



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

The Russian World in Perspective: Comparing Russian Culture and Language Promotion with British, German and French Practices

Noack, C.

DOI

[10.1515/9781474463812-013](https://doi.org/10.1515/9781474463812-013)

[10.3366/j.ctv21pts4h.15](https://doi.org/10.3366/j.ctv21pts4h.15)

Publication date

2021

Document Version

Final published version

Published in

Politics of the Russian Language Beyond Russia

License

CC BY-NC-ND

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Noack, C. (2021). The Russian World in Perspective: Comparing Russian Culture and Language Promotion with British, German and French Practices. In C. Noack (Ed.), *Politics of the Russian Language Beyond Russia* (pp. 215-240). (Russian language and society). Edinburgh University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781474463812-013>, <https://doi.org/10.3366/j.ctv21pts4h.15>

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (<https://dare.uva.nl>)

The Russian World in Perspective: Comparing Russian Culture and Language Promotion with British, German and French Practices

Christian Noack

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of new cultural diplomacy institutions in Russia has elicited substantial scholarly attention in the context of the public and academic debates about Russia's use of soft power. One of the central questions is whether the Russian Federation has indeed substantially modernised its arsenal of cultural diplomacy, or whether it merely fell back on tried and tested Soviet practices after a hiatus of more than a decade. Famously, Joseph Nye took part in the debate, criticising what he saw as the shortcomings of China's and Russia's approaches to soft power, namely the strong role of the state and the lack of engagement of civil society in Russia's and China's contemporary cultural diplomacy (Nye 2013).

Occasionally, the Russian institutions, the Russian World Foundation (Fond Russkii Mir) created in 2007, and the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), established in 2008, have been compared with Western or Chinese organisations dealing with foreign cultural policy (Wilson 2015; Pashaeva 2016). Following Patricia Goff's suggestions, such comparison should distinguish between 'the official cultural diplomacy framework policies' defined by governments and the 'cultural diplomacy efforts' aimed at their implementation. While the former are 'more enduring, more consistent over time and space' (and much better documented), the latter often appear to be 'contingent, ad hoc, the product of individual creativity' (Goff 2013: 13).

Given that the implementation of language promotion is central to this volume, a concluding comparative chapter on Russian and Western practices should obviously help to put the findings of case studies from the preceding chapters into a broader perspective without abandoning the focus on the language promotion practices. Owing to the geographical and thematical scope of these practices, such a task almost amounts to squaring the circle. For the following comparison, I have sought a compromise solution. First, I examine the institutional arrangements, the funding and the geographic spread of the institutions promoting language and culture. Second, I take a look at the discursive framing of language promotion, comparing the answers given on the websites of the Russian and Western institutes against the rhetorical question of why one should study the promoted language. On the one hand, I am interested in the degree to which the learning of the foreign language is couched in terms of cultural enrichment or utilitarian gains. On the other hand, I discuss whether or not the process of language learning is treated as a unidirectional process, or whether it is rather portrayed as a key element in a broader cultural exchange. In the third section, I consider the practical services that the institutions offer to language learners and teachers. My examination of this question focuses on offerings available through the central websites of the institutions, in particular the access to online teaching and learning materials. In the last part, I briefly review cognate activities, in fields such as teacher training or the support for language learning in the educational systems of the host states.

INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP

With the collapse of the USSR, much of the Soviet infrastructure of cultural diplomacy was disbanded. Some institutions continued to lead a shadowy existence on the margins of Russia's new governmental apparatus. One important example would be the former Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, now called Centre for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. Initially attached to the Government of the Russian Federation, it was moved to the Foreign Ministry in 2002.

An institutional rebuilding began in earnest only during Putin's second term, 2004–8. The political context was shaped by Russia's economic recovery, the perception of Western encroachment upon Russia's self-defined zone of influence in the 'near abroad', and the rise of a political discourse about the fate of the Russian-speaking 'compatriots' outside the borders of the Russian Federation. At the same time, a process of

‘indigenisation’ of the concept of ‘soft power’ could be observed in political and academic discourses, demanding that Russia be provided with the means to ‘wield its own soft power to balance and – where necessary – oppose the American effort’ (Osipova 2016: 346–7).

When the Kremlin began to rebuild its cultural diplomacy arsenal, it did indeed partly fall back on reviving old Soviet institutions, but it also partly emulated international best practice in the field. Within a single year, the Russian Federation created two institutions that would become active in the field of external culture and language promotion. In June 2007, Putin signed a decree establishing a private foundation, Russkii Mir. In September 2008, interim president Medvedev authorised the creation of the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). Russkii Mir was conceived as a public charity, ostensibly styled according to Western models. Rossotrudnichestvo, by contrast, is a state agency under the control of the Foreign Ministry and sees itself as a direct successor to the earlier Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), created in 1925 and remodelled into the above-mentioned Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations in 1958 (Gould-Davies 2003).

The mission statement of the Russkii Mir Foundation defines the promotion of language and culture as its core duty. Pointing to two of the three possible translations of the Russian word *mir* (‘peace’, ‘world’ and ‘community’), the Foundation’s website reiterates one of the basic principles of cultural diplomacy, namely the ‘promotion of peace and understanding in the world by supporting, enhancing and encouraging the appreciation of Russian language, heritage and culture’. As to the teaching of the Russian language ‘within Russia [!] and abroad’, the target groups are defined as ‘new learners of the language and [. . .] those who already know and love Russian and wish to recapture or maintain their fluency’ (Russkii Mir 2020a).

Of course, the mission statement also refers to the third translation of *mir*, ‘community’, identified here with the ‘Russian community abroad’, which the Foundation wishes to ‘reconnect’ with its homeland, through ‘cultural and social programs, exchanges and assistance in relocation’. The website also aims to explain the collocation ‘Russian World’, which is described as ‘the largest diaspora population the world has ever known’ and said to comprise not only ethnic Russians, but also ‘millions of people who have chosen the Russian language as their subject of study, those who have developed an appreciation for Russia and its cultural heritage’ (Russkii Mir 2020a). At this juncture, the Foundation refers to

the political discourses on the ‘Russian World’ and ‘compatriots living abroad’, although it was Rossotrudnichestvo that had explicitly been commissioned to look after the latter group. As the state agency’s long official name already suggests, the government assigned two other tasks to it that had been largely irrelevant in the Yeltsin years, but had risen in importance under Putin. These were, first, improving political relations with what remained of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and, second, managing Russia’s re-emergence as a donor in international development policies.

