who I was and what was the purpose of my visit. Later, I learned from Genésio that this was the procedure that enacted a "non-threatening" visitor. Had they sensed a risk – or something "strange" – they would have communicated via the opening of the steel drawer that was also part of this secured, cabin-like structure.

32 Central material and spatial components of many residential securityscapes in urban Brazil, the *portaria* often translates as the space staffed by the concierge, a word that English borrowed from French to refer to the receptionists stationed at the lobbies of hotels and high-end apartment buildings. Even though this may accurately represent part of what *portaria* work consists of, it does not fully capture the literal gatekeeping practices that make it a security cabin as much as (or more than) a welcoming hospitality desk.

On my second visit, the *porteiro* had already recognized me via the surveillance camera monitor, which fast-tracked my entrance, slightly. Already aware of the system, I pulled the first door closed behind me, to expedite the opening of the second glass door, which also emitted a loud and piercing noise. I later asked Genésio about how he and the rest of the *portaria* staff could bear to listen to that all day. He laughed and said that, after three days of work, you barely noticed it anymore. While the material infrastructure and usual procedures that regulated access from the street into the condominium were fairly layered and elaborate, making it past the ground-floor entailed an even more sophisticated system. The 22-apartment high-rise – one spacious flat per floor – was a particularly exclusive one: each level possessed its own elevator password, which meant that not even the building employees could circulate upwards past the ground floor without being directly summoned by residents. At 4 pm, when it was time for maintenance staff to bring down the trash disposed of by the flats, they had to call the *moradores* (residents) through the building's intercom system to "unlock" the elevators for them.

When we spoke, Genésio had 22 years of experience at *portarias* located in "noble areas" of Recife, including two years as the *encarregado* at Barão de Lucena, an apartment building that was almost a decade old. In addition to the hands-on work experience, he had also accumulated myriad courses and certifications: he had been trained as a *vigilante* (private security guard), on fire safety in buildings, and on basic electrician skills. As he took me around the *portaria*, garage, and his office by the building's underground parking area, the middle-aged condominium employee confidently explained the many security materialities around us. Numerous movement sensors were strategically deployed, for example, which fed the *portaria* staff with visible and audible real-time notifications of where movement had been sensed. Surveillance cameras were, of course, also in place. In addition to the employees whom Genésio supervised directly, the building administration hired the support of private security guards via a local company. The armed guards were stationed at a sentry box that stood at the front edge of the condominium grounds. It was quite unusual for residential condominium securityscapes to include hired guards in Recife, which attested to the

wealth of this particular enclave.

Genésio was proud to proclaim that Barão de Lucena had never had an *ocorrência* – a police-like term to refer to criminal events, or "occurrences". He contrasted this flawless record with a vivid mapping of incidents that had taken place in the vicinity: "this building right next to us, Côte d'Azur, had one [occurrence]. They jumped [over the fence]. Because there's an old building on the other side. It was one year, one year and a half ago". As we moved through this intricate security arrangement composed of people and things, Genésio noted: "My job is to keep everything working" (*minha função aqui é manter tudo funcionando*). His direct interaction with residents was minimal since they mostly went in and out by car and barely used the building's shared areas: "It's very rare that they talk to me. They talk to the *síndico*, and it's not really talking. It ends up in his e-mail, or WhatsApp, and then he sends it to me".

A lot of effort went into conveying to residents that the "software" and the "hardware" that composed the Barão de Lucena securityscape were working as they should, engendering a look and feel of safety perceptible to *condôminos*. Genésio explained: "So far, they seem pleased with what I've been doing. Because if a gate breaks, I run as fast as I can to fix it. If any [security] system breaks, I rush to resolve it. So, I don't let the *morador* [resident] notice that it's falling apart, so that he doesn't feel unsafe. We're out of [parking] stickers, so I've ordered a hundred more just now. I don't let him perceive it, I don't let him perceive that the building is falling behind, unkempt". Researching São Paulo's *portarias*, Susana Durão (2020) observed the friendliness that low-wage *portaria* workers were expected to perform whenever interacting with residents and visitors. In addition to managing their conduct in such direct encounters, *portaria* staff also silently orchestrate the perceptible elements composing the aesthetic dimension of the condominium securityscape.



Figure 10. A doorman looks down on me, inspecting my appearance and waving me into the condominium.

Many aspects of Genésio's job converged with the accounts of other *portaria* workers in Vista Nova and Jardim. Within condominium walls, *porteiros* and *encarregados* had limited direct contact with high-rise residents, but curating an affective atmosphere of safety – predicated on the perception that security systems were in place, and functioning silently – was a major part of their jobs. At Condomínio Côte d'Azur, directly next to Barão de Lucena, a very similar sociomaterial security arrangement awaited me. I crossed the double-door threshold to find the doorman on duty peering out of a small mirrored window. He asked me to wait in the lobby, where I took a seat on an expensive-looking fluffy purple designer chair. Another tiny window that I had not expected opened into the waiting area. Through it, I was told that Solimar, the *portaria* supervisor, would be right with me. In the common area outside the building, there was a swimming pool, where a small group of children played under the watchful gazes of uniformed babysitters who seemed to outnumber the children, as they sat and talked at a poolside wicker table.

Solimar arrived in a sharp suit and tie, and suggested we sit outside, at one of the patio tables. In addition to the commonplace cameras, sensors and access-control devices, which he described as being part of a single "set", Solimar added the visible presence of the military police to his description of what *segurança* (security) at Côte d'Azur consisted of. In the evenings, there was always a police car around at the back of the building, for the protection of what he called "influential residents", those with connections to the state government. The supervisor framed this police presence as a welcome "support" to the condominium's security set. I later found that such "support" was not only legible to the staff and dwellers of Côte d'Azur, but also perceptible, and to some extent appreciated, by residents of neighbouring buildings, who got to have the police closer, regardless of their own level of "influence".

Sensing state policing nearby was a desire that many residents of these fortified symbols of privatization shared. In an interview, a high-ranking military police officer who had worked in the South Zone for many years mentioned the limited interest condominium residents showed in interacting with the

PM directly, at residents' association meetings and the likes. However, this did not mean they were fully indifferent, or apathetic, towards police. In the major's experience, when condominium residents sensed a lack, or absence, of state security, they felt *prejudicados*, cheated. The building forms were an issue, according to Major Marques: "If you have a ten-storey building, and a fellow is on the third, fourth, fifth, sixth floor: the police is patrolling downstairs the whole time, but he doesn't see the police patrol. So, what did we do? It became mandatory for the policeman to turn on the flashers on top of the car and beep the siren at every crossroad". The audible signal was a message aimed at high-rise dwellers that, the officer argued, enhanced the extent to which police was noticed, improving what he termed as residents' "feeling of safety". "Keeping the [bedroom] light on fends off my daughter's ghosts", Marques stated, in reference to his young child, "This little police sound put in people's minds that the police were present".

It is probably safe to assume that this audible performance of police presence was not repeated at every corner, of every block, by the low-ranking officers who had been under Marques' command during the years he served in the area. However, the strategy reveals that attempts to engender the sensation of police presence amongst the elusive, yet *influential*, residents of Recife's high-rises was on the agenda of state policing, in addition to being a key concern of the condominiums' low-wage employees. Although direct and substantial encounters with enclave dwellers were unusual for those directly and indirectly tasked with securing their residential spaces, such aesthetic practices enacted *condôminos* as subjects to appease and reassure. Within the distribution of the sensible elements that made up the condominium securityscape, the *morador*'s entitlement to a sense of safety mobilised a range of sensorial elements, orchestrated by state and non-state security workers.

A privileged view from above

The verticality of Recife condominiums not only created a volume that security providers and materialities sought to protect. The several-storey

distance between the *portarias* and the penthouses also offered state policing a lookout point onto the city, explored through a video surveillance pilot project named Carcará, after a bird of prey found across South America. On May 8, 2015, on the front page in one of the state's largest newspapers, the *Diário de Pernambuco* (2015), bold letters reading "Streets surveilled by the buildings" (*Ruas vigiadas pelos prédios*) accompanied an image captured from the top of one of the "twin towers" – a pair of high-end residential high-rises often evoked as iconic examples of the city's market-driven real estate developments. Under the guise of having a bird's-eye view of Recife's Metropolitan Region and other key cities in the state, the state Secretariat of Social Defence (SDS) proposed moving 100 surveillance cameras – out of the 985 contracted by the secretariat at the time – to the top floors of tall residential and commercial buildings, expanding the reach of these devices to a 3-kilometer radius (Oliveira, 2015).

During an early-fieldwork visit to CIODS, a high-ranking military police officer, who had retired into the private security technology industry, showed me around the control room that monitored the Carcará cameras already in place. He asked one of the operators on duty to do a quick demonstration of their reach by displaying the images captured from one of the "twin towers" on one of the control room's big screens. The employee moved the camera around, showing off its potent zoom capacity, which could clearly depict the entrance to a nearby low-income settlement. When the 360-degree camera incidentally captured parts of the "twin towers" themselves, the system blurred them automatically, in order to protect the privacy of condominium residents, a courtesy that was not extended to other inhabitants of Recife. Carcará came up again in an interview I conducted a few months later, with Enrique, the security coordinator of a high-end commercial condominium that was also to be crowned with two SDS cameras. "It's a partnership in which we grant them the physical space, and they provide the device", he told me. In Enrique's view, the building's position was "privileged" from a security standpoint, since it offered a view onto a neighbouring *comunidade* (low-income community), and onto important traffic arteries of the South Zone.

The Carcará pilot project was just one attempt to integrate the visual possibilities of condominium securityscapes into state initiatives for urban surveillance and policing. In the same CIODS control room where a proud operator had showed off the reach of the twin tower camera, another surveillance experiment involved bringing together real-time footage from condominium CCTVs on a single screen. Another attempt to optimize the gaze of devices already in place within private enclaves – but looking outwards – was evident in the campaign of an unsuccessful contender in Recife's 2020 mayoral race. *Delegada* Patrícia (Police Commissioner Patrícia, as she is known), a candidate of the Podemos party who was endorsed by the far-right president Jair Bolsonaro, promised to "invest in the integration of security cameras of buildings and private establishments to the already existing security system to intensify the fight against crime" (G1 PE, 2020). Within such pilot projects, experiments, and political pledges, condominiums are enacted as valuable policing partners, on account of their symbolic, material and locational elements, and their related potential in helping policing workers sense insecurity in their surroundings.

With an eye at street-level

This last point was also a guiding principle of the policing partnership De Olho na Rua (DOR), or With an Eye on the Street, mentioned early on in this chapter. In contrast with the panoramic images that Carcará sought to capture from the top of high-rises, this project was designed to make use of the ground-level views that condominium staff had of the street when stationed at *portarias*. A partnership between the SDS and the union representing the regional commercial real estate sector[33] (SECOVI-PE), DOR performed a convergence between the security goals of condominium marketers, administrators and dwellers, and those of state policing actors. According to DOR's own accounts, when condominium robberies committed in the

33 This includes commercial and residential condominiums, condominium administrators, and real-estate administrators and brokers in the state of Pernambuco (SECOVI-PE, n.d.).

south-eastern capitals of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo made national news in the early 2000s, Pernambuco's real estate sector was scared into taking pre-emptive measures. Their partnering with state policing was part of an effort to avoid similar occurrences in Recife and surroundings.

The DOR project, which started with security-related trainings offered to condominium staff, evolved into a radio network that connected hundreds[34] of *portarias* to each other and to state policing, from 2004. During my fieldwork, all condominiums mentioned so far – Atlantic Park, Asa Branca, Barão de Lucena, and Côte d'Azur – were part of the programme. To be a member of DOR was not particularly costly for condominiums, adding up to roughly 360 EUR[35] a year, a fee that mostly covered the rental costs of the analogue radio equipment, provided and maintained by a local company. Once placed at the *portaria*, the device afforded 24/7 connection to the programme's network and CIODS base, which was always staffed by a pair of monitors. Even though their uniforms were "military police beige", these monitors were civilians, employed by the network's private partners.

In early June, 2015, a DOR event was organized at the Integrated Academy of Social Defence (Academia Integrada de Defesa Social, ACIDES), in central Recife, with the objective of "strengthening the ties", as its organizer phrased it, between the different parties involved. To that end, the academy's auditorium was filled with new employees hired by condominiums enrolled in the network, who had not yet been trained for DOR. That morning, after the complimentary breakfast, the invited attendees and I sat through talks offered by high-ranking military police officers and a fireman, and by the main coordinator and advocate on the SECOVI-PE side.

34 At the start of my fieldwork period, in 2015, 700.

35 This encompassed a yearly fee (29 BRL) paid to ANATEL, the National Telecommunications Agency; monthly payments of 139 BRL, for the maintenance and rental of the equipment, plus a one-off installation fee of 100 BRL. This comes up to roughly 360 EUR per year, using quotations from March 2020, when 1 BRL was priced at 0,20 EUR.

"The doorman is not a person who opens the door. He's a person who knows what to do when opening the door", exclaimed the first and most rambunctious speaker. Wielding the microphone like a preaching pastor, Colonel Borges interspersed hyperbolic praise for the important security work performed by doormen with factual descriptions of DOR's creation and daily functioning. "I take care of your families when I'm on the *viatura* [police car]. You take care of my family when I'm at home", he told the roughly 50 people in the audience, whom he addressed as "my friends" and "my doormen", amongst other amicable terms. While the colonel's presentation contained disciplining messages, he communicated these in a light-hearted fashion. One of his PowerPoint slides featured a photograph of a sleeping doorman, which he followed up with a rhetorical question: "Why does the *marginal* [thug] choose condominiums? Look at this professional. He's asleep!" He did place some of the blame for opportunistic crimes on condominium residents, however: "Everybody is a *doutor* [a "boss", a person of distinction], but when they come in, they leave the gate open!", a statement that signalled a certain intimacy with *portaria* work, inducing discrete laughter from the audience. "Isn't that right, *amigos porteiros* [doormen friends]?", he asked. In unison, the audience agreed with a "yes".

Condomínios and the (making of) condoscapes

"Initially everyone was very excited, it was a fantastic thing, but it came to a point that the doormen were not heard anymore by the police. It was only working to spread the gospel, advertising targeted at the *porteiro*, so it stopped making sense. The Bible was all anyone talked about anymore", a Jardim *condômino* commented during a meeting of the Safe Jardim initiative, explaining why he saw DOR as a failure. At the time, hundreds of condominiums still deemed it worthwhile to have their *portarias* connect to each other and to the DOR base via the shared radio frequency, but it was widely acknowledged that the programme's heyday was in the past. His complaint about the (mis)use of DOR radios for the exchange of Bible verses amongst

porteiros (see Frossard and Jaffe, 2019) hinted at one of the reasons that DOR had "lost credibility", as another Jardim *condômino* put it. What was intended as a network of condominiums was ultimately perceived and discredited as a network of *doormen* – a group that, according to Safe Jardim *condôminos*, was making undisciplined use of the network and losing the police's attention.

The fizzling out of excitement over DOR did not result from, or in, a general lack of confidence in its baseline aim, which was to enrol "condominium security" in the securing of the neighbourhood, the city, the state. In fact, initiatives aimed at this enrolment continue to proliferate in the Recife areas where condominiums cluster. The Safe Jardim initiative, for instance, involved neighbours organizing to connect the condominiums' sociomaterial security arrangements to create a neighbourhood-wide securityscape. In January 2017, the organizers of the initiative held a meeting on the ground floor of the Golden Gate Flats, a high-end apartment block in the area. From the perspective of state policing, Jardim was not a hotspot for crime: its low homicide rates made it a low priority for the military police. Its mostly middle- and upper-class residents, however, were concerned about the frequency of burglaries, muggings, and car hijackings, and their widely shared sense of insecurity was exacerbated by the feeling that too few police officers patrolled the area. The meeting in question was meant as a catalyst for the budding resident-led initiative, which aimed to connect the area's residences and businesses in preventing and reporting crime. Additionally, it sought to strengthen their ties with the military policemen allotted to that chunk of Recife's South Zone. Unlike many neighbourhood-level projects, the event did not seek to fill the room with however many individual Jardim residents showed interest in participating; at that point, participation was condominium-based.

A meeting of *síndicos*



Figure 11. Illustration of síndicos gathered for security in Jardim. Drawn from Mendonça Filho (2012).

On that mid-summer evening, *condôminos* interested in Safe Jardim trickled into a meeting room on the first floor of the Golden Gate Flats. In total, nine condominiums were represented. Most of those present were residents and *síndicos* of their condominiums, elected by fellow *condôminos*. One participant was a resident who took part in his condominium's council, and had promised to report back to the *síndico* on the gathering. A professional *síndico* was also in attendance, representing one of the four enclaves he managed. The group was joined by two invited representatives from TotalTech (one of them also a resident of Jardim), a small company specialized in the electronic surveillance devices that had become so pervasive. Perhaps the odd one out was Haroldo, a municipal councilman who lived in the area and was eager to act as a bridge between city-level security governance and Jardim, a neighbourhood he saw himself indebted to, based on the votes he had received from the area. Haroldo's enthusiasm was received with palpable scepticism from the residents most committed to the initiative: they may have wanted to draw the state closer in terms of an enhanced police presence, but they did not want the project to become "political", or tainted by electoral interests. The atmosphere was, nonetheless, cordial throughout.

Initially, the conversation revolved around what happened at attendees'

respective *portarias*. Should residents get out of the car to open the garage, or could doormen open the gate after spotting the driver from behind their desks? They agreed that the first option was preferrable, in terms of security, since it was difficult for condo staff to truly see who was behind the wheel from a distance. Also, "if the doorman doesn't open, it's trouble [for him]", one of the participants noted. Another raised the issue of whether the night *porteiros* should be allowed to watch television during their long and most often uneventful shifts. "[The *portaria*] is a workplace, [the *porteiro*] is the main person responsible for the building's entrances and exits, he needs to be alert to everything that goes on", one resident asserted. Another interjected: "It's hard for a person to stay awake all through the night. The day is bad, but at night you need to have a distraction."

A TotalTech representative offered a couple of technological fixes to help them solve this conflict, including a device that would beep every 15 or 20 minutes, obliging the *portaria* watchmen to get up and silence it. In addition to beeping, the gadget could also generate reports for the *síndico*, who would then be able to check whether the beeps were actively silenced throughout the night, or if the *porteiro* had managed to sleep through the noise. Even as low-wage condominium staff were busy maintaining the security atmospheres of residential enclaves to appease *condôminos*, *síndicos* and concerned residents debated how the *portarias* themselves could be mobilised to keep doormen awake and alert. Throughout the evening, conversations on affairs *within* the condominiums ended on a minor key, due to the their "prickliness". "This topic is a wasp's nest. Let's leave the building and go back to [talking about] the street. If you go into the building, you're toast", one *síndico* sighed.

The meeting that night was, indeed, outward facing. Safe Jardim relied on residential condominiums for what they could "see" from within their walls, but its success also entailed crafting how these structures looked and felt, to potential criminals *and* to policing providers. While the initiative included a channel for denouncing "suspicious activities" to the police, that was not all they wanted the buildings to communicate. Within the scope of this project, individual closed condominiums were not only "recipients" of

state and non-state protection – the buildings themselves were also given specific responsibilities. The condominium's material and sensible dimensions were key in the enactment of both the role of security beneficiary *and* that of security authority. This became clear in the informal presentation of the project offered by Luisa, a young and highly-educated professional, actively involved in making Jardim safer through Safe Jardim. She talked the meeting attendees through the plan calmly and clearly, speaking over the hum of the room's air-conditioning unit:

Luisa

Each of you is from a different condominium, right? Since you came here today, it is implied that you're interested in participating in the project. So, I will sign you up and check who has cameras and who doesn't, who has a 24-hour doorman and who doesn't.

This inventory was important, since the project largely depended on making use of, and expanding, the securityscapes of Jardim's individual condominiums. The idea was to harmonize security objects and services across different sites in a way that connected member-condominiums to each other and to state policing. Every participating *portaria* was to have its own smartphone with an internet connection. The device would serve two main purposes. The first was to create a dedicated WhatsApp group so that doormen with their eyes on the street could exchange security-relevant information with each other and with military policemen stationed in the area. The second purpose was to offer victims of muggings spotted from the *portaria* the possibility to file an online police report immediately. For the "package" to be complete, the condominiums' ground-level view – from the inside outwards – should be enhanced by external surveillance cameras and a spotlight, directly altering the sensorial experience of walking Jardim.

Luisa took note of whether the condominiums represented that night were properly equipped with what she considered a "basic security set". As she called their names, one by one, the room was filled with references to sandy beaches, Parisian squares, noblemen of past Pernambuco. Costa Brava, Place Dauphine, Barão de Suassuna. Eight out of nine condominiums had

outward looking surveillance cameras, while the other elements, such as spotlights that shone onto the sidewalk, were slightly less ubiquitous. For condominiums with tight budgets, 24-hour doormen service would be a tough addition, but those present seemed eager to procure the simpler material fixes that some were still missing: LED spotlights, cameras, a cheap smartphone they could pay for in several instalments. After explaining the project to the receptive audience, Luisa unveiled the vinyl stickers that would serve as a badge of condominium membership. Meant to be glued on the outside walls of participating enclaves, the sticker, which also contained the logo of the Pernambuco Military Police, would signal which condos were part of the "community" network.

Luisa

At the same time that it will show that the condominium is a spot where people have direct contact with the military police, it will also show that the condominium is a support spot, which is something we would like to ask of you here: that policemen are able to access the condominium to use the bathroom, drink some water. Which is something that already happens in some places.

Right after the meeting, the first sticker was stuck on the façade of the Golden Gate Flats, signalling to whoever was close enough to read it that they were in an area watched by "the community", and that this "community" would be in direct touch with the military police in case of "suspicious activity". Even as it sought to welcome street-level military police officers into the *portaria*, the sticker was also a warning to "suspicious" people and activities.

Figure 12. Safe Jardim sticker indicating collaboration between local condominiums and the military police.

Condomínio security out of place

The various initiatives described show how the securityscapes of individual and clustered condominiums affect the areas around them, through their gaze and influence on the spaces directly outside their walls. Here, I extend the analysis to "othered" spaces in Recife by asking: how does the aesthetic ordering of condominium security affect spaces and populations outside the city's condoscapes? I approach this question in relation to the Capibaribe I Housing Estate (Conjunto Habitacional Capibaribe I). The estate was inaugurated in Vista Nova around the same time that a wave of real estate development resulted in condominiums such as Atlantic Park and Asa Branca. The project was designed to house *recifenses* who had been forcefully evicted from informal riverside settlements. Their removal followed the construction of the Via Mangue highway, as the mobility infrastructure itself and the local real estate boom it instigated began to reshape the city's South Zone (Campos, 2015).

Carried out by the municipality with support from the federal government's Programme for Growth Acceleration (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC), the housing project fit under the My House, My Life Programme (Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida, MCMV). Launched in 2009, this federal housing initiative was geared towards making homeowners out of low- and middle-income families through targeted financing mechanisms (Caixa, n.d.). As the case of Capibaribe I exemplified, MCMV also served as part of the financial toolbox that states and municipalities could draw on for resettling forcefully evicted households. Under the slogan "More than a change of address, a change of life", MCMV produces vertical and horizontal collective housing estates that are organized as condominiums (Caixa, n.d.). According to anthropologist Moisés Kopper, the ambitious federal programme "performs resettlements and regularizations of illegal land occupations through public-private partnerships with market agents, aiming to overcome precarity, and move towards a modern world of asphalt and urban infrastructure" (Kopper, 2016, p. 188, my translation). Kopper (2016, p. 205) identifies a "certain civilizing aesthetics" inscribed in the materialities of MCMV housing units and clusters, and

anchored in condominium norms. In this section, I explore how Capibaribe I's securityscapes and aesthetics reinforce and challenge this condominium normativity.

The fragmented securityscape of Capibaribe I

The Capibaribe I vertical housing project was composed of ten four-storey blocks, each containing 32 flats. Even though the different buildings and housing units started out roughly the same, residents had made various post-inauguration changes to their apartments and shared areas, often going beyond merely decorative interventions. The spatial and material layout of Capibaribe I was condominium-like: the multifamily apartment buildings were separated from the street by a wall, and from each other by passageways and parking spaces. Additionally, residents told me that the URB, Recife's municipal-level urban development corporation, had introduced condo-logics of administration and maintenance: each of the ten blocks were asked to choose a *síndico* and a council composed of three other residents. Though this governance structure did not always mean much in practice, the function of the *síndico* remained relevant. After all, someone had to deal with tasks associated with each block's shared areas and concerns: maintaining the electric water pumps, conducting minor repairs, and paying the monthly electricity bills for the buildings' communal spaces. *Síndicos* collected a small and informal condominium fee from each apartment to cover the costs associated with such management and maintenance activities, a fee that residents commonly sought to evade.

In most blocks, *síndicos* and residents had also dedicated time and money to erect self-built wall-gate combos between their respective apartment buildings and the estate's open passageways. This was an explicit breach of the condominium-like rules, which did not permit permanent or structural changes to shared areas. Nonetheless, security materialities, such as gates, fences and walls, were amongst the most noticeable interventions added by Capibaribe I dwellers. The fact that these were organized and constructed at the level of individual buildings resulted in a range of different designs

and materials securing the entrance to blocks across the estate. According to Gilda, the *síndica* of block C, the enclosure of her building was a long process, because the municipality did not condone it. Despite this official censure, the city did not seem intent on tackling this issue, as other *síndicos* and residents also explained, and as the persistence and proliferation of self-built walls and self-installed iron gates suggested.

It was quite common for me to arrive at Capibaribe I to the sight of residents I knew working on the gate-wall ensembles erected to filter access to their respective apartment buildings. These access-control sets were sometimes in the making for long periods of time – an effect of scarce resources, and an indication of their continuing relevance for the occupants laying the bricks and turning the screws. In early 2017, Seu Severino, the *síndico* of the B block, was still slowly working on a brick wall that would be complemented by an aluminium gate, similar to others that were already up and closing. Dona Iara, his wife, did not like the look of it: she preferred the one that their son, Gilson, had built for block A, where he was both a resident and the *sub-síndico*. There, the chosen gate had spikes on top, which were carefully painted by Gilson's teenaged son. In block J, Doralice told me that the iron grates (*grades*) that she and her neighbours had added to the front doors of their apartments were amongst the first interventions they carried out after moving in, still in their first year: "*era tudo aberto*", it was all open, she explained. Collective efforts ensued to add parallel iron bars to the ground-level entrance leading to block J's stairs, and to the rear storage area. The process was similar across apartment buildings: someone proposed a security intervention and once enough people agreed to pay for a share, the security add-on became financially feasible. The labour involved in the process was always sourced amongst residents themselves.

Lula, the *síndico* of block F, described the gate-wall addition as something that was "not 100% … but it helps, it prevents [incidents], because the harder the access the more protected we feel". For him, even though many residents (*moradores*) did not collaborate, by "leaving the gates open day and night", the simple fix seemed better than nothing. This feeling towards these self-deployed security materialities was shared by most Capibaribe I

síndicos and residents. These security forms did not *resolve* tensions and

Figure 13. Entrance to one of Capibaribe I's housing blocks, with the gate-wall combo that residents added themselves.

frictions, but helped engender a shared sense of security and protection. In this respect, the material barriers erected around housing units, windows, and buildings in the state-provided estate did not differ significantly from the ones installed around the condos of middle- and upper-class *recifenses*. However, for Capibaribe I residents, the risks they were trying to avert did not come from a diffuse "outside", or from a neighbouring low-income settlement of potential "intruders", as was the case in Jardim: threat was mostly mapped onto the estate itself.

Petty theft was a theme in some of the (in)security anecdotes I heard and recorded at Capibaribe I – residents described how belongings were sometimes fished out from the outside, encouraging residents to fortify their windows. There were also humorous retellings of how poorly equipped the units were, security-wise, when the municipality first delivered the housing project. According to Natasha, a domestic worker who lived in the B block, the same keys could initially open the doors to several apartments, forcing residents to change their locks. However, the most narrated source of insecurity was related to "wrong people" (*pessoas erradas*): those neighbours who were "involved" (*envolvidos*) in illicit activities. In reference to the nuisances associated with these "bad" neighbours, which ranged from drug trade, to clandestine parties and improper garbage disposal, Adilson, the *síndico* of block D, told me: "It is one thing to combat something that may one day happen. The hardest thing is for you to combat something that already exists". His statement suggested how he and other residents saw the walls they had erected: rather than a future-oriented tactic to minimize risk, they deployed them to manage and navigate ordinary circumstances and everyday estate-level relations. This was captured in Adilson's description of a neighbour who "dabbled" in drug trade: "In my block there is someone who dabbles in this [*mexe com isso*], but I've already made it very clear that I am not going to allow [drug] users in the hallways, you see? Because he's not the only one who lives there. I find it disrespectful, a lack of manners."

