Who Owns the Crimean Past?

Conflicted Heritage and Ukrainian Identities

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Who owns the Crimean Past?
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Rob van der Laarse
Abstract

In the past ten years interest in the history and heritage of European regional and ethnic conflicts has grown explosively. These not only play a prominent role in collective memory, but also in political debates, cultural property protection, commemorations, and public space. The so-called Crimean Gold exhibition at the Allard Pierson museum has become stateless after the 2014 Russian ‘annexation’ of Crimea, and is actually put on trial in Amsterdam, claimed by Ukraine and four Crimean museums. Who defines the national identity of conflicted heritage? The author argues that the trial represents the new geopolitical reality of the EU’s and NATO’s eastward expansion, activated by the Euromaidan revolt and the MH17 crash, and fuelled by transnational memory wars narrated in terms of national trauma and victimhood. The question of ownership is not a legal one, but reveals the highly contested use of the past in post-communist nation building.

Introduction

The Crimea. Gold and Secrets of the Black Sea was the title of a travelling exhibition on display at the Amsterdam Allard Pierson Museum from February to September 2014. Launched in Bonn a year before, this biggest-ever exhibit of Crimea’s ancient treasures abroad with thousands of objects, was welcomed as an innovative, richly documented project with unique objects and advanced digital visualisation techniques. The exhibition’s impact was comparable to that of the famous Scythian Treasures exhibition in the US Metropolitan Museum of Art in 2000, based on the discoveries (mostly from the late 1980s) of the first century BC burial mounds near the Russian town of Filippovka on the European-Asian border. But in contrast to these Russian excavations which focused on the material culture of the Scythian nomads who traversed the steppe corridor from the Black Sea to China, many of the thousands of objects at the Allard Pierson Museum originated from the ancient Greek trading colony Chersoneses (nowadays Sevastopol), excavated by the experienced Crimean archaeologist Larisa Sedikova. Among them were several Athenian jars, Hellenistic inspired grave stones (fig. 1), a cup from Southern France, amulets from Egypt, and a two thousand year old, small Chinese lacquer box (first century AD) which as one of three comparable,
precious findings, originally used for cosmetics, had in Roman times found its way via the Silk Road to Crimea. Unearthed in 1990 from ‘woman’s grave 620’ at the Crimean site Usst’-Alma, it was the most western copy of the Han period (fig. 25). As such these local findings depicted the transnational character of Crimea’s antiquity during the Greek colonization. Apart from a small number of impressive Scythian golden objects, like a fourth century BC gold ceremonial helmet (fig. 2) and sword from the collection of the Kiev Museum of Ukrainian Treasures, most artefacts were from the collection of four Crimean museums. The main contributor to the travelling exhibition was the historical museum of Bakhchisaray which together with the sixteenth-century Tatar Khan’s Palace is an important centre of Crimea’s Tatar Muslim culture rooted in the Ottoman era. After Stalin’s 1944 deportations the indigenous Tatar community has become a small minority which is nowadays strongly opposed to Crimea’s Russification. Nonetheless the Tatar museum might fear the loss of its more than two hundred loans. In an ironic twist of history this historical exhibition, that according to its initiator the leading curator and expert in Crimean archaeology Valentina Mordvintseva, wanted to show multicultural dynamics and cultural encounters (fig. 3), has given rise to a nationalist conflict on its contested identity as Crimean or Ukrainian ‘national cultural heritage’.

Actually, the ownership of the Crimean treasures is literally put on trial in Amsterdam. Lawyers of both parties – the Crimean museums and the Ukrainian state – are currently carefully debating the legal status of the loan contracts with Allard Pierson museum, and the political status of Crimea. Instead of going into the legal details of constitutional and international law, and cultural properties treaties, I will explore in this contribution the cultural and geopolitical context of the current civil lawsuit in Amsterdam on the ownership of the Crimea exhibition, and demonstrate how this international
heritage conflict is rooted in a symbolic construction of conflicting pasts and identities. For, in contrast to the message of the exhibition, the trial shows that there is no heritage without culture and no culture without conflict. Considering that even world heritage only exists within the context of national heritage discourses, it might be self-evident that regions without a national status might easily lose their cultural property to competing states with stronger claims on nationhood. But who actually defines and authorises the national identity of heritage in conflict? As I will argue, the Maidan revolt, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the Ukrainian civil war have created a new geopolitical reality which transformed the travelling exhibition into an orphaned, diasporic collection. As such, this international conflict reveals the role of states using heritage for politics of identity and othering.

Business Wars

To understand what’s at stake in Amsterdam we should first look to the transnational context of this cultural property conflict, and more in general to the present Ukrainian-Russian crisis and the previous post-communist memory wars. We may start at the mid-Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, recently renamed Dnipro, which from the beginning of its independence in 1991 functions as one of the main arenas for Ukraine’s economic and political clan struggle. Travelers will see today a brand-new neo-classicist flat building with seven towers, called the Menorah, which houses since 2012 a Jewish business and cultural centre as well as Ukraine’s first Museum for Jewish Culture. Its owner, the Jewish-Ukrainian tycoon Igor Kolomoyskyi, was governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and up to the beginning of 2015 one of the main economic and military supporters of the Kiev regime. Kolomoyskyi also owned the premier league football club Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk, and he was known as a generous nationalist supporter of the Maidan revolt. Yet he also sponsored the hooligan militias of Pravy Sektor (Right Sector), and initiated in 2014 as his private army the Dnipro Battalion, nicknamed ‘Kolomoyskyi’s battalion’, which consisted of around 20,000 voluntary troops trained by Georgian military advisors. After this the second richest man of Ukraine and one of the richest four hundred people of the world with a private asset of 3 billion dollars in 2012 according to Forbes6 changed his hometown Geneva, the seat of his business empire, for his Ukrainian birth town Dnipropetrovsk (but also possesses Israeli and Cyprus citizenships), he soon became Vladimir Putin’s main economic enemy.

Thus when Crimea’s new government after the 2014 Russian annexation nationalised Kolomoyskyi’s
Privatbank, he did the same with Putin’s titanium factory in Dnipropetrovsk. With an estimated private asset of 40 billion dollar (according to the Russian political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky) the Russian president is not only the richest man of Europe, but also operates in politics as a ‘genius of business’. Of course, in addition to the mines and metal industry of Eastern Ukraine, Putin’s interest in the region is fused with an imperialist ambition to defend the interests of what in his view still belongs to the legacy of historical Russia. And whereas he generally likes order and stability as good for business, Ukraine is to Putin a phantom, a historical mistake. Yet, also among his opponents one can find such strong ideological claims on Ukrainian space and identity. Thus for Kolomoyskyi, or the chief rabbi of the Dnepropetrovsk region Shmuel Kaminezky (migrated in 1989 from Israel to Ukraine), the Maidan Revolt stands for a national rebirth of Ukraine comparable to the 1967 War for the State of Israel, and Crimea could thus be framed as Gaza, the Russians as the Arabs, and the rebellious Donbass as the West bank (fig. 4).

Nothing of this ‘western’ narrative can of course be traced in the neighbouring Donbass region with the city of Donetsk as the centre of the counter-revolt. Most Donbass activists agree with Moscow’s argument that the illegal, putschist Kiev regime represents a return to fascism comparable to the Ukrainian nationalist collaboration with Nazi Germany during the Great Patriot War. According to the pro-Russian Donetsk militia, the Maidan was fascist from the start while the nationalist attack of Soviet symbols such as the Lenin statues in 2013–2014, clearly proves that history repeats itself. The Donbass region is actually ruled by the steel magnate Rinat Akhmetov, who with 15 billion dollars of private assets in 2013 according to Forbes, was the by far richest billionaire of Ukraine. He was the owner of the football club Shakhtar Donetsk and its huge Donbass Arena stadium, hosting EURO 2012, and since the ‘voting fraud’ of 2004 Akhmetov supported the Donbass representatives of the former president Viktor Yanukovych’ Party of the Regions. Yet after Yanukovych fled to Moscow in February 2014, he seems to have chosen to stay outside publicity, whereas his Donbass football club went into exile in, of all places, the ‘Orange’ city Lviv – from where it still successfully competes with Kolomoyskyi’s FC Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk in the National Championship.

After Yanukovych and Akhmetov lost control over national politics, it proved to be the Odessa born oligarch Petro Poroshenko, ‘the Chocolate King’, who had the best cards for nation-wide support. Like Kolomoyskyi, this former ‘orange oligarch’ lost the Crimean branch of his factories after Russia’s annexation and had enough reasons to put his trust in Europe. Yet after winning the presidential elections of May 2014 in the first round, the nation was still torn apart by the growing competition of magnates and nationalists. Russia strengthened its grip on Crimea (fig. 5) as well as on the eastern self-proclaimed ‘people’s republics’ of Lugansk and Donetsk where volunteers and Russian veterans transformed the Donbass revolt in a military border campaign. Despite this conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Kiev’s political elites however, went on competing for power. Thus the Euromaidan parties won the
national parliamentary elections in October 2014, and the district’s vote mainly went to Poroshenko’s ‘Bloc’ (more than 30 percent of the seats in the national parliament) and the Self Reliance Party (Samopomich) of Lviv’s neo-conservative mayor Andriy Sadovyi (10 percent). But the turnout was hardly 53 percent, partly because there were no elections in the rebellious regions and partly because many people did not trust the oligarchs’s candidates. Thus because the Donbass electorate was not able to vote, Akhmetov’s group of mostly eastern provincial supporters in parliament was reduced to the level of that of his rival Kolomoyskyi. Yet also the Maidan coalition lacked a real winner. Even the icon of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko (also from Dnipropetrovsk) got only 6 percent of the vote, as many regarded her too radical, too corrupt, or both. Actually it was prime minister Arsen Yatsenyuk who won the vote after his new People’s Front seceded from Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party. His initial support of Poroshenko, turned out to be very fragile though. Soon the 2,500 civil servants of Yatsenyuk’s cabinet came to operate as a strong counterforce to the 2,000 officials and employees of Poroshenko’s presidential administration, which completely deconstructed national policymaking.