As to the promotion of language and culture, there is indeed significant overlap in the duties allotted to the Russkii Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo. The state agency, too, defines ‘preserving the cultural heritage, promoting the Russian culture and language and educational and scientific cooperation’ as part of its tasks. Rossotrudnichestvo has taken over or reopened the former Soviet ‘Centres of Science and Culture’. According to Rossotrudnichestvo’s website, such centres currently operate in 62 states. Moreover, 24 representatives of the agency are attached to Russian Embassies in 21 other countries (Rossotrudnichestvo 2020a). The Russkii Mir Foundation, for its part, is supposed to promote Russian language and culture through ‘Russian Centres’ and smaller ‘Russian Cabinets’ created in collaboration with host institutions abroad, mostly universities and libraries. Many of the smaller cabinets in the West are also run by Russian expat organisations. The Russkii Mir website lists 102 centres and 106 cabinets, which indicates a slight decrease since 2018, when the annual report counted 112 centres (Russkii Mir 2019a: 20; 2020b).¹

There is also no clear-cut division of tasks between the two institutions as far as language promotion is concerned. Rossotrudnichestvo has been commissioned to implement the successive federal target programmes titled ‘The Russian Language’ since 2008. The state agency also bears responsibility for the current 2016–20 cycle. In 2015, the programme’s ambitious goals were set as ‘improving the conditions for teaching, learning and promoting the Russian language, Russian culture and Russian-language schooling in other countries’. The programme aims at raising by a factor of ten the number of qualified language teachers and translators, the quality and quantity of available online materials, and finally the number of schools abroad receiving direct assistance from the Russian Federation. For the realisation of these ambitious aims, the government designated 7.6 billion roubles for five years, the equivalent of just under 100 million euro (Government of the Russian Federation 2015; see also the section on language promotion below). All of this suggests a conscious, albeit ambiguous division of activities in the field

of language and culture promotion between a public charity and a state agency. The former is responsible for contact with, and the co-funding of, Russian language-related partner institutions abroad, while the latter engages in the promotion of language and culture through its own networks of branches attached to the Russian embassies. In 2007, the newly designated director of *Russkii Mir*, Viacheslav Nikonov, described the Foundation as having been created

on the principle of state–private partnership. Some of the funds will come from the state, but I hope not the bulk of it. [. . .] There are far more limitations on the use of state funding [than with respect to private funding]; there are strict guidelines on where it may go or not go. In this specific area, which involves broad international network activities, it would of course be easier to operate with private funding. (Nikonov 2007)

In international comparison, the closest resemblance to this arrangement can be found in France. On the one hand, the promotion of French culture and language is carried out by the *Alliances Françaises*, a network of decentralised non-governmental organisations, often emerging as a result of local initiatives abroad and largely self-funded. On the other hand, the *Instituts Français*, state agencies attached to French embassies abroad and paid and staffed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, likewise engage in culture and language promotion. This is not to say that the system of the *Alliances Françaises* would have been totally independent of state influence since their creation in the 1880s. The initiators were celebrated French intellectuals of the time, acting against the backdrop of a broad public perception that French diplomatic and cultural influence was decreasing after the defeat at the hands of Prussia. Only late in the interwar period, in 1936, reacting to both National Socialist and Soviet propaganda, did the French Foreign Ministry create its first office for cultural diplomacy (Paschalidis 2009: 278–80).

The double structure of state-run *Instituts Français* and non-governmental *Alliances Françaises* expanded during the Cold War. The French government started to worry about the efficiency and the visibility of France's external cultural policies not long before the post-1989 era of 'cultural capitalism' (Paschalidis 2009) and has recently tried to realign the system. The largely independent *Alliances* were subordinated to the *Fondation des Alliances Françaises*, created in Paris in 2007. A little later, in 2010, the *Instituts Français* were subordinated under a new central agency by the same name, tasked to coordinate language and culture promotion between the *Alliances*, the *Instituts* and a couple of

other state and public agencies. With this institutional rearrangement, the aims of culture and language promotion changed, too, as will be discussed in more detail below. Suffice to say here that, besides enhancing international ‘recognition’, French language and culture promotion was increasingly linked, as in other Western countries, to the aim of promoting the French higher education system and the country’s cultural industries (Steinkamp 2009; Ahearne 2018). As of today, the hoped-for streamlining of French cultural diplomacy has not been fully realised. Attempts to merge the governmental and public institutions have made some progress, yet the fusion meets protracted resistance, in particular from the French and overseas Alliances (Guerrin 2018; Eschapasse 2019; Robert 2019; Institut Français 2019).

Returning to the new Russian structures, *Rossotrudnichestvo*, in its subordination to the Foreign Ministry and in its institutional integration into the system of Russian diplomatic representations abroad, is indeed reminiscent of the French Instituts. Unlike its French counterparts, the state agency neither directly supervises the *Russkii Mir* Foundation, nor possesses the degree of independence from the Russian Foreign Ministry that the French Instituts enjoy. *Russkii Mir*, for its part, seems to be modelled on ‘para-public entities’ (Goff 2013: 13), such as the British Council or the German Goethe-Institut. The Foundation is governed by a director and small management board, under the supervision of a board of trustees, which comprises academics and above all politicians, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, some business people and a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church (*Russkii Mir* 2020c, 2020d). The British Council’s leadership team is likewise controlled by a board of trustees, on which politicians, businessmen and cultural administrators are represented (British Council 2020a).

As a public association (*Verein*), the Goethe-Institut is led by a director and a smaller steering committee consisting of six members, either academics or business people. Both the British and the German institutions rely on the recommendations of several specialist advisory boards, which do not seem to exist for *Russkii Mir*. The Foundation’s website lacks detailed information concerning its inner administration or its connections with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The British Council and the Goethe-Institut both provide on their websites the relevant statutes and further documentation regarding their working relationships with the governments and, in the British case, the parliament (British Council 2020b; Goethe-Institut 2020a). The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office delegates culture and language promotion to independent agencies, of which the British Council is only one, and one increasingly losing influence (Bell 2016: 76–7). Creating ‘friendly knowledge and mutual

understanding' and 'promoting British education and education cooperation', and finally selling courses in the English language as the key resource for this, the British Council is intended to support and complement 'diplomatic, commercial and development efforts' (quoted in Martens and Marshall 2003: 267).

In the German case, the collaboration has been formalised in a series of framework agreements (*Rahmenverträge*) between the government and the Goethe-Institut, the last of which was concluded in 2004. Although the German Foreign Ministry is responsible for regulating foreign cultural policies, it delegates this task to a public association (Goethe-Institut 2020b). The Goethe-Institut's website describes the 'promotion of German language', 'international cultural cooperation' and 'intercultural dialogue' as its main tasks, but also hopes to 'create a comprehensive image of Germany' (Goethe-Institut 2020c).

FINANCIAL ENDOWMENT

While the British and the German institutions make considerable efforts to display their 'arm's-length' distance from the state, there is less determination noticeable in the case of *Russkii Mir*. It is very difficult, for example, to find information about the Foundation's budgets and the share of public funding in them. The Foundation invites donations, but does not record them on the website. All 'partners' listed on the website are state institutions (*Russkii Mir* 2020e). To be sure, *Russkii Mir*, in contrast to *Rosstrudnichestvo*, publishes annual reports on its websites, as do all Western institutions discussed in this chapter. However, *Russkii Mir*'s annual reports do not contain information on funding either (*Russkii Mir* 2019a). There are only scattered references to the amount of money available to the Foundation. According to newspaper articles, the budget allocated to the *Russkii Mir* Foundation by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation amounted to 500 million roubles in 2013 and just 427.5 million roubles in 2015, worth 11 million euro in 2013 and only 5.7 million euro in 2015 (Wilson 2015: 1192; Mkhoyan 2017: 693). *Rosstrudnichestvo*'s budgets are also undisclosed. Several sources indicate that it stood at 2.5 or 2.19 billion roubles in 2013 (roughly 60 and 52 million euro, respectively). It should have more than trebled until 2020, but due to Russia's economic troubles in the 2010s it has likely been decreasing since, as have the budgets of foreign language media outlets (Osipova 2016: 351–2; Wilson 2015: 1192).

