Subjectivity after Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein’s embodied and embedded subject and the debate about the death of man
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Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology

3.1 Introduction

Even though it is only in his earlier writings that Wittgenstein explicitly contemplates the subject and its place (or non-place) in the world, it is the later Wittgenstein who is counted among the twentieth-century rethinkers of subjectivity, for it is only in his later writings that he explores the consequences of de-emphasizing or underestimating man’s embodiedness and embeddedness. These explorations are not confined to the best-known part of Wittgenstein’s later work. In addition to many of the Investigations’ entries, the numerous remarks written between 1946 and 1951 and posthumously published as the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (some of which had already been added to the Investigations by its editors under the heading Part II) unrelentingly investigate how to understand specific psychological phenomena as well as the human psyche more generally. In this chapter, I will consult both the Philosophical Investigations and these collections of post-Investigations remarks in order

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1 See TLP 5.631, TLP 5.632, TLP 5.641, NB 2.8.16, NB 2.9.16. It will become clear in chapter 4 that there are similarities between Wittgenstein’s earlier and his later view on the soul or inner. However, since it is not my objective to sketch the developments in his thinking on these matters (as is for instance the aim of Stern 1995), I do not want to make claims about the Cartesian or non-Cartesian character of Wittgenstein’s earlier notion of the subject. As Stokhof 2002 explains, Wittgenstein’s early conception of the self is to a large extent inspired by Schopenhauer (see pp. 191-210).

2 Hence, I will consult both the “second” and what some consider to be the “third Wittgenstein” (cf. Moyal-Sharrock 2004). Again, since it is not my aim to sketch the developments in Wittgenstein’s thinking, I will not comment on the possible differences between his PI and his post-PI outlook. Suffice it to say that even if works like RPP and LW can be said to constitute a relatively new phase in Wittgenstein’s thinking, they still contribute just as much as PI to a rethinking of the Cartesian take on the nature of man. Cf. also Van Gennip 2008, where it is argued that several lines of thought as found in OC have their roots in plenty of older manuscripts and typescripts.
to explicate Wittgenstein’s contribution to the debate on the nature of man, and will use the label “philosophy of psychology” as a short-hand for all these sources.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology constitutes an excellent starting point for investigating his contribution to the subjectivity debate, for, contrary to what this label might suggest, these remarks do not provide, guidelines for conducting psychological research, say. Rather, they investigate a myriad of psychological concepts and try to get a firmer grasp of what it means to say that thoughts are private and feelings are inner, for instance. More often than not, moreover, the ideas about such privacy and interiority which Wittgenstein evaluates along the way have a distinctly Cartesian ring.³ Now “Cartesianism” is not so much the name for one clear and distinct philosophical position as it is the label for a whole cluster of ontological and epistemological presuppositions, sometimes more and sometimes less overtly at work in philosophical as well as non-philosophical discourse, about the way mind and body and self and other (inter)relate. As a result, one rarely encounters Cartesianism in a pure and unadulterated form, but let me nonetheless briefly list the presuppositions for which this label has come to stand.

According to the customary rendering of the Cartesian view, it is the mind that makes the human being into the human being, and the human mind is unlike anything else one encounters in the world. Or to be more precise, Cartesianism understands the mind and mental matters on analogy with the physical world and material matters, but it takes the former to be composed out of entirely different stuff and to occupy its very own ontological domain. On the Cartesian view, the mind or inner constitutes a literally inner realm in which psychological phenomena such as thoughts and feelings reside or take place. These phenomena are thus understood as akin to physical or material objects and processes, with the distinction that they belong to one’s private inner world instead of to the public outer one. Yet - lest there be any misunderstanding - Cartesianism does not merely distinguish psychological from physical or material phenomena by means of their location. Though it takes psychological phenomena to be object- and process-like,
it emphatically takes them to be objects and processes of a non-material or non-
physical kind, and thus to differ from ordinary objects and processes both in terms
of their location and in terms of the substance they are made of.

In Cartesian accounts of mind, these ontological presuppositions are typically
followed or accompanied - for perhaps it is not the ontological postulations that
come first, and perhaps they do not logically enforce any other assumptions - by
several epistemological ones. Occurring in a private inner realm, or so it is argued,
psychological phenomena are only accessible to the one who has or undergoes
them. More specifically, Cartesianism assumes that a person has immediate access
to his or her own thoughts and feelings by means of introspection; barred from
such access, however, any other has to make do with speculations based on what
this person says or does. Given that the outer fences off the inner, true knowledge
of someone’s mental states is available to the first person alone.

On a Cartesian view, the first person also has a special status or privilege
(though this no longer concerns a strictly epistemological privilege) in the sense that
the role of other human beings is reduced to a bare minimum. Obviously, when it
comes to someone’s physical being, a person would not exist and continue to exist
if it were not for others, but when it comes to one’s existence as a mental being –
and thus when it comes to the very essence of one’s being – no outside input is
required. On a Cartesian view, a person needs the help of others only to acquire the
right terms for referring to her inner occurrences. Aside from being able to talk
about it in a public language, she has possession of and access to a full repertoire of
psychological phenomena from the day she was born.

In some way or other, presuppositions of this kind play a central role in the
remarks comprising Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In line with my
arguments in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein does not lay them bare order to
show that all those labelled “Cartesian” are wrong for trying to understand the
nature of man, or even in order to show that all of their intuitions about the subject
are utterly mistaken. Just as Wittgenstein, on my reading of his discourse on
method, proves to be just as interested in the nature of things as other philosophers
are, his philosophy of psychology, on my understanding of these remarks, no less
aims to give an account of subjectivity than a full-blown Cartesian treatise on this
topic. Moreover, just as Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance tries to
capture the nature of essences more adequately than traditional philosophy, his
psychological writings attempt to do more justice to the mind or inner than the
Cartesians are able to do. He points out that while Cartesian-style depictions of
matters mental may seem pre-eminently equipped for explicating what it means to
call thoughts “private” and feelings “inner”, they actually fail to account for the
things they set out to explain and also fall short of capturing our day-to-day
experiences with both our own and other minds. Sharing the Cartesian concern
with subjectivity, Wittgenstein tries to develop an account that is both conceptually
and phenomenologically more adequate.
In what follows, I will discuss a selection of Wittgenstein’s remarks on both specific psychological phenomena and the domain of the mental more generally in an attempt to reconstruct the post-Cartesian trajectory he may be said to have travelled, as well as the outlook to where that trajectory can be said to have led.

### 3.2 Inner objects and processes

It is by no means merely in (allegedly) Cartesian theories that talk of inner objects and processes abounds; our everyday psychological language is filled with such phrasings, too. We talk about calculating in the head, for example, insist that we clearly see a situation before us when discussing a past event, and worry that while one of our friends looks perfectly happy on the outside, he is in fact terribly unhappy within. It is therefore not so much the fact that Cartesianism makes mention of inner occurrences that makes this position problematic, or even that it theorizes about the nature of such occurrences at all. According to Wittgenstein, the problem with Cartesianism rather is that it takes our talk of inner objects and processes too seriously – and that it thereby, on a different level, by far does not take them seriously enough. As several of his remarks make clear, portraying psychological phenomena such as thoughts and feelings as literally inner entities actually fails to capture what is essential about them.

Take for instance the phenomenon of memory and remembrance. Explained along Cartesian lines, and seemingly not without support from our day-to-day discourse, remembering constitutes “a seeing into the past.” When one remembers someone or something, or so the explanation could go, this someone or something is no longer actually present but is mentally represented again by means of an image. Memories are thus reproduced internal representations and remembering amounts to perceiving these with the inner eye. Straightforward as the analogy to seeing may seem, however, Wittgenstein points out that it does not hold.

When one wanders through one’s former hometown, say, and runs into an old friend, memories of how this person used to look enable one to determine how much he has changed, yet this cannot be accounted for by maintaining that the memories in question are old or retrieved images of one’s friend. As Wittgenstein brings to the fore, even if images would appear before one’s inner eye in such a case, it still remains to be explained how one is able to recognize them as representations of something past. Such recognition, namely, requires information that is not contained within the images themselves, like an acquaintance with the

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4 RPPi 592; see also RPPi 111, RPPi 159, RPPi 1050.
5 See RPPi 1041.
6 Which is not to say that such recognition requires an explicit process of interpretation in which additional knowledge is applied to an image; cf. Wittgenstein’s arguments against taking seeing-as to be a form of interpretation, to be discussed in the sixth section of this chapter.
hairstyles of the previous decade and an awareness of the fact that people develop wrinkles as they grow old. An image by itself, whether mental or not, does not yet reveal the date of its production, and talk of retrieved images thus fails to make sense of the very essence of remembering: its allowing us to revive or relive things past. Indeed, Wittgenstein observes, instead of explaining what memory is, the Cartesian account simply falls back on this phenomenon. Remembering cannot be called a seeing into the past, he states, for “even if it showed scenes with hallucinatory clarity, still it takes remembering to tell us that this is past.”

A similar message is conveyed in some of Wittgenstein’s more well-known remarks involving literally inner images. As he argues in §§139-142 of the *Investigations*, it cannot be maintained that understanding what, for instance, the word “cube” means, is a matter of mentally observing a picture of a cube. The only reason that this explanation may seem appropriate is that there already exists a convention to take 12 lines arranged in a particular manner as a picture of a cube, but nothing in this configuration itself forces one to see it like that: “we are,” Wittgenstein explains, “at most under a psychological, not a logical, compulsion” here. While these lines represent a cube given the conventional method of projection, one could just as well imagine a different method according to which the linear arrangement should be taken to symbolize, say, a prism.

Moreover, Wittgenstein adds, it is of no use to continue along Cartesian lines and suggest that, in addition to the mental image, the method of projection is internally represented, too. No less a static mental entity, Wittgenstein maintains that a cube+projection-picture simply shares the fate of the picture-cube. A picture of a projection method might, logically speaking, also allow for different applications that the one we tend to think of first. And it is for a similar reasons, to come back to the phenomenon discussed a moment ago, that the inadequacy of explaining remembering as a seeing into the past cannot be countered by recourse to feelings that supposedly inform one of the pastness of the images perceived. Apart from the fact that particular feelings or experiences do not always seem to accompany our memories, and that it would also take remembering to recognize purported memory-feelings when they occur, a feeling as such no more connects up to one specific time and place than an isolated image. Hence, just as talk of retrieved images and feelings of pastness does not succeed in capturing in a non-circular manner what is essential about remembering, reference to inner pictures

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7 See LWi 837.
8 Cf. Schulte 1993, pp. 96-97. As Schulte points out, Cartesian-style accounts of memory (or the accounts offered by James and Russell, to be precise), for this reason add that it is not just mental images but also special feelings that constitute remembering; I will come back to this shortly.
9 RPPi 592; see also RPPi 1131, LWi 837.
10 PI 140.
12 See PI II § xiii 231a-c, RPPi 112, RPPi 118, RPPi 120, RPPii 583; cf. Schulte 1993, pp. 105-08.
and projections presupposes rather than explains our understanding of words like “cube”.\textsuperscript{13}

Besides examining the explanatory power of Cartesian-style objects, Wittgenstein also explores what the postulation of mental processes ultimately entails and achieves, as several of his remarks on the phenomenon of thinking go to show. From a Cartesian perspective, thinking can be said to form a kind of speaking, but instead of constituting a public, audible form of speech, thinking concerns man’s ability “to talk inaudibly, within [the privacy] of his mind.”\textsuperscript{14}

Explained along Cartesian lines, thinking amounts to talking in the head. However, as Wittgenstein’s analysis of this explanation makes clear, it cannot be considered to be satisfactory. For first of all, the fact that a sentence is supposedly uttered mentally or internally does not yet make this string of words into an instance of thinking. In so far as the only difference between such an inner monologue and an outer one lies in the former’s privacy or inaudibility, a sentence spoken mentally need not be accompanied by any thought, just as sentences expressed audibly or publicly may simply serve to practice one’s pronunciation, or be uttered “in a queer automatic way”.\textsuperscript{15}

Wittgenstein’s verdict on this purported inner process is akin to his verdict on the inner objects discussed above: like an image does not of its own accord convey when it was produced or what it represents, the mere uttering of words, whether mental or not, by itself does not equal being absorbed in thought.

