PROTECTING CONCESSIONARY RIGHTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

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Abstract
This article engages with the history of international investment law in the first half of the 20th century. It traces how British international lawyers and economists inscribed their vision of an international legal order protecting private property of Western companies against attempts at nationalisation in the wake of socialist revolutions and the decolonisation of large parts of the world. The article focuses on the role of ‘general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations’ as building blocks for an international legal order today called international investment law. Based on the analysis of arbitrations over disputes resulting from concession agreements and scholarly writings in the interwar period, this contribution draws out the modes of authorisation upon which these invocations rested. At the heart of the vision were ideas of ‘modernity’ ‘civilisation’ ‘equity’ and ‘justice’ that enabled a temporalisation of difference, locating Western claims to legality above rivalling claims of socialist and
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‘newly independent’ states. These ideas ultimately constituted the paradox of a ‘modern law of nature’ that claimed timeless universality while authorising the ordering of foreign property in line with Western conceptions of modernity.

1. Introduction

The codification of ‘general principles of law recognized by civilised nations’ in Article 38(3) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice marks a well-known event in the history of international law.1 The list of sources drafted in 1920 was carried over into the corresponding Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and is the hallmark of sources doctrine until today. Yet, general principles have not played as important a role in the development of international law as treaties and custom did and have received much less scholarly attention.2

In the following, the article traces the role of ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ in the first half of the 20th century as the fundamental building block for the coming into being of the field on international investment law. First, the article shows that general principles were invoked in the practice of early investor state

1 Permanent Court of International Justice: Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee June 16th-July 24th 1920 with Annexes (1920).

arbitrations to claim the applicability of an international legal order superseding domestic law. At the occasion of arbitrations concerning disputes over concession agreements, the reference to an international order enabled positioning the protection of foreign property as universal rule against domestic attempts at large-scale redistributions of wealth. Second, the article draws out how general principles were considered in scholarly writings in the same period, especially in the works of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Sir Arnold McNair. By drawing out the private law character of their conceptualisation, the article shows how general principles were a vessel for prioritising the continuation and protection of accrued wealth over attempts at redistribution for the public good. Finally, the article shows that the authority for successfully establishing an international order of this character is drawn from a temporalisation of difference that creates a paradoxical understanding of general principles as ‘akin to a modern law of nature’.

2. Internationalisation of contracts

Most early investor-state arbitrations of the first half of the 20th century, meaning arbitrations in which a company engaged in a legal dispute with a state in an international arbitral forum, have a commonality; they were based on a concession
agreement\(^3\) until well into the 1950s.\(^4\) Concession agreements denote ‘a broad range of legal instruments under which a State grants certain economic rights and privileges to foreign investors within the framework of a public function’;\(^5\) usually involving the exploitation of natural resources or the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects. The fate of these legal instruments was highly controversial during and after decolonisation and the socialist revolutions in a number of countries around the globe.\(^6\) One could think of the nationalisations in the course of the socialist revolutions in the Soviet Union and Mexico, the large land reforms in Eastern Europe, or the later

\(^3\) In the collection of records of 15 investor-state arbitrations before 1934, all were based on a dispute over a concession agreement.


nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company. Other instances were linked to decolonisation and the claim to control over resources and industry by ‘newly’ independent states. In all these instances contracts granting rights to foreign investors were affected by legal measures of the ‘new’ government.

In an attempt by Western governments, companies and their legal representatives to safeguard foreign property from such restructurings of property holdings, they developed the theory of the internationalisation of contracts, meaning ‘the removal of the foreign investment transaction from the sphere of the host state’s law and its subjection to an immutable, supranational system’.\(^7\) It was a conjunction of ‘extra-State law or norms […] with an independent forum’\(^8\) that were at the core of the coming into being of what we call international investment law today. But how was this achieved – how were concession agreements moved from the domestic to the international sphere?

Focusing on the applicable law for concession agreements the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases of 1929 offers a useful point of entry. In the Serbian and Brazilian Loans


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Cases, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) made the famous stipulation that ‘any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some country.’ Since concession agreements involved a state on the one hand, but a company or an individual on the other, they would fall under municipal law. What a close reading of early arbitral awards reveals, is that this rule on the applicable law was restated in almost every award. However, in many cases its invocation was then followed by a reference to a law of higher order by way of general principles, a law that was ultimately located outside the realm of national laws. This was necessary, it was

9 Payment of Various Serbian/Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France [1929] (Judgment) (ser A) Nos 20/21 PCIJ 4, at 41.