Not only has Poroshenko thus far not been very successful in fighting corruption or winning back the Eastern regions, Kiev also lost its grip on the right-wing militias with their Maidan-like anti-establishment politics. Because of the continued violence in the East also a growing part of the population was suffering from war fatigue. This might explain why in October 2014 both Kolomoyskyi’s Right Sector – the most militant nationalist supporters of the Maidan revolt – and even the oldest far-right party Svoboda (All-Ukrainian Union ‘Freedom’) did not reach the five percent election threshold. Founded in 1991 as the Social-National Party of Ukraine with support of Western-European neo-fascist leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, “Freedom” had joined the Alliance of European National Movements in 2009 as the only partner organization outside the EU. It was regarded as being modern and western, notwithstanding its nationalist loyalty to OUN’s 1941 mission of a national segregation of Ukrainians from ‘non-Ukrainians’, characterised by a strong Russophobia and an anti-communist, anti-Polish and Anti-Semitic xenophobia, defending Ukraine against ‘Moskali’, ‘Sovky’, ‘Liakhy’(Poles) and ‘Zhydy’ (Jews). Yet despite Svoboda’s glorification of street violence, its 2011 march with black Nazi banners in Lviv to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the establishment of the Waffen-SS Galizien, and its violent Kiev protests a year later against the new Language Law, allowing bilingualism in regions with more 10 per cent non-Ukrainian speakers, its activist leader, the Lviv boxer and sports doctor Oleh Tyahnybok (who survived nine court cases for inciting ethnic hatred since 2004) was hailed in the Ukrainian media in 2012 as politician of the year. Tyahnybok’s public destroying of the fence near the entrance of parliament was even welcomed as the symbolic representation of a new-epoch of Ukrainian politics. After the Maidan revolution, Svoboda which in contrast to Western-European extreme-right parties got its support almost entirely from educated urban voters (from Western Ukraine), even took control of the ministries of education, agriculture and environment, and the secretary of the Security and the National Defence Committee. Yet after being represented in local and regional governments with many inexperienced politicians, Svoboda lost its popularity. In addition, Tyahnybok’s reputation was further destroyed after being banned from the US because of antisemitism, and by the discovery in 2015 of his involvement in a Dutch art theft. Ukrainian experts on national TV channels considered the Dutch accusation “a provocation and a powerful information
attack against our country”, whilst a Russian expert commenting on Ukraine’s unwillingness to return the art works to the Netherlands, rhetorically asked: are the Dutch still willing to return the “Scythian Gold” to Ukraine?\(^{18}\)

Not least because of the successful adaptation of the nationalist agenda by other Maidan parties, the ultranationalist right is represented in parliament after October 2014 only by Oleh Lyashko’s Radical Party (**Verchyna Rada**) which received 7.5 percent of the vote. Lyashko, again a former member of Tymoshenko’s bloc, who also took part in the presidential elections, had proposed a bill for re-introducing the death penalty for pro-Russian separatists during the Crimean crisis and in the eastern war zone supported the Ukrainian army with his private troops in the cleansing of towns like Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from pro-Russian rebels. Yet his populist promise to purify the country from oligarchs ‘with a pitchfork’ isolated him from former Orange tycoons like Kolomoyskyi.\(^{19}\) Still Lyashko was just one of the more than thirty battalion leaders ranking on the local election lists, who operated more and more like independent war-lords with high-rank political support.\(^{20}\) With or without Kiev’s approval, some of these militants even agitated against corruption in far-right regions like the Carpathian Mountains at the Hungarian-Slovakian border, where local magnates began to fear that the eastern war had given birth to a monster.\(^{21}\)

Facing the dilemma of cooperating with either corrupt oligarchs or radical militants, Poroshenko chose to rely on new favourites to strengthen his internal power base without undermining the Army’s anti-terrorist operations, even if necessary against the ‘terrorist’ battalions. In addition to many academic and military experts from Ukrainian think-tanks in the US and Canada, he attracted his former study friend Mikheil Saakashvili as a special advisor. The refugee president of Georgia received Ukrainian citizenship in 2015, after which the president appointed him governor of Odessa Oblast. As an experienced state reformer Saakashvili soon became a key figure in the Ukrainian state’s struggle against the mafia with a Kiev office in Poroshenko’s presidential palace. Within one year his staff succeeded in forcing both prime minister Yatsenyuk and his Dnipro ally governor Kolomoyskyi to resign, whereas other businessman-politicians, such as the extremist **Oekrop** (Patriot Union) leader Gennadi Korban were arrested by the state security service. Even though the regional power base of the tycoons remained strong enough to let Kolomoyskyi and Akhmetov continue to compete with favourites in local elections, this anti-corruption campaign seriously harmed the political elite. This also applied to the implementation of EU transparency regulations concerning the assets of public officials. Ukraine’s immense class division was in October 2016 suddenly revealed by figures on the wealth and property declarations of its politicians, showing billions in assets and bank accounts, lots of Rolexes, diamonds, wine cellars, and hundred thousands of dollars in *hard cash*. This was true even for the prime minister and the head of the national bank, in a country with a gross national income comparable to that of a third world economy.\(^{22}\) Well aware of the growing discontent among the population, Saakashvili as well as some other Georgian officials immediately dropped down their functions. While his Dutch wife was running for presidency in Georgia, Saakashvili was expected to prepare for running for elections in Ukraine after an outdoor press conference in which he resembled his former protector Poroshenko with Yanukovych in treating the population like dirt: “what difference who will steal from them?”\(^{23}\)

So the situation is hybrid and complex, and much more ambiguous than suggested by the popular
myth of ‘two Ukraines’: the European west and the eastern Slavic. In fact, the number of Russian
speaking Ukrainians is much greater than that of the inhabitants of the rebellious eastern republics, while, on the other, millions of people don’t master Russian or the official Ukrainian language
(fig. 6). As the eastern Ukrainian scholar Tatiana Zhurzenko noticed, not only the Ukrainian speaking
population but also most of the Russian speaking Ukrainians are loyal to the notion of one
Ukrainian state.24 Yet the political conflict and military dynamic itself transformed the 1990s policy of
bilingualism and multiculturalism into a unifying doctrine of ethno-nationalism from above, mobilized
against a common ‘eastern’ enemy with all the anti-European characteristics of totalitarianism. For
in Ukrainian politics nationalists and magnates alike are hijacked by purifying narratives driven by
a messianic mission “to turn into an important Central European state, rather than a post-Soviet
post-colony like Belarus”, for which it should have its own, undivided culture, identity and history –
“a national history, not one dictated by Moscow”.25 Thus on the one hand the decentralization bill
proposed by Poroshenko in the spirit of the EU supported Minsk peace deal with Putin, corresponds
to the ‘western’ façade of the Ukrainian Constitution (as it would give more rights to Russian-speaking
minorities). On the other, such a policy of federalism is believed to be actually Putin’s strategy of
undermining Ukraine’s independence by legitimizing the autonomy of the eastern districts.26 Wishing
to become Europeans without becoming Europeanized, a serious recognition of minority rights and
bilingualism actually meets the same kind of resistance among Ukrainian nationalists as among the
ruling nationalist elites today in comparable post-communist countries like Hungary or Poland.

As an inclusive solution of the Ukrainian crisis seems nowadays farther away than two decades ago,
one really wonders how a state bombing its own rebellious cities during a civil war with more than
9,300 military and civilian deaths in the eastern regions (May 2016), could be so confident about its
ability (and right) to bring ‘separatists’ back under control without offering language and minority
rights. Even before the war, as noticed by Andriy Portnov, the Russian-speaking Donbass citizens
were framed by orange reformers as pro-Russian collaborators. In the 1990s still more industrial and
market-based than the traditional, agrarian West, the Eastern Ukrainians have been othered and
orientalised as a bunch of barbarians, and therefore non-Ukrainians.27 Although it is still questionable
whether a more inclusive notion of nationalism would be able to integrate the eastern provinces,
or whether the eastern ‘defensive borderlands discourse’, full of Soviet nostalgia, “represented the weakness of national identity and a threat to the project of a truly independent Ukraine”, it is clear that Ukraine’s future lies in a thorough re-definition of its self-image as a nation. Acturally the furious opposition of Ukrainian nationalists to federal reforms by demanding one Ukrainian identity, not only deepened the East-West division, but also undermined the ‘western’ reform movement. It created dissidents like Hanna Hopko, expelled in August 2015 with four other politicians from the Self-Reliance faction (taken over by a Donbas Battalion commander) on the accusation of supporting the Minsk amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution that would have allowed more decentralization and autonomy for the Russian-speaking regions. “I feel ashamed that a party which was supposed to be a modern, democratic alternative, is sliding into populism and Bolshevik authoritarianism” as she commented.

Geopolitics

Today it is almost impossible to believe that the present crisis started only a few years ago with the Ukrainian FEMEN movement protesting against the authoritarian powers of state, patriarchate and religion, which was followed by the demonstrations at Maidan square in support of an EU trade association treaty that for various reasons won support from a completely different coalition of oligarchs, academics, orthodox priests and nationalists. Also compared to other countries this was a unique coalition because of the soon leading role of right-wing populists in pro-European demonstrations against corruption and the government’s withdrawal from EU negotiations. Even if one would argue that the leading role of Svoboda and the Right Sector in the Euromaidan protest movement had less to do with a choice for Europe than with that against Russia, it offered nonetheless a striking contrast to Western-European populist movements dominated by Euroscepticism. And the Ukrainian ‘EU-nationalists’ were successful revolutionaries. For who would have expected that the Euromaidan revolt which begun on 21 November 2013, would after the astonishing tragedy of the ‘Maidan Massacre’ of 21 February 2014 lead to the impeachment of Viktor Yanukovych on May 21; a regime change soon legitimized by EU approved elections?

Yet from Moscow’s perspective the political consequences of this Maidan coup went far beyond the hosting of Ukraine’s refugee president. Already during the Orange regime of 2004, and backed by a 2008 referendum, Ukraine had opted both for an association treaty with the European Union and for a NATO membership. By 2010 it was the pro-Russian Ukrainian opposition of Yanukovych though that won the public vote while boycotting the parliament in protest against joining NATO. At the same time the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Ukraine and Georgia, as proposed by the US president Bush and the Dutch NATO secretary general De Hoop Scheffer, was effectively blocked by France and Germany. Yet after Kiev’s third regime change in February 2014 a majority of the Ukrainian population supported a renewed offer of NATO secretary general Rasmussen (the former Danish prime minister who two years later became an advisor to Poroshenko) to apply for NATO membership, after which in December the parliament abandoned Ukraine’s non-aligned status. This game-changing decision was immediately followed by the planning of a large number of military operations by NATO members on Ukrainian territory, whereas the United States started to train Ukrainian troops. According to
Russia this was a one-sided, self-declared violation of Ukraine’s 1991 independence treaties which for more than two decades guaranteed Ukraine’s military and political neutrality. It not only forced Russia to secure its strategic military presence in the Black Sea and its western border, but also offered a direct legitimation for the incorporation of the Crimean Republic to the Russian Federation, which on its turn was answered with western economic sanctions against Russia – and actually fostered a real NATO involvement in Ukraine.