What is more, Wittgenstein points out, given that it always takes a certain amount of time to utter the words that constitute a sentence, the analogy of thinking to talking does not hold at all. In contrast to a spoken string of words, it is not always possible to indicate the beginning and the end of a certain train of thought, nor does a train of thought necessarily develop in a similar, one-after-the-other fashion: “I cannot say, e.g., that this or that phase of the process occurred in \textit{this} time segment. So I can \textit{not} describe the thinking process as I can describe the speaking itself, for instance. That is why one can’t very well call thinking a process.”\textsuperscript{16} Unlike speaking, thinking cannot be considered to be a specific process or activity, not even of an internal kind. And as Wittgenstein observes, this non-process-like character is in fact reflected in our day-to-day dealings with other minds. When we are looking at a person or even a chimpanzee undertaking certain complicated actions, and assert that she or it accompanies these actions with thinking, we are not referring to an “imaginary auxiliary activity; [an] invisible

\textsuperscript{13} It should be noted that Wittgenstein’s remarks about the meaning of “cube” do not only pertain to a Cartesian-style appeal to inner pictures, but more generally apply to attempts at explaining meaning in terms of strictly individual states; cf. Stein 1997, pp. 200-202. I will discuss Wittgenstein’s arguments against a non-Cartesian individualistic view on the mental (namely physicalism) in section 4 and will explore the general non-individualistic character of his alternative account in section 5 of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{14} RPPi 574; see also RPPii 7, RPPii 34, RPPii 193.

\textsuperscript{15} RPPii 256; see also RPPi 180, RPPii 192; cf. Budd 1989, p. 128; Johnston 1993, pp. 68-69.

\textsuperscript{16} RPPii 266; see also RPPi 210, RPPii 257.
stream” underlying the external activities we perceive. Rather, when we say of a person that she’s thinking, we mean to say something about the way in which her (external) activities are performed and distinguish them from actions of a purely mechanical kind. 

On Wittgenstein’s view, one is ill-advised to insist that, faced with the inadequacy of the accounts just discussed, they need to by amended by recourse to even further internal entities, or that the inner objects and processes they invoke are of a special, self-explanatory kind. For Wittgenstein, it is no coincidence that the postulation of inner entities is of no avail in explaining both thinking, remembering and the understanding of meaning, for as becomes clear in the course of his private language argument, he considers the entire model at work in these explanations to be misconceived.

Leaving aside discussions as to what §§ 243-315 of the Investigations (where this argument is usually located) convey about the possibility of private ostensive definitions and the solitary following of rules - not to mention debates as to where the argument should be located or whether it can be considered to be an argument at all - these remarks do not only show that even when it comes to psychological concepts, the Investigations’ earlier observations about the necessity of pre-existing public practices apply. In delivering another blow the Augustinian account of meaning, Wittgenstein also lays bare the assumptions it makes and needs to make about the phenomena that psychological concepts supposedly label in order to

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17 RPPii 228; see also RPPii 224, RPPii 226, RPPii 227, RPPii 229.
19 Among Wittgenstein scholars, the private language argument is hotly debated, both in terms of its main moral and in terms of its place in PI as a whole. I cannot give an overview of this debate here; suffice it to say that much of it has come to revolve around Kripke 1982. Kripke claims that the real argument against private language is to be found in the discussion on rule following reaching its conclusion long before PI 243 (namely in PI 202), and furthermore maintains that PI shows normativity to reside in the blind inclinations a language user has been brought to make her own as a member of a community. Many commentators have taken issue with Kripke’s interpretation. Hacker 1990 (see pp. 18-21), to give just one example, contends that PI shows normativity only to exist, not so much in the context of a community, but in the context of a practice, whether communal or individual, and also argues that PI 243-315 do not constitute a special application of the rule following considerations but have traditional presuppositions about the human mind as their global target. (See also Stein 1997 for an in-depth examination of the main points raised by Kripke and an assessment of the standard objections levelled against his reading.) My discussion of PI 243-315 will focus on the insights it offers about the nature of mind, regardless of the place they occupy in PI more generally. As for the adequacy of Kripke’s community account of rule following, I will address the relationship between the individual and the (linguistic) community in chapter 5, albeit from a very different perspective. In so far as Kripke takes community to be a mere conglomerate of by and large unthinkingly acting individuals, the account of community I will offer can be considered to be an amendment to his interpretation of Wittgenstein too. And, as for Kripke misunderstanding Wittgenstein for attributing him a plain old philosophical argument in the first place (see e.g. Stern 1995, pp. 175-186), the previous chapter should have made sufficiently clear that I do not consider that to be a valid reason for dismissing an interpretation of Wittgenstein.
avoid the criticisms he has already supplied. These assumptions turn out to be strikingly Cartesian and are moreover shown to have some ironic implications.²⁰

In § 243, perhaps in anticipation of the qualms that readers might have about his persistent arguing that meaning is always already a public affair, Wittgenstein inquires about the possibility of a private language: a language for the employment of which no pre-existing public practices are required and the meaning of which is accessible to one and only one individual. Both these criteria need to be met in order for a language to be entitled to the epithet “private”, for a language cannot be called truly private when it is merely applied in a solitary setting. To be sure, Wittgenstein observes, a person can use language privately in the sense of, say, encouraging himself or speaking in monologue, but such language games are still executed in ordinary public speech. More eligible for the label “private language” therefore appears to be the vocabulary we use to talk about our inner experiences. Referring to phenomena that can, or so it seems, only be known to the person who has or undergoes them, psychological language might truly be used and understood by the first person alone.

Wittgenstein immediately raises some questions about the way in which the word “private” is used here, and suggests that, judging by our day-to-day practices, psychological language cannot be said to be private either, at least not in the desired sense. After all, we talk about our thoughts and feelings on a daily basis and do so in a language that, while no guarantee against misunderstandings, is in principle available to anyone. Moreover, Wittgenstein remarks, it is on the basis of the natural or instinctive expressions of sensations like pain that a person acquires a psychological vocabulary to begin with, meaning that there is another sense in which this language cannot be said to be a wholly non-public matter: our “words for sensations are tied up with [the] natural expressions of sensation.”²¹ If psychological language is to be truly private, the connection of sensations to expressive behaviour would have to be an inessential one, and a person would - in contrast to the way words like “pain” are apparently taught – have to be able to identify these strictly inner occurrences entirely by herself.²² So if psychological

²⁰ Some commentators (see e.g. Pears 1988, pp. 328-360 and Monk 1999, p. 116) take the theory of sense data as expounded by Russell and others to be the direct target of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, rather than a broader Cartesian take on the nature of mind. I feel that even when such phenomenalist ideas were the main impetus for Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language, they can from a systematic point of view still be regarded as a critique on Cartesianism more generally. Like e.g. Overgaard 2005 (see pp. 252-253), I take these remarks, and most notably PI 293, to contain a reductio ad absurdum of Cartesian-style accounts of subjectivity. (And I hope that the current study goes towards fleshing out Wittgenstein’s alternative account - a task which, as Overgaard concludes, still remains to be completed. Contrary to Overgaard’s suggestion, however, I do not think that this recourse to a comparison with Heidegger is needed. Indeed, given the latter’s suspicion towards the everyday and the fact that his Daseinsanalytik comes with notions such as Eigentlichkeit and Verfallenheit, I doubt whether the comparison between Wittgenstein and Heidegger goes all the way.)

²¹ PI 256; see also PI 244.

²² See PI 256, PI 257.
language is to be an exception to the rule that meaning is always already public, not only would an inward ostension have to suffice for defining the meaning of psychological concepts, the Cartesian inner-outer model would have to hold as well.

In the course of §§ 243-315, Wittgenstein demonstrates that a private ostensive definition\textsuperscript{23} - no less than a public one\textsuperscript{24} - is by itself an idle ceremony that does not provide criteria for the proper employment of words, but he also takes apart the general account of mind that makes private ostensive definitions seem necessary and possible in the first place. As he explains, the idea that psychological phenomena are private inner entities that bear no fundamental relation to anything exterior, effectively boils down to the thought, not so much “that each person possesses his own exemplar [of e.g. pain], but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else.”\textsuperscript{25} By means of the beetle box analogy expounded in § 293, Wittgenstein argues that this idea is already thoroughly incoherent.

If phenomena like pain were private in this sense of the word, he spells out, one could compare pain to a thing - let’s say a beetle - in a box; a box, moreover, that only its owner can look into. A boxed up beetle of this kind could be said to be truly private, for here it would be true to say that people only know by looking into their own box what a beetle is, or what the word “beetle” refers to. But then again, Wittgenstein observes, to talk about a referent of this word does not seem to be entirely appropriate. That is to say, if the beetle-box possessors really have a word for the content of their boxes, and use it unproblematically on numerous occasions, they cannot be said to use the word “beetle” as the name of a thing. For if the “thing” inside everyone’s box is truly inaccessible to others yet consistently referred to as a “beetle”, it is in fact entirely irrelevant what the content of a person’s box is. This content need not be the same for all persons, or could change constantly – indeed, a person’s box might even be empty. In other words, the boxed up beetle may be utterly and completely private, it for that very reason “cancels out, whatever it is.”\textsuperscript{26}

Applying the moral of the beetle box story to the relationship between psychological terms and psychological phenomena, Wittgenstein concludes that an Augustino-Cartesian outlook, according to which words like “pain” label hidden inner objects, effectively renders our thoughts and feelings completely insignificant: “if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{27} No wonder, then, that the postulation of internal images and activities fails to capture what is essential about remembering and thinking. By cutting out everything even remotely

\textsuperscript{23} See most notably the thought experiment of the private diarist: PI 258-261, PI 270. For a more elaborate discussion of these remarks, see e.g. Hacker 1990, pp. 93- 146; Williams 1999, pp. 15-33.
\textsuperscript{24} See PI 26-36.
\textsuperscript{25} PI 272.
\textsuperscript{26} PI 293.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibidem; see also RPPi 1089.
suggesting that psychological phenomena may not be fully private entities – such as human behaviour and the circumstances in which these phenomena take place – Cartesianism unwittingly endangers the very reality of matters mental. With only the words we use to talk about them left in place, it is precisely our thoughts and feelings that drop out of the picture once it is assumed that psychological concepts serve to designate private objects.

