

Appendix A: Information on expert survey

The paper relies on a new dataset – the 2019 European Parliament Election Expert Survey dataset (EPEES_19) – based on expert judgments about campaign strategies of parties competing in the 2019 EP election. Following the procedure developed for national elections worldwide (e.g., Nai, 2018; Nai, 2020), a sample of domestic and international scholars with expertise in politics and elections was contacted in all 28 EU member states in the direct aftermath of the election (i.e. on May 27, 2019) and asked to provide their opinion on several aspects of the election, including the campaign strategies of competing parties. We define an “expert” as a scholar with expertise in electoral politics, political communication, and/or electoral behavior, or related disciplines, for the country where the election was held. “Expertise” is established by the presence of one of the following criteria: (1) existing relevant academic publications (including conference papers); (2) holding a chair in those disciplines in a department within the country; (3) membership in a relevant research group, professional network, or organized section of such a group; (4) explicit self-assessed expertise on a professional webpage (e.g., bio-note on a university webpage). Two reminders were sent out at one-week intervals. In total, 381 of the 2,525 experts contacted answered the questionnaire, which makes a response rate of about 15% and 13.6 experts per country on average; this average is comparable to an expert sample we ran to assess campaign communication in elections worldwide (e.g., Maier and Nai, 2020) and substantially higher than in other studies based on expert ratings, for instance on US presidents (see, e.g., Lilienfeld et al., 2012). The number of expert ratings collected varies considerably across the 28 countries (Table A2 below).

The current dataset contains information for 191 parties having competed in the 28 EU member states, based on aggregated ratings of the experts who participated in our survey. For each country, we asked experts to rate up to ten parties. The sample of parties should in general include the most important parties competing in the 2019 EP elections. The selection of parties included in the questionnaire depended on their relative strength in pre-electoral polls (e.g., POLITICO’s “Poll of Polls”¹) and recent national elections. A list of the parties represented in our sample can be found in Table A1 below.

Using expert ratings to assess party positions (on European integration) is certainly not a new approach. Quite a number of studies in this field use expert data (e.g., Bakker et al., 2015; Benoit and Laver, 2007; Ray, 1999). However, measuring parties’ *campaign communication* using this data source might seem somewhat more unusual, although this technique has been successfully applied in this field recently (e.g., Nai, 2018; Nai, 2020). The standard approach in the discipline consists of content analyzing communication events and discursive material, such as campaign ads, posters, manifestos, press releases, online communication on websites or social media channels, or media coverage of the campaign. The advantage of measures obtained through content analysis is that the discursive universe is known, and the coding can be monitored and verified (for instance through intercoder

¹ <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/>

reliability assessments); on the other hand, the classical approach suffers from several shortcomings that hinder comparative research. First, it is an excessively expensive and time-consuming method, with the direct consequence of reducing the number of the compared cases and countries to keep the costs at bay. Second, the relative importance of specific communication channels is likely to vary across countries. Furthermore, for some sorts of campaign communication the measured level has been shown to be a function of the medium (for instance for negative campaigning, see, e.g., Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010; Walter and Vliegthart, 2010); in this sense, scholars comparing campaign communication across countries by looking only at specific communication channels could run the risk of obtaining a skewed image of the overall campaign. Relying on expert judgments – and, more specifically, on systematic surveys in which experts are asked to provide ratings about the national campaign on the whole, and not on a specific channel (see below) – allows us to address all these shortcomings simultaneously (Gélineau and Blais, 2015). Although expert surveys have been the target of important methodological critiques on the one hand (Budge, 2000; McDonald et al., 2007), scholarship has on the other hand shown that there generally is a high level of agreement among expert-respondents regarding the positioning of parties, even on specific issues (Hooghe et al., 2010; Whitefield et al., 2007), that expert surveys align quite well with the perceptions of citizens (Bakker et al., 2015), and that responses of experts show substantial correlations with other content analyses of campaign material (e.g., Maier and Nai, 2020).

Table A1: Parties under investigation

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
			Mean	SD	Mean	Mean
Austria	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Yes	5,36	2,06	7,02	5,00
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)	No	5,29	1,59	4,64	6,10
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Yes	3,93	2,09	7,02	2,30
Austria	Die Grünen	No	7,14	1,75	4,64	6,50
Austria	NEOS	No	8,64	1,45	4,64	6,70
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	Yes	1,80	1,23	2,88	4,25
Belgium	Humanist Democratic Centre (cdH)	No	2,63	2,62	3,37	6,42
Belgium	Socialist Party (PS)	No	2,89	2,93	3,37	6,08
Belgium	Ecolo / Groen	No	4,73	3,29	3,37	6,58
Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)	Yes	4,22	3,38	2,88	6,58
Belgium	Reformist Movement (MR)	Yes	3,00	2,92	2,88	6,50
Belgium	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open-VLD)	Yes	4,44	3,17	2,88	6,83
Belgium	Workers' Party (PVDA/PTB)	No	3,18	2,99	3,37	2,73
Belgium	Socialist Party Different (sp.a)	No	2,50	2,73	3,37	6,00
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	No	1,36	1,50	3,37	2,25
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)	Yes	5,74	2,21	3,40	6,55
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)	No	2,84	1,68	4,74	5,10
Bulgaria	United Patriots	Yes	3,74	2,00	3,40	n.a.
Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)	No	5,00	2,12	4,74	6,25
Bulgaria	Volya	No	2,35	1,37	4,74	3,50
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	Yes	5,19	2,40	3,58	6,67
Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)	No	4,94	1,95	5,19	6,63
Croatia	Human Shield (Živi zid)	No	2,69	2,36	5,19	1,82
Croatia	Bridge of Independent Lists (Most)	No	2,57	1,55	5,19	3,82
Croatia	START	No	4,18	2,27	5,19	n.a.
Croatia	Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)	No	3,55	1,97	5,19	6,38
Cyprus	Democratic Rally (DISY)	Yes	3,33	1,03	2,38	6,00
Cyprus	Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	No	2,83	1,60	3,33	5,00