As Adilson and others made explicit, their issue was not with the illicit character of such activities. Their apprehension had to do with how these activities affected the everyday and domestic lives of "uninvolved" residents. As

Victor, from block B, explained, some of the worry stemmed from the potential of gun-based conflict amongst drug retailers, or their eventual clashes with the police. Experiences and imaginaries of military police presence elicited ambiguous feelings amongst estate dwellers, summarized well by Diva, the *síndica* of a neighbouring block: "Since they [the state] knew who they were putting here, they should have had a plan to bring the *viatura* [police car] around. Once, twice a week". Even as she saw a neighbourhood police patrol as a desirable – yet absent – element of everyday life at the estate, she immediately added that they knew that "inside the police, there are *bandidos* [thugs], and that amongst *bandidos* there are also good people [*gente de bem,* presented in between air quotes]", complicating the binary thinking that often structured normative imaginaries and narratives of crime and the fight against it.

It is safe to say that middle- and upper-class condominiums are not devoid of inner tensions. As Caldeira (2000, p. 275) noted herself, at condominium meetings of elite enclaves of São Paulo, "[r]esidents would stand up and shout at each other, pound on tables, verbally threaten their neighbours, and use ... a good amount of derogatory language and insults". When it came to the *securityscapes* of elite condos, though, I found that *condôminos* themselves were never enacted as threats, even when their behaviour was at odds with agreed-upon security procedures and protocols. Risk was, rather, mapped onto those othered along the lines of race and class, including condo staff and service providers, but most often situated at the intersection of *out there* and *close by*. In Capibaribe I's securityscape, on the other hand, residents' security-related concerns situated threats to their daily lives as "already there" and, since their ambiguous relationship with state policing led most issues to be resolved *internally*, this resulted in a fragmented securityscape, characterized by a process of "micro-fortification". Within Capibaribe I, individual households and buildings would fence themselves in, filtering the circulation of fellow project residents, and fracturing the project-wide securityscape.

A potent example of this "micro-fortification" took place on the third floor of block H, where Rivaldo was the *síndico*. Right below his apartment, the

residents of four flats had come together to add an iron gate to seal off the entrance into the narrow corridor they shared – a material fix that would make a secured space out of four apartments. Before carrying out the plan, they asked Rivaldo for permission, to which he responded positively, stating that for their own security it was indeed an excellent idea. The caveats he had to share, at the time, had nothing to do with safety, but with other aspects of maintenance and management: "So I said: let it be clear that, when it comes to cleaning and the likes, that's on you. From the moment you close off the area, it's your responsibility. If the water company guy can't come in, that's not my fault, you need to handle it." He explained that the neighbours were happy to take on full responsibility over their shared spaces and infrastructure, if it meant being allowed to enclose their corridor.

These visible material modifications around individual flats, groups of flats, and apartment buildings became even more noticeable against the backdrop of Capibaribe I's identical four-storey buildings, designed in the image of other estates erected previously (see Alcântara and Monteiro, 2010). The micro-fortifications that distinguished specific housing units and blocks from each other enacted what Diva described as "to each their own spot" (*cada um no seu quadrado*). The *síndica*, who worked as a health care agent, had been a member of the residents' association of the self-built settlement from which the majority of Capibaribe I inhabitants had been evicted. Soon after they relocated, Diva tried to start a similar association for the estate, a plan that never materialized. The costs and bureaucratic procedures required were not the only problem. For Diva, the position of community leader was a "double-edged sword", as it entailed working with residents with whom she shared a future view for "the community", but also with those who engaged in practices that clashed with her own sense of morality, such as drug trafficking and sex work. As she explained to me, through her health work, she got to know and have contact "with all kinds of people", but averting direct confrontation was also a way to protect herself and her family. Separating neighbours along moral lines, she explained, was a way to keep coexistence harmonious. Seu Severino, the B block's *síndico*, shared this view: "I asked them to put all of us *crente* folk [as evangelical Christians are sometimes called] in a single block, but they mixed everything up! I've

Figure 14. Residents sealed a shared corridor off from the rest of the building with a metal gate.

never seen so much nuisance, so much rumpus." Even though the relocation did not enact the faith-based moral separation that Seu Severino deemed the most desirable, the micro-fortifications that did materialize made the intra-project divides both visible and palpable: to each – family, housing unit, set of like-minded neighbours, or block – their own spot.

"This is not a condominium"

From within, Capibaribe I may have been a hyper-fragmented space, splintered into self-built and self-managed securityscapes. From the outside, however, it was perceived and performed as a homogeneous, condominium-like unit – and not only in relation to security practices, infrastructures and materialities. As far as postal services were concerned, for example, the ten buildings that composed the estate were a single address. In the absence of a staffed *portaria*, mail was delivered to whoever was *síndico* at the building closest to the estate's street-facing entrance. From then inwards, it was up to whoever received the bundle of correspondence to voluntarily sort the letters and hand them down to other *síndicos*, who would then distribute them to their final recipients. Postal services were not the only ones enacting Capibaribe I as an enclosed, unitary and private enclave. The estate's material maintenance was also left to the residents, to the annoyance of those who saw no choice but to take on individual responsibility for collective spaces and services: "I get angry because there was one time that I left the bushes without mowing and they came up to here", said Seu Severino once, gesturing at a height of roughly a meter and a half from the ground. "I call EMLURB [the municipal company for urban maintenance and garbage disposal], and they say they won't come because it's a closed condominium [*condomínio fechado*]. How is this a closed condominium?! If anyone can enter and make a rumpus [*zoada*] in here?", he asked. His indignant rhetorical question flagged an affective sense of inequality that residents sometimes conveyed, evoking the contrast between what they considered the aesthetic orderings of "real" condominiums with what their housing estate looked and felt like. Even as Seu Severino could call and recognize himself as a *síndico*, Capibaribe I was certainly not a condominium.

The condominium was not just a way of imagining the elite enclave, but a sensible spatial ordering that many who lived in Capibaribe I knew intimately. Not only did they enter such spaces regularly through jobs that were common at the estate, such as domestic worker, doorman, or security guard. They were also partially tasked with maintaining these elite spaces. Helena, who had a job as a domestic worker in a condominium elsewhere in the South Zone, said she chatted with *síndicos* from "rich buildings" for tips whenever she could. She explained that she did not have an issue with meddling (*enxerimento*) in places, whether she fit in or not – an explanation underlining that her access to upper-class enclaves and their managers did not entail belonging. Rivaldo, a *síndico* who lived in the estate and worked as a private security guard in a residential condominium, also referred to these spaces as points of reference, in terms of what Capibaribe I was *not*: "It's like I always tell them [his neighbours], this is a housing project. It is totally different from a posh condominium in [posh neighbourhood], because there they pay for their comfort, and here we need to maintain our comfort."

Through this subtle comparison, Rivaldo foregrounded that, unlike upper-class enclaves, Capibaribe I did not have buffer spaces – and buffering labour – to shield its residents from perceptible discomfort. The obligation to self-maintain a general sense of order and cleanliness at the estate enrolled different material elements and practices – from access control contraptions to the upkeep of sewage infrastructure – that were commonly grouped together as part of the experience of dwelling at the estate. In this context, water and sanitation were recurring topics. Shortly after it was first occupied, the estate went through a period of intermittent water supply, which was still vivid in residents' memory a few years later. "We spent almost two years of two days with water [supply], and a week without. There were days when we had to use inadequate water from artesian wells", Lula, the *síndico* from block F, told me. Such troubles with the water supply and the sewage system prompted residents to file formal complaints, service requests, and note down protocols, in order to get the attention of URB and Compesa, the state-managed sanitation company. In addition, residents also responded with their own material interventions, not unlike those that resulted in their gates and walls: groups of neighbours gathered to dig, or

deepen, artesian water wells, clean out grease traps, and tinker with the plumbing in order to facilitate wastewater flows. No buffers separated residents from the literally dirty work.

Occasionally, politicians would "appear", as Diva put it. At one point a municipal councilwoman (*vereadora*) began to focus on the infrastructural problems that the housing estate residents faced. My interlocutors remember her as the politician who had helped several residents not only with the water shortage, but also with the abundance of new bills that accompanied their relocation into formalized housing. While they sometimes mentioned specific good deeds, such as her help in reducing the amounts households were billed by getting them registered as "low-income" with water and electricity companies, residents' discussions of "politics" were generally sceptical in tone. "We know it's politics", Diva matter-of-factly described the *vereadora's* motivation, before calling attention to the fact that the following year, 2016, was going to be a "politics year" – a moment when, due to an upcoming electoral race, candidates would start showing up around the estate to harness residents' support. In Diva's disaffected view, Capibaribe I dwellers were targeted by candidates eager to have something to show during "the time of politics" (*época de política*), but *they* did not have politicians they could appeal to for claims related to the state-provided housing estate. Mauro, who was the *síndico* of block E and a doorman in an upper-class condominium not far from there, narrated his cynical view of the performances that took place during politics time: "We need to be in the loop, talk to [the politician], he makes a promise, we know it's fake, but at that moment we can demand something, and he might realize it during the period he's trying to get votes. We don't vote for him, but then he already delivered. These are the things that happen", Mauro explained, as we sat at his kitchen table. He added that if I came back soon, I could witness it first-hand: "You can come by, they'll start to appear".

Conclusion: Security authority and citizenship in and beyond the condoscape

Under the auspices of Safe Jardim, condominiums connected to each other legibly and explicitly to enhance security in between their gates and walls, eventually expanding into the streets of Jardim. This resident-led initiative served as a didactic display of the social positions involved in the aesthetic ordering of condominium securityscapes. In terms of security authority, little was left in the hands of more traditional forms of city-level governance, as the lacklustre responses to Haroldo's suggestions exemplified. A Jardim resident elected into the municipal legislative system as a *vereador*, Haroldo may have wanted to act as a neighbourhood representative, in security matters and beyond. However, his form of authority, often negatively associated with electoral (self-)interest, had no significant part to play in the condominium-based initiative, which relied on the administrative powers of the *síndico*. This "plastic, flexible and poorly delimited" function (Dunker 2015, p. 81) was not individually authoritative. Rather, the forms of spatial control *síndicos* oversaw were enacted onto the broader neighbourhood through the norms, forms, and affects that made up the condominium, and the workforce that maintained it on an everyday basis. If *síndicos* were the forms of spatial and security authority that these arrangements legitimated, then the *condôminos*, the condominium dwellers, were the normative model of citizen. These elusive subjects were not generally, or commonly, expected to directly partake in participatory spaces such as condominium assemblies, or police-meets-residents gatherings. However, they were enacted by state and non-state security practices and materialities as subjects to affectively appease with the *feeling* that everything was in order.

The rationale behind Safe Jardim's meeting of *síndicos* was not one of representation vis-à-vis the residents of the enclaves they administered and generally lived in. It was, rather, informed by a management normativity that sought to avoid "politics" and aimed to reap easy benefits from the security materialities and labour that were mostly already in place. This managerial

normativity geared towards "making it work" was similar to the rationales that resulted in projects such as Carcará and With an Eye on the Street, which aimed to repurpose the views of Recife that penthouses and *portarias* offered for security. These initiatives all sought to mobilise lookout points and technologies within condominiums, and to close the surveillance circuit, quickly passing on security-relevant information to military and civil police forces. While Safe Jardim eschewed what its participants saw as "politics" and "politicians", being able to display – visibly and explicitly – that a partnership with the military police had been established was significant in instilling an atmosphere of control around its member-condominiums.

Initiatives like Safe Jardim evidence how the city's middle- and upper-class securityscapes actively shape social and political relationships. However, even without such active initiatives, condominiums, as norms-forms-affects clusters, have effects beyond their own walls. As *síndico* Carlos pointed out as we talked, looking out over Vista Nova, condominiums converged around a similar aesthetic normativity, when it came to security objects and services, ending up "all the same". Regardless of whether neighbouring *síndicos* came together around urban security, the clustered proliferation of condominiums generated a particular atmosphere, a setting within which it was not hard to be branded "suspicious". In addition, the aesthetics of security in Recife's "condoscapes" were not only shaped by the enclaves themselves. As illustrated by Major Marques' efforts to render police presence sensible up in the residential towers of Recife's South Zone, state policing was also enrolled in what security looked and felt like in the city's condoscapes.

Whether with cynicism or conviction, the state officials, companies, *síndicos* and active citizens who managed the condominium's securityscapes and their aesthetics removed irreconcilable claims – the so-called "wasp's nests" – from view, and from meeting agendas. They staged neat correspondences between material and financial resources, needs, and labour, staving off the inherent frictions between who was secured and who did the securing. In the Capibaribe I context, however, condominium norms and forms appeared differently, highlighting frictions rather than obscuring them. Residents' condo-like aspirations of enclosed living resulted in

micro-fortifications that revealed ongoing internal tensions. Here, there were *síndicos*, but no *condôminos*; gates, walls, and vertical buildings, no condominium. In Capibaribe I, condominium norms and forms presented an aesthetic order that was legible to the estate's residents. Partly imposed on them, partly emulated by them, they felt that this order was not quite theirs. Their constant efforts were required to keep the estate functioning. This brought home the fact that, in working-class spaces, condominium norms and forms did not automatically result in a shared sense of comfort and protection. Erecting the gates and walls themselves not only elicited feelings of safety, but also triggered an affective sense of inequality, an acute awareness of the difference between their position and that of "real" *condôminos*. Although this sense does not necessarily unsettle the post-political police order enacted in how Recife's vertical enclaves are secured, it reveals incongruities between security forms and citizenship and authority norms that the condoscapes smoothed over.

Chapter Four

Smart Phones, Good Communities

On an early morning in late 2016, hundreds of children in their school uniforms filled the streets of União, holding banners aloft as they marched through the neighbourhood. A liaison of community leaders, government representatives, school principals, and a few concerned residents had organized the Walk for Harmony and Peace Culture, as a way to call attention to their growing feeling of insecurity in the area. The theme of the protest sought to put a positive spin on their struggles against violence, which they hoped would translate into more attention from local policing authorities. Conveniently, the children's state school uniforms, with their white t-shirts, matched the peace doves adorning some of the banners (see Figure 15). "We embrace this cause, for a neighbourhood of peace!", one sign read.

Rental cars with loudspeakers on top powered the event's soundscape, as community leaders and local government representatives took turns speaking into the microphone. Some speeches called for action through concerned diagnoses of the problem at hand. Others took a more light-hearted approach, and tried to connect with the youthful crowd by using the slang some of the kids had written into their banners: "Peace is dope!" (*A paz é foda!*). During the march, João, one of the organizers, explained the movement's demands to one of the local news outlets covering the event: "We want to walk around at any time, with mobile phones, watches, wallets, without the fear of getting mugged. Beyond that, the other objective of the walk is to stimulate citizenship". Even as they were marching for specific security-related outcomes, the march in itself was conceived of as a performance of citizenship, or *cidadania*. Both protestors and the politicians they addressed frequently and elastically deployed this term to articulate a range

of duties, entitlements and behaviours, from access to rights and state-provided services to what was deemed good civic conduct.

While the organizers gave the march a voice, the school children gave it volume: without them, the demonstration could not have filled the narrow streets of União. The children, a mix of teenagers and younger students, appeared generally excited to be there, albeit apparently unconcerned with the walk's core message and paying little attention to the speeches. Regardless of the event's main goals, it seemed like a good enough excuse to get out of school early. The home-made banners included topical jokes and personal social media handles. One even showed handwritten support for "Bolsonaro 2018", a thought that, at the time, many Brazilians still deemed somewhat absurd and humorous. The União residents who stood watching as we marched down the road, blocking traffic, seemed largely unmoved by the event organizers' emphatic speeches and the teenagers' giddiness. Once the march arrived at its final destination, the organizers conjured a *ciranda* – a group dance in which participants join hands in a circle – to the music played by local musicians.

As the group spun around, I looked for a place to sit and hide from the midday sun. I spotted an acquaintance by a shaded bench, and made my way over. Zé, a long-time União resident who was employed at the school where the march had both begun and ended, regarded the whole spectacle with disdain, asking me what I thought of it. Before I could answer, he articulated his own discomfort: "Because all *I* see is politics", a statement he justified by calling attention to the electoral ambitions of the event's most noticeable organizers. To Zé, the visible performance of *cidadania* was driven by the not-so-visible interests of the community leaders, each with their own political agenda. In addition, the demonstration's medium and message did not give Zé a sense of a collectivity anchored by a shared cause. Rather, the walk's aesthetics struck him as completely detached from what he perceived the local reality to be. The "culture of peace" framing, in particular, hit a nerve. "Just the other day they shot a guy [*cabra*] right there", he told me cynically. As he pointed to the spot where the body had fallen, he was also calling attention to the chasm between the walk's upbeat poetics and the

Figure 15. School children from União march for peace.

forms of lethal violence that were not uncommon in the area. Later that day, another research interlocutor, Jorge, shared a similar sentiment. A local business-owner with a military police past that had carried over into informal security provision, Jorge told me that, to him, a "walk for peace" made no sense, since muggings were the reality that the population grappled with. He shared Zé's wariness towards a local politician, a *vereador* (municipal councillor) (see Figure 16), who deployed men he knew as neighbourhood watchers. This effort had little effect, Jorge explained, because these monitors lacked the coercive capacity needed to stop crime.



Figure 16. A banner we marched past, communicating a *vereador*'s gratefulness towards União voters: "Gratitude: this is how we can define our feeling. [Number of] votes, [number of] partners, [number of] friends, [number of] fighters. Thank you, my community. For with God nothing shall be impossible (Luke 1:37)".

While I chatted with a sceptical Zé about the morning demonstration, a preteen who had been listening attentively to us beamed when the recent homicide came up. "I have a photo of the dead body on my phone! Do you want to see it?", she asked excitedly, as though she had been waiting for a chance to join the conversation. Before either of us could react, she had moved closer, left arm stretched, phone in hand. Her right index finger swiped through images of the lifeless body of the homicide victim as she enthusiastically shared the gruesome hearsay that was circulating along with the pictures. As the details became more graphic, she pinched thumb and index finger together on the touchscreen and spread them apart to magnify the image of the body. As she zoomed out again, the crime scene was instantly identifiable as a spot just a stone's throw away from where we sat. The photo had been taken at night, with the street dimly lit by yellowish streetlamps, but

the cold light of the flash made the victim's contours visible and sharp.

The União march was a familiar form through which community leaders and movements attempted to make their claims visible to local state authorities and the broader population. In this instance, they received direct support from Governo Presente (Present Government), a programme aimed at bringing state services closer to territories mapped as vulnerable, especially in relation to violence and criminality. Within the programme, it was mostly community leaders and residents' associations – officially described as local "living forces" (*forças vivas*) (SEART, n.d.) – who communicated claims and demands to the state, on behalf of "the community". In fact, residents viewed the loud demonstration for more policing and less violence that emerged from this partnership with scepticism, as was perceptible in the absence of marchers who were not in school uniform. This did not go unnoticed by the event organizers, who reconvened soon after the event for an assessment of how things had gone. João, the community leader most centrally involved in the effort on the União side, expressed disappointment at what he perceived as residents' *dormant* disposition towards social causes that did not lead to individual gains. As they evaluated the event, mobilisers from União and Governo Presente agreed that it was a valuable starting point, but acknowledged the disappointing outcomes in terms of community engagement: the general population of União had yet to be properly *sensitized* (*sensibilizada*).

While the public event did not manage to *move* many into joining under the auspices of "peace", "harmony", and "citizenship", residents of União were certainly not indifferent to local manifestations of crime and violence. In fact, these were everyday topics in the community, where concerns related to insecurity had been increasing around the time of the march. However, violent occurrences tended to be processed via much more intimate channels than that of public, street-level demonstrations. In addition to the usual neighbourhood-level word of mouth, instant messaging apps were increasingly enrolled to share security-related gossip in the form of multimedia content. As exemplified by the young girl's ability to quickly pull a homicide scene from her pocket, explicit images of real-life crime circulated widely, through a circuit afforded by residents' smartphones. As this chapter

discusses, these ubiquitous devices grew in importance during the months following the march, shaping how community leaders and residents made themselves and their security claims perceptible to state policing.

In Chapter Three, I explored how citizenship and authority norms – and the social and spatial differentiation they inform – are performed in and through the built environment, pointing to the aesthetic and material forms aimed at producing safety as affect. Here, I discuss how such norms are shared and negotiated in WhatsApp security groups. I examine how these groups and the digital technologies they rely on work as a different type of form that also elicits affective responses, and that reflects and reproduces sociospatial difference and inequality in Recife. I unpack the "affordances" of smartphones and WhatsApp, discussing how they shape the parameters within which notions of "good" citizenship and "good" authority are performed, negotiated, and circulated in relation to street-level security. Drawing from both União and Jardim, I discuss how messaging apps shape ordinary practices of seeing, capturing and sharing (in)security amongst and between citizens and state security actors. I suggest that this form of digital mediation – and the imaginaries of "direct", "real-time", "all the time" contact it entails – reconfigures long-standing forms of urban political brokerage (see Koster, 2012, 2014), representation, and claims-making. Furthermore, even as WhatsApp security groups work to solidify classed and racialized divisions between "good citizens" and "threats" – a distinction mapped on specific places – they afford the circulation of citizenship and policing norms across territories that are usually performed as fundamentally "different" when (in)security is concerned.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I present recent debates that connect digital technology to urban space, inequality and surveillance, and draw on the concept of affordances to think through what WhatsApp policing groups *afford* for how group members sense and make sense of each other and their surroundings. I move on to focus on the smartphone itself, drawing on an encounter with a military police officer whose work relied heavily on this personal mobile device, discussing what it enables, encourages, and constrains in routine police work. Next, I unpack everyday

uses of WhatsApp policing groups in both Jardim and União, focusing on what the software affords security providers and recipients, in terms of how they perform and negotiate notions of "good" citizenship and "good" authority. Specifically, I highlight how it affords visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy to participant-police relations. Lastly, I contrast Jardim and União's WhatsApp policing groups, highlighting how their affordances are socio-spatially differentiated. As the chapter discusses, in the middle- and upper-class condoscape, these neighbourhood-based policing groups enable a form of top-down, *vertical* surveillance, which takes aesthetic form in digital exchanges with peers and police. Meanwhile, in the low-income community of União, the WhatsApp groups encouraged a kind of *lateral* surveillance, requiring group members to turn their practices of seeing and showing (cf. Mitchell, 2002) towards their peers. As discussed in Chapter One, once the group's attention turned against the police – in other words, once they captured and shared *sousveillant* imagery (cf. Mann and Ferenbok, 2013) – the digital bond was interrupted.

Digital policing technologies, urban inequalities and aesthetic affordances

Mediated spatiality

How do digital policing technologies work in, through and on urban space? Early work on the spatiality of digital technologies (e.g., Castells, 2004; Graham 2004) viewed the domain of online experience as specific, distinct from face-to-face encounters, and organized according to a different logic from physical space. However, the rapid and on-going transformation of digital devices and their uses – not least smartphones, which are more akin to microcomputers than to what we once knew as telephones – increasingly complicates clear divisions between experiences of "online" and "offline" spaces. The interest in digital devices, infrastructures, and the entangled online/off-line spatialities they afford has been central to human geography's recent "digital turn" (Ash et al., 2018a), resulting in different understandings

of how digital spaces relate to those we deem "physical". The idea of code/space (Kitchin and Dodge, 2014), for instance, points to how spatial processes and relations are produced and shaped by the myriad kinds of software that are increasingly embedded in everyday life. The concept of "hybrid space" (Souza e Silva, 2006) is another frame through which to think the blurring between the digital and the physical. Less focused on the coding than on what their users experience in their everyday lives, the approach calls attention to the rise of mobile technologies with location awareness, which shape how space is navigated and gamified.

The problem of framing the enmeshing of physical-digital worlds in terms of *hybridity*, though, is the underlying assumption that the two realms were fully separate, before becoming hybrid through the rise of mobile technologies (Leszczynski, 2018, p. 16). In other words, it perpetuates imaginaries of an immaterial virtual realm, essentially different from the material spaces we inhabit in the flesh. In analysing the role of the smartphone in urban policing, I draw on Agnieszka Leszczynski's (2018) formulation of mediated spatiality, which understands the social, the technological, and the spatial as inseparable: they are mutually co-constitutive as they actively shape our lived experiences. Accordingly, I approach smartphone usage for policing purposes as a material, embodied practice that cannot be disembedded from the social and spatial relations that it shapes, and is shaped by.

Digital differentiation

Working from this approach, how might we understand the digital policing technologies in relation to forms of urban differentiation and inequality? Recent scholarship has emphasized that digital policing systems reproduce and deepen the city's social and spatial divides, as they render marginalized residents and spaces as *objects* to be read and transformed into data. Drawing on the use of predictive policing in Chicago, for instance, Brian Jordan Jefferson (2020) provides a fine-grained account of how geographic information systems read negatively racialized populations and neighbourhoods as criminogenic. Jefferson (2017, 2020) argues that the veneer

of scientific objectivity that shrouds crime-predicting and crime-mapping software conceals how these incorporate long-standing forms of racial profiling, while also obscuring the structural root causes of crime's clustering in specific areas. By drawing historical connections between the branding practices of enslavement and how contemporary biometric surveillance reads and racializes bodies, Simone Browne (2015) similarly questions the neutrality of digital technology. In different ways, such analyses lay bare the forms of class- and race-based discrimination that automated surveillance systems perpetuate and expand as they categorize specific bodies as "risks", whether in relation to urban safety, national borders, or insurance schemes.

Cracking open the black box of digitized risk assessment to unveil the forms of differentiation and objectification they engender is, of course, important. However, digital technologies are also implicated in much less automated forms of surveillance that rely on the value-judgment of ordinary people, and not code – resonating with what Ellen van Holstein (2018) has framed as *grassroots securitisation*, a development predicated on the ubiquity of handheld digital devices. In urban Brazil, the use of digital devices and social media is ubiquitous, including amongst low-income residents of marginalized areas (see Nemer, 2016; Spyer, 2017). While inequalities exist in terms of access to devices and to stable internet connections, social media platforms and instant messaging apps are deeply entangled with social and political processes in the urban margins[36] – affording empowerment through information and political mobilisation (Nemer, 2016), and enabling counter-surveillance mechanisms against state violence (Mano and Menezes, 2020). Additionally, though, as this chapter foregrounds, marginalized subjects are not only the *objects* of grassroots surveillance: they can also be enrolled as active participants in digital surveillant practices that, in the case I discuss

36 In Brazil, access to social media and messaging apps are also facilitated by "zero rating" mobile data packages, which offer unlimited data for selected apps, such as Facebook and WhatsApp. As reported by Juliana Gragnani for BBC Brazil, these kinds of contracts have been associated with the spread and higher impact of "fake news" in both Brazil and the United States, since they reduce the costs associated with using the apps through which users spread and receive misinformation (Gragnani, 2018, April 16).

here, are not separate from state policing.

While neighbourhood watches may evoke analogue imaginaries of vigilant civilians making the rounds by car or on foot, increasingly, their reach is extended through social media networks that enable surveillance or even "digital vigilantism" (Trottier, 2017, 2018). Based on research on one such a neighbourhood patrol, Ana Ivasiuc (2018) describes how Facebook worked as a platform in which white and middle-class participants vertically surveilled "subaltern Others" (Ivasiuc, 2018, p. 17) – in this case, the Roma population –, through the dissemination of images of those framed as security threats. Over the past few years, such neighbourhood initiatives increasingly enrol the instant messaging app WhatsApp. As I go on to show, the circulation of digital content within such surveillance practices normalizes the exclusion of those seen and felt to be out of place, while contributing to the formation of communities through a shared sense of security and insecurity (see also Dixon, 2017; Ivasiuc, 2019). To explain *how* smartphone-based security practices shape such collective affects and processes of community formation, while avoiding tech determinism and taking situated social and spatial relations into account, I draw on the concept of affordances.

The aesthetic affordances of Whatsapp policing

Out of all the bits of my research that I presented at conferences, lectures, and seminars over the past few years, WhatsApp policing elicited the most audience response. Peers and students always had their own examples of this practice to share, drawn from very different geographical contexts. Statements like "in my parents' village, in North Brabant [South of the Netherlands], the neighbours started a WhatsApp security group too", or "I've heard of similar groups popping up in Bogotá", were common reactions to my discussions of Recife-based WhatsApp policing. Although I never joined any of the WhatsApp groups organized for the surveillance of my own Amsterdam neighbourhood, I walk past the street signs that announce their existence almost daily. In addition to still being part of the groups that cover Jardim and União, in Recife, WhatsApp missives from

my mother commonly include forwarded content from the Rio de Janeiro neighbourhood where I lived for almost half of my life. The other day, I learned through forwarded messages that a mugging had taken place on my old street:

[11:31, 1/5/2021] **Mum**
They took the mobile phone and the keys of both cars

[11:31, 1/5/2021] **Mum**
Didn't hurt anybody.