10 Some examples of cases referencing general principles in consideration of the applicable law are the Palestine Railway case (Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman de Jaffa à Jerusalem et Prolongements v. Government of the United Kingdom, 1922), the Lena Goldfields case (Lena Goldfields Ltd. v. Soviet Union, 1930), the Watercourses in Katanga case (Compagnie du Katanga v. The Colony of the Belgian Congo, 1931), the Greek Telephone Company case (Greek Telephone Company v. Government of Greece, 1935), the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi case (Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd v. the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 1951), the Ruler of Qatar case (Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Company, Ltd. 1953), The ARAMCO case (Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company, 1963).
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argued in one form or another, for the ‘construction of modern commercial instruments’.11

British international lawyers strongly drove these developments in arbitral practice and scholarly writing, since Britain was one of the largest outward investors in this period.12 Indeed, a great number of early arbitrations not only involved British companies but were also dominated by a small group of British international lawyers, including, amongst others, Hersch Lauterpacht and Arnold McNair. Based on early disputes in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration or the Anglo-Iranian case, the 1950s saw an ever-increasing consensus between a number of Western scholars that domestic law could not be the appropriate applicable law for concession agreements, which

11 In the Matter of an Arbitration between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) (Award) reproduced in International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1 (1952) 247-61, 251. Other examples of such an invocation are the Lena Goldfields Arbitration of 1930, and the proceedings in the Anglo-Iranian case in 1952 and the Ruler of Qatar Arbitration of 1953.

12 Britain was the largest outward investor until 1945 with total overseas investments estimated at £3545 million in 1938. This number included 46% foreign direct investment and 54% of portfolio investment. T. A. B. Corley, ‘Competitive Advantage and Foreign Direct Investment: Britain 1913-1938’ (1997) 26(2) Business and Economic History 599-608, at 601. The British share furthermore constituted about 41% of global FDI. I. Salavrakos, ‘Determinants of German Foreign Direct Investment: A Case of Failure?’ (2009) 12(2) European Research Studies 3-26, at 7.
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then came to be called ‘economic development agreements’.

Anghie describes that what came to be developed to safeguard the concessions was ‘a new system of law, which had an international character, but which was not public international law.’

One of the best-known propositions was advanced by Philip Jessup with his publication Transnational Law in 1956, wherein he proposed a transnational law consisting of a mix of private and public law sources to govern relations on the international level. Other authors made suggestions along similar lines. What all these propositions had in common, was the claim of a higher legal order, superseding domestic law. The study of these early arbitrations shows that the vessel for the making of such a higher legal order were ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.


3. General principles in early arbitrations

General principles, or the technical term ‘general principles recognized by civilized nations’ with explicit reference to Article 38 of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and later the International Court of Justice (ICJ), were invoked in a number of awards in the few early arbitrations between a company and a state. A systematic analysis reveals that these invocations constituted an argumentative pattern that enabled the elevation of concession agreements to the international sphere.

As mentioned before, the majority of early arbitrations involved a British company as well as a number of British lawyers who worked together on both sides of the arbitrations. In the Sheik of Abu Dhabi Arbitration of 1951 Walter Monckton, Hersch Lauterpacht, GRF Morris and R Dunn appeared on behalf of the company, whereas the Ruler of Abu Dhabi was represented by NR Fox-Andrews, CHM Waldock, Stephen Chapman and JFE Stephenson. Together with RV Idelson, Hartley Shawcross, Arnold McNair and John Megaw, these lawyers worked on most of the cases involving British companies and some aspect of international law at the time. In addition to the Sheik of Abu Dhabi Arbitration (1951), NR Fox and Walter Monckton served as counsel in the Ruler of Qatar Arbitration (1953). In The Rose Mary Case (1953), Idelson and

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17 See Serbian/Brazilian Loans case, supra note 10.

18 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Company, Ltd. (Award) 20 ILR 543, 1953.
Lauterpacht were part of the drafting team, and Hartley Shawcross and John Megaw appeared as counsel.\textsuperscript{19} McNair was the presiding judge in the \textit{Anglo-Iranian Case} (1952) at the ICJ in which Waldock was counsel for the British government and Lauterpacht and Idelson were part of the legal team.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, the \textit{Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration} took place after the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company in Iran in March 1951, but before the International Court of Justice issued a judgment on 22 July 1952. The \textit{Rose Mary Case} evolved from the same facts as the Anglo-Iranian dispute and was decided in 1953,\textsuperscript{21} so that the legal work for the three cases must have been done at the same time. These lawyers worked together on many more occasions and were likely to know each other well and be familiar with the arguments

