The grammaticalization of Dutch moetens: modal and post-modal meanings

Abstract: This chapter provides a synchronic and diachronic description of the Dutch modal moetens, which means 'must' in Modern Dutch. The synchronic description combines Narrog's (2005) distinction between volitive and non-volitive modality with Hengeveld’s (2004) approach to modality, which subcategorizes modal distinctions according to their domains and their targets. It is shown that moetens can be used to express all of these distinctions, although it is rare in the function of objective epistemic modality. The diachronic description focuses on deontic moetens and post-deontic non-modal meanings. It consists of two parts, the first describing the Old Dutch moetens ‘may’ and its development into an expression of optative illocution in Middle Dutch, as well as its semantic shift to modal necessity. In this context Nuys’ (2011, 2013) claim, according to which moetens has been undergoing a process of degrammaticalization from Middle Dutch onward, is critically evaluated. The second part of the diachronic description of moetens is dedicated to a 20th century innovation which consists of the use of moetens in an imperative-like construction. The chapter ends with a synthesis of the changes undergone by moetens from Old Dutch onward making use of the Functional Discourse Grammar approach to grammaticalization (Hengeveld this volume).

Keywords: modal necessity, modal possibility, optative, imperative, degrammaticalization, Dutch

1 Introduction

As opposed to most other Germanic languages, such as English, German, or Danish (Mortelmans, Boye and van der Auwera 2009), Modern Dutch has only

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one auxiliary expression of modal necessity, *moeten.* As a consequence, *moeten* is highly polysemous, i.e. it can express almost any kind of modal necessity of both the non-epistemic and the epistemic type. With the deontic modals of most other Germanic languages (except English), it shares the property of being able to occur without a lexical verb in a number of contexts, such as in that of directional movement. Consider the following examples from Dutch (1a), German (1b) and Danish (1c) quoted from Mortelmans, Boye and van der Auwera (2009: 25, 29, 45):

(1) a. Zij moet naar huis.
    she must.PRS to home
b. Sie muss nach Hause.
    she must.PRS to home
c. Hun skal hjem.
    she must.PRS home
d. *She must home
    ‘She has to go home’

The difference between Dutch, German, Danish and also Swedish (Lissan Taal-Apelqvist pers. com.) is, however, that Dutch allows the independent use of *moeten* with eventive subjects, as shown in example (2):

(2) Moet dat dan, vraag ik, gelukkig worden?
    must.PRS that then ask.PRS.1SG I happy become.INF
    ‘Is that really necessary, I ask, to be happy?’
    (DRAPAC 28 MtH)

The wide applicability of deontic *moeten* as a lexical verb has led to the idea that *moeten* might be in the process of degrammaticalization (Nuyts 2011: 180; 2013: 131‒132). On the other hand, *moeten* has an innovative auxiliary use which is far more grammaticalized than the grammatical expressions of modal necessity in other Germanic languages. Consider the following example:

(3) Moet je horen wat ze nu weer
    must.PRS.sg you hear.INF what they now again

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2 In fact, there is a second one, *dienen te* ‘need, ought to’, which covers rule based necessity only and appears exclusively in very formal written contexts, such as legal texts and instructions.
3 Nuyts (2014: 369‒379) presents an explanation of this “degrammaticalization” in terms of iconicity, which is, however, too much dependent on the Cognitive Grammar view on deontic modality to be helpful in this context.
In this construction *moeten* has developed beyond the modal domain proper into an expression of an imperative-like illocution (or “sentence mood” in the terms of Narrog 2005, 2012, this volume).

Our contribution will explain the property illustrated in (2) and focus on the grammaticalization of *moeten* within and beyond modality, thus providing an account of the case illustrated in (3). It is the aim of this paper to describe the grammaticalization of *moeten* making use of an approach to the grammaticalization of modals presented in Hengeveld (this volume). In order to account for this process adequately, we will first describe the modal uses of *moeten* from a synchronic perspective and then discuss both its semantic and its syntactic development from a diachronic perspective, in the course of which we will show that, in a certain sense, there is a kind of “degrammaticalization” of *moeten*, but not in the way Nuyts (2011, 2013) proposes. The synchronic data used in this paper will consist of a corpus of 20th century literary prose of 3,156,483 words, which has been drawn from the Dutch-Russian Amsterdam Parallel Aligned Corpus (DRAPAC), and the Corpus Hedendaags Nederlands ‘Corpus of Modern Dutch’ (CHN), provided online by the Institute for the Dutch Language (INT). For the diachronic section of this paper we will use the online diachronic dictionaries of the INT.

Section 2 of this study will be dedicated to the description of the modal functions of *moeten* in Modern Dutch making use of a categorization of modality that is inspired by Hengeveld (2004, this volume). In Section 3, we will consider the diachrony of *moeten* discussing both the semantic and syntactic developments as well as the potential degrammaticalization of this modal. Section 4 will deal with the use of the innovative post-modal *moeten* and explain the restrictions on this use. Section 5 will discuss the grammaticalization of modal and post-modal *moeten* from a Functional Discourse Grammar perspective, and Section 6 will be dedicated to our conclusions.

2 The modal meanings of *moeten*

Our point of departure is the definition of modality provided by Narrog (2005: 697), according to which “the expression of a state of affairs is modalized if it is marked for being undetermined with respect to its factual status, i.e. it is neither positively nor negatively factual”. We interpret the concept of “state of affairs”
as used here in a non-technical sense and read it as including propositional contents, too. Our classification of modality makes use of Hengeveld’s (2004) distinction between domains and targets of modal evaluation. The domains include facultative, deontic and (objective and subjective) epistemic modality, and the targets are (i) primary participants (mostly agents) in events, (ii) events, and (iii) propositional contents. We will, therefore, distinguish, for instance, between participant-oriented and event-oriented deontic modality. However, we will deviate from Hengeveld (2004) at one point: instead of his presentation of the domain of modal evaluation as forming one whole, we rather prefer the distinction used by Narrog (2005) between those domains that have “an element of will” in the source of modality, and those that have not.  