Yet it was not the Ukrainian revolution and the Crimean crisis that produced this geopolitical reawakening of Cold War policies of intervention and containment. Putin had already feared NATO interventions in post-communist Central-Eastern Europe since the 1998–1999 Kosovo war, which to him was symptomatic for Moscow’s humiliation by western powers after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Added to this were the 2002 ‘secret CIA prisons’ or ‘black sites’ in Poland, Czech Republic and Rumania, during the American initiated global War on Terror, and the US plans for a rocket shield against Islamic terrorism located at the European-Russian border. In response to the EU enlargements from 2004–2007 (fig. 7) Russia was strengthening its international position already by the use of gas deals with strategic EU countries like Germany and the Netherlands, and also with former Soviet countries like Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine which were invited to take part in a Eurasian Economic Union, modelled on the old Soviet Comecon. At the same time, Putin-Russia started to intervene in former Soviet satellites like Saakashvili’s Georgia which since the 1990s denied independence to its Russian northern minority. Russia’s military support and political recognition of the Republic of South-Ossetia after the five-day Russo-Georgian War (2008) would become a blueprint for the creation of pro-Russian ‘frozen conflict-zones’ like the self-declared Eastern-Ukrainian Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics with their own presidency and Narodni Soviet (People’s Council).

Altogether, the 25-year ‘cold peace’ period after the fall of the Soviet empire in 1989 came definitively to an end with the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Turning his back to Europe, Putin became an effective player in geopolitics on the Eurasian continent as well as in the Arab world. Yet the crises at the EU-Russian border also changed Europe’s own attitude towards its identity and frontiers even before the ensuing Syrian refugee crisis. This was caused by the unexpected trans-nationalization of the Ukrainian conflict with the MH17 plane crash of 17 July 2014. This Dutch-Malaysian flight (the Dutch flight number was KL 4103) was attacked by a Russian Buk missile launched from Ukrainian pro-Russian territory (fig. 8). The Dutch mourned for a total number of 196 of 298 victims, more than two-thirds of the passengers (among them staff members of my
own university and residents of my home-town), and families had to wait a long time for the identification and burying of their relatives as the crime scene near Donetsk city was still for months a war zone, and inaccessible to forensic researchers.

One of the immediate effects of the MH17 crash was a retreat of Russian militia leaders to Moscow, after which Putin and Poroshenko started direct negotiations in Minsk on gas, trade and peace, supervised by Merkel and Hollande. Interestingly Donetsk’s prime minister Zacharchenko first regarded the treaty as treason, but changed his opinion under Moscow pressure. When he and his Lugansk colleague Igor Plotnisky won the presidential and council’s elections in November 2014, a solution still seemed possible. To give them more credibility the elections were, like the earlier Crimean referendum on joining with the Russian Federation, supervised by extremist left- and rightwing European observers – actually some of them close allies of Svoboda!

Unfortunately, because of the emotions and media logic of the MH17 attack, western leaders became frightened about the security of Europe’s population. Thus on 2 December 2014, at the closure of a Netherlands-Russian ‘year of friendship’, the Dutch government decided on a NATO request for the very first time since the ending of the Cold War to send a thousand air mobile brigades (together with Norwegian troops) for a Rapid Reaction Force to the Baltic and Polish-Russian frontier. To be sure, this concerned a new European defence line far beyond Churchill’s Iron Curtain, comparable only to the Nazi-German Eastern Front during the Second World War (fig. 9). With the exception of fascist Waffen-SS volunteer militia, Dutch soldiers had never entered these former Soviet territories before. Yet for this occasion the Netherlands government stated in a press release that it wanted to warn Putin with their F-16 fighters “to be careful, as we are there, and we don’t let you walk over us!”

As for the Netherlands such military bravado should, in my view, not be understood only as a response to MH17, let alone as a real fear for Russian interventions. Russia was actually for the Netherlands an important trading partner. In a wish to stay calm and act strong, this new national trauma resonated the earlier trauma of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. For it was the same airmobile infantry brigade (then dressed with blue helmets as UN Dutchbat troops) which was ordered in 1993 to defend the surrounded Bosnian enclave against the Serbs. Without getting UN permission for air strikes, the third Dutchbat mission ended two years later with the humiliating surrender to General Ratko Mladic, which was followed by the massacre of about 8,000 Bosniak men and boys deported from Dutchbat’s Potocari compound to nearby killing fields. The Srebrenica massacre was the first mass killing in Europe after the Second World War. Facing the shame of defeat and the fear for responsibility even seven years later the popular Kok Cabinet chose to resign after the outcome of the NIOD Srebrenica report (2002). Since then Dutch politics have witnessed a permanent crisis characterised by the rise of populism, Euroscepticism, anti-Islamism, and a growing mistrust against international authorities.
Yet the present Ukrainian crisis and the 1990 Yugoslav wars were not only closely related from a Dutch perspective. Visiting Belgrade on October 2015 on the occasion of Serbia’s liberation of the Nazis by Russian troops seventy years before, president Putin promised his Serbian colleague after receiving Serbia’s Order of the Republic that Russia would continue to support Serbia in the conflict-ridden issue of Kosovo. Putin also angrily criticised both the 1999 NATO bombings of Belgrade (with support of the Dutch airmobile brigade), and the 2014 economic sanctions against Russia’s illegal annexation imposed by the USA and the EU. According to him it was Ukraine that had witnessed an “anti-constitutional coup d’état in February”. In an interview in Politika, Putin even complained that “the vaccine against the Nazi virus” is unfortunately “losing its potency in some European states”. And on the streets in Belgrade T-shirts were sold with his portrait carrying the text: “Kosovo is Serbia, Crimea is Russia”.46

Heritage on Trial

Thus geopolitics determined the fate of the Crimea exhibition in the Allard Pierson Museum, which now has been stocked in the museum’s depot in Amsterdam. For one month after the opening of the exhibition, the Crimean plebiscite of 16 March 2014 on the joining with the Federal Republic of Russia, made the collection ‘stateless’ according to international law. The Dutch state created a fait accompli by August 31 when it permitted only Kiev’s state museum to take its 19 Scythian gold treasures (worth 11.4 million euros) back home, while the Crimean museums did not receive a customs permit for their 565 exhibits (2,111 objects, insured for 1.4 million euros).47 The State justified its refusal on the grounds that the UN and the EU did not recognize Crimea’s self-declared status as an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. As a result, both Kiev and the Crimean museums, backed by Moscow, claimed at the Amsterdam District Court the ‘Crimean Treasures’ as their national heritage. To whom should the artefacts be returned?

UNESCO advised the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitrage (PCA) in the Hague. This would have made it a government issue and rescued the University of Amsterdam from foreign damage and compensation claims by either Ukraine or the Crimean museums. Unfortunately though, this was immediately hijacked by politics when Ukraine’s warning that Moscow would bring the treasures to Russia was taken over by a liberal Dutch EU-parliamentarian who welcomed international law because it would either refund them to Kiev’s ministry of culture, or kept them safe in Amsterdam as long as the ‘illegal’ Russian occupation of Crimea lasts – for “more tastes don’t exist”.48 It only confirmed the Russian state media’s accusation that the Netherlands were not impartial and tried to keep the collections for themselves.49 Because the matter became so strongly politicised, the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs reframed it “as a private law issue between the Allard Pierson Museum and the museums on the Crimea” in which the State could not play a role.50

The Amsterdam museum had signed a loan contract with the Ukrainian museums to return all objects to the owners before the end of August 2014 at the latest. But should the owners be understood as a country or a community? The answer to this question became an important element in most of
the parties’ motivations. As such, this international conflict on the legal ownership of the Crimean museums who demanded the return of their loans from a Dutch museum, and the Ukrainian state who demanded the Crimean collection from the Dutch government to be ‘returned’ to Ukraine, reveals the role of states using heritage for politics of identity and othering. So Kiev claimed the collection as ‘national cultural property’ which, according to the Ukrainian state, was only kept in “operational management” by its former state museums in Crimea, now having “a Russian identity”. The museums should therefore not even be a party in this case, and besides where the objects had been found or displayed was completely irrelevant according to Kiev, as “cultural property should return to countries of origin, which is Ukraine”. Yet to the Crimean museums, “who anxiously build their collections over a two-hundred years”, far before the creation of the Ukrainian state and up to today as “a cultural legacy of local tribes and local people” (fig. 10), the Amsterdam museum should fulfil its contractual obligations by sending the exhibits back to where they came from – not to Kiev, but to “Chersonese” from where they had been send directly to Bonn. Finally, the accused party, the University of Amsterdam under the name of the Allard Pierson Museum, denies being in default in the fulfilment of its obligation as it would love to return the loans to the rightful owners – though the museum would do this only in case it would not be held responsible for compensation of one of the other parties.

Interestingly, there appeared in April 2015 also a third country when the State of the Netherlands decided to intervene – in contradiction with its former opinion, as if the case was still brought to international court – arguing that it “will by its intervention assure that the objects will not be exported to Crimea, except in case it will be definitively and irrevocable be established that the Crimean museums are the legal party, and the objects can be transferred without violating international law.” Actually it seemed to confirm the suggestion in July 2014 of the Ukrainian minister of Culture, a former actor and Maidan activist, that the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs had guaranteed him the return of the Crimea collection to Ukraine to which they should rightfully belong. This self-proclaimed role of the Hague as defender of international law against what it motivated as a threat to Ukraine’s ‘national cultural heritage’, did not hold for the Court, as the Amsterdam judge was not convinced of ...