Hence, as §§243-315 of the *Investigations* show, psychological language is no private language, not only in the sense that a private ostension is insufficient for establishing the use of psychological terms, but also in the sense that such terms do not refer to literally inner events and entities. As Wittgenstein hastens to add, this does not mean that he takes psychological phenomena to be unimportant or non-existent. In response to the Cartesian assumption that a word like “pain” stands for some concrete thing, he is not insisting that there is no such thing as pain: “The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.” 28

His conclusion, moreover, contains an important proviso: it is only if and when the model of ‘object and designation’ is imposed on psychological concepts that our thoughts and feelings are rendered insignificant. Far from concluding they should be explained away on all accounts, Wittgenstein argues that the incongruous consequences of Cartesianism can be avoided when psychological phenomena are conceived of differently: “The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way,” 29 namely, as names or labels for objects. There is an alternative to the Cartesian view, capable of doing more justice to our thoughts and feelings than Cartesianism itself, and the outlines of this alternative come into view when it is realized that, as Wittgenstein has already observed, our ordinary psychological language is always already bound up with the socially informed, external expressions of the mental.

### 3.3 Psychological verbs in the first and the third person

Considering that Cartesianism already ignores or distorts certain important features of our psychological practices, Wittgenstein takes a closer look at our day-to-day dealings with both our own and other minds. One highly distinctive characteristic thereof is that while we sometimes fail to see what someone else is thinking or feeling, there can normally be no doubt as to the psychological state we ourselves are in. Whereas one may for instance misinterpret another person’s pretence for genuine pain, or her pain for pretence, it is only in highly exceptional cases that we

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28 PI 304.
29 Ibidem.
hold a person to be mistaken about her own pain.\textsuperscript{30} Cartesianism takes this first person certainty to be a matter of infallible knowledge, owing to a person’s having direct access to his or her thoughts and feelings by means of introspection. From this perspective, first person utterances like “I hope she will come” and “I am in pain” should be considered to be knowledge claims based on inward observation, or reports of the things someone perceives inside. Our access to other minds, by contrast, is supposed to be indirect, and Cartesianism accordingly takes third person statements like “He is anxiously awaiting her coming” and “She is in pain” to amount to educated guesses at best. Based on an inventory of external clues rather than an inspection of a person’s inner itself, third person statements can supposedly never shake off their speculative status.

By discussing concrete cases of when and why we talk about our own and other people’s thoughts and feelings, Wittgenstein shows that within a Cartesian framework – no matter how well-equipped it seems for capturing the certainty distinctive of first and the uncertainty distinctive of third person utterances - both types of statements are misrepresented, both in terms of the kind of access purportedly enabling them, and in terms of the epistemological status granted to them. Yet far from merely undermining the Cartesian spin on our psychological practices, Wittgenstein also indicates how their asymmetry could be conceived of instead. In what may appear to be a complete reversal of Cartesianism, Wittgenstein claims: “Psychological verbs [are] characterized by the fact that the third person of the present is to be identified by observation, the first person not. Sentences in the third person of the present: information. In the first person present, expression.”\textsuperscript{31}

Let me explain somewhat less concisely what findings this claim can be said to encapsulate.\textsuperscript{32}

Consider initially Wittgenstein’s observations about the way psychological statements in the first person come about. As several of his remarks make clear, he thinks that it is inaccurate to maintain that sentences like “I am hurt” and “I am overjoyed” are descriptions based on observation. When someone says he is in pain, or in ecstasy, this is normally not preceded by an examination of his psychological condition. Indeed, Wittgenstein asks, can we even make sense of observing our own thoughts and feelings Cartesian-style: “How can you look at your grief? [...] By not letting anything distract you from your grief? [...] And if you

\textsuperscript{30} See PI 288, PI II § xi 220g-221a. Exceptions to the rule that a person cannot be mistaken about his or her own psychological phenomena could be phantom pain, or confusing a yearning for attention with love. However, such exceptions do not alter the fact that a person is normally not in doubt as to what he is thinking or feeling. Moreover, is the case of phantom pain really best described by saying that someone who suffers from it erroneously believes to be in pain? And is the person who confuses a need for attention with love truly mistaken about his feelings, or perhaps letting himself be guided by - what are considered to be - the wrong motivations in romantic affairs?

\textsuperscript{31} RPPii 63.

\textsuperscript{32} But see Ter Hark 1990 (chapters 4 & 5) for a more detailed discussion of the presuppositions Wittgenstein confronts and the arguments he develops in order to expose them.
are holding every distraction at a distance, does that mean you are observing this condition? or the other one, in which you were before the observation?\footnote{RPPi 446; cf. RPPii 171 RPPii 725, LWi 39, LWi 407.} Being hurt and being engaged in a careful observation of one’s pain seem, \textit{pace} Cartesianism, mutually exclusive states.

Moreover, that an inspection of one’s inner is not a precondition for first person statements is reflected in their role or function in our everyday practices. When someone says “I am hurt” or “I am overjoyed”, giving a description of his inner life is in most cases not exactly what he has in mind: “Does someone crying out “Help!” want to describe how he is feeling? Nothing is further from his intentions.”\footnote{LWi 48; see also RPPii 724.} Describing one’s thoughts and feelings is something a person only does in quite specific circumstances, such as during psychotherapy, or when telling a friend about the ordeals suffered the day before.\footnote{See LWi 27, RPPii 726.} This parenthetically explains why Wittgenstein is so careful to restrict his claim about the non-descriptive nature of first person utterances to those in the present tense. A statement of the form “I was afraid”, namely, might indeed function as a description of a person’s feelings – even though it was arguably not a Cartesian-style introspection that brought him to yell out “Help!” in the first place.

The realization that someone in pain or in fear may just as well scream “Ouch!” or “Help!” as say “I am hurt” or “I am frightened” also enables Wittgenstein to move away from the Augustinian or Cartesian assumption that psychological concepts simply serve to describe inner objects, and to develop a different account of first person utterances. For, he puts forward, “[p]erhaps this word “describe” tricks us here”\footnote{PI 290.} - perhaps we should not see such utterances as on a par with a description of, say, the things present in a particular room, but take seriously their proximity to the groan someone emits when hurting herself, or the cry someone utters when faced with something fearful. It is, for one thing, on the basis of cries and groans that one acquires a psychological vocabulary to begin with, as Wittgenstein already mentioned in discussing private language: “A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences.”\footnote{PI 244.} We would not be inclined to call a child’s crying a report of its feelings, and, Wittgenstein argues, “[i]f a cry is not a description, then neither is the verbal expression that replaces it.”\footnote{RPPii 728.}

Drawing on the continuity between an exclamation like “Ouch!” and a sentence like “I am in pain”, therefore, Wittgenstein suggests that first person utterances form a signal rather than a description, or a manifestation instead of a report of a person’s psychological phenomena.\footnote{See PI 180, PI 582, PI 585, RPPi 691, RPPi 313.} On his view, “I am hurt” and “I am
overjoyed” are not descriptions based on observation but unmediated expressions of someone’s pain or joy. Rather than forming an optional, after-the-fact report of the mental matters one perceives inside, such (more or less) verbal behaviours are already part and parcel of the multifaceted phenomena we call “pain” and “joy”.

Given that Wittgenstein holds a person’s thoughts and feelings to be manifested or materialized rather than reported or described in first person utterances, it should come as no surprise that he also takes issue with the Cartesian account of third person statements. Cartesianism maintains that a person’s doings and sayings are the only things observable from an outside perspective, and that our access to other minds is accordingly – assuming that these doings and sayings also bear no essential relation to what someone is thinking or feeling - wholly indirect. On this view, a sentence like “She is in pain” is uttered only after an inventory of a person’s actions and reactions but can never amount to more than an estimation, no matter how carefully such external clues are registered; external clues are after all all they are. Wittgenstein finds this explanation just as phenomenologically incorrect as Cartesianism account of psychological verbs in the first person.

In our day-to-day dealings with other people, he observes, we do not first take stock of what they do and say and then speculate about what might, perhaps, be going on inside them: “In general I do not surmise fear in him--I see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside.” While it may be true that we sometimes fail to understand what someone else is feeling or thinking, we are not forced to fall back on conjectures every time we are faced with another human being. As Wittgenstein asks with some sense of drama: “ ‘I can only guess at someone else’s feelings’ – does that really make sense when you see him badly wounded, for instance, and in dreadful pain?”

In such a case, as well as in numerous more mundane ones, another person’s thoughts and feelings are there “as clearly as in your own breast.”

40 RP Pii 170; see also RP Pii 570, RP Pii 719, LWi 767, PI 537.
41 LWI 964; see also PI II § xi 223e.
42 RP 927. Let me remark at this point that even though I am not explicitly or primarily placing Wittgenstein’s remarks in this context, his observations about our day-to-day dealings with other people’s thoughts and feelings can be said to defy other mind scepticism. For more elaborate discussions of Wittgenstein’s remarks from this perspective, see Rudd 2003, Glendinning 1998 and Overgaard 2007. Cavell has also worked extensively on Wittgenstein and other minds, see e.g. Cavell 1979, pp. 329-496 and Cavell 2005, pp. 132-154 for a more succinct overview of the ways in which he has dealt with this topic. While there is no consensus as to the exact Wittgensteinian challenge to the other mind sceptic, Cavell perhaps most clearly stands out from other interpretors, maintaining that scepticism is not a theoretical problem that should be overcome but instead points to a very real possibility in our everyday dealings with other people, a possibility of which we must consequently always remain aware (see Cavell 1979, pp. 368-370; Cavell 2005, pp. 133-135, p. 138). With Overgaard 2006, however, I feel that to the extent Wittgenstein does not simply explain the problem of other minds away, he does not do so in the sense of feeling that there still remains work to be done in understanding our exact relationship to others. Put differently, Wittgenstein may deny that there is a sceptical problem but all the same maintains that there is an ontological problem of other minds.
Hence, Wittgenstein maintains that whereas we cannot be said to observe our own psychological phenomena – at least not in the Cartesian sense of the word – we can be said to observe another’s – even though this does not take the form of a Cartesian-style introspection. His analysis of first and of third person statements go hand in hand. For if “I am overjoyed” is already part and parcel of a person’s psychological condition, rather than a report she gives – and could also refuse to give – of what goes on inside, “She is over the moon” need not be considered to be an estimation. Instead of seeing mind and body as diametrically opposed or only contingently related, Wittgenstein takes them to be intrinsically connected, thereby blurring the distinction between inside and out. From such a perspective, what a person says and does need not be set aside as purely external clues, and a sentence like “She is over the moon” can accordingly be taken to genuinely describe the state that another human being is in.

Indeed, on Wittgenstein’s account, one does not always need a first person report in order to tell what someone else is thinking or feeling. Elaborating fully on the continuity between groans and grimaces on the one hand, and sentences like “I am in pain” on the other, Wittgenstein takes verbal as well as non-verbal behaviour to be expressive of mind: “If one sees the behaviour of a living thing, one sees his soul.”43 This does not only include well-defined actions; as Wittgenstein for instance remarks about another person’s being in fear, this may already be observed in – as opposed to inferred from – the widening of his eyes and twitching of his mouth: “the timidity does not seem to be merely associated, outwardly connected, with [such facial changes]; but fear is there, alive, in the features.”44

Given that a person’s thoughts and feelings are personified or present in her gestures and facial expressions, among other things, the accuracy of a statement like “She is in pain” does not always depend on a preceding first person avowal, and “She is hurt” therefore does not automatically make for an inferior version of the first person’s saying “I am in pain.” In Wittgenstein’s book, third person statements are no conjectures but go to show that we are often able to immediately see someone else’s psychological condition, owing to the fact that the bodily and behavioural are not supplementary or secondary to the mental, but instead constitute the very sphere where the latter comes to life or resides.