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
Cyprus	Democratic Party (DIKO)	No	3,33	,82	3,33	6,00
Cyprus	Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK)	No	2,20	1,64	3,33	5,50
Cyprus	National Popular Front (ELAM)	No	1,17	1,47	3,33	3,50
Czech Republic	ANO 2011	Yes	4,60	2,12	5,83	4,48
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	No	5,20	1,99	5,25	3,78
Czech Republic	Czech Pirate Party	No	5,50	1,72	5,25	6,12
Czech Republic	Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)	No	6,00	2,69	5,25	1,48
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	No	5,11	1,45	5,25	2,37
Czech Republic	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	Yes	5,90	1,85	5,83	5,74
Czech Republic	Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU–ČSL)	No	6,00	1,63	5,25	6,22
Czech Republic	STAN	No	6,70	1,16	5,25	6,52
Czech Republic	TOP 09	No	6,30	1,34	5,25	4,38
Denmark	Socialdemokratiet (A)	No	5,43	2,76	5,36	5,07
Denmark	Venstre (V)	Yes	5,29	2,87	5,69	5,79
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (O)	No	4,43	2,37	5,36	2,00
Denmark	Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne (Ø)	No	6,00	2,38	5,36	2,43
Denmark	Radikale Venstre (B)	No	6,00	3,11	5,36	6,93
Denmark	Socialistik Folkeparti (F)	No	5,57	3,41	5,36	5,14
Denmark	Folkebevægelsen mod EU (N)	No	6,29	3,09	5,36	n.a.
Denmark	Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF)	Yes	5,43	3,05	5,69	5,71
Denmark	Alternativet (Å)	No	6,14	3,18	5,36	5,38
Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	No	4,43	2,37	4,64	6,58
Estonia	Estonian Centre Party	Yes	3,50	1,52	5,68	5,50
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE)	Yes	5,29	2,29	5,68	2,08
Estonia	Pro Patria (Isamaa)	Yes	5,14	1,57	5,68	5,08
Estonia	Social Democratic Party (SDE)	No	6,00	1,41	4,64	6,58
Estonia	Estonia 200	No	6,60	2,07	4,64	6,75
Finland	Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)	Yes	7,25	1,39	6,88	5,93
Finland	Finns Party	No	6,25	1,83	7,48	1,64
Finland	National Coalition Party (NCP)	No	7,67	1,00	7,48	6,43
Finland	Centre Party (KESK)	Yes	6,25	1,83	6,88	4,86

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
Finland	Green League (VIHR)	Yes	8,67	,71	6,88	6,50
Finland	Left Alliance (V)	Yes	7,67	1,22	6,88	5,07
Finland	Swedish People's Party of Finland (SFP)	Yes	7,56	1,88	6,88	6,43
Finland	Christian Democrats (KD)	No	6,71	2,06	7,48	3,93
France	La République En Marche (REM)	Yes	7,11	1,27	5,89	6,83
France	Les Républicains (LR)	No	5,13	1,81	7,11	5,50
France	Rassemblement National (RN)	No	5,00	2,60	7,11	1,38
France	Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV)	No	7,22	1,79	7,11	6,38
France	La France insoumise (FI)	No	6,13	1,81	7,11	2,88
France	Parti socialiste (PS)	No	6,00	1,53	7,11	6,13
Germany	CDU/CSU	Yes	6,09	2,01	6,12	5,99
Germany	SPD	Yes	6,57	1,90	6,12	6,52
Germany	FDP	No	6,13	1,82	6,33	5,76
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	No	7,32	2,19	6,33	6,76
Germany	Die Linke	No	5,84	2,11	6,33	4,71
Germany	AfD	No	5,19	2,69	6,33	1,90
Greece	New Democracy (ND)	No	2,91	2,17	3,45	6,89
Greece	Syriza	Yes	3,45	1,92	2,68	5,00
Greece	Golden Dawn	No	2,00	2,65	3,45	1,22
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	No	2,60	1,90	3,45	1,11
Greece	Movement for Change (KINAL)	No	3,22	2,54	3,45	n.a.
Hungary	Fidesz–KDNP Party Alliance	Yes	6,92	3,25	6,13	3,07
Hungary	Jobbik	No	5,17	2,69	6,92	3,79
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	No	5,92	2,69	6,92	6,50
Hungary	Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	No	6,54	2,33	6,92	5,53
Hungary	Democratic Coalition (DK)	No	7,92	2,14	6,92	6,93
Hungary	Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk)	No	5,08	3,26	6,92	n.a.
Ireland	Fine Gael	Yes	4,57	0,98	4,10	6,29
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	No	4,14	1,46	4,57	6,14
Ireland	Páirtí an Lucht Oibre (Labour)	No	4,67	1,21	4,57	6,14
Ireland	Sinn Féin	No	3,50	2,59	4,57	3,71
Italy	Partito Democratico (PD)	No	5,29	1,72	4,45	6,79
Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S)	Yes	4,22	2,37	5,34	3,47
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	No	4,13	1,85	4,45	4,89