Fig. 10

Silver handle in the shape of a deer on a bronze chain (13.4 cm), found in a woman’s burial grave from a Scythian mausoleum in Ust-Alma, Crimea, 1st-2nd century BC. State Historic-Cultural Reserve, Bakchysarai.

its self-evident interest. Yet it clearly demonstrates the impression of a top-down, stately framed perspective on contested heritage, grounded in national identity claims of ‘authorised heritage discourses’.56

It might be clear that the trial (against the Allard Pierson Museum) has become a case of contested heritage that can’t be solved by legal arguments. As noticed by the Amsterdam law professor Inge van der Vlies after the first hearings in October 2016: “This is a political sparring in which also the aftermath of MH17 plays a role; and although it has legally nothing to do with it, it will be of influence.”57 According to a Dutch TV reporter, “this is politics playing the card of cultural heritage”.58 Or, to speak with the Crimean curator of Bakhchisaray museum: “It gives you a deep feeling of injustice that politics interferes so rough in historical and cultural processes” (fig. 11).59 What the Amsterdam Trial on the Crimean treasures makes clear is that when heritage is on trial, politics of identity are at stake.

This politicization was also reflected in social media. In Russian-speaking media the Crimean ‘stolen art’ case was furiously debated in the context of Nazi looted art, whereas in Ukraine the stately framing of Moscow’s threat to its national identity dominated. Thus even though the Allard Pierson exhibition The Crimea. Gold and Secrets of the Black Sea only contained a small number of Scythian golden objects almost all of which had been returned by August 31 to Kiev (fig. 12), a typical comment on the Euromaidan website reads: “The artefacts of Scythian Gold [sic] came from the unified country of Ukraine. The world acknowledges that the annexation by Russia of Crimea was illegal. The artefacts must be returned to Ukraine, and the disposition of items from Crimea to be determined by the Ukrainian government!”60 Considering the overwhelming visual attention to Scythian helmets and other attributes on the internet (fig. 13), one can hardly blame him for such an ethno-nationalist framing of the exhibition’s opposite message of a cultural melting pot. And
the same applies to common knowledge among internet users that Russia would for sure wanted to appropriate the Crimean collection, whereas the Crimean museums had more reason to fear the loss of their collections to Kiev. Actually, this idea can be traced back to a briefing of Ukraine’s newly appointed vice prime minister for Social Affairs on 24 March 2014, who suggested that Russia wanted to “annex” the Crimean exhibits for its Scythian collection in the Hermitage in Saint Petersburg after August 31, as a result of which “regulations have been changed to transfer administration rights over these valuables to the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine.” Since then the Crimean collection is regarded as Ukrainian state property.

Scythians and Vladimirs

In contrast to what many expected, Moscow did not choose to intervene in the Amsterdam trial, or claim the Crimean collection as Russian state property. It was clear however that it would not accept any other verdict than a return of the objects to the Republic of Crimea – a policy determined by Putin’s self-proclaimed role of protector of Russian culture within and beyond the Russian border. Thus Crimea had for Putin always been Russian, and Crimea’s vote after the Maidan coup for a’re-uniting’ with the Russian Federation, could simply be framed as a correction of Khrushchev’s 1954 gift of Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Playing the Slavic card as a defender of endangered Russian minorities in former Soviet republics, Putin’s illiberal and masculine narrative recalls the lines of Alexander Blok’s *The Scythians* (1918): “Yes, we are Scythians – leaves of the Asian tree / Our slanted eyes are bright aglow with greed.../ To shelter you, the European race / From the Mongolians’ savage raid and sieges .../ You, the old world, now rushing to perdition...” Though Blok’s position was as ambiguous as Putin’s today, this hybridity was exactly what makes the mythic Scythians so useful. For as the only ones prepared to wage a Eurasian culture war and purify the weak and degenerated Europeans out of hate and love (if forced to), seemed still an adequate description.

In remarkable contrast to Putin’s warnings for Ukraine’s return to fascism however, this Slavic claim on *Lebensraum* touched on some chord that vibrated far beyond Russia in Europe’s far-right circles. Interestingly, the Scythians already inspired Nazi looters during the German War with Russia to scramble for Scythian findings in Ukrainian and Crimean museums (fig. 14). Special anti-Jewish SS cleansing operations in Crimea and Southern Ukraine were justified by scientific Nazi expeditions headed by leading archaeologist Herbert Jankuhn and Karl Kersten, who claimed the existence of...
Scythian and Gothic tribes as German ancestors with the help of artefacts looted from local museums by SS roving killing units.\textsuperscript{63} With support of Himmler’s SS Ahnenerbe organisation, even Dutch archaeologists were digging in Ukraine for Scythian traces and remnants of an old Gothic capital with a mighty palace that would resemble the glory of Rome.\textsuperscript{64}

Akin to left-wing fellow-travellers in the past, Moscow’s cultural policy today inspires Europe’s most popular anti-EU politicians, such as Matteo Salvini, the Italian Lega Nord leader, who praised Putin in 2014 as “the best ally for Europe against Muslim terrorism”, whereas Marine Le Pen claims that Russia’s strategic interests and cultural policy – if not financial support – should correspond with hers for France.\textsuperscript{65} Even in the Netherlands, where Moscow is held responsible for MH17, Dutch right-wing populists were far from sympathetic to their Ukrainian counterparts when initiating (and winning) the Netherlands’ first referendum in April 2016 against a Dutch ratification of the reissued EU-Ukrainian Association Treaty. Although, hardly a third of the electorate showed up and the No-campaign was cynically clear about their ‘who cares Ukraine’ mentality in what was basically an anti-everything opposition to Europe, the governmental parties considered it rightly a victory for Putin.\textsuperscript{66}
In addition to playing the ethnic card, Putin also played the religious one. Since the renaissance of Russia’s Orthodox church after the fall of communism, Christian Orthodox pilgrims reclaim the Crimea as the locus of Russian identity. And by stressing the Crimea as the cradle of Slavic culture ever since prince Vladimir of Kiev was baptised there and adopted Byzantine Christianity as the state religion in 998, president Vladimir Putin identifies himself to the Orthodox founder of Kievan Rus, honoured by the Russian Orthodox church as a saint equal to the apostles. Whereas in Kiev in 2013 Vladimir Lenin’s enormous statue was pulled down by Maidan demonstrators, Putin erased in Moscow three years later a twenty meters high statue of his tenth-century namesake nearby Lenin’s Kremlin mausoleum. Accompanied by the widow of the anti-communist, Orthodox Russian writer Solzhenitsyn, the president unveiled according to the Russian state television, “the first monument to Vladimir the Great” as a saint, statesman and warrior, with a call in Soviet tradition to all Russians in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine “to stand together against contemporary challenges and threats, using our spiritual legacy and our invaluable traditions of unity to go forward and continue our thousand-year history.” As a Facebook user commented: ‘Like it or not, but Vladimir is the fate of Russia (fig. 15).” Putin was of course well aware that the first Saint Vladimir monument with its bronze cross towered already since 1853 far above the Dnieper river in Kiev (fig. 16), and that the Great Prince of Kiev was since the Maidan revolt considered to be the founder of the Ukrainian state. President Poroshenko furiously responded only a few hours after Putin’s speech by accusing Moscow of a “hybrid appropriation” of “our Ukrainian prince” and thus of Ukrainian history by an act of historical revisionism. Actually the Ukrainian president had signed a decree in February 2015 to back the thesis of Saint Vladimir as the creator of “the European state of Rus-Ukraine”. Even though Ukraine was from the twelfth century erased from history, the prince’s decisions to baptize the Russian people should according to Ukraine’s president be regarded a “European choice”, whereas the twelfth-century Slavic Principality of Great Vladimir after the decline of Kiev should represent nothing more than the ‘Moscow horde’. Yet whatever one thinks about such myth-making, Poroshenko’s claim of prince Vladimir’s ‘European choice’ was a painful statement considering the still considerable support of Ukraine’s Russian-Orthodox minority for the Moscow Patriarchate. Already before the decline of communism Ukraine was
regarded the Soviet Union’s bible belt.⁷⁰ But after Ukrainian independence many Russian-orthodox believers did not separate from the Moscow Patriarchate. Not unlike the 1980s Polish Catholic Solidarność movement, the Ukrainian opposition had been dominated by priests and crosses. Yet in contrast to the Poles, Ukraine was less divided between religion and atheism than between two kinds of ethnically defined churches claiming the same saints and sacred ground. Actually the eleventh-century bones of Yaraslav the Wise, Kievan Rus’ best-known ruler claimed by Russia and Ukraine as one of the founding fathers, were out of a concern that they might end up in Moscow already in 1944 stolen by Ukrainian nationalists and taken to the United States, where they are expected to be still secretly kept in the Ukrainian orthodox Church of the Holy Trinity in Brooklyn.⁷¹ The religious separation from ‘Moscow’ was therefore fundamental to Ukraine’s process of nation building, and nationalist parties like Svoboda proposed above all a radical purification of the nation by “the establishment of a unified Ukrainian Local Church centered in Kiev”.⁷² Whereas the new ‘Kiev priests’ are regarded separatists in the eyes of the old Ukrainian-Moscow patriarchate which is still seated in the medieval Kiev Cave Monastery at the bank of the Dnieper river, the old ‘Russian priests’ are nowadays regarded a ‘fifth column’ by the new Kiev Patriarchate seated in the completely restored St. Michael’s Golden-Domed Monastery of which the original, twelfth-century building was demolished by Stalin in the 1930s. Yet both claim Kiev as their sacred birth place.

Presence of the Past, Past in the Present
What we are witnessing today in Ukraine is one of the most severe crises of Europe after the 1990s Yugoslav Wars, and which can again be directly linked to the memory and meaning of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Only since the Srebrenica massacre (1995) the recognition of the Holocaust and other genocides – and, as a consequence, the prosecution of racism, ethnic cleansing, and Holocaust denial – came to function as a ticket to Europe, based on the undisputed recognition of a common painful past, such as stipulated in the Stockholm Declaration of the International Forum on the Holocaust of 2000.⁷³ Therefore, like prince Vladimir’s ‘European choice’, also the recent building of a Holocaust museum in Dnipro symbolizes a choice for Europe, which, however, in the Ukrainian context is not regarded primarily as a warning against Nazism but against Bolshevism, and thus a choice against Russia!