Explained along Wittgensteinian rather than Cartesian lines, then, it is not quite correct to hold that only the first person can know what he or she is thinking or feeling.45 Wittgenstein does not only take issue with the idea that the asymmetry

43 PI 357; see also RPPi 595, RPPi 450. Cf. Schatzki 1996 (see pp. 41-53) on Wittgenstein on the expressiveness of the human body, and both Overgaard 2005 (see pp. 260-263) and Plant 2005 (see pp. 82-83) - who both point to a connection with Levinas in this respect - on Wittgenstein on the expressiveness of the human face. Cf. also Von Savigny 1996, who argues that linguistic utterances are simply more conspicuous than non-linguistic ones, and by no means the only means of expression (see pp. 183-186).
44 PI 537; see also RPPii 570.
45 See RPPi 564-573, PI II § xi 220-223.
between first and third person utterances should be explained in terms of direct versus indirect access, he also contests the accompanying notion that this difference is a matter of infallible knowledge versus inconclusive speculation. In this respect, too, he finds the Cartesian account of psychological asymmetry wanting. As Wittgenstein contends, not only is it indeed possible to come to know someone else’s thoughts and feelings, it is in fact impossible to have knowledge of one’s own: “It is correct to say “I know what you are thinking”, and wrong to say “I know what I am thinking.”” Yet far from depriving the self of every privilege, Wittgenstein thinks that it is Cartesianism that runs the risk of explaining first person certainty away.

It would, namely, only be correct to say that one knows one is in pain or in ecstasy if “I am hurt” and “I am overjoyed” were observation statements for which proof could be demanded and that could then also be proved wrong. Knowledge, as Wittgenstein most elaborately discusses in the remarks posthumously published as On Certainty, belongs to the same epistemological category as doubt and justification - the suggestion that first person utterances are knowledge claims, no matter how well it seems to capture their distinctive certainty, therefore reintroduces the possibility of error and hesitation with regard to one’s own psychological state. This possibility is in fact already brought in when it is declared that being in a certain state of mind is a matter of introspecting inner events or entities, for if a person could be said to observe his pain or joy, he could also be said to misinterpret or overlook it. To be sure, a committed Cartesian could counter this by claiming that introspection constitutes a very special, infallible kind of observation, and that statements like “I am in pain” accordingly belong to a group of extremely well-founded knowledge claims. On Wittgenstein’s non-observational, non-descriptive account of first person utterances, however, the possibility of doubt and error does not crop up in the first place, and no such manoeuvres are required in order to preserve first person certainty.

If Wittgenstein denies first person expressions the status of knowledge claims precisely with the aim of accommodating their distinctive certainty, his claiming that it is, *pace* Cartesianism, certainly possible to know someone else’s thoughts and feelings likewise does not amount to a denial of the uncertainty characterizing third

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46 PI II § xi 222b; see also RPPi 573, LWi 228. Hence, that Wittgenstein does not do away with first person certainty does not mean that he holds on to the ideal of the self-present subject that is the target of much anti- or post-Cartesian philosophy, for his first person is not an observing or identifying Ego; cf. Glendinning 1998, pp. 145-147. (And let me add that the fact that Wittgenstein does not hold the first person to be an identifying Ego in turn does not mean that he belongs to the camp of those who, against Cartesianism, insist that the self is an essentially split subject. On my view, Wittgenstein typically operates between such extremes.)

47 See RPPi 572, PI II § xi 221-222.

48 See OC 32, OC 91, OC 178, OC 243, OC 504, OC 580. Cf. Van Gennip 2008, pp. 150-159. As Van Gennip explains, Wittgenstein’s concern with concepts like certainty and knowledge was not limited to the remarks written in 1949-1951 and nowadays known as OC, but is also exhibited in plenty of older writings, including those on psychological asymmetry.
person statements. If a person’s verbal and bodily behaviour is intrinsic rather than secondary to his psychological condition, as Wittgenstein holds, there is no ground for claiming that other minds are at best indirectly accessible, but it by no means implies that people are always already completely transparent to each other.49 For even if someone’s thoughts and feelings are in principle already present in what he says and does, an onlooker might still misapprehend or overlook them.

Apart from the fact that one might simply close one’s eyes in the face of another’s thoughts and feelings,50 one reason that we sometimes fail to see or be certain about someone else's psychological state is that while her doings and sayings provide a basis for making observation statements of the form “She is in pain” and “She is overjoyed,” it is her “fine shades of behaviour”51 rather than any concrete activities to which these statements are due. That is to say, Wittgenstein explains, a person’s psychological phenomena are often (and perhaps more often than not) manifested, not so much in what she says or does, but in how she says or does it: in what tone of voice and with what look in her eyes, for instance. It is in this respect that Wittgenstein calls the evidence we have for making third person statements “imponderable”.52 On his analysis, we do not lack grounds for making third person statements, but this evidence may fail to be decisive in the case of doubt or dispute about a person’s psychological state. For while the look in someone’s eyes may be blatantly obvious to the one observer, there need not be something clear and distinct for him to point to in order to convince another onlooker of the sadness in this third person’s gaze.53

There are further reasons for calling the basis of third person statements imponderable or indeterminate. Not only are a person’s fine shades of behaviour just as important as the more concrete things she says and does, there is also no list of necessary and sufficient characteristics that constitutes someone’s being in pain or in ecstasy, no matter how many nuances one might include in such a list. Sadness, for example, does not always take the form of weeping and stammering, and a person weeping and stammering might also be in a condition other than grief.54 This is partly because the way someone’s feelings are materialized may

49 See PI II § xi 223f, RPPi 138, RPPii 560, LWii 70b.
50 Cf. Cavell 1976, pp. 238-266. Cavell argues that other minds are not so much there to be known as to be acknowledged, and that this acknowledgment can also be withheld; on his view, therefore, we ourselves are the scandal of scepticism (see Cavell 2005, pp. 151). While Cavell here seems more concerned with drawing out the ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s insights, rather than spelling out his non-Cartesian ontology, the qualms Cavell has about the appropriateness of the term “knowledge” in this context are not unjustified. I have been using terms like “knowledge” and “observation” to describe the third person perspective seemingly unreservedly up until now, mainly in order to bring out the contrast between the Wittgensteinian and the Cartesian view, but will qualify my use of these terms in the next section.
51 PI II § xi 203b, 204, 207, LWii 65f.
52 PI II § xi 228b-d, LWi 922-924, LWi 936, LWii 95a.
53 See RPPii 168, RPPii 684, RPPii 688, LWi 937.
54 Cf. Von Savigny 1996, p. 181; he explains that such elements are conspicuous rather than indispensable.
reflect her personal style and character, but also because the context of a person’s (fine shades of) behaviour often needs to be taken into account in order to ascertain what state of mind she is in.\textsuperscript{55} Tear-filled eyes and a trembling voice can after all be part and parcel of both gratitude and grief. Whether they are elements of the one or the other depends on whether they occur in the context of an award ceremony or in the context of a funeral, say. Or as Wittgenstein observes with regard to an apparent declaration of love: “it makes a difference whether someone says to me “I love her” because the words of a poem are going through his head or because he is saying it to make a confession to me of his love.”\textsuperscript{56} In the context of a play or poetry recital, such avowals do not automatically have the same significance as in off-stage life.

Speaking of (true) love, moreover, for such phenomena holds that their occurrence always already spans more than one specific time and place, which means that the context that needs to be taken into account in order to ascertain a person’s psychological state may also include the doings and sayings preceding and following a person’s (fine shades of) behaviour. Whereas some thoughts and feelings can occur in a flash or the space of one second, love, hate and depression, for instance, do not concern what a person says, does or experiences at one particular instant.\textsuperscript{57} Statements like “She loves him” or “He is in deep despair”, if they are to be accurate descriptions of someone’s psychological state, are therefore only uttered after witnessing a person’s actions and reactions over several occasions, and will moreover be retracted if someone’s subsequent behaviour puts this previous conduct in a very different light. While one may for example be certain that a particular person only married a woman twice his age because of her money, one may have to conclude that he loved her after all when he stands by her even after her stocks have crashed. In contrast to a momentary sensation like pain, Wittgenstein explains, “[love] is put to the test.”\textsuperscript{58} That phenomena like love and despair only unfold over a longer period also means that one has to be quite close to a person in order to be able to witness enough of her behaviour and understand what psychological state they are part and parcel of.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55} See PI 581, PI 583, RPPi 314, RPPi 1066, RPPii 148, RPPii 149, RPPii 150, I.Wi 861; cf. Mulhall 1993, pp. 63-64; Schatzki 1996, pp. 35-37, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{56} RPPi 1135.
\textsuperscript{57} Cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003, pp. 203-205 - but let me already remark here that while I think that their analysis of e.g. the concept of emotion is insightful, I disagree with their overall understanding of philosophy as conceptual analysis and of the way it relates to the scientific enterprise. I will come back to this in note 80 on page 67 of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{58} RPPi 959; see also RPPii 152.
\textsuperscript{59} It may, parenthetically, most notably be such extended psychological phenomena that form exceptions to the rule that a person cannot be mistaken about her own thoughts and feelings, or will as a rule not be confused or ignorant about these (see also the remark I made in note 30 of this chapter). In the case of love and depression, someone else may actually be in a better position to tell what state the first person is in, precisely because the latter lacks the distance to put his doings and undergoings in the proper light.
To the extent, then, that third person statements do not form unsubstantiated speculations, they are due to evidence of the most delicate, variable and dispersed kind. That mental matters are, on Wittgenstein’s analysis, already present or personified in someone’s contextualized (shades of) behaviour serves to explain why another’s thoughts and feelings are often perfectly - and even painfully - clear, but it at the same time provides an explanation for the fact that we sometimes fail to see or be certain about someone else’s psychological state. Psychological phenomena, namely, while no less real than physical or material ones, are no clear and distinct objects whose contours can be indicated with one simple finger movement.

Hence, just as Wittgenstein safeguards rather than denies first person certainty, he does not do away with third person uncertainty; he merely argues that this need not be taken to result from a person’s thoughts and feelings being private objects hidden inside of her: “One could even say: The uncertainty about the inner is an uncertainty about something outer.” Indeed, on Wittgenstein’s view, the postulation of a private inner realm is not even necessary in order to accommodate what is perhaps the main impetus behind it: the fact that we may on occasion not just fail to understand someone else’s thoughts and feelings, but might in fact be actively misled about these.

As Wittgenstein points out, pretending to be in pain, say, is never merely a matter of displaying pain behaviour on the outside without truly feeling pain within. A person might also exhibit pain behaviour unaccompanied by pain after having received a special kind of drug, for instance, in which case we would think twice before calling her a liar and impostor. Something more is required if the label “liar” is to apply: “There must be a motive present for the simulation, hence a situation which is not quite simple to describe. Making oneself out sick and weak, in order then to attack those who help one.” So, far from being solely explicable in terms of the Cartesian inner-outer model, what holds for genuine psychological phenomena holds for the phenomenon of pretence too: there is evidence on the basis of which we can ascertain what someone else is (or is not) thinking or feeling, but this evidence is, to a bigger or lesser extent, ambiguous and diffuse.