There are clear similarities in how WhatsApp practically enables neighbourhood-level surveillance across contexts, urban or otherwise. As this chapter shows, though, much of what these mediated surveillance practices produce is not just dependent on features of the app in itself, but also on attributes of the user, the location they are WhatsApp-ing from, and many other factors. The concept of affordances allows us to account for this contextual specificity, without losing the app or the digital device from sight. In its original ecological psychology formulation, "*affordances* of the environment are what it *offers* the animal, what it *provides* or *furnishes*, either for good or ill" (Gibson, 2014 [1979], p. 56, emphasis in original). The concept has crossed disciplinary boundaries and is now commonly used to understand the interactions between humans and artifacts.[37] In general terms, affordances denote "the range of functions and constraints that an object provides for, and places upon, structurally situated subjects … affordances are the dynamic link between subjects and objects within sociotechnical systems" (David and Chouinard, 2016, p. 241)

What affordance theory offers to our understanding of digital technologies

37 E.g., in (social) media studies (Bucher and Helmond, 2018; Santos and Faure, 2018), science and technology studies (Davis and Chouinard, 2016), anthropology (Bareither, 2019; Keane, 2018) and design and architecture (Gaver, 1996; Rietveld, 2017). See Bucher and Helmond (2018) for a rich discussion of how affordance thinking has been taken up by different authors and fields.

is its emphasis on their relational character. Affordances provide a language to think through the properties of technological devices and other objects, not in terms of fixed *features*, but rather through what they enable when in relation with another entity – human or non-human. I draw on Davis and Chouinard's (2016), elaboration of this relationality to focus on *how* things afford and to whom: instead of thinking in terms of what an object does or does not afford, they suggest thinking in terms of what artifacts *request*, *demand*, *encourage*, *discourage*, and *refuse*. I am especially interested in thinking through the *aesthetic* affordances of digital technologies such as WhatsApp policing, exploring how the socio-technical specificities of both the app and smartphones more broadly encourage or discourage particular sensory experiences and emotional responses.

My analysis of WhatsApp security groups in Recife identifies what are, fundamentally, affordances that pertain to aesthetics as sense perception (see Chapter One). I am interested in how the app requests, demands or encourages group members to become sensibly attuned to each other and to (in)security in the territories with which they identify. The multimedia security content that members can capture and circulate through the app is part of "everyday practices of seeing and showing" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 170) that mobilise sensory registers that privilege the visual.[38] By requesting and circulating visual, audio, and textual content on people and situations read as "risky", such WhatsApp groups often end up reflecting and normalizing classed and racialized inequalities. However, an open approach to the sensible forms these groups afford – attending to the relations between WhatsApp, users' embodied experiences of it, and their locations – allows us to engage the seeing and showing that falls outside of simply *surveilling*. After all, as much as they perform the divides between "good citizen" and "threat", the aesthetic registers and affective experiences that such policing

38 This is a point that Louise Amoore (2007) picks up on in her discussion of the *vigilant visualities* – the watchful practices of seeing and showing – mobilised in post-9/11 homeland security in the United States. While stressing that no visual practice is ever *just* visual, Amoore explains how vision is made to be the prime and most reliable register within security logics and repertoires (see also Ivasiuc, 2019).

groups afford also enact how civilian and military "surveillers" perceive and feel about each other and the spaces around them.

Within the WhatsApp policing groups I discuss here, security-related content captured and shared by neighbours and state policing agents, for instance, are commonly celebrated with emojis – clapping hands, trophies, medals –, as well as text-based adulation. Immediate and multimedia performances of praise and disapproval are simple examples of the types of civilian-police security encounters that the app's interface encourages within WhatsApp policing groups. These visual and textual performances of praise also indicate the digital medium's emotional affordances, "its capacities to enable, prompt and restrict the enactment of particular emotional experiences unfolding in between the media technology and an actor's practical sense for its use" (Bareither, 2019, p. 15).[39] As shall become clear through the empirical material, the emotional performances that such neighbourhood surveillance groups afford are central elements within the multimedia repertoires through which WhatsApp group members enact, negotiate, and challenge notions of both "good" citizenship and "good" authority.

Concealing *cidadãos*, sharing *bandidos*

Before discussing how WhatsApp groups in União and Jardim afforded consensus and dissensus around such normativities, I focus on an encounter with a military police officer whose work relied heavily on informants. This encounter highlights what the smartphone and instant messaging apps afforded security providers, shaping how police officers can cultivate relationships with citizens, and how they can capture and circulate images of those branded as *marginais* (thugs). I met Robson in a mid-October

39 Here, Bareither draws on Bourdieu's notion of "practical sense", defining it as "a sense for how to handle everyday life situations through applying embodied knowledge" (Bareither, 2019, p. 9, in reference to Bourdieu, 1990). This embodied notion of what is appropriate in a given context resonates with debates on the everyday normative arbitrations performed by ordinary people, introduced in this dissertation's introduction.

morning in 2016 during a return visit to a station attached to the military police battalion that covered Recife's South Zone. The police sergeant who introduced us described Robson as a policeman who was always out on the streets: "the guy who produces the most around here". His "productivity" was measured in the numbers of arrests he made, presented as a reflection of how much time he spent outside on the streets, and the effort he put into his patrols.

Stepping inside the station for our impromptu interview, Robson wore a pistol on his belt, and an automatic rifle strapped across his torso, which was shielded with a bulletproof vest. He was muscular, with a stocky build, and a body language that suggested intimidating masculinity. His serious face took a while to unfrown. As we sat together in a small room that was part of the poorly equipped police station, he explained that his job wasn't really dictated by the requests for police response managed centrally by CIODS. Unlike other officers, his daily routine did not consist of responding to calls made to the emergency hotline 190 or demands generated by state video surveillance networks; he was rarely required to deal with muggings and robberies. He was part of a team that mainly worked with a confidential network of informants to crack down on drug-dealing at specific hotspots. The routine he described mostly focused on the retail drug markets operating from *favelas* in Recife's South Zone.

Obtaining information, he explained, was really at the core of his job, so cultivating and maintaining a network of informants was central: "*You have to bring people close to you*", he emphasized. I asked how he managed to do this. After all, "snitching" is always a tricky, and risky, business for those involved. His methods, he explained, started with a sorting process in the communities identified as hotspots: he had to distinguish those residents who were pro-police from those who weren't, by "observing who is who in everyday life". He described his informants as "simple people" who lacked much, but were willing to share a lot, once a bond of trust had been established. Since his daily work relied so heavily on the information supplied by ordinary residents, sorting supporters from antagonists was a key part of Robson's job. As the officer talked me through this sensitive sorting, it became clear

that while the process was not always straightforward, it seemed to always end up with the same two categorical outcomes: one was either a *marginal* or a *cidadão* (a citizen) – emic terms for valuating residents that were current within and beyond police circles.

In his work routine, the mobile phone enabled communication with the residents on whose tips he relied in two ways. In his communication with informants, maintaining their anonymity was key for protecting their safety and sustaining the exchange of information on local criminality. Those citizens with whom Robson established a bond of mutual trust had to remain anonymous and out of sight, and this meant communicating discretely through phone calls rather than meeting face-to-face. In addition to affording anonymity, the same mobile technology and its features for image and audio capture also enabled ways of visualizing – and sharing – those perceived as "thugs". To Robson, there were two types of criminals: those who were overt thugs, in the way they dressed, walked, and talked, and those who wore "citizen masks". The latter, however, always let something slip, he explained: a word, an attitude – something that made the masks drop. His eloquent, but somewhat vague, description of how to distinguish a citizen from a *marginal* must have left a puzzled look on my face, so he resorted to his phone's visual archive to get his point across.

"Here, I'll show you", he said, as he picked up his smartphone.

With his right-hand thumb, he accessed his photo gallery and showed me pictures of young men sitting on the ground looking apprehensive during what appeared to be arrests or *abordagens* (stop-and-frisks). Swiping through the pictures, he pointed out that criminals often wore clothes from Cyclone, a brand that, according to him, was popular among those who wanted to be perceived as "badass thugs" ("*bandido rochedo*").

"See? Football shirts, shorts, flip-flops. They all look the same. A citizen doesn't dress in this way. A European football shirt in these communities is a sign of status. You can bet that anyone wearing them is a thug", he asserted. He continued swiping through photos. "Look at this creature", he said,

as he showed me a young man with a dyed blond mohawk hairstyle, and a diamond-shaped pendant hanging from his neck.

"Also, a citizen doesn't stand around the community's alleys and streets during work hours. A citizen is concerned with making a living [*seu ganha-pão*]. ... *Look at these three*. Bank robbers", he said, showing me a picture of three friends smiling and posing together for the camera. "If you see a guy like this is hanging around the community during working hours, it's a *bandido* [criminal]. I say it without fear of making a mistake".

The phone emerged as a central enabler of the citizen-informant relationships on which the officer relied in his policing routines. According to him, meeting in person – far from the informants' place of residence – was ideal, but this was difficult to achieve and therefore a rare circumstance. This left his smartphone as the sole channel through which to attain relevant information on an everyday basis. As he made clear, however, messaging apps and other social media were not to be trusted: they did not provide sufficient anonymity – an important condition for the safety of the informant, and the durability of the policeman-informant bond. Messaging apps connected to the internet, such as WhatsApp – with their automatic archival features, expandable avatar photos, and vulnerability to hacking – *discouraged* the exchange of confidential information. Many of the smartphone's features discouraged or refused the covert sharing of security-related knowledge: good citizen-informants should be valued and protected, which meant taking precautions such as communicating through old-fashioned phone calls, which left a much more discrete digital trail.

While it prevented, or discouraged, anonymous communication, the ordinary smartphone's capacity to archive, and quickly disseminate, multimedia material *encouraged* the collection of digital files on those categorized as "thugs". As the officer swiped left through his photo gallery, it became clear that the pictures of those informed on came from a variety of sources. Some were shots of detained individuals, looking seriously at the phone pointed at them during an encounter with the police. Other images looked like screenshots of profile pictures and group photos taken from social media

platforms, either by Robson himself, or by colleagues who then circulated them via WhatsApp. As opposed to the treatment reserved for volunteer informants, anonymity was clearly not a preoccupation where those tagged as threats were concerned.

The smartphone afforded Robson the capacity to *capture*, *receive*, *archive*, and *circulate* visual content of those who were not deemed *cidadãos*. The device enabled the effortless compilation of an informal digital record of those informed on, and classified as "thugs": a dossier composed out of haphazardly assembled images, which then became security information, regardless of the conditions under which they were originally produced. The easy capturing of pictures, preserved in a digital gallery, stretched the temporality of the "suspect" category beyond a particular security encounter. With the tap of an officer's finger on a touchscreen during a stop-and-frisk operation, a man profiled as a potential *marginal* could be easily congealed as a possible threat in a digital dossier – one that could effortlessly, and rapidly, make its way from phone to phone.

While talking me through the digital gallery of negatively racialized young men, from particular neighbourhoods, dressed in particular brands, Robson was *sensitizing* me towards being able to visually identify a potential *marginal*. Due to the research context in which our conversation took place, this "instructive" dimension was performed quite explicitly: his goal was to clearly demonstrate what he was talking about as he discussed how to distinguish citizens from their others. Even without such thorough verbal explanation, I suggest that the continuous production and circulation of digital content depicting those categorized as "other-than-citizens" (Colona, 2019, p. 141) generates a shared *sense* of what the (potential) criminal looks like; a common sense that normalizes forms of classed, racialized, gendered and spatialized differentiation. Even when verbal commentary accompanies these images as they circulate, coded language – references to clothing brands and behaviour – conceals these social and spatial categories of differentiation. Within policing circles, race, in particular, often remains an "absent presence" (M'Charek et al., 2014, p. 462), having been normatively rendered unmentionable, or "inconvenient" (Dias, 2021). I elaborate this

point in the next section, in which I discuss the enrolment of ordinary citizens into smartphone policing groups.

Whatsapp policing

In April 2018, the frontpage of one of Recife's biggest newspapers read: "An example of citizenship that comes from Casa Forte."[40] Beneath it, a photograph featured eight North Zone residents huddled together, their faces lit by the smartphones in their hands. A caption explained the somewhat enigmatic title-picture combo (*Diário de Pernambuco,* 2018):

> Residents of Casa Forte and nearby neighbourhoods ... joined state power to fight criminality in the region. Social participation in the resolution of problems in the community was put in practice with the creation of the WhatsApp group Casa Forte Mais Seguro (Safer Casa Forte). Direct communication with the police reduced muggings and robberies.

As the frontpage news item suggests, mobile phones and their messaging software are increasingly implicated in how Recife residents deal with both insecurity and policing. The trend continued to spread throughout the city, led by different military police battalions. I had been hearing about the increasing importance of WhatsApp for citizen-police relations in Recife for quite some time before it made headlines. In fact, by the time the phenomenon made headlines, I had already been part of similar digital spaces for several months: I had been added as a researcher to the WhatsApp policing groups of Jardim and União by administrators in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The initial premise of such groups resembled the objectives that held together Robson's covert network of informants. The day-to-day practices that the instant messaging groups afforded, though, were significantly different from the phone-based interactions between policemen and selected informants. While communication with informants was predicated on the anonymity of sources, WhatsApp policing groups encouraged visibility,

40 "Um exemplo de cidadania que vem de Casa Forte"

instantaneity, and intimacy amongst citizens and between civilians and police.

Briefly, these three affordances involve the following: with *visibility*, I point to how the groups became a platform where citizens and policemen could become visible and intelligible to each other, negotiating and performing shared visual and verbal languages of "good citizenship" and "good policing" in relation to security practices. Secondly, this digital link is an *instantaneous* one: it enabled local policemen and citizens to remain connected in real-time, all the time, as they moved through the city. And, lastly, WhatsApp afforded intimate, personalized mediated encounters: through the devices in their pockets, residents were in direct and emoji-filled touch with each other and with policemen of their respective areas (see Figure 17). Along with the other two relational features, this engenders a sense of *closeness* that has affective effects (see also Dixon, 2017).

While the three affordances singled out are common to both sets of WhatsApp policing groups presented and analysed here, as flagged in the introduction to this chapter, others are predicated on the social and spatial positioning of users. In Jardim, for instance, the groups enabled and encouraged the surveillance of "outsiders" deemed culpable – or capable – of petty theft and muggings in the area. Meanwhile, in União, the same digital environs required participants to engage in the lateral surveillance of their neighbours. Even though União residents were also in a position to look "upwards" and keep watch on abuses of power by state police, their circulation of sousveillant footage disrupted the aesthetic consensus on which the digital connection had been built.

Figure 17. A digital image that police officers circulated via "Policing União". Against a background featuring the colours of the Pernambuco state flag, a red heart encapsulates the message "Those who love care", floating above two coats of arms: the Pernambuco Military Police's and the local police battalion's.

Below, I illustrate these affordances and their tensions by drawing on exchanges that took place in the WhatsApp groups themselves, and situating these exchanges in the participants' broader socio-spatial contexts. As will become clear, even though Jardim and União groups were assembled for the same purposes – and proposed by the same high-ranking military police officer – they afforded different practices and relationships, according

to factors that had to do with users' positionality within Recife and the specific territories they inhabited and informed on. Having provided a glimpse into the abrupt disruption of the União-based group in Chapter One, I now turn to its inauguration, before detailing Jardim's WhatsApp policing origin story.

Selecting the "good citizens" of União

In the period after the march described at the start of this chapter, fear of violence increased amongst União residents. In early 2017, a few months after the first mobilisation, local community leaders made another attempt to rally residents. They intentionally set this gathering in the evening, so that more people could join after working hours. Without the partnership of local schools, the turnout was limited to a few dozen people, fewer than the organizers had hoped. During the gathering, community leaders such as João, of the local residents' association, and Fernando, the grateful councilman, took turns at the mic speaking against the muggings that had been worrying many. Although amplified by a powerful sound system, their voices failed to reverberate with the crowd, which stood scattered around the dimly lit square, apparently unmoved. Dissatisfied with the event, which did not generate the perceptible atmosphere of collective dissent they had hoped to spark, the community leaders behind the demonstration reconsidered their mode of protest. Later that evening, in conversation with some of the most vocal residents present, they decided to take their outrage beyond the streets of União, and into the area's military police battalion.

The impromptu visit to the local battalion led to the establishment of the "Security União" WhatsApp group, whose *de facto* dissolution I charted in the first few pages of this thesis. At the battalion, the high-ranking Officer Ramos, joined by a few policemen, welcomed a small group of residents and myself into an air-conditioned meeting room. The group members took turns voicing their grievances. João kick-started the litany of complaints, not with the usual critique of the police's absence, but with a hard-hitting commentary on its hostile presence. He narrated a recent episode after a local

carnival parade that involved policemen making excessive and indiscriminate use of pepper spray when a group of carnival-goers refused to disperse. He had been driving into the area as the conflict took place, followed by his son and grandchildren, and told the officer he had witnessed pepper spray hit "children, mothers, and women".

"They were throwing pepper spray, as my wife was leaving the car to get my granddaughter, but she quickly turned back. Thank God I saw through the rear-view mirror that my son's car window was closed. But, officer, if that window had been open, and the pepper spray had hit my grandchildren, rest assured, I would have taken a beating", João told Officer Ramos, in a calm, but firm tone. His complaint was followed by a demand, not for less police, but for more of a *better* police presence. "I believe, I want to believe, that we want to have the police by our side. And I also want to believe that the police want to have the community by their side", João said.

He moved on to a second story: "Those who are mugging in União are real *malandros* [bums; scoundrels]. It happens all the time. There was a birthday party, around one or two months ago. It was a girl's fifteenth birthday. They passed by on motorbikes and took the mobile phones of everyone who was at a *girl's fifteenth birthday*." Other meeting attendees chimed in with similar stories of petty muggings, which tended to highlight the audacity of the *malandros* stealing in broad daylight, with no fear of getting caught. The quick succession of themes that were brought to the meeting by João and other residents reflect the position of a community such as União vis-à-vis state policing. While armed muggings and robberies were central safety concerns, police aggression was also a source of worry, as João's account of the pepper spray incident indicated. They demanded that the police do something about the *malandros*, while calling attention to the fact that they had recently and excessively targeted "good citizens" and innocent bystanders: children, mothers, women, fathers, and grandfathers. Even as João acknowledged that he would have taken a beating from the police, if he had stood up for his grandchildren, he also expressed an explicit wish to have the police *closer*.

During the meeting, the back and forth between residents and policemen shifted in tone and content. Residents complained about past occurrences, but they also gave concrete suggestions, or instructions, for how the military police should respond. At times, Officer Ramos responded defensively, insisting that residents take account of the structural shortcomings that the police faced. He also critiqued the homicide-reduction emphasis of Pernambuco's overarching security policy (the Pact for Life, PPV, see Chapter One), as it ended up taking attention away from the property crimes, such as muggings and robberies, that União residents felt increasingly victimized by. "Who suffers with crimes against property? The good people. And who suffers with homicide? The bad people", stated Ramos, going against PPV priorities, but meeting the normative sensitivities of those present: they perceived themselves as good citizens who were likely to be mugged, but unlikely to die by homicide, a fate that they felt only awaited *envolvidos* (those involved in crime).

The officer pulled a short-term solution from the sleeve of his beige uniform that reiterated this normative distinction: the immediate creation of a WhatsApp group, in which he himself would take part. As he professed optimistically, this had already been done elsewhere, yielding positive results in areas similarly covered by the battalion: "Why [create a WhatsApp group]? WhatsApp sends written messages, voice messages, photos, videos, and this makes it easier for us to reach the *elemento* [police jargon for suspect, perpetrator], right? ... These groups have facilitated our work a lot", Ramos declared optimistically. "But," he warned, "the *community* has to create these groups, because they know who to add. ... Because this information, that you will send to the police, if there is a crook in the group, you'll be unsafe, because he will brand you, understand? So, the community creates it", he concluded firmly.

The officer's assertive recommendation resonated with a tension I have called attention to previously, one that is telling of how União residents are positioned in relation to Pernambuco's state policing forces. In contrast to an area such as Jardim, União residents who share information with the military police on what goes on in the neighbourhood are advised to be

discrete; caution is needed when selecting "who to add". The creation of "Security União" already included a sorting process. The process did not just entail adding a pre-existing group of "good citizens". It was also the active formation of a community, which was charged with new security-related responsibilities.

The "Security União" WhatsApp group was officially activated as a space for exchanging policing-related information immediately after that meeting at the battalion, inaugurating a new channel through which residents and community leaders could make themselves and their claims perceptible to state security actors. Officer Ramos was added, with administrator privileges. The first messages sent made use of the platform's multimedia and real-time coverage capacities: they were photos taken of us at the impromptu meeting. Some depicted the smiling residents posing next to the uniformed officer. Others were candid snapshots of the spur-of-the-moment tour that we all received of shiny new vehicles that had been recently delivered to the battalion, soon to be at the service of the area's safety. Over time, in the group's media archive, the inaugural images of proud citizens posing with a satisfied authority figure would be lost in a sea of "elements": individuals who had just been arrested, homicide victims, and footage from surveillance cameras. The policemen in the group also actively contributed content: in addition to responding to residents' pleas, they often initiated the interactions, sharing photos of security operations as they took place.

Seeing and being seen in Jardim

Policed by the same military police battalion that covers União, Jardim had established a WhatsApp group connecting residents and state security the year before. The same officer who proposed União's WhatsApp policing initiative had been behind the launch of Jardim's group: in 2016, Officer Ramos had suggested the technological fix while attending a meeting with residents alarmed at muggings and car robberies in the neighbourhood. By the time that gathering dispersed, all attendees had been added to the newly inaugurated group. Alberto and Luisa, two residents who were particularly

active in Jardim-related mobilisations (including the Safe Jardim initiative discussed in Chapter Three), became group administrators: "The next day [after the creation of the group], I almost couldn't work! Everyone was asking to add this person, and that person", Luisa recalled.

In contrast to União, where policemen were included directly in the group that contained all other participating residents, Jardim had groups with only residents, and another, separate group, in which only the admins of the first groups connected with police commanders and street-level officers. In addition to adding or removing users from the groups, and enforcing group rules, Jardim admins also mediated between the police and the wider community of participants: they both informed the police what was being reported on in the groups, and forwarded media and requests from police to citizens.

"They [Jardim residents] do security amongst themselves, and the police comes in as a secondary actor", Mancini, a high-ranking officer who served under Ramos at the battalion, stated approvingly. He participated in several WhatsApp groups with residents of different areas within the South Zone; much like me during the course of this research project, Mancini, and many of his peers, moved across the spaces of Jardim and União. At the time of our conversation, in late 2016, União's smartphone policing group had not yet been established, but Mancini already contrasted the two areas, in terms of how their residents engaged security matters. "The higher the schooling", he told me, "the more willing people are to participate. They [the educated upper classes, such as the majority of Jardim] *present us with the problem, as well as with the solution*. It's different from meetings in Vista Nova, or União, in which they only bring us the problems … Everything falls back on the police's shoulders: problems with the health system, with education".

In mid-2016, Alberto and Márcia, a fellow Jardim resident, consciously enacted the sort of autonomous security citizenship that Mancini praised. On a weekday, around 7 pm, they scheduled a walk to map Jardim's public lighting. This walk was part of an ongoing effort that emphasized the importance of good lighting in increasing urban safety. As we were leaving

Márcia's house, they told me to leave my purse behind, since it was still "mugging time". According to their own informal crime mapping, 5 pm to 8 pm was the time slot in which most of such crimes were committed: "Even though we're almost at the end of it, better not risk it", Alberto advised.

"Mugging time" was also the time of day that the lampposts were switched on. To Alberto and Márcia, the light that these lampposts were able – or unable – to cast onto Jardim's roads and sidewalks was a matter of (in)security. They took it on themselves to deal with the matter by going through the area street by street, pen and spiral notebook in hand, listing each lamppost according to the unique number attributed to it, along with a comment on its current condition. Since Jardim consisted mostly of gated, vertical condominiums with one or two buildings each, many of the street lights were privately owned and maintained. Alberto and Márcia also jotted down the details of such private lights in the spiral notebook if they felt they were significant in illuminating their surroundings. Those issues that could be publicly dealt with were later translated into requests addressed to EMLURB.

As we made our way down one of Jardim's main streets, Alberto and Márcia attuned me to the safety-related sense they made of the ordinary behavioural, material and atmospheric elements we encountered. "On this corner there are many muggings", Alberto said of one spot. A tree was no longer just a tree: it was also a material form that a mugger could hide behind to surprise unsuspecting pedestrians, especially in a badly lit area. As a woman strolled past, chatting on her smartphone, Márcia sneered: "See? Then they ask why they get mugged!". In addition to taking measures to protect themselves, Alberto and Márcia's policing citizenship drove them to address security elements such as the yellow lighting, the defective lampposts, and other residents' behaviour, given the chance. Their detailed mapping and reporting of street lighting were a way to perform good – as in responsible and autonomous – citizenship in order to catch the attention of municipal authorities. As Alberto explained: "When the state sees that you are organized, they treat you differently." By "differently", he meant better and more attentively. Jardim's WhatsApp policing groups, which Alberto co-administered and which were taking off around the time of our night

light walk, afforded the area's residents with new ways of seeing and showing (in)security in the neighbourhood, but also with new ways of being seen by state security authorities (see Figure 18).

Local enthusiasm for the new security groups was so great that, in just over a month, the group was at full capacity – WhatsApp only allows groups of up to 256 people. The level of interest led the administrators to split the initial group into five groups, organized by quadrants that Alberto mapped out with the assistance of a local policeman. The residents were distributed into groups that took into account the proximity of their residence to local hotspots of informal crime reporting, and the streets through which police usually drove through during patrols: "The quadrants take operational efficiency into account. We gathered the informal complaints and the policing [car] routes from a period of three months, give or take", Alberto explained.

Making space for all the Jardim residents who wished to be more active in local policing was not the only catalyst for the multiplication of these WhatsApp groups. For the administrators, it also meant having more control over the information that was shared, since chats with fewer people were easier to discipline. "We were wasting a lot of time, in a single group, because people are scared. Irrational fear makes them neurotic, you see?", Alberto told me, referring to the noise created by messages he considered irrelevant for the groups' purposes. "The water delivery boy was considered a suspect, you know? So, we noticed that, in people's neurosis, the profile of someone who could mug them was a Black kid with shabby clothes on a bicycle. And we thought: what an idiotic mentality! Any kid on a bike was considered a thief. He could even be wearing nice clothes, but was a thief", Alberto complained.

To limit bad WhatsApp policing practices, such as taking and circulating photographs of subjects whose only "offense" was cycling while Black, the Jardim admins formulated a long list of rules for digital conduct, shared with participants as soon as they joined the group. Very direct throughout, the twelve-point text mimicked the language of depersonalized official

documents, avoiding a tone suggesting neighbourly camaraderie, and making ample use of full caps (perhaps the most efficient form of modulating affect through digital communication, after emojis). For instance, expressing Alberto's frustration with the circulation of photos that were informed by "neurosis" and racial prejudice, the second rule of the list stated that "messages that are offensive and/or contain: discrimination in all its forms (origin, religion, colour, ethnicity, etc.), pornography, sexism (misogyny/misandry), jokes, chains (hoax, scam, phishing and spam), political activism or propaganda, ARE EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED". The everyday practices of WhatsApp policing in Jardim did not *always* adhere to these assertively stated regulations, however. Predictably, the day-to-day use of the groups gave rise to myriad tensions, focused on the digital forms that participants gave their security concerns, and the norms that this aesthetics enacted. I unpack these tensions in the next section, where I discuss the Jardim and União WhatsApp groups in relation to each other.

Mediated security encounters in União and Jardim

When União's group was still active, the affordances I signalled earlier – namely, *visibility*, *instantaneity*, and *intimacy* – were common to the WhatsApp policing practices of both neighbourhoods. In the exchange below, for instance, João, the União community leader and group administrator, forwarded a message to fellow participants, requesting police attention on a particular street. The battalion's centre for operations, which processes "occurrences" and communicates them to the policemen on duty, acknowledged receipt, while another officer chimed in, asking for more information.

João
[Forwarded message]
Hey João
This video shows a burglar trying to rob my mom's house
It's on X Street
Many people have been robbed here
Without mentioning the noise disturbance

Figure 18. A screenshot of one of Jardim's groups, sharing images of policing achievements with the group: two people arrested, a gun and stolen bike apprehended.

Which is also a crime
It's chaos at night
If we complain we get threatened
Police needs to investigate this street

João

I received it this morning. Please, Officers [Comandantes], we are counting on

you. Thanks.