Actually in Ukraine, like in most post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the Holocaust competes with a counter paradigm, arguing that the liberation from Soviet ‘occupation’ was built on the suffering of a large part of the millions of people killed in the 1930s and 1940s. This can be explained historically, for in these twentieth-century ‘bloodlands’ Nazi terror was no exception, like in the West, but only radicalised and surpassed Soviet terror.⁷⁴ Today this Occupation paradigm is supported by most eastern European countries signing the 2008 Prague Declaration of the Viségrad Group on the initiative of the Polish EU presidency, that demanded from the European Union to “recognize Communism and Nazism as a common legacy” and deal with communist crimes “in the same way as the Nuremberg Tribunal did with Nazi crimes”.⁷⁵ Despite Russian accusations of a ‘radical Nazification’ of the former communist bloc countries, and Jewish and left-wing critics of this ‘red-brown’ or ‘double genocide’ thesis which challenges the uniqueness of the Holocaust by
equating Nazi and Communist crimes, a 2009 EU parliament resolution supports the Eastern European suffering as victims of two regimes of terror, while recommending a ‘Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian regimes’. It shows clearly how the EU’s eastwards expansion (2004/2007/2013) from 12 to 28 member states has created a paradigm shift in Europe’s memory culture, whereas the occupation paradigm even radiates to other strongly divided post-communist countries dealing with EU association treaties like Moldavia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Yet should we understand this competing memories on Nazi and Soviet terror as a necessary widening of Europe’s post-war memory culture, or does it signify a relapse into old-fashioned nationalism?

Far from a shared history, the re-awakening of the Cold-War totalitarianism thesis has become crucial to the cultural and political nation building of most post-communist states, and therefore fuel for memory wars. Thus Robert Conquest’s pioneering study Harvest of Sorrow (1986) about Stalin’s 1932–1933 ‘terror famine’ has become since Ukrainian independence (1991) a cornerstone for what diasporic Ukrainian nationalists in the USA and Canada had already since the 1930s framed as a Stalinist genocide. Whereas the Great Famine was for decades a ‘non-story’ in Ukraine, it had been widely known in Western Europe and America, and figured prominently in Nazi propaganda as proof of the evil of Jewish Bolshevism – a dark discourse which still resonates on the internet. Yet the issue in the 1990s was not the ‘hidden truth’ of the famine, but its background, aims and intent. While on the one hand, communist historians during Perestroika began to explore the newly opened archives to search for economic causes of the ‘Soviet Famine’ in relation to Stalinist politics of collectivisation and dekulakization, radical newspapers in Lviv started to frame the 1932–33 ‘Ukrainian famine’ on the basis of Canadian and US testimonies as a ‘communist crime’ with ‘genocidal intentions’ by the Soviet regime against the ‘Ukrainian nation’. And while most historians, including those using the term genocide, calculated a death toll for Ukraine of around 3–3.5 million, Ukrainian memory activists such as Ivan Drach in his 1992 article ‘The Genocide of Ukraine’ propagated a number of 8 to 12 million victims, even much higher than Conquest’s 5 million Ukrainian deaths (of a total number of 7 million), and almost twice as much as the number of European Jews killed in the Holocaust!

Drach’s intention to surpass the Jews was also evident by his use of the Orthodox inspired image of “the nation-Christ, which is being crucified endlessly”, while he referred to Stalin’s ‘genocidal plan’ as a “final solution to the Ukrainian question” with the intention to kill “dozens of millions” Ukrainians. A first collection of hundreds of testimonies and memoirs was already published with The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A white Book in Toronto (1953) and Detroit (1955) by the Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror, to which Drach’s Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika (Rukh) added a memorial of 6,000 witness letters, ‘33 Famine, a People’s Book of Memory (1990). Drach also introduced the word ‘Holodomor’ (murder by starvation) which would soon become the new mnemonic frame for the ‘Ukrainian Holocaust’.

Actually it was the American historian James Mace who as Conquest’s main researcher for Harvest of Sorrow and head of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine (1987) initiated the ‘Ukrainian genocide’ thesis. After moving in the 1990s to Ukraine he played a key role in the Holodomor debate. Yet although enjoying huge popular support, Mace lost trust in the integrative power of the genocide thesis just because of the historical impact of the genocide. At the eve of the Kiev congress hearings
on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the 1933 famine in 2003, he was asked in an interview by the Maidan.org website: “do you think the famine belongs only to the past, to just history?” Mace answered that unfortunately history was not passed and that the wounds of the ‘manmade famine’ were far from healed, for “Ukraine is a post-genocidal society in which there is no agreement as to the basic national values, a problem which does not exist in most European countries.”

Some years before in a blog, he even wondered “if this country will ever be whole”. In my opinion, this lack of consensus on Ukraine’s identity has much to do with Ukraine’s post-communist memory map which represented a divided present instead of a common past. For the divergent views on Ukraine’s totalitarian history and the Holodomor followed electoral patterns, language preferences, and national loyalties almost exactly like the map of the current Ukrainian crisis (fig. 17). Holodomor memory activism was located mostly in western Ukraine, which also had the strongest connection with the Atlantic Diaspora. Yet behind the trauma narratives of its newly constructed ‘national history’ that restored a continuity between the suppressed memory of the short-lived 1941 nationalist one-party state and the independence of 1991, there seems to be no connection between Ukrainian history and memory.

As an export product of the Northern America mnemonic competition of the Ukrainian and Jewish (Ukrainian) diaspora, each claiming the highest number of victims by respectively Nazi and Soviet terror, it turned history upside down in the Ukrainian context of the Orange and Maidan revolutions. For using the Holodomor as Ukraine’s national birth myth completely ignores the fact that the ‘Russian’ east (like Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, and the Volga basin) suffered more than the ‘European’ west, where nowadays most people accept this highly nationalised version of the past – even though it became part of Soviet Ukraine only in 1939 (fig. 18). Faced with this contradiction the Yushchenko administration explained on its website that the Holodomor was indeed “greatest in the [Eastern] regions were the electoral base of the anti-crisis coalition [party of the regions, socialists and communists] is concentrated”, because “in view of insufficient information, Soviet propaganda, and the unclear position of coalition leaders, residents of those territories do not understand [sic] the true consequences of this tragedy”. Though not untrue but a half-truth, it was actually in Western Ukraine where the present population has no direct access to the local past, like in Lviv which was repopulated with Ukrainian people from the hinterland after the Nazis had destroyed its Polish-Jewish identity. Had not the more nationalist Western Ukrainians after 1939 been incorporated in Soviet Ukraine, according to an American OUN-sympathiser, the
‘Ukrainian nation’ might have never recovered from the Stalinist offensive against “the main army of the Ukrainian national movement, the peasants”.

Although the Holodomor has been revealed for decades in the media over and over again as a ‘hidden truth’, the first commemoration crosses actually appeared in the 1990s in villages in Eastern Ukraine, and it was the former ‘red’ president Leonid Kuchma who in 1998 declared the fourth Saturday in November an official remembrance day for the victims of the Holodomor and Soviet totalitarianism. Kuchma also initiated a memorial to the victims of Stalin’s “artificially induced famine of 1932” erected in the heart of Kiev. Yet he did not call it a genocide, and at the same time continued the official commemorations of the Red Army’s victory on Nazi Germany. It was this balancing between anti-Stalinism and anti-fascism which was opposed, however, by a counter narrative developed by Western Ukrainian memory activists working towards a rehabilitation of the fascist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). To reframe these anti-communist partisans from Nazi collaborators into “war combatants for Ukraine’s independence”, they used the Holodomor thesis to propagate an alternative genocide ‘against the Ukrainian people’.

To foster this discursive break with the antifascism myth (as with Europe’s Holocaust memory culture), a Western Ukrainian, ethno-nationalist and Holodomor centered memory culture was gradually imposed on the whole of Ukraine. Modelled to the Holocaust paradigm, the Ukrainian parliament voted after the 1933 famine hearings of 2003 on the initiative of Kuchma’s opponent Viktor Yushchenko for a ‘Declaration to the Ukrainian People’ which established the term genocide for the 1932–33 famine “in the vocabulary of the authorities”. During Yushchenko’s ‘Orange’ presidency (2005–2010) the congress voted after furious debates for a bill declaring the Holodomor a “deliberate act of genocide against the Ukrainian people”, which in November 2006 was assigned to law after being reframed (on the request of the ‘red’ anti-crisis opposition) as a totalitarian act of genocide “aimed at mass destruction of a part of Ukrainians as well as other peoples of the former USSR”. Whereas historians still debated the notion of genocide, the presidency then introduced some radical amendments to Ukraine’s criminal code to criminalize denial of the Holodomor (as well as the Holocaust!), not as a fact but as a genocide. Referring to combating Holocaust denial, Yushchenko in a message in the Wall Street Journal on 27 November 2007 called on world leaders to recognize the Holodomor “as an act of genocide designed to suppress the Ukrainian nation”, described as “a
state-organized program of mass starvation [...] in 1932–33 [which] killed an estimated 7 million to 10 million Ukrainians, including up to a third of the nation’s children [sic].101 Although international organisations like the UN, UNESCO and the EU thus far avoided the term genocide, Holodomor commemorations are supported today by a growing number of western governments.102

Then, in an ultimate attempt to ‘end’ for once and for all the political and historical debate on the genocidal intention of the Holodomor, the Yushchenko administration decided to put history on trial. Under the president’s approval and in cooperation with the World Congress of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Secret Service (!) went to Court with 3,685 Soviet classified documents and the documentation of 933 massacre sites of ‘genocide victims’ to charge Stalin, Molotov and three other former Soviet communist leaders of genocide, for which they were posthumously found guilty in January 2010.103 At the same time the Yushchenko administration initiated an Ukrainian Institute for National Memory to authorize the Holodomor paradigm scientifically, and signed a decree on the initiative of the Ukrainian diaspora to establish a national Holodomor memorial museum in the Ukrainian capital. Opened in 2015 in Kiev at the border of the Dnieper river nearby the sacred Cave Monastery, it was built half within the hill with a high tower topped by a cross, exhibiting nineteen ‘National Books of Memory’ with the names of 880,000 famine victims, including those of the US Black Deeds and the Ukrainian ’33 Famine books.104 In fact the museum uses the word Holodomor as a plural term for three Soviet famines – in 1921–1923, 1932–1933, and 1946–1947 – which all together were considered in Poroshenko’s 2015 remembrance speech, “a war waged by Russia against Ukraine” (fig. 19).105