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{The Rose Mary (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Ltd v. Jaffrate)} (Judgment) 1 WLR 246 (1953). The Rose Mary was a ship carrying oil cargo from the newly founded National Iranian Oil Company, which was forced into the port of Aden (then British protectorate). The Aden Supreme Court ruled that the cargo was the property of the Anglo-Iranian company and was unlawfully carried by the merchants. Lauterpacht commented on the Court’s decision to find Iranian domestic law in breach of international law with hesitant affirmation. H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Rose Mary Case’, \textit{International law: being the collected papers of Hersch Lauterpacht systematically arranged and edited by E. Lauterpacht} (1970 (unpublished case note, originally 1953)) vol. 3, 242.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Anglo-Iranian Oil case (United Kindgom v. Iran)} (Preliminary Objection of 22 July 1952) [1952] ICJ Rep. 93.
\item \textsuperscript{21} See \textit{Rose Mary case, supra note 19}.
\end{itemize}
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and findings in the other cases.\textsuperscript{22} ‘General principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ were invoked in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration 1930, the Anglo-Iranian Case 1953, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration 1951 and the Ruler of Qatar Arbitration 1953. In each of these instantiations they were grounded in an article of the concession agreement that read almost identical in all four cases and made reference to ‘good faith’ and ‘reason’. It can be almost stated with certainty, that the drafter of all the concession agreements underlying these arbitrations was R.V. Idelson.\textsuperscript{21} In each arbitration the reference to general principles served as a basis of an argument for the application of a higher legal order that could supersede domestic law.

The tight knit relationships between the practitioners invite a focus on legal practice, as invented and undertaken by the lawyers. By applying this lens, we can see how ‘legal knowledge comes into agentive being in the process of its being handed from one legal actor to another (…). What matters, rather, is the practice, the move, the

\textsuperscript{22} Shawcross, H. Lauterpacht and Waldock worked together in the Corfu Channel case before the ICJ from 1947-1949, Lauterpacht and Monckton collaborated on legal opinions for oil concessions in Kuwait and McNair acted as senior counsel in the Aramco Arbitration in 1963. See for these collaborations E. Lauterpacht, The Life of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, QC, FBA, LLD (2010) at 324, plate 16.

Thus, a pattern of reasoning was established through the same argument and travelled from one award to the other through the people who were involved. This focus on practice demystifies the legal claim and its status. It turns it from an expression of ‘the law’ into an argument particular to the actors involved in these cases.

One might ask about the contestations against this line of reasoning and wonder how it was able to travel so smoothly? The response to this has to do with the definition of what counts as the legal sphere. In the eyes of Western lawyers and the Western media, contestations of socialist governments were not understood to take the form of legal arguments. They were located outside the legal field and construed as political manoeuvres. From the Soviet perspective, the withdrawal of its arbitrator from the Lena Goldfields Arbitration in 1930 was a contestation of the legitimacy of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. In scholarship and media in the West it was characterised as a rejection of the rule of law. In a similar vein, the insistence of the


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Mossadegh government on the payment of compensation according to domestic laws after the nationalisation of the oil concession of British Petroleum finally ending with a Coup d’État by the British and US government, is a form of contestation illegible as lawful from a study of awards over concession agreements.27

In addition to the non-recognition of contestations in legal terms, the ease of building a pattern of reference stems from the fact that the same British lawyers sometimes appeared as counsel on both sides of the dispute.28 The claim to a higher legal order through general principles was normalised, it became the common ground for argumentation. The focus on repetition and the absence of contestation indicates the early formation of a professional field with shared commitments and assumptions as has become common place today in both commercial as well as investment arbitration. The developments described here should be seen in light of the emergence of the field of arbitration more broadly as traced in sociological terms by Dezalay and Garth.29 In the following I will develop the deployment of such a claim


28 One example of British lawyers acting on both sides is the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration discussed below.

for a higher legal order in the *Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration* to substantiate my argument. Yet, a similar substantiation could be made by example of any of the other above-mentioned arbitrations.

4. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration

The dominant view in the first half of the 20th century was that contracts were subject to the national laws of the country in which the contract was performed.\(^{30}\) In the *Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration*, the arbitrator, Lord Asquith, took this understanding as a starting point, but ended with the application of ‘a sort of “modern law of nature’”\(^{31}\), which was in effect a representation of English law. His reasoning was based on the text of Article 17 of the concession agreement. This article read as follows: ‘*The Ruler and the Company both declare that they intend to execute this Agreement in a spirit of good intentions and integrity, and to interpret it in a reasonable manner.*’\(^{32}\) From this clause Lord Asquith deduced that the parties ‘repel[ed] the notion that municipal law of any country could be appropriate’, and that instead the ‘terms of the clause prescribe[d] a sort of modern law of nature.’\(^{33}\) Let us follow Lord Asquith’s argument

\(^{30}\) Serbian/Brazilian Loans case, supra note 9. See also A. Nussbaum, supra note 26, at 36.

\(^{31}\) Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration, supra note 11, at 250-1.


