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Negation in Functional Discourse Grammar

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- (63) a. In no clothes does Robin look good.
 b. In no clothes Robin looks good.

In (63a), *in no clothes* is Focus, appearing in clause initial position and triggering subject-verb inversion. In (63b), however, *in no clothes* is neither Focus nor Contrast; the Focus is on *good*.

Finally, zero-quantification can occur within the scope of higher-layer negation:

- (64) We never do things for no reason.

3.8 Summary

We have observed the possibility of negation occurring at each of the layers of the Representational Level. At all but the lowest layers, negation takes the form of the operator ‘neg’. Only at the lowest layers does negation show up as zero-quantification (an option not present in all languages) or as derivation (in the case of negative lexical items). An overview of the various types of negation is shown in Table 2, which makes proposals for naming the different types.

Table 2. Types of negation at the Representational Level

Representational Level	p	ep	e	f ^c	f ^d	\$	x, l, t, r, q
	Disagreement	Co-negation	Non-occurrence	Failure	Local negation	Antonymy	Zero-quantification

4. Negation at the Interpersonal Level

The various layers at the Interpersonal Level, too, allow negative operators. Negative operators at this level do not express negative meaning in the narrow sense. The layers of the Interpersonal Level are actional in nature, and concern the actions that the current speaker is carrying out at the moment of speaking. A speaker cannot at the same time carry out an action and negate that he/she is doing so, so the negative categories at this level express other shades of negativity that will be dealt with layer by layer below.

4.1 A-negation: Rejection

Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 148–149) make a distinction between propositional and actional *yes* and *no*. Propositional *yes* and *no* fill in the truth value of a Propositional Content that is being questioned:

- (65) A. Did John go home?
B. No (he didn't)/Yes (he did).

Actional *yes* and *no* challenge Discourse Acts executed by the interlocutor. Examples are given in (66)–(67):

- (66) A. Go home!
B. No!/Forget it!/Get lost! (I don't accept your order.)
(67) A. Go home!
B. Okay! (I accept your order.)

The rejection in (66B) challenges the imperative speech act in (66A). Speaker B considers that speaker A is not in a position to tell him/her what to do. (67B), on the other hand, is an acceptance of (67A).

As (66B) shows, there are various options for realizing the rejecting Act. A rejecting Act is different from a negated Propositional Content, in that several of these options are not available for propositional *no*:

- (68) A. Did Peter go home?
B. No!/*Forget it!/*Get lost!

Similarly, *okay* in (67B) can only be used as actional *yes*, not as propositional *yes*:

- (69) A. Did Peter go home?
B. *Okay!

Actional *no* is thus a rejecting Act, which may be represented as in (70) (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 149):

- (70) (A_I ; no (A_I))

4.2 F-negation: Prohibition & co.

Lyons (1977), Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Dik (1997) all consider the following examples to be cases of illocutionary negation:

- (71) I do not order you to go.
(72) I do not promise you to come.

A problem with this analysis is that (71)–(72) are not performative, while their positive counterparts are. This can be demonstrated through the standard test in which the adverb *hereby* is added to the expression:

- (73) a. I hereby order you to go.
 b. *I hereby do not order you to go.
- (74) a. I hereby promise you to come.
 b. *I hereby do not promise you to come.

The ungrammaticality of (73b) and (74b) shows that these are not performative utterances, hence the negation on these sentences cannot be illocutionary negation. These utterances rather contain a negated State-of-Affairs (cf. Section 3.3).

There are, however, illocutions with a negative value. The most common ones are the prohibitive illocution and the dishortative illocution. These are illustrated in (75) and (76):

- (75) Tauya
 Yate-zatene!
 go-PROH.SG
 ‘Don’t go.’ (MacDonald 1990: 213)
- (76) Kamaiura
 T=a-ha-uma=n.
 HORT=1SG-GO-NEG.HORT=HORT
 ‘Let me not go.’ (Seki 2000: 333)

The illocutionary markers in (75) and (76) are dedicated expressions of the prohibitive and dishortative illocutions, that is, they are not composed of the corresponding imperative or hortative marker combined with a regular negative marker. In this sense they may be interpreted as negative illocutions, not as negated illocutions.

Negative illocutions like these may be represented as in (77)–(78), where abstract illocutionary predicates occupy the head position of the illocution (F) (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 70–76):

- (77) (F_I: PROH (F_I))
 (78) (F_I: DISHORT (F_I))

4.3 C-negation: Denial

In FDG a Communicated Content (C) is a message that is communicated by a speaker in a Discourse Act, as opposed to a Propositional Content (p), which is a unit of thought that is not necessarily communicated but can be talked about. Given this difference, a Communicated Content is a unit at the Interpersonal Level, while a Propositional Content is a unit at the Representational Level.

A Communicated Content cannot be negated as such, as once it is produced it exists, but an interlocutor can deny its appropriateness. An example of this is given in (79):

- (79) A: You hate me!
 B: It's not that I hate you, it's just that I think you are a bit annoying.
 B': ??It's not true that I hate you, it's just true that I think you are a bit annoying.
 B'': I DON'T (hate you).
 B''': I don't "hate you".