4 We therefore follow Narrog in making a basic distinction between “volitive” and “non-volitive” modal domains, the former including deontic and boulomaic and the latter inherent, circumstantial and epistemic modal distinctions. Furthermore, we make use of the concept of “episode” (cf. Hengeveld this volume), which we consider to be basically a “tensed state of affairs”. The most important modal distinctions that result from this approach and can be expressed by moeten are represented in Tab. 1, in which the bracketed numbers refer to the examples to be given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>volitive</th>
<th>non-volitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>participant</td>
<td>deontic (4)</td>
<td>inherent (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>event</td>
<td>prescriptive deontic (5–6)</td>
<td>circumstantial (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>episode</td>
<td>evaluative deontic (7–8)</td>
<td>(objective epistemic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proposition</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>subjective epistemic (11)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The general idea of the schema in Tab. 1 is that its vertical orientation reflects the increasing scope of the modalization: in the case of participant-oriented modality,

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4 The “element of will” can concern any source of modalization, be it an individual or some norms or rules, which, in the end, are always manmade. Narrog (2005: 683–685) refers back to Jespersen (1924), who first introduced this distinction between different types of what he named “mood” as well as to Heine (1995) and Palmer (2001), who have reintroduced this distinction before him.
the modal is supposed to modify the relation between the predicate and its arguments; event-oriented modals modify a non-tensed state of affairs and may take participant-oriented modals in their scope; episode-oriented modals modify a state of affairs that can be located in time and may take event-oriented modals in their scope, and proposition-oriented modals modify propositional contents and as such can take all the lower elements in their scope. We will provide evidence for these scope relations in the discussion of the volitive domain.

Examples (4)–(11) illustrate the different uses of *moeten* listed in Tab. 1. The example (4) illustrates the case of participant-oriented deontic (volitive) modality, which concerns the necessity that is imposed by either some person or some general rule on a specific human participant in the state of affairs referred to.

(4) *Hij schreef mij eens dat wij niet hard moesten zijn in ons oordeel over haar.*

He wrote me once that we shouldn’t be hard in our opinion about her.” (DRAPAC 24 HH)

The fact that the modal is in the past tense is due to past tense copying (*consecutio temporum*) from the main clause, which does, however, not affect the principled posterior orientation of the modalized expression (cf. Laca 2014: 82).

We now turn to the event-oriented volitive category, i.e. prescriptive deontic modality, as referred to in Tab. 1. In this case the source of the modal necessity consists of general or institutional norms, laws, as well as any type of instructions, whereas the target is some state of affairs, the primary argument of which refers either to a second order entity, or to an inanimate or non-specific animate first order entity. Example (5) illustrates the second order entity type:

(5) *Milieuvriendelijk en -bewust gedrag moet worden gestimuleerd.*

‘Environment-friendly and -conscious behaviour must be stimulated’ (CHN, Press 2010)

Example (6) is another example of prescriptive deontic modality. In this example the source is Government Information and the target is a state of affairs, because the referent of the first argument is a group of people which is identifiable but not specific. This means that the potential referents know that they are meant, but the writer of the text does not know who they are (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 36).
This example furthermore illustrates the fact that event-oriented modality can have participant-oriented modality in its scope, in this case participant-oriented possibility, expressed by kunnen ‘can’, because the individuals in question are required to take the necessary measures in order to be able, in concrete cases, to produce an ID.

As opposed to prescriptive deontic modality, evaluative deontic modality5 has its source in a personal view on what is considered necessary. This modal distinction can scope over prescriptive deontic modality. In (7) moeten has an auxiliary expression of prescriptive deontic possibility mogen ‘may’ in its scope:

(7) Wie zo denkt ‘houdt niet van en is tegen joden’ en is een anti-semit, die men straffeloos zo moet mogen noemen.

‘Who thinks like this ‘is not fond of and is against jews’ and is an anti-semit, whom one should be allowed to refer to as such without being punished.’

(CHN, Essay 1995)

In addition, evaluative deontic moeten can concern a state of affairs in the past:

(8) [An accusation of murder]

Ze hadden een ander doelwit moeten uitzoeken.

‘They should have looked for another target.’

5 In Olbertz and Gasparini Bastos (2013) this distinction has been referred to as one between “objective” and “subjective” deontic modality. However, given that “subjective deontic modality” is not subjective in the strict sense of the term, we prefer the labels “prescriptive” and “evaluative” here.
Bram was niet schuldig.6
Bram was not guilty.
‘They should have chosen a different target. Bram was not guilty.’
(DRAPAC 61 LdW)

This does not mean that the obligation expressed by the modal concerns the
past state of affairs, rather the state of affairs remains posterior to the modaliza-
tion (Lyons 1977: 824). However, both the modalization and the state of affairs
are anterior to the moment of speaking, i.e. the moment at which the evalu-
tation takes place (Narrog 2008: 288).7 What (8) expresses is the speaker’s opinion
that in the past there was a necessity for the state of affairs een ander doelwit
uitzoeken ‘chose a different target’ to occur, and that neither the modalization
through moeten nor the state of affairs are real, as indicated by means of the plu-
perfect tense marking. Given the fact that the evaluation in (8) concerns a past
state of affairs, we account for this use in FDG by making use of the “episode”,
which corresponds to (sets of) tensed states of affairs.