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
Italy	Lega	Yes	4,69	2,63	5,34	1,68
Italy	Fratelli d'Italia (FdI)	No	4,29	2,26	4,45	1,95
Italy	Più Europa (+E)	No	8,06	1,64	4,45	n.a.
Italy	La Sinistra (LS)	No	4,91	1,45	4,45	5,27
Latvia	Social Democratic Party 'Harmony'	No	2,86	2,48	5,48	5,55
Latvia	New Conservative Party (JKP)	Yes	4,50	2,35	3,26	5,73
Latvia	National Alliance (NA)	Yes	4,50	1,85	3,26	4,73
Latvia	Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS)	No	3,67	1,63	5,48	4,82
Latvia	Unity (V)	Yes	7,63	2,26	3,26	6,80
Latvia	Development/For! (AP!)	Yes	7,29	1,98	3,26	6,64
Latvia	Who owns the state? (KPV)	Yes	3,50	3,51	3,26	5,09
Lithuania	Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD)	No	7,11	2,03	6,21	6,82
Lithuania	Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVŽS)	Yes	5,75	1,91	5,59	5,45
Lithuania	Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP)	Yes	6,67	1,94	5,59	6,73
Lithuania	Party Order and Justice (PTT)	No	5,13	2,30	6,21	3,64
Lithuania	Labour Party (DP)	No	5,13	2,10	6,21	5,10
Lithuania	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance (LLRA–KŠS)	No	5,00	2,18	6,21	4,50
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party (CSV)	No	8,50	0,71	7,83	6,50
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP)	Yes	7,50	0,71	7,00	6,50
Luxembourg	Democratic Party (DP)	Yes	8,50	0,71	7,00	6,50
Luxembourg	The Greens	Yes	7,50	0,71	7,00	6,57
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR)	No	6,50	0,71	7,83	4,00
Luxembourg	Pirate Party Luxembourg	No	n.a.	n.a.	7,83	4,50
Luxembourg	Déi Lénk	No	6,00	0,00	7,83	4,00
Malta	Labour Party (PL)	Yes	2,30	1,42	3,21	6,14
Malta	Nationalist Party (PN)	No	3,20	2,44	2,30	6,57
Malta	Democratic Party (PD)	No	3,22	2,59	2,30	n.a.
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)	Yes	3,22	2,73	4,49	2,95
Poland	Civic Platform (PO)	No	5,56	2,24	3,22	6,67
Poland	Kukiz'15	No	3,22	2,22	3,22	3,11

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
Poland	Spring (Wiosna)	No	4,90	2,18	3,22	6,89
Poland	Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	No	4,89	2,03	3,22	6,57
Poland	Polish People's Party (PSL)	No	4,38	1,69	3,22	5,14
Poland	Liberty (KORWiN)	No	4,00	2,60	3,22	1,37
Portugal	Partido Socialista (PS)	Yes	3,05	2,30	3,65	6,75
Portugal	Partido Social Democrata (PPD/PSD)	No	2,95	1,81	3,05	6,75
Portugal	Partido Popular (CDS-PP)	No	2,58	2,09	3,05	5,88
Portugal	Bloco de Esquerda (BE)	No	4,95	2,61	3,05	3,75
Portugal	Partido Comunista Português (PCP)	No	4,12	2,39	3,05	2,75
Romania	National Liberal Party (PNL)	No	3,40	1,90	3,15	6,27
Romania	Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Yes	3,10	1,66	3,91	4,00
Romania	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)	Yes	3,20	2,20	3,91	5,00
Romania	PRO Romania	No	3,56	2,35	3,15	5,40
Romania	Save Romania Union (USR)	No	4,00	2,16	3,15	6,75
Romania	Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party (PLUS)	No	4,00	2,16	3,15	n.a.
Romania	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ)	No	3,50	1,60	3,15	n.a.
Romania	People's Movement Party (PMP)	No	5,00	2,49	3,15	5,67
Slovakia	Direction – Social Democracy (SD)	Yes	4,57	2,07	4,72	5,19
Slovakia	Progressive Slovakia (PS)	No	8,14	1,35	4,52	6,87
Slovakia	Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	No	5,43	2,15	4,52	4,13
Slovakia	Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia	No	2,00	3,32	4,52	1,31
Slovakia	We Are Family	No	3,14	2,79	4,52	3,13
Slovakia	Ordinary People (OĽaNO)	No	4,17	2,23	4,52	4,75
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	Yes	3,14	2,12	4,72	3,07
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	No	5,43	1,51	4,52	5,19
Slovakia	Most–Híd	Yes	5,86	1,77	4,72	6,67
Slovenia	List of Marjan Šarec (LMSŠ)	Yes	4,40	1,67	3,96	6,00
Slovenia	Social Democrats (SD)	Yes	5,00	1,87	3,96	6,47
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)	No	2,75	0,96	4,27	5,13
Slovenia	New Slovenia – Christian Democrats (NSi)	No	3,50	1,29	4,27	6,00
Slovenia	The Left (Levica)	No	6,20	2,17	4,27	4,13
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party (SNS)	No	3,40	2,30	4,27	2,67

