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Publication date
2022

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Citation for published version (APA):

Chen, L.-Y. (2022). *Experts and the science-policy interface in China's climate policy*.

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This thesis explores the ways in which experts engage in China's climate policies at four different administrative levels (i.e. international, national, provincial, and prefectural) and how politics simultaneously influences the science-policy interface (SPI) in an authoritarian context and a multi-level governance framework.

First, experts play an essential role in shaping China's foreign climate policy by leading science/politics co-constituted ammunition to negotiate with their counterparts in global climate politics. At the national level, the demand of Chinese policymakers is setting the related targets and developing the policy framework for both climate change mitigation and adaptation. While the experts provided sufficient scientific advice, policymakers tend to add some political considerations due to different timing and factors at the higher (international) and lower (subnational) governance levels before making the final decision. Given that local Chinese officials, in general, lack capacity and expertise for addressing climate change, experts engage not only in formulating low-carbon development-related plans but also in carrying out such policy programmes. Political performance and accomplishment, feasibility and achievability of policy goals, and regional competition are considerations regarding the uptake of experts' advice at the lower government levels.

While the past SPI literature focuses primarily on the scientification of policymaking, the political considerations and conditions for explaining SPI identified in the thesis can be a hypothesis to test in other countries to improve our understanding of the science-policy-politics nexus.

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Liang-Yu Chen



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Cover design: Yun-An Olivia Dung

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ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex

ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel
op dinsdag 28 juni 2022, te 15.00 uur

door Liang Yu Chen
geboren te Taipei City

Promotiecommissie

<i>Promotor:</i>	prof. dr. J. Gupta	Universiteit van Amsterdam
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Executive Summary

The Problem: Although a considerable amount of climate change related scientific knowledge and information has been provided to policymakers, there is a persistent gap between knowledge production and use in human response to climate change. Even after three decades of efforts to tackle climate change since 1990, the incremental progress of the international climate negotiations and the slow-moving policy implementation at the domestic level is unlikely to meet the long-term objective of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Understanding when, why, and how policymakers use scientific evidence and expert knowledge to tackle climate change is critical. Further, as international climate negotiations are moving from a top-down to a more bottom-up process where countries state what they are willing to do, bridging the gap between science and climate policy at multiple levels of governance in varied political environments becomes more challenging.

While there is growing knowledge on how science and policy interact in general and in the climate change field in particular, there are at least four knowledge gaps in the existing literature: (1) A lack of exploration of the science-policy interface (SPI) in the Global South context; (2) A lack of exploration of SPI from a multi-level or cross-level perspective; (3) A lack of theoretical discussion and concept definition of SPI; and (4) A lack of exploration of SPI and China's climate policy together.

Research questions: To address these knowledge gaps, this thesis studies China and addresses the overarching question: Under what conditions and in which ways do experts influence China's climate policy across multiple levels of governance, and what does this mean for the future of China's climate policy? Related sub-questions are: (1) Who are the experts that are engaging with the policy process?; Who are the policymakers? (2) What kinds of science do experts generate and what kinds of science do policymakers need in order to make decisions, and why? (3) What kinds of political considerations do policymakers take into account before making the decisions?

Analytical Framework: This thesis reviews the scholarly literature on science-policy interface and problem solving in order to formulate an analytical framework to look upon SPI in China's climate policy across multiple levels of governance. It examines three elements of SPI: (1) the input of science, (2) the intersection process of science and politics, and (3) the output of SPI. First, it investigates four types of knowledge policymakers demand and experts provide as input for China's climate policy: (1) Fundamental knowledge that contains scholarly/technical information and scientific understanding of

an issue; (2) Applied knowledge for designing projects, policies, and laws for achieving social goals; (3) Stakeholder knowledge based on common sense and local practice; and (4) Discursive knowledge that presents a frame, narrative or discourse, indicating a certain way of dealing with the given issue. Second, it applies three models to explain the intersection process of science and politics in China's climate policy: (1) The science-push model focuses on the ways in which the experts influence policymaking; (2) The policy-pull model highlights how policymakers' demand for policy-relevant knowledge pulls experts to provide assistance; and (3) The co-production model stresses that rather than 'science speaking truth to power,' science and politics are 'making sense together' to co-generate a policy. While the three models of SPI may co-exist in a policy issue, they provide insightful lenses to examine the relationship between experts, policymakers, and policy. Lastly, regarding the output of SPI, I develop a five-level cumulative scale of policymakers' response to the experts' scientific input to evaluate science's impact on policy: (1) Policymakers are informed and have taken note of the input; (2) Policymakers put the suggested ideas on the policy agenda for debate; (3) Policymakers agree with the recognition of policy problems but are contesting regarding the solutions; (4) Policymakers accept the experts' advice and make decisions based on political considerations; and (5) Policymakers accept all advice and directly put it into policy practice. This thesis assumes to some extent that there is consensus among the scientists regarding what should happen at the respective governance levels. Concerning the theoretical lens for analysing SPI, the thesis builds on a typology of policy problems with four types of structures mapped out in two dimensions: (1) Structured, (2) Unstructured, and two kinds of moderately structured problems: (3) Moderately structured problem (means) and (4) Moderately structured problem (ends). A problem is termed structured when there is a high consensus on norms and values among policy stakeholders and can be solved by standardised techniques and procedures since there is a certainty on what kind of knowledge is relevant and the values that should underlie policy instruments. Meanwhile, a problem is labelled as unstructured when there is a disagreement on values and relevant knowledge among policy stakeholders. Further, a moderately structured problem (ends) occurs when there is consensus on relevant values but uncertainty or dissent on what kind of knowledge is relevant. Lastly, a moderately structured problem (means) indicates that there is a certainty of relevant knowledge, yet the norms and values remain contested.