Battalion Operations Centre
POSITIVE, THE BATALLION'S COMMANDER WILL BE INFORMED OF THE SITUATION

Policeman
Do you think we can get more information on this element?

João
X Street, number 257

Policeman
Ok

The straightforward exchange above is representative of much of what I witnessed in such groups over the years. In Jardim, where the main groups did not include policemen as direct participants, the civilian administrators would be the ones to promptly respond to a resident's claim, informing them that it had been forwarded to the military police, or requesting additional information. Both civilian and military admins tended to respond to reports of suspicious activity or criminal offenses instantaneously. These responses did not necessarily result in the immediate assignment of police to a given "crime scene", of course. In fact, those who used the groups to request the police's *instant* response were still asked to call 190 – the traditional police hotline – to generate a protocol number that could legitimate the physical presence of officers.

Jardim resident
My wife's truck has just been stolen, license plate XXX-0000. They went down [street name], leaving the new [school] building.

Admin
Police has been informed.
We ask that you generate the protocol via 190, and file a report on the incident.

Jardim resident
My protocol number is M0000000
I'm going to pick her up now so we can report it.

Admin
Ok, thanks.

As the brief dialogue demonstrates, the usage of WhatsApp groups for real-time communication with police did not *replace* traditional means of "calling the police". What it did enable, though, was a *sense* of police ubiquity: instantaneous access to police fed the perception that they were always close by, and alert, even when police encounters were brokered by admins. This enhanced sense of closeness also resonated affectively. Bruna, who had lived in Jardim for over two decades and had been a member of one of its policing groups from the beginning, identified two affective shifts that took place after she joined the WhatsApp security group. At first, having her daily life punctuated by multimedia files and text messages on criminal incidents and suspicious activities – all happening close to where she lived – terrified her. "The group gave me the real dimension of violence", she explained. This fearful response resonated with stories I had heard about shops in the neighbourhood starting to close early, after their owners became group participants. For Bruna, this increased sense of fear was followed by a growing sense of safety, once she realized that police response was a quick message away: "if I knew, or suspected, of anything, they'd pass it on to the police right away". In addition to affording her access to the group, Bruna's smartphone also provided her with real-time access to the CCTV cameras she had installed around her home: "I'm not sure it helps, but it calms me down."

Military police officers did more than just react to the residents they were in touch with via WhatsApp; they also became active producers of digital content aimed at perceptibly performing "good policing". The battalion responsible for both Jardim and União even developed a WhatsApp template that made ample use of emojis for efficiently sharing information on specific *ocorrências*.

PMPE - DIM - 19°BPM
⏩ OCORRÊNCIA:
• *M* 0000000

▶️ Type of occurrence: firearm apprehension

🗓️ DATE/TIME:
• XX/XX/2017, at 20:30

⚠️ WHERE IT HAPPENED:
• [Street name], União

👹 Charged: Escaped

🪄 FACT DESCRIPTION: We received reports that elements were armed in the community of União preparing to commit a homicide, we drove to the scene and when we got there, the individuals escaped upon seeing us, we scanned the scene and found a 32-calibre revolver with three intact ammunitions, we then delivered the weapon to the police station where it was apprehended.

😔 Victim: Society

☠️ APPREHENDED MATERIAL:
1 32-calibre revolver number XXXX
3 intact 32-calibre ammunitions

🎯 RESULT: Apprehended weapon

🚔 Team
[Number of police car]
Sgt [Name]
Private [Name]
Private [Name]

Victory in the Pact 19• BPM Always Moving Forward

The template became a popular form for presenting police work legibly to WhatsApp group participants. Though emoji choice varied, seemingly according to the sender's taste, the format remained generally the same. The example included above was forwarded by Officer Ramos himself to the União group, along with images of the apprehended weapon and bullets, meeting immediate pictographic praise.

União Resident 1
👊🏻👊🏻

União Resident 2
👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻

União Resident 3
👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻

União Resident 4
👆🏻👆🏻👆🏻👆🏻👏🏻👏🏻👆🏻👆🏻👆🏻🙏🏻

União Resident 5
Well done 👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻

In a form more intimate and spontaneous than that of the emoji-filled template, officers sometimes shared selfies while on duty in União, as well as pictures of the operations they carried out – while they were taking place (see Figure 19). In Jardim, where police officers mostly communicated with group admins, media flowed less spontaneously from police to ordinary residents. This did not mean that images of "good" police work did not reach them, though: admins often shared visuals of arrests, apprehensions and so on. When I was first added to the Jardim groups, images of arrested persons were circulated widely in the hope that other potential victims would come forward and strengthen the state's case against the detainee. Though this practice was later prohibited, the police continued to send textual descriptions of their achievements in Jardim, which were often met with praise, or expressions of relief.

Figure 19. Image of police stop-and-frisk (abordagem) in União, shared with the group by a police officer.

As the groups afforded more intimate encounters with the police, they also encouraged increased familiarity with the language and aesthetics of police work. Police jargon for those considered suspects and for arrest procedures seemed to circulate seamlessly between policing professionals and civilians. Following the exchanges within the WhatsApp groups and the group guidelines, participants were disciplined on what to share and how: they were sensitized regarding what street-level police work consisted of, and taught

– both implicitly and explicitly – to translate their knowledge of particular situations into textual and visual content that policemen could act upon.

Teresa Caldeira (2000, p. 20) uses the concept of the "talk of crime" to refer to constantly circulating narratives on crime, which she reads as attempts to "re-establish order and meaning" amid escalating violence, to provide a verbal, symbolic grammar through which to reorganize a universe that seems to have lost coherence. The exchanges within Recife's WhatsApp policing groups, however, were more than narrative attempts to make sense of seemingly senseless danger. Translating one's direct encounters with crime and suspicious activities into sharable multimedia content became an encouraged *practice*: an active performance of "good citizenship" that also entailed recognizing and praising what was being aesthetically enacted as "good authority". In addition to the fearfulness that the groups may have enhanced at first, this relational performance also engendered an affective sense of safety and protection. Here, drawing on my own WhatsApp compulsion, I also suggest that there is a libidinal, voyeuristic pleasure to witnessing, and taking part in, these surveillant exchanges (see also Bruno, 2008; Cardoso, 2015).

Notwithstanding these feelings of safety, protection and even desire, the new forms of visibility that WhatsApp policing groups afforded also generated tensions. These tensions arose from normative disagreements and mismatched desires regarding the roles of citizens and police, and were productive of ambivalent affects. They were, of course, not only shaped by what took place "in" the groups, but by broader and long-standing social and spatial relations and inequalities. In the following section, I concentrate on the more "tense" dimensions of WhatsApp policing, aided by the notions of lateral and vertical surveillance.

Looking down, sideways and up

Surveillance works in multiple directions: sideways in what is called "lateral surveillance", down within hierarchical relations in "vertical surveillance",

and back up in "sousveillance" (see Mann and Ferenbok, 2013; Ivasiuc, 2018; Jeursen, 2019). WhatsApp security groups in Recife afford surveillance in all these directions, but not everywhere, or to everyone. Concentrating on how these relational affordances shift according to participants' positionality within the city's highly segregated landscape is a way to understand the chokepoints that hinder the circulation of the policing and citizenship norms I have discussed so far, and the inequalities that the groups (re) produce.

The extensive set of rules imposed on participants of the Jardim groups is telling for how behaviour was policed amongst peers. Since they retained the capacity of adding and removing participants, admins had most authority within the groups, and they reacted rapidly to content that was not aligned with the groups' explicit goals:

Admin 1

This message is at odds with the group's objectives, please delete for everyone

Phatic greetings – such as "Good morning, group" ("*Bom dia, grupo*") messages, so common amongst Brazilian WhatsApp-ers – were prohibited for their lack of security relevance, as was any other conversation, image, or video that did not perform some sort of citizen surveillance or crime reporting. Positive reactions to security-relevant content were allowed, but only within the twenty minutes following its circulation. In the União group, even though there was not such a clear set of rules, admins also sought to curtail conversations that had no immediate relevance to neighbourhood security. João, for instance, did so through a recurring message: "Just to remind you: This group was created with the goal of dealing with issues connected to SECURITY, especially in União. Thank you. Fiquem com DEUS [Stay with GOD]." In both Jardim and União, reprimanded participants would sometimes protest a particular instance of digital rule enforcement, which could ultimately result in their expulsion from the good WhatsApp-ing community. Such cases were rare, though: much more often than not, participants would apologize, or quietly perform acquiescence.

As WhatsApp developed into a medium that encouraged the viralisation of fake content, Jardim admins – especially Alberto himself – became agile fact-checkers, cracking down on messages claiming to report violence that had allegedly just taken place nearby, but that actually depicted incidents that had occurred years before, or in other neighbourhoods, municipalities, or states (see Figure 20). To be considered valid, the media shared needed to relate to a pressing security issue *and* be of clear relevance to the area. This latter criterion showed how the formation of these digital communities was also very much anchored in performances of territory, repeatedly demarcating their boundaries. In disciplining their fellow residents, Jardim admins also sought to attune them to what counted as a security issue, which sometimes meant countering multimedia content considered discriminatory along the lines of race and class. As Alberto related, the Jardim groups had initially been flooded with images of Black young men marked as suspicious – a trend that he deemed both bigoted and useless, from an urban policing perspective. Admin messages and announcements tried to correct this by noting that homelessness was not a crime, and that it was not the police's job to "sweep" people from the streets of Jardim, if they were not breaking any laws. Much like race itself could be, racism was also, at times, an absent presence (M'Charek et al., 2014) in WhatsApp security groups – a practice that admins might censor without naming.

Figure 20. "Fact-checking" image aimed at showing that a photo of two "wanted" motorcycle robbers, which had circulated previously across Jardim groups, depicted criminals from Manaus, and not Recife.

By disciplining their fellow WhatsApp-ers, individual admins tried to counter the racialized and classed aesthetic normativity that rendered Black delivery boys as security threats to Jardim. However, this did not prevent the general "verticality" of the groups' surveillance practices, which were mostly focused on the petty crime – or "criminal micropredation" (Lancaster, 2012, p. 533) – committed by marginalized subjects within that context. This

surveillant focus was produced by, and productive of, a certain distribution of the sensible that transcended admin's individual desires to prevent the reproduction of discriminatory messages and images. This comes out subtly in the exchange below, which took place in one of Jardim's groups, a few years ago.

Resident 1

3 shots fired and people shouting "thief" around the boutique on Y Street.
Hard to know what happened. Just heard 3 shots and a motorcycle

Resident 2

I heard it here too, on Z Street.

Admin 1

Police car informed.

Resident 3

I heard it here on V Street.

Resident 3

Resident 3

The incident [*ocorrência*] was by the corner of V and Z. Between the pharmacy and the bakery.
Two people on bicycles, possibly policemen, waiting for police car support.
Apparently, one fled towards the bakery.

Resident 1
Yes, victim

Resident 4
Ok.
The one who fled seemed to have been holding a helmet...So I believe it was the partner.

Resident 5
I heard it too from V.

[A few hours go by]

Admin 2
Element arrested today for theft in Jardim. The other partners managed to flee on other motorcycles. The victim reported it, which made the police's work possible. Fingers crossed he won't be set free after the custody hearing.

The administrators' messages reporting the occurrence's resolution were accompanied by a photo of the arrested perpetrator, taken at the police station, and shared with the admins by the officers involved. Pleased with the outcome, a number of residents responded with congratulatory emojis:

Resident 6
👏👏👏👏

Resident 7
👏👏👏

Admin 2
Preventive [prison sentence] decreed in custody hearing.

Resident 8
👏👏👏👏👏👏

Resident 9

👏👏👏👏

Resident 10

How wonderful
This is how you do it
Congratulations
To the group
👏👏👏👏

The textual content underlines my previous point on civilian adoption of police jargon, with its use of terms such as "element", "custody hearing", and "preventive" as shorthand for preventive sentence. Meanwhile, the visual register of the incident – captured in the midst of real-time citizen sensing and reporting – indexes the affective verticality that characterizes WhatsApp surveillance practices in elite areas such as Jardim. Here, the WhatsApp surveillers discussed shots heard at a distance, and shared pictures of the scene taken from the bird's-eye view afforded by their high-rise flats. Following the arrest, the mugshot circulated – a practice still allowed at the time – did not depict a peer, but an "element" rendered as "other" to the middle- and upper-class backdrop where whiteness, as part of the aesthetic default, was left implicit (see Lentin, 2019). This *aesthetics of vertical surveillance* is apparent across the many individual images that made up the chat's digital archive. Like the images taken from up high, the many pictures of CCTV footage that this archive contained (see Figure 21) also gave sensible form to the physical and symbolic distancing between *a priori* citizens and other-than-citizens. In the many photographs of people, "good" citizens were concealed behind the lenses, while "*bandidos*" were captured visually and visibly – a relation that was also clear in the compilation of digital images that Robson had walked me through.



Figure 21. Image shared by a participant in one of Jardim's WhatsApp groups: a photo of CCTV footage depicting a man who, according to the sender, had been lurking around their condominium. Images of footage captured by surveillance cameras are frequently shared amongst Jardim residents.

In Jardim, then, these WhatsApp groups afforded vertical surveillance that literally took place "from above". In contrast, in União, the Whatsapp policing groups encouraged *lateral* surveillance. This came out clearly in an episode, illustrated below, that started with a policeman's request for information. Yet such requests can also give rise to transgressive forms of

sousveillance, or surveillance "from below", as became clear in the series of exchanges that led to the group being stripped of its policing functions (see Chapter One).

Policeman

Please provide information on the whereabouts of this individual through a private message!! He killed H., in [sub-section of União]

A photograph of the suspect was smiling at the camera, apparently taken from a personal social media account, accompanied the officer's urgent request for his location.

Policeman

It was around half an hour ago
Help us to remove this weed from União
I guarantee that I won't reveal anyone's identity!

Resident 1

Denouncing is our best weapon!!!!

Resident 2

I was at the corner of [street name]
This guy walked by saying he was going to kill a dude
But sometimes we don't believe them, right?
It was probably him

Resident 3

Good night, all!
I ask you that the comment above does not leave here, the girl sent it by mistake. It was supposed to be in a private message and so she's nervous. Tks.

Resident 4

A story was going around saying he was killed by mistake
They thought he was somebody else
This will be a shit show

These 3 last messages I received from another group. Was it by mistake?

Resident 5
Shootout on [street name]
Now

Policeman
Please send it to me in private

Resident 6
They killed a good citizen
[Photos of H, dead and alive]
☝☝☝

The pointing emojis called attention to the two photographs that accompanied the resident's message: one of H.'s fallen dead body, and another of him alive and well, smiling at the camera with his arm around a person who had been cropped out of the picture.

Resident 7
That's true [in reference to the "good citizen" message]

Resident 8
Yesterday evening my sister-in-law's car was stolen by [street name] and the thief is the one who's suspected of killing H.

João
Dear Commanders, without a doubt, an urgent intelligence operation is needed. We can't tolerate this kind of violence in our Community. We want answers in concrete actions.
...

Resident 9
Guys H.'s mom had a heart attack after hearing about his death and died too 😪
😔😭

Sadly, it's what people are saying, I don't know if it's true, I took it from another group.

Resident 10

The GATI [Group of Tactical Actions] just dragged [suspected killer] out of here. In a chase

Resident 11

It's very unfortunate

The exchange above was initiated by a request for information by a PM officer that included an image of the assumed culprit – a smiling one, most likely taken from a social media account. In response, participants posted images of the victim, H.: not only of his dead body, but also another friendly-looking, smiling portrait, followed by a caption that framed him as a *cidadão de bem* ("good citizen"). This explicit captioning was an implicit repudiation of the widely held belief that "good" people did not die of homicide – a view that Officer Ramos reproduced on the day that I joined União residents into the police station. As H.'s peers and neighbours, the group's participants were in a position to vouch for his character, and to be privy of hearsay on the devastating impact of his death on his close relatives.

The policeman who initiated the exchange had hoped the residents would also be close enough to H.'s suspected killer to be able to help with an ongoing search. The multimedia content that residents shared in response to the officer's request was quite intimate, productive of a *lateral surveillance aesthetics* that contrasted with the Jardim group's images taken from far above, or captured by CCTV systems. The União group's lateral and intimate modes of seeing and sharing provoked an affective sense of apprehension, which, at some point, even encouraged admins to change the name of the group from "Security União" to "União Group", making their policing objectives even less visible to outsiders who might happen to glance at a participant's phone. Peppered throughout the chat were reminders that they were a "closed" group of "good" people – acknowledgements of the fact that they were WhatsApp-ing from a place that was frequently enacted as a

"bad" one, when security was concerned.

The direct contact with police officers that the group afforded União residents also enabled a type of sousveillance from residents towards police officers, looking back at power "from below". This was somewhat subtly apparent in everyday exchanges, in which residents would unapologetically send texts denouncing police errors and absences. When a security incident was left "unread", residents would be quick to point it out:

João

Officers, we need a response!
Where are the police?
Officers, we need a response!
Where are the police?
We are doing our part.

The *sousveillant aesthetics* of the video that depicted what group participants perceived as excessive use of force by police, which I detailed at the start of this thesis, sensibly disrupted the original distribution of "parts", as they were originally shared and divided amongst state police and civilians in relation to security in União. This disruption, as discussed previously, also interrupted the digital connection between residents and police that the group had afforded for years, albeit tensely and ambivalently. While Jardim's groups still gather roughly 500 "good citizens", União's was abruptly unsettled, and then gradually emptied, becoming an uneventful reservoir of motivational and holiday-themed JPEGs.

Conclusion: Unequal shares

This chapter started with "analogue" demonstrations through which community leaders of União sought to make their security claims seen and heard, going on to describe how they eventually led to the creation of a digital connection between "good citizens" and state police for neighbourhood-level surveillance. In a moment in which "traditional" forms of

political brokerage and representation – embodied by community leaders and municipal councilmen – were failing to *move* residents into action, WhatsApp policing groups and the "direct", "real-time", "all the time" citizen-police connection they afforded gained appeal. Similar to the security partnerships discussed in Chapter Three, these norms-forms-affects clusters staged an order in which citizens and policemen appeared alongside each other, on the same side of a security battle that gained aesthetic form in multimedia files, captured and shared by smartphones.

The practices of seeing, capturing, and sharing that the WhatsApp policing groups afforded worked to solidify classed and racialized divisions between "citizen" and "*bandido*". Like Robson's digital image gallery, the continuous production and circulation of digital content depicting those categorized as "other-than-citizens" (Colona, 2019, p. 141) work to engender a shared *sense* within these WhatsApp groups of what the (potential) criminal looks like. Such digital-visual practices, I suggest, contribute to the normalization of classed, racialized, gendered and spatial forms of differentiation. These citizen-policing partnerships do more than solidify multimedia imaginaries of "the suspect", however: they also provided a channel for enactments of *good citizenship*.

In the everyday uses of WhatsApp policing groups in both Jardim and União, security providers and recipients were encouraged to sensibly perform and negotiate notions of "good" citizenship and "good" authority in a range of ways. By affording visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy to participant-police relations, WhatsApp policing groups enabled citizens to share, in real-time, their security-related practices of seeing and showing. More than merely narrative attempts to make sense of seemingly senseless danger, translating encounters with crime and suspicious activities into sharable content became a rewarded *practice*. In this context, performing "good" citizenship also entailed demonstrating a visible willingness to partner with the local PM battalion through voluntary vigilant labour. The same channels through which citizens became visible to peers and the police also allowed the police themselves to perform ubiquitous and instantaneous presence, responding to a demand discussed briefly in Chapter Three and

unpacked further in Chapter Five.

Drawing on the cases of União and Jardim, I showed how these groups afforded the sensible circulation of citizenship and policing norms across territories that were usually performed as fundamentally "different" when (in) security was concerned. Although the same normativity of active citizenship animated the creation and the everyday use of neighbourhood WhatsApp groups in both Jardim and União, the stakes, risks, and effects differed depending on the sociospatial context. Although WhatsApp afforded visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy for citizen-police encounters in both localities, the surveillant aesthetics and affects that emerged within these broad frames for security (inter)action were relational matters, predicated on users' positioning in Recife's unequal urban landscape. As I have shown, in the middle- and upper-class condoscape, these neighbourhood-based policing groups enabled a form of top-down, vertical surveillance, which took aesthetic form in digital exchanges that objectified those recognized as "outsiders" and often associated with neighbouring favelas. At the same time, in the low-income community of União, the WhatsApp groups demanded a kind of lateral surveillance, which required group members to turn their watchfulness towards their neighbours – a potentially risky practice.

As discussed in Chapter One, once the group's vigilance turned to the police – in other words, once they captured and shared *sousveillant* imagery (cf. Mann and Ferenbok, 2013) – police officers left, emptying the group of its purpose. In sharing a video of excessive use of force by local police and demanding explanations, participants of the União group saw – and showed – themselves as entitled to fair, transparent, and accountable state policing, disrupting the post-political consensus that formed the basis of the group. The role of street-level policing in the everyday maintenance of this aesthetic consensus is the focus of the next chapter, which also considers how security affects uphold and unsettle the *police order*, providing us with glimpses of politics.

Chapter Five

Boundary Citizens

"For many people, being stationed here is like some sort of punishment", Private Ruth told me, during one of my first visits to the military police trailer aimed at enhancing the police presence in Vista Nova (Figure 22). The post's most "punishing" qualities were the heat and the stillness. Jokingly referred to as a sauna by Ruth and her shift partner, Private Camargo, the metallic box heated up in the sun, and didn't afford much movement. She described their duties: "Well, we get in and our task is to look after this spot, and the materials [radio, ammunition, vests] that we keep here. There's also a police car that gives us support. Sometimes a civilian comes by, asking for assistance". Ruth also mentioned the visualization of its surroundings as one of the trailer's tasks, which was linked to its location: "This place used to be very complicated due to muggings, drug-trafficking, and prostitution. When we were on the *viatura* [police car] we were always sent here".

Figure 22. Fixed policing post in Vista Nova.

The trailer had been positioned strategically close to a shopping mall, residential high-rises, and *comunidades* seen as potential sources of danger.

Put in place after muggings began to affect mall-goers, the trailer had what Ruth called *ostensividade*. In policing language, *policiamento ostensivo* (or "ostensive policing", in a literal translation) encompasses street-level practices that are immediate and perceptible, consisting of "the uniformed and capillary presence of the military police that makes them a palpable everyday presence" (Muniz et al., 1999, p. 6, my translation). The officers stationed at the trailer were not only there as lookouts, but as presences to be seen and felt, either as crime-inhibitors, or safety-enhancers. At any given time, there were always two officers stationed there, but many others would come and go by car or motorcycle, stopping in for a quick break, a chat, or some water. There was a malfunctioning television that, in the afternoon, was usually tuned into news programmes heavy on sensationalist crime-reporting. On the little table, there were two analogue radios: one that connected the trailer to the area battalion, and another that linked it directly to the shopping mall's security command centre. The second radio didn't always work, much like "the sauna's" air-conditioning unit, which the officers stationed there told me had also been an in-kind donation by the neighbouring mall.

The military police officers who served in the neighbourhood were not the only armed actors that the shopping mall relied on. SEGMAX's *vigilantes*,[41] as private security guards are called, were everywhere in the enclave's external and internal parking zones. The commercial security services that were visible in Recife's mass private spaces were very diverse in terms of

41 The guns were for the *vigilantes* located at the shopping mall's external areas and accessways, but were required by law to stay within its property. Guards on motorcycles often left the mall's perimeter – sometimes serving as messengers or delivery people between the mall and PPO 1, for instance – but were unarmed when doing so. Although less strict than military rankings, there was a hierarchy amongst the SEGMAX employees who served at the mall: the simple *vigilantes* were the most numerous, but a few of them worked as leaders during their 12-hour shifts. The *vigilantes* and leaders answered to their supervisors: these were unarmed, and wore button-up shirts and ties, instead of the police-like uniform donned by the guards.

how "equipped" they appeared to be for violence work. Often, private security companies or commercial establishments would supply their guards with little more than a radio and a vest imprinted with their logo. This was not the case for most of the SEGMAX guards working at the mall: they wore boots and uniforms resembling those of Pernambuco's Military Police, a cap, and carried a radio and a firearm, strapped to their bulletproof vests. While most of them worked on their feet, there were also mobile patrols, who drove in circles within the mall's perimeter on brightly-coloured motorcycles or in conspicuous cars topped with flashing lights.

The many hours I spent at the trailer between 2015 and 2017 were mostly slow-moving and uneventful. The care of a friendly stray dog whom the trailer officers had adopted and named "Flagrante" (police jargon for catching a crime in the act) was also part of the routines that Ruth and Camargo described, on one of my first visits. "We care for his hygiene, his medicine, food, and everything else. Beneath this uniform there is a sensitive human being, you see? And I don't hear anybody saying: *Wow, that's so nice, what the police are doing!*", Ruth told me, speaking with evident frustration. She felt that whenever she was called to an occurrence, there would be a civilian filming her with a smartphone: "It's like they're waiting for you to slip up!". Here, "slipping up" was a euphemism for excessive use of force by the police. Aware of ongoing debates on the violence of Brazilian military policing, Ruth sarcastically imagined the alternative to "firm" stop-and-frisk repertoires: "The guy is armed, the guy is aggressive towards you, yells at you. If you aren't firm, you'll be beat up on the street. I think that people want you to arrive and say: *Please, citizen, could you please, sir, would you be so kind as to put your hands on your head, citizen*?" While Ruth felt that police *baculejos* (slang for forceful stop-and-frisk procedures) were always subject to the watchful electronic gaze of "three or four smartphones", good deeds such as the care of Flagrante and "helping old ladies cross the street" were invisible to society at large. What got to Ruth and her shift partner, who nodded along in agreement and chimed in with his own complaints, was not the fear that these smartphone videos would be used as evidence against them in an eventual legal case. Feeling like the object of constant public scrutiny had a more immediate, affective repercussion for how they experienced

their working routines and related to *recifense* society.

Working at the crossroads between stigmatized working-class residential areas, middle-class condominiums, and a high-end shopping enclave, Ruth and Camargo also shared their experiences with policing across the divides they ostensibly demarcated. They spoke of their difficulty dealing with "the most economically favoured". "Sometimes they don't want to listen. They think they're better than you. They don't want to share information and they want us to act like their personal little guards, moving back and forth through the condominiums, the places where they are", Ruth vented. "The people with better living conditions look at you from way up there. As if you were nothing, as if you were a fly", she added, alluding to the same vertical aesthetics described in the previous two chapters. While explaining how she often felt when encountering Recife's upper classes, Ruth related her subjective experiences of discrimination to the visual identification of "suspect elements" discussed at length in the previous chapter: "You're discriminated from the moment you arrive. The same way that other people feel discriminated because of how society looks at them: Black people, who live in peripheral areas, who walk around wearing a chain, who walk around with a cap on. We are *also* discriminated against. They're the only ones who get any sympathy [*os coitados são só eles*], but we are also discriminated against".

The similarity that Ruth resentfully described between street cops in uniform and young Black men donning chains around their necks and caps on their heads did not come out of the blue. Earlier in our conversation, there had been some banter from their side, mocking the "suspect individual lurking" ("*indivíduo suspeito rondando*") trope, which they perceived as the "top" reason behind the calls that "economically favoured folks" made to the police. "When you get there, it's just because the guy is wearing a T-shirt, flip-flops, a cap, a chain. Most of the time the guy's got nothing on him [e.g., drugs, guns], it's just his clothing", they explained, echoing Jardim admin Alberto's complaints about his neighbours' "bad" surveillant practices, discussed in the previous chapter. The parallel between police officers and those profiled as suspects disregards important differences between the two groups, in terms of their respective power and authority within

"economically favoured" spaces. After all, as the previous chapter discussed and Ruth herself brought up, unwanted sightings of "suspect elements" in these areas were what often triggered requests for perceptible military police presence in the first place. Regardless of the analogy's fragility, *feeling* discriminated while on the job was fairly common amongst Recife's public and private street-level security providers. This feeling affected how they related to civilians, and to the military and commercial organizations in which they were embedded.