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS)	Yes	3,40	1,14	3,96	5,53
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	Yes	4,70	2,54	2,96	6,80
Spain	Partido Popular (PP)	No	4,20	2,20	4,70	6,47
Spain	Ciudadanos (Cs)	No	3,80	2,35	4,70	6,73
Spain	Unidas Podemos	No	3,80	2,39	4,70	5,27
Spain	VOX	No	1,90	1,45	4,70	3,27
Spain	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	No	1,80	1,93	4,70	5,53
Spain	Junts per Catalunya (JxC)	No	2,10	2,23	4,70	5,13
Spain	Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)	No	3,11	2,67	4,70	6,40
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party (S)	Yes	5,86	2,07	5,81	5,75
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	No	5,21	2,42	6,85	2,24
Sweden	Moderate Party (M)	No	4,92	2,36	6,85	6,06
Sweden	Christian Democrats (KD)	No	5,54	2,44	6,85	5,82
Sweden	Green Party (MP)	Yes	7,85	1,77	5,81	5,12
Sweden	Left Party (V)	No	6,38	2,47	6,85	3,18
Sweden	Centre Party (C)	No	7,00	1,73	6,85	6,06
The Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	Yes	5,85	1,97	6,34	5,08
The Netherlands	Christian Union (CU)	Yes	6,27	1,62	6,34	4,00
The Netherlands	Forum for Democracy (FvD)	No	5,69	2,68	6,32	1,08
The Netherlands	GreenLeft (GL)	No	7,36	1,11	6,32	6,46
The Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Yes	5,29	1,62	6,34	5,33
The Netherlands	Labour Party (PvdA)	No	7,44	1,55	6,32	5,92
The Netherlands	D66	Yes	7,88	1,42	6,34	6,92
The Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	No	5,60	2,87	6,32	1,31
The Netherlands	Socialist Party (SP)	No	6,04	2,09	6,32	2,83
The Netherlands	Party for the Animals (PvdD)	No	5,93	1,98	6,32	2,64
UK	Conservative Party	Yes	3,59	3,02	4,77	1,53
UK	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	No	3,93	3,22	3,59	n.a.
UK	Labour Party	No	2,96	2,68	3,59	4,00
UK	Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems)	No	6,08	3,70	3,59	6,76
UK	Brexit Party	No	5,24	4,50	3,59	1,88
UK	UKIP	No	5,09	4,23	3,59	1,00

Country	Party	Government	Focus on EU issues ^a		Focus on EU issues of opposing bloc ^a	EU position ^b
UK	Scottish National Party (SNP)	No	4,90	2,51	3,59	6,56
UK	Change UK - The Independent Group	No	5,57	3,82	3,59	n.a.
UK	Plaid Cymru (PC)	No	4,58	3,34	3,59	6,23
UK	Sinn Féin	No	4,57	3,03	3,59	n.a.

a: 10-point scale from 0 ('very rarely') to 10 ('very often'), b: 7-point scale from 1 ('strongly opposed') to 7 ('strongly in favor').

Table A2: Number of experts per country

Country	Number of experts
Austria	14
Belgium	12
Bulgaria	19
Croatia	16
Cyprus	6
Czech Republic	10
Denmark	8
Estonia	8
Finland	9
France	10
Germany	47
Greece	11
Hungary	13
Ireland	7
Italy	20
Latvia	8
Lithuania	10
Luxembourg	2
Malta	10
Poland	11
Portugal	20
Romania	11
Slovakia	7
Slovenia	5
Spain	10
Sweden	16
The Netherlands	34
UK	27

Appendix B: Descriptive statistics; additional analyses separating established opposition and challenger parties, analyses using hierarchical regressions

Table B1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Scale	Mean	SD	N
<i>Indicators measured at the party level</i>				
EU salience (dependent variable)	11-point scale from 0 (“solely focused on national/regional issues”) to 10 (“solely focused on European issues”)	4.91	1.66	190
Political role	0=opposition party, 1=governing party	.31	.46	190
Established opposition party	0=no, 1=yes	.34	.48	190
Challenger party	0=no, 1=yes	.35	.48	190
EU dissent	11-point scale from 0 (“party was completely united”) to 10 (“party was completely divided”)	2.69	1.42	178
Strength of leadership	% vote share according to the last election poll before the EP election	.18	7.23	186
EU position	- % vote share last national election 7-point scale from 1 (“strongly oppose European unification”) to 7 (“strongly in favor of European unification”)	5.00	1.70	178
Extremity EU position	4-point scale from 0 (“moderate position on European integration”) to 3 (“extreme position on European integration”)	1.78	.85	178
Congruence EU position/public opinion	0=no, 1=yes	.70	.46	178
EU salience of opposing bloc	11-point scale from 0 (“all parties of the opposition bloc solely focused on national/regional issues”) to 10 (“all parties of the opposing bloc solely focused on European issues”)	4.91	1.66	190
<i>Indicators measured at the country level</i>				
Election cycle	% of time that has passed since the last national election	51.12	30.71	190
Election cycle ²	% of time that has been passed since the last national election (squared)	3551.83	3352.41	190
Experts: left-right self-placement	11-point scale from 0 (“left”) to 10 (“right”)	4.23	.99	190
Experts: EU attitude	11-point scale from 0 (“EU integration has already gone too far”) to 10 (“EU integration should be pushed further”)	6.87	.88	190
Experts: familiarity	11-point scale from 0 (“not at all familiar with election campaigns in this country”) to 10 (“very familiar with election campaigns in this country”)	7.54	.71	190
Experts: easiness	11-point scale from 0 (“questions were very difficult to answer”) to 10 (“questions were very easy to answer”)	5.11	1.03	190
Experts: citizen	0=no, 1=yes	.88	.19	190
Experts: female	0=no, 1=yes	.28	.29	190