\(^{33}\) Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration, supra note 11, at 250-1.
to unravel some of the foundational ideas. In a search for the appropriate legal regime to govern the concession agreement, Lord Asquith argued the following:

If any municipal system of law were applicable, it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi. But no such law can reasonably be said to exist. The Sheikh administers a purely discretionary justice with the assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments. Nor can I see any basis on which the municipal law of England could apply. On the contrary, Clause 17 of the agreement, cited above, repels the notion that the municipal law of any country, as such, could be appropriate. The terms of that clause invite, indeed prescribe, the application of principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of civilised nations—a sort of ‘modern law of nature’. I do not think that on this point there is any conflict between the parties. But, albeit English municipal law is inapplicable as such, some of its rules are in my view so firmly grounded in reason, as to form part of this broad body of jurisprudence—this ‘modern law of nature’.  

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The argument rested on two different ideas. One was the intention of the parties as critical for the interpretation of the contract and the other was a resort to a natural law-grounded order of legal principles. The first strand was expressed when the Arbitrator tried to establish that the application of municipal law could not have been intended, because the particular municipal law in question could not ‘reasonably be said to exist’ in the administration of ‘a purely discretionary justice with the assistance of the Koran.’ In particular, the Arbitrator doubted the existence of ‘principles applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments.’

In the absence of applicable domestic law, so the argument went, the parties could not have intended its application. But because the Arbitrator had tied his reasoning to an abstract rule, namely the inapplicability of any domestic law, he needed to establish a different legal order to adjudicate the dispute. By invoking general principles as an expression of principles grounded in natural law, the Arbitrator distinguished between such domestic laws that had the quality to represent the modern law of nature and those that did not. On this basis he presented English municipal law as the representation of ‘the modern law of nature’. Its application was therefore not warranted ‘as such’ but because ‘its rules [were] so firmly grounded in reason, as to

Contract Concluded by International Persons’ (1959) 35 British Yearbook of International Law 34, at 52. For contemporary critical commentary, see Somarajah supra note 7, at 289-99. Anghie, supra note 14, at 226.

35 Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration, supra note 11, at 250-1.
form part of this broad body of jurisprudence.'\textsuperscript{36} This line of reasoning was based on a phrase in the concession agreement recording the parties’ commitment to ‘good intentions and integrity’ and interpretation in a ‘reasonable manner’. From these cues, Lord Asquith developed a universal legal order superseding domestic laws, and concluded that the parties intended this legal order to be applied to their contract. Islamic law was not an expression of this order, but English law was. In his argument, Islamic law was merely domestic law, while English law was bestowed with a double quality. It was domestic law, but it was also representative of a higher universal legal order. This aspect of Lord Asquith’s reasoning is an iteration of what Pahuja calls the ‘operationalisation of the universal’,

\textsuperscript{37} a constitutive technique for international law. When Lord Asquith said, ‘modern law of nature’, British law moved from the ‘particular’ to the ‘universal’ thereby authorising the dismissal of Islamic law.

In other arbitrations, the rhetoric was less dismissive and condescending, but the mode of reasoning stayed the same: the displacement of a domestic legal order by reference to a higher legal order. This higher legal order was determined by turning a particular domestic law into a universally applicable norm, claiming its status as ‘general principle of law recognized by civilized nations’.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

5. General principles in scholarship

The writings of Lauterpacht and McNair allow insights into the conceptual framework underlying the above-described practice. In 1957, McNair wrote the most important piece for the internationalisation of concession agreements, with the title *The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations*. The article introduced the language of economic development as an underlying justification for the establishment of an international legal order. However, the foundations of his argument can be found in the writings of scholars during the interwar period on acquired rights and state succession. McNair’s article is a culmination of both the developments in arbitral practice discussed above and the theoretical developments to be discussed in this section.

*5.1. General principles as rules of private law*

General principles occupy a particularly important place in international legal theory. In the discussion of the sources of the binding force of international law, the battle

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line in the interwar period ran between positivists and natural lawyers.\textsuperscript{39} Lauterpacht located his own view of international law between the ‘believer in the law of nature and the principles of natural justice forming part of international law’ and the ‘rigid positivist’.\textsuperscript{40} He saw himself as someone occupying ‘a middle course who, now powerfully supported by Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court, recognizes the practice of States as the principle source of law, but is prepared to extend the sphere of applicable international law by approved scientific methods of analogy with, and deduction from, general principles of law.’\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, for Lauterpacht, general principles had delivered \textit{un coup mortel} to positivist theory.\textsuperscript{42} They provided a solution to the problem of a court ruling of \textit{non liquet} due to gaps,\textsuperscript{43} or lacunae, in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} H. Lauterpacht, \textit{The Function of Law in the International Community} (2011 (first published in 1933)) 65.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{42} H. Lauterpacht, ‘Règles générales du droit de la paix’ (1937) \textit{62 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye} 100-206, at 164.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Koskenniemi describes Lauterpacht’s approach as follows: ‘That the legal order is unable to recognize the existence of gaps results from its inability to limit their scope. In particular, there is no method to
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international law, arising from a strictly positivist view. General principles were the logically necessary expression of the completeness of the law, since ‘law, like physics, does not tolerate a vacuum.’