Methods: This research assumes a constructivist ontology and a hermeneutic epistemology while employing an interpretive policy analysis (IPA) approach to examine SPI and China's climate policy. It adopts the single-country case study approach and the embedded multiple case study design. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is chosen as the case study since China is the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter and is an

authoritarian regime; this allows me to investigate SPI in a non-democratic situation. Based on the analysis of nine selected policy issues, I examine the ways in which Chinese experts engage in climate policies at four different administrative levels (i.e., international, national, provincial, and prefectural levels) and the output of SPI. Research methods include an extensive review of varied sources of publications and academic literature, content analysis of policy documents, fieldwork, and 67 semi-structured in-depth interviews with experts and other categories of policy actors in Beijing and Guangzhou City (Guangdong Province). The research focused on 9 policy issues (see *Table*).

Table. Nine policy issues analysed in this research

Selected cases	Level of governance	Problem type	Stages of a policy cycle
1. The principle of counting cumulative emissions per capita	International	Unstructured	Agenda-setting; policy formulation
2. The carbon budget proposal		Unstructured	Agenda-setting; policy formulation
3. The negotiation on technology development and transfer		Moderately structured (ends)	Agenda-setting; policy formulation
4. National target-setting on CO ₂ emissions reductions	National	Moderately structured (ends)	Agenda-setting; policy formulation
5. The Climate Law		Unstructured	Agenda-setting; policy formulation
6. Policy choice between carbon tax and carbon trading		Moderately structured (ends)	Agenda-setting; policy formulation
7. Low-carbon province and city pilot programme	Provincial / prefectural	Moderately structured (means)	Agenda-setting; policy formulation; implementation
8. The GHG emissions inventory		Moderately structured (ends)	Implementation
9. The pilot emissions trading scheme (ETS)		Moderately structured (ends)	Agenda-setting; policy formulation; implementation

Chapter 4 examines how Chinese politics and policymaking have been changing and what this implies for the distinctive features of China's climate politics and policymaking today. China's climate policy has evolved since 1990 in five phases: Phase 1 (before 1997) identified the international scientific and environmental aspects; Phase 2 (1998~2006) focused on how this issue became a domestic challenge focusing on economics and energy; Phase 3 (2007~2009) signified a big proactive change towards climate policy; Phase 4 (2010~2019) moved from central planning to local operationalisation; and Phase 5 (2020~) focuses on operating the domestic ETS to ensure that CO₂ emissions in China peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2060. The features of current Chinese politics and policymaking are: (1) Fragmented authoritarianism and bureaucratic competition at the horizontal level; (2) Centre-local relations, implementation gaps, and vertical bargaining between different levels of government; (3) The use of policy experimentation/pilot projects before scaling up; and (4) The emphasis on scientific decision-making. When moving from Phase 1 to Phase 2, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) incrementally became the two dominant players that held the decision-making power during the progress of international climate negotiations. The two Ministries' dominant position was a result of bureaucratic competition where the economic development and energy ministry took control from the environmental and meteorological sector in steering China's climate policy. During Phase 3 and Phase 4, tackling climate change has been translated domestically by the Chinese government as 'energy-conservation and emissions-reduction' and 'low-carbon development' as the dominant discourse. Apart from bureaucratic competition, experts play a critical role in shaping China's climate policy as a repackaging of energy policy. From Phase 4 to Phase 5, China has launched a series of low-carbon related pilot programmes at the local levels and the nationwide emissions trading system, showing its ambition to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.

Chapter 5 examines how Chinese experts engage in China's *foreign* climate policy, particularly how they participate in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Groups (WGs) as well as the international climate negotiations. The science-push and the co-production models can be applied to depict the feature of Chinese experts' involvement at this level. Concerning the Chinese experts' impact on IPCC, the experts in WGI (the physical science basis) are more influential than those in WGII (impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability) and WGIII (mitigation of climate change) in terms of the number of selected participants and the publications cited as references in the Assessment Reports (ARs). In order to gain influence in global climate politics, Chinese policymakers need not only fundamental but also discursive knowledge. Hence, the Chinese experts who

come from top universities and semi-official think tanks speak on behalf of China, not only as scientists but as political representatives, to other countries. Yet, the space for negotiation is based on what has been decided at China's domestic level, indicating that Chinese experts are putting forward views that have been internally negotiated in order to guide policy in international climate talks. The three case studies show that experts play a key role in shaping China's foreign climate policy by loading science/politics co-constituted ammunition to negotiate with their counterparts in global climate politics.

Chapter 6 analyses the experts' engagements with China's climate policy at the *national* level and the results show that the science-push and policy-pull model can best describe the science-policy intersection. The demand of Chinese policymakers at this level is setting the related targets and developing the policy framework of both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Concerning the input for policymaking, not only semi-official research institutes but also universities, NGOs, and other categories of expert institutes are involved in the policy process. Yet, while each research institute can undertake research, Chinese policymakers often listen to voices from some specific institutes. Among all, the Energy Research Institute (ERI), the National Centre for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), and Tsinghua University are the most influential knowledge suppliers for the central government. In terms of the output of SPI, my study shows that while the experts provided sufficient scientific advice, some political considerations influence the policymakers' final decision. First, timing matters. Different timing leads to different considerations (e.g., to set an ambitious goal and ensure the goal is achievable). Second, scale matters. While making a policy decision, not only the factors at the present governance level, but factors at the higher (international) and lower (subnational) governance levels will be considered by Chinese policymakers. Third, the features of China's political system (i.e., fragmented authority and bureaucratic competition) remains an obstacle that hinders policy uptake of experts' scientific input.

Taking Guangdong Province and three *prefecture-level* cities (Guiyang, Guangyuan, and Qingdao) in Western and Eastern regions of China as examples, **Chapter 7** and **Chapter 8** address the experts' engagement in China's provincial and local climate governance respectively. All the three models—the science-push, policy-pull, and co-production model can be found in policy practice. Instead of fundamental knowledge, local Chinese policymakers need primarily applied knowledge and stakeholder knowledge that help to carry out the climate-related policy projects and facilitate the compliance of local industries and enterprises. Considering that the officials at the lower government levels, in general, lack capacity and expertise for addressing climate change, experts have a higher degree of impact on both policymaking and implementation. In terms of who 'the' experts

are, the research centres for addressing climate change established by provincial and local governments, alongside local universities and expert institutes, provide key scientific input for local climate policy. Meanwhile, quite often local officials accept assistance provided by research institutes that come from the higher (i.e., provincial and national) levels. At the initial stage, experts play the role of 'policy entrepreneurs' that introduce the concept of low-carbon development (LCD) and low-carbon economy (LCE) to local officials through capacity building. Then, they act as advisors with expertise that assist local officials by generating plans and guidelines. When stepping to the stage of policy implementation, experts play the role of practitioners with an administrative professional that helps officials carry out the policy projects. In terms of the output of the SPI, the case studies showed that the experts have a substantial impact on China's local climate policy. Yet, the political environment at the local levels (characterised e.g., by parochialism and regional competition) and the priorities and considerations of local officials (e.g., achieving their target responsibilities set by the centre) are decisive to the policymakers' final policy decisions.