Table B2: EU salience by country and party types

	Total	Government parties	Established opposition parties	Challenger parties
Total	4.91	5.23	4.81	4.73
Austria	6.07	4.64	5.29	7.89
Belgium	3.08	3.37	3.19	2.27
Bulgaria	3.93	4.74	3.92	2.35
Croatia	3.85	5.19	3.68	3.43
Cyprus	2.57	3.33	2.79	1.17
Czech Republic	5.70	5.25	5.83	5.83
Denmark	5.62	5.36	5.67	5.71
Estonia	5.16	4.64	5.21	6.60
Finland	7.25	7.48	6.88	-
France	6.10	7.11	6.12	5.00
Germany	6.19	6.33	6.73	5.52
Greece	2.84	3.45	3.07	2.30
Hungary	6.26	6.92	5.92	6.18
Ireland	4.22	4.57	4.40	3.50
Italy	5.09	4.45	4.66	8.06
Latvia	4.85	5.48	3.67	2.86
Lithuania	5.80	6.21	5.59	-
Luxembourg	7.42	7.83	8.50	6.25
Malta	2.91	2.30	3.20	3.22
Poland	4.31	3.22	4.94	4.04
Portugal	3.53	3.05	2.76	4.53
Romania	3.72	3.15	3.63	4.19
Slovakia	4.65	4.52	5.43	4.36
Slovenia	4.09	4.27	3.13	4.80
Spain	3.18	4.70	4.20	2.75
Sweden	6.11	6.85	5.82	5.80
The Netherlands	6.34	6.32	7.44	6.12
UK	4.65	3.59	4.52	4.84
N	190	59	65	66

Significance levels: a: $p < .1$, b: $p < .05$, c: $p < .01$, d: $p < .001$

Table B3: Selective emphasis model (with separate estimates for established opposition and challenger parties)

	M1		M2		M3		M4	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Adjusted R ²		.364		.414		.365		.425
Established opposition party	-.124	(.159)	-.133	(.162)	-.129	(.162)	-.144	(.162)
Challenger party	-.482	(.415)	-.298	(.423)	-.482	(.428)	-.290	(.438)
EU dissent	-.087	(.097)	-.031	(.130)	-.080	(.145)	.116	(.183)
Strength of leadership (SOL)	.024 ^b	(.012)	.025 ^b	(.012)	.142	(.119)	.009	(.108)
Congruence EU position/public opinion	.641 ^b	(.233)	-.132	(.238)	.618 ^b	(.237)	-.245 ^c	(.265)
Election cycle	.016	(.028)	.012	(.028)	.530	(.815)	.427	(.823)
Election cycle ²	-.000	(.000)	-.000	(.000)	-1.010	(.787)	-.910	(.773)
SOL x EU dissent					.182 ^a	(.089)	.249 ^c	(.088)
SOL x election cycle					-.008	(.486)	.269	(.479)
SOL x election cycle ²					-.114	(.427)	-.368	(.433)
EU position			.229 ^b	(.083)			.255 ^c	(.088)
Extremity EU position			.350 ^a	(.199)			.376 ^a	(.195)
Experts: left-right self-placement	.029	(.224)	-.009	(.230)	.002	(.218)	-.056	(.220)
Experts: EU attitude	-.245	(.324)	-.295	(.323)	-.253	(.308)	-.313	(.306)
Experts: familiarity	-.224	(.264)	-.293	(.277)	-.211	(.259)	-.280	(.269)
Experts: easiness	-.543 ^b	(.208)	-.508 ^b	(.207)	-.560 ^b	(.201)	-.522 ^b	(.197)
Experts: citizen	-2.644 ^b	(1.118)	-2.660 ^b	(1.162)	-2.834 ^b	(1.043)	-2.908 ^b	(1.048)
Experts: female	-1.023	(.960)	-.704	(.894)	-.989	(.922)	-.623	(.846)
Constant	13.778 ^d	(3.099)	13.028 ^d	(3.176)	13.687 ^d	(3.033)	13.262 ^d	(3.183)
N		178		178		178		178

Significance levels: a: $p < .1$, b: $p < .05$, c: $p < .01$, d: $p < .001$; displayed are unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression (in parenthesis: clustered standard errors); variables included in interaction terms are z-standardized. Regression slopes for established opposition and challenger parties are not significantly different (for all $p > .1$).