Let me end this section by reiterating that Wittgenstein speaks of “evidence” here in order to indicate the non-speculative nature of third person statements, and by no means wants to imply that a person’s contextualized (shades of) behaviour are mere evidence, i.e., evidence in the sense of hints or clues as to what is really

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60 LWii 88; see also LWi 197.
61 See RPPi 565, RPPi 574, RPPl 563, RPPl 564.
62 See RPPi 137.
63 RPPl 824; see also LWi 262, LWii 56e, LWii 56f.
64 In addition, see Ter Hark 1990, pp. 129-135. Ter Hark points out that Wittgenstein also shows pretending to be a highly specialized language game – which means that we can only call someone an impostor after she has already learned a lot - as well as that the need to hide or feign behaviour arises only because people are not always a mystery to each other in the first place.
going on inside someone. In Wittgenstein’s book, the vagueness and multifariousness of psychological phenomena should not be taken to constitute a shortcoming and make one look for something that is less indeterminate and therefore, supposedly, more relevant or real. Instead, it belongs to the very essence of our psychological practices that third person uncertainty exists. Although one may be frustrated or dissatisfied with “our language-game which rests on ‘imponderable evidence’ and frequently leads to uncertainty,” one would “exchange it for a more exact one” only to alter our lives beyond recognition. For, Wittgenstein observes, “variability itself is a characteristic of behaviour without which behaviour would be to us as something completely different.” Thoughts and feelings, or at least the thoughts and feelings that play a part in our psychological practices, do not come in a pure and precise form.

3.4 On the outside rather than the inside of the subject

On the basis of the preceding exposition of Wittgenstein’s remarks on first and third person utterances, he can be said to replace the Cartesian account with a model that tries to bring out the asymmetry between these types of statements more adequately. And as the above exposition also made clear, this alternative model concerns not only the epistemology but also the ontology of matters mental.

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65 Cf. Ter Hark 2000, pp. 204-217 and Ter Hark 2004, pp. 138-143. Ter Hark explains Wittgenstein’s view on psychological indeterminacy by means of the latter’s concept of “pattern”. I by no means think this is uninformative but merely postpone introducing this concept myself because I think its social connotations are very important as well – a psychological pattern in Wittgenstein’s sense, namely, is never a pattern one follows or displays individually – and will therefore only discuss it in the section on the sociality of subjectivity. Cf. also Von Savigny 1996, p. 155; Schatzki 1996, pp. 71-72.

66 See RPPii 657, RPPii 682, LWi 888, LWii 30a.

67 LWii 95; see also LWi 35, LWi 955.

68 RPPii 627; see also RPPii 615, RPPii 622, RPPii 628, LWi 249, LWii 37e.

69 Also, what holds for Wittgenstein’s use of the word “evidence” holds for his much debated claim “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI 580) too. Here, Wittgenstein is not claiming that we need external criteria in order to make something invisible, namely, the real inner events, at least somewhat accessible - hence the scare quotes. On Wittgenstein’s view, what someone thinks and feels has no existence separate from or prior to what she says and does. Cf. Overgaard 2004, pp. 268-269; Rudd 2003, pp.118-120; Ter Hark 2000, pp. 202-204. (In contrast to my reading, however, Ter Hark argues that one precisely misunderstands Wittgenstein’s claims when one takes them to be of an ontological kind, but this points to a more basic difference of opinion as to the aim and nature of Wittgenstein’s method; see also my arguments in chapter 2. A propos Wittgenstein’s non-Cartesian ontology, Rudd still seems to hold on to Cartesian-style distinction between in- and outside, claiming that since pain and the expression of pain are not identical, we can never observe someone else’s pain itself. Yet while the former is true, the latter does not follow; I will shortly say more, not only on the connection, but also on the distinction between e.g. pain and pain behaviour. For now, suffice it to say that “I am happy” can still be said to be an expression of joy rather than joy itself because this phenomenon cannot be reduced to either one of the doings and sayings that are part and parcel of it.)
If the Cartesian dual sphere ontology follows from a misinterpretation of the epistemological status of first and third person utterances, Wittgenstein accompanies or underpins his reorientation of the Cartesian epistemology with a different ontology of psychological phenomena and of the way inner and outer relate. In his book, what a person says and does, and how she says and does it, are not matters of her first observing her thoughts and feelings and then giving a description or a hint of them. Instead, such (fine shades of) behaviour are already part and parcel of a person’s psychological state, and it is also because of this interconnectedness between inner and outer that we can be said to have proper (though by no means infallible) access to what other people think and feel.\(^70\) Wittgenstein’s epistemological account of psychological asymmetry cannot be separated from his embodied or enacted ontology.

As a first step towards formulating this Wittgensteinian account of subjectivity, let me summarize the insights obtained so far by saying that he situates psychological phenomena on the outside rather than the inside of the human being. According to Wittgenstein, that is, thoughts and feelings are not inner objects that exist separate from and prior to a person’s doings and saying, but are less clear-cut, highly multifaceted phenomena that precisely have their life in someone’s (fine shades of) behaviour on particular (more or less extended) occasions. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the outer is not an inessential supplement to the inner but should be considered to be the very locus thereof.

I deliberately call this formulation tentative or provisional, not only because bringing out Wittgenstein’s more general insights requires due care and caution, but mainly because several important qualifications need to be made. That is to say, contrary to what my claiming that he takes the outer to be the locus of the inner may suggest, Wittgenstein holds psychological phenomena to be neither a purely physiological nor a purely behavioural affair.\(^71\) While he takes issue with the Cartesian account of the way mind and body (inter)relate, he does not embrace a reductionism to either one of these kinds instead.

Let me start with Wittgenstein’s verdict on physicalism, or the idea that mind and brain can be said to be identical.\(^72\) In contemporary philosophy of mind, the

\(^70\) Though to the extent that the term “access” suggests that something must be opened or unlocked in order for it to take effect, Wittgenstein may want to deny that we have “access” to other minds after all. He does not claim that our ability to see what state other people are in is a matter of literally being able to look inside their hearts and heads.

\(^71\) Let me already make clear at this point that these are not the only qualifications to be made, for not only does Wittgenstein not reduce the inner to the outer in the behavioural or physiological sense of the word, much of his philosophy of psychology is moreover devoted to showing that the doings and sayings in which psychological phenomena have there life, are for an important part socially determined. I will discuss this element of Wittgensteinian subjectivity in the next section.

\(^72\) Cf. Kim 1998, pp. 9-13, pp. 58-62; Stoljar 2001, pp. 9-13. They explain that physicalism actually comes in both reductive and non-reductive forms but is often regarded as a intrinsically reductive notion, with type physicalism as its most prototypical expression. According to Kim (see pp. 221-237), this is not entirely without right, because it is hard to formulate a non-reductive physicalism
mind-brain identity thesis is not unequivocal: it can stand either for so-called “type physicalism” or what is known as “token physicalism”. “Type physicalism” is a shorthand for the thesis that mental occurrences and physical occurrences are events of the same kind - hence the epithet “type” - or that mental events simply are physical events. On this view, pain is for instance nothing over and above the C-fibre stimulations that neuroscience has shown to occur whenever a person has, say, a headache. Token physicalism is the competing notion that every particular event – hence the epithet “token” - that has a mental property also has a physical property, or that every specific mental event can also be considered to be a physical event. On this view, a particular person’s having a headache can be looked at as both an instance of C-fibre stimulation and an instance of pain. The main difference between type and token physicalism accordingly is that token physicalists are in fact not committed to a reduction of mind to brain; leaving the exact relationship between mental and physical events undecided, they merely hold that a psychological occurrence is always also a physiological one.

In a couple of remarks that once more concern the phenomenon of remembering, Wittgenstein seems to address the topic of physicalism most directly. These are §§ 902-905 and § 220 of the first volume of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology; I will discuss them in this order. In the first of these passages, reflecting on the idea that for every memory there is a trace in the nervous system that corresponds to it and causes it, Wittgenstein does not so much discuss a proposal to reduce memories to brain states - that is, an application of type physicalism - but should sooner be said to examine a form of token physicalism. However, the mere suggestion that every psychological occurrence needs to be accompanied – let alone explained away – by a physiological one, immediately seems to be brushed off by Wittgenstein. When one runs into an old acquaintance, recognizes him and remembers his name, Wittgenstein asks, “why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system? [...] Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds?” Indeed, as far as he is concerned, physiological processes are entirely irrelevant to what a person remembers or thinks: “No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking.”

that is not either uninformative or effectively reductive too. My discussion of Wittgenstein and physicalism will address both a reductive and a non-reductive kind, but its main conclusion will be anti-reductive.

73 I am following Kim’s definition here (see Kim 1998, pp. 58-62), who mainly seems to have Davidson’s “anomalous monism” in mind, but there are other version of token physicalism as well, such as psychofunctionalism (see Jacob 1997, p. 37). Thornton 1998 precisely applies the remarks I will also discuss to Davidson’s philosophy of mind; Ter Hark 2000 brings Wittgenstein’s insights to bear on physicalist ideas as expounded by Armstrong, Fodor and Churchland.

74 According to Kim, token physicalism is therefore not much of a physicalism (see Kim 1998, pp. 60-61).

75 RPP: 905.

76 RPP: 903.
This may seem to conflict with Wittgenstein’s taking Cartesianism to task for effectively disconnecting mind and body, but he is not claiming that what a person thinks or feels bears no relation whatsoever to what goes on in the brain. Wittgenstein immediately goes on to modify his statement, explaining that while he assumes that there is “a system of impulses going out from [the] brain” and underlying one’s thoughts and memories, he doubts whether this system should necessarily “continue further in the direction of the centre.” In other words, Wittgenstein does not deny that physiological processes make psychological ones possible, but he does question the notion that what happens at the psychological level is a direct result and simple mirror image of what goes on in the brain, and that it would thus be possible to determine what state of mind someone is in simply by looking at his neural activity. To the extent that token physicalism as such does not yet prescribe one specific view of the relationship between mind and brain, Wittgenstein would dispute those versions that take physical and mental events to stand in a one-to-one, isomorphic relation. Such versions of token physicalism would also come quite close to the stronger thesis of type physicalism.

In an attempt to clarify his supposition about the way that the physical and the mental need not be considered to be related, Wittgenstein then imagines our thoughts and memories to be akin to certain kinds of plants, and their concurrent neural constellations to the seeds out of which this vegetation grows. The plants he has in mind multiply in such a way that an individual seed always brings forth a plant of the same kind that it sprouted from itself, but without the seed having any properties or structures that indicate what it will produce. In order to ascertain what type of vegetation will grow out of them, as a result, it is of no avail to examine these seeds themselves, no matter how thoroughly one proceeds; what they will bring forth can only be determined by taking a broader perspective and also taking their history into account. Wittgenstein sums up: “So an organism might come into being even out of something quite amorphous, as it were causelessly.”

This botanical thought experiment may not be the most convincing, to say the least, for it is hard to imagine how plants with such principally structureless seeds could actually reproduce, but Wittgenstein does not seem to be bothered by such qualms. If the possibility of something originating out of chaos, so to speak, is at odds with or “upsets our concepts of causality,” he declares, “then it is high time they were upset.” And one could perhaps grant him that the way that the brain makes our thoughts and memories possible need not have the exact same structure as the causal processes behind the reproduction of plants.