In (79B) the message expressed in (79A) is denied, and an alternative for it is offered. This differs from the negation of a Propositional Content, discussed in Section 3.1, where the truth of a proposition is at stake. As (79B') shows, a paraphrase in terms of truth values is inappropriate using the same construction. To express propositional negation in this context, (79B'') has to be used. An alternative way of expressing the first part of (79B) is (79B'''), where the speaker accompanies the utterance with a gesture reminiscent of quotation marks written in the air.

In (79B) denial is expressed periphrastically using the expression *it is not that*. In similar contexts double negation can serve the same purpose, as illustrated in (80B):

- (80) A. I have the feeling you don't like me.
 B. I don't not like you.

A further frequent construction used to express this kind of negation is illustrated in (81):⁸

- (81) Not that I regret any of it!

In this construction the copula present in (79B) is suppressed, which may be taken as a sign of fixation of the construction.

8. See e.g. Schmid (2013) for constructions of this type.

In Spanish, denial constructions exhibit the special property that they are expressed through a construction with the subjunctive, which is used here to express that the information given is presupposed. An example is (82):⁹

- (82) *No es que me hayan engañ-ado*
 NEG COP.IND.PRS.3SG CONJ 1SG.ACC AUX.SBJV.PRS.3SG deceive-PST.PTCP
a mí, es que han
 ACC.DEF 1SG.OBL COP.IND.PRS.3SG CONJ AUX.IND.PRS.3SG
engañado a todo el mundo.
 deceive-PST.PTCP ACC.DEF all DEF world
 ‘It’s not that they have deceived ME, it’s that they have deceived EVERYBODY.’

This contrasts with propositional negation, which does not trigger the subjunctive, as illustrated in (83):

- (83) A. *Te han engañado.*
 2SG.ACC AUX.IND.PRS.3SG deceive-PST.PTCP
 ‘They have deceived you’
 B. *No, no me han engañado.*
 NEG NEG 1SG.ACC AUX.IND.PRS.3SG deceive-PST.PTCP
 ‘No, they have NOT deceived me.’

Denial may be represented as an operator at the layer of the (denied) Communicated Content, as in (84):

- (84) $(A_i: [(F_i: \text{DECL } (F_i)) (P_i)_s (P_j) (\text{neg } C_i: [- \text{ I don't like you } -] (C_i))] (A_i))$

4.4 T-negation: Metalinguistic negation

An Ascriptive Subact T captures an act of predication executed by a speaker. The appropriateness of a Subact of Ascription can always be questioned or denied. In the latter case, we speak of T-negation, called metalinguistic negation in Horn (1985). Examples illustrating this type of negation are illustrated in (85) and (86):

- (85) He is not “happy”, he is ecstatic.
 (86) She is not “pretty”, she is gorgeous.

Example (85) is appropriate in a context in which the previous speaker has ascribed the property *happy* to the subject. This speaker is then corrected by the current

9. <https://www.huffingtonpost.es/2018/02/01/pablo-iglesias-va-a-ser-difcil-que-leonor-sea-jefe-del-estado_a_23350035/>

speaker who characterizes this ascription as inappropriate and provides an alternative. The same reasoning applies to (86). Metalinguistic negation may have the same surface morphosyntactic manifestation as $e(p)$ -negation, but behaves quite differently. Example (86) above can only be interpreted as metalinguistic negation, while (87) can only be $e(p)$ -negation:

(87) She is not pretty, and this has bothered her all her life.

Metalinguistic negation can be combined with other types of negation, for instance with antonymy, as in (88):

(88) She is not “unhappy”, she is depressed.

Metalinguistic negation of this type may be represented as an operator at the layer of Ascriptive Subact, as in (89):

(89) $(C_I: [(neg T_I), \dots] (C_I))$

4.5 R-negation: Metalinguistic negation

A Referential Subact (R) captures an act of reference executed by the speaker. As in the case of Ascriptive Subacts, the appropriateness of the reference can be questioned or denied. The following example illustrates this:

(90) He is not “Mr Bergoglio”, he is His Holiness the Pope.

Example (90) is an identificational construction, which in FDG is treated as a construction based on two Subacts of Reference (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 193). In (90) one Subact of Reference ‘Mr Bergoglio’ is replaced by a more appropriate one ‘His Holiness the Pope’. This case is thus entirely parallel to the cases in 4.4, the only difference being that the appropriateness of a Subact of Reference is denied in (90), while the appropriateness of a Subact of Ascription is denied in (85)–(86). The similarity is also visible when we compare (90) to a parallel case of $e(p)$ -negation:

(91) He is not Mr Bergoglio, Mr Bergoglio has moved to another place.

Another example of this type of negation is given in Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 788):

(92) She didn’t have lunch with “your old man”; she had lunch with your father.

Metalinguistic negation of this type may be represented as an operator at the layer of the Referential Subact, as in (93):

(93) $(C_I: [(neg R_I), \dots] (C_I))$