Let us now turn to the non-volitive semantic domain, where we will start
again with participant-oriented modality working downwards toward the propo-
sitional modalization. The participant-oriented non-volitive necessity is basically
inherent, that is to say, it finds its origin in physical or psychological needs of
an animate individual, and does, indeed have a restricted applicability, includ-
ing “nutrition and excretion”, as Narrog (2012: 10) aptly remarks. But in Dutch it
includes also weeping, yawning, and laughing as in the following example:

(9) Anna, even alles vergetend, moest lachen
Anna for_a_bit everything forgetting must.pst.sg laugh.INF
om deze zeldzame vorm van bijeloof in_het_kwadraat.
about this rare form of superstition squared
‘Anne, for a moment forgetting everything, couldn’t help but laugh about
this rare form of utter superstition.’
(DRAPAC 36 TdL)

6 In (7) the past form of the auxiliary hebben ‘have’ one would normally require the past partic-
iple form of the auxiliary verb moeten, which does indeed exist, because Dutch modal verbs are
not defective. However, the Dutch moeten has the infinitival form because it is followed by the
infinitive of a main verb. In the combination with an infinitival full verb modal and aspectual
verbs never have a participial form due to the rule infinitivus pro particio, which Dutch has in
common with German (cf. e.g. IJbema 1997 for more details).
7 We are grateful to Heiko Narrog for pointing this out to us.
Turning to event-oriented necessity, we find circumstantial necessity as the non-volitive distinction at this level. As Narrog (2012: 10) observes, it is indeed difficult to find truly circumstantial cases of necessity which do not allow for a deontic reading, but they do exist: in the case quoted in the following example, the necessity depends on the rising sea level, an objective factor exterior to the event in question:

(10) Volgens Van Ravenswaay is het [industriële] park belangrijk vanwege de stijgende zeespiegel, waardoor sowieso moet worden uitgeweken naar het zuiden van het land. ‘According to Van Ravenswaay the [industrial] park is important because of the rising sea level whereby anyway must.prs.sg aux.inf swerved.ptcp to the south of the country anyway.’
(CHN, Press 2010)

The remaining distinction to be discussed is subjective epistemic necessity, because we have not found any case of objective epistemic necessity expressed by moeten. Usually, objective epistemic necessity is expressed in Dutch by means of adjectival expressions. As opposed to subjective epistemic cases of moeten, objective epistemic moeten is motivated by objective calculations.8

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8 Occasionally, however, moeten can fulfill that function, too, as shown in the following example suggested to us by Kees Hengeveld (in 2015):

(i) Hij is in januari 2000 geboren, dus hij moet nu 15 zijn. ‘He was born in January 2000, so he must be 15 by now.’

At first glance, the concepts “objective” and “epistemic” seem to be incompatible, since “epistemic” generally presupposes the individual evaluation of the external world rather than a description of the external world. However, cases of objective epistemic moeten, such as the one exemplified here, are possible in situations in which the speaker – until the moment of speaking – did not realize that the given state of affairs is indeed necessarily the case.
Example (11) illustrates the expression of subjective epistemic necessity by means of *moeten*:

(11) *Bij deze woorden kon ik een glimlach, die iets zeer kwetsends moet gehad hebben, niet onderdrukken.*

‘At these words I couldn’t suppress a smile, that must have had a very offensive effect.’

(DRAPAC 18 ME)

Hengeveld (1988: 236‒237) provides a number of tests for subjectivity, the most generally applicable ones are the following two: (i) subjectively modalized expressions are bound to declarative illocution, objectively modalized expressions are not, and (ii) subjectively modalized expressions cannot be contained in hypothetical sentences, objectively modalized expressions can. Now let us compare (11) to a (somewhat simplified) adjectival expression of the same content (12):

(12) *Het is waarschijnlijk dat de glimlach iets zeer kwetsends had.*

‘It is likely that the smile had a very offensive effect.’

When questioning both expressions, then (11a) is marginally acceptable as an echo question in reaction to (11), whereas (12a) is grammatical and acceptable without such a restriction.

(11) a. *Moet de glimlach iets zeer kwetsends gehad hebben?*

‘Must the smile have had a very offensive effect?’

(12) a. *Is het waarschijnlijk dat de glimlach iets zeer kwetsends had?*

‘Is it likely that the smile had a very offensive effect?’
Let us now apply the second test mentioned in (ii) above, which consists in using the subjective and the objective epistemic modal expressions in a conditional apodosis:

(11) b. *Als de glimlach iets zeer kwetsends gehad*  
if the smile something very offensive had.


moet hebben, heb ik met je te doen.  
must have.1sg have.ptcp have.prsg 1sg I with you to do.

‘If the smile must have had a very offensive effect, I pity you.’

(12) b. *Als het waarschijnlijk is dat de glimlach iets zeer kwetsends had, heb ik met je todo.*  
if it probable is that the smile something very offensive had, have.ptcp 1sg I with you to do.

‘If it’s likely that the smile had a very offensive effect, I pity you.’

Again, the subjective epistemic expression in (11b) is awkward, whereas the objective modal expression in the conditional clause in (12b) is fine. The conclusion is therefore that the epistemic use of *moeten* is virtually restricted to the subjective type, i.e. to the expression of the commitment to the truth of a proposition either by the speaker or a different subject referent. 9

We have shown in this Section that *moeten* is able to express any kind of volitive and non-volitive distinction of modal necessity. As the volitive distinctions discussed here are all of a deontic nature, we will, henceforward, refer to the volitive domain as “deontic domain”. The remainder of this paper will be dedicated exclusively to the deontic domain, which is the one that gave rise to the imperative-like *moet je* construction, which is the focus of this paper.

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9 Although, as a general rule, the subject in such cases refers to the speaker, this is not necessarily the case:

(i) *Volgens Irene moet zijn algemene indruk wel juist geweest.*  
according to Irene must.1sg be.prsg his general impression indeed correct.