Although there can’t be any doubt about the criminal intent of the Kremlin’s state-organised repression, purges and mass shootings, forced collectivisation, forced kulak migrations, forced labour camps, grain confiscations, and the starvation of millions after the bad harvests of 1930–1933, it is remarkable that even Nicolas Werth who had long been convinced of genocidal intentions, recently established that after Perestroika no Kremlin documents have been found which “targeted the Ukrainians of them being Ukrainians”.106 In addition one may wonder why a multidirectional relationship with the Holocaust was at least discursively possible, whereas the more obvious comparison with the Nazi Hungerplan of 1941–1943 has not been made. Though completely ignored, this extremely well-documented prelude to the German ‘Ostkolonisation’ as prepared in Generalplan Ost (1940–42)107 was a famine genocide intended to completely overshadow Stalin’s ‘hunger catastrophe’. Food minister Herbert Backe personally convinced Hitler of “a dying off of industry” and the elimination of 80 per cent of the “racially, very bad” Ukrainian people by means of a forced migration to Siberia.
and the Hungertodt of at least 30 million people after everything was taken out of the country.\textsuperscript{108} The German Command after the capture of Kiev in September 1941 and the mass killing of more than 33,000 Jews at Babi Yar in one single event, decided to let “at least 10 to 20 million of these [Ukrainian] people” die during the coming winter in “the greatest starvation since the Thirty Years’ War” – or as Berkhoff writes: “never before in history had there been a plan for mass murder on this scale.”\textsuperscript{109}

Ukraine’s hegemonic memory culture is a striking example of remembering to forget. For how could the victims of Soviet and Nazi terror have been combined with the heroic role in Ukraine’s struggle for independence ascribed to Ukraine’s nationalist partisans? Sharply criticised by the then prime minister Yanukovych, president Yushchenko was a welcome guest in 2006 at the 65th anniversary of the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the 100st anniversary of the birth of its commander in chief Roman Shukhevych on whom he posthumously conferred the new title ‘hero of Ukraine’ “for extraordinary, personal contributions to the national liberation struggle for freedom and independence of Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{110} Yet Shukhevych made a career in political assassinations before propagating with OUN leader Stepan Bandera a ‘permanent revolution’ of unlimited violence, after which UPA was deeply involved in Nazi mass killings in Western Ukraine. From 1941 he actively collaborated as OUN-B commander with the Nazi Nachttigall Batallion and the 201st Schutzmannschaft Batallion in subversive actions against Soviet partisans, pogroms in Lviv, and the ‘pacification’ of Belarussian villages, whereas OUN-B and UPA launched in 1943–1944 an unrivalled ethnic cleansing and murder campaign against the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (nowadays Ukraine), with a total loss of 70–100,000 Poles killed and 200–300,000 refugees.\textsuperscript{111} At the end of his presidency, Yushchenko issued a last, contested decree recognising UPA veterans as ‘war combatants’ and proclaiming the title of national hero also to Bandera (killed by the KGB in Germany in 1959).\textsuperscript{112}

Like Shukhevych, Bandera’s portrait was printed on Ukrainian stamps (fig. 20), and the Euromaidan demonstrators would carry his portrait as an icon on their breasts. Both are however held for war criminals in Poland and Israel because of the ethnic cleansing operations during the German occupation and the Volhynia massacre (35–60,000 victims). In 2013 the international football association FIFA even banned the Lviv football stadium for hosting qualification matches up to 2018 because of Ukrainian fans raising banners of the SS Galizien Division, the red-black OUN flag, portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych, and doing the Banderist Nazi salute during matches with Poles (fig. 21). The nationalist press regarded it a Russian-Jewish-communist “attempt to ruin Ukraine’s image”, and at the same time an attempt of the Yanukovych regime’s to recognize the ‘Volyn tragedy’ to achieve Polish support in his negotiations with Europe and the banning of OUN, UPA, and the SS Galician Division as criminal organizations on the accusation of Holocaust denial.\textsuperscript{113}
They successfully propagated the insurgent struggle as an undividable element in Ukraine’s national history, under the device: “True, the UPA was nationalistic. Yes, it killed Poles. But it also fought against the Soviets.”\textsuperscript{114} The contrast could not be greater between this silenced genocide and the accusations of an Ukrainian delegation represented by Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko which arrived in November 2016 at the International Criminal Court in The Hague to discuss the ‘crimes against citizens’ committed by the former Ukrainian government and “the-then President Yanukovych against the Euromaidan activists in late 2013–2014”, while framing his pro-Russian role “as part of the greater series of events, which eventually led to the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas.”\textsuperscript{115}

The biggest mistake of the Yushchenko administration was probably the illusion that taking history to court, “shifts any discussion of the famine in Ukraine from the political to the legal realm.”\textsuperscript{116} The Holodomor and Bandera cult was, however, not restricted to politics, nor to justice, and certainly not to historical debate; it has since the 1990s been communicated via schoolbooks, remembrances, literature, testimonies, ‘Bandera museums’, film, media and popular culture, and most visible via Ukraine’s public space.\textsuperscript{117} Not only was the whole country spotted with Holodomor memorials, after the Orange revolution also virulent nationalism entered the streets. Thus Lviv’s city council had ordered in 2006 to bring the remains of the NKVD and KGB murdered OUN leaders Andriy Melnik (buried in Rotterdam), Bandera (buried in Munich), Yevhen Konovalo and others to be replaced in a mausoleum at the city cemetery in the form of a huge granite column honouring also the Division SS Galizien, which was glorified at the same time in the Lviv Historical Museum after being redesigned by historians from the New York ‘Brody-Lew fraternity’. In contrast to the collaborating Ukrainian SS and Wehrmacht troops, not one section mentioned the fate of their victims, the Poles and Lemburg Jews making up respectively 50 and 30 per cent of the inhabitants of pre-war Lvov. “This form of revisionism gets close to negationism”, as Delphine Bechtel remarked.\textsuperscript{118}

In the wake of Svoboda’s ‘struggle with the fence’, all of Ukraine’s space was soon claimed by identity politics. Maidan activists in 2013–2014 destroyed hundreds of Lenin monuments in Lviv, Kiev, and all the other Western and Central Ukrainian cities; an outburst of iconoclasm which after the regime change became a national policy with the 2015 Decommunization Law (fig. 22). Though according to

\textbf{Fig. 22}
Decommunization of the Ukrainian USSR, poster from the government site on decommunization of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.  
\textit{Source: memory.gov.ua}
a poll supported by around 50 per cent of the population, it outlawed Ukraine’s three communist parties, communist uniforms and symbols, such as flags, banners and emblems, images and statues of Lenin and Stalin, granting special legal status to veterans of the “struggle for Ukrainian independence”, and ordered the renaming of public places, streets and complete cities, towns and villages, while violation of the law would carry a penalty of prison sentences to five years. In the Maidan regions this was of course already underway, like in Kolomoskyi’s Dnipropetrovsk where the central Lenin Square was renamed in 2014 Heroes of the Maidan Square, followed by 80 streets in 2015, while the city’s name changed into Dnipro in 2016. In Kiev the iconoclasts took power after Maidan, and renamed on 7 July 2016 five streets, a lane and an avenue; the last one altered from Moskovsky Prospekt into Prospekt Stepan Bandera – exactly at the same day as when the Polish Senate adopted a resolution to name July 11 as National Remembrance Day for the victims of the ‘Volyn genocide’, committed by the Ukrainian Banderists against the citizens of the Second Polish Republic! In addition to such Polish traumas, the other half of Ukraine’s population symbolically lost their neigbourhood. Looking at the map (fig. 23), most of the renamings proposed by the decommunisation law were (under European protests) planned for the rebellious cities Donetsk and Lugansk as well as for Crimea and Sevastopol, a disowning of the past which of course had to wait until “the return of the temporarily occupied territories” under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

To conclude
As we saw, Europe’s geopolitical shift caused enormous problems in the EU’s dealing with the past and in its external relations with Israel, the US and in particular Russia, where the memory of the Great Patriot War still functions as an anti-fascist foundation myth. Yet far from ideology, what is at stake in these memory conflicts are conflicted histories and politics of identity in a post-communist context of nation-building. This explains why the question on the ownership of the Crimea collection is not a legal but a cultural one – and thus an issue of contested heritage and competing memories. Thus the Scythian past was already appropriated as Slavic in Russia at the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, which made it possible today for Putin to nationalize the Scyths as ‘Russian’ and for Poroshenko as ‘Ukrainian’ – in the same way as prince Vladimir of Kiev had been appropriated as a founding father of both nations.
Like in the Baltics and other former communist countries, nation building meant in the first place a break with a long-lasting Russification, which explains the memory wars between pro-Russian and pro-European parties and populations, and in the second place an urge to create new national histories and heroes. In particular after the Orange Revolution Ukraine witnessed a profound anti-Russian as well as anti-Polish nationalization of history, language, and popular culture. The problem with Polishness had of course to do with the strong Galician element within Ukrainian nationalism both within postwar (Western) Ukraine and in the Ukrainian diaspora. Yet the western dominance also favoured the anti-Russian founding myth of Ukrainian independence based on the Holodomor paradigm and the nationalist struggle against communism (associated with Russianism), while ignoring the genocidal violence and ethnic cleansing campaigns of Nazism and ethno-nationalism. Both forms of xenophobia were therefore strongly related.

The remarkable paradox of nation building is that a state moves forwards by looking backwards, when creating a national history, heritage and identity for its own people out of the living culture shared with former compatriots now transformed into strangers. For not only was Bandera posthumously proclaimed ‘national hero’ in 2010 as the outcome of a deep-seated memory war, the same year witnessed the outbreak of an unexpected ‘fairy tale war’ between Ukraine and Russia. Paradoxically this intangible heritage conflict began with an initiative for strengthening the bond between the two ‘befriended countries’ by literally putting their mutual folklore on the map. Russia launched a *Fairy Tales Map of Russia* with about thirty figures, such as the giant knight Muromets, Kurochka the chicken with the golden eggs, and Kolobok (the Gingerbread Man) which in particular was attributed a Russian origin (fig. 24). At Ulyanovsk State University even a university chair on Kolobocology (*Kolobkovedenie*) was created, held by Sergei Petrov, and Koloboks’ pretended home town Ulyanovsk decided to make him the mascot for the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia. Yet in the *Fantastic Tales of the Ukraine* the same figures are displayed, and Ukrainian historians and linguists are convinced that the name Kolobok is derived from the Ukrainian word *kolo*, meaning round like the pancake’s shape. In Russia, though, a ball of dough is called a *kolob*, and the traditional name for dough in Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk’s region) should be *kolebyatka*, as stated by professor Petrov. Although they did not go to the International Court, the Ukrainians were convinced that their Great Brother wanted to steal their heroes, and folklorists started to lobby for registering and safeguarding Kolobok as UNESCO intangible heritage. Although most of the Russian and Ukrainian fairy tales might actually be shared by most Europeans, they may change within a few years into a nightmare of contested folklore.