As Chapters Three and Four have shown in different ways, sensible policing *presence* was a key demand amongst Recife-dwellers mobilising for more (or better) state security provision. Within the urban areas where I did my research, the presence of military police officers – whether "fixed" at PPOs or on the move by car or motorcycle – were the forms of security most acutely felt or desired in public spaces. Meanwhile, *vigilantes* (security guards) quite literally stood for "security" in mass private properties, such as the mall described here. In this chapter, I approach both sets of actors as *street-level policing*, understood broadly as the kind of policing intended to be seen and felt. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the state and non-state policing forms that I describe here enact subjects deserving of protection in roughly similar ways, producing a seamless continuum between being a full *citizen* and an entitled *client*. Analogously, those prone to being stopped and frisked by police officers were also those read most frequently as potential threats within the mall's perimeters. As this chapter argues, the bordering processes that perform such distinctions between citizen/client and threat, whether in public or private urban spaces, require the *affective labour* of policing actors.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I connect debates on affective labour to the everyday bordering work that is involved as security workers sort through people and places. Next, I show how this labour is shared by street-level policing across public-private divides, attempting to make "citizens" and "clients" feel at ease and "criminals" feel frightened. The following section discusses how the affects elicited by everyday street-level security work go beyond these workers' deliberate engineering of civilian apprehension or comfort. Specifically, I engage street-level policing workers' as

boundary citizens, who experience feelings of tension and unease due to the sense of being precariously positioned at the very boundaries they are paid to enforce. In the final section, I analyse three types of boundaries within and between security organizations: the borders drawn between *military service* and *security as service work*, between military police and civilians, and between police "troops" and "commanders". I discuss how such borders fed into the moods and aesthetics that mobilised Pernambuco's military police privates and corporals for better working conditions between 2016 and 2017. Without losing sight of the classed and racialized borderings that were left untouched, I close by suggesting that this movement provided us with glimpses of politics in the Rancièrian sense, by shedding light on incongruities at the core of the police order – literally and figuratively.

Affective labour and street-level policing as bordering

In seeking to understand how street-level state policing sorts citizens in urban Brazil, various scholars have focused on *abordagens* (stop-and-frisks) as a prime site where uniformed street cops are implicated in the maintenance of inequality along lines of race, class, and gender (e.g. Anunciação et al., 2020; Barbosa and Sá, 2015; Fernandes, 1989; Ramos and Musumeci, 2008; Sá and Santiago Neto, 2011).[42] Such scholarship argues that race and class

42 For Heloisa Rodrigues Fernandes (1989), for instance, *abordagens* were part of the "choreographies of power" performed by military police in São Paulo, already in the 1970s. Once ordinary citizens from criminalized areas were caught up in one, they were tasked with proving they were not *bandidos* (criminals). A recent study of the north-eastern capitals of Salvador, Recife and Fortaleza emphasized that institutional racism largely informs the discretionary grounds for stop-and-frisk operations by the military police (Anunciação et al., 2020). Drawing on four different federative units – São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and the Federal District –, a recent mixed-methods study on ostensive policing and racial relations (Sinhoretto et al., 2020) reached similar conclusions. Racialized divides were most blatantly reflected in quantitative indicators referring to police lethality and to ▶

intersect with territorial belonging (being from *favelas* or other stigmatized areas) and appearance (clothing, hairstyle etc.) in the production of suspicious subjects in encounters with police (Anunciação et al., 2020); in the making of subjects as "*bandidos*" (Misse, 2010, p. 17). [43] Related literature also shows that police officers are often aware of the discriminatory and violent character of *abordagens* and other sites of racial filtering (*filtragem racial*), despite general patterns of institutional denialism and everyday languages and rationales explicitly deployed to conceal the racialized dimensions of such practices (Barros, 2008; Sinhoretto et al., 2020).

Such street routines are shaped by the so-called "policeman nose" ("*faro policial*"): street cops' *faro* (or sense of smell) consists of an embodied sensitivity for identifying the right – as in *legitimate* – targets for their coercive practices (Albernaz, 2015). Predictably, this so-called sense of smell tends to be anchored by "suspicion informed by racialized bodily stigma" (Sinhoretto et al. 2020, p. 9), even if not explicitly described as such. As Elizabete Albernaz (2015, p. 98) argues, in addition to being central to the maintenance of social hierarchies, this sensorial sensitivity is key to the "moral and physical survival" of police officers themselves within them. After all, street cops do not only negotiate such hierarchies in relation to stigmatized people and places. The majority working-class subjects that compose the lowest ranks of the PM must also navigate *carteiradas*: belittling encounters with individuals who resist, challenge, or attempt to co-opt police authority based on their

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► arrests in which perpetrators were caught "red-handed" (*prisões em flagrante*). Qualitative data from the same study, however, also revealed the less quantifiable ways in which racial filtering (*filtragem racial*) permeated the institutional logics of military police, such as the systematic constraint of Black citizens' mobility, and the relational impunity of white individuals who break the law (ibid.).

43 Focusing on Rio de Janeiro, Michel Misse (2010) has grappled with the category of *bandido* as "the criminal subject that is produced by police interpellation, public morality and penal laws" (Misse, 2010, p. 17). As Misse explains through his notion of "criminal subjection", a *bandido* is not simply a subject who breaks the law, but a specific "social type", who also embodies specific markers of poverty, race, and lifestyle.

personal connections, for example, to high-ranking military police officers or to figures within the judicial system (Muniz and França, 2010).

Street-level policing foregrounds processes of subjection and subjectification (Fassin, 2013), which are implicated in the making and maintenance of difference between people and places. Stop-and-frisk operations and other everyday street-level security encounters – when police are dispatched to a specific occurrence, or when officers on patrol perform checks on civilians based on their *faros* – are among the repertoires through which police power is implicated in making order in the city. However, the (potential) use of force that grounds police power – an idea that Micol Seigel (2018) has mobilized in her framing of police work as "violence work"[44] – means that policing *effects* may be obtained, "with *no* use of police resources *at all*" (Proença Júnior and Muniz, 2006, p. 244). In other words, even in the absence of concrete *abordagens*, *baculejos*, or lethal use of force, entrenched fear of such established police practices works to, for instance, constrain the mobility of negatively racialized urban residents (Sinhoretto et al., 2020). Here, I suggest that there is an ambivalent affective dimension to this urban ordering and bordering. This is a dimension that I analyse as the affective labour of security, performed by state and non-state street-level policing practices alike, albeit under different circumstances and for varying purposes.

Affective labour is "the labour involved in manufacturing, distributing and circulating affects that produce relationships between social actors and the environments they inhabit" (Thomas and Correa, 2016, p. 123-124). This type of labour "is immaterial, even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible: a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction,

44 Seigel's approach to violence work draws on and expands on Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo (2002). The author's use of "violence work" seeks to call into question the "stateness" of policing, since it encapsulates "the full panoply of people whose work rests on a promise of violence, thereby displacing some of the weight of the assumption that policing is only or even primarily a state project or that the state is a watertight container or boundary for 'the police'" (Seigel, 2018, p. 12). This definition of "violence work" is what informs how the term is deployed in the present chapter.

excitement, passion – even a sense of connectedness or community" (Hardt, 1999, p. 96).[45] In spite of the notion's more evident connections to care work (e.g., Kikon and Karlsson, 2019), affective labour can involve the production of both "positive" and "negative" affects. James T. Thomas and Jennifer Correa (2016) understand affective labour from *above* – the positive and negative affects engendered by how "the state" enters the everyday lives of citizens – not as unintended side-effects but as integral to state governance, and to the formation of resisting subjects engaged in affective labour *from below*.

As this chapter shows, the affective labour of street-level policing involves generating such positive and negative affects: attuning some subjects to a sense of fear and apprehension, while producing feelings of safety and well-being for others. However, Thomas and Correa's distinction between *from above* and *from below* becomes less clear when we focus on police officers who inhabit the lower end of social hierarchies themselves, and even more so when we consider commercial security guards positioned at the intersection of violence work and service work. The affective labour of these state and non-state security workers involves attempts to generate differentiated affective responses in ways that do not threaten social hierarchies. According to Nandini Gooptu (2013, p. 35), for instance, "the affective expression of servility and its corporeal embodiment, as well as the management

45 Interested in unpacking how labour was being reconfigured through the "postmodernization" of global capitalism, Michael Hardt proposed affective labour as a facet of what he termed as "immaterial labour" (see Lazzarato, 1996), the kind whose fruits are largely intangible. Within this context, the "affective labour of human contact and interaction" (Hardt, 1999, p. 95) emerges as central across industries and social realms – think of the service economy, for example, or the interactions upon which healthcare is based. In addition to being part of debates on the immaterial commodities of post-industrial societies, the concept owes much to feminist scholarship on the corporeal forms of labour that were traditionally performed by women, within and outside the home – as Hardt (1999, 2007) himself notes.

of one's own emotions"[46] have become intrinsic to the routines of security guards in Kolkata, whom she understands as service workers. A similar dynamic emerges in what Erika Robb Larkins (2017, p. 61) has called "security as hospitality", which encapsulates the non-threatening and "professional" image that dark-skinned, working-class security guards need to project when on duty in elite spaces of Rio de Janeiro. Due to Brazilian society's ease to equate dark-skinned, working-class men with violence and crime, this constant bodily management – a key part of their security schooling – becomes a requirement for private security guards. Within this highly unequal context along the lines of race and class, Robb Larkins (2017, p. 69, my emphasis) suggests that "one can read 'security as hospitality' as *a mode of subject formation*" – a connection to citizenship that cuts across the different forms of affective labour I discuss here.

In highly unequal contexts – such as Indian and Brazilian cities – service workers are often required to perform with and against the roles that are normatively ascribed to them. As Robb Larkins (2017) discusses, young men of colour from working-class areas need to appear docile to the predominantly white elites that hire them, countering the stigma that frames them as potentially threatening – and which, paradoxically, renders them suited for security work in the first place. An analogous tension emerges around domestic work: in Brazil, as elsewhere, the racialized, classed and gendered tropes that render maids "dirty" also mark them as an infinite source of labour, "suitable" for cleaning work (Pinho, 2015). Drawing on Mary Douglas (2006 [1966]), Patrícia Pinho (2015, p. 119) links this position to the trespassing of a normative boundary: "Because [the domestic worker] works to eliminate dirt, her body is constantly crossing the border between 'purity and danger'". This positioning entails a constrained form of spatial mobility: the "good", or "ideal" maid must have a constant awareness of "her place", one that is also materially and spatially defined in the homes of their employers (Pinho, 2015, p. 108). Similarly, the "good" low-end security provider

46 This point resonates with the influential work of Arlie Hochschild (1983 [2012]) on emotional labour, which aims to capture the management of feelings by wage-workers in post-Fordist economies.

and street-level violence worker are expected to "know their places" as they move through the spaces they are tasked with securing. What makes their positioning distinct from other low-status positions is the fact that knowing – and *enforcing* – everyone else's "place" is also a requirement.[47]

Policing actors on the ground do more than embody the symbolic borders between safety and danger. They are deployed *at* the borders, as their job is to maintain them – sometimes violently, always affectively. Though the tension inherent in this role is particularly salient in the case of private security guards (see Diphoorn, 2016), the low-ranking state officers tasked with ostensive policing also experience it acutely, in on-duty encounters with the upper classes, or off-duty encounters with other security actors. Some of the Black police officers interviewed by Sinhoretto et al. (2020), for instance, reported feeling apprehensive over the possibility of being stopped by fellow officers when out of uniform, or driving in their private vehicles.

Drawing on the outlined debates, this chapter builds on and extends contemporary scholarship on urban policing and/as socio-spatial bordering: those "spatial and relational practices that occur through processes of translation and negotiation" (Christensen and Albrecht, 2020, p. 386; Kyed and Albrecht, 2015). Such research has highlighted how policing is part of local dynamics of bordering *and* bounding. Working in Nairobi, for instance, Naomi van Stapele (2020) complicates dominant narratives that homogenize low-income urban settlements by calling attention to the multiple "insides" and "outsides" drawn *within* the neighbourhood, and how these enable and contest police killings of young Black men. Drawing on the

47 My analysis, like that of the works cited here, does not suppose that domestic or violence workers are unaware of these tensions and paradoxes while performing their everyday duties. Domestic workers in Brazil and beyond engage in a range of resistant practices and tactics against the place socially assigned to them on the basis of their race, class, and gender (Pinho, 2015). Similarly, violence workers have drawn on the affective experiences of these tensions to mobilise politically for better working conditions. The (threat of) violence that characterizes their work, however, complicates the political effects and affects of their collective bargaining, especially in the case of military privates and corporals.

same urban context, Tessa Diphoorn (2020) has shed light on the forms of bordering that occur amongst state security actors themselves, focusing, for instance, on the moral bordering between self-appointed "pure apples" and their allegedly corrupt colleagues. Relatedly, Micol Seigel (2018, p. 13) has called attention to the borders that demarcate what police is and does; or, more precisely, what police *should* be and do. As Seigel (ibid.) notes, while police/violence work is constantly blurring the borders between public and private, military and civilian, and between the "local" and other scales, these divisions remain important to how police are imagined and, hence, legitimized.

While such work has tended to emphasize the *discursive* dimension of such processes, policing and/as bordering may also enrol materials, infrastructures, and – importantly for this chapter – affects and atmospheres. For instance, interested in how assemblages of security rely on and reproduce borders in the city of Nairobi, Francesco Colona (2020) has argued that the state-like sorting between protection-worthy and dangerous subjects enrols police patrols, private security companies, as well as objects and infrastructures. Adding to the policing-as-bordering debate through related sensitivities, this chapter suggests that the bordering work of violence workers – within and outside of the state and non-state organisations in which they are embedded – is not only predicated on discourses and imaginaries of policing, but also on the affects and atmospheres they (aim to) engender.

Policing presence, across public and private divides

To analyse the aesthetic and affective dimension of policing presence, I focus on the narratives and experiences of two sets of street-level security providers who work in close proximity to each other in Recife's South Zone: the first consist of low-ranking military police officers, including a retired policeman with an enduring role in União's security constellation; the second are armed security guards employed by a private security company that I

call SEGMAX here. The state police mainly included privates (*soldados*) and corporals (*cabos*) – the two lowest ranks in Brazil's military police hierarchy – deployed at "ostensive policing posts" (PPO, in the Portuguese acronym) or as part of Neighbourhood Patrols (*Patrulhas do Bairro*). PPOs are fixed, small single-storey buildings, booths, or trailers, while Patrulhas do Bairro[48] are vehicle-based and mobile forms of policing, albeit constrained to the areas they are assigned to. On the SEGMAX side, I draw on my fieldwork with armed security guards (*vigilantes*) during their shifts at the commercial enclave – which contained a shopping mall and high-end office towers – near the PPO where Private Ruth, introduced at the start of this chapter, was stationed.

While a vocal part of the population saw PPOs as an important security intervention, military police planning assessed their utility quite differently. In 2015, the PM colonel in charge of CIODS remarked how interesting he found residents' perceptions of this form of police presence: several PPOs had been deactivated due to "lack of efficiency", but their removal displeased those who lived in close proximity to one.[49] In August 2020, a Jardim resident used his area's WhatsApp policing group to express his desire for a PM trailer nearby. The causal linkage he drew between the inauguration of a new PPO and increased safety in the area was swiftly reasoned away by the group's administrators, who contended that the "troop costs" of the fixed posts were too high. In other words, the number of officers necessary to staff a trailer was not worth it; they were more valuable on motorised vehicles, free to drive wherever needed.

48 This preventive and ostensive form of policing was inaugurated under the Pact for Life (*Pacto Pela Vida*), and aimed at bringing the military police closer to local communities and their localities (PMPE, n.d.).

49 Local news coverage of state police corroborated this impression: in late 2014, after a few PPOs were removed from the city centre, *Diário de Pernambuco*'s Wagner Oliveira stated that PPOs were vanishing from the streets of Recife, raising concern amongst local residents and commerce (Oliveira, 2014).

Despite this "lack of efficiency", fixed posts usually staffed with a pair of low-ranking police officers on 12- or 24-hour shifts still dotted Recife, mostly as ad hoc responses to specific location-based demands and programmes, or as material "leftovers" of past security policies. PPOs 1 and 2, as I refer to the ones I discuss here, are examples of both instances. As many fixed posts closed throughout the city, PPO 1, the "sauna-like" trailer, was established as a response to highly publicized muggings that targeted mall patrons. The mall, whose security was coordinated by two retired colonels (one from the military police, the other from the state fire department) contributed material resources for the trailer itself and its staff. For instance, an additional analogue radio system was provided, connecting the PPO directly to the mall's security command centre, and SEGMAX guards handed out meal tickets to the officers stationed at the trailer. This form of "in-kind" donation was a common strategy aimed at building rapport between street-level police, private security companies and commercial establishments. These close connections between state and commercial policing were not only visible at "the bottom", facilitated by meals and meal tickets, gallons of mineral water, and so on,[50] but also at "the top", mostly when colonels retired into private security leadership positions, as exemplified by those who managed security at the mall.

The material infrastructure of PPO 2 resulted from a different trajectory and urban security rationale. It was not a small booth, a trailer, or a repurposed container, but a small, single-storey building with a front room where citizens could sit and wait, and an office-like space at the back. The architectural style of its rundown façade indicated the earlier era of urban security planning to which it belonged. The post was amongst the Community Security

50 Low-ranking police officers also commonly work as private guards informally, while off duty and out of uniform, a phenomenon this chapter will touch on. Here, though, I specifically refer to strategies put in place to enhance uniformed, "official", police presence around specific areas and commercial establishments.

Centres (*Núcleos de Segurança Comunitária*[51]) that were part of a community policing policy implemented in Pernambuco in 2001, with the aim of decentralizing the spatial headquarters of the PM, bringing them closer to urban communities (Aguiar, 2005).[52] By the time I entered the building, in mid-2015, the centre's community security roots were not very evident, although the space designed to welcome local residents afforded officers with a better meeting space than the trailer-like PPOs. In addition to the two officers stationed there on 24-hour shifts, those on "car duty" would often stop by for a break and a chat. Similar to PPO 1, a neighbouring commercial establishment stocked them with basic supplies, such as coffee and drinking water: "A very small price to pay for having the police in their pocket", an officer noted drily, during one of my early fieldwork visits.

Cynical remarks such as these were commonplace: they were perhaps the most common tone in both PPOs in discussions of urban security politics. While the street-level military police frequently criticised what they perceived as external interests – such as the mall's desire and capacity to keep the police close – they regarded other informal influencers as insiders. This was evident, for instance, in how they interacted with Jorge, a retired policeman from União whose bar functioned as an informal PPO. At a 2016

51 Officially, this would make PPO 2 an NSC, and not a textbook PPO. However, I use the PPO acronym because it is the term that police officers most commonly use; and it is the most descriptive, simply referring to a policing post that is ostensive and "fixed", without channelling policy rationales that no longer represent present-day policing approaches.

52 This kind of approach seems to come back cyclically, repackaged by state security authorities as a novel way of doing policing at the neighbourhood level. Recently, Pernambuco's iterations of Koban, a celebrated community policing model from Japan, illustrates this pattern. Inaugurated in the coastal neighbourhood of Boa Viagem in late-2018, it covers a perimeter of 4 square kilometres, under the slogan "Our presence, your safety". Echoing traits of past community-oriented policies, this result of the cooperation between the Japanese Consulate and the PMPE seeks to "bring the military police closer to the *pernambucano* citizen, preventing, surveilling and interacting with the community" (PMPE Facebook, September 18, 2019).

meeting connecting União community leaders, residents, and state government representatives, one resident noted this with scorn: "Jorge's is the only place in the neighbourhood where you always see police". His career within the military police granted him intimate knowledge of, and access to, neighbourhood-level police work, and he mobilised this for his enduring role as a local security broker. Though the extra-legal security services he provided were not, in any way, officially connected to state policing, the rank he could still claim made these services legitimate to the on-duty officers, who saw him as a peer.

Between *bandidos* and *cidadãos*

Early on in my fieldwork, I was at Jorge's often, both during the day and in the evenings. On one such evening, the sidewalk outside the bar was particularly crowded. Two of the patrons hanging out there were privates Ricardo and Antonio, who had been assigned as a pair to the local Patrulha do Bairro, the car-based neighbourhood patrol. Once again, Jorge introduced me as the researcher who had come to him due to my desire to learn about "the reality of things". Upon hearing the words "security" and "citizenship" in my own introduction, Ricardo asked me whether my aim was to perpetuate "the victimhood of the Black man". Awkwardly, I mumbled a poorly formulated response about wanting to *understand*, and not assess. The conversation carried on, with me and my research out of focus.

Ricardo's question implicitly referred to "those human rights people" – as they are generically referred to by detractors – and their attempts to foreground the structural racism that underlies homicides in general, and police killings in particular. After all, as discussed previously, the vast majority of those killed, by both civilians and police, are young Black men from the urban margins. This was – and continues to be, at the time of writing in 2021 – a key and divisive topic in Brazil, and beyond. Anti-racism movements and campaigns such as Amnesty International's Jovem Negro Vivo (Black Youth Alive), released in November 2014 (Anistia Internacional, n.d.), are often met with disdain from those who see stigmatized and historically Black urban

areas as breeding grounds for irredeemable criminals (see Costa Vargas, 2018). Encapsulating Ricardo's somewhat cynical framing of the "Black male victimhood" that academics and "human rights people" tend to perpetuate, a popular expression amongst those holding such punitivist views is: "Oh, do you feel sorry for them? Then take them home" ("*Tá com pena? Então leva pra casa*").

Ricardo's question triggered a conversation that took us from Recife to Rio de Janeiro, the national capital of "spectacular" police and drug trafficker violence (Robb Larkins, 2015). Even though police killings were, and are, a nation-wide concern, Rio's military police are particularly notorious for their lethality (Andreoni and Lodoño, 2020). My interlocutors were four policemen: privates and shift partners Ricardo and Antonio, Jorge, and a less vocal civil police agent. Within their converging narratives, those who died at the hand of police officers were never victims, but drug dealers or at least *envolvidos*, "involved" in criminal activity. It was in this context that Jorge raised the topic of Amarildo de Souza, referring to him as a "tremendous dealer" who "everybody made a big fuss about". Amarildo was a Black construction worker who went missing in 2013, after being taken into the Police Pacification Unit (UPP) in Rocinha, the Rio favela where he lived with his family. What Jorge presented as a "big fuss" was "the wave of multiracial protests that followed Amarildo's disappearance" (Costa Vargas, 2018, p. 203). As anticipated by those who rallied around his missing person case in 2013, a year still remembered in Brazil for its urban uprisings, Amarildo had become another casualty of lethal police violence. In 2016, 12 policemen were convicted for torture followed by death, concealment of a corpse, and fraud (Tavares, 2016).

The final conviction would not be issued until February 2016, but at the time of our conversation in Recife, in September 2015, my interlocutors had already come to a verdict of their own. They did not contest the violence perpetrated by the military police, but, by rendering Amarildo a *bandido*, deemed it legitimate. Like me, Jorge and the others had followed the case on the news. As public security men, however, they claimed to have a sensitivity that I, and the majority of the population, lacked: they believed they could

spot a *marginal* when they saw one, and Amarildo, in their view, was not the righteous martyr emblazoned on protesters' t-shirts and signs. Together with Ricardo's sarcastic reference to Black men depicted as the helpless victims of security forces, their framing of Amarildo's death was yet another form of denying the "antiblack logic" (Costa Vargas, 2018) which made it similar to so many other police killings in Brazil, and beyond. In order to draw the boundary that separated Brazil's many "Amarildos" from the "good citizens", the four policemen – three of them Black men from the urban margins themselves – resorted to another border, that between the *world of police*, with its resulting worldviews and sensitivities, and the *world of civilians* (Barros, 2009). This boundary, which worked to bind military police together across sub-national divides, presumed a differentiated sensing capacity, the so-called *faro* through which violence workers could distinguish citizens from threats.

The bordering between *bandidos* and *cidadãos* was a process that privates Ricardo and Antonio unpacked further, during a Neighbourhood Patrol night shift I joined for a few hours, a few days after we first met. My house in União at the time was in what the two described as a "calm area", meaning that it was not among the neighbourhood's hotspots for muggings, or for drug dealing and consumption. As we drove around União and Vista Nova that night, they talked me through their relationships with residents, whom they divided into different categories. In an attempt to make me understand the local dynamics, Ricardo explained, matter-of-factly:

> Here's the deal: the older folks, the chill folks, the good people in the community, the citizens, they respect us a lot. There are some who want to disrespect us, want to take the piss. The thieves, the dealers, the little thugs. They're scared of the way we approach them. Because if they make a joke, or act tough towards us, we'll beat them, we give them a real beating. So, we can impose ourselves. Impose our presence in the place. So they start to respect us, through fear. Because if we try to act like community police, in our country, saying "Good night, citizens", "Hands on your heads, citizens, good night", they'll take the piss out of you.

The greetings and instructions mentioned were said in an exaggeratedly

gentle tone, similarly to the one Ruth sarcastically deployed during the encounter I described early on in this chapter. They too mocked the idea of street-level policing approaching community residents "nicely" while on duty, unless they wanted to be made fun of. Ricardo continued:

> We have to arrive, not beating people, of course, but, I'll give you an example: there are five guys standing around, you say "Let's go!", and take out your gun, to really intimidate them. Because if I don't do this, they will crowd us and take the piss out of us. "Hands on your heads, let's go, let's go!" – so they feel the pressure already, you understand?

"After all, we are the oppressive organ of the state", Antonio summarized their position. For these two violence workers, it was clear that their authority hung on the use of force, or the threat of it. This resonated with a form of affect management that Jorge also described in relation to his own informal, private security role: "*Citizens* have to *respect* you, *marginais* have to fear you". At PPO 2, Private Fernandes and Corporal Silva also stressed the importance of being attuned to the fear that so-called *bandidos* experienced towards police, but they framed this look of apprehension as one of the "clues" that criminals gave off: "looking at you from the corner of his eye, sees you from afar and already lifts up his t-shirt [showing that he is not carrying a firearm], sees the police car and gets scared [*toma um susto*]". These descriptions of bordering work by street-level policing workers – which are common-sensical amongst them – result in an affective tautology of sorts. Outward expressions of apprehension towards police seemed to work as both the *reason* for, and the laboured *result* of, *abordagens* and *baculejos* aimed at intimidating specific types of community residents.

Amongst the sensible elements that police acted upon when performing suspicion, race remained an absent presence, as it did in relation to WhatsApp policing (see Chapter Four). They did discuss visible markers of class and address more explicitly. "We turn a blind eye to the rich kids [*a gente faz vista grossa pros riquinhos*], we discard certain types. It's like a prejudice we have", explained Fernandes, "and we are scared of *carteiradas*, because they happen a lot". Famously captured by Brazilian anthropologist

Roberto DaMatta (2020 [1969]) through the sentence "Do you know who you are talking to?", *carteiradas* made officers apprehensive given the deleterious effects they could have on their mood, day, and – ultimately – career. By "turning a blind eye" to "rich kids", the policemen begrudgingly appeased those who were most likely to pull powerful connections out of their pockets as a way to evade policing and its consequences.

Direct interpellation of wealthy residents living in upper-class neighbourhoods and enclaves, they explained, was more the exception than the rule. And when it took place, it usually resulted from targeted complaints, and not from police officers' "sense of smell" (*faro*). However, as we drove around, Ricardo shared one *faro*-driven instance, in which he – "without any stress" – approached a group of teenagers who were smoking pot in the street. In his narrative, "a *filho de papai* [privileged daddy's boy] started to take the piss, [saying] 'call me sir', being arrogant towards us". According to the private, the state surveillance cameras around prevented him and his colleagues from beating the boy up: "But I was going to. I spent three days with a headache". In another occasion, presumably outside the field of vision of surveillance cameras, he narrated being able to act upon this affective sense of disrespect by beating a man who had called the police "pieces of shit". For Ricardo, this had *felt* legitimate: "I had to act. It's the legality of my anger, isn't it, bro?". To which Antonio, from the front passenger seat, replied, in the language that came with the job: "Affirmative".

The affective labour that produces fear and comfort, I suggest, is not a corruption, or an unforeseen by-product of ostensive policing, but a core aspect of how street-level security authorities enact unequal urban orders. Perhaps less predictable, though, is how it affects the ground-level violence workers charged with this bordering work – how they navigate their work as "boundary citizens" who could themselves easily be read as threats based on how they embody classed, racialised and place-based markers. As noted earlier, both state and non-state policing workers experience the tensions that come with being "the violent bodies that protect" (to paraphrase Pinho's [2015] analysis of "the dirty body that cleans"), albeit in different ways, as I discuss in the next section, which focuses on private security guards.

Between *meliantes* and clients

While on duty at the mall, SEGMAX guards were required to be clean-shaven, and to stand up straight – no leaning allowed. They were always equipped with a cap, a bullet-proof vest, an analogue radio, and a firearm. On their uniforms, the company logo was always clearly visible, as were their nametags, with pictures. When I joined *vigilante* Rodrigo during an ordinary morning's shift at the mall, in 2015, he had been working as a guard for just under five years, four of them at similar stations. "The hardest part of working at shopping malls", he told me, "is dealing with clients".