Table B4: Co-orientation model (with separate estimates for established opposition and challenger parties)

	M1		M2		M3		M4	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Adjusted R ²	.410		.569		.408		.569	
Established opposition party	-.301	(.271)	-.408	(.248)	-.298	(.282)	-.416	(.257)
Challenger party	-.460	(.385)	-.061	(.413)	-.472	(.379)	-.064	(.404)
EU salience of opposing bloc	.596 ^d	(.093)	.699 ^d	(.088)	.787 ^c	(.271)	.924 ^d	(.227)
Established opposition party x EU salience of opposing bloc					.201	(.272)	.227	(.254)
Challenger party x EU salience of opposing bloc					-.057	(.293)	-.061	(.239)
EU position			.296 ^c	(.082)			.301 ^c	(.083)
Extremity EU position			.397 ^c	(.123)			.390 ^c	(.121)
Experts: left-right self-placement	-.025	(.115)	-.094	(.140)	-.025	(.117)	-.106	(.142)
Experts: EU attitude	-.356 ^b	(.142)	-.413 ^b	(.157)	-.348 ^b	(.153)	-.416 ^b	(.162)
Experts: familiarity	-.031	(.139)	-.096	(.160)	-.054	(.143)	-.117	(.151)
Experts: easiness	-.196 ^a	(.113)	-.154	(.118)	-.193	(.118)	-.152	(.120)
Experts: citizen	-1.572 ^c	(.508)	-1.536 ^c	(.440)	-1.584 ^c	(.552)	-1.609 ^c	(.499)
Experts: female	-.083	(.593)	.299	(.603)	-.153	(.558)	.241	(.568)
Constant	7.442 ^c	(1.983)	5.450 ^b	(2.189)	10.501 ^d	(1.800)	9.179 ^d	(2.101)
N	190		178		190		178	

Significance levels: a: $p < .1$, b: $p < .05$, c: $p < .01$, d: $p < .001$; displayed are unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression (in parenthesis: clustered standard errors); variables included in interaction terms are z-standardized. Regression slopes for established opposition and challenger parties are not significantly different (for all $p > .1$).

Table B5: Integrated model (with separate estimates for established opposition and challenger parties)

	M1		M2		M3		M4	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Adjusted R ²	.505		.572		.496		.566	
Established opposition party	-.380	(.243)	-.417 ^a	(.240)	-.388	(.259)	-.420	(.257)
Challenger party	-.419	(.428)	-.173	(.422)	-.407	(.426)	-.167	(.423)
EU dissent	-.185 ^b	(.072)	-.083	(.086)	-.262 ^b	(.110)	-.100	(.126)
Strength of leadership (SOL)	.021 ^a	(.012)	.021 ^a	(.012)	.202	(.119)	.159	(.109)
Congruence EU position/public opinion	.903 ^c	(.281)	-.005	(.227)	.919 ^c	(.291)	-.042	(.249)
Election cycle	.013	(.015)	.009	(.015)	.434	(.478)	.322	(.477)
Election cycle ²	-.000	(.000)	-.000	(.000)	-.483	(.440)	-.366	(.415)
EU salience of opposing bloc	.650 ^d	(.135)	.691 ^d	(.127)	.830 ^b	(.298)	.898 ^c	(.280)
SOL x EU dissent					-.001	(.060)	.058	(.067)
SOL x election cycle					-.390	(.483)	-.115	(.449)
SOL x election cycle ²					.285	(.423)	.013	(.409)
Established opposition party x EU salience of opposing bloc					.231	(.285)	.205	(.269)
Challenger party x EU salience of opposing bloc					.040	(.300)	-.065	(.266)
EU position			.310 ^d	(.073)			.323 ^d	(.079)
Extremity EU position			.292 ^a	(.160)			.285 ^a	(.159)
Experts: left-right self-placement	-.034	(.126)	-.095	(.125)	-.034	(.126)	-.109	(.128)
Experts: EU attitude	-.346 ^a	(.177)	-.409 ^b	(.174)	-.348 ^a	(.181)	-.402 ^b	(.182)
Experts: familiarity	-.003	(.166)	.048	(.170)	-.003	(.175)	-.066	(.172)
Experts: easiness	-.221	(.154)	-.168	(.146)	-.231	(.160)	-.187	(.149)
Experts: citizen	-1.656 ^c	(.540)	-1.616 ^c	(.477)	-1.747 ^c	(.568)	-1.767 ^c	(.522)
Experts: female	-.196	(.786)	.176	(.734)	-.290	(.759)	.101	(.709)
Constant	6.837 ^b	(2.469)	5.524 ^b	(2.282)	9.886 ^d	(1.847)	9.237 ^d	(1.905)
N	178		178		178		178	


Significance levels: a: $p < .1$, b: $p < .05$, c: $p < .01$, d: $p < .001$; displayed are unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression (in parenthesis: clustered standard errors); variables included in interaction terms are z-standardized. Regression slopes for established opposition and challenger parties are not significantly different (for all $p > .1$).