‘According to Irene his general impression must have been correct.’
3 The diachrony of deontic *moeten*

In this section we will consider the diachronic semantic and syntactic development of deontic *moeten* with the first and foremost aim to find out if the predictions with regard to grammaticalization implied in Tab. 1 can be confirmed. In addition, we will also take a glance at the development of the independent, i.e. lexical variant of *moeten* in order to challenge Nuyts’s (2011, 2013) claim. We will first present the relevant data in Section 3.1 and discuss these data in Section 3.2.

3.1 Diachronic data

This section will make use of the data provided in the four historical dictionaries of Dutch, made available online by the INT.\(^\text{10}\) We will first look at the semantic development of *moeten* from the first attestations onward and then consider the development of lexical uses of *moeten*.

In the first attestations of Old Dutch (approx. 950‒1150) *moeten* (in the form of *mozon*) primarily expressed participant-oriented possibility ‘may’:

(13) *That* they *stay-INF may.PRS.PL in god.GEN empire*

“That they may stay in God’s empire.”

(*Mittelfränkische Reimbibel*, 1151‒1200, ONW)

This meaning of *moeten* can still be found in Middle Dutch (approx. 1200–1550):

(14) *Die man bat hem ..., dat hi met hem moeste varen, maer Jhesus ontseid hem*

“This man asked him permission to sail with him but Jesus denied it.”

(*Rijmbijbel*, ms 1300‒1350?, MNW)

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\(^{10}\) According to the information provided by the INT, The Old Dutch Dictionary (ONW) covers the period from ca. 500 to 1200, the Early Middle Dutch Dictionary (VMNW) the period from ca. 1200 to 1300, the Middle Dutch Dictionary (MNW) that from 1250 to 1550 and the Modern Dutch Dictionary (WNT) from 1500 to 1976 (however, the entry on *moeten* dates from 1907). Given the overlap between Early Middle Dutch and Middle Dutch, we will lump the two together under the heading of “Middle Dutch.”
Most cases are similar to (14) in having specific human referents for the primary participant slot, and are therefore expressions of participant-oriented modality. However, in contexts of laws and instructions, moeten is also used with non-specific human referents, i.e. as an expression of event-oriented deontic possibility, as illustrated in (15):

(15) Dat men voortaan gheen brandewijn sal moeten tappen
    that one henceforth NEG brandy shall.PRS.SG may.INF serve.INF
    ‘That henceforth no brandy may be served’
    (Wfr. Stadsrechten, 1536, WNT)

In addition, this example is illustrative of the fact that from the 16th century onward moeten is used in the sense of deontic possibility only in the combination of moeten with some kind of negation.11 As an expression of deontic possibility, moeten gradually comes to be substituted in early Modern Dutch by mogen ‘may’, which in Old Dutch had the exclusive function of expressing physical ability and was still relatively rare as an expression of deontic possibility in Middle Dutch (Duinhoven 1997: 409–410).

In addition to the strictly modal meanings, moeten had developed an optative function from Middle Dutch onward:

(16) Onse here moet met u wesen
    our lord must.PRS.SBJJSG with you be.INF
    ‘May our Lord be with you’
    (Spiegel Historiael, ca. 1350, MNW)

This optative function of moeten has been lost in the 18th century and is presently expressed by the subjunctive paradigm of the verb mogen ‘may’, which was infrequent in this function in Middle Dutch (Duinhoven 1997: 408).

We now turn to the first attestations of deontic necessity expressed by moeten in Medieval Dutch. As opposed to what we have seen so far, these are of the participant-oriented (17) as well as of the event-oriented (18) type, and there is no way of assessing which was first.

11 For an overview of diachronic changes between necessity and possibility in other languages, see Narrog (2012: 185–199), who emphasizes the role of negation in this process, as proposed by, among others, Goossens (1987) for English and Bech (1951) for German.
The grammaticalization of Dutch moeten

(17) Gi muet allene [bute]n staen.
you must.PRS.SG alone outside stand.INF
‘You must stay outside alone.’
(Reinaert E, 1276–1300, VMNW)

(18) sijn aes moet sijn uersch ende leuende
its bait must.PRS.SG be.INF fresh and alive
‘its bait must be fresh and alive’
(Der Naturen Bloeme, 1287, VMNW)

In the period between the 15th and the 18th centuries, deontic modality expressed by moeten gradually becomes predominantly an expression of deontic necessity. By then the participant-oriented is only a bit more frequent than event-orientation: out of the 17 unambiguous cases of deontic necessity, 10 are participant-oriented and 7 are event-oriented. Example (19) illustrates the former and (20) the latter:

(19) Sonder sneven moetti mijn hoge gebod volbringen
without hesitate.INF must.PRS.SG_he my high order fulfil.
‘Unwaiveringly he must fulfil my high assignment’
(De sevenste bliscap van Maria, 1445–1465, MNW)

(20) Men moet Gode meer gehoorsaem zijn dan
one must.PRS.SG god more obediant be.INF than
den menschen
the men
‘One must be more subserviant to God more than to men’
(Statenbijbel, 1688, WNT)

In 18th century Dutch, we also find cases of moeten in the evaluative deontic necessity function, which we classified as episode-oriented in Tab. 1 in Section 2.

As mentioned earlier, evaluative deontic necessity modalizes either a modalized state of affairs or an anterior one. The latter is the case in the following example:

(21) Een schurk, die al lang moest zyn
a scoundrel who already long must.PST.SG be.INF
opgehangen geworden,
hanged.PTCP AUX.PTCP
‘A scoundrel, who should have been hanged long ago,’
(Willem Leevend, 1784–1785, WNT)
As regards the independent use of *moeten*, in Early Middle Dutch already *moeten* in its deontic necessity meaning can be used independently as long as directional movement is implied, such as illustrated in the following example:

(22) *Wi moeten int helsce vier.*
    
    *we must.PRS.PL in_the infernal fire*
    
    ‘We must [go] into the infernal fire.’
    