Lauterpacht saw Article 38(3) as an acknowledgment of the already established and long-standing arbitral practice refuting the positivist problem of gaps in international law. In his second doctoral thesis Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law at the LSE under the supervision of McNair in 1927, he wrote ‘there exists a customary rule of international law to the effect that “general principles of law,” “justice,” and “equity” should, in addition to and apart from custom and treaties, be treated as binding upon international tribunals.’ Lauterpacht’s argument was that the reference to Article 38(3) was a recognition of the already established customary rule that general principles formed part of the body of international law. His thesis then set out to document and systematise the practice of international courts and distinguish between “essentially” important (political) and non-important (legal) issues.’ Koskenniemi supra note 39, at 367.


45 Lauterpacht, ‘Règles générales du droit de la paix’, supra note 42, at 165.


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tribunals to better grasp the content and character of such principles. Indeed, McNair characterised Lauterpacht’s LSE thesis as ‘in effect, a commentary upon Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Court.’

The connection between a broader theory of international law and the place of general principles becomes crucial when we pay attention to the sources Lauterpacht offered for these general principles. As indicated in the title of his thesis, he looked at analogies to private law sources. This was not simply to fill the gaps of the international legal system, but was based on an understanding that ‘regards the relation of the State to its territory as identical with or as analogous to the private law right of property.’ The most obvious place to trace this conception is the debate over acquired rights in cases of state succession. When we pay attention to the terminology, we see that the notion of succession already implied a certain continuity. In Lauterpacht’s vision, international law served as a ‘legal bridge’ for the continuity of international obligations. Here, too, Lauterpacht argued in favour of a strict

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48 McNair, supra note 13, n. 3.

49 Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, supra note 46, 130.

50 Ibid 92.


52 Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with Respect to Private Law Obligations’, supra note 44, 127.
analogy to private law principles since the problems were ‘identical’. In the case of state succession, as in the case of death of any legal subject, ‘the purpose of the law should be, and in fact is, to preserve acquired rights and maintain the continuity of law.’

He asked, ‘is he [the new sovereign] bound by the obligation of the former sovereign, because he finds it convenient to be so, or because international law imposes upon him that duty’? For Lauterpacht, international law, rather than the will of the state, was the source of rights that made the coming into being of ‘new’ states possible. Recognition became the topic of Lauterpacht’s first book after the war. As Koskenniemi put it, recognition was the ‘master technique establishing the connection between the abstract rule and its concrete manifestation.’ Recognition provided the technique to make international law the source of new sovereignty. Combining these two strands of thought, international law as the source for the right for the constitution of a new state and international law as concerned with a continuation of obligations,

\[53\] Lauterpacht, *Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law*, supra note 46, 125.

\[54\] Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with Respect to Private Law Obligations’, supra note 44, 126.


\[56\] Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with Respect to Private Law Obligations’, supra note 44, 127.


we can see how acquired rights become the focal point of the international legal regime. Lauterpacht regarded the protection of acquired rights as the basic function of law, which had to be regulated ‘by a rule of law independent of the will of the actual successor.’

5.2. Acquired rights and unjust enrichment

McNair’s body of work was also informed by an interest in treaty law and contract, and he shared Lauterpacht’s orientation towards analogies from private law sources. McNair based his conceptualisation of international law and property on the distinction of imperium and dominium, understood as ‘the imperium or sovereignty which belongs to the State, and the dominium or property which belongs to the individual.’ The distinction between imperium and dominium lies at the heart of the notion of acquired rights, which are considered to be part of the sphere of dominium and thereby unaffected by changes in imperium. The analytic terms of imperium and dominium are the basis for an imagined distinction between the political and the economic sphere. The Austrian international lawyer, Alfred Verdroß, had written

59 Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, supra note 44, at 129.


61 McNair, ‘The Effects of Peace Treaties upon Private Rights’, supra note 60, at 381.
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extensively on general principles and acquired rights in international law, and was cited by both Lauterpacht and McNair. Verdroß’ arguments and ideas show the connection between the economists and the international lawyers of the interwar period. In his Hague lecture on Règles internationales concernant le traitement des étrangers of 1931, Verdroß explicitly distinguished between the rules for the treatment of foreigners in general and the rules pertaining especially to the economic sphere. 62 Verdroß argued on the basis of a distinction between imperium and dominium that the latter should be ‘autonomous’. 63 He referred to the World Economic Conference in Geneva in 1927, co-organised by the International Chamber of Commerce and the League of Nations, which was the place for advancing liberal politics for thinkers such as Röpke, Hayek and Haberler. 64 In line with these thinkers, in Verdroß’ argument, the necessity of a distinction between the political and the economic sphere arose out of the assumption that a functioning economic system depended on private property and free trade. 65

62 A. Verdroß, ‘Règles internationales concernant le traitement des étrangers’ (1931) 37 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye, 325.