While Chapters 5 to 8 deal with experts' involvement in China's climate policy from the international, national, provincial to the prefectural level, respectively, **Chapter 9** explains how the experts and policymakers interact *across multiple levels* of governance. First, it shows that the international-domestic linkages between foreign and Chinese research institutes and the centre-local and provincial-municipal interactions among expert institutes jointly form the scientific input for China's climate policy. While foreign research institutes and international donors consistently provide scientific, technology and funding support, expert institutes in Beijing play an essential role in: (A) Lobbying the officials to experiment with pilot programmes; (B) Developing methodological instructions for capacity-building training; and (C) Reviewing policy documents submitted by the localities. Meanwhile, local experts facilitate bottom-up knowledge travel by sharing local experiences of low-carbon related pilot programmes. Apart from the division of labour (cooperation), there are also tensions between experts at different administrative levels regarding the core concerns of policy and the strategies for completing the work. For instance, while the Beijing experts develop a meticulous framework aiming to compile a comprehensive GHG emissions inventory, local experts adopt the strategy of 'grasping the large and releasing the small' to complete the work in a practical way. Second, all the three SPI models occur in cross-level dynamics of China's climate policy. Specifically, the science-push model is more appropriate to depict the experts' engagement with China's climate policy at the higher levels of governance, and the policy-pull model appears more often at the lower government levels. Third, in terms of the output of the SPI in China's climate policy, it is more likely that experts at the lower governmental levels successfully influence

polymaking and implementation than experts at the higher governmental levels.

Chapter 10 revisits the relationships between science and climate policy in China, and the theoretical reflections we can learn from the Chinese case study. The answers to the sub-questions are: (1a) Concerning who ‘the’ *experts* are, rather than only semi-official think tanks being dominant in the policy process, there are multiple scientific input providers (e.g., experts from universities, NGOs, and international organisations) into China’s climate policy at different levels of governance; (1b) Regarding who ‘the’ *polymakers* are, the powerful ministry has evolved from the scientific and environmental protection administration (the CMA and NEPA) in the early 1990s to the energy and economic development ministry (the NDRC) ever since the 2000s. Recently, the distinctive institutional change of China’s climate policy is that the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was reorganised as the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) and took over the NDRC’s role in leading the planning and coordination for addressing climate change in 2018. The government restructuring indicates the Chinese government’s dual attempts. First, China seeks to resolve the long-standing problem of fragmentation of authority—while the MEP is responsible for regulating carbon monoxide (CO), control of carbon dioxide (CO₂) falls under the NDRC. Second, highlighting the concept of ecological civilisation (EC) as the core doctrine of its global and national development strategy, China attempts to situate climate change with environmental governance and pollution control under the EC discourse; (2) Regarding the types of knowledge polymakers need in order to make decisions: (a) Polymakers at the higher levels of governance (i.e., international and national level) demand and accept more fundamental and discursive knowledge to gain influence in global climate politics and to guide domestic policy directives. For instance, a science-based proposal to negotiate with China’s allies and opponents for fair burden sharing of GHG emissions reductions, and an understandable narrative with vision to convince domestic stakeholders to guide China’s low-carbon development; (b) Polymakers at the lower governmental levels (i.e., provincial and prefectural levels) demand and accept more applied knowledge due to their limited capacity and expertise for policy planning and implementation. This includes, for instance, the toolkits for developing the low-carbon plan for provinces and cities and the administrative guidelines for emissions inventories and running the ETS; (3) Regarding SPI in cross-level dynamics of China’s climate policy, the science-push model is more appropriate to depict the experts’ engagement with China’s climate policy at the higher governmental levels, and the policy-pull model appears more often at the lower levels.

To offer a comprehensive picture of SPI in China’s authoritarian context, this thesis identified several political considerations of Chinese polymakers for the adjustment and

uptake of the experts' scientific advice and policy suggestions: (A) Timing: Chinese policymakers will not announce a decision when the time is not ripe; (B) National interests: Chinese policymakers will defend their perceived national interests in the international climate negotiations; (C) Scale: Policymakers consider not just factors at the present governance level but also factors at the higher and lower levels; (D) Political performance and accomplishment: When setting a target or deploying a policy instrument, policymakers are concerned more with political performance and accomplishment; (E) Feasibility and achievability: When setting a policy goal, it must be feasible and achievable; (F) The target responsibility system (TRS) set for assessing the performance of local officials and Party cadres; and (G) Regional competition: low-carbon development (LCD) and low-carbon economy (LCE) become local policymakers' leverages to promote their territories.

Based on the nine case studies, this research demonstrates that the typology of four policy problems could help illuminate the varied roles of experts and their policy impacts. While the experts' impact on unstructured problems is limited (CEPC, CBP, and the Climate Law), they have a significant effect on moderately structured problems (ends) (TD&T, Target-setting on CO₂ emissions reduction, carbon tax vs carbon trading, EI, and pilot ETS) and moderately structured problems (means) (LCPC). The nine case studies also echo the notion that experts can stimulate problem structuring by mediating SPI to reconstruct the present problem as a structured problem.