Much of the non-state, commercial policing that I observed and discussed with SEGMAX staff resonated with Robb Larkins' (2017, p. 61) formulation of "security as hospitality". At the mall, guards were very explicitly deployed to curate the commercial enclave's atmosphere as a safe realm for middle-class consumption and leisure. This securityscape was not meant to elicit the same affective reactions from all those entering its premises, though. *Clients* were supposed to perceive security guards as amicable and non-threatening, while those perceived as *non-clients* were kept aware of guards' embodied authority. Even in the absence of (re)actions such as firing guns and provoking bodily harm, the sensible presence of guards was a core part of the mall's securityscape. Notwithstanding his "ostensive" policing role – visibly armed, and alert at all times – Rodrigo explained that little was expected of him beyond physical presence and appropriate workplace posture. Whenever a safety threat did arise, his task was to remove it from clients' field of vision: "My job is to try to appease the situation, and drive the discussion away from here".

The openness of the shopping centre area, complete with public bus stops linking it to different parts of the city, resulted in a heterogeneous group of visitors: while some came by car for the high-end shopping, others were just walking through to reach the low-income residential areas on the other side. From the perspective of the mall's security staff, their role was to draw an affective line between clients and non-clients. While the former should always *feel* a sense of safety and ease, the latter are to be constantly *copiados*,

security jargon for surveilling a suspicious element closely. As SEGMAX supervisor Mauro once told me, once they *feel copiados*, or closely surveilled, "*meliantes* leave to put on their show elsewhere". As was the case at Jorge's bar, within the premises of the nearby mall, "citizen" and "client" were used interchangeably, while *meliante* was the most recurrent term used to categorize those perceived as neither. Similar to *marginal*, or even *bandido*, *meliante* was another flexible security term, which applied to both those who had done wrong and those seen as *potential* wrongdoers.

Through what Rodrigo presented as "the eyes of a security guard", threats were most likely to come from the neighbouring low-income residential areas that surround most of Recife's shopping malls. He referred to spaces such as Capibaribe I as giant drug-dens, for instance, and associated favelas with *noiados* (pejorative slang for crack users) and *maloqueiros* (thieves). In addition to proper posture, which communicated his alertness to *noiados* who might try to take advantage, he explained, a key aspect of his job was knowing his post well, in terms of who came and went: "If I am not able to discern, I can make two mistakes: treating a client like a *marginal*, or a *marginal* like a client".

During my visits to the mall, I was able to observe the orchestration of ground-level surveillance that enacted certain visitors as other-than-clients – usually Black young men, entering the premises by foot. The idea was that they could *feel* this bordering, albeit subtly, as *vigilantes* watched them while muttering coded language and visual descriptors on the shared radio frequency. During a shift by one of the mall's busiest accessways, *vigilante* Ronaldo mentioned that I would rarely hear his voice on the radio, meaning that he was not keen on the concerted "copying" of those read as threatening due to visual markers: "The guys [guards] describe everything they see as suspicious. I look at someone in flip-flops and I think: he didn't have money to buy a pair of sneakers. I copy out of respect for my colleagues", he explained. While I was there, he got a message that announced two *meliantes* coming towards his post: "blue t-shirt; grey t-shirt; *comunidade*; young; flip-flops" – a near perfect synthesis of the sensible markers through which suspects were usually identified. Ronaldo responded as per the protocol,



Figure 23. Private security guard in uniform.

stating that he was "aware" and that the two boys had been "*copiados*". We stood quietly as they passed. Once they were gone, the *vigilante* turned to me and said: "See what I told you? The two with the flip-flops? What they mean [on the radio] is that they are poor and thieves".

Although Ronaldo was personally and explicitly opposed to what he saw as the banal criminalization of the aesthetic markers of poverty, his "copying" practices mirrored those of his suspicious colleagues. Though he mentioned that he chose to do so out of respect for the others, it was hard to imagine a different course of action within that context, where he himself was surveilled by peers and superiors, both on the ground and behind the hundreds of cameras. What I mean to stress here is that attempts to manipulate affective experiences and atmospheres does not rely (solely) on individual affective labourers. As the case of Ronaldo shows, it is inscribed in the standard policing procedures and the atmospheres they engender, which *vigilantes* have little room to alter, even when they consciously oppose the discriminatory norms that such procedures enact.

Armed and uniformed, often in the relentless heat of the sun, SEGMAX guards very literally stood to be seen and variously felt by mall-goers (Figure 23). Presence was the main requirement, but "good presence" demanded affective labour on their part, even though the use of direct force was not as available to them as it was to military police officers. Eliciting apprehension on the part of those perceived as unwanted presences was part of their routines, but, in line with their hospitality-like work, the affective management they performed was primarily geared towards appeasing clients. Making sure that clients never felt uncomfortable in relation to the presence of the armed men around – and they *were* all men – was a core responsibility. In order to intimidate as little as possible while still carrying a visible firearm at all times, SEGMAX guards kept their left hands on their guns, and never their right. As Rodrigo explained to me, by protecting the weapon – which was always attached to their bullet-proof vests – without seeming as though they could swiftly draw and fire it, they contributed to the mall's affective atmosphere of safety.

From a contractual perspective, the mall (which functioned legally as a commercial condominium) was the actual client, who hired SEGMAX to secure its external and surrounding areas. However, from the perspective of a private security officer on the ground, such as Rodrigo or Ronaldo, "clients" were the transient and heterogeneous group that flocked to the mall complex for a wide array of reasons, from leisurely consumption to medical examinations. Being stationed at one of the mall's main access ways resulted in intense interaction with "clients". For many, the security guard was the first employee they spotted, and, thus, the one they turned to for directions and general information.

Client

Do you know how I can get to the notary office?

Rodrigo

GOOD MORNING, MADAM!

This over-the-top performance of enthusiasm was a tactic that Rodrigo resorted to whenever he wanted to let clients know that they had not been sufficiently polite. Many encounters between the guard and the mall visitors started off in the same manner: the lack of ceremonial niceties in clients' requests would trigger Rodrigo's sarcastic response, often delivered with a smile. Ronaldo, another SEGMAX guard, did the same: "You'll see: people come talk to me and I throw in a 'good morning!' immediately, since very few say it spontaneously." In a later reference to clients, Ronaldo clarified that this was the furthest he could go, within the bounds of the affective forms of labour required by the post: "They come and treat us like the bottom of the bottom. [By greeting them] I slap them twice, without using my hands. A discerning person will understand. I like helping people, but only when they're polite." Rodrigo's experience echoed Ronaldo's: "The biggest reason for dissatisfaction, or weariness, is the interaction with the client", he explained, recounting various illustrative anecdotes of past frictions involving mall-goers. "From the moment you are harassed, you can't retaliate. [If you do] you can even be notified to the [mall] administration, and then you will always be the wrong one".

Boundary citizens

In addition to the tensions that emerged from interactions with mall-goers of the desirable if frequently rude kind, Ronaldo pointed to an additional one, which was inherent to their positioning between *meliantes* and clients. "If I arrive here and [my colleagues] don't recognize me, they'll say '*meliante*'. Now I go out in sneakers, but in shorts and flip-flops…", he said suggestively, with a grin. With this light-hearted comment on being a change of clothes away from being the object of fellow *vigilantes*' suspicion, Ronaldo touched on a tension that cut across state and non-state policing. Here, I refer to the strain of maintaining the normative boundaries that separate "good citizens" and "suspicious elements" from a subject position that could be relationally enacted as either. The scenario that Ronaldo presented exemplifies an important way in which *vigilantes* experienced this tension. On their days off, depending on where they were and what they were wearing, guards could easily be subjected to the same racialized, classed and place-based profiling they engaged in when "copying" *meliantes* during working hours. Additionally, even while on duty, they were also regarded as common suspects of workplace wrongdoings: "Whenever something happens, for the [hiring] company and for the police, the *vigilante* is the first suspect. Those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear, but many [*vigilantes*] get scared when they have to go down to the police station", Heitor, a delegate of Pernambuco's Union of Security Guards (SINDESV-PE), told me. While on the job, this liminal position as "violent bodies that protect", which I frame here as "boundary citizens", is enacted in the many measures through which they are controlled and surveilled, and in the ways in which they are required to emotionally and physically self-manage, even while being treated as "the bottom of the bottom".

Vigilantes and street-level police officers, such as the privates and corporals whose experiences I have discussed here are, of course, positioned very differently within the formal and informal hierarchies of violence work. However, the affective labour both types of policing workers perform enact the citizen and the client along similar lines. Whether in public or private spaces, street-level forms of security are enrolled in engendering affective

atmospheres of safety for white, middle- and upper-class residents to move through and consume in, while intimidating other-than-citizens and other-than-clients. They also embody a similarly liminal position of "boundary citizenship": when moving through the condoscapes discussed in Chapter Three, for instance, state police officers may experience an affective sense of inequality similar to that related by *vigilantes* in their encounters with clients.

The experiences of subalternity of street-level policing actors do not necessarily contribute to the "unmaking" of the social and spatial borders that they are tasked with maintaining. However, the in-betweenness they experience as they move across such divides reveals tensions within the self-evident neatness of the police order – in the Rancièrian sense – giving us glimpses of politics. In order to push this argument further, though, we need to consider the everyday bordering that takes place between forms of street-level policing. Though state and non-state divides matter here, I suggest that the bordering between military police ranks, and between military and civilian security workers, are more centrally implicated in how policing maintains, and disturbs, the aesthetics and affects of the police order.

Patent grievances

From mid-2015, when I started spending time at PPOs 1 and 2, police officers often responded to my presence by cataloguing their work-related complaints. In August 2015, sitting in a circle with six or seven policemen who were speaking on top of each other as they bombarded me with grievances, I asked if I could turn on the recorder. In response, Sergeant Lúcio, the highest-ranking officer in the room, jokingly bellowed: "I don't want to go to Afrânio!" They all roared with laughter. Afrânio was the last municipality of Pernambuco's *sertão* (backlands). Standing for the remote, undesirable destination where police officers who committed transgressions could be sent, it was emblematic of what might happen to policemen who crossed their superiors. Half-seriously, they implied that badmouthing the institution and its commanders on an academic researcher's SD card could be one

such “infraction”.

The reference to Afrânio was already a jab at the military hierarchies that privates, corporals, and even sergeants perceived as another unjust aspect of a job they defined in terms of its high risk, low salaries, and limited societal recognition. During the same visit that Afrânio was first mentioned, I could witness an evocative manifestation of this dynamic, in real-time. Sergeant Lúcio was facetiously performing his aversion to privates. He started off laughing, but grew more seriously annoyed when Eduardo, the private who was supposed to drive him, arrived late. Irritated, he entered the room where we had been talking, venting about what he perceived as utter disrespect. Eduardo blamed his 20-minute delay on traffic, but Sergeant Lúcio was unconvinced, threatening to write Eduardo up the next time something similar happened. Defiantly, Eduardo retorted: “Why wait? If you want to write me up, write me up.” Lúcio appeared furious as he related this exchange, which had just taken place in PPO 2’s front room, while shuffling frantically for a pen with which he could sign off the warning. Accumulating notifications such as these, the others explained, could result in time in military prison. After filling in the formal notification, the sergeant forbade the private from entering the car, even though he had initially been assigned the role of driver.

After Lúcio had left for a homicide scene close by, the tone of the conversation immediately changed. The three lower-ranking officers who remained in the PPO could openly perform their disapproval of the sergeant, whose moods they were required to manage. They vented with the same intensity about Lúcio’s attitude in particular, and the system that enabled and encouraged it, more generally: “Which other profession in the world can entail prison time for a person who arrives late?”, asked Eduardo, a rhetorical question that served as a hook for the three of them to express their shared desires for police demilitarisation, as a way of enhancing state security workers’ rights.

In addition to dealing with their direct superiors, low-ranking military police also had to contend with retired officers who continued to wield

authority even as they had moved into non-state policing. As noted previously, military police colonels often retired into the private security industry. This meant managing *vigilantes*, while retaining influence over low-ranking PMs – inside battalions and on the street. In the mall, the highest posts within the enclave's security governance structure were occupied by two colonels, who continued to exercise authority over street-level police. Privates Ricardo and Antonio shared their experiences of this with me: "He [the colonel] calls, he wants us there. He doesn't want to know if you're in the middle of a stop-and-frisk or anything. He's rude towards you. He wants you there, because he's a colonel, and you're a private".

Another source of grievances connected to the boundaries between military and civilian security workers. At street-level, the boundaries between public and private policing were unsettled by police officers who dabbled in informal private security in their "free" time. Out of the two interviews I conducted at the security guards' union SINDESV-PE, one representative complained about how common it was for policemen to take the jobs of licensed private guards in neighbourhood markets, for instance, while another casually narrated the informal guard gigs he worked, alongside military police friends out of uniform. When it came to workers' collective subjectivities, though, the boundaries between *military police service* and *security as service work* were performed and narrated as clear-cut. Rubens, a private security guard who lived close to me in União, once related, evocatively, that a *vigilante* was "nothing" in terms of identity: "it's a profession, it's our work". In contrast, as military police interlocutors repeatedly asserted, one never stopped being a PM – a subject position performed and felt off-duty, and well into retirement.

This distinct "non-civilian" subject position was not always advantageous; notably, it made it harder for state police to mobilise for labour rights. The "unexceptional" character of private security work in this regard was evident in security guards' collective mobilisations organized with union support. In early 2019, for instance, the *vigilantes* stationed at the Restauração Hospital, Pernambuco's largest hospital, organized a strike. The movement demanded that their employers pay for the two-month long salary delays,

provide five months' worth of meal tickets, and cover their social security funds contributions (Gouveia, 2019) – claims that any group of professions could have formulated during a time of crisis. The military structure that still organizes street-level state policing in Brazil, however, made unions and related claims-making repertoires illegal (see Benzaquen, 2021). The military normativity that made their recruits other-than-civilians fuelled the dissatisfaction of privates such as Eduardo, who could not think of any other profession *in the world* where a lack of punctuality could entail imprisonment as punishment. As I detail below, the affective sense of differentiation that emerged in low-ranking military police officers' relations with civilians *and* with the higher echelons of the PM bound them together, often in opposition to "the state".

Two polices

Descriptions of Brazil's police forces often start with references to its "two polices". In her introduction of Brazilian state policing to an anglophone academic audience, Roxana Cavalcanti (2020, p. 47) explains: "The Brazilian police are divided into two major forces: the military police and the civil police. Other smaller forces exist, such as the federal police, with functions similar to the American FBI. The military police patrol the streets, while the civil police are responsible for investigations." While this structural divide between the two main forces is important, whenever my research interlocutors referred to the state's "two polices", they were actually referring to the two separate tracks that co-existed in the PM's vertical ordering. In everyday complaints, these two "sides" were referred to as "the troops" (*a tropa*) and "the command" (*o comando*).[53] This distinction is structurally embedded within the institution: "Soldiers [privates] – the lowest rank in the military police – cannot progress to the highest ranks in the military police

53 This divide mirrored that within the Brazilian Army. The ranks that police officers referred to in the everyday as "troops" were officially the *Praças* (privates, corporals, sergeants, and sub-lieutenant), while they used "the command" to refer to the *Oficiais* (lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant-colonels, and colonels) (França, 2019).

through work. The highest ranks in the military police go through a separate recruitment process and are often politically connected" (Cavalcanti, 2020, p. 47). In the case of Pernambuco's military police, as was the case in most Brazilian states (see Riccio, 2017), the separate recruitment tracks also had different educational requirements: to join the selection process for the lowest ranks, one only needed a high school diploma,[54] while a university degree was required for those aspiring to climb the ladder that started at lieutenant and ended at colonel.

Rank-related grievances had been central to my interactions with low-ranking PMs since 2015. When I returned to Recife in late 2016, though, the dissatisfied moods of Pernambuco's privates and corporals had solidified noticeably. On December 6, with widespread support from the troops, Pernambuco's Association of Privates and Corporals (ACS-PE), which represented the two lowest ranks of military police and military firemen, announced that PMs would no longer sign up for extra shifts through the Security Overtime Programme (Programa de Jornada Extra em Segurança, PJES). This concerted boycott of the official channel through which officers exchanged their days off for a top-up to their monthly salaries resulted in a dramatic reduction of street-level policing in Pernambuco. This action-short-of-a-strike made use of the hashtag #STRENGTHandHONOUR (*#FORÇAeHONRA*), but was most commonly referred to as "standard operation" (*operação-padrão*), demarcating a period during which PM privates and corporals were incited by the association to perform their duties according to what was officially *standard* – especially in terms of contracted hours. Three days after it began, the fear of palpable police *absence* triggered an ostensive state response: under Operation Lion of the North (Operação Leão do Norte), which lasted for roughly a month, officers of the Brazilian

54 Many of my PM interlocutors had joined as privates, but had university degrees, or were pursuing one, in order to access better public servant jobs – a synonym for professional stability – both within and outside public security. Recent recruits in this position often stressed that this was changing the profile of the military police, which they commonly described as an archaic institution, and one that remained as such due to its rigid military structure.

army were deployed to perform "police like" work in Recife's Metropolitan Region (Exército Brasileiro, n.d.; see Figure 24).

As the Army began to guard Recife's public spaces, privates and corporals were talking to each other – and to me – about the importance of imagining other-than-military policing: "as long as there is 'military' in the name, the police will not improve, it will stay archaic", Gomes, a private who had joined the PM roughly five years before, told me. For him, the suffocating sensation of military rules that were detrimental to the troops was one of the triggers of the *operação-padrão*, which they sometimes framed as an "awakening" of the troops. Silva, a corporal, mentioned the recent union-led achievements of the civil police – an organisation that he described as "a son of the same father who receives better treatment" – and the command's failure in dialoguing with the troops.

Within the PMs' varied readings of the situation, they recurrently pinpointed the widespread use of WhatsApp as an important catalyst, highlighting how it had enabled connections between the privates and corporals of different battalions within Pernambuco. For Gomes, WhatsApp groups were what enabled the troops to share real-time information on the issue: "I'm in the battalion group, and in the group of a colleague's battalion too, and so it goes." Couto, a private of Gomes' generation, echoed this point: "There are two polices inside the [military] police. With WhatsApp, we're getting a lot more information to question this. I now question this, but before this would be unthinkable." Moura, one of Couto and Gomes' colleagues, told me that WhatsApp was his main source of information on the movement. He was confident that, without it, the *operação-padrão* would not have taken place: "I was on duty when I received the first messages asking people to take their names off the overtime list [PJES]. I wondered: will this stick? And then it started. First in one battalion and then it kept spreading. I don't think it would have spread like this without WhatsApp."

Though I was never a direct participant of the PM groups in question, Silva forwarded me countless multimedia messages that had gone viral amongst the troops. Roughly a month after the start of the operation, one message



Figure 24. Brazilian army officials policing the Boa Viagem beach during the PM's actions-short-of-a-strike, in December 2016.

passionately summarized the state of the negotiations between the association and the Pernambuco government on better pay and working conditions:

> The government decided to not negotiate with the associations, and rather with the commanders of each battalion (the same ones who, at the beginning, articulated a 10,000 BRL raise for themselves and 300 BRL for the *praças*). … The worst part is not even denying us a raise, but refusing to dialogue with the associations and persecuting the policemen, this lack of flexibility is feeding the movement.

The many written messages, videos, and audios that I received almost daily for several months, from December 2016, enacted a sensible order in which privates and corporals were on one side of a battle against both their military superiors, and civilian forms of authority at the level of the Pernambuco state.

Silva

A sensible audio from a MILITARY POLICEMAN!!!

The PRAÇAS are the ones on the streets and the OFICIAIS are the ones promoted for MERIT!!!

The centrality of WhatsApp for the movement under the #STRENGTHandHONOUR (*#FORÇAeHONRA*) hashtag resulted in a striking consistency in terms of how "the troops" (privates and corporals) perceived and represented their movement. "Expired bulletproof vests" (*coletes vencidos*), alongside old and faulty police cars (*viaturas sucateadas*), became the main signifiers of the precarious working conditions that they sought to call attention to, even if the movement's central claims were salary-related. In conversations, quantitative comparisons marking the difference between "troops" and "officers" also rolled off their tongues, which I associated with the often questionable, but always harrowing, numbers that circulated via WhatsApp: "They want us to do legality within illegality. Wearing expired vests. The bonus for work-related risk is 500 *reais* (BRL) for privates and 3,000 *reais* (BRL) for colonels. I get that the highest rank should make more, but why isn't the risk bonus the same? We believe that our lives are worth more than 500 *reais*. How many occurrences have been answered by high-ranking officers [*oficiais*] and how many by privates and corporals?", Private Ferreira summarized this issue one evening at PPO 2.

Figure 25. Protester wearing the Association of Privates and Corporals t-shirt, which reads "Não ao PJES!" ("No to the overtime programme!").

The digital circulation of content across battalions was key to organising privates and corporals into an *aesthetic formation* (Meyer, 2009, p. 7), a frame that captures how shared sensorial and affective experiences shape subjects and collectives, however transient they may be. In addition to this digital bounding, the movement also took to the streets of Recife, organising walks and protests, complete with chants and banners. One such demonstration, in January 2017, was fronted, not by police officers themselves, but by their families and, most visibly, their wives. The families' walk through the centre of Recife led to the Campo das Princesas Palace, which houses the government of Pernambuco. This form of protest by familial proxy drew attention to the military's prohibitions on labour-related protests and union-like performances. By strategically centring the families, the march and subsequent rally made low-ranking police officers' claims visible, while shielding individual officers from repercussions. In the evening, while the wives of the association leaders were inside the palace speaking with government

representatives, a crowd that included many more women and children than usual stood waiting while *brega* music sounded from the rented *trio elétrico* – a truck equipped with loudspeakers that could serve as a mobile stage for protest leaders during rallies, or for musicians during Carnival. At the top, a large banner repeated, in bold letters, the message also emblazoned on many of the protesters' t-shirts: "My husband is a citizen! He is a military policeman/military fireman! #STRENGTHandHONOUR" (Figure 26).



Figure 26. "My husband is a citizen! He is a military policeman/military fireman! #FORÇAeHONRA".

Roughly two weeks later, another demonstration took place. This time, privates and corporals themselves, albeit in plain clothes, came out in protest by the light-blue 19th-century building that housed the legislative chamber of Pernambuco. I chatted with Private Cunha, whom I knew from PPO 2, as we both leaned against the wall overlooking the water. Around us, hundreds

of officers waited, facing the *trio elétrico* from where the movement's leaders would speak to the crowd. Cunha asked if I could tell that he was carrying two pistols under his red t-shirt. I shook my head. As we looked out over the water towards the Palácio do Campo das Princesas, he and a friend shared a farcical retelling of the police strike that had taken place in 2000: "The police camped there. There was a shoot-out. The general commander [of the PM] had been in the army. He came out in camouflage, black paint on his face. When the shooting started, he hid under his desk." After I pointed out that they were certainly not old enough to have witnessed a strike that had taken place almost two decades earlier, Cunha remarked: "No, but people talk about it. And there are videos. If you search on YouTube you'll find it. 'Police strike 2000'."

Once the president of Pernambuco's Association of Privates and Corporals (ACS-PE) took the impromptu stage, he spoke into the microphone, addressing the hundreds of military policemen and firefighters who stood before him: "After I count to three, we start the 'Our Father' [*Pai Nosso*], which is a universal prayer". Cunha turned to me to explain: "He's a pastor". With enthusiasm, Albérisson Carlos, the policeman-pastor-president, counted from one to three, while holding the hands of the men who stood by him. To his right was state deputy [*deputado*] Joel da Harpa, a military policeman who was a vocal representative of PMPE troops within the state-level legislature,[55] and whose career as a politician had stemmed from his leadership in the military police strike of 2014 (Benzaquen, 2021). As the crowd started the *Pai Nosso*, Carlos incited them to pray louder. Holding hands as they prayed, the privates and corporals enunciated the verses as if they were military battle cries. After bellowing the closing "Amen", Carlos cried "Glory to God!", inviting the crowd to answer by waving his arm in a beckoning gesture. "Glory to God", the public repeated.

55 In recent years, Brazil has witnessed a sharp increase in the numbers of state security professionals – especially military police officers – who enter the realm of electoral politics, most frequently representing right-wing, or centre-right, political parties and agendas, fuelled by societal concerns around violence and criminality (Lima and Bueno, 2020).

This last section may feel like an abrupt change of theme and tone, a departure from the mundane encounters that this chapter began by describing, which I introduced to analyse street-level policing as a form of bordering that involves affective labour. Purposefully, this shift aims to capture – to the extent that the written form affords it – the sense of rupture that I experienced myself in late 2016, when the *operação-padrão* started, seeping into the security practices and insecurity concerns I had been following. Army jeeps and officers in camouflaged attire could be spotted around the South Zone areas of Recife where I lived and spent most of my time, while police officers out of uniform and their families gathered for prayer and protest, in front of public buildings. In the PPOs I frequented, this was all officers talked about, as they scrolled through their WhatsApp messages, a medium that Jardim residents also used to inform each other on how this shift in policing affected them. Roughly two weeks after the movement had started, one of the policing groups' admin wrote:

> 💬 ⚠️A NOTE FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE JARDIM POLICING GROUPS
> Good morning, everyone. We would like to inform you that, as all of you know, the military police are in *operação padrão* [standard operation], and this has made our situation, like that of all other Pernambuco citizens, harder. We understand the legitimacy of the police force's complaints, and while the state government cannot reach a consensus, we will face difficulties in solving demands. ...

For corporal Silva, the movement had worked to make the "blemishes of the police" visible to society. For many, it would be safe to say that the "blemishes" of urban policing were, in fact, always already apparent in officers' everyday practices, and the sensible and affective borders they enacted between citizens and their others. I pick up on Silva's phrase, though, to reflect on what was, indeed, made perceptible during the *operação-padrão*'s most heated moments. Going back to the Rancièrian (2015) language that runs through this dissertation, I suggest that we read the digital and embodied performances associated with #STRENGTHandHONOUR as part of the "conservative wave" (see Almeida, 2019) reconfiguring "the distribution of the sensible", or "the police", in Brazil and beyond. This becomes

particularly salient in the second protest described, in which an aesthetic formation emerged out of the enmeshed repertoires of militarism, evangelical Christianity, and institutional politics – spheres that were also visibly entangled in those standing on the top of the *trio elétrico,* inciting the crowd. I also contend that the movement provided us with glimpses of true *politics*. The broader unfolding of #STRENGTHandHONOUR also included fleeting demonstrations of equality, staged by privates and corporals who became visible as *workers,* as talks of demilitarisation took place informally in PPOs and battalions. Catalysed by, and generative of, an affective sense of injustice that emerged from within the literal and figurative police order, the movement called attention to the two irreconcilable polices that existed in one, briefly denaturalizing the fundamental border that produced police officers as other-than-civilians.

Conclusion: Security affects and the (un)settling of inequality

This chapter started by showing how state and non-state forms of street-level policing were similarly implicated in drawing sensible borders between citizens-clients and their others – a distinction that performs race- and class-based differentiation. I drew on the notion of affective labour as a way to analyse how the sensible presence of policing reinforces borders between those people and places classified as *dangerous* and those classified as entitled to protection. Intentional attempts at eliciting either apprehension or safety as affect are important parts of the affective labour involved in street-level policing. The affective dimension of urban security goes beyond this production of differentiated affect, however. Engaging the resentment and frustration that security workers experience, themselves positioned at the boundary between citizen and threat, adds to our understanding of what we consider as security affects (cf. Anderson, 2015). The positioning of street-level policing workers, who often feel as though they are shakily treading the very borders they are paid to enforce, adds tension to the sensible order of urban policing in Recife.

Delving deeper into the affectively charged position of policing workers entailed unpacking another set of relational borders, drawn between *military service* and *security as service work*, military police and civilians, and police "troops" and "commanders". I discussed how concerted digital and street-level actions moved Pernambuco's military police privates and corporals into a claims-making aesthetic formation, which mobilised against the state and military hierarchies for better pay and working conditions between 2016 and 2017. As I tried to convey, the claims that this movement staged – from the figurative and literal heart of the police order –, while resonating with the right-wing populist turn that was to come, also gave us glimpses of politics, in the Rancièrian sense.