63 Ibid, 389.


65 Verdroß, ‘Règles internationales concernant le traitement des étrangers’ supra note 62, at 396.
One of the most difficult questions was the relationship between sovereignty and acquired rights. Most authors were of the opinion that a change in the sovereign did not affect private rights per se. However, this position did not provide an answer to the question whether the ‘new’ state had to respect those rights after succession. In 1941 McNair wrote that ‘once the cession has taken place the dominium is at the mercy of the new sovereign.’ A similar argument was made by Kaeckenbeeck, the president of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia, in 1937 when reflecting on the status of acquired rights. ‘The question when the legislature should overrule vested rights or capitulate before them is always and exclusively a question of policy, of public interest, which the state alone is competent to decide [and] almost every social change, almost all so-called progress, plays havoc with some vested rights.’ These positions built on the distinction between imperium and dominium, but did not limit sovereignty in and of itself. Rather they appeared to insist on the primacy of imperium over dominium. This primacy, however, came with a catch: that of compensation.

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67 McNair, ‘The Effects of Peace Treaties upon Private Rights’ supra note 60, at 384.


The state’s prerogative over legality and illegality of the act of confiscation required an international minimum standard of compensation. Indeed, Kaeckenbeeck’s article on acquired rights ends with a section on compensation calling for the establishment of a flexible international standard. He argued that the question of the legality of ‘the suppression’ of a vested right is solely for the national jurisdiction to decide. The question of compensation for the imposition of ‘the economic sacrifice demanded on behalf of the community’ is, to some extent, one that could be bound to an ‘international minimum standard for equitable compensation’.70 The debate over the appropriate standard of compensation took on particular prominence in the form of the two conceptions of the Hull Formula and the Calvo Doctrine and continues until today.71 The Hull Formula goes back to a 1938 letter by US Secretary of State Cordell Hull after the nationalisation of US interests in Mexico and prescribed ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation.’72 The Calvo Doctrine was developed by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo in the 19th century and prescribed the primacy of

70 Ibid., 15-6.

71 In 1961 Shawcross defended the proposition that acquired rights of foreigners were always protected under the standard of compensation of the ‘Hull formula’. H Shawcross, ‘The Problems of Foreign Investment in International Law’ (1961) 102 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye 335-93, at 351.

domestic law over an international standard of compensation. What is often overlooked in the literature is the related but slightly different concept of unjust enrichment. The principle is at the heart of the connection of acquired rights and compensation as described by O’Connell: ‘The juridical justification for the obligation to pay compensation is to be found in the concept of unjustified enrichment, which lies at the basis of the doctrine of acquired rights.’ It has been relied on to argue for the application of the Hull Formula, rather than the Calvo Doctrine, and thus in favour of an international minimum standard rather than domestic discretion. It is considered to provide a remedy precisely when there is no clear breach of law, but ‘in cases when justice in a very fundamental sense requires it.’ Thus, at least the common law conception of the notion is rooted in an idea of natural law.

73 Ibid ,1-2.

74 For an account of the relationship of state succession and unjust enrichment, see Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, supra note 46, 133.


78 Ibid 4.
For my purposes, the most important category of acquired rights are concession agreements, which Lauterpacht characterised as a ‘rather frail and undefined category of rights’ in 1927. Lauterpacht had only reluctantly included a note on the Lena Goldfields Arbitration in the Annual Digest of 1930. By the time McNair wrote his article The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations in 1957, the situation had changed, and the fate of concession agreements had become a major concern, discussed as internationalisation of contracts. The oil arbitrations, as a practical concern, had put concession agreements and arbitrations between states and companies at the centre of attention. In his article, McNair did not offer a conclusive

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79 Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with Respect to Private Law Obligations’, supra note 44, at 133.


81 The Lena Goldfields Arbitration Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases - Years 1929 and 1930, starting pages 3 and 426 (cases nos 1 and 258).

82 Sornarajah, supra note 7, at 289-99.

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list of general principles in existence, but he gave two examples of ‘likely candidates[s], among many, for recognition.’ It comes as no surprise that the two doctrines he proposed were ‘unjust enrichment’ and ‘acquired rights’. We see here that the scope of the natural law element that was at play in different versions in all the above accounts was the protection of contract and property from the sovereign sphere.