All of this is small change when compared with the funding of the

Western institutions. Their annual budgets keep growing, albeit not exclusively through state funding. Taking 2015 as a point of comparison, the Goethe-Institut received 236.6 million euro from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The British Council had a total income of 864.3 million pounds (or roughly 1 billion euro) for the 2013–14 academic year. The Alliances Françaises collected 1.59 million euro from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014; their own income for the same year amounted to 203 million euro (Mkhoyan 2017: 693). By 2017–18, for which we have no data for the Russian institutions, the British Council had a budget of 1.3 billion euro, the Goethe-Institut 366 million euro, the Alliances Françaises 212 million euro and the Institut Français 33 million euro. State share in funding amounted to 89% for the Institut Français, 65% for the Goethe-Institut, 14.3% for the British Council and merely 4% for the Alliances Françaises. In turn, this means that the branches of the British Council earned a staggering 800 million euro (or 60%) of their funds by selling services such as language courses and exams. Moreover, the British Council received another 335 million euro (or 25.7%) in donations. The Alliances Françaises earned 195 million euro, and donations amounted to 8.5 million euro (4%). For the Goethe-Institut, the figures are 90 million euro of generated income (24%) and 12 million euro in donations (3%). The lion's share of income generated by the British, German and French institutions themselves comes from the sale of language instruction and certification of language skills (British Council 2019: 80–130; Goethe-Institut 2018: 126–28; Fondation des Alliances Françaises 2018a: 90–101; 2018b; Institut Français 2019: 88–9).

That there is a growing market for courses and certificates even in languages other than English has dawned on Russian experts and politicians as well (Medvedev 2012), yet we have no data and little evidence that *Russkii Mir* and *Rossotrudnichestvo* are aiming to capitalise on this. This lack of initiative seems even more puzzling as British and French external culture and language promotion is explicitly seeking to prepare the ground for expanding the commercial scope of the culture industries. As far as we can deduce from the media use of Russian speakers abroad, this would represent a significant opportunity for Russia as well, which remains largely untapped as of yet (see Chapters 3 and 5 in this volume).

GEOGRAPHY

The relatively modest funds clearly restrict the scope of activities of the Russian institutions in geographic terms, too. Judging by the numbers

reported on the websites and in *Russkii Mir*'s annual reports, both organisations managed to create an impressive network of Centres and Cabinets within a decade. This has certainly been easier for *Rossotrudnichestvo*, due to its larger budgets and its institutional integration with the Russian diplomatic representations abroad. In many cases, Centres for Science and Culture were still existing or were recreated by the cultural divisions of the embassies. The state agency lists 85 branches abroad on its website, of which more than 70 are attached to the embassies in capital cities. The only country hosting several branches across the country is India, with 5 representations. States such as Poland, Egypt, the USA and Brazil count 2 branches each. In terms of geographic spread, the largest number of Russian Centres for Science and Culture operate in Europe and Asia (28 each), followed by 16 in the post-Soviet space, including Russia. Notably, there are no representations in the Baltic States. *Rossotrudnichestvo* is comparatively underrepresented in Africa and the two Americas, with just 20 branches in total, which also sheds light on the priorities of Russia's development aid (Wilson 2015: 1184–5).

Although comparatively underfinanced, *Russkii Mir*, too, managed to set up a quite impressive network of Centres and Cabinets. The website lists 100 Centres and 114 Cabinets in 2020 (*Russkii Mir* 2020f, 2020g). The degree to which these institutions depend on Russian subsidies is unclear, however. In the case of Centres at Western universities, *Russkii Mir* largely contributes by sending books or language teachers or sponsoring guest lectures; the brunt of the costs is borne by the local host institutions, who as a rule were dealing with Russia prior to *Russkii Mir*'s engagement (Oostrá 2019: 25–6). Cabinets are by definition relatively small 'corners', bookshelves stacked with literature and media in the Russian language, donated by the Foundation. The scope of activities of Centres in and outside the former Soviet space also seems to be fairly limited, when compared with the offerings of the Western institutions (see Chapters 1–3 in this volume). *Russkii Mir*'s news section on its website and in its annual reports presents a mix of public lectures, short-term training, summer schools, workshops and commemorative events. The number of taught language courses was about 250 in total in 2018 (*Russkii Mir* 2019a: 21–30).

The geographical focus of *Russkii Mir*'s activities clearly lies in Europe, which counts 48 Centres and 44 Cabinets, followed by the post-Soviet space with 24 Centres and 25 Cabinets. It is worth mentioning that, unlike *Rossotrudnichestvo*, *Russkii Mir* is cooperating with host organisations in Lithuania and Estonia (1 Centre and 2 Cabinets each). Besides universities, the partners are schools and associations of the Russian-speaking minorities. In the case of Moldova (4 Centres and 12

Cabinets), many representations work in internationally non-recognised Transnistria. In Europe, particularly high numbers of branches can be found in Slavic-speaking countries such as Bulgaria (5 Centres and 9 Cabinets). With 21 Centres and 25 Cabinets, Asia is another area of focus; here the brunt of representations can be found in former communist allies such as Mongolia or Vietnam. Interestingly, there are no *Russkii Mir* representations in India, perhaps due to the strong presence of *Rossotrudnichestvo*. Again, Africa and the two Americas are clearly underrepresented, with just 7 Centres (none in Africa) and 19 Cabinets. Oceania is a complete blind spot for both *Rossotrudnichestvo* and *Russkii Mir* (*Russkii Mir* 2020f, 2020g; *Rossotrudnichestvo* 2020c).

The professed programmatic focus of the Russian institutions on the ‘near abroad’ is thus not explicitly mirrored by the geography of branches. There are several possible explanations for this. First, the number of existing branches does not necessarily reflect the scope and intensity of activity in a given country. Second, a number of representations have been closed down in Ukraine since 2014, with only a few remaining in the self-declared People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Third, the quest for mutual recognition and the principle of reciprocity (Ahearne 2018: 696–7) seems to have channelled quite a few resources to Europe, where there is not only a large number of independent states that have been running their own cultural institutes since 1989 (Paschalidis 2009: 284), but also a growing proportion of Russian-speaking minorities, organising themselves in expat associations and seeking collaboration predominantly with *Russkii Mir*. That said, a closer look at the geography of Centres and Cabinets in the former Soviet space shows that Russia’s culture and language promotion through *Russkii Mir* and *Rossotrudnichestvo* rarely ventures beyond the larger cities and the areas densely settled by ethnic Russians, that is, areas populated by those *Russophones* that Moscow considers to be ‘compatriots’.