Theoretical implications: This thesis contributes to theorising SPI by employing an interpretive policy analysis (IPA) and a multiple/cross-level analysis of SPI in an authoritarian context. First, while the extant SPI literature primarily focuses on the role of science at the stage of policymaking, this thesis expands our understanding of the experts' engagement with virtually all phases of China's climate policy. It reveals that China's climate policy is not just about national policymaking/state regulation vs local implementation/compliance. Rather, local actors are learning and redefining policies based on local knowledge and trial-and-error in each stage of the policy process. Concerning the policy-relevant knowledge, while only high-level political decision-makers demand fundamental (scientific) knowledge, policymakers at all governance levels demand discursive and applied knowledge to make decisions and disseminate to the target groups and stakeholders.

Second, the multiple-/cross-level analysis of SPI shows that both top-down and bottom-up knowledge travel occurs in China's multi-level climate governance. Meanwhile, policymakers make decisions not just under the political settings at the given governance level; they also have to consider factors from the higher and lower governance levels (e.g.,

the policy choice between carbon taxation and carbon trading in Chapter 6). Additionally, I demonstrate that the same experts' engagement with the policy process could be interpreted through different SPI models. For instance, while one can adopt the science-push model to describe Beijing experts' contribution to developing guidelines and toolkits for local actors, it is also a policy-pull model since Chinese central policymakers demand that the experts do so (Chapter 9).

Lastly, while the existing literature has accumulated limited knowledge about SPI in an illiberal and authoritarian context, this research presented the political considerations and conditions for explaining the policymakers' uptake of experts' scientific input in China's authoritarian regime. While the past SPI literature focuses primarily on the scientification of politics and policymaking, this research also contributes to understanding the politics/politicisation of science/knowledge. I argue that the political considerations and conditions for explaining SPI identified in this research (e.g., horizontal/vertical power relations and concerns of timing and political performance) could be a hypothesis to test in other countries, not just authoritarian regimes. Further, I hypothesise on the basis of this thesis that while in authoritarian countries local governments will be satisfied with applied knowledge once the central government has accepted the fundamental and discursive knowledge. This may not be the case in democratic countries where even local governments may need convincing about the fundamental and discursive aspects of the program. To sum up, researchers should consider the nature of politics to better understand the interplay between science and policy.

Contents

Executive Summary	i
Contents	x
List of Tables	xxii
List of Figures	xxiv
List of Maps	xxv
Abbreviation.....	xxvi
Note on Publications	xxx
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Purpose of thesis	1
1.2 Problem definition	3
1.2.1 Societal problem	3
1.2.1.1 Climate change	3
1.2.1.2 Climate change and China	5
1.2.2 Academic problem: knowledge gaps in the existing literature	9
1.3 Research Questions, focus and limits	11
1.3.1 Overall question and sub-questions	11
1.3.2 Research focus and limits	11
1.3.2.1 Research focus	11
1.3.2.2 Research limitations	13
1.4 Policy relevance.....	13
1.4.1 Global level	14
1.4.1.1 Why science is important for global climate policymaking	14
1.4.1.2 How has the IPCC evolved from the AGGG onwards	14
1.4.1.4 Evolution of the interface of science and global policymaking	20
1.4.2 Chinese level	21
1.5 Structure of the thesis	21

Chapter 2: Theorising the Science-policy Interface	23
2.1 Introduction	23
2.2 A survey of the SPI literature.....	23
2.2.1 Review of the SPI literature in general.....	23
2.2.1.1 Diversity in SPI research with a concentration on environmental issues	24
2.2.1.2 Asymmetrical distribution of case-study regions: 72% from Global North and 28% from Global South	25
2.2.1.3 A lack of exploration of SPI from a multi-level or cross-level perspective	26
2.2.1.4 Multiple research methods have been adopted for investigating SPI	27
2.2.1.5 Lack of theoretical foundations for discussing SPI.....	27
2.2.2 Review of the literature on SPI AND climate change	28
2.2.3 Review of the literature on SPI AND climate change AND China	30
2.2.4 Review of Chinese publications on SPI AND climate change.....	30
2.3 Defining the science-policy interface	32
2.3.1 What is science?	33
2.3.2 What is policy?.....	35
2.3.3 What is interface?	37
2.3.3.1 The science-push model	37
2.3.3.2 The policy-pull model	38
2.3.3.3 The co-production model	39
2.4 Introducing a theoretical lens: problem structure and a typology of policy problems.....	40
2.4.1 Defining a policy problem	40
2.4.2 Four types of policy problems and the expected roles of science	40
2.4.3 Climate change: a wicked or unstructured problem?	43
2.4.3.1 Critiques on the concept of wicked problems	43
2.4.3.2 Climate change and problem structuring	45
2.5 Conceptual framework for analysing SPI.....	46
2.6 Conclusions	49
Chapter 3: Methods	51

3.1 Introduction	51
3.2 Epistemological position of this study	51
3.3 The Case study approach: China as a case and cases in China	52
3.3.1 The single-case study approach: China as a case	52
3.3.2 The embedded multiple case study design: cases in China.....	53
3.4 Units of analysis and units of observation	56
3.4.1 Defining units of analysis and units of observation	57
3.4.2 Units of analysis/observation for studying ‘science’	58
3.4.2.1 Knowledge	58
3.4.2.2 Experts.....	58
3.4.2.3 Research institutes	58
3.4.3 Unit of analysis/observation for studying ‘policy’	58
3.4.3.1 Policy	59
3.4.3.2 Policymakers	59
3.4.3.3 Policy documents	59
3.4.4. Units of analysis and units of observation for studying ‘politics’	59
3.4.4.1 Political settings.....	60
3.4.4.2 Political considerations.....	60
3.5 Research methods and data collection	60
3.5.1 Literature review	60
3.5.2 Content analysis of policy documents	60
3.5.3 Fieldwork	62
3.5.3.1 Field sites: Beijing and Guangzhou (Guangdong Province).....	62
3.5.3.2 Observation and Field notes.....	65
3.5.4 In-depth interviews.....	65
3.5.4.1 Purposive and snowball sampling of interviewees	66
3.5.4.2 Composition of interviewees.....	67
3.5.4.3 Forms and structure of interview	69