    (*Rijmbijbel*, 1285, VMNW)

The use of independent *moeten* of the type illustrated in this example has become very frequent in Modern Dutch. As would be expected, independent *moeten* occurs primarily with human referents as primary arguments, a situation that remains basically unchanged in Middle Dutch. In early stages of Modern Dutch (1500–today), however, we find independent uses of *moeten* in its deontic necessity meaning in (metaphorical) directional movement contexts, now more frequently with inanimate referents:

(23) *Daer most een drinckpenningh off*
    
    *there must.PRS.SG a gratuity off*
    
    ‘A gratuity must [be deducted] from it’
    
    (*Boere-klucht*, 1612, WNT)

About two hundred years later, there are also cases of event-oriented deontic modality that are unrelated to movement, where the first argument refers to an event rather than to an object:

(24) *Hij zou zeker... trotsch worden; en dat moet niet*
    
    *he would.SG certainly haughty become.INF and that must.prs.sg not*
    
    ‘He would certainly become haughty and that must not [happen]’
    
    (*Maurits Lijnslager*, 1808, WNT)

However, in the examples quoted in VMNW, there are also two cases with non-animate referents, one of which is the following:

(i) *Want alle dinc muêt wiëder tuêt sinre naturen*
    
    *for all thing must.prs.sg again to its nature*
    
    ‘For everything must [return] to its nature’
    
    (*Moraalboek*, 1270–1290)
In Modern Dutch, *moeten* can be used independently also in clear cases of evaluative deontic necessity:

(25) [En je kunt nu eenmaal niet een vrijhandelsakkoord sluiten en daarbij bepaalde sectoren uitsluiten. ‘And you just cannot conclude a free trade agreement and at the same time exclude certain sectors.’

Maar achteraf bekeken had dat misschien wel gemoeten.

‘But looking back maybe this should have [happened] indeed.’

(CHN, Press, 2003)

Now we have seen five phenomena of diachronic change within the deontic domain of *moeten*: (i) the increasing prominence of deontic necessity meaning, (ii) the concomitant loss of the deontic possibility meaning, a process that was paralleled by (iii) the increasing use of *moeten* in other than participant-oriented functions, (iv) the loss of the optative, and (v) the gradual broadening in terms of different uses of *moeten* as a lexical verb.

### 3.2 Discussion

In this section we will start with the last case of diachronic change mentioned above, the expansion of *moeten* as an independent lexical verb, and then discuss the other changes.

Nuyts (2011: 161; 2013: 126) shows, on the basis of corpus analysis, that the independent use of *moeten* has increased between Old Dutch and Modern Dutch from 0% in Old Dutch to 5% in written Modern Dutch and 10.5% in spoken Modern Dutch. This ratio in Modern Dutch is confirmed by an analysis of a section (165,879 words) of our own written corpus. The semantic distribution yields the picture represented in Tab. 2. In addition, Tab. 2 shows that 94% of the independent uses of *moeten* express directional movement, and that almost all of these are directed towards specific human referents, i.e. are expressions of participant-oriented modality.

**Tab. 2**: Independent use of *moeten* in Modern Dutch literature (165,879 words).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total <em>moeten</em>: 635</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of which independent: 35 (5.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which directional movement: 33 (94.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which participant-oriented: 30 (85.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nuyts (2011, 2013) proposes to view this process, as well as similar processes in the case of kunnen ‘can’ en mogen ‘may’, as one of “degrammaticalization”, but he also shows that the case of the Dutch modals does not fit the concept of “degrammaticalization” as it stands. The most influential study of degrammaticalization, Norde (2009), defines the relevant type of “degrammation” as a shift (i) from grammatical to lexical content or (ii) from more grammatical to less grammatical content (Norde 2009: 133). Therefore, Nuyts (2011: 179–180; 2013: 132) introduces the concept of “primary degrammaticalization”, which is supposed to account for cases of partial loss of auxiliary properties, irrespective of possible semantic changes.

Our hypothesis with respect to the rise of the independent lexical uses of moeten is, however, that deontic moeten was first lexicalized in the context of directional movement in participant-oriented contexts, where it would always be read as ‘must go to’, as in example (22). On analogy to the participant-oriented cases, lexical moeten would then also be used when the primary participant refers to an inanimate object as in (23), which becomes more frequent from the 17th century onward. Later on, on analogy to the movement cases, lexical moeten came to be used incidentally in non-movement contexts. This means that there is just a gradual and analogical process of lexicalization, for which Nuyts does not provide anything but a new label.

As regards the semantic processes, the gradual expansion of deontic moeten in general to event-oriented and later episode-oriented contexts, which we have described in Section 3.1, confirms our expectations with regard to the increasing scope of moeten. However, this expectation is not borne out with respect to deontic necessity: in this context we would have expected moeten to start off with participant-orientation and then spread to event-orientation, but the fact is that both develop in parallel. A possible explanation may be related to the fact that the expression of deontic necessity was taken over from Old Dutch sullan ‘shall’ (Modern Dutch zullen), when this ceased to express deontic necessity and came to express future tense exclusively. The Old Dutch dictionary (ONW) entry of sullan mentions twelve cases of deontic necessity, ten of which are participant-oriented, one is event-oriented and one is doubtful. Another possible explanation may be in the very nature of deontic necessity: the source of deontic necessity probably more often is a “collective will” i.e. general rules rather than the will of an individual, and deontic necessity from a general source can be equally targeted to states of affairs and to participants in states of affairs.

A further aspect in the development of moeten that calls for an explanation is the loss of the optative function, which could in fact be analyzed as a true case of “degrammation” in Norde’s (2009) terms, because the optative is

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13 For a diachronic study of this problem see Honselaar and Olbertz (2016).
generally regarded as a sentence type or sentence mood, to be associated with illocution rather than with modality (Levinson 1983: 42; Hengeveld 2004: 1191; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008: 71). We believe that the “retraction”\(^{14}\) of \textit{moeten} from the illocutionary domain can be explained through the loss of the function of deontic possibility. As we have seen, this was the most prominent function of \textit{moeten} until the 15th century and most probably the source of the development of the optative (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 107, 112–113), the first occurrence of which dates from the 13th century. The most probable explanation of this process is the following: when the possibility function of \textit{moeten} gradually gave way to the necessity function, the optative function shifted together with the expression of deontic possibility to the – by then innovative – modal auxiliary \textit{mogen}.