Table B6: Integrated model of strategic campaign communication using hierarchical regression analysis

	M1		M2	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
R ² overall		.599	.604	
R ² , within		.259	.267	
R ² , between		.799	.798	
Party role	.252	(.174)	.254	(.177)
EU dissent	-.115	(.072)	-.134	(.112)
Strength of leadership (SOL)	.020 ^a	(.012)	.150	(.110)
Congruence EU position/public opin,	.003	(.253)	-.010	(.262)
Election cycle	.007	(.015)	.270	(.468)
Election cycle ²	-.000	(.000)	-.399	(.474)
EU salience of opposing party bloc	.524 ^d	(.101)	.791 ^d	(.160)
SOL x EU dissent			.082	(.090)
SOL x election cycle			-.163	(.506)
SOL x election cycle ²			.080	(.468)
Party role x EU salience of opp. bloc			-.123	(.183)
EU position	.289 ^d	(.069)	.292 ^d	(.071)
Extremity EU position	.259 ^b	(.124)	.265 ^b	(.128)
Experts: left-right self-placement	-.054	(.134)	-.066	(.133)
Experts: EU attitude	-.310 ^b	(.141)	-.329 ^b	(.142)
Experts: familiarity	-.148	(.173)	-.124	(.173)
Experts: easiness	-.284 ^a	(.149)	-.293 ^b	(.148)
Experts: citizen	-1.811 ^b	(.737)	-1.959 ^c	(.744)
Experts: female	-.097	(.728)	.138	(.724)
Constant	7.201 ^c	(2.251)	9.656 ^d	(2.019)
N (observations)		178	178	
N (groups)		28	28	

Significance levels: a: $p < .1$, b: $p < .05$, c: $p < .01$, d: $p < .001$; displayed are unstandardized coefficients of an hierarchical linear regression (in parenthesis: standard errors); variables included in interaction terms are z-standardized; M1 replicates M5 from Table 2, M2 replicates M6 from Table 2.

Figure B1: Interaction between Inner-party Dissent and Strength of Leadership
(Electoral Success)



Source: Own data and analysis (Plot for Table 2, Model 2)

Strength of leadership: -1 = party lost electoral support since the last national election;


1 = party gained electoral support since the last national election.

Internal dissent: High values = high dissent in CHES data (x-axis).

Appendix C: Validating expert judgments with CHES and social media data

In order to validate the experts' assessments of EU salience we provide two tests: First, we compare our dependent variable with rating on the parties' EU salience collected in the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). Both measures show a significant positive correlation ($r=.19$, $p<.01$; see also Figure C1). However, the correlation is not as strong as one would expect. Also, when replicating the integrated models M5 and M6 (see Table 2 in the Results section of the main text) with CHES data (see Table C1 in the Web Appendix), the findings are stable to some extent, but also show some differences. In the replication with CHES-data, the election cycle shows an additional positive effect on EU salience while the party's EU position is not significant any more but only parties' extreme EU positions. The effect of EU salience of the opposing party bloc is positive when using EPEES data but negative when using CHES data. The reasons for these discrepancies can be at least twofold: On the one hand, the CHES-question asked how important the EU was in the parties' public stance *throughout the year 2019* (data collection took place in early 2020). In contrast, EPEES asked to what extent *the European election campaign* focused on European issues. Hence, EPEES' time frame was narrower, but it also focused on a specific part of party communication, i.e. the election campaign. On the other hand, to assess EU salience CHES uses a scale from 0 ("no importance") to 10 ("great importance"), while EPEES asks whether a campaign focused solely on national/regional issues (0), solely on European issues (10) or somewhat in between. Hence, the EPEES scale is more complex as it reflects the balance of two endpoints of the issue space. Which scale is used for the assessment has important consequences; for instance, if both national and European issues had very (un)important, experts in EPEES most likely would have chosen the value 5 to reflect this balance. On the CHES scale, the score would have been 10 (0).

Figure C1: EU salience in EUEES_2019 and 2019 CHES expert ratings



Source: 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, <https://www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel-hill-expert-survey>, last access 31 August 2020; the variable EU_Salience has been used to measure EU salience in the CHES data. Scale is running from 0 (“European Integration is of no importance”) to 10 (“European Integration is of great importance”).

Table C1: Replication of Models M5 and M6 (Integrated Model, see Table 2) using EU salience as measured by the 2019 CHES data as dependent variable

	M5		M6	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Adjusted R ²		.428		.421
Party role	-.034	(.138)	-.025	(.143)
EU dissent	.114	(.073)	.129	(.121)
Strength of leadership (SOL)	-.009	(.009)	-.056	(.074)
Congruence EU position/public opinion	-.581	(.358)	-.575	(.374)
Election cycle	.037 ^b	(.017)	1.096 ^b	(.517)
Election cycle ²	-.000 ^b	(.000)	-1.405 ^b	(.566)
EU salience of opposing party bloc	-.239 ^b	(.095)	-.321 ^a	(.179)
SOL x EU dissent			-.043	(.112)
SOL x election cycle			.172	(.304)
SOL x election cycle ²			-.250	(.338)
Party role x EU salience of opp. bloc			-.030	(.191)
EU position	.016	(.098)	.025	(.100)
Extremity EU position	1.166 ^d	(.163)	1.143 ^d	(.165)
Constant	5.000 ^d	(.609)	4.447 ^d	(.360)
N		179		179

Significance levels: a: p<.1, b: p<.05, c: p<.01, d: p<.001; displayed are unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression (in parenthesis: clustered standard errors); variables included in interaction terms are z-standardized.

Second, we compared EU salience per party as reported in EPEEs to EU salience in parties' social media posts. For this, we analyzed 35,547 Facebook posts made by national political party accounts and party leaders and 462,937 tweets by EP candidates from all 28 EU member states for the time between April 23rd and May 30th 2019. For the analysis of tweets, the Twitter accounts of all EP candidates from the relevant parties in the 28 member states were researched by national country experts who were part of the Euromanifesto Study. The tweets were then bought from Twitter after the election (for more details, see Stier et al., 2020). We also researched the Facebook pages of the national political parties and also pages of leaders if the party relies strongly on charismatic leadership, e.g. the ÖVP (Sebastian Kurz) or the Lega (Matteo Salvini). The data was collected from CrowdTangle, Facebook's social media analysis platform that provides full historical access to all posts by public pages.² In

² <https://www.crowdtangle.com>

total, the analysis is based on 211 Facebook pages and 3,073 Twitter accounts. For both datasets the research period is 23 April to 30 May 2019.