3.5.4.4 Reflections	70
3.6 Conclusion	71
Chapter 4: Evolution of China's Climate Policy	73
4.1 Introduction	73
4.2 Contours of China's political system.....	73
4.2.1 A unitary state	73
4.2.2 A Communist Party-state	74
4.2.3 A multi-level governance structure.....	75
4.2.4 A two-term limit on heads of government units.....	76
4.3 Distinctive features of China's policy processes	76
4.3.1 Fragmented authoritarianism and bureaucratic competition at the horizontal level	77
4.3.2 Centre-local relations, implementation gaps, and vertical bargaining between different levels of government	77
4.3.3 The use of policy experimentation/pilot before scaling up.....	78
4.3.4 The emphasis on scientific decision-making	79
4.3.5 Implications for analysing the SPI in China's climate policy	80
4.4 Evolution of China's climate policy.....	80
4.4.1 Phase 1 (before 1997): Climate change treated as a scientific and environmental issue.....	81
4.4.2 Phase 2 (1998~2006): Climate change is identified as an economic and energy issue.....	82
4.4.2.1 Bureaucratic competition as an explanation for China's focus on economic development	82
4.4.2.2 A science-based explanation for China's focus on energy issue	83
4.4.3 Phase 3 (2007~2009): Climate policy is a repackaging of energy, economic, and environmental strategies	84
4.4.3.1 Climate change was elevated to the top of the Chinese political agenda	85
4.4.3.2 Economic development departments take the lead	85
4.4.3.3 GHG mitigation and energy policies as the core of domestic climate policy	86

4.4.4 Phase 4 (2010~2019): China’s climate policy includes local pilot programmes and experimentation	88
4.4.5 Phase 5 (2020~): China is on the road to operating the ETS to reach carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060	91
4.5 Conclusions	91
Chapter 5: Chinese Experts and China’s foreign Climate Policy	93
5.1 Introduction	93
5.2 Evolution of China’s foreign climate policy	93
5.2.1 Phase 1 (1990~1997): China sees climate as obstructing development prospects	93
5.2.2 Phase 2 (1998~2006): China turns to support the flexible mechanisms under the KP	94
5.2.3 Phase 3 (2007~2009): China switches to a proactive stance and announces its first-ever voluntary CO ₂ emissions reduction target.....	95
5.2.4 Phase 4 (2010~2015): China becomes more active in global climate politics and announces its absolute target for CO ₂ emissions reduction	95
5.2.5 Phase 5 (2016~): China is aiming to be a global climate leader	96
5.3 Chinese experts in the operation of the IPCC Working Groups	97
5.3.1 Number and proportion of the experts in each WG	97
5.3.2 Assessing their impact: Chinese experts in WGI have more advantages than those in WGII and WGIII	101
5.4 Chinese experts as delegates to international climate negotiations	102
5.4.1 The emerging national team of experts.....	102
5.4.1.1 Phase 1 (1990~1997): officials and technocrats are the main force for negotiation.....	103
5.4.1.2 Phase 2 (1998~2006): outside experts began to be invited to the climate talks	103
5.4.1.3 Phase 3 (2007~2009): Tsinghua University formed an expert team to support the government	103
5.4.1.4 Phase 4 (2010~2015): experts from the NCSC joined as a new force for negotiation.....	104

5.4.1.5 Phase 5 (2016 onwards): a new generation of younger experts emerges ...	104
5.4.2 Experts' division of labour when engaging with international climate talks	104
5.4.2.1 Directly participation (experts from universities and government-affiliated think tanks)	104
5.4.2.2 Contact and coordination (only experts employed at government-affiliated think tanks)	105
5.4.2.3 Consultancy and technical assistance (senior experts)	105
5.4.3 The operation of the Chinese delegation and the experts' perceptions of participating in the international climate talks	106
5.4.3.1 The collective decision-making process of China's foreign climate policy ...	106
5.4.3.2 Expert-negotiators are agents that implement some already decided decisions	107
5.4.3.3 Experts' perceptions of participating in global climate politics: 'science without borders, but scientists have nationalities'	108
5.5 How do Chinese experts speak on behalf of the Chinese government? Three case studies	108
5.5.1 Case I: The notion of cumulative emissions per capita (CEPC)	108
5.5.1.1 The experts, argument, and the science-policy interaction process	108
5.5.1.2 The result: the international community noted but did not adopt the CEPC approach	110
5.5.1.3 Analysis: the co-production of science and politics	110
5.5.2 Case II: The Carbon Budget Proposal (CBP)	111
5.5.2.1 The experts, argument, and the science-policy interactions process	111
5.5.2.2 The result: the international community noted but did not adopt the CBP	113
5.5.2.3 Analysis: Chinese experts were unable to persuade the audience from industrialised countries	113
5.5.3 Case III: The negotiation for technology development and transfer (TD&T)	114
5.5.3.1 The experts and the science-policy interactions process	114
5.5.3.3 The result: experts have stimulated the institutionalisation of the TD&T rules and procedures	115

5.5.3.4 Analysis: a broader support as the conditions for the Chinese experts’ success	116
5.6 Inferences.....	116
Chapter 6: Experts and China’s National Climate Policy.....	119
6.1 Introduction	119
6.2 Organisation of research institutes in China’s national climate policy	119
6.3 Case I: National target-setting on CO ₂ emissions reductions	121
6.3.1 Setting China’s first-ever relative CO ₂ emissions reduction target in 2009.....	121
6.3.2 Setting China’s first-ever absolute CO ₂ emissions reduction target in 2014	123
6.3.3 How did Chinese policymakers make the decision? Timing as a critical consideration.....	124
6.4 Case II: Legislation of China’s Climate Law: loud thunder, little rain	125
6.4.1 Multiple scientific input for drafting China’s Climate Law	125
6.4.3 When science meets politics: three contestations that hinder the uptake of science	128
6.4.3.1 Climate Law or Energy Law? Contestation on the necessity of China’s Climate Law.....	128
6.4.3.2 Soft law or hard law? Contestation on the attribute of China’s Climate Law	129
6.4.3.3 Contestation on the content of China’s Climate Law: jurisdictions and policy venues.....	129
6.4.4 Indefinite postponement of China’s Climate Law?	130
6.5 Case III: Market instrument: Carbon tax vs. the ETS.....	130
6.5.1 Carbon tax.....	130
6.5.2 Experts promoting the ETS in China	133
6.5.3 Why carbon taxation lost, and the ETS won? Timing, bureaucratic competition, and considerations of governance scale	136
6.6 Inferences.....	138
Chapter 7: Experts and China’s Provincial Climate Policy.....	139
7.1 Introduction	139