As we will show in the next section, \textit{moeten} has recently come to fulfill a new illocutionary function; this time it is one which is more in line with the semantic specialization of volitive \textit{moeten} to the domain of deontic necessity.

\section*{4 A new illocutionary function of \textit{moeten}}

This section deals with the imperative-like construction with \textit{moeten}, which we will preliminarily refer to as the \textit{moet je} construction, exemplified in (3) in the introduction to this chapter, which we repeat here for convenience.

\begin{verbatim}(3) Moet je horen wat ze nu weer
must.prs.sg you hear.inf what they now again
bedacht hebben
invented.ptcp aux.prs.pl
‘Now listen what they have been contriving now!’
(DRAPAC 20 AF)
\end{verbatim}

Occasionally we find, instead of the informal second person pronoun, \textit{je}, the neutral plural pronoun \textit{jullie} or the rather formal singular pronoun \textit{u}:

\begin{verbatim}(26) [speaker wants primary schoolteachers to be experts in certain subjects rather than being generalists]
Moet u zich eens voorstellen
must.prs.sg you.formal refl.2.formal mit imagine.inf
\end{verbatim}

\(^{14}\) Haspelmath (2004: 33–35) defines “retraction” as a process consisting of the loss of manifestations of higher degrees of grammaticalization of a given lexical item.
The *moet je* construction appears in the 20th century DRAPAC corpus from the 1940s onward. In the literature it has been mentioned in the 1950s already by Droste (1956: 33), who refers to this construction as ‘invitation’ and relates it to the imperative. Apart from this, the *moet je* construction has not received much attention in the literature on Dutch modals, with the notable exception of Janssen (2006).\(^{15}\) Our aim in this section is to pin down the exact interactional function of the *moet je* construction, which obviously is similar but not equal to the imperative. This section will be organized as follows: in 4.1 we will present the form of the *moet je* construction and in 4.2 we will explain this form in relation to the function of this construction.

### 4.1 The form of the *moet je* construction vs the imperative

Like the imperative, the *moet je* construction is not tensed, which implies that *moeten* is obligatorily present tense marked (Droste 1956: 33; Janssen 2006: 337). Thus the past tense variant of (27a), namely (27b), is ungrammatical.

(27) a. *Ik reed me daar op een avond door de Westgaag en opeens zag ik er een midden op de weg zitten. Ik probeerde nog af te remmen maar het was al te laat, hij sprong recht in mijn gezicht, zo van de grond af, ‘One evening I was cycling through the Westgaag and suddenly I saw one [a skunk] sitting in the middle of the street. I tried to brake but it was too late: he jumped right into my face, from the streetlevel,’*

   moet je nagaan, terwijl ik op een hoge fiets zat.

b. *just imagine, while I was sitting high on a bicycle.*

(DRAPAC 29 MtH)

\(^{15}\) Nuyts, Byloo and Diepeveen (2007: 167) quote an example of this construction and, without taking note of its specific properties, interpret it as a *sterk advies* ‘strong piece of advice’ (2007: 168). Nuyts (2011, 2013) does not mention the *moet je* construction at all.
b. *moest je nagaan, terwijl ik op een hoge fiets zat.
must.pst.sg you imagine.inf while I on a high bicycle sat.sg
‘just imagined, while I was sitting high on a bicycle.’

A second property that the moet je construction shares with the imperative is its addressee-orientation, i.e. the subject in the construction with moeten must always have a second person referent. Therefore the 1st person plural variant of (28a), i.e. (28b), is ungrammatical as it stands, although interpretable as a deontic question.

\[(28)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(a)} & \quad \text{[Talking about World War II: one of two imprisoned members of the Dutch resistance is telling how they passed their time talking about their work while waiting for their execution]} \\
& \quad Moet je je voorstellen hoe we daar zaten \\
& \quad \text{must.prs.sg you refl.2sg imagine.inf how we sat.pl}
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(b)} & \quad \text{[During an interview, Pieter van den Hoogenband, Dutch swimming champion, shows the interviewer his first swimming certificate, gained at the age of five]} \\
& \quad Je moet dit zien \\
& \quad you must.prs.sg this see.inf
\end{align*}
\]

A third property the moet je construction shares with the imperative is the position of the finite verb, which must always be sentence initial. (29b), where the pronoun is in sentence initial position, is interpretable, but only as a declarative participant-oriented deontic expression.

\[(29)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(a)} & \quad \text{[During an interview, Pieter van den Hoogenband, Dutch swimming champion, shows the interviewer his first swimming certificate, gained at the age of five]} \\
& \quad Moet je dit zien \\
& \quad must.prs.sg you this see.inf
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(b)} & \quad \text{[During an interview, Pieter van den Hoogenband, Dutch swimming champion, shows the interviewer his first swimming certificate, gained at the age of five]} \\
& \quad Je moet dit zien \\
& \quad you must.prs.sg this see.inf
\end{align*}
\]
Now let us turn to the properties that distinguish the *moet je* construction from the imperative. First, the *moet je* construction must always contain a pronoun referring to the addressee: compare (30), which exemplifies the *moet je* construction, with the imperative in (31).

(30) a. *moet je hier ruiken*

    must.prs.sg you here sniff.inf

    ‘take a sniff at this!’