These fleeting glimpses of politics become perceptible in the disjunction between the sticky military subjectivities that binds military actors together across ranks and state borders, and the affective sense of inequality generated by lived experiences of subalternity within and beyond the corporation. Briefly unsettling the post-political complementarity of citizens, clients, police officers and guards, the movement that gathered the two lowest ranks of the PM revealed tensions that were inherent to the institution in which they were embedded. It made space for other-than-military policing to be imagined, and for military subjects to appear – albeit briefly and contentiously – *also* as workers and citizens. The #FORCEandHONOUR mobilisation gave form to a friction in and of the military/civilian border that structures street-level policing in Pernambuco, and elsewhere in Brazil, upsetting the self-evidence of the police order, in the Rancièrian sense. The ways that military aesthetics and affects – enmeshed with performances of evangelical faith, and nods to electoral politics – continued to fuel the repertoires of protesting troops, however, indicates the resilience of military subjectivities, and their enduring connections to violence that is unequally distributed across Recife's urban landscape, even when pistols are properly concealed under plainclothes. These are connections that are part of the reason why military forces are legally prevented from striking, in the first place, and what renders their paralysations *mutinies* (Benzaquen, 2021). Relatedly, the movement's brief staging of equality did not extend to the urban subalterns othered as *bandidos*, *meliantes*, or *marginais*. The circulating forms

and affects that composed and catalysed this mobilisation of street-level security workers may have briefly exposed "a wrong" (Rancière, 1999, p. 35) that questioned borders within the military, and even between military and civilians. The borders between "good" and "bad" people and localities that violence workers were deployed to draw and enforce, however, remained in place.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

Citizenship and authority through security norms, forms and affects

In this thesis, drawing on ethnographic research in Recife, I have analysed how norms and values pertaining to citizenship and authority are shared, negotiated and performed in the everyday spaces, practices and encounters that make up urban security in Recife. I sought to address two overarching questions: *How are norms of citizenship and authority (re)produced through everyday urban security practices? How do these practices affect the production and maintenance of sociospatial difference and inequality in Recife?* In answering these questions, I have concentrated on understanding *how* citizenship and authority normativities are practiced. I focused on how notions of "good" and "bad" citizens and policing are performed within urban security arrangements, through the use of specific aesthetic forms that are aimed at eliciting specific affective responses. The sensorial-political consensus staged by the aesthetics of urban security, as I have explored, works to reproduce and normalize social and spatial differentiation – chiefly along the lines of class and race – in the everyday. Differently positioned subjects are assigned shares in the making of this aesthetic and affective order, which produces difference, as well as commonality. Though it may feel self-evident and all-encompassing, this Rancièrian "police order" also contains political tensions, revealed in the very ordinary processes and relations enrolled in its maintenance.

The approach that I developed sought to intervene in current debates on urban security, citizenship and inequality. As I outlined in the introduction, existing research has included a strong emphasis on the governance of

urban (in)security, with a focus on *who polices* (e.g., Beall et al., 2013; Davis, 2020; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007, 2015; Muggah, 2014). Within this literature, gradations of citizenship emerge from security governance failures and fragilities, which tend to concentrate in marginalized urban areas – from where citizen resilience can also arise. Another body of literature has focused on *who is policed*, foregrounding how different forms of security provision converge in their production of killable subjects, along classed and racialized divides (e.g., Alves 2018; Costa Vargas, 2018; Hansen, 2006; Denyer Willis, 2015; Mbembe, 2003). These scholars approach the production of non-citizenship as an urban security *project*, rather than a problem or failure of security governance. Finally, a third strand of scholarship has concentrated on how authority and citizenship are relationally performed and negotiated in policing encounters (e.g., Fassin, 2013; Harriott and Jaffe, 2018). Shedding light on how security authority and citizenship are co-constitutive of each other, this research foregrounds the everyday *processes* in which classed and racialized differences are produced, and maintained, but also negotiated – even within highly unequal and fragmented urban contexts.

Intervening in these debates, in this thesis I have argued for an approach that concentrates on the production, circulation and negotiation of citizenship and policing *norms*, and that engages these norms through the aesthetic and affective dimensions of urban security. This approach connects anthropological engagements with everyday normative processes of subject and community formation (e.g., Holston, 2008; de Koning et al. 2015; Lazar, 2013) to recent work highlighting the aesthetic-affective dimensions of politics (e.g., Adey, 2014; Bargetz, 2015; Ghertner, 2014; Ghertner et al. 2019; Navaro-Yashin, 2012; Rancière, 2013, 2015). This approach to citizenship and authority, focused on the connections between norms, aesthetic forms, and affects, can expand our understanding of how unequal urban orders are both normalized, and potentially unsettled.

Reading everyday urban security practices through Rancière's (2013) concept of the "distribution of the sensible", which also entails a *distribution of affects* (cf. Bargetz, 2015), I have traced the citizenship and policing norms that urban security forms stage and the affective atmospheres they elicit.

As I have highlighted throughout, such security practices stage an aesthetic order in which active citizens and present policers partake as neatly complimentary – a *police order* in the Rancièrian sense. I have drawn on this approach throughout this thesis' empirical chapters to analyse a broad range of what I call *sensible security arrangements*, in which state and non-state actors, materialities, and technologies are enrolled in order to engender affective atmospheres of safety and apprehension. My analysis of how urban security forms and affects enact, circulate and unsettle normative articulations of "good citizenship" and "good authority" developed from three ubiquitous security forms: vertical condominiums, WhatsApp-based partnerships for neighbourhood surveillance, and state and non-state forms of street-level policing. Below, I revisit the main points yielded from these norms-forms-affects clusters, teasing out, at the end, key insights that cut across their different contributions.

Senses, shares, and divisions of urban security

Recife's aesthetic and material forms have long been the objects of urban development and governance interventions, as Chapter Two has unpacked, geared towards different visions of the "good" city, and the "good" urban citizen – notions that have been enmeshed with urban (in)security in different ways. Aesthetic dichotomies associated with the (post-)colonial city's polarized expansion – such as dry/wet, formal/informal, and high/low – have been historically sensed and made sense of through their classed and racialized connotations. Norms that pertain to hygiene, development, and security have materially sedimented onto Recife's urban landscape, cementing the exclusion – and, at times, fuelling the resistance – of the people and places deemed as threats to such norms. The material and spatial orderings – and *otherings* – of this chapter reverberate throughout those that follow; not as historical precedents in a linear trajectory, but as past configurations of relations that are still active, ongoing, and relevant for understanding the material and spatial dimensions of urban security, citizenship and inequality.

Such spatial and material dimensions are central to Chapter Three, which unpacks the vertical condominiums of Jardim and Vista Nova through the security norms, forms and affects that shape and are shaped by this housing typology, within and beyond the limits of their discrete gate-wall-*portaria*-high-rise arrangements. While governed by explicit rules of conduct, which seek to manage behaviour within condominium confines, this residential space also enacts more tacit normative connections between residents' safety and forms of classed and racialized separation. The recognizable security atmospheres that this ubiquitous urban form affords are not fully contained by the formal perimeters of individual enclaves, however. In addition to constituting securityscapes (Maguire and Low, 2019) in themselves, condominiums shape spaces of security around them, and elsewhere. Their rapid and clustered proliferation – specifically relevant in Recife's South Zone – make *condoscapes* out of the areas where many of them tower over. Outside the affective atmospheres they immediately engender, material and immaterial condo-elements are inscribed in working-class housing estates, resulting from "civilizing" impositions (cf. Kopper 2016, p. 205), as well as from low-income residents' security concerns and condo-like aspirations. However, walls, gates, and *síndicos* did not make a condominium: in the case of the state-provided residential enclave discussed here, condo norms and forms appeared as "out of place", contributing to an affective sense of inequality (cf. Bottero, 2019) amongst dwellers of the *habitacional*.

Chapter Four unpacked a norm-form-affect cluster that is less immediately visible than condominiums, condoscapes, and their others, while similarly ubiquitous. Through area-based WhatsApp policing groups of both Jardim and União, encounters with (potential) criminality were translated into sharable content – an encouraged citizenship *practice*. Functioning as more than channels for narrative complaints around perceived urban danger, such groups encouraged security providers and recipients to perform and negotiate notions of "good" citizenship and "good" authority in a range of sensible ways. Affording visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy to participant-police relations, these digital spaces enabled citizens to share, in real-time, the security-related practices of seeing and showing that made up their voluntary vigilant labour – and performed their willingness to partner

with the local PM battalion. The same channels through which citizens became visible to peers and the police also allowed the police themselves to perform presence – even when not physically deployed to the sites where reported occurrences took place. These groups afforded the sensible circulation of converging citizenship and policing norms across Jardim and União, territories that were usually performed and narrated as fundamentally distinct urban (in)security contexts. This, however, does not mean that the immediate sociospatial context ceases to matter. Although the same normativity of active citizenship fuelled neighbourhood WhatsApp groups in both Jardim and União, the stakes, risks, and effects of active participation were very much shaped by participants' positioning in Recife's fragmented urban landscape. Visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy were affordances that applied to citizen-police encounters in both locales, but the surveillant aesthetics and affects that emerged within these broad frames for security (inter)action were distinct. While residents of União might have been eager to appear on the screen of military police officers in the same terms as the active citizens of Jardim, the vertical surveillance that this digital platform enabled and encouraged within condoscapes differed from the lateral surveillance demanded from partner citizens of the low-income community – a form of seeing and showing that was potentially detrimental for both the watcher and the watched.

The task of enacting seemingly suspicious or criminal subjects as threats within – and to – the dominant aesthetic order, as this dissertation has shown, is distributed amongst a range of state and non-state actors, materialities, and technologies. Whether within informal urban security arrangements or formal partnerships, identifying these "elements" was a task increasingly demanded from those eager to be recognized as so-called "good" citizens and communities. This task was, perhaps, most salient as a requirement for membership within the WhatsApp policing groups of Chapter Four, but was also present in the making of condoscapes, where *portaria* staff, for instance, were enrolled as the "eyes" on the streets between residential high-rises. As Chapter Five unpacked, however, Recife's South Zone continued to rely on professional state and non-state security workers, whose employment involved the making and maintenance of affective

atmospheres of safety, which entailed sorting citizens and clients from elements and *marginais*. As the chapter discussed, state and non-state forms of "ostensive" policing, understood broadly as the kind of policing intended to be seen and felt, enacted a seamless continuum between being the *citizen* and the *client*, while reading potential threats on the basis of classed and racialized markers. This bordering, as the chapter discussed, required the *affective labour* of policing actors. From their own boundary positioning emerged a boundary subjectivity that unveiled frictions and fragilities at the core of the police, in the Rancièrian sense. Here, I am gesturing towards the subjects who are included in the police order of urban security, but ambivalently so, precariously treading the very sensible borders that their violence work is deployed to enforce.

Sensible shares

From the many urban security processes and relations that this dissertation has engaged, a range of shared practices emerge as enactments of "good" citizenship in relation to urban security. We might categorize these common practices, which circulate across urban divides, as follows: first, *curating and maintaining built and sensorial environments* according to dominant articulations of the look and feel of safety; second, the largely visual *sensing, capturing, and sharing of (potential) criminal occurrences*; and third, the *active recognition of and submission to security authority*. Meanwhile, shared practices that enacted "good" authority across divides between and within state and non-state security organizations tended to share an emphasis on *performing flexible, ubiquitous, and immediate presence*. The norms that this thesis has unpacked circulate across urban spaces that *recifenses* and policing workers commonly perceive and enact as different worlds, when it comes to law-breaking and law-enforcing.

Amongst the overarching themes that cut across the cases unpacked in Chapters Three to Five, perhaps the most evident is the centrality of *sensible security forms* to how citizens and security authorities recognize and relate to each other. In relation to condominiums and condoscapes, for instance,

material and sensorial interventions curated by residents and *síndicos* were not only intended as direct attempts to produce a safer environment. These interventions also made them *visible* to state authorities, and specifically visible as deserving of protection – or at least of the sense of protection that police presence engendered amongst middle- and upper-class citizens of Jardim and Vista Nova. This dynamic of mutual recognition was also apparent in my discussion of WhatsApp surveillance groups of Jardim and União, which provided a channel for "good citizenship" and "good policing" to be enacted through practices of reciprocal seeing and showing. Likewise, the felt presence of street-level police officers and private security guards – who enacted a continuum between deserving citizens and entitled clients – was a central, sensible dimension of how they did security/violence work.

Aesthetic divides

While the aesthetic consensus enacted by these sensible security arrangements staged a self-evident complementarity between active citizens and present policing, these orderings also produced divisions. Here, I suggest, that the processual and relational crafting of this aesthetic order reproduces sociospatial inequalities in two key ways. Perhaps most evidently, the forms and affects involved in this order work to solidify classed and racialized imaginaries of which people, places, and offenses should be the target of security attention. Muggings, for instance, alongside other property-related crimes, mobilized the attention of citizens and the police as occurrences that victimize "good people" – in contrast with homicides, widely held as the fate of "bad people", those involved in illegal practices and, therefore, killable, as Officer Ramos implied in his conversation with the "good", active citizens of União. Aesthetic markers associated with class, race, gender, age – and, importantly, address – were similarly sensed, captured, and circulated as relevant risk factors, perpetuating all too familiar *otherings*. Less familiar, perhaps, are the forms of inequality that emerge amongst those who share a dedication to the citizenship agendas discussed here, but who are situated differently in Recife's urban landscape.

In spatial terms, these shared "good citizen" subjectivities complicate the contiguous surfaces and fixed borders that divided city images and imaginaries evoke, suggesting instead a *topological* take on citizenship, tethered to "dynamic and continuous fields of relations" (Hepworth, 2015, p. 112), rather than on fixed localities and borders. Even if outside of fixed dualisms, though, the sensible security arrangements analysed here continued to shape spatial processes and experiences along classed and racialized lines. This is perhaps clearest in Chapters Three and Four. As an aesthetic ensemble that connected atomized high-rises and houses, the condoscapes of Jardim and Vista Nova expanded the territories of the white urban elites. Similarly, Jardim's initial WhatsApp policing group quickly mushroomed into five, assembling a policing community out of individual residents, and fostering their policing subjectivities. In contrast, at the Capibaribe I housing estate, and in the low-income community of União, partaking in the dominant aesthetic order of security resulted in the splintering of these spaces into material and digital enclaves of selected *cidadãos de bem* ("good citizens").

As I have suggested throughout this thesis, the aesthetic ordering of urban security is predicated in differentiating *citizens*, *condôminos*, and *clients* – those who are seen, heard and felt as the rightful recipients of both state and non-state security services – from their others, the *marginais*, *bandidos*, and *meliantes*. As I have argued, there is a strong affective component to *how* these differences are performed in the everyday. The affects that mundane security practices and materialities are orchestrated to engender – that is, the affects that are object-targets of security (Anderson, 2015) – vary, in accordance with the subject in question. While those who appear as citizens, *condôminos*, and clients are attuned to a sense of safety, their classed and racialized others are attuned to a sense of apprehension in policing encounters – especially when traversing spaces where they are perceived as out of place.

Inequality affects

An *affective sense of inequality* also circulated amongst marginalized subjects as they precariously partook in urban policing practices. This formulation draws on Wendy Bottero's (2019) engagement with inequality through the normative dispositions of ordinary people, who are often required to morally substantiate their actions, and to evaluate those of others – through different approaches to everyday *oughtness*, as I noted earlier on in this thesis. As Bottero (2019) argues, this also entails subjects and collectives being able to oppose norms that are dominant. Experiences such as "suffering, disrespect and stigmatization", she suggests (ibid., p. 89), "represent powerful affective forces generating dissent and struggle". The different analytical threads that this dissertation has woven together do not seek to establish a direct and causal relation between the affective sense of "a wrong" (Rancière, 1999, p. 35) and the emergence of sensible dissent. More modestly, though, I suggest that an affective sense of inequality within a given distribution of the sensible affords the conditions for its disruption: for the "wrong people" (Panagia, 2012, p. 100) to emerge as sensible political subjects.

Although the inequality affects that I seek to identify here cut across the different urban security arrangements analysed, they are perhaps most salient in the dynamics described in Chapter Five. After discussing how street-level policing actors sort amongst citizens and non-citizens through affective labour, the chapter shed light on the shared sense of inequality that has worked to bound together formations of violence workers tasked with such bordering practices. This affective sense of a wrong that intensified as it circulated amongst state security providers at the frontlines of Recife's social, spatial and symbolic borders has not necessarily worked to unsettle the normative order that keeps these same street-level violent workers at the edge of citizenship. However, as discussed through the #STRENGTHandHONOUR movement, it foregrounded disjunctions that fuelled fleeting glimpses of politics. Through the dissatisfaction of "the troops" with their status of subalternity within the military, which also spoke to their subalternity within Recife's sociospatial landscape, gaps and incongruities were revealed at the core of *the police*, by which I mean here both the PM *and* the

dominant political-aesthetic order. As the mobilisation's most heated moments showed, however, military subjectivities – performed in articulation with religious and electoral allegiances – proved sticky, and continued to structure the terms and tones through which privates and corporals recognized themselves. While the affective sense of a wrong that went viral amongst the troops exposed fissures within the military police, its tethering to well-delimited ranks – or "parts" (Rancière, 1999, p. 14) – prevented it from affecting Recife's broader sociospatial order, which their everyday violence work maintained as common sense.

Beyond urban security: "The crisis is aesthetic"

It had been roughly six months since I had left Recife for Amsterdam when I picked up my phone for the last time to send Corporal Silva a WhatsApp message, asking for updates on the military police unrest I discussed in Chapter Five. There were barely any news items on the topic anymore in the online media outlets whose homepages I kept refreshing, as I tried to keep a sense of current events from a different time zone. Though I was four hours ahead of Recife, I constantly felt like I was falling behind on new developments. On that late October afternoon, this sense of distance and detachment boiled over its usual threshold, prompting me to type an unassuming greeting: "Hi Silva! How are things?". Though it was late afternoon for me, and early afternoon for him, he wished me a good morning, and a short conversation ensued.

Silva
They're the same

Carolina
Are you still in operação-padrão? How is the movement going?

Silva
Nothing's changed
There were no more mobilisations

Carolina
I see! There hasn't been a lot of news on it lately

Silva
Yes, true, but violence is on the rise
A motivated policeman is worth 30 policemen
While they don't solve the police problem, I believe it will stay that way
Everyday there is news of murder from lots of different places
There are places where we never used to hear about violence and now it's generalized
As long as there isn't professional appreciation, the policeman will stay demotivated
And this is not good, because it's society that suffers

This was the last time Silva and I chatted, but it was not the last time I heard from him. As was also frequent in our chat history, he forwarded me messages every once in a while, presumably from the many WhatsApp groups he was part of and would often refer to when we talked in person. These messages were usually related to urban violence and policing in Recife, but could also be motivational platitudes, not unlike the ones I was used to getting from older relatives based in different states of Brazil. In late September 2018, just a couple of weeks before the first round of Brazil's presidential election, Silva forwarded me a message that signalled that something had indeed been changing within Recife, in spite of the uneventfulness that his last missive had sought to capture, roughly a year before.

Silva
I stand with Jair Messias BOLSONARO, because he is the only one who's defending:
FAMILY
CHILDREN AGAINST GAY KITS IN SCHOOLS.

QUALITY HEALTH.
QUALITY EDUCATION
QUALITY SECURITY.
HE IS THE ONLY ONE THAT PUTS GOD ABOVE ALL.
HE'S CATHOLIC.
THE WIFE IS AN EVANGELICAL FROM THE BAPTIST CHURCH.
DEFENDS ALL RELIGIONS.
HE IS AGAINST ABORTION.
AGAINST DRUGS AND AGAINST THE LIBERATION OF MARIJUANA.
HE IS NOT THE BEST BUT HE IS WHO GOD PUT IN FRONT OF US.
THEN WE'LL CHANGE BRAZIL. 🙏🙌

During my time in Recife, Bolsonaro was mostly regarded as a somewhat comical congressman from Rio de Janeiro, with limited influence in defining the terms and tone of politics and policing in Recife. Shortly after my departure from Pernambuco, this had changed. Needless to say, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected the president of Brazil not long after Silva's campaigning message – one of the countless messages disseminated via WhatsApp in support of this former captain of the Brazilian Army (Avelar, 2019; Machado, n.d.). Although in Recife Bolsonaro lost by a small margin to the Workers Party (PT) candidate, Fernando Haddad, he went viral amongst military policemen across the country, capturing much of their dissatisfaction and gaining their allegiance. The message that Silva forwarded shortly before the election was a concise summary of the norms Bolsonaro campaigned on, and his viral WhatsApp message in ALL CAPS – complete with misinformation about the opposing candidate – was an effective illustration of the forms that circulated such values. As I move towards the final passages of this thesis, I start from this message to close with a brief reflection on the norms, forms, and affects of citizenship, authority, and inequality in contemporary Brazil – beyond Recife, and beyond urban security.

The us-versus-them dichotomy that structures Bolsonaro's bellicose messaging relies heavily on military, punitivist, and religious values and imagery, as the corporal's digital campaigning illustrates. As Letícia Cesarino (2019) discusses, in addition to containing the all too familiar ingredients

of right-wing populism, the affectively loaded repertoire that rendered Bolsonaro a "*mito*" (myth) was new enough to warrant the formulation of a new term: *digital populism*. Amongst the facets we might consider new, Cesarino (2019) argues, are the fractal topologies that WhatsApp mediation afforded to the talks and times of populist politics, and how easy it became for individual users to reproduce its vocabulary and aesthetics – even if their mass dissemination via WhatsApp did, and does, also involve contracted, concerted mass communication strategies that often function outside of legality.[56]

In this context of *digital populism* that Cesarino sketches, forms of digital opposition have also proliferated. In the throes of the memetic battlefield (cf. Bentes, 2016), one recurring online catchphrase has captured my attention in recent years: "*A crise é estética*" or "The crisis is aesthetic". According to the #MUSEUMofMEMES (#MUSEUdeMEMES) (Souza, 2020), a project by the Universidade Federal Fluminense (Fluminense Federal University), the earliest reported use of the catchphrase was in 2016, when it was tweeted by Brazilian cartoonist André Dahmer. The phrase functioned as sardonic, Twitter-friendly, commentary on a news article that reported on a Dutch artist accusing the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) of plagiarising his work (Senra, 2016). The work/copy in question was the giant rubber duck that had become a symbol of the movement that rallied different sectors of Brazilian society in support of the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, the then president and member of the Workers Party. The "FIESP duck" (*pato da FIESP*) – which appeared in paid newspaper ads and on street manifestations in giant, inflatable form – materialized the expression "*não*

56 As journalist Patrícia Campos Mello (2018) reported for the *Folha de São Paulo* newspaper, during the 2018 elections, companies contracted digital advertising agencies to disseminate content against the Workers Party (PT). Since this constitutes undeclared corporate endorsement, it is an illegal practice according to Brazilian electoral law. Analogous practices associated with the use of WhatsApp for the mass dissemination of political propaganda and "fake news" are still associated with the so-called "office of hate" (*gabinete do ódio*), the team of Brasília-based public servants in charge of the production and mass reproduction of pro-Bolsonaro digital content from the presidential palace (Boghossian et al., 2020).

vou pagar o pato", which means "I will not take the rap" (but translates literally to "I will not pay the duck"). This slogan and its visual manifestations had been circulating since late 2015, when they were mobilized as part of a FIESP-backed campaign against tax increases proposed by the federal government (Melo, 2015). In that context, campaigners from the industrial and financial sectors announced their refusal to *take the rap* for what they framed as the Workers Party's economic mismanagement. Not long after, though, the duck had become a signifier for much broader and more diffuse forms of dissatisfaction, which became aligned in favour of Rousseff's impeachment. Realized in August 2016, the impeachment was one of the landmarks of the state of so-called "crisis" that has been felt, and narrated, with varying intensities, since the urban uprisings of 2013 (see Pinheiro-Machado, 2019).

The catchphrase that renders the crisis *aesthetic* has appeared many times since, though, and often in reference to different elements associated with the conservative subjectivities that latched onto *Bolsonarism* (see Junge, 2019; Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco, 2020). In this context, the phrase and its variants are mobilized on social media to subtly ridicule the aesthetic choices associated with the current right-wing regime: "The basic element of the use of the meme is the disapproval of an aesthetic proposal, whether in a more serious tone of negative criticism of a government measure aimed at art and culture in Brazil, or as a joke to show an opinion about bad taste or the aesthetic inadequacy of something or someone" (Melo, 2020). In my own scrolling practices, I have seen references to the aesthetic dimension of "the crisis" attached to Bolsonaro's clothing choices, the design of the 200 reais bill, the revamped logos of governmental programmes, and myriad other humorous associations between right-wing worldviews and *bad taste*. Echoing the Bourdieusian (1984) approach to aesthetics in terms of taste and class-based distinction, which I touch upon in Chapter Three, such formulations tend to similarly perform distinction, but in relation to the "others" located at the opposite end of the spectrum of institutional politics.

Provoked by this memetic (Bentes, 2016) catchphrase, and drawing on the conceptual language that runs throughout this thesis, I wonder what it

might mean to engage "the crisis" as "aesthetic", not as a gesture towards the *tastelessness* of "the conservatives", but in terms of a (re)distribution of the sensible. The first thing that comes to mind is, perhaps, a reframing of the catchphrase to highlight that *maintaining* the conservative status quo, or the police order, is *also* an aesthetic matter, one that "renders and sustains certain things, places, utterances, and conditions as common sense, while others remain in the register of non-sense" (Swyngedouw, 2018, p. 49). The sedimentation of what we have come to understand, in Brazil and beyond, as a "conservative wave" articulates, as Ronaldo de Almeida (2019, p. 185) identifies, at least four main threads: economic liberalism, moral regulation, securitarian punitivism, and social intolerance. The consensus staged between these four vectors, which we could also broadly understand as *normativities*, is also an aesthetic one, staged on the streets, but also – and, perhaps, mainly – online (Machado, n.d.). From the sensible articulations of such normativities, heterogeneous formations of "good citizens" – *cidadãos de bem* – emerge, affectively bound together by countless and shifting aesthetic forms. Yellow football shirts, military ranks and symbols in the spaces of executive power, maskless faces that recognize each other amid a global pandemic, and viral WhatsApp content that solidifies whose concerns are legible within this ordering. In the polarizing battle that this order stages, police forces across the country have emerged alongside the president. Echoing dynamics discussed earlier, Bolsonaro has performed as "a kind of union leader of the low ranks of the police forces throughout his political career", and has been central in catapulting police and army officers into institutional politics, through electoral endorsements and direct appointments, since 2018 (Durão et al., 2021, p. 2).

Joining the interdisciplinary voices attempting to engender hopeful affects amidst despondency and despair, however, I close by suggesting that aesthetic forms and formations need not only serve as novel diagnostic tools into the neoliberal, conservative "police order" that has been established. They can also attune us to the fissures within it, which keep providing us with promises of politics (cf. Swyngedouw, 2018). As Rosana Pinheiro-Machado (2019, p. 163) states in her chronicle of contemporary Brazil, from the 2013 urban insurgencies to the current "crisis", "the far-right won, but

so did the feminists" – which, to me, does not announce the score of a zero-sum game, but gestures towards "the two worlds in one" (Rancière, 2015, p. 45) of politics. In recent years, out of sensible demonstrations of equality, sensible political subjects have also emerged, affirming their right to rights, to life, to the city, against a status quo in which their claims emerge as "mimimi" – the onomatopoeia that is evocatively deployed to render their voices as meaningless noise. Whether in the form of anti-racism movements against genocide – by state violence, or state negligence – or in the questions and tensions raised when police officers appear as anti-fascist workers (Durão and Souza, 2020), time and again, consensual orders are unsettled by those who stubbornly stage dissensus. If the crisis is aesthetic, so is the way out of it.

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Summary

Drawing on ethnographic research in Recife, this thesis analyses how norms and values pertaining to citizenship and authority are shared, negotiated and performed in the everyday spaces, practices and encounters that make up urban security in the capital of Pernambuco, in the Northeast of Brazil. It seeks to address two overarching questions: *How are norms of citizenship and authority (re)produced through everyday urban security practices? How do these practices affect the production and maintenance of sociospatial difference and inequality in Recife?* In answering these questions, I have concentrated on understanding *how* citizenship and authority normativities are practiced. In other words, I focus on how notions of "good" and "bad" are performed in relation to citizens, policing actors, and "policing citizens" through the sensible forms of urban security and the affective responses they (aim to) elicit. The sensorial-political consensus staged by the aesthetics of urban security, as I have explored, works to reproduce and normalize social and spatial differentiation – chiefly along the lines of class and race – in the everyday. Differently positioned subjects are assigned shares in the making of this aesthetic and affective order, which produces difference, as well as commonality. Though it may feel self-evident and all-encompassing, this Rancièrian "police order" also contains political tensions, revealed in the very ordinary processes and relations enrolled in its maintenance.

The approach outlined above seeks to intervene in current debates on urban security, citizenship and inequality. Existing research has included a strong emphasis on the governance of urban (in)security, with a focus on *who polices* (e.g., Beall et al., 2013; Davis, 2020; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007, 2015; Muggah, 2014). Within this literature, gradations of citizenship emerge from security governance failures and fragilities, which tend to concentrate in marginalized urban areas – from where citizen resilience can also arise. Another body of literature has focused on *who is policed*, foregrounding how different forms of security provision converge in their production of killable subjects, along classed and racialized divides (e.g., Alves, 2018; Costa Vargas, 2018; Hansen, 2006; Denyer Willis, 2015; Mbembe, 2003). These scholars approach the production of non-citizenship as an urban security *project*, rather

than a problem or failure of security governance. Finally, a third strand of scholarship has concentrated on how authority and citizenship are relationally performed and negotiated in policing encounters (e.g., Fassin, 2013; Harriott and Jaffe, 2018). Shedding light on how security authority and citizenship are co-constitutive of each other, this research foregrounds the everyday *processes* in which classed and racialized differences are produced, and maintained, but also negotiated – even within highly unequal and fragmented urban contexts.