But apart from the question as to whether there is any botanical truth to Wittgenstein’s comparison, the upshot of his thought experiment is also not a foolproof argument against the idea that mind and brain are causally related.

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77 Ibidem; see also RPPi 157.
78 RPPi 903.
assuming that he would want to deny such a relationship in the first place. The seed comparison only serves to indicate, in a somewhat roundabout way, that from the existence of a causal relation between physical and mental events, the containment of the mental within the physical does not yet follow, or that in order for the physiological to make the psychological possible, they need not have the exact same structure. Wittgenstein points out that the existence of a causal relation between physiological and psychological events by itself does even not preclude the possibility that there is no structural similarity between the physical and the mental whatsoever. On his view, our brains might thus turn out to lack each and every organization, without this disorder making our thoughts and memories any less structured (or, well, any more disorganized).

But this merely means that to the extent that a token physicalist would want to defend that physical and mental events to stand in a one-to-one, isomorphic relation, she would need some additional arguments or evidence. Neither token physicalism as such, nor the stronger thesis of type physicalism, are rejected by Wittgenstein’s thought experiment.

Judging by §§ 902-905 of the first volume of the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, then, Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of a causal relationship between neurological and psychological processes, but he offers no account of the exact relationship between mind and brain himself. Yet as § 220 of this same volume goes to show, Wittgenstein is in fact not entirely agnostic when it comes to this relationship. He argues that even if there were a clear causal correspondence between certain psychological processes and certain physiological ones, it is still not by merely looking at a person’s neural activity that his thoughts and feelings can be determined. Here it becomes clear that if Wittgenstein does not disapprove of all forms of token physicalism, he does take issue with physicalism of the reductionist or type variety.

Wittgenstein’s argument against an explanation of remembering solely in terms of neurological occurrences actually proceeds along similar lines to his arguments against explanations of remembering solely in terms of internal images; on his view,

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80 Here, Wittgenstein seems to leave the question to science, the exact organization of our brains not being something he feels able to discuss. However, this does not mean that he envisions a strict division or hierarchy between philosophy and science of the kind argued for in e.g. Baker & Hacker 1980 (see pp. 475-481) and especially Bennett & Hacker 2003 (see pp. 396-408). On my reading, Wittgenstein neither sees language and world as standing in a wholly one-sided relation, nor takes it to be philosophy’s task to merely dissolve the mistakes that other people make (again, see my arguments in the previous chapter). For these reasons, I do not share Bennett & Hacker’s understanding of philosophy as conceptual analysis in the sense of only demarcating what scientists can and cannot do, and not being able to learn anything from science itself. (Also, see RPPi 157, LWi 807.)

81 Cf. Thornton 1998, pp. 180, pp. 203-204. Thornton takes RPPi 902-905 to deny physicalism as well as a causal theory of mind, and subsequently tries to put these claims, of which he acknowledges that they may be somewhat unconvincing, in a more compelling light. On my reading, however, these remarks contain an argument against neither physicalism nor physico-mental causation - although Wittgenstein may have wanted them to provide such arguments.
what applies to (purported) inner events and entities holds for (real or imagined) physiological processes too.\textsuperscript{82} Just as a mental image is by itself a static entity that does not convey anything past, a trace left behind in the nervous system by something one witnessed before does not yet constitute a memory. For, Wittgenstein explains, when someone would then try to recall the incident, “he would have to infer it from this impression, this trace. Whatever the event does leave behind in the organism, it isn’t the memory.”\textsuperscript{83} Far from explaining what remembering is, an appeal to neurological entities simply falls back on this phenomenon. Moreover, if memories were simply traces in the nervous system, we would also say of a dictaphone that it remembers things, whereas we only ascribe memories to living human beings. A memory does not yet occur on the neural level, it is something that only the subject in its entirety and historicity can be said to have or undergo.\textsuperscript{84} According to Wittgenstein, physiological processes and psychological phenomena are in an entirely different league.

Hence, Wittgenstein may not be denying that the occurrence of a mental event always also implies the occurrence of a specific physical event – he may, in other words, not directly refute token physicalism – he does argue against the idea that psychological phenomena can be reduced to physiological processes: he categorically rejects type physicalism. That Wittgenstein situates mental matters on the outside rather than the inside of the subject should therefore not be taken to mean that he considers the mental to be a purely physical affair.

However, not only does he not hold our thoughts and feelings to be outer in this sense,\textsuperscript{85} Wittgenstein does not take them to be wholly outer in a behaviouristic sense either. As he himself tries to remove any suspicions to the contrary: “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” – If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical one.”\textsuperscript{86} Put differently, while Wittgenstein argues that Cartesianism mistakenly portrays our thoughts and feelings as literally inner entities and unduly severs the ties between sensation and the expression of sensation, he does not thereby claim that behaviour is all there is to it when it comes to psychological affairs. But in order to bring this out properly, some distinctions again have to be made, for just as the mind-brain identity thesis in not unequivocal, the term “behaviourism” covers several related yet distinct perspectives on the

\textsuperscript{82} As I pointed out in note 13 of this chapter, Wittgenstein’s remarks about the meaning of the word “cube” apply to attempts at explaining meaning in terms of individual states more generally, hence to physicalism as well as to Cartesianism. The non-individualistic character of Wittgenstein’s account of subjectivity will, as I also already announced, be explored in the next section.

\textsuperscript{83} RPPi 220; see also LWi 77, LWi 806.

\textsuperscript{84} See RPPi 220, RPPi 280, RPPi 501, PI 570; cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003, pp. 68-88 on the mereological fallacy, pointing out that psychological predicates which apply only to humans or animals as wholes cannot be applied to any one of their parts, \textit{in casu}, their brains.

\textsuperscript{85} And perhaps physiological processes should actually also be said to be inner, albeit not in the Cartesian meaning of the term.

\textsuperscript{86} PI 307; see also PI 244, PI 304, PI 308, LWi 406.
relationship between the mental and the behavioural, not all of them equally reductive.

In philosophical expositions of behaviourism, three kinds are usually distinguished, namely methodological, logical and ontological behaviourism. Behaviourism of the methodological or epistemological variety merely concerns the way in which psychological research should be conducted. It states that psychology, if it is to be a truly scientific discipline, cannot rely on introspective reports and should only concern itself with publicly observable, behavioural data. It is informed by specific ideas about what knowledge and observability consist in, but is not automatically committed to any views on what our everyday psychological concepts mean or refer to. Logical behaviourism, in contrast, is a thesis about the meaning of our ordinary psychological vocabulary. It holds that every psychological expression can be translated into a statement about behavioural occurrences, without this affecting the meaning of the expression at issue. Yet like methodological behaviourism, it officially refrains from making claims about the referents of these expressions, or about what psychological phenomena actually are; this, rather, is the province of ontological behaviourism. Ontological behaviourism is behaviourism in its most radical form, stating that psychological phenomena simply are behavioural phenomena. On this view, there is nothing to a person over and above her bodily and verbal actions and reactions. I will respectively address the second, the third and the first form of behaviourism.

There can be little doubt as to Wittgenstein’s disagreeing with logical behaviourism, to start with. To the extent that it takes first person as well as third person expressions to be translatable into statements about objective behavioural facts, Wittgenstein cannot be said to subscribe to a behaviourism of this kind. As was explained in the previous section, there is a fundamental asymmetry characterizing our psychological vocabulary: Wittgenstein maintains that whereas a statement of the form “He is in ecstasy” can be considered to be a description, a statement like “I am overjoyed” cannot be said to describe anything at all. A first person expression can therefore not be translated into a statement reporting behavioural occurrences without changing its meaning beyond recognition.

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87 Cf. Kim 1998, pp. 29-44. As is argued in Day & Moore 1995 (see pp. 76-77), philosophical discussions of behaviourism do not always do justice to the views adopted by behaviourists; O'Donohue 1999 (see pp. 1-8) accordingly points out that “behaviourism” is more of a family resemblance concept than a uniform theory, and goes on to describes no less than 14 kinds. (Including a Wittgensteinian one - see pp. 329-360; the contribution is by Bloor - although that is argued to ultimately not be a form of behaviourism at all. According to Bloor, Wittgenstein should be considered to be a collectivist rather than a behaviourist; I will discuss Wittgenstein’s collectivism in the penultimate chapter.) In the following discussion, I will stick to philosophical usage and only explain why Wittgenstein is not a methodological, logical or ontological behaviourist. See Overgaard 2004, pp. 272-280 for a somewhat more detailed discussion of the different versions of behaviourism that might and have been attributed to Wittgenstein, for instance (and most famously) by Chihara and Fodor.

88 Cf. Moore 1999, pp. 51-54; he explains that many methodological behaviourists actually subscribed to a dualistic ontology.
Psychological verbs in the first person, being manifestations rather than descriptions of a person’s mind, are no more about publicly observable activities than about private inner objects. And as Wittgenstein observes, this holds in ordinary, everyday contexts as well as in the context of psychological research: “The psychologist reports the utterances of the subject. But these utterances ‘I see...’, ‘I hear...’, ‘I feel’ etc., are not about behaviour.”\(^{89}\) If Cartesianism misinterprets the asymmetry characterizing our psychological practices, logical behaviourism ignores it altogether.\(^{90}\)

Yet whereas Wittgenstein’s analysis of first person expressions unmistakably betrays his distance from logical behaviourism, his accompanying account of third person statements may seem to place him in the behaviourist camp nonetheless. As was also explained before, first person statements, rather than being about behaviour, are themselves pieces of fear or joy behaviour, and it is for this reason that third person statements need not be taken to be mere speculations. According to Wittgenstein, a person’s doings and sayings form an intrinsic part of the psychological state she is in, and sentences like “She is in pain” can accordingly be said to genuinely describe other minds. But if third person statements are about other minds precisely because they report rather than speculate about behaviour, Wittgenstein’s outlook may seem very close to behaviourism of the reductionist, ontological kind.

While there could be said to be some affinity between Wittgenstein and this form of behaviourism in that both, contrary to Cartesianism, acknowledge the strong relationship between sensation and the expression of sensation, Wittgenstein is eager to stress that this affinity does not go all the way. He asks: “When I report ‘He was put out’ am I reporting behaviour or a state of mind?” and immediately responds: “Both. But not side by side;”\(^{91}\) such a statement is only “about the one via the other.”\(^{92}\) In other words, to the extent that third person statements are about behaviour, they are about something present in yet irreducible to that behaviour; they are not solely or simply about behaviour.

In order to fully understand what Wittgenstein means here, it is not enough to recall that, as discussed before, in addition to someone’s discrete doings and saying, we always also take the fine shades and context of this behaviour into account. Though strict ontological behaviourists might deny that especially fine shades of

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\(^{89}\) LWii 2; see also PI II § v 179b, RPPi 468, RPPi 703, RPPi 712, RPPii 166.

\(^{90}\) A similar observation could parenthetically be made about Wittgenstein’s distance from physicalism, for in so far as it takes to entire domain of the mental to be reducible to physiological occurrences, physicalism also fails to do justice to the asymmetry characterizing our psychological practices. The objection that it cannot accommodate the phenomenal quality of first person experience (or “qualia”, in contemporary philosophy of mind terms) is often raised against reductive physicalism; cf. Kim 1998, pp. 64-67. If there is a Wittgensteinian contribution to this debate, it is probably his insistent emphasis on the difference between the first and the third person perspective.

\(^{91}\) RPPi 288; cf. PI 421.