In comparison with the European institutions, Russia’s selective geographical focus does not particularly stand out, except for in its focus on the Russian-speaking diaspora. All of the British, German and French cultural institutions run between one-quarter and one-third of their branches in Europe. In relative terms, the geographical spread of the British Council’s and the Goethe-Institut’s offices is quite similar. The former runs 48 branches in Europe and another 11 in the post-Soviet space, out of 176 in total. The latter has 151 branch offices in total, of which 55 are located in Europe, and likewise 11 in the post-Soviet space. Due to its colonial past, Britain is better represented in Asia (66 against 42 German branches) and Africa (34 and 21, respectively). The Americas and Oceania play a lesser role, with 17 British Council and 22 Goethe-

Institut branches. The state-run French institutes display a similar global distribution (Europe 77, post-Soviet space 9, Asia 53), except for their strong presence in Africa (61 branches), which corresponds to the declared ambitions of the French to develop *francophonie* above all in this demographically fast-growing world region. Only the network of the Alliances Françaises shows a significantly diverging picture, being more evenly spread across the world regions. Of 832 branches, more than 200 Alliances are based in Europe, some 30 in the post-Soviet space, around 70 in Asia, 39 in Oceania, 110 in Africa, 112 in North America and an astounding 181 in Latin America. This suggests that the bottom-up principle underlying the development of the Alliances and their relative independence from state funding created a network which reflects demand *sur place* much more than the state-run or largely state-financed networks, which seem to reflect political imperatives and geo-strategic considerations to a much larger degree (British Council 2020c; Goethe-Institut 2020d; Institut Français 2020a; Fondation des Alliances Françaises 2018a).

FRAMING LANGUAGE PROMOTION

Language promotion and, through the tool of language, the facilitation of cultural exchange, has formed the backbone of cultural diplomacy since its ‘invention’ in the age of nationalism. According to the rationale of cultural diplomacy, good relations between societies or states are rooted in mutual understanding and recognition. As a rule, cultures and languages are fundamental and distinctive for different societies, hence language and education represent the most significant entry points into another culture. Culture and education can thus draw people closer together and accentuate commonalities or facilitate mutual recognition, even if cultures seem poles apart or even strongly adversarial (Goff 2013: 2–3; Ahearne 2018: 696–7). The promotion of language and culture is thus central to the work all of the institutions described here, and represents the main point of comparison in this chapter. It is, however, applied in different forms and practised in various combinations with other activities, which can only be summarily described and contrasted in this section.

In a narrow sense, language promotion comprises the teaching of the language, the issuing of language certificates, and the provision of teaching and reading materials in the target language. With the exception of language test certificates, the Russian and all other institutions discussed here engage in these activities. The only broadly recognised

Russian test, TORFL/TRKI, is the intellectual property of Herzen University. It can only be taken at larger Russian universities, or at selected contracted partner institutions abroad, but not in *Russkii Mir*'s or *Rossotrudnichestvo*'s branches (Russia.study 2020). Beyond direct language tuition, institutions active in the field of cultural diplomacy usually aim at improving the teaching of their respective language abroad, either through teacher training or by supporting teaching in the education system of the host country through the provision of didactic material and textbooks. In both cases, the physical representation of the institutes in the host countries has an important role to play, providing classrooms and libraries for students from the host countries. Some organisations offer temporary placements for language instructors and teaching assistants, too. Again, most of these resources are offered by both the Russian institutions and their Western European equivalents.

Further related services are in connection with the preparation and admission of foreign students to the higher education systems of Britain, Germany and France, including the provision of study grants. As Chapter 7 in this book extensively discusses Russian activities in that field, it is sufficient to say here that the institutes under discussion fulfil different roles, very often in cooperation with other state-run agencies that bear the principal responsibility for foreign student recruitment. The British Council, for example, actively seeks to recruit international students for British higher education institutions. Since 2016, the British Council has also been the main organiser of the global 'Study UK' campaign that promotes the UK as the first-choice study destination for international students.² The UK's universities are primarily targeting 'growth markets' in Asia, in states such as China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey (British Council 2020i; Cai 2019: 56).

In the French and German cases, the language promotion institutions are not directly charged with foreign student recruitment. The French *Instituts and Alliances* and the German *Goethe-Institut* clearly conceive of their language teaching as an important channel for attracting foreign students to France and Germany, though, and closely collaborate with the bodies in charge, *Campus France* and the *German Academic Exchange Service*. In particular, France has seen a 'major concerted legislative and budgetary endeavour over the last fifteen years to merge *grandes écoles*, universities and other higher education institutes' to make its 'complex, idiosyncratic and fragmented' higher education system more attractive to foreigners. As in the Russian case, the use of English as a language of tuition, which was actually legally banned before 2013, is making only slow inroads (Ahearne 2018: 705).

WHY STUDY RUSSIAN, ENGLISH, GERMAN OR FRENCH?

All institutions discussed here assume that learning the language they represent is attractive per se, as it provides the gateway to a different culture. The international reputation of one's language is frequently emphasised, sometimes more strongly than the practical advantages that command of that language offers. As a rule, the target audience is conceived as 'non-native speakers', for whom specifically designed teaching and learning methods and materials are suggested. Native speakers abroad, that is, diaspora groups and expats, are targeted only by the Russian institutions. During the interwar period, the Goethe-Institut's institutional forerunner, the Akademie zur Wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und Pflege des Deutschtums or, for short, the Deutsche Akademie, created in 1925, was also very active in this field. After the Second World War, this politically tainted task was taken over by another private association, the Verein für Deutsche Kulturbeziehungen im Ausland, which was dissolved only as late as 2019 (Michels 2005).

The connections between Britain and France and their former colonies, in which English and French are still used as second languages, falls somewhere between these poles. Relationships between the former metropolises and the colonies are recast in less one-sided ways than in the Russian case, even though French language promotion targets francophone countries in particular with the aim of buttressing the international importance of the French language.

Russkii Mir and Rossotrudnichestvo emphasise the aim of promoting the Russian language outside the Russian Federations, referring both to its significance as part of a shared cultural 'world heritage', and, as already mentioned, to Russia's responsibility for the ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking diaspora. Russkii Mir refers on its website to reconnecting 'the Russian community abroad to its homeland, forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programmes, exchanges and assistance in relocation' (Russkii Mir 2020a), with the latter actually being a task assigned to Rossotrudnichestvo. The state agency's website, in turn, delivers a large amount of statistical data relating to the Russian language's position as a world language – from being the sixth most spoken language in the world after English, Chinese, Hindi, Spanish and Arabic, to functioning as the second most frequently used language on the Internet. In terms of numbers, Rossotrudnichestvo claims that some 273 million people in the world speak Russian, 146 million of them living in the Russian Federation and no fewer than 127 million outside its borders (Rossotrudnichestvo 2020b). These numbers seem

fairly accurate: other sources quote 260 million Russian speakers as of 2010, some 50 million fewer than in 1990 (Aref'ev and Sheregi 2014: 19).