We translated dictionaries used in previous EP campaign research (Maier et al., 2014) into the 28 EU member states' national languages and counted EU-related tweets and Facebook posts made by each party. We identified EU-related content based on the keyword list of Authors (Maier et al., 2014) that contains the names and acronyms of European institutions and governance arrangements (see Table C2). As campaign communication is less heterogeneous than news coverage (e.g. few references to the European Song Contest or football), we also include the generic string "europ*" that captures EU-related discussions more broadly (including institutions' names) but still results in a low number of false positives.

We marked EU-related content as any Facebook post or tweet that contains at least one of these keywords. Before running the dictionary analysis, we preprocessed the text data by removing language specific stop words, Twitter handles (e.g. @ManfredWeber) and hashtag signs (#). As our central measure, we calculated the share of EU-related Facebook posts/tweets among all Facebook posts/tweets by a given party. In line with related research, e.g. on negative campaigning (Stevens, 2009), we regard the *proportion* of the EU in the overall amount of communication as the strongest signal triggering perceptions of the EU's importance in a party program on behalf of voters and experts. At the same time, the usage of social media by political parties should influence the likelihood that citizens and experts actually recall EU-related information. Therefore, we weight our analysis based on the *overall frequency* of Facebook posts/tweets by a party.

The correlations between expert assessments of EU salience and the share of EU-related tweets or Facebook posts range from $r=0.35$ to $r=0.39$ and are statistically significant. Again, we do not expect a perfect overlap between these two measures as in EPEES experts were asked to assess the scope of the campaign *on the whole*, beyond specific campaign channels. Also, individual social media posts by candidates and representatives may well deviate from the overall party campaign.

Table C2: Keywords used for identifying EU-related Facebook posts and tweets


european union	the european external action service
eu	eeas
european parliament	european economic and social committee
ep	eesc
mep*	the european investment fund
european council	eif
ec	european ombudsman
european commission	european data protection supervisor
council of the european union	edps
european central bank	economic and monetary union of the european union
ecb	emu
european investment bank	european politic*
eib	european polic*
european stability mechanism	european elections
esm	ep elections
european financial stability facility	eu elections
efsf	european integration
european financial stabilisation mechanism	troika
efsm	frontex
european constitution	constitutional treaty
court of justice of the european union	treaty of lisbon
european court of justice	lisbon treaty
ecj	europ*
european court of auditors	

Note: Displayed is the English keyword list. Keywords were translated into the official languages in the 28 EU member states.³

³ Acknowledgements blinded for review.

Figure C2 compares EU salience in Facebook posts by parties/party leaders and in expert ratings. The correlation weighted by the total number of Facebook posts by a party (as indicated by the color and size of points and incorporated in the regression fit line) between the two measures is $r=0.39$.

Figure C2: EU salience in Facebook posts by parties and party leaders and in expert ratings.




The point size and color are weighted by the number of Facebook posts sent by each party. Selected values in the legend represent the min, median and max number of Facebook posts. The fit line is based on a regression of expert ratings on Facebook shares, weighted by the number of Facebook posts. Labels are assigned for parties that received more than 25% of the votes in the 2019 EP election. The Lega that is an outlier in terms of the total number of Facebook posts was removed.

For visualization purposes, the outlier Lega and its leader Matteo Salvini are removed, as they posted 8,892 Facebook posts compared to the next party with 720 Facebook posts. When including the Lega, the weighted correlation is $r=0.35$. The unweighted correlation when including all parties is $r=0.47$.

The equivalent plot is shown for Twitter in Figure C3. Expert ratings and EU Saliency in tweets made by EP candidates are highly correlated when using weights for the correlations ($r=0.39$). Since there are noteworthy deviances between the two measures in the case of a few parties with a moderate number of tweets in the top left and bottom right corners of the plot (such as the ÖVP), the unweighted correlation is insignificant and small ($p=0.03$). Plausible reasons why the unweighted measure is more in line with experts' ratings in the case of Facebook could be that communication by parties on Facebook more closely resembles the overall campaign strategy (as it is also present in mass media) than EP candidates' more heterogeneous Twitter use. Moreover, Twitter is not used as much as Facebook by smaller parties in our sample, especially from Eastern Europe.

Nonetheless, all of the weighted correlations reported for Facebook and Twitter are highly significant ($p<0.001$) and also remain significant when using robust standard errors (though the significance shrinks to $p<0.05$). We take this as evidence that there is a solid correspondence between expert ratings on the saliency of the EU in party programs and campaign communication by two different sets of party actors on two different online platforms.

Figure C3: EU salience in tweets by EP candidates and in expert ratings.



Note: The point size and color are weighted by the number of tweets sent by each party. Selected values in the legend represent the min, median and max number of tweets. The fit line is based on a regression of expert ratings on Twitter shares, weighted by the number of tweets. Labels are assigned for parties that received more than 25% of the votes in the 2019 EP election.

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