Joining and contributing to these debates, this thesis argues for a focus on the production, circulation and negotiation of citizenship and policing *norms*, and engages these norms through the aesthetic and affective dimensions of urban security. This approach connects anthropological engagements with everyday normative processes of subject and community formation (e.g., Holston, 2008; de Koning et al. 2015; Lazar, 2013) to recent work highlighting the aesthetic-affective dimensions of politics (e.g., Adey, 2014; Bargetz, 2015; Ghertner, 2014; Ghertner et al. 2019; Navaro-Yashin, 2012; Rancière, 2013, 2015). Such an approach to citizenship and authority, focused on the connections between norms, aesthetic forms, and affects, I suggest, deepens our understanding of how unequal urban orders are both normalized, and potentially unsettled.

Reading everyday urban security practices through Rancière's (2013) concept of the "distribution of the sensible", which also entails a *distribution of affects* (cf. Bargetz, 2015), this dissertation engages the citizenship and policing norms that urban security forms stage and the affective atmospheres they elicit. As highlighted throughout, such security practices stage an aesthetic order in which active citizens and present policers partake as neatly complimentary – a *police order* in the Rancièrian sense. Throughout this thesis' empirical chapters, I analyse a broad range of *sensible security arrangements*, in which state and non-state actors, materialities, and technologies are enrolled in order to engender affective atmospheres of safety and apprehension. My analysis of how urban security forms and affects enact, circulate and unsettle normative articulations of "good citizenship" and "good authority" developed from three ubiquitous security forms, tethered

to differently positioned areas of Recife's South Zone: vertical condominiums, WhatsApp-based partnerships for neighbourhood surveillance, and state and non-state forms of street-level policing. Below, I outline the main points yielded from the different chapters that make up this thesis, teasing out, at the end, key insights that cut across their different contributions.

Of mud, marble, and mirrors

Recife's aesthetic and material forms have long been the objects of urban development and governance interventions, as Chapter Two has unpacked, geared towards different visions of the "good" city, and the "good" urban citizen – notions that have been enmeshed with urban (in)security in different ways. Aesthetic dichotomies associated with the (post-)colonial city's polarized expansion – such as dry/wet, formal/informal, and high/low – have been historically sensed and made sense of through their classed and racialized connotations. Norms that pertain to hygiene, development, and security have materially sedimented onto Recife's urban landscape, cementing the exclusion – and, at times, fuelling the resistance – of the people and places deemed as threats to such norms. The material and spatial orderings – and *otherings* – of this chapter reverberate throughout those that follow; not as historical precedents in a linear trajectory, but as past configurations of relations that are still active, ongoing, and relevant for understanding the material and spatial dimensions of urban security, citizenship and inequality.

Condoscapes

Such spatial and material dimensions are central to Chapter Three, which unpacks vertical condominiums through the security norms, forms and affects that shape and are shaped by this housing typology, within and beyond the limits of their discrete gate-wall-*portaria*-high-rise arrangements. While governed by explicit rules of conduct, which seek to manage behaviour within condominium confines, this residential space also enacts more tacit

normative connections between residents' safety and forms of classed and racialized separation. The recognizable security atmospheres that this ubiquitous urban form affords are not fully contained by the formal perimeters of individual enclaves, however. In addition to constituting securityscapes (Maguire and Low, 2019) in themselves, condominiums shape spaces of security around them, and elsewhere. Their rapid and clustered proliferation – specifically relevant in Recife's South Zone – make *condoscapes* out of the areas where many of them tower over. Outside the affective atmospheres they immediately engender, material and immaterial condo-elements are inscribed in working-class housing estates, resulting from "civilizing" impositions (cf. Kopper 2016, p. 205), as well as from residents' security concerns and condo-like aspirations. However, walls, gates, and *síndicos* do not necessarily make a condominium: in the case of the state-provided residential enclave discussed here, condo norms and forms appeared as "out of place", contributing to an affective sense of inequality (cf. Bottero, 2019) amongst dwellers of the *habitacional*.

Smart phones, good communities

Chapter Four unpacks a norm-form-affect cluster that is less immediately visible than condominiums, condoscapes, and their others, while similarly ubiquitous: area-based WhatsApp policing groups. In such digital spaces, encounters with (potential) criminality are translated into sharable content – an encouraged citizenship *practice*. Functioning as more than channels for narrative complaints around perceived urban danger, such groups encouraged security providers and recipients to sensibly perform and negotiate notions of "good" citizenship and "good" authority in a range of ways. Affording visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy to participant-police relations, these digital spaces enabled citizens to share, in real-time, the security-related practices of seeing and showing that made up their voluntary vigilant labour – and performed their willingness to partner with the local PM battalion. The same channels through which citizens became visible to peers and the police also allowed the police themselves to perform presence – even when not physically deployed to the sites where reported

occurrences took place. These groups afforded the sensible circulation of converging citizenship and policing norms across territories that were usually performed and narrated as fundamentally distinct urban (in)security contexts. This, however, does not mean that the immediate sociospatial context ceases to matter: the stakes, risks, and effects of active participation were very much shaped by one's positioning in Recife's fragmented urban landscape. Visibility, instantaneity, and intimacy were affordances that applied to citizen-police encounters in relationally different locales, but the surveillant aesthetics and affects that emerged within these broad frames for security (inter)action were situated matters. The vertical surveillance that this digital platform enabled and encouraged within condoscapes differed from the lateral vigilance they demanded from partner citizens of low-income communities – a form of seeing and showing that was potentially detrimental for the watcher and the watched.

Boundary citizens

The task of enacting seemingly suspicious or criminal subjects as threats within – and to – the dominant aesthetic order, as this dissertation shows, is distributed amongst a range of state and non-state actors, materialities, and technologies. Whether within informal urban security arrangements or formalized partnerships, it was a task increasingly demanded from those eager to be recognized, and enacted, as so-called "good" citizens and communities. As Chapter Five unpacked, however, street-level security workers were still deployed – while officially *employed* – for the making and maintenance of affective atmospheres of safety in Recife's South Zone, which entailed sorting citizens and clients from elements and *marginais*. As the chapter discussed, state and non-state forms of "ostensive" policing, understood broadly as the kind of policing intended to be seen and felt, enacted a seamless continuum between being the *citizen* and the *client*, while reading potential threats for the same classed and racialized markers. Both dimensions of bordering, as the chapter discussed, required the *affective labour* of policing actors. From this boundary positioning, emerged a boundary subjectivity that unveiled frictions and fragilities at the core of the police, in the

Rancièrian sense. Here, I am gesturing towards the subjects who are included in the police order of urban security, but ambivalently so; precariously treading the very sensible borders that their violence work is deployed to enforce.

Sensible shares, aesthetic divides, inequality affects

From the many urban security processes and relations that this dissertation engages, a range of circulating practices emerge as enactments of "good" citizenship in relation to urban security, which we might categorize as follows: first, *curating and maintaining built and sensorial environments* according to dominant articulations of the look and feel of safety; second, the largely visual *sensing, capturing, and sharing of (potential) criminal occurrences*; and third, the *active recognition of and submission to security authority*. Meanwhile, practices that enacted "good" authority tended to share an emphasis on *performing flexible, ubiquitous, and immediate presence*. The norms that this thesis has unpacked circulate across spaces that *recifenses* and policing workers commonly perceive and enact as different worlds, when it comes to law-breaking and law-enforcing.

While the aesthetic consensus enacted by these sensible security arrangements staged a self-evident complementarity between active citizens, and present policing, these orderings also enacted divisions. Here, I suggest, that the processual and relational crafting of this aesthetic order reproduces sociospatial inequalities in two key ways. Perhaps most evidently, the forms and affects that compose it work to solidify classed and racialized imaginaries of which people, places, and offenses should be the target of security attention. Muggings, for instance, alongside other property-related crimes, mobilized the attention of citizens and the police as occurrences that victimize "good people" – in contrast with homicides, widely held as the fate of "bad people", involved in illegal practices and, therefore, killable. Aesthetic markers associated with class, race, gender, age – and, importantly, address – were similarly sensed, captured, and circulated as relevant risk factors,

perpetuating all too familiar *otherings*. Less familiar, perhaps, are the forms of inequality that emerge amongst those who share a dedication to the citizenship agendas discussed here, but who are situated differently in Recife's urban landscape.

In spatial terms, these "good citizen" subjectivities complicate the contiguous surfaces and fixed borders that divided city images and imaginaries evoke, suggesting instead a *topological* take on citizenship, tethered to "dynamic and continuous fields of relations" (Hepworth, 2015, p. 112), rather than on fixed localities and borders. Even if outside of fixed dualisms, though, the arrangements of sensible security presented and analysed continued to shape spatial processes and experiences along classed and racialized lines.

As I suggest throughout this thesis, the aesthetic ordering of urban security is predicated in differentiating *citizens*, *condôminos*, and *clients* – those who are seen, heard and felt as the rightful recipients of security services, whether state or non-state – from their others, the *marginais*, *bandidos*, and *meliantes*. There is a strong affective component to *how* these differences are performed in the everyday. The affects that mundane security practices and materialities are orchestrated to engender – that is, the affects that are object-targets of security (Anderson, 2015) – vary, in accordance with the subject in question. While those who appear as citizens, *condôminos*, and clients are attuned to a sense of safety, their classed and racialized others are attuned to a sense of apprehension in policing encounters – especially when traversing spaces where they are perceived as out of place.

An *affective sense of inequality* also circulated amongst marginalized subjects as they precariously partook in urban policing practices. This formulation draws on Wendy Bottero's (2019) engagement with inequality through the normative dispositions of ordinary people, who are often required to morally substantiate their actions, as well as valuate those of others. As Bottero (2019) argues, this also entails subjects and collectives being able to oppose norms that are dominant. Experiences such as "suffering, disrespect and stigmatization", she suggests (ibid., p. 89), "represent powerful affective

forces generating dissent and struggle". The different analytical threads that this dissertation weaves together do not seek to establish a direct and causal relation between the affective sense of "a wrong" (Rancière, 1999, p. 35) and the emergence of sensible dissent. More modestly, though, it suggests that an affective sense of inequality within a given distribution of the sensible affords the conditions for its disruption: for the "wrong people" (Panagia, 2012, p. 100) to emerge as sensible political subjects.

Samenvatting

Op basis van etnografisch onderzoek in Recife analyseert dit proefschrift hoe normen en waarden met betrekking tot burgerschap en autoriteit worden gedeeld, betwist en uitgevoerd in de alledaagse ruimtes, praktijken en ontmoetingen van stedelijke veiligheid in de Braziliaanse staat Pernambuco. Het proefschrift stelt twee overkoepelende vragen: Hoe worden normen van burgerschap en gezag ge(re)produceerd in alledaagse stedelijke veiligheidspraktijken? En hoe beïnvloeden deze praktijken de productie en instandhouding van sociaalruimtelijk verschil en ongelijkheid in Recife? Bij het beantwoorden van deze vragen heb ik me gericht op hoe burgerschaps- en autoriteitsnormen in de praktijk worden gebracht. Hierbij bestudeer ik hoe onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen "goede" en "slechte" burgers, politie-actoren en "politie-burgers" in zintuigelijk waarneembare vormen van stedelijke veiligheid en de affectieve reacties die deze vormen (willen) uitlokken. Een zintuigelijk-politieke consensus, die gevormd wordt door de esthetiek van stedelijke veiligheid, reproduceert en normaliseert sociale en ruimtelijke differentiatie, voornamelijk in termen van klasse en ras. Verschillend gepositioneerde subjecten krijgen een aandeel in de totstandkoming van deze esthetische en affectieve orde, die zowel verschil als gemeenschappelijkheid creëert. Hoewel deze Rancièriaanse "politieorde" vanzelfsprekend en alomvattend lijkt, bevat deze ook politieke spanningen, die uitdrukking krijgen in dezelfde alledaagse processen en relaties die deze orde vormen.

Met deze benadering draagt dit proefschrift bij aan actuele debatten over stedelijke veiligheid, burgerschap en ongelijkheid. Bestaand onderzoek legt een sterke nadruk op het bestuur van stedelijke (on)veiligheid, en of *wie politietaken uitvoert* (bijv. Beall et al., 2013; Davis, 2020; Koonings en Kruijt, 2007, 2015; Muggah, 2014). Deze literatuur belicht hoe burgerschapsdifferentiaties voortkomen uit zwak of falend veiligheidsbeheer, en richt zich daarbij meestal op achterstandswijken - waar overigens ook de veerkracht van burgers wordt herkend. Een ander debat richt zich op *wie er aan politiecontrole wordt onderworpen*, waarbij wordt benadrukt hoe binnen verschillende vormen van veiligheidsvoorziening bepaalde levens verwaarloosbaar worden, langs

scheidslijnen van klasse en ras (bijv. Alves, 2018; Costa Vargas, 2018; Hansen, 2006; Denyer Willis, 2015 Mbembe, 2003). Deze wetenschappers benaderen de productie van niet-burgers meer als een gericht politiek veiligheids*project*, dan als een falen van veiligheidsbeleid. Ten slotte heeft een derde debat zich gericht op hoe autoriteit en burgerschap relationeel vorm krijgen binnen politie-ontmoetingen (bijv. Fassin, 2013; Harriott en Jaffe, 2018). Dit onderzoek belicht hoe veiligheidsautoriteit en burgerschap elkaar vormen, met een nadruk op de alledaagse processen waarin klasse- en geracialiseerd verschil wordt geproduceerd, in stand gehouden, maar ook betwist - zelfs binnen zeer ongelijke en gefragmenteerde stedelijke contexten.

Dit proefschrift verbindt deze debatten, en geeft ze een nieuwe wending door de nadruk te leggen op de productie, verspreiding en onderhandeling van burgerschaps- en veiligheidsnormen, waarbij het deze normen benadert door zich te richten op de esthetische en affectieve dimensies van stedelijke veiligheid. Deze benadering brengt antropologisch onderzoek naar alledaagse normatieve processen van subject- en gemeenschapsvorming (e.g., Holston, 2008; de Koning et al. 2015; Lazar, 2013) in dialoog met recent werk naar de esthetisch-affectieve dimensies van politiek (e.g., Adey, 2014; Bargetz, 2015; Ghertner, 2014; Ghertner et al. 2019; Navaro-Yashin, 2012; Rancière, 2013, 2015). Een dergelijke benadering van burgerschap en autoriteit, dat de verbanden tussen normen, esthetische vormen en affecten centraal zet, verdiept ons begrip van zowel de normalisering als de mogelijke ontwrichting van ongelijke stedelijke ordes.

Door de alledaagse stadsveiligheidspraktijken te duiden aan de hand van Rancières (2013) concept van de "verdeling van het waarneembare", dat ook een *verdeling van belichaamde affecten* inhoudt (cf. Bargetz, 2015), bevraagt dit proefschrift de burgerschaps- en politienormen en de affectieve sferen die door stedelijke veiligheid gegenereerd worden. Zoals ik steeds benadruk, ensceneren dergelijke beveiligingspraktijken een esthetische orde waarin actieve burgers en politieagenten elk een complementair deel vormen: een politieorde in de Rancièriaanse zin. In de empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift analyseer ik een breed scala aan *zintuigelijk waarneembare beveiligingsassemblages*, waarin statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren, materialiteiten

en technologieën worden betrokken met het doel sferen van veiligheid en angst te creëren. Mijn analyse van hoe stedelijke veiligheidsvormen en -affecten normatieve begrippen van "goed burgerschap" en "goed gezag" genereren, verspreiden maar ook ontwrichten, is ontwikkeld op basis van drie alomtegenwoordige veiligheidsvormen, verbonden met verschillende delen van Recifes Zuidzone: verticale *condominiums*, WhatsApp buurtpreventiegroepen, en publieke en private vormen van beveiliging op straatniveau. Hieronder vat ik de verschillende hoofdstukken kort samen, waarna ik de kerninzichten die uit deze hoofdstukken voortkomen bespreek.

Van modder, marmer en spiegels

Zowel stedelijke ontwikkeling als bestuurlijke interventies richten zich reeds lang op Recifes esthetische en materiële vormen, laat hoofdstuk twee zien. Deze interventies zijn steeds geënt op verschillende visies van de "goede" stad en de "goede" stadsburger, opvattingen die op verschillende manieren in stedelijke beveiliging terugkomen. Esthetische dichotomieën die verband houden met de gepolariseerde uitbreiding van de (post-)koloniale stad – zoals droog/nat, formeel/informeel en hoog/laag – zijn historisch als sociaaleconomische en geracialiseerde termen geïnterpreteerd. Hygiënische, ontwikkelings- en veiligheidsnormen hebben hun weerslag gevonden in het stedelijke landschap van Recife, dat zo de materiële basis vormt voor de uitsluiting van "gevaarlijke" mensen en plaatsen - en soms voor het verzet tegen deze uitsluiting. In dit hoofdstuk beschrijf ik de historische materiële en ruimtelijke ordening van Recife niet zozeer als een lineair traject dat rechtstreeks leidt tot de hedendaagse processen die in latere hoofdstukken besproken worden, maar als eerdere configuraties van relaties die nog steeds actief en doorlopend zijn, en die relevant zijn om de materiële en ruimtelijke dimensies van stedelijke veiligheid, burgerschap en ongelijkheid te begrijpen.

Condoscapes

Dergelijke ruimtelijke en materiële dimensies staan centraal in hoofdstuk drie, dat zich richt op de veiligheidsnormen, -vormen en affecten van flatgebouwen (*condominiums*), zoals die zich binnen en buiten de grenzen van hun poort-muur-*portaria*-hoogbouwcombinaties manifesteren. Hoewel deze woonvorm zich kenmerkt door expliciete gedragsregels, die het gedrag binnen de condominiumgrenzen moeten reguleren, zien we hier ook meer stilzwijgende verbanden gelegd worden tussen de veiligheid van bewoners en sociaaleconomische en geracialiseerde segregatie. De typische veiligheidssferen die deze alomtegenwoordige stedelijke vorm biedt zijn ook buiten de formele grenzen van individuele enclaves te herkennen. Dergelijke hoogbouw vormt niet allen zelf een securityscape (Maguire en Low, 2019), het beïnvloedt ook elders de ruimtelijke gedaante van veiligheid. De snelle en geclusterde verspreiding van condominiums, met name in de Zuidzone van Recife, heeft van de omliggende lagere gebieden *condoscapes* gemaakt. Buiten de affectieve sferen die condominiums in hun directe omgeving produceren, worden materiële en immateriële condo-elementen in volkswijken opgenomen, als gevolg van "beschavende" impulsen (vgl. Kopper 2016, p. 205) maar ook van de daadwerkelijke veiligheidsproblemen en condo-achtige ambities van bewoners. Muren, poorten en *síndicos* (beheerders) vormen echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs een condominium: in het geval van de hier besproken *habitacional* (sociale woningbouw), leken condo-normen en -vormen "niet op hun plaats", wat bijdroeg aan een affectief gevoel van ongelijkheid (vgl. Bottero, 2019) onder bewoners.

Slimme telefoons, goede gemeenschappen

Hoofdstuk vier belicht een norm-vorm-affectcluster dat minder direct zichtbaar is dan flats, condoscapes en hun anderen, maar even alomtegenwoordig: WhatsApp-buurtpreventiegroepen. In deze digitale ruimtes worden ervaringen met (potentiële) criminaliteit vertaald naar deelbare inhoud – een aangemoedigde burgerschaps*praktijk*. Dergelijke groepen fungeren als meer dan alleen kanalen voor verhalende klachten over

waargenomen stedelijk gevaar, ze moedigen beveiligers en beveiligden ook aan om noties van "goed" burgerschap en "goed" gezag waarneembaar uit te voeren en te betwisten. Door zichtbaarheid, onmiddellijkheid en intimiteit te bieden aan de relaties tussen deelnemers en politie, stelden deze digitale ruimtes burgers in staat om in real-time de veiligheidspraktijken van zien en laten zien (die deel uitmaakten van hun vrijwillige waakzame arbeid) te delen, evenals hun bereidheid om samen te werken met het plaatselijke militaire politiebataljon. Dezelfde kanalen die burgers zichtbaar maakten voor elkaar en voor de politie maakten ook de aanwezigheid van de politie zelf mogelijk, zelfs als deze niet fysiek werden ingezet op de locaties waar gemelde voorvallen plaatsvonden. Deze Whatsappgroepen zorgden er op waarneembare wijze voor dat burgerschaps- en politienormen convergeerden in wijken die meestal als fundamenteel verschillende stedelijke (on)veiligheidscontexten begrepen werden. Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat de sociaalruimtelijke context niet meer relevant was: de inzet, risico's en effecten van actieve deelname aan Whatsapp groepen werden sterk gevormd door hoe individuen gesitueerd waren binnen het gefragmenteerde stedelijke landschap van Recife. Deze groepen maakten zichtbaarheid, onmiddellijkheid en intimiteit mogelijk binnen politie-burger relaties op verschillende locaties, maar de esthetiek en affecten van surveillance bleven ruimtelijk gedifferentieerd. Het verticale toezicht dat Whatsappgroepen binnen *condoscapes* aanmoedigden, verschilde van de horizontale waakzaamheid die ze eisten van deelnemers uit armere wijken, waarbij deze laatste vorm van zien en laten zien potentieel schadelijk was voor zowel kijker als bekekene.

Grensburgers

Het creëren van schijnbaar verdachte of criminele subjecten als bedreigingen binnen – en voor – de dominante esthetische orde wordt, zo laat dit proefschrift zien, verricht door een reeks publieke en private actoren, materialiteiten en technologieën. Of het nu ging om informele stedelijke veiligheidsregelingen of geformaliseerde partnerschappen, dit werk werd in toenemende mate geëist van degenen die graag erkend wilden worden als "goede" burgers en gemeenschappen. Hoofdstuk vijf laat echter zien dat, naast deze

vormen van burgerparticipatie, professionele beveiliging op straatniveau nog steeds volop wordt ingezet, met name om affectieve veiligheidssferen te creëren en onderhouden, wat vaak de scheiding van burgers en klanten enerzijds, en "elementen" en *marginais* anderzijds inhield. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt hoe binnen publieke en private vormen van affectief politiewerk, in brede zin opgevat als het soort politiewerk dat gezien en gevoeld hoorde te worden, *burger* en *cliënt* een naadloos continuüm vormden, terwijl potentiële bedreigingen nog steeds aan de hand van sociaaleconomische en geracialiseerde kenmerken werden "herkend". Deze vormen van categorisering vereisten dat politie-actoren *affectieve arbeid* verrichten. Door hun eigen positionering op de grens tussen burger en bedreiging ontstond een grenssubjectiviteit die fricties en kwetsbaarheden binnen de Rancièriaanse politieorde onthulde. Deze grensburgers zijn deel van in de politieorde van stedelijke veiligheid, maar ervaren ook een zekere ambivalentie; zij leven zelf in het sociale grensgebied dat zij dienen te bewaken.

Waarneembare aandelen, esthetische scheidslijnen, ongelijkheidsaffecten

De diverse stedelijke veiligheidsprocessen en -relaties die in dit proefschrift aan bod komen laten een gemeenschappelijke reeks praktijken zien, die "goed" burgerschap behelzen in het kader van stedelijke veiligheid: ten eerste, *het beheren en onderhouden van de gebouwde en zintuiglijke omgeving* naar heersend begrip van een veiligheidsgevoel; ten tweede, het grotendeels visueel *waarnemen, vastleggen en delen van (potentieel) criminele gebeurtenissen*; en ten derde, de *actieve erkenning van en onderwerping aan de veiligheidsautoriteit*. Ondertussen deelden praktijken die de status van "goede" autoriteit nastreefden een nadruk op het *uitdragen van flexibele, alomtegenwoordige en onmiddellijke aanwezigheid*. De normen die dit proefschrift belicht worden gedeeld door stadsdelen die inwoners van Recife en politieagenten gewoonlijk als verschillende werelden beschouwen, als het gaat om het overtreden en handhaven van de wet.

Terwijl de esthetische consensus die deze waarneembare veiligheidsregelingen vervaardigden een vanzelfsprekende complementariteit tussen actieve burgers en de aanwezige politie suggereerde, bracht deze ordening ook verdeeldheid met zich mee. Deze esthetische ordening op reproduceert twee belangrijke manieren sociaal-ruimtelijke ongelijkheden. Ten eerste versterken de vormen en affecten waaruit deze consensus bestaat de sociaaleconomische en geracialiseerde verbeelding van welke mensen, plaatsen en overtredingen veiligheidsaandacht verdienen. Overvallen en andere vermogensdelicten werden door burgers en de politie gezien als voorvallen waarvan "goede mensen" het slachtoffer waren. Moorden daarentegen werden vaak beschouwd als het lot van "slechte mensen", die betrokken waren bij illegale praktijken, en om wiens sterven minder of niet gerouwd werd. Op vergelijkbare wijze werden esthetische kenmerken die samenhangen met klasse, ras, geslacht, leeftijd - en, belangrijker nog, adres - als relevante risicofactoren waargenomen, vastgelegd en verspreid, met als gevolg al te bekende vormen van uitsluiting. Minder bekend zijn misschien de vormen van ongelijkheid die opduiken onder degenen die ook toegewijd zijn aan de hier besproken heersende burgerschapsagenda's, maar die een minder gepriviligeerde positie innemen binnen het stedelijke landschap van Recife.

In ruimtelijke termen overstijgen de gedeelde subjectiviteiten van "goede burgers" de zogenaamd onoverkomelijke grenzen tussen arm en rijk binnen "verdeelde steden". Deze gemeenschappelijkheid suggereert eerder een *topologische* kijk op burgerschap, gevormd door "dynamische en continue velden van relaties" (Hepworth, 2015, p. 112), in plaats van vaststaande plaatsen en grenzen. Maar al compliceerden de hier besproken arrangementen van waarneembare veiligheid gangbare dualismen, ze bleven desalniettemin ruimtelijke processen en ervaringen vormgeven langs lijnen van klasse en ras.

Zoals ik in dit proefschrift betoog, leunt de esthetische ordening van stedelijke veiligheid op het onderscheiden van *burgers, condôminos* en *klanten* - degenen die als de rechtmatige ontvangers van bescherming door publieke of private veiligheidsdiensten worden gezien, gehoord en gevoeld - van hun

tegenhangers, de *marginais*, *bandidos* en *meliantes*. De alledaagse productie van deze categorieën kent een sterk affectieve component. De effecten die alledaagse beveiligingspraktijken en materialiteiten moeten veroorzaken - dat wil zeggen, de effecten die het doel van beveiliging zijn (Anderson, 2015) - variëren, afhankelijk van het subject in kwestie. Terwijl degenen die verschijnen als burgers, *condominos* en klanten zijn afgestemd op een gevoel van veiligheid, zijn hun sociaal-economische en geracialiseerde anderen afgestemd op een gevoel van angst bij politie-ontmoetingen, vooral wanneer ze in ruimtes komen waar hun aanwezigheid als misplaatst worden ervaren.

Een *affectief gevoel van ongelijkheid* circuleerde ook onder gemarginaliseerde subjecten die op precaire wijze een rol speelden binnen stedelijke politiepraktijken. Dit concept baseer ik op Wendy Bottero (2019), die ongelijkheid benadert via de normatieve disposities van gewone mensen, van wie vaak wordt verlangd dat ze hun acties moreel onderbouwen en die van anderen in dezelfde termen beoordelen. Zoals Bottero (2019) stelt, houdt dit ook in dat subjecten en collectieven zich kunnen verzetten tegen dominante normen. Ervaringen als "lijden, gebrek aan respect en stigmatisering", suggereert zij (ibid., p. 89), "vertegenwoordigen sterke affectieve krachten die afwijkende meningen en strijd genereren". De verschillende analytische draden die deze dissertatie samenweeft, leggen niet zo zeer een direct causaal verband tussen het affectieve gevoel van "een fout" (Rancière, 1999, p. 35) en het ontstaan van een waarneembare *dissensus*. Meer bescheiden suggereert het wel dat een affectief gevoel van ongelijkheid, binnen een bepaalde verdeling van het waarneembare, de voorwaarden biedt voor de ontwrichting van die verdeling, wanneer de "foute mensen" (Panagia, 2012, p. 100) op de voorgrond treden als waarneembare politieke subjecten.