In the quest for international recognition, both websites link the transnational 'value' of the Russian language to its role as the carrier of Russian high culture in general and Russian classical literature in particular. *Russkii Mir* features five lines from Anna Akhmatova's patriotic poem *Muzhestvo* ('Courage'), evoking the 'great Russian word' as the mediator of Russianness between generations (*Russkii Mir* 2020a). *Rossotrudnichestvo*'s website is more detailed on the accomplishments of Russian literature, listing many Russian authors as well as composers of classical music, artists and filmmakers in the past and present (*Rossotrudnichestvo* 2020d). Against this backdrop, learning the Russian language either appears as an inherited, patriotic duty, or is motivated by the desire to gain access to one of the world's most acclaimed high cultures. There is comparatively little space on either website devoted to pragmatic motives for acquiring Russian. *Russkii Mir* refers to its historic function as a lingua franca in Eurasia (*Russkii Mir* 2020a). *Rossotrudnichestvo*, by contrast, notes its status as one of the United Nation's working languages and lists post-Soviet states in which it still functions as an official language or a language of instruction in the educational system. The state agency also concedes that 'many people learn [the] Russian language with a practical goal to study and work in Russia' and that Russian-speaking people 'can communicate with Russian business partners or work in a Russian company abroad' (*Rossotrudnichestvo* 2020b).

Of course, neither references to the global status of the language promoted nor to its function as the carrier of a commonly recognised high culture are absent from the online presences of the Western institutions. As a rule, however, they are mitigated with references to diversity and dialogue between cultures. With English as the dominant world language, the British Council's self-presentation does not dwell extensively on possible reasons for partners or clients to study English. It is simply said to 'unlock a whole new world of opportunities'. This motive is taken up again when parents across the globe are advised to give their child 'the gift of the world's most widely spoken language' by booking courses for children at a British Council branch (*British Council* 2020d). The British Council, too, underlines the role of language acquisition in cultural diplomacy, claiming to contribute to the creation of 'friendly knowledge and understanding between the people of the UK and other countries' (*British Council* 2020e).

The German and French institutions, by contrast, have developed different strategies for 'selling' their language to their respective audi-

ences. 'We promote knowledge of the German language abroad', states the Goethe-Institut's website, 'and foster international cultural cooperation. We convey a comprehensive image of Germany by providing information about cultural, social and political life in our nation' (Goethe-Institut 2020e). Among 'ten reasons to learn German', the Goethe-Institut's website lists at least six that are more or less career-oriented. They include learning the language of your German business partner, the possibility of a global career with German under one's belt, employment in tourist industries catering for German travellers, and career opportunities in science, research or communication in Germany (Goethe-Institut 2020f).

Not entirely voluntarily, French language promotion has possibly undergone the most significant changes in recent years, in terms of both structure and philosophy. The Institut Français, in its new role as the body responsible for the coordination of French external cultural politics, promotes 'French and plurilingualism', accepting the predominance of English and attempting to carve out a niche for the French language. In its 2019 annual report, the Institut Français presented this new rationale under the header 'et en plus, je parle français':

The Institut Français aims to promote, in an offensive and innovative manner, a renewed image of the French language [. . .] To achieve this objective and break with the traditional image of the French language, glamorous and romantic, the new campaign [. . .] conveys the idea of French as the language of employment, innovation, digital technology, the business world and *Francophonie*. This campaign also highlights the multilingualism and the complementarity of the French language compared with English. (Institut Français 2019: 36)

In other words, the future of global French is seen as being one of several languages learned and used in parallel, in particular in francophone Africa. Quickly growing populations in that continent will soon represent the largest share of French speakers worldwide. As in the case of the fusion of the Alliances with the Institute, this is clearly a political vision, imposed top down by the centralised French administration. It remains to be seen whether the decentralised system of Alliances will smoothly accept the top-down redefinition of their tasks. After all, a perceived need *sur place* and local initiatives have been at the roots of many of the hundreds of Alliances worldwide.

TEACHING AND LEARNING SUPPORT

What can teachers and learners of Russian actually expect from the new Russian institutions? And how does this relate to the established practices of their British, German and French peers? Conventionally, the language promotion institutes organised and continue to organise language courses in their representations across the globe. So do *Russkii Mir* and *Rossotrudnichesvo* with their Centres and Cabinets. As discussed above, their networks are, however, much less extensive and are geographically concentrated in Europe, the former Soviet space and some former communist allies in Asia. According to their web presentations, both agencies target non-native speakers across the globe, as well as heritage speakers and their children in the near abroad. There are only occasional hints in the news section of *Russkii Mir*'s website, however, that the focus on these heritage speakers and learners has informed new didactic approaches (*Russkii Mir* 2010, 2019b). In general, Russian is taught with established methods developed either for a 'foreign language audience' or for native speakers in Russia (*Oostr* 2019: 26-7).

Beyond that, there is little generic information about specific offerings for adults, adolescents or children. Language learners are referred to the individual offerings at the nearest branches in their countries. The Foundation's Centres and Cabinets at foreign partner institutions, as well as the state agency's Russian Centres for Science and Culture, offer Russian-language library and database resources, although not for remote access. Language courses on the spot are open to individuals and groups, and tailored to different age groups, to schoolchildren, students or to professionals. Language learners will find specific courses preparing them for language exams, too (*Russkii Mir* 2020h). Information about prices for the language courses or examinations are absent from the central websites.

By comparison with their Western European peers, both institutions have very little to say about teacher training, although this is also listed as one of the fields of activity. In its 'education' section, however, *Russkii Mir* advertises the 'Russian Mir professor program' offering placements for Russian-language instructors in educational institutions abroad. Possibly the grants can also be used for the training of foreign teachers in Russia (*Russkii Mir* 2020i). *Rossotrudnichestvo* features no dedicated section for teacher training on its own websites. Courses for Russian teachers in the 'near' and 'far abroad' are regularly mentioned in the news section, however. Such courses are organised by Russian pedagogical universities and held in the Russian Centres for Science and Culture.

As a rule, they last a few days and the number of participants is fairly small (Rossotrudnichestvo 2019a, 2019b).

According to the 2015 presidential decree regarding Russian schools abroad, accessible on its website, Rossotrudnichestvo develops and implements a policy of supporting Russian language schools abroad together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (Rossotrudnichestvo 2020e). The document suggests both direct support and the provision of online study materials for schools registering with Rossotrudnichestvo. It neither sets geographical or quantitative aims, nor contains any reference to the financial sums involved (Kremlin 2015). Due to the lack of annual reports, there is very little evidence about the implementation process; again, only occasional reports in the news section of Rossotrudnichestvo's website provide scattered evidence for the type of schools involved and the concrete support schools have received. Such information is also lacking on the Internet portal 'Sistema podderzhki russkikh shkol' ('Support System for Russian Schools').³ Instead, this website offers links to the databases of commercial enterprises selling Russian teaching material and textbooks, such as LitRes.⁴

Given the fact that both Russian institutions are building or rebuilding a network, the lack of online resources for people living beyond the scope of the Centres, which are usually located in capital cities or urban agglomerations, is perhaps most surprising. Russkii Mir offers a few links, for example to Russian-language child-friendly websites and to a list of 100 literary works canonical for Russian schoolchildren (Russkii Mir 2020j). The link to an 'online beginner's class for the study of Russian as a foreign language, including two basic courses with supplemental language learning materials', did not work when access was attempted repeatedly in the spring of 2020. If the Foundation's writing and translation grants have helped to produce new textbooks, there is neither explicit reference to them, nor links to publishers where they could be purchased. The publication of bilingual books for the children of expats is occasionally announced in the news section, however (Russkii Mir 2020k). Rossotrudnichestvo, in a 2014 report on its activities during the federal target programme for the Russian language since 2008, claimed to have sponsored the development of 53 textbooks on literature and culture, 44 manuals on grammar and 17 textbooks designed specifically for the children of compatriots (Oostr 2019: 33). Although the agency is responsible for the current successor programme, there is no detailed information about the deliverables on its website.