7.2 China's provincial climate policy and the primary source of scientific input	139
7.2.1 Evolution of China's provincial climate policy	139
7.2.2 Provincial research centres and expert committees as primary source of scientific input	140
7.3 Case I: Guangdong Province's low-carbon province pilot programme	141
7.3.1 Low-carbon province pilot programmes as a gripper	141
7.3.2 Science-push: experts lobby both provincial and central officials to launch the LCPPP	142
7.3.3 Policy-pull: experts assist provincial officials with compiling policy documents	143
7.3.4 Co-production: experts play a mixed role of both experts and agents of the officials	145
7.3.5 A higher degree of policymaker's demand and experts' impact on Guangdong's LCPPP	145
7.4 Case II: Guangdong Province's GHG emissions inventory	146
7.4.1 Emissions inventory as a cornerstone of local climate governance	147
7.4.2 Policy-pull: expert institutes as appropriate entities to fulfil the work	147
7.4.3 Co-production: experts defend Guangdong's inventory data during the central's examination	148
7.4.4 A higher degree of policymakers' demand and experts' policy impact	148
7.5 Case III: Guangdong Province's pilot emissions trading scheme (ETS)	148
7.5.1 Pilot ETS: the most labour-intensive policy programme	149
7.5.2 Science-push: experts lobby both provincial and central officials to launch the pilot ETS, and organise training sessions for local actors	149
7.5.2 Policy-pull and co-production: experts contributed to institutional design and establishment of the Guangdong ETS	150
7.5.3 A higher degree of experts' policy impact on Guangdong's ETS	152
7.6 Contextualising SPI in China's provincial climate policy	153
7.6.1 Attributes of the research institutes explain who has more policy impact and on which stage of the policy process	153

7.6.2 The change of local officials' needs, preferences, and trust of research institutes explains the change of influential experts	154
7.6.3 Provincial officials are more concerned with political achievements than with professional expertise due to the target responsibility system	155
7.7 Inferences.....	157
Chapter 8: Experts and China's Local Climate Policy	159
8.1 Introduction	159
8.2 China's local climate policy and the primary scientific input	159
8.2.1 Evolution of China's local climate policy	159
8.2.2 Primary sources of scientific input for China's local climate policy	160
8.3 Guiyang (Guizhou Province)	162
8.3.1 A sketch of Guiyang	162
8.3.2 Scientific input for Guiyang's climate policy	163
8.3.3 Process of the interplay of science and Guiyang's climate policy	163
8.3.4 Output of SPI in Guiyang's climate policy	165
8.4 Guangyuan City (Sichuan Province).....	165
8.4.1 A sketch of Guangyuan	165
8.4.2 Scientific input for Guangyuan's climate policy	165
8.4.3 Process of the interplay of science and Guangyuan's climate policy	166
8.4.4 Output of SPI in Guangyuan's climate policy	169
8.5 Qingdao City (Shandong Province)	170
8.5.1 A sketch of Qingdao	170
8.5.2 Scientific input for Qingdao's climate policy	170
8.5.3 Process of the interplay between science and Qingdao's climate policy	170
8.5.3.1 The Technical Assistance project funded by the Asian Development Bank. 171	
8.5.3.2 The Sustainable and Liveable Cities project funded by the Caterpillar Foundation	172
8.5.3.4 The pilot ETS.....	173
8.5.4 Output of the SPI in Qingdao's climate policy.....	174

8.6 Conditions for accepting the experts' recommendation for low-carbon development	174
8.6.1 External assistance, local need to promote the city, and local policymakers' political sensitiveness	175
8.6.2 LCD as the only card to play (Guiyang and Guangyuan) or the card that has to be played well (Qingdao)	175
8.7 Inferences.....	176
Chapter 9: Experts and the Science-policy Interfaces in Cross-level Dynamics of China's Climate Policy	179
9.1 Introduction	179
9.2 Multiple forms of scientific input for China's climate policy: division of labour and cross-level interactions between research institutes	179
9.2.1 International-domestic linkages as scientific input for China's climate policy ...	179
9.2.2 Centre-local interactions of research institutes as scientific input for China's climate policy.....	181
9.2.3 Provincial-municipal partnerships of expert institutes and horizontal knowledge travel as scientific input for China's climate policy	183
9.2.4 Triangular interaction in cross-level dynamics of China's climate policy	183
9.3 Tensions between the cross-level intersection the processes of science and politics in China's climate policy	187
9.3.1 Foci of policy planning: 'low-carbon' development/economy vs. low-carbon 'development/economy'	187
9.3.2 Compilation of emissions inventory: meticulous vs. grasping the large and releasing the small	188
9.3.3 Target decomposition of GHG mitigation: set a reversed mechanism to force localities to peak earlier vs. converge towards the middle of the procession	190
9.4 Science-policy interface in multi-level governance and cross-level dynamics of China's climate policy	191
9.4.1 Models of the intersection process of SPI of China's climate policy	191
9.4.1.1 SPI models at each governance levels of China's climate policy.....	191