    (DRAPAC 27 MtH)

b. *moet hier ruiken*

    must.prs.sg here sniff.inf

    ‘must sniff at this’

(31) *Ruik eens... dit is de geur van heiligheid.*

    sniff.imp mit this is the smell of sacredness

    ‘Just take a sniff ... this is the smell of sacredness.’

    (CHN, Press, 2011)

Secondly, the *moet je* construction allows only unstressed addressee pronouns (Droste 1956: 33) as shown in (32), while imperatives allow emphatic pronominal reference to the addressee for the exclusive purpose of contrastive focus marking (33).


    must.prs.sg you mit listen.inf Marco

    ‘Listen, Marco!’

    (CHN, Press, 2006)

b. *Moet jij eens luisteren, Marco.*

    must.prs.sg you.emph mit listen.inf Marco

    ‘Must you listen, Marco.’

(33) [—*Hoor nou eens even ... ‘Now just listen ...’*]

    — *Nee, luister JIJ nou eens even!*

    no listen.imp you.emph prt mit mit

    ‘— Now YOU just listen!’

    (E. Proper and S. van den Eynden, *Vals profiel*. 2010, internet)

Thirdly, the *moet je* construction is bound to positive polarity, as shown in (34a) and (34b), while imperatives may be negated as, can be gathered from example (35).

(34) a. *Moet je kijken!*

    must.prs.sg you look.inf

    ‘Look!’

    (DRAPAC 38 HM)
b. *Moet je niet kijken!
must.prs.sg you not look
‘Don’t you want to look!’

(35) Kijk niet Eddy, kijk niet
look.imp not Eddy look.imp not
‘Don’t look, Eddy, don’t look!’
(CHN, Van hier en daar en overal, 1986)

Fourthly, the moet je construction does not admit a temporal modifier such as morgen ‘tomorrow’ in the state of affairs it has in its scope (36), while such a modification is possible in the case of imperatives (37).

(36) a. [‘Als lucht ben je onzichtbaar en overal. ‘Being air, you are invisible and you are everywhere.’]
   Moet je je eens indenken, eekhoorn.”
must.prs.sg you refl.2sg mit imagine squirrel
‘Just imagine, squirrel.” ’
(DRAPAC 56 TT)

b. *Moet je je morgen eens indenken, eekhoorn.
must.prs.sg you refl.2sg tomorrow mit imagine squirrel
‘Imagine tomorrow, squirrel.” ’

(37) Kom morgen maar terug.
come.imp tomorrow mit back
‘Come back tomorrow.’
(CHN, Press, 2004)

Finally, the use of the moet je construction is restricted to verbs of physical and mental perception, that of the imperative is not. Consider the imperative of the verb come in (38a) and the application of the same verb to the moet je construction in (38b), which yields an ungrammatical result.

(38) a. “Henri, kom eens hier [...] riep hij.
   Henri come.imp mit here shouted.pst.sg he
‘ ‘Henri, just come here [...]’ he shouted.’
(DRAPAC 48 GR)

b. *Henri, moet je eens hier komen
   Henri must.prs.sg you mit here come.inf
‘Henri, must you just come here’

From the examples we have seen so far, we can gather that the lexical restriction is such that it allows for all kinds of perception; (i) visual: zien, kijken ‘look’
(cf. examples (29) and (34), respectively), (ii) auditive: *horen, luisteren* ‘listen’ (cf. examples (3) and (32), respectively), (iii) olfactory: *ruiken* ‘sniff’ (cf. example (30)), and (iv) mental: *nagaan*, reflexive *voorstellen* and reflexive *indenken* ‘imagine’ (cf. examples (27), (28), and (36), respectively).

In the following section, we will show that despite these numerous restrictions, the *moet je* construction can be viewed as a grammaticalized expression of an illocutionary distinction.

### 4.2 The function of the *moet je* construction: immediate perception imperative

We have shown in Section 4.1 that *moet je* behaves like a positive imperative requiring from the addressee the perception of some state of affairs. This perception, i.e. the perlocutionary effect of the imperative, needs to be realized immediately at utterance time, this is why temporal marking is excluded, hence “immediate perception” is required.

The impossibility to stress the addressee in this construction is related to the fact that there is obligatory focus marking elsewhere, i.e. on the element expressing the required perlocutionary effect. This may be the verb, as in the following example:

(39) *Moet je eens kijken*  
must.prs.sg you MIT look.inf  
‘Just LOOK!’  
(CHN, Press, 2005)

However, whenever there is additional information present specifying the object to be perceived, such as the noun phrase *dit tolletje* ‘this little tol’ in the following example, then this element is in focus:

(40) *moet je dit tolletje zien*  
must.prs.sg you this tol.dim see.inf  
‘Look at THIS LITTLE TOL!’  
(CHN, Press, 2005)

Elements such as the noun phrase in (40), the demonstrative pronoun *dit* ‘this’ in example (29) and the locative adverb *hier* ‘here’ in example (30) always have

---

16 In this case, the verb is the only possible element to be stressed, because mitigating particles, such as *eens* in this case, cannot be stressed (Elffers 1997: 60). For the use of particles in Dutch imperatives and the like cf. Vismans (1994).
deictic reference to an entity present in the situation of the interaction. As a general rule, we can therefore establish that this construction always requires focus marking on the most focal element expressed in the construction.\textsuperscript{17}

What we have not explained so far is the incompatibility of the \textit{moet je} construction with negation. The function of this construction is to draw the attention of the interlocutor to something to be perceived, this attention drawing is a type of linguistic action, i.e. in terms of Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 47) it is the realization of a “discourse act”. As such it cannot be negated, very much in the same way as a performative speech act cannot be negated.

Given the properties described in this section, we will refer to this construction as the “immediate perception imperative”.\textsuperscript{18}

## 5 The grammaticalization of deontic \textit{moeten}

In this section we will account for the diachronic development of deontic \textit{moeten} and for its synchronic scope relations within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008, 2010), in which such a development can be accounted for in a straightforward way, as shown in Hengeveld (2011, this volume).

Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) is conceived as a top-down layered model of the grammatical competence of speakers in view of verbal interaction as the main function of language. The highest components of the grammar consist of an interactional pragmatic and a semantic level, where the former governs the latter. Each of these components has an internal structure of

\textsuperscript{17} Janssen (2006) refers to the \textit{moet je} construction as “focus construction”. The situation becomes more complex in the case of mental perception, where, depending on a number of contextual factors either the object to be perceived or the verb can be in focus:

(i) \textit{moet je je MIJN SITUATIE eens voorstellen!}
   \begin{verbatim}
   must.prs.sg you refl.isg my situation mit imagine.inf
   ‘Just imagine my situation!’
   \end{verbatim}

(ii) \textit{moet je je MIJN SITUATIE eens VOORSTELLEN!}
   \begin{verbatim}
   must.prs.sg you refl.isg my situation mit imagine.inf
   ‘Just IMAGINE my situation!’
   \end{verbatim}

Obviously, prosodic factors play an important role in the pragmatics of the \textit{moet je} construction, but we will not go into details here. We are indebted to Cecilia Odé for discussion and suggestions in this field.

\textsuperscript{18} This post-modal development confirms the unproven claim made by Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994: 210) that deontic necessity can develop into imperativity; see also van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 96) and Narrog (2012: 159–160, this volume).
hierarchical layers that corresponds to linguistic scope relations. We have seen the internal structure of the semantic level (“representational level” in Functional Discourse Grammar) on the vertical axis in Tab. 1: (i) participant-oriented modality operates on the predicate and its arguments (“configurational property” in FDG), (ii) event-oriented modality operates on the state of affairs, (iii) episode-oriented modality operates on (a set of) states of affairs that can be freely located in time, (iv) proposition-oriented modality operates on a propositional content, which can be located in neither time nor space but can be evaluated in terms of truth.

The interactional pragmatic level is called the “interpersonal level” in FDG and has a hierarchical structure, too. The highest layer is the individual “discourse act”, which may or may not equal a clause. The discourse act basically consists of the illocution and the content to be communicated.¹⁹

In the representations given in Tabs. 3 and 4, the interpersonal level is abbreviated as IL and the representational level as RL. Within each level, the relevant internal hierarchical layers are given, and the arrows indicate the expected direction of change. The boldfaced layers and arrows correspond to the changes that have actually taken place. The modal meanings are given in italics and the numbers refer to the example(s) given for each type in the course of this paper.

Table 3 represents the Medieval development of *moeten* as an expression of deontic possibility, before these meanings definitively shifted to the modal *mogen* in the 18th century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 3: Historical development of <em>moeten</em> in the function of deontic possibility (12th–18th c.).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IL:</strong> Discourse act ← Illocution ← Communicated content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RL:</strong> Proposition ← Episode ← State of affairs ← Configurational property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IL:</strong> Optative (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RL:</strong> Event-oriented possibility (15)</td>
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</tbody>
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The case of *moeten* as an expression of deontic necessity, represented in Tab. 4, is different for the simple reason that a more differentiated development has taken place within the – semantic – representational level.

¹⁹ For more details on the theory of Functional Discourse Grammar, see Giomi (this volume).
Tab. 4: Historical development of *moeten* in de function of deontic necessity (13th–20th c.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IL: Discourse act</th>
<th>←</th>
<th>Illocution</th>
<th>←</th>
<th>Communicated content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Immediate perception</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>imperative (26–30), (32), (34), (36), (39–40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RL: Proposition</th>
<th>←</th>
<th>Episode</th>
<th>←</th>
<th>State of affairs</th>
<th>←</th>
<th>Configurational property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Evaluative</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Prescriptive</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Participant-oriented</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>deontic necessity (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>deontic necessity (18), (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>deontic necessity (17), (19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further important point of divergence is that in this case the diachronic data do not reflect any historical development from participant-oriented modality to event-oriented modality, which is marked by the fact that there is no arrow but a dash between the configurational property and the state of affairs. Nevertheless, the mutual ordering of these elements correctly reflects the fact that despite of the lack of diachronic evidence, there is a synchronic scope relation between participant-oriented and event-oriented modality such that the latter scopes over the former, rather than the other way round.

This analysis provides additional evidence for the development of grammaticalization within and across levels in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld this volume).

6 Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that in Modern Dutch *moeten* expresses all kinds of deontic and non-deontic modal meanings, among which objective epistemic modality is rather marginal. Modern Dutch *moeten* also has a lexical version, which we interpret as a case of lexicalization, rather than degrammaticalization. Viewed from a diachronic perspective, deontic *moeten* developed twice from semantics proper to the domain of illocution: in Medieval Dutch it developed from deontic possibility to optative illocution, and in 20th century Dutch it developed from deontic necessity to imperative illocution, giving rise to the “immediate perception imperative”. Although the results of the first development shifted in the 18th century to a new expression, i.e.
mogen ‘may’, both developments are interesting cases of what according to Narrog (2012: 160) “can be taken as a paradigm example of increased speech act orientation.” Narrog (2012, this volume) presents quite a number of similar diachronic changes. Whereas Narrog prefers to represent these changes with the emphasis on their graduality, we have chosen the Functional Discourse Grammar approach (Hengeveld this volume) which emphasizes the stepwise hierarchical layering to be observed in the development of moeten from both a synchronic and a diachronic perspective.

Uncommon abbreviations

DIM = diminutive, EMPH = emphasis, FDG = Functional Discourse Grammar, IL = interpersonal level, INT = Institute for the Dutch Language, MIT = mitigation, PRT = particle, RL = representational level.

Corpora


[DRAPAC] Dutch-Russian Amsterdam Parallel Aligned Corpus. Amsterdam: Department of Slavic Studies, University of Amsterdam.


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