This is in stark contrast to the broad array of services offered by the websites of the British Council, the Goethe-Institut, and the Alliances

Françaises and Institut Français. Every single one of them offers much more detail on different target groups, using the European language self-assessment grid (CEFR) system to indicate the level of language knowledge required or attained in a certain course. Obviously, a lot of teaching and learning is still organised physically in the branches of these institutions across the globe, and the website offers search engines for finding the best offerings in the local area. With the exception of the Goethe-Institut, no detailed information on tuition fees for courses and exams is provided, obviously due to extreme differences between regions. The websites leave the visitor in no doubt, however, that most of these services are commercial. All these institutions also offer paid online courses, again tailored to different audiences and age groups (British Council 2020f; Goethe-Institut 2020g; Fondation des Alliances Françaises 2018a; Institut Français 2019).

The websites recommend selected, commercially produced textbooks, with links to the publishers or traders where these can be acquired. Beyond that, all institutions provide online teaching aids and materials for free. Often these are collections of published or literary materials with thematic focuses, accompanied by didactic suggestions. Beyond introductions to the politics, culture and society of Britain, Germany or France, such collections often focus on the practice of intercultural contacts and learning (British Council 2020g; Goethe-Institut 2020h).

Like their Russian counterparts, the British Council and the French Instituts are also supposed to support the teaching of English and French respectively in their host countries. The Goethe-Institut, by contrast, is not directly involved in improving language teaching in the schools of the host countries. This task is assigned to another federal state body, the Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen.

The British Council does not just look after the quality of teaching of English abroad, but also in the UK itself. With a view to increasing future student exchange or intake, it is supporting some countries in improving the level of English teaching on a bilateral basis, promoting, for example, the study of English in China and the study of Mandarin in Britain.⁵ In response to the global use of English, the British Council has also teamed up with commercial companies such as Microsoft to improve the quality and use of IT in education, for example in Africa (Cai 2019: 48). As for France, the Institut Français offers grants for innovative projects in the teaching of the French language abroad, of which 37 were funded with some 280,000 euro in 2019. Beyond that, in 2018 the French Foreign Ministry commissioned the Institut with the implementation of the project 'IFclasse – le français de l'enseignement', aimed at improving the French skills of teachers working primarily in French-speaking

Africa. Finally, the Institut is realising the ambitious project of creating a global professional network for French teachers, 'IFprofs'. Launched in 2018 with the aim of pooling pedagogical and methodological resources at a global level, it encourages teachers to exchange best practice among themselves and provides the Institut with a large pool of potential clients for its own teacher training. Already by 2019, IFprofs counted no fewer than 31,000 members from 76 countries (Institut Français 2019: 37–8).

ON- AND OFFLINE LIBRARY SERVICES

Media repositories and libraries are established instruments in culture promotion abroad, and *Russkii Mir's* Centres and Cabinets could be said to be built around physical libraries, providing 'access to a broad range of learning materials and popular science information from Russia'. They offer, first, fictional and non-fictional literature, textbooks, reference books and dictionaries and a selection of books for children. Second, they stock classic Soviet and contemporary Russian films, audiobooks, plays and multimedia (language) learning programmes. Finally, they offer online access to Russian databases. The use of all these materials requires physical attendance (*Russkii Mir* 2020g, 2020h).

Such libraries are less important for the usually better equipped Centres of Science and Culture, which comprise exhibition spaces, conference halls, theatres and cinemas, and so on. There is no generic description of the Centres on *Rossotrudnichestvo's* website. To find out about the cultural and linguistic offerings, the websites of the local branches must be referred to, whose addresses are listed on the central website (*Rossotrudnichestvo* 2020f). A cursory browse through a couple of these websites suggests that, likewise, many of the activities taking place at *Rossotrudnichestvo's* branches require physical attendance. Neither *Rossotrudnichestvo* nor *Russkii Mir* seem to engage directly in the creation of online libraries and media centres.

To be sure, the system of Western cultural promotion also anticipates physical attendance for its language courses, as described above, and offers physical library space with comparable materials and aims. The Goethe-Institut alone runs 96 libraries with some 800,000 titles (*Goethe-Institut* 2020i). In times of tighter budgets, such physical libraries have become financial liabilities, however, and that may be one of the reasons that the well-entrenched institutions are far ahead of their newly founded Russian peers in terms of online services. The British Council's online library offers a large collection of fictional and non-fictional e-books and periodicals; however, full access requires membership (British Council

2020h). The Goethe-Institut, for its part, offers a broad range of German-language e-books, periodicals and visual media, in total 19,000 items, for free in its media centre, 'Onleihe' (Goethe-Institut 2020j). The French 'Culturethèque' is perhaps the most ambitious of the online media centre projects. It offers access to 190,000 electronic documents. According to its website, Culturethèque has more than 250,000 users in 110 different countries. Access is free of charge for people registered with the Institut Français or Alliances Françaises (Culturethèque 2020). By comparison, the Russian institutions merely provide links to online libraries outside their jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

A new chapter in Russia's cultural diplomacy, or old wine in new bottles? In terms of the institutional set-up, the Russkii Mir Foundation is clearly emulating established international models of public corporations taking over foreign cultural policy tasks, as seen in the British Council and the German Goethe-Institut. At the same time, in terms of tasks assigned and financial endowment, Russkii Mir is clearly dwarfed by the state agency Rossotrudnichestvo. For the state agency, however, while the promotion of language and culture is important, it is not its only task. Perhaps this imbalance between public corporation and state agency is indeed a sign of a deep-seated distrust of public participation in Russian politics. In international comparison it is not unique, though. Centralised France also has a long history of exploiting state agencies and public associations in parallel when it comes to promoting language and culture. At the same time, the French example illustrates the problems of coordination and international visibility that this approach entails. With the latter ranking high among the aims of Russia's foreign cultural policy, the future of the arrangement remains to be seen.

As far as the practice of promoting culture and language is concerned, the comparison highlighted four substantial differences between the work of the Western agencies and their Russian counterparts. First, a lack of transparency as far as funding and the reporting of activities are concerned. Russkii Mir as a public charity publishes annual reports, and both the Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo run a broad and multi-lingual web presence. Nonetheless, judging the scope, seriousness and efficiency of their work in international comparison is difficult due to the selectivity and narrowness of the information.

Second, and closely related, the Russian institutions conceive of the promotion of language and culture as a largely unidirectional undertak-

ing. Their presentation of Russian language and culture in an international environment is mainly geared at convincing others of the status and value of Russian language and culture. By comparison with their Western peers, both institutions provide fairly little room for dialogue or exchange, not to mention integration into a multicultural environment. The question of ownership and of the acceptance of different rules and standards strongly sets the Russian practice apart from those of the other countries discussed in this chapter. It is precisely a multifaceted and pluralistic understanding of culture which is lacking in Russia's language and culture promotion. Russian culture is understood in an essentialist way, and there seems to be a widely shared consensus among Russia's political and cultural elites that a unified and 'indivisible' Russian culture and language should lie at the basis of the Federation's cultural diplomacy, which is thus subordinated to domestic priorities stemming from the unfinished process of nation building (Ryazanova-Clarke 2017: 446, 450).