McNair did not rely on a notion of natural law, as Lord Asquith did, but emphasised the implied or explicit consent of the parties to the contract. This could be found in the clauses discussed above or in the reference to arbitration in the concession agreement itself. However, traces of natural law resembling Lord Asquith’s argument can still be found in McNair as well as in Lauterpacht. The resort to ‘equity’ and ‘justice’, or one could argue to ‘good faith’ and ‘reason’ as guiding lights was deployed in explicit opposition to the positivist tradition. Lauterpacht used the also turned his attention to concession agreements and argued in a similar vein as McNair, see Verdroß, ‘Quasi-international Agreements and International Economic Transactions’, supra note 16 230.


85 Ibid. See also Friedmann, supra note 34, at 295-9.


87 Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, supra note 46, at 289-99. 'Law is not a spiritless and self-sufficient mechanism.' Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with Respect to Private Law Obligations’, supra note 44, at 128. For an account of a positivist conception of the notion
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langue of ethics when discussing state succession. In citing Charles Cheney Hyde, he affirmed the argument that ‘the ethical point of view tends in the direction of recognizing, (...) the principle of succession in the relation between States, that the practice of States tends in the same direction, and that a formal merger between ethics and law in this domain is only a question of time’.88 Koskenniemi distinguishes Lauterpacht from launching ‘simply a naturalist critic of nationalism and sovereignty’, but passages like the one cited above are important for showing the proximity between Lord Asquith’s ‘modern law of nature’, McNair’s ‘new legal system’ and Lauterpacht’s vision of general principles for a seamless international law. It is precisely in this leap, in the short distance between the positivist stance and Lauterpacht’s suggestion, that we find the door for the imposition of international legal rules on attempts by newly independent states to reorganise their economic systems. It is only through anchoring the international legal order in natural law that its imposition over domestic law could be made plausible. Here the particular was able to move to the universal.

‘civilised’ and its consequences for the binding character of international law see J. Kunz, ‘Zum Begriff der "nation civilisée" im modernen Völkerrecht’ (1927) 7(1) Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 86-99.

88 Lauterpacht, ‘Succession of States with Respect to Private Law Obligations’, supra note 44, at 128.
5.3. *From ‘civilisation’ to development*

McNair’s 1957 article located the necessity of a new international legal order in the context of a conflict between the countries of the global North, on the one hand, and Socialist countries and countries of the global South on the other. The internationalisation of concession agreements, and thus the protection of contract and property, prevented ‘new’ states from changing ownership and distributional structures. Proponents of this imposition justified it through the racialised qualifier ‘civilised’ that morphed into the concept of development. The wording in McNair’s article is indicative of this transformation. Concession agreements were now called ‘economic development agreements’ and McNair explicitly connected general principles, concession agreements and development. In the introduction to his article, McNair contended that general principles are

likely to [enable] a legal system for the regulation of some of the now numerous contracts made between corporations (or, less commonly, individuals) belonging to countries which have capital and skill to spare, and the Governments of certain countries which have natural resources awaiting development but not enough capital or skill available for that purpose. \(^{90}\)

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90 Ibid.
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In this linkage, McNair showed the continuity between the civilising mission of the 19th century and the development discourse of the 1950s.

He was careful to stress the economic perspective of his argument, speaking of material ‘civilization’ by which he did not want to ‘suggest any moral superiority.’\textsuperscript{91} McNair distanced himself from superiority established on moral grounds, but he did not distance himself from superiority as such. In a move traced by many postcolonial writers, the difference was now located in technical superiority.\textsuperscript{92} McNair relied on difference in the degree of legal sophistication to justify the imposition: ‘It is believed that the provisions, for instance, of the Islamic law respecting economic development agreements are very inadequate, if indeed there are any at all.’\textsuperscript{93} He argued that the application of general principles was necessary ‘to a contract in which the legal systems of the two countries involved present a strongly marked contrast, both in content and in stage of development.’\textsuperscript{94} Based on this distinction, McNair promoted a double standard for the application of general principles to contracts between states and companies. In the relationship between a Western state and a company, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid, at 2.
\item For a detailed account of the transformation of the notion of ‘civilisation’ to economic development in international law, see Pahuja, supra note 37.
\item Ibid (emphasis added), 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
sovereign kept the prerogative of defining the legal environment for the operations of a company. In the relationship between a ‘new’ state and a company, the sovereign state and the company were equalled on two grounds. On the one hand, the company achieved quasi-sovereignty by elevating contracts to the status of treaties and thus making it much harder to unilaterally change their terms.95 On the other hand, ‘new’ states were treated as private actors and considered to have renounced the sovereign prerogative to act in the public interest within that relationship.96 The term ‘civilised’ thus enabled McNair to conceptualise contractual relations between a state and a company in the West differently than in the rest of the world.