\(^{92}\) LWii 2.
behaviour qualify as behaviour “in a narrower sense,” a behaviourist need not automatically disregard the circumstances and way in which behaviour is performed. These elements can after all also be said to be public or outer. If it is really the case that Wittgenstein does not reduce the inner to the outer behaviourist-style, as he himself suggests, the difference with ontological behaviourism should be of a qualitative rather than a quantitative kind.

That third person statements are, on Wittgenstein’s view, not purely about behaviour, is accordingly not just because we take a whole constellation of external elements into account. It is rather because we immediately take such a constellation to be a plain instance of exasperation or ecstasy. When we claim “He was put out,” we do not report an examination of another person’s doings and sayings, even including circumstances and style; we indicate that we already see this contextualized and fine-grained behaviour as nothing less than annoyance. That the difference between Wittgenstein and reductive behaviourists is not merely quantitative is therefore as much a matter of ontology as of epistemology, or as much a matter of what he takes us to see when we make third person statements as of how he take us to see or deal with these things. If Wittgenstein underpins his reorientation of Cartesian epistemology with a different account of the way inner and outer relate, the non-behaviourist character of his alternative ontology only comes out when we also consider how he begs to differ with behaviourism’s epistemology.

In so far as methodological or epistemological behaviourism holds that all that is publicly observable are things like movements, shapes and sizes, and ontological behaviourism goes on to conclude that such things are all that is actually out there, Wittgenstein already refuses to take the very first step. Take the case of looking at a photograph, he recommends: “ask yourself whether you see only the distribution of darker and lighter patches, or the facial expression as well [...] and when you say of the face that it is smiling—is it easier to describe the corresponding lie and shape of the parts of the face, or to smile yourself?” According to Wittgenstein, smiles and glances are no less visible than shapes and movements. But then again, he continues, “I contradict anyone who tells me I see the eye’s glance ‘just as’ I see its form and colour.” For someone might be able to see and describe another

93 RPPi 314.
94 Interpreters like Mulhall and Schatzki, first and foremost emphasizing the contextualized character of Wittgenstein’s outlook, suggest that the difference with behaviourism already results from a focus on behaviour-in-context instead of on behaviour-in-isolation (see Mulhall 1993, pp. 62-65; Schatzki 1996, pp. 23, p. 61, pp. 79-80). That, however, does not seem to suffice to bring out the real disagreement between Wittgenstein and behaviourism; as Moore explains, methodological behaviourists, in any case, also count the environmental variables of past and present among admissible data (see Moore 1999, p. 23, p. 51).
95 Cf. Rudd 2003, pp. 126-127; Glendinning 1998, p. 143. Both argue that Wittgenstein takes psychological phenomena to be manifest only to a creature that responds in the appropriate way.
96 RPPi 1072; see also RPPi 267, RPPi 287.
97 RPPi 1101; see also RPPi 1066, RPPi 1068, RPPi 1070, RPPi 1103.
person’s face most accurately, without being able to identify the smile on her lips or the glance in her eyes. Wittgenstein concludes: “So if the ideal representation of what is seen is the photographically (metrically) exact reproduction in a picture, then one might want to say: “I see the movement, and somehow notice the joy.””

Wittgenstein’s conclusion should not be taken to mean that smiles and glances are not visible after all. His observation only implies that they are not visible in the same way as shapes and sizes are, or that two different concepts of seeing are at work here. In the term Wittgenstein eventually reserves for this other kind of perception, one should distinguish between seeing tout court and seeing-as. Though we ordinarily use the word “seeing” in both of these ways, there is a difference between seeing in the sense of observing quantifiable matters like size and movement, and seeing in the sense of recognizing a hesitant gesture or a smiling face. And this is a difference just as much in the objects of vision as in the way we approach them, or a difference just as much in ontological as in epistemological respect. Wittgenstein seems to hold that different kinds of phenomena require or go together with different kinds of perception.

This distinction, then, is of the utmost importance when it comes to psychological verbs in the third person. Sentences of the form “He is in pain” and “She is overjoyed” need not be considered to be purely about behaviour, or even a conglomerate of behavioural data, because they are uttered on the basis, not of seeing, but of seeing-as. According to Wittgenstein, far from treating someone else’s behaviour simply as behaviour, we always already take it as expressive of mind and as part and parcel of the psychological state he is in. Or as he himself puts it: “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul.” Assuming that difference between seeing and seeing-as concerns the objects of vision just as much as the way we approach them, this should not be taken to mean that, on Wittgenstein’s view, psychological phenomena are simply projected onto other human beings and do not even exist apart from our attributing them. Quite the contrary - that we speak of other people’s thought and feelings, or even of thoughts and feelings überhaupt, is not a matter of our merely believing or conjuring up something: “I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.” Instead of a calculation

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98 RPPi 1070.
99 See RPP 1068, RPPi 1071, RPPi 1102, LWi 431. Pursuing a different strategy, Wittgenstein also argues that seeing is actually not even a matter of taking in clearly circumscribed characteristics in the case of simple objects of vision; see RPPi 966, RPPi 1070, RPPi 1079, RPPi 1080.
100 As is well-known, seeing-as is a topic recurring throughout Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, with PI II § xi as its locus classicus; cf. Budd 1989, pp. 77-99; Mulhall 1993, pp. 6-34; Ter Hark 1990, pp. 106-186. My brief introduction of the concept of seeing-as here by no means does justice to all of Wittgenstein’s insights on this topic, but I will discuss them (and defend my specific interpretation of them) more thoroughly in the final section of this chapter.
101 PI II § iv 178d.
102 Ibidem; see also RPPi 268, RPPi 917, LWi 354; cf. Ter Hark 1980, pp. 139-140. Ter Hark explains that the Wittgensteinaian framework accordingly leaves no room for something like the traditional argument from analogy. To the extent that one nonetheless feels that Wittgenstein does not sufficiently do justice to the otherness of the other, cf. Overgaard 2005, arguing (by
we time and again perform, or a conviction we have decided to entertain, the attitude Wittgenstein mentions is not anything we actively or deliberately adopt. It rather refers to something we normally do not do, namely, treat other people as soulless beings, as objects or automata, say.\textsuperscript{103}

Indeed, that this our normal attitude towards others perhaps only comes out when we realize that people sometimes have or take a different perspective; a realization that may make one feel, Wittgenstein expects, “a little uncanny.”\textsuperscript{104} If someone’s thoughts and feelings only come to life or reside in her doings and sayings, but at the same time cannot be reduced thereto, a person may ignore or fail to see other people’s psychological phenomena when she only sees or focuses on other people’s behaviour in terms of measurable actions and reactions. A person who has or takes such a perspective may be called “soul blind”, just as Wittgenstein calls a person who is unable to treat pictures like anything but blueprints, or who would be unable to hear the plaint in a certain melody, “aspect blind”.\textsuperscript{105} Far from being better able than the average onlooker to see what is truly out there – the succession of movements, the geometrics of the face, even if their circumstances are also taken into account – we would feel that a person who lacks the soul attitude misses out on something that is all too relevant and real.\textsuperscript{106} This is precisely why the term “blind” is appropriate here, and why the realization that such blindness is possible, will probably make one feel somewhat ill at ease. The soul blind person is incapable of seeing the very subjectivity or humanity of her fellow beings.

As is the case with his discussion of Cartesianism, Wittgenstein’s differing from behaviourism is a matter of both ontology and epistemology, or of ontology and epistemology combined. And as it turns out, Cartesianism and behaviourism are
actually quite similar in both these respects. Although behaviourism will have no truck with Cartesian-style introspection when it comes to the issue of epistemology, both behaviourists and Cartesians maintain that all that is publicly available are things like movements, shapes and sizes. In contrast to both these positions, Wittgenstein holds that psychological phenomena are no less visible than such quantifiable matters, provided that one has or takes the appropriate attitude. As a result, Wittgenstein’s alternative to the Cartesian claim that third person statements are mere conjectures does not amount to cool and detached observation à la behaviourism - a nuance which might have been missed in above given formulations. Wittgenstein precisely explains that we will inevitably fail to see what someone else is thinking or feeling when we take the perspective of an outside observer rather than that of a fellow human being.

This also points to the ontological assumptions that Cartesians and behaviourists share, for while they have widely diverging views on the reality of mind, they have like perspectives on the human body. Both Cartesianism and behaviourism presuppose that a person’s doings and sayings belong to the category of measurable things and therefore automatically and completely fall outside the scope of the mental. In other words, both consider behaviour to be mere behaviour or to be nothing but behaviour, the difference being that Cartesians subsequently posit psychological phenomena inside the subject, whereas radical behaviourists claim that if a person’s thoughts and feelings cannot be said to be identical to his doings and saying, they cannot be said to be anything at all. Wittgenstein rejects the assumption that makes this all-or-nothing decision seem necessary in the first place. Refusing to defend that all that is out there must take a pure and precise, quantifiable form, or can partake in one and only one, clearly definable category, he maintains that human behaviour is always already filled or overflown with soul – even though it takes the right kind of seeing to recognize that fact.

Hence, to summarize the findings of this section: that Wittgenstein takes the outer to be the locus of the inner does not mean that he considers thoughts and feelings to be purely physiological or purely behavioural affairs. As he himself declares: “Am I saying something like, “and the soul itself is merely something about the body”? No. (I am not that hard up for categories.)”\textsuperscript{107} What is more, rather than situating mental matters on the outside of the subject, Wittgenstein should be said to locate them in between subjects. In his account, after all, epistemology is part and parcel of ontology. A person’s doings and saying only come to life as instances of, say, fear or joy to those who take this behaviour as expressive of mind. According to Wittgenstein, then, psychological phenomena have their existence, not so much on the outside of the human being, but in the interspace between the subject and its fellow men.

\textsuperscript{107} RPPii 690.
But there is another sense in which the notion of an in-between or interspace is appropriate here, and this has got do with the fact that there is another respect in which Wittgenstein’s outlook differs from that of both Cartesianism, physicalism and behaviourism. For regardless of their respective differences, these accounts of the (un)reality of mental matters all focus first and foremost on the isolated, individual subject, or even only on one specific part or feature thereof. Yet as Wittgenstein remarks: “The behaviour of humans includes of course not only what they do without ever having learned the behaviour, but also what they do [and say] after having received a training.” On his view, the manifestation of psychological phenomena should often (and perhaps more often than not) be seen against the background of someone’s upbringing within a particular community. As I will explain in the next section, Wittgenstein takes much expressive behaviour, as well as the ability to understand these expressions, to be socially informed accomplishments rather than pre-given facts.

3.5 In the interspace between a community of subjects

When Wittgenstein is mentioned as one of the thinkers responsible for the specific turn that the debate on subjectivity took, it is in fact more often his embedding than his embodying the subject to which this is due. This is by no means unjustified, since Wittgenstein’s rethinking of Cartesianism concerns the relationship between the self and it social surroundings as well as, and even at the same time as, the relationship between mind and body. Indeed, even though I did not make it explicit when discussing them, that Wittgenstein takes subjectivity to be intrinsically social already becomes clear in the *Investigations’* remarks leading up to the beetle box paragraph that dismantles the idea that mental matters are private inner objects.