9.4.1.2 Same effort of experts but different SPI models from the cross-level perspectives	192
9.4.2 Output of the SPI of China’s climate policy	194
9.4.2.1 Measuring the experts’ impact on China’s climate policy at each governance level.....	194
9.4.2.2 Measuring the experts’ impact on China’s climate policy from the cross-level perspective.....	197
9.5 Inferences.....	198
Chapter 10: Conclusions.....	201
10.1 Introduction	201
10.2 Differentiating SPI elements in China’s multi-level climate governance	201
10.2.1 Who are the experts? Multiple scientific input for China’s climate policy.....	203
10.2.2 Who are the policymakers? From science and environment to energy and economic development	203
10.2.3 Policymakers’ demand and experts’ provision of knowledge	204
10.2.4 Division of labour (cooperation) and tensions between cross-level dynamics of SPI.....	206
10.2.5 Political considerations of policymakers before making the decisions	207
10.3 Explaining the experts’ varied roles and policy impact through the typology of policy problems	209
10.4 Conditions for mediating SPI in an authoritarian regime	211
10.4.1 Political settings and officials’ political considerations as main conditions for experts to successfully influence China’s climate policy.....	211
10.4.2 What does the feature of SPI in an authoritarian context mean for the future of China’s climate policy?	212
10.4.3 Recommendations: driving China’s climate policy through mediating SPI	214
10.5 Theoretical contributions and implications	215
10.5.1 An expanded understanding of knowledge, mindsets of experts, and policy stages.....	215
10.5.2 A multi-level and cross-level perspective for analysing SPI.....	216

10.5.3 A contextualised examination of SPI in China’s authoritarian regime with the focus on the politicisation of science	217
10.6 Reflections and recommendations for future research.....	218
References	221
Appendix	267
Appendix I: Research Questions of this Study	267
Appendix II: List of Interviews	268
Appendix III: Interview Questions	273
Appendix IV: Explanation of rating experts’ policy impact across governance levels.....	275
Annex	280
Annex I: Evolution of China’s climate change-related policies, laws, and documents ...	280
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch).....	282
Acknowledgement	292
About the Author	294

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Top emitters of GHGs (total amount) in the past thirty years	3
Table 1.2 Climate Change Impacts in China	8
Table 1.3 Evolution of focus of the IPCC working groups.....	14
Table 1.4 IPCC Assessment Reports and main conclusions of the scientific basis of climate change	16
Table 1.5 Key outputs in the UNFCCC negotiations	17
Table 2.1 Research methodologies of the SPI literature (1990-2020).....	27
Table 2.2 Literature review on ‘SPI AND climate change’	29
Table 2.3 Literature review of Chinese publications of SPI AND climate change (1990-2020)	31
Table 2.4 Four types of knowledge in science-policy interactions	35
Table 2.5 Ten characteristics of a wicked problem recognised by Rittel and Webber (1973)	44
Table 2.6 A five-level cumulative scale for evaluating the experts’ impact on policy decision	49
Table 3.1 Explanation of nine embedded case studies	55
Table 3.2 Units of analysis and units of observation in this study	57
Table 3.3 China’s official documents on climate change.....	61
Table 3.5 Key features of Beijing and Guangdong province.....	64
Table 3.6 Composition of interviewees	68
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the five phases in the evolution of China’s climate policy.....	80
Table 4.2 Three batches of low-carbon province and city pilot programmes since 2010 .	90
Table 5.1 Characteristics of China’s foreign climate policy since 1990.....	93
Table 5.2 Number and proportion of Chinese experts in the IPCC WGs	98
Table 5.3 Top 10 research institutes where experts were selected to participate in the IPCC WGI.....	99
Table 5.4 Top 10 research institutes where experts were selected to participate in the IPCC WGII.....	100
Table 5.5 Top 10 research institutes where experts were selected to participate in the IPCC WGIII.....	101
Table 5.6 Division of labour of experts in China’s engagement with the international	

climate talks.....	106
Table 6.1 Categories of expert committees and research institutes in China’s national climate policy.....	120
Table 6.2 Research institutes and various estimations of CO ₂ emissions reduction target for 2020	122
Table 6.3 Research institutes and their estimated peak year of China’s CO ₂ emissions.	123
Table 6.4 Comparison of the two drafts of China’s Climate Law	127
Table 6.5 Comparing three official think tanks’ scientific input for carbon tax.....	132
Table 6.6 Knowledge-oriented actors engaged with promoting the ETS in China	133
Table 7.1 Contribution of research institutes to Guangdong’s GHG emissions inventory	148
Table 7.2 Influential research institutes and their contribution to different stages of Guangdong’s climate policy cycle.....	154
Table 8.1 Three prefectural cities for analysing SPI in China’s local climate policy	161
Table 9.1 Comparison of the core concerns between central and local perspective	187
Table 9.2 Models of the intersection process of the SPI of China’s climate policy.....	192
Table 9.3 Experts’ impact on different governance levels of China’s climate policy	195
Table 10.1 Synthesis of SPI elements in nine case studies.....	202
Table 10.2 Knowledge policymakers demand and experts provide in China’s multi-level climate governance	205
Table 10.3 Experts’ multiple roles at different levels of China’s climate policy.....	206
Table 10.4 Centre-local tensions in the low-carbon province and city pilot and emissions inventorying	207

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Rising global temperature.....	4
Figure 1.2 CO ₂ emissions and CO ₂ emissions per unit of GDP, China (1990-2018).....	6
Figure 1.3 GHG emissions of China by sector in 2005, 2010, and 2014 (without LULUCF) .	7
Figure 2.1 Top 20 popular research themes of the SPI literature (1990-2020)	24
Figure 2.2 Academic disciplines of the SPI literature (1990-2020)	25
Figure 2.3 Top 20 popular case-study regions of the SPI literature (1990-2020)	26
Figure 2.4 Level of analysis of the SPI literature (1990-2020).....	26
Figure 2.5 Theoretical approaches of the SPI literature (1990-2020)	28
Figure 2.6 Five stages of the policy cycle	36
Figure 2.7 Three classic models of science-policy interactions.....	37
Figure 2.8 Four types of policy problem	41
Figure 2.9 The role of science in four types of policy problem	42
Figure 2.10 Conceptual framework for analysing science-policy interactions	47
Figure 3.1 Nine cases that present the cross-level dynamics of SPI.....	56
Figure 4.1 China's parallel hierarchy of party and state	75
Figure 7.1 The Emission Trading Scheme Management System of Guangdong Province	152
Figure 9.1 Two-level collaboration between research institutes and government units	184
Figure 9.2 Three-level collaboration between expert institutes and government units .	186
Figure 9.3 Same effort of experts but different SPI models from the cross-level perspectives	193
Figure 10.1 Linking SPI in nine case studies to the four types of policy problems	210