If we now also consider Verdroß’ terminology, we can see the relationship between ‘civilisation’, development and liberalism. Verdroß ascribed the failure of the League of Nations’ Codification Conference of 1930, aiming at codifying multilaterally the responsibility of states for damage done in their territory to the person or property of foreigners, to a difference in the readiness to liberalise. ‘Les Etats moins avancés’ were proposing ‘leurs idées peu libérales’ which hindered the ‘Etats avancés’ from

95 Anghie, supra note 14, at 234.

96 Ibid. Confirming this point and on the role of corporations in the history of international law generally, see F. Johns, ‘Theorizing the Corporation in International Law’ in Anne Orford et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (2016) 635, 639.
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codifying their progressive and modern ideas.97 In explicit terms, Verdroß proposed that ‘les Etats avancés’ should establish this convention on their own and it would, hopefully by virtue of de facto application, become ‘des vraies normes universelles’.98 Thus, the actual relevance of the autonomy of the economic sphere was in regard to control over property in ‘new’ states, which appeared to not be liberal enough.

Self-determination and nationalisation as modes of resistance against colonial rule were difficult to square with the imposition of a transnational legal system on domestic matters. In his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on Succession of States in Respect of Matters other than Treaties, Mohammed Bedjaoui argued in 1968 that concessionary rights could neither be regarded as acquired rights nor could there be talk of compensation that would not consider the profits made through the concessionary enterprise.99 It was precisely the battle over the economic sphere of the ‘newly’ independent states that provided the background for the disputes over concession agreements. The resort to economic development superficially dispersed this tension and enabled the maintenance of Western control without claiming cultural

97 Verdroß, ‘Règles internationales concernant le traitement des étrangers’, supra note 62, at 393.

98 Ibid, 394.

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inferiority.\textsuperscript{100} As Pahuja argues ‘the separation of an economic sphere allows backwardness to be situated away from culture, preserving the dignity obtained by self-determination by attributing that backwardness to economic exploitation by the colonizer.’\textsuperscript{101} This exploitation could now be remedied with the help of Western nations. President Truman introduced the tools for this undertaking in his inaugural address when he called ‘for capital investment in areas needing development.’\textsuperscript{102} He defined the horizon as development through economic growth for overcoming material underdevelopment. But in order to secure the necessary foreign ‘help’, as Truman would have it, the ‘new’ sovereign state had to accept McNair’s new legal system.

6. Conclusion

British international lawyers elevated the jurisdiction over concession agreements from the domestic to the international sphere through reference to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. The reliance on general principles indicates how internationalisation became authoritative. On one hand it was a matter of repetitive legal practice of cross-referencing that slowly grew into a line of precedent. This practice was based in the broader policy of companies and imperial governments

\textsuperscript{100} Pahuja, \textit{supra} note 37, at 54.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 65.


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3766828
protecting concession agreements from nationalisations. The concession granted to the British company Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the arbitration arising out of a dispute over this concession stands as an example of these practices. On the other hand, the Arbitrator Lord Asquith characterised Islamic law as archaic and unsuited for modern economic transactions, such as interpreting oil concessions. In consequence, he applied English law by reference to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ as an iteration of a ‘modern law of nature’. It was by reference to the notion of civilisation that Islamic law was discarded, and British law moved up into the international sphere. The simultaneous claim of modernity and universal timelessness becomes visible as the paradox authorising this reasoning.

The legal arguments developed in the Sheik of Abu Dhabi Arbitration were not a unique instantiation of this argument. To the contrary, other arbitrations between British companies and states concerning resource concessions in the first half of the 20th century with the involvement of the same lawyers allowed them to establish a circle of self-referential precedents that constituted the authoritative legal foundation for the internationalisation of concession agreements. McNair stressed the fact that he was not suggesting anything novel with his reliance on general principles, but that there was an ‘emerging consensus of opinion’ supporting it, and that his goal was ‘to
take stock of this trend.'103 This consensus of opinion could certainly be found in the practice of the same British international lawyers. In light of this, the mode of reasoning was not a timeless and placeless iterations of ‘the law’, but the product of a joint effort between the British government, British companies and British international lawyers.

The theoretical underpinnings for the practice in the arbitrations are found in the scholarly writings of the same legal practitioners, such as Lauterpacht and McNair. They developed the relationship between ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’, the protection of private property and the notion of ‘civilisation’ that enabled the elevation of jurisdiction over concession agreements to the international sphere. The argument for the international sphere rested on a hierarchisation of difference embedded in the notion of ‘civilisation’ that later turned into the notion of development after the Second World War. As Anghie describes it, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration is ‘now regarded with a certain embarrassment.’104 Recalling Lord Asquith’s condescending rhetoric, this comes as no surprise. But it is the tone and not


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the argument that scholars distance themselves from. The hierarchisation of difference remains the underlying assumption for the development discourse and underpins the internationalisation of contracts until today.