Third, the actual methods of language promotion follow established routines, both in terms of how language and learning are conceived, and in terms of a very slow inclusion of online or hybrid learning formats. While this requires further, case study-based research on the work of Russian Centres on the spot, in general both the content and availability of online resources lag substantially behind those of the Western agencies. This may be partly due to the lack of funding. At the same time, *Russkii Mir's* annual reports, the case studies in the other chapters of this volume, and policy documents and speeches by Russian leaders suggest a continuing reliance on an 'old-school' understanding of the task and on the quantitative rather than qualitative measurement of the Russian institutions' efficiency (Medvedev 2012).

Fourth, and perhaps most important, none of the Western agencies targets expats and diaspora groups. Both Russia's and China's institutions do, and that is an important explanation for their rather conservative approach to multiculturalism and plurilingualism. The promotion of language and culture is, in the Chinese and Russian cases, aimed at reintegrating large collectives beyond the borders of the states. Both projects rely on language and culture conceived as unitary and state-controlled.

That said, taking a historical look at the emergence and development of language and culture promotion of the European powers helps to put Nye's ideas about soft power into perspective. Nye developed his concept by discussing the correlations between different types of power in what would be called the 'American century', that is, from a position of political, economic and military strength. European powers, by contrast, reverted to cultural diplomacy when they perceived a loss of strength

and prestige in times of real or perceived crisis. The French reacted to their defeat in the war against Prussia in 1870–1. The Germans built up an aggressive ‘defence’ of German cultural and linguistic influence in Eastern Europe after their territorial losses in the wake of the First World War. The British, finally, embarked on cultural diplomacy in the 1930s to counter German and Soviet influences in Europe and the Near East. The geopolitical and security arguments that they used at the time are not too far a cry from current Russian discourses on applying soft power with the aim of stabilising Russia’s cultural and linguistic dominance in the former Soviet space.

NOTES

1. All translations from Russian, French and German language sources in this chapter by the author, Christian Noack.
2. <<https://study-uk.britishcouncil.org/>> (last accessed 29 June 2020).
3. <https://russchools.org> (last accessed 29 June 2020).
4. <<https://rs.litres.ru/>> (last accessed 29 June 2020).
5. See <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/education/schools/support-for-languages>> (last accessed 29 June 2020).

REFERENCES

- Ahearne, Jeremy (2018), ‘International recognition regimes and the projection of France’, *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 24 (6), pp. 696–709.
- Aref’ev, Aleksandr Leonardovich and Frants Edmundovich Sheregi (2014), *Inostrannyye studenty v Rossiiskikh vuzakh*, Moscow: Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Centre for Sociological Research, <<http://www.socioprognoz.ru/files/File/2014/full.pdf>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Bell, Emma (2016), ‘Soft power and corporate imperialism: Maintaining British influence’, *Race & Class* 57 (4), pp. 75–86.
- British Council (2019), ‘Annual report and accounts 2018–19’, <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/how-we-work/corporate-reports/annual-report-2018-19>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- British Council (2020a), ‘Board of Trustees’, <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/how-we-are-run/board-trustees>> (last accessed 15 December 2019).
- British Council (2020b), ‘How we work’, <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/how-we-work>> (last accessed 15 December 2019).
- British Council (2020c), ‘Contact your local British Council office’, <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/contact/local-office>> (last accessed 29 May 2020).
- British Council (2020d), ‘Learn English’, <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/english>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).
- British Council (2020e), ‘About us’, <<https://britishcouncil.org/about-us>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).

- British Council (2020f), 'Learn English online', <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/english/learn-online>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).
- British Council (2020g), 'Find classroom resources', <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/school-resources/find>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- British Council (2020h), 'Search through our digital library collection', <<https://library.britishcouncil.org/>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- British Council (2020i), 'Study UK', <<https://www.britishcouncil.org/education/ihe/what-we-do/study-uk-campaign>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Cai, Liexu (2019), 'A comparative study of the Confucius Institute in the United Kingdom and the British Council in China', *Citizenship, Social and Economics Education* 18 (1), pp. 44–63.
- Culturethèque (2020), 'Institut Français: Culturethèque', <<https://www.culturetheque.com/EXPLOITATION/NLD/culturetheque.aspx>> (last accessed 29 May 2020).
- Eschapaspe, Baudouin (2019), 'Révolution culturelle à l'Alliance Française', *Le Point International*, 6 February, <https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/revolution-culturelle-a-l-alliance-francaise-06-02-2019-2291862_24.php#> (last accessed 19 May 2020).
- Fondation des Alliances Françaises (2018a), 'Rapport d'activité 2018', <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjnoPnR9OrpAhUR26QKHbW8C0MQFjABegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.fondation-alliancefr.org%2F%3Fcat%3D1066&usg=AOvVaw3a2TQyIW8JPgJVvNN7X_Vs> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Fondation des Alliances Françaises (2018b), 'Les Alliances dans le monde. Affiche', <<https://www.fondation-alliancefr.org/wp-content/medias/DATA2018/HautPage-Affiche-2018.pdf>> (last accessed 29 May 2020).
- Goethe-Institut (2018), 'Jahrbuch 2017/18', <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwib3on-8rpAhWLLewKHR55D-JwQFjAAegQIBhAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.goethe.de%2Fresources%2Ffiles%2Fpdf180%2Fgi_jahrbuch_17_18_web_doppelseiten1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1a_fC9zJY65jxdNkGQoPRF> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Goethe-Institut (2020a), 'Vereinsatzung', <<http://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf166/vereinsatzung-de.pdf>> (last accessed 15 December 2019).
- Goethe-Institut (2020b), 'Basic agreement', <http://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf165/rahmenvertrag_engl_30okt18.pdf> (last accessed 15 December 2019).
- Goethe-Institut (2020c), 'Responsibilities', <<https://www.goethe.de/en/uun/auf.html>> (last accessed 15 December 2019).
- Goethe-Institut (2020d), 'Standorte', <<https://www.goethe.de/de/wwt.html>> (last accessed 29 May 2020).
- Goethe-Institut (2020e), 'Organisation', <<https://www.goethe.de/en/uun/org.html>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Goethe-Institut (2020f), 'Warum Deutsch lernen?', <<https://www.goethe.de/en/spr/wdl.html>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).
- Goethe-Institut (2020g), 'Deutsch online', <<https://www.goethe.de/de/spr/kup/kur/doln.html>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).
- Goethe-Institut (2020h), 'Konzepte und Materialien', <<https://www.goethe.de/de/spr/unt/kum.html>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Goethe Institut (2020i), 'Zukunft Bibliotheken', <<https://www.goethe.de/de/kul/bib.html>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Goethe Institut (2020j), 'Über 100 deutsche Filme online ansehen', <<https://www.goethe.de/de/kul/bib/ser/fio.html>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).