What I wanted to make clear is that there is no heritage without conflict. If Europe’s biography has been seen by romanticism as a layered palimpsest longing for an age-old, hidden and pure identity lost in modernization, than a critical biography should address heritage as the outcome
Fig. 25
Chinese lacquer box (wood, length 11 cm., height 10.5 cm, 1st century AD). This was one of three Chinese boxes from the Han dynasty, excavated from a woman’s grave in the Crimean Ust-Alma burial mound in 1990, and the best preserved because it was found inside a larger box. Photo: F. Odaka.
Source: De Krim. Goud en geheimen van de Zwarte Zee, Allard Pierson Museum Series volume 4, 94.
of a dynamic using and abusing of the past for present purposes. It may also warn us that even the 
deepest layers and the remotest regions of Europe’s cultural history can still evoke new wars on 
memory and heritage conflicts. In this turmoil of identity politics the normative notion of ‘occupation’ 
appeared more and more in political crime accusations supported by a contradictory alliance of 
nationalists and memory activists, sharing traumatic memories and a cult of victimhood. Thus with 
museums, monuments, city councils and street names as the symbolic targets for a revolutionary clash 
of culture, the Ukrainian revolution seemed to have connected its hope for a new future in Europe with 
that for an identity rooted in an ethno-nationalist myth about its distant past.223

The fate of the contested Crimea treasures, now in diaspora in Amsterdam, is therefore directly 
connected to the Ukrainian crisis. Their destination will in the end depend on the ability to impose a 
more inclusive alternative for the exclusive notion of ‘one people, one religion, one language, and one 
history’. The question ‘who owns the past?’ is therefore crucial for a deeper understanding of Europe’s 
multi-layered and conflicted past, represented by a myriad of competing memories and identities, 
which might easily lead to silencing or forgetting instead of mutual understanding. In this sense Walter 
Benjamin’s famous statement at the eve of the Second World War, that Europe’s history is written by 
the looters of forgotten cultures, still holds. But we may now add the notion that forgotten memories 
may easily be revitalised as counter memories. Such memory wars may lead to ethno-nationalist 
notions of ownership as well as to new, challenging cultural encounters beyond the authorised 
national, if not nationalist discourses of history, heritage and identity. Against the contradictory 
European background of globalisation and the revival of nationalism, it is a choice we all have to make 
in order to understand each other. The Chinese lacquer box from Crimea might be a good icon to start 
with (fig. 25).

Notes
International Arts, 17-8-2015, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/arts/international/artifacts-from-
crimean-museums-are-held-hostage-by-politics.html?_r=0; Olena Makarenko, ‘Crimea’s occupied cultural 
heritage’, Euromaidan Press, 9-10-2016, URL: http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/09/10/crimeas-occupied-
cultural-heritage/ 
4. A. Kurmasheva and R. Synovitz, ‘Russia Tries To Win Over Crimean Tatars’, Radio Free Europe, 12-3-2014, URL: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-tries-to-win-over-crimean-tatars/25294599.html, and Oksana Alpashkina, 
head conservationist at the Bakhchysarai Historical and Cultural Preserve, about the present situation: Paul 
com/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579471111226424466 
Groene Amsterdammer, 16-7-2014. 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/eight-ukrainians-make-forbes-magazines-list-of-wor-123875.html.; 
like all Ukrainian billionaires Kolomoyskyi’s 2015 ranking dropped off to $1.3 or $1.4bn; Forbes. The World’s 
Billionaires; URL: http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list; H. Smeets, ‘Armpje drukken met de oligarchen’, NRC-

8. van Herpen 2014.


10. Akhmetov ranked 88th on the 2014 billionaire list, though in 2015 dropped off to 6.7bn, which still ranks him the 201 richest billionaire of the world. Remarkably, Forbes explanation is that also his assets in Russian-annexed Crimea have been nationalized; Forbes, URL: http://www.forbes.com/profile/rinat-akhmetov/?list=billionaires

11. Akhmetov’s fortune was in 2004–2006 estimated $2.5–3.5bn, and in 2006 the oligarch had even putted himself with thirty-seven of his employees on the list; Wilson 2000, 331.

12. Shortly before being released from prison after being sentenced for seven years on abuse of power, Tymoshenko had a track record of dirty deals such as with Kolomoyskiy in winning control of Ukraine’s most popular TV channel 1+1 before the 2006 elections and the passing over to him by her government of Europe’s largest ferroalloys plant from his rival businessman-politician V. Pinchuk; Wilson 2000, 328.


16. Almost half of its electorate in 2012 had a university degree; the highest level of education in comparison to other parties; Kurbatov & Marchenko 2015, 593.

17. Tyahnybok’s militia tried to sell in total three of 24 stolen Golden Age art works from the Westfries Museum in Hoorn for 5mn euros on the black market, himself being photographed with while being photographed with the portraits of the OUN leaders Shukhevych, Bandera, and Konovalets on the wall; ‘Brein’ Kunstroofzaak biedt Westfries Museum portretten aan’, NOS, 7-12-2015, URL: http://nos.nl/artikel/2073727-brein-kunstroofzaak-biedt-westfries-museum-portretten-aan.html. See for the Svoboda-OUN and high political connections; Arthur Brand, “Security Service and Politicians of Ukraine are in Possession of Stolen Paintings from Dutch Museum”, URL: http://www.arthurbrand.com/?page_id=881 ; ‘One stolen Dutch painting will return to museum’, 30-5-2016 (translated message from Dutch NOS News TV), URL: https://dearkitty1.wordpress.com/2016/05/30/one-stolen-dutch-painting-will-return-to-museum/?iframe=true&preview=true

18. L. Marie White, “In a Derivative Move, Ukrainian Nazis are Selling Stolen Dutch Art”, Russia Insider, 10-12-2015, URL: http://russia-insider.com/en/derivative-move-ukrainian-nazis-are-selling-stolen-dutch-art/r11752; Though responding to the director of the Hoom museum, Ukraine’s minister of Foreign Affairs recognized the issue as very important “in the referendum context”, and the head of the Security Service should have interviewed more than 100 people “to find these pictures in the shortest time”, Tetiana Sviatenko, ‘Museum scandal between Ukraine and the Netherlands. The deadlock of cultural exchange: Ukrainian far-right activists do not return Dutch paintings of the XVII century, and the Netherlands do not return Scythian Gold to Ukraine’, Dutch referendum on Ukraine, 112UA, 6 April 2016, URL: http://112.international/article/museum-scandal-between-ukraine-and-the-netherlands-3808.html


20. After appointing the deputy commander of the Azov Batallion as Kiev Oblast police chief, Ukraine’s American-born chief rabbi Y. Bleich condemned the Internal Affairs minister A. Avakov’s and stated “if the interior minister continues to appoint people of questionable repute and ideologies tainted with fascism and right-wing extremism, the interior minister should be replaced.”; S. Sokol, ‘Kiev regional police head accused of neo-Nazi ties’, The Jerusalem Post, 12-11-2014, URL: http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Kiev-regional-police-head-accused-of-neo-Nazi-ties-381559

21. A. Taub, ‘Pro-Kiev militias are fighting Putin, but has Ukraine created a monster it can’t control?’, Vox World, Febr. 20, 2015, URL: http://www.vox.com/2015/2/20/8072643/ukraine-volunteer-battalion-danger ; H. Smeets,
"In het westen van Oekraïne is het nu ook mis", NRC-Handelsblad, 16-7-2015.


25. A. Szeptycki, ‘Should the Volyn Crime be condemned? Ukraine must have its own national history’, The Ukrainian Week, 30-4-2013, URL: http://ukrainianweek.com/Columns/50/78855

26. Moscow actually has become the most consistent defender of the Minsk-2 agreement of Ukrainian sovereignty within the new borders, without Crimea but with Donbass; Sakwa 2016, 258–259.


29. J. Hudson and R. Standish, ‘Can Poroshenko Control Ukraine’s Right Wing? The Ukrainian’s newest opponents are n his own parliament’, Foreign Policy, October 14, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/14/can-poroshenko-control-ukraines-right-wing/


33. As still holds for the EU chairman Jean-Claude Juncker who stated even in March 2016, with an eye to the Dutch referendum against the EU association agreement with Ukraine, that it would at least take years for Ukraine to join the EU and NATO; ‘Juncker says Ukraine not likely to join EU, NATO for 20-25 years’, RadioFreeEurope, 4-3-2016, URL: http://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html

34. In combination with NATO’s eastwards expansion, it was regarded by Moscow “a hostile gesture”; A. Luhn, ‘Russia derides Ukraine’s hiring of ex-NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen’.