List of Maps

Map 3.1 Two field sits: Beijing and Guangzhou (Guangdong Province).....	63
Map 8.1 Three case study cities: Guiyang, Guangyuan, and Qingdao	162

Abbreviation

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AR	Assessment Report
AWG-ADP	The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AWG-KP	The Ad Hoc Working Group on Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
BASIC countries	Brazil, South Africa, India, and China
CA	Contributing Author
CAAS	Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences
CAEP	Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning
CAFS	Chinese Academy of Fiscal Science
CAMS	Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences
CANGO	China Association for NGO Cooperation
CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
CAS-IAP	Institute of Atmospheric Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences
CAS-IPM	Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CASS-IUE	Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CASS-RCSD	Research Centre for Sustainable Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CBA	Carbon Budget Account
CBAP	Carbon Budget Account Proposal
CBDR	Common but differentiated responsibilities
CBEEEX	China Beijing Environment Exchange
CBP	Carbon budget proposal
CCCPC	Central Committee of Communist Party of China
CCI	Clinton Climate Initiative
CCICED	China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEEX	China Emissions Exchange at Guangzhou
CEPC	Cumulated Emissions Per Capita

CEPREI	The CEPREI Calibration & Testing Centre
CER	Certified Emissions Reduction
CJFD	China Academic Journals Full-text Database
CLA	Coordinating Lead Author
CLEMF	China Low-carbon Economy Media Federation
CMA	China Meteorological Administration
CNCCP	China's National Climate Change Programme
CNKI	China National Knowledge Infrastructure
CO	Carbon monoxide
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CQC	China Quality Certification Centre
CRELE	Credibility, relevance, and legitimacy
CTC	The Climate Technology Centre
CTCN	The Climate Technology Centre and Network
CUPL	China University of Political Science and Law
DCC	Department of Climate Change (central government) / Division of Climate Change (provincial government)
DRC	Development and Reform Commission
DRC	Development Research Centre under the State Council
EC	Ecological civilisation
ECA	Epistemic community approach
EDF	Environmental Defense Fund
EI	Emissions inventory
ENGO	Environmental non-governmental organisation
ERI	Energy Research Institute
ETS	Emissions Trading Scheme
EU	European Union
FA	Fragmented authoritarianism
FYP	Five-Year Plan
G-77	Group of 77
GCB	Global carbon budget
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GD-DRC	Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission
GD-DST	Guangdong Provincial Department of Science and Technology
GDAAS	Guangdong Academy of Agricultural Sciences
GDAES	Guangdong Academy of Environmental Sciences
GDAF	Guangdong Academy of Forestry

GDCC	Guangdong Climate Centre
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDRCCC	Guangdong Research Centre for Climate Change
GDTE	Guangdong Techno-economy Research and Development Centre
GEEE	Guizhou Environment and Energy Exchange
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GEI	Global Environmental Institute
GHG	Greenhous gas
GIEC	Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion, Chinese Academy of Science
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GLCDPA	Guangdong Low-Carbon Development Promotion Association
GONGO	Government-organised non-governmental organisation
ICCSA	Institute for Climate Change and Sustainable Development
ICLEI	International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
iGDP	Innovative Green Development Programme
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IPA	Interpretive policy analysis
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI	Joint Implementation
IR	International Relations
KP	Kyoto Protocol
KU	Knowledge utilisation
LA	Lead Author
LCB	Low-carbon Bureau
LCC	Low-carbon city
LCD	Low-carbon development
LCE	Low-carbon economy
LCEC	Low-carbon eco-city
LDC	Least developed countries
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
LNG	Liquefied natural gas
LPG	Liquid petroleum gas
LCCP	Low-carbon city pilot
LCPC	Low-carbon province and city pilot

LCPPP	Low-carbon province pilot programme
MEE	Ministry of Ecology and Environment
MEP	Ministry of Environmental Protection
MICE	Meetings, incentives, conferences, and exhibitions
MLG	Multi-level governance
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOHURD	Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
MOST	Ministry of Science and Technology
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NCC	National Climate Centre
NCGCC	National Coordination Group on Climate Change
NCGCCS	National Coordination Group on Climate Change Strategy
NCSC	National Centre for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NECCC	National Expert Committee on Climate Change
NEA	National emissions account
NEA	National Energy Administration
NEPA	National Environmental Protection Agency
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NLGACC	The National Leading Group for Addressing Climate Change
NLGACCCECER	The National Leading Group for Addressing Climate Change and Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction
NO _x	Nitrogen oxide
NPC	National People's Congress
ODS	Ozone depleting substances
PAC	Policy package of China
PNS	Post-normal science
QDECI	Qingdao Engineering Consulting Institute
QIBEBT	Qingdao Institute of Bioenergy and Bioprocess Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
QUST	Qingdao University of Science and Technology
RC	Respective capabilities
RE	Review Editor
RIFS	Research Institute for Fiscal Science
PECE	Programme of Energy & Climate Economics

PHCER	Tan Pu Hui certified emissions reduction
PRC	People’s Republic of China
RUC	Renmin University of China
SAR	Scientific Assessment Report
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SCLGECER	The State Council Leading Group on Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction
SDPC	The State Development Planning Commission
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute
SO ₂	Sulphur dioxide
SOE	State-owned enterprise
SPF	Strategic Programme Fund
SPI	Science-policy interface
SSTC	State Science and Technology Commission
STS	Science and technology studies or the study of science, technology and society
SYSU	Sun Yat-sen University
TA	Technical assistance
TD&T	Technology development and transfer
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TM	Technology Mechanism
TRM	The Technology Roadmap
TRS	Target responsibility system
TWN	Third World Network
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
US	United States of America
UK	United Kingdom
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WBGU	German Advisory Council on Global Change
WCP	World Climate Programme
WG	Working Group
WOS	Web of Science
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wild Fund for Nature

Note on Publications

Chapter 7 is written on the basis of the author's published peer-reviewed article:

Chen, Liang-Yu. 2017. "How do Experts Engage in China's Local Climate Governance? A Case Study of Guangdong Province." *Journal of Chinese Governance*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 360-384.