- Goff, Patricia M. (2013), 'Cultural diplomacy', in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Oxford Handbooks Online, <<https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199588862-e-24>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Gould-Davies, Nigel (2003), 'The logic of Soviet cultural diplomacy', *Diplomatic History* 27 (2), pp. 193–214.
- Government of the Russian Federation (2015), 'The Russian Language Federal Targeted Programme for 2016–2020', 20 May, <<http://government.ru/en/docs/18169/>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Guerrin, Michel (2018), 'Francophonie ou cacophonie?', *Le Monde*, 26 January, <<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1991106466?accountid=1725>> (last accessed 19 May 2020).
- Institut Français (2019), 'Rapport d'activités 2019', <https://www.if.institutfrancais.com/sites/default/files/medias/documents/if_ra_2019.pdf> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Institut Français (2020a), 'La culture française dans le monde', <<https://www.if.institutfrancais.com/fr/dans-le-monde/liste/lieux>> (last accessed 29 May 2020).
- Kremlin (2015), 'Kontseptsia "Russkaia shkola za rubezhem"', <<http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/50643>> (last accessed 31 March 2020).
- Martens, Kerstin and Sanen Marshall (2003), 'International organisations and foreign cultural policy: A comparative analysis of the British Council, the Alliance Française and the Goethe-Institute', *Transnational Associations* 4, pp. 261–72.
- Medvedev, Dmitry (2012), 'President Dmitry Medvedev speaking at a meeting of the heads of foreign offices of the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Cultural Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)', Government of the Russian Federation, 3 September, <<http://archive.government.ru/eng/stens/20531/>> (last accessed 29 January 2018).
- Michels, Eckard (2005), *Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswärtige Kulturpolitik 1923–1960*, Munich: Oldenbourg.
- Mkhoyan, Anna (2017), 'Soft power, Russia and the former Soviet states: A case study of Russian language and education in Armenia', *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 23 (6), pp. 690–704.
- Nikonov, Vyacheslav (2007), 'Delivering the Russian language to the world', *Moscow News* 2007 (32), 16 August, <<https://web.archive.org/web/20091109085145/http://www.mnweekly.ru/national/20070816/55268005.html>> (last accessed 30 January 2018).
- Nye, Joseph (2013), 'What Russia and China don't get about soft power', <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/>> (last accessed 20 February 2019).
- Oostra, Sjoerd (2019), *A Russian World? On the Inner Workings of Russian Cultural-Linguistic Institutes and Their Effectiveness as Vehicles of Soft Power*, MA thesis, University of Amsterdam Graduate School of the Humanities.
- Osipova, Yelena (2016), 'Indigenizing soft power in Russia', in Naren Chitty, Li Ji, Gary D. Rawsley and Craig Hayden (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, London: Routledge, pp. 346–57.
- Paschalidis, Gregory (2009), 'Exporting national culture: Histories of cultural institutes abroad', *International Journal of Cultural Politics* 15 (3), pp. 275–89.

- Pashaeva, Giulshan (2016), 'Mirovye iazyki kak sostavnaia chast' publicnoi diplomatii', SAM Kommentarii 16, Baku: Centr Strategicheskikh Issledovaniï pri Prezidente Azerbajdzhanskoi Respubliki.
- Robert, Martine (2019), 'Les grands chantiers de l'Institut Français', <<https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/services-conseils/les-grands-chantiers-de-linstitut-francais-960822>> (last accessed 19 May 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2019a), 'Povyshenie kvalifikatsii v Moskve i Sankt-Peterburge dlia rusistov iz Armenii', <<http://www.rs.gov.ru/ru/news/51269>> (last accessed 31 March 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2019b), 'Kursy povysheniia kvalifikatsii dlia uchitelei-rusistov starovali v Rossiiskom kul'turno-informatsionnom tsentre v Sofii', <<https://gov.ru/ru/news/58672>> (last accessed 31 March 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2020a), 'About Rossotrudnichestvo', <<http://rs-gov.ru/en/about>> (last accessed 2 April 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2020b), 'Strengthening the position of the Russian language', <<http://rs.gov.ru/en/activities/9>> (last accessed 2 April 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2020c), 'Contacts', <<http://rs.gov.ru/en/contacts>> (last accessed 22 May 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2020d), 'Popularization of Russian culture in the world', <<http://rs.gov.ru/en/activities/2>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2020e), 'Education and science', <<http://rs.gov.ru/en/activities/10>> (last accessed 29 May 2020).
- Rossotrudnichestvo (2020f), 'Predstavitel'stva v mire', <<http://rs.gov.ru/ru/contacts/inworld>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Russia.study (2020), 'Russian language certification', <<https://russia.study/en/public-material/ru-lang-certification>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2010), 'First Russian textbook for Russian-language children in Estonia', <<https://russkiimir.ru/en/news/136013/>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2019a), 'Otchet o deiatel'nosti fonda "Russkii Mir" v 2018 god', <https://russkiimir.ru/events/docs/Report_2018.pdf> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2019b), 'Russian textbook for bilingual kids to be presented in UK', <<https://russkiimir.ru/en/news/251400/>> (last accessed 20 February 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020a), 'About Russkii Mir Foundation', <<https://russkiimir.ru/en/fund/>> (last accessed 2 April 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020b), 'Katalog Ves' Russkii Mir 2020', <https://russkiimir.ru/catalogue/catalog.php?country=-1&category=50&set_filter=%CF%EE%EA%E0%E7%E0%F2%FC> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020c), 'Management Board', <<https://russkiimir.ru/en/fund/management-board.php>> (last accessed 1 February 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020d), 'Board of Trustees', <<https://russkiimir.ru/en/fund/board-of-trustees/>> (last accessed 1 February 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020e), 'Partnery', <<https://russkiimir.ru/fund/partners/>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020f), 'Katalog russkikh tsentrov', <<https://russkiimir.ru/rucenter/catalogue.php>> (last accessed 22 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020g), 'Chto takoe kabinet?', <<https://russkiimir.ru/rucenter/cabinet.php>> (last accessed 22 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020h), 'Russian Center – definition and mission', <<https://russkiimir.ru/en/rucenter/what-is.php>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).

- Russkii Mir (2020i), 'Education', <<https://ruskiymir.ru/en/education/>> (last accessed 20 May 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020j), 'Biblioteka knig i multimediiinyi izdaniï', <<https://ruskiymir.ru/education2/library/>> (last accessed 31 March 2020).
- Russkii Mir (2020k), 'Uchebniki dlia detei-bilingvov, a takzhe ikh roditelei', <https://ruskiymir.ru/publications/273229/?sphrase_id=1018719> (last accessed 20 April 2020).
- Ryazanova-Clarke, Lara (2017), 'From commodification to weaponization: The Russian language as "pride" and "profit" in Russia's transnational discourses', *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 20 (4), pp. 443–56.
- Steinkamp, Volker (2009), *Die auswärtige Kulturpolitik als Instrument der französischen Außenpolitik*, Berlin: DGAPAnalyse Frankreich 5.
- Wilson, Jeanne L. (2015), 'Soft power: A comparison of discourse and practice in Russia and China', *Europe-Asia Studies* 67 (8), pp. 1171–202.