36. US president George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of the since 2002 CIA operated black sites in 2006, an EU report in 2007 confirmed 1,245 CIA flights, while Poland admitted in 2014 to have hosted a secret CIA black site in Poland; the total number of black sites is suspected to have been around 50 in 28 countries, though most of them not confirmed; Wikipedia, URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_site

38. For the transnational connection of the Maidan Massacre and the MH17 Crash, compare Gudziak 2015.
41. Representatives of the Greek communist party, the Hungarian nationalist Jobbik party, the Austrian FPÖ, Vlaams Belang, and Marine Le Pen’s Front National; ‘Radicaal links én rechts prijzen verkiezingen Donbas’, NRC Handelsblad, 21-11-2014. The Dutch PVV leader Geert Wilders was still in May interviewed by Russia Today, though after the MH17 Russia ‘is difficult’; ‘Moskou leent aan Le Pen in hoop EU te verzwakken’, NRC-Handelsblad, 24-11-2014.
42. van der Laarse 2013, 78.
43. ‘Flink aandeel Nederlanders voor NATO-Flitsmacht’, NOS Nieuws; http://nos.nl/artikel/2006843-1000-nederlanders-voor-nato-flitsmacht.html . The request came from the Norwegian NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg.
44. Russia was the 11th export-partner for The Netherlands in 2013 and the 12th in 2014; ‘Belangrijkste handelspartners’, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 31-10-2014; https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2014/44/belangrijkste-handelspartners
50. According to the ministry, in Thomas, ‘Gouden twistappel’.
52. As argued by Ukraine’s lawyer; Verstraete, ‘Strijd om Krimgoud’, Ibid., and ‘Proxy-Oorlog Oekraïne’, 5-10-2016, BNR Webedactie, URL: http://www.bnr.nl/nieuws/juridisch/10311751/schattenkrimmoetenнииaooekraïne
December 14, although the final judgement after appeals may take several more years; Kay Rutten, ‘Zaak Krim-Kunst eindelijk voor de rechter’, BNR-Nieuws, URL: https://www.bnr.nl/nieuws/juridisch/10311734/zaakkrimkunstefineldvoorerechter

55. According to Y. Nishchuk in Thomas, ‘Gouden twistappel’.


57. Van der Vlies’s cited in H. de Lange, ‘Twist om de Krim-schatten’, Dagblad Trouw, URL: http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4512/Cultuur/article/detail/4389587/2016/10/05/Twist-om-de-Krim-schatten.dhtml. According to her international treaties about the return of heritage don’t play a role, as they deal mainly with looted art.

58. According to the NOS TV reporter M. Remmers who is following the trial: ‘Rechtszaak over Krim-goud wordt politiek steekspel’, NOS.nl, URL: http://nos.nl/artikel/2136136rechtszaakoverkrimgoudwordtpolitieksteekspel.html


64. Significant for this militant, racist base of Himmler’s influence on Germany’s leading archaeologists and prehistorians is the ideological radicalization of the Dutch director of the National Service of Antiquity F.C. Bursch after digging on Jankuhns invitation for SS Ahnenerbe in the Ukraine in 1943; Eickhoff 2003, 259, 266-269 and compare Princle 2006, 218-221, 233–235.


69. Timofeychev, ‘Moscow monument to Prince Vladimir’. Added to this destruction of Kievan Rus by the following Mongol (read Russian) horse-archers invasions were the Cossack heroes of the new national paradigm, who in a series of battles against the Poles would lead the Ukrainian people to the second period of 17th-18th century Hetmanate independency, only to be slowly disrupted by Russification up to 1991; Plokhy 2012.

70. Bruning 2015.


74. Snyder 2010.

75. ‘Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism’, 3-6-2008, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, URL: http://www.webcitation.org/64otCtAyz

76. R. van der Laarse 2013, 126–128.

77. In Moldavia a liberal government coalition signed an association treaty with the EU against the will of half its population, sanctioned by a narrow victory of the pro-EU coalition in national elections; F. Huiskamp,
Verkiezingen Moldavië: pro-Europa wint nipt, maar verdeeldheid groot, 1-12-2014, NRC.nl, URL: http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/12/01/verkiezingen-moldavie-zit-tussen-de-eu-en-rusland-in/

78. Conquest 1986 which was furiously criticized by Tottle 1987. Tottle was a Canadian communist, while Conquest, a convinced ‘cold warrior’, had worked for the British IRD propaganda counter-offensive unit; Defty 2013.

79. Starovoyt 2015, 220.

80. Remarkably even Lenin is regarded a ‘Jewish Bolshevist dictator’ at the white power site ‘The Three Holodomor Genocides’, Holodomor.info.com: the Jewish cleansing of Europeans, URL: https://holodomorinfo.com/. In particular G. Jones’ press reports were used for Hitler’s 1933 electoral campaigns, as reported in Deutschösterreichische Tageszeitung, 3-3-1933; Snyder 2010, 61; ‘Famine Exposure Newspaper Articles relating to Gareth Jones’ trips to the Soviet Union (1930-35)’, Garethjones.org, URL: http://www.garethjones.orgsoviet_articlessoviet_articles.htm


82. Such as defended by the Ukrainian historian Vasylo Marochko in the 1990s; Marples 2007, 44–45; Ukrainian Famine’, New World Encyclopedia, UCL: https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Ukrainian_Famine. Whereas the famine is explained as primarily a natural disaster, crop failures throughout the Soviet Union, worsened by forced collectivization and the increased food demands of urbanization and industrialization, by M. B. Tauger, ‘Natural Disasters and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1933’, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East-European Studies no 1506 (University of Pittsburgh, 2001), a more intentionalist view is defended by Davies & Wheatcroft 2004 and Wheatcroft 2003. Wheatcroft on the basis of the most extensive archive studies thus far, suggests a number of deaths at around 4.5 million. See on the numbers also R. van der Laarse, ‘ Bones never lie? Unearthing Europe’s Age of Terror in the Age of Memory’, in Z. Dziuban (ed.), The Forensic Turn (forthcoming).


84. Marples 2007, 44–45.


86. According to Mace, it was Brach who introduced the word Holodomor in 1986, though it was published for a first time in 1988 by Oleksa Musiyenko in Literaturna Ukrayina, and adopted by the Ukrainian Voluntary Historical-Memorial Association in 1991; J. Mace, ‘The Great Famine-Genocide in Soviet Ukraine (Holodomor)’, ArtUkraine.com, URL: http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/mace22.htm (first published The Day Weekly Digest, Kyiv, Ukraine, 28-9-2003), and see also Noack 2015, 142–143.


89. Korostelina, 293–315.

90. Compare for the ‘Orange’ fusion of nationalism and ‘postcolonial’ memory activism in Lviv’s toxic Bandera cult, Narvselius 2012, 339–349.


95. In close correspondence was the fictional Ukrainian state continuity mapped according to the maximal area of the extension of the Ukrainian language boundaries; Bechtel 2015, 188–189.

96. The Holodomor 1932–1933: Genocide against the Ukrainian People, Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (Kyiv: Olena Teliha Publishers 2008), which includes the text of Yushchenko’s Holodomor Law. Katchanovski 2010, 973–997. Using a 2008 survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on the
question whether Soviet and Nazi policies were genocidal, the author concludes that regional political culture is the most significant factor affecting attitudes towards Soviet genocide in Ukraine.

100. Kasianov, ‘Debate on law drafts on ‘Holodomor denial’. Denial of both the Holodomor and the Holocaust has become punishable by four years of imprisonment, even though it is hard to understand how that might be interpreted considering the nationalism involvements in Nazi war crimes.
109. Berkhoff 2004, 49, 164–169 307–308. A death toll of 30 million was planned for 10 years, and in Ukraine up to 1943 “the Nazi regime ended the life of at least one million civilians and prisoner of war”, and in 1943–44 appr. 4–5 million Soviet citizens died by the German conquest in Ukraine and Belarus, that became the Third Reich’s largest colony in 1941–1944; Snyder 2010, 162–169, 411.
111. The death toll varies from 30,000 (Ukraine) to 100,000 (Poland), though 38,700 victims have been documented, although Ukrainian scholars also argued that Polish citizens should have been murdered by Soviet NKVD officers disguised as OUN-UPA fighters. See for different estimates also ‘Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia’, Wikipedia, URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacres_of_Poles_in_Volhynia_and_Eastern_Galicia#Number_of_victims
112. In 2013 Ukraine’s High Court confirmed Yushchenko’s 2010 decree that UPA veterans as war combatants and refused the claim of Natalia Vitrenko, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, that it violates her constitutional
rights “in as much as it demeans her dignity as a daughter of a Red Army veteran who fought against the Nazis and their abettors during WWII, as well as dishonors her as a civic and political activists”; Mark Rachkevych, High court upholds decree recognizing UPA partisans a World War II combatants, Kyiv Post, 7-2-2013, URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20130208014932/http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/high-court-upholds-decree-recognizing-upa-partisans-as-world-war-ii-combatants-320057.html

113. To blame the messengers a FARE observer for FIFA was identified as a Jew, communist, cosmopolitan, in V. Burlakova, ‘Bandera Non Grata. The pro-Russian left in Ukraine may stand behind FARE’s campaign against Ukrainian ‘fascists’ and ‘racists’, The Ukrainian Week, 4-10-2013, URL: http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/90836; compare also Bechtel 2015, 190–191.

114. A. Szeptycki, ‘Should the Volyn Crime be condemned? Ukraine must have its own national history, not one dictated by Moscow. And the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is one of its elements’, The Ukrainian Week, 30-4-2013, URL: http://ukrainianweek.com/Columns/50/78855

115. Earlier accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity were inadmissible to the ICC; ‘The Hague to discuss the crimes of Yanukovich’, 112UA, 22-11-2016, URL: http://112.international/video/the-hague-to-discuss-the-crimes-of-yanukovich-134-134.html.

116. Yushchenko cited at Snyder, ‘Ukraine’s Past on Trial’.


119. The law was already submitted by the Yatsenyuk government to ban the promotion of both communist and national-socialist totalitarianism; according to the November 2016 poll organised by the Ukrainian sociological study group Rating, 48 % of 2,000 Ukrainian residents of 18 years and older wanted a ban on communist ideology, 36% were against it and 15% undecided, whereas 33% supported a ban on nationalist ideology (a few years before 40%), 40% was against and 25% undecided. 41 % supported a dismantling of Lenin statues all over the country, 48 % were against it, and 15% undecided. Most respondents (57%) were against the changing of Soviet names of cities and streets except in taking place selectively; ‘Almost half of residents of Ukraine want decommunization’, Kyiv Post, 18-11-2016, URL: https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/almost-half-residents-ukraine-want-decommunization.html

120. The resolution was adopted by parliament two weeks later, after rejecting amendments of the liberal opposition to eliminate the words “genocide” from the resolution; ‘Polish Sejm labels Volyn killings “genocide”, UNIAN Information Agency, 22-7-2016, URL: http://www.unian.info/politics/1432207-polish-sejm-labels-volyn-killings-genocide.html; V. Zhuhan, ‘Polish-Ukrainian confrontation over historical past gains momentum’, Euromaidan Press, 7-8-2016, URL: http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/08/polish-ukrainian-confrontation-over-the-historical-past-gains-momentum/


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