As Wittgenstein points out in § 244, the thesis that psychological language is a truly private language can only appear to make sense if one completely disregards the way in which the meaning of words like “pain” are usually taught: “words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.” Hence, not only is the relation between sensation and the expression of sensation – a topic extensively discussed in the previous sections – essential from day one, the way in which a person’s doings and sayings make for instances of fear

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108 Cf. notes 13 and 82 of this chapter, in which I pointed out that both mental pictures and neurological traces are by themselves inert entities that lack each and every meaning, the problem being not so much that they are (in one sense or other) inner objects as that they are supposed to do their work outside of each and every public practice.

109 RPPi 131.


111 PI 244.
or joy are also to a large extent the result of his upbringing. *Pace* Cartesianism, Wittgenstein maintains that the inner is not just always already outer, but is always already social too.

That is to say, an important proviso immediately needs to be made, for as Wittgenstein’s remark about the origin of first person statements makes clear, it is only on the basis of the natural or instinctive expressions of a phenomenon like pain that the child is taught more sophisticated forms of expressive behaviour. It is thus only on the basis of certain natural facts about infant life that the social formation of mental matters takes place. But this distinguishes Wittgenstein’s view on human development from the Cartesian outlook nonetheless.\(^{112}\) To the extent that Cartesianism assumes that a child comes into this world with a full-blown repertoire of psychological phenomena and only needs to learn how to label and communicate these correctly, Wittgenstein underscores that an infant is born with a limited range of possible sensations that are, however, always already manifested in very natural and recognizable ways.\(^{113}\)

These basic expressions are not learned and neither is their connection to pain or joy established only after a process of explanation or experimentation. Indeed, Wittgenstein suggests, not only would the teaching and learning of how words like “pain” are used become an even more impressive task without the natural manifestedness of such basic sensations - involving almost superhuman insight or a great deal of luck on both sides of the parent-infant relation - he even suspects that the reverse situation (in which children could first be taught what pain is and subsequently explained how such a thing can be expressed) would be downright inconceivable: “Suppose someone knew, guessed, that a child had sensations but no expression of any kind for them. And now he wanted to teach the child to express the sensations. How must he connect an action with a sensation, so that it becomes the expression of the sensation? Can he teach the child: “Look, this is how one expresses something--this, for example, is an expression of this--and now you express your pain!” ”\(^{114}\) In Wittgenstein’s book, as becomes clear once more, expressions are not supplementary or secondary to the mental, but this connection is in place from the very first day.\(^{115}\)

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\(^{112}\) See my description in the first section of the presuppositions about human development that are usually associated with the term Cartesianism, p. 47 of this chapter.

\(^{113}\) Cf. Schatzki 1996, pp. 58-63. Though to the extent that Schatzki wonders whether the infant’s reactions are already real expressions and is not prepared to attribute it much mind (see p. 60), my reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks differs from his. On my view, Wittgenstein takes the child’s reactions to always already belong to the sphere of the mental, if only to a very basic subset thereof.

\(^{114}\) RPPi 309-310; see also RPPi 308, PI 257.

\(^{115}\) I thus take Wittgenstein’s dubbing these expressions “primitive” to mean, not just that a language-game is based on them (see RPPi 910), but that they are innate. Such a reading, however, by no means makes Wittgenstein into a defender of, say, the innateness of grammar, as Rhees seems to fear (see Rhees 2003, p. 98), for it only takes reactions, not anything sophisticated and intellectualist, to be inborn. (I will argue in chapter 5 that the infant can also be ascribed certain basic beliefs (as well as an even more fundamental instinctive trust), yet that concerns beliefs in
The instinctive expressions of certain basic sensations, then, form the basis for the infant’s interaction with its caretakers and are as such fundamental, not just to its bare bodily survival, but also to its subsequent psychological development, according to Wittgenstein. In the course of the child’s upbringing, as the \textit{Investigations} remark on the origin of first person expressions also already indicates, it obtains ever more refined expressions for the sensations it has or undergoes. It learns to replace crying with statements such as “I am in pain”, but is also made aware of the difference between pains and itches, say, as well as between dull, throbbing and stifling pains. The infant can furthermore be said to be informed of when and how it is appropriate - if at all - to give voice to a particular psychological phenomenon. Depending on the circumstances, its age and its gender, for instance, a child’s crying will after all not always receive exactly the same response. (And far from proving that the relation between the inner and its outer manifestations is not intrinsic after all, this merely highlights their intertwining again: in contrast to the Cartesian notion that thoughts and feelings are always already hidden, it shows that people have to learn to keep these to themselves.)

But on Wittgenstein’s analysis, the child’s upbringing is not merely a matter of refining the way it manifests its basic sensations, it is also a matter of enhancing the reservoir of psychological phenomena it can be said to have or undergo. The Wittgensteinian view on human development thus not only differs from Cartesianism in what it considers to be the basis for the infant’s initiation, it also differs from the Cartesian view in what it takes to be the subject of this process. Whereas Cartesianism maintains that it is only the means to communicate one’s inner occurrences that have to be acquired, Wittgenstein holds that it’s a person’s psychological life itself that develops over the years. He observes: “One does not say that a suckling hopes that...,”\footnote{RPP\textit{ii} 15.} and “[neither] is the newborn child capable of being malicious, friendly, or thankful,”\footnote{LWi 942.} yet “bit by bit daily life becomes such that there is a place for hope [etc.] in it.”\footnote{RPP\textit{ii} 15; see also RPP\textit{ii} 151, LWi 940.}

Moreover, regardless of what the latter quote may suggest, that life becomes such is not a purely passive or automatic affair. It is a result of the infant’s being shown how to participate in its community’ psychological practices, or in the perhaps more salient term that Wittgenstein comes to use in this context, it is a result of the infant’s being shown how to exhibit recognizable expressive patterns:

\the sense of certainties, hence not necessarily something sophisticated and intellectualist either.) Rhees is arguing against Malcolm 1995 here, whose reading of Wittgenstein’s use of “instinctive” and “primitive” is also criticized by Dromm 2003. While I agree with Dromm that it might go too far to claim that Wittgenstein takes all of our language games to spring from instinctive behaviour (such is also not the topic of this section), I disagree with his critique in so far as Dromm argues that the offering of even the outlines of an account of language acquisition goes against Wittgenstein’s intentions, as he only aims to highlight features of our grammar in order to counteract the theories developed by other thinkers (see Dromm 2003, p. 683, pp. 688-690).
“[The child] has to learn a complicated pattern of behaviour before he can pretend or be sincere.”

Wittgenstein not merely maintains that a person’s psychological life stands to be developed, he more precisely holds that this development occurs as a result of a socialization process. This can be brought out more clearly by having a closer look at the patterns of which he claims that infants have to make them their own, for that Wittgenstein takes psychological development to occur in a socialization process is a corollary to his taking mental matters, or at least certain non-basic ones, to reside or have their life in socially informed and recurring constellations of expressive behaviour.

What we call pretending, hoping and rejoicing is, to paraphrase one of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following, not something that “only one man” can do or experience and can do or experience “only once”. Although psychological phenomena do not come in a pure and precise form - residing in a person’s (fine shades) of contextualized behaviour, as those with the appropriate attitude can tell – this does not mean that there is no unity whatsoever to the delicate and dispersed components that make up an instance of ecstasy or hope, and that similar kinds of unity cannot came about on other occasions. It is with the aim of capturing this unity in diversity and variability that Wittgenstein speaks of psychological patterns. A pattern, namely, does not constitute one clear and distinct object but is composed of various elements that are combined and repeated, though this repetition need not concern every single detail in order for one to be able to recognize it as one and the same.

The indefiniteness of mental matters has been discussed extensively in the previous sections; what accounts for the unity or recognizability that nonetheless exists when it comes to (non-basic) psychological phenomena - or for the fact that, say, two constellations of contextualized behaviour both form instances of gratitude, even though only in one case a “Thank you” is uttered and the other case even involves more tears than smiles – is the fact that the persons in casu, as full-fledged members of a particular community, share an understanding of what gratitude is and of what one can be grateful for, and have been attuned to respond in certain ways to such thankworthy phenomena. Given this shared background, different behaviour can be expressive of the same psychological state, for although one person may more verbose and the other more prone to tears, both find themselves in circumstances that are usually considered to call for gratitude. But

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119 LWi 869; see also PI II § i 174a-b, PI II § i 228f-229a-b, RPPii 624, RPPii 651, LWi 365, LWi 862, LWii 40a-b, LWii 55b-c.

120 I will shortly modify this statements somewhat, pointing out that Wittgenstein grants nature as well as nurture a role in psychological development.

121 Cf. Ter Hark 2004.

122 Cf. Ter Hark 2004, arguing that the concept of pattern precisely aims to accommodate the vagueness of psychological concepts rather than explain it away, as referentialistic models of mind do.

this shared background also places limits on what can count as a manifestation of gratefulness. Although the persons in casu have not been taught to react in one specific way to thankworthy occurrences, neither of them is grinding their teeth and clenching their fists, say, and if one of them were to act like that on a thankworthy occasion, we would perhaps be surprised or perturbed but would not think of calling his behaviour an instance of gratitude.

Wittgenstein’s notion of a psychological pattern picks out this incorporated understanding and broad reactive prefiguration that might still manifest itself differently each time: “‘Grief’ describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life.”124 Such a pattern is carried by the attuned members of a particular community and is subsequently passed on to the next generation when they are shown what can be said and done on what occasions. Combining a complex and variable array of behavioural and contextual elements, a psychological pattern is also something that a person can only partake in after having been initiated into the customs of its community. And as a result, infants raised in more or less diverging cultures will come to possess more or less diverging mental repertoires.

Hence, while Wittgenstein holds that an infant comes into this world with fairly basic psychological phenomena manifested in fairly basic ways, he observes that there are many thoughts and feelings that a person can only have or undergo after having made a certain pattern his own: “It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say that he has had this experience.”125 Given that a child’s primitive manifestations form the basis for the acquisition of more complex expressive patterns, there may not be a sharp distinction between basic and sophisticated mental matters, but this does not alter the fact that, on Wittgenstein’s view, a large part of one’s psychological repertoire is obtained rather than innate. He states: “And if the play of expressions develops, then indeed I can say that a soul, something inner is developing. But now the inner is no longer the cause of the expression.”126 In other words, Wittgenstein not only argues that the outer is, pace Cartesianism, not secondary to the inner, he even claims that the inner itself is in some respects an acquired phenomenon, issuing from the upbringing that a person has received.

This has ramifications for the third person perspective as well. In order for an onlooker to recognize a specific constellation of behavioural and contextual elements as an instance of gratitude or grief, she has to be able to take this behaviour – in addition to taking it as expressive of mind in the first place – as an instance of these larger communal patterns. And the familiarity with such patterns, Wittgenstein suggests, is the kind of thing one learns “only through long

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124 PI II § i 174b; see also LWi 406.
125 PI II § xi 209a, LWi 734.
126 LWi 947.
experience and not from a course in school.” It is something that a person has to acquire and only acquires by participating in the relevant psychological practices: “How could you explain the meaning of ‘simulating pain’, ‘acting as if in pain’? [...] One is inclined to say: “Just live among us for a while and then you’ll come to understand.” No less than the first person perspective, Wittgenstein takes the third person perspective to be obtained in a socialization process rather than at someone’s disposal from the start.

Yet perhaps a proviso should be made here as well, for just as it is only on the basis of certain primitive manifestations that first person expressions are taught, instinctive behaviour could be said to lie at the basis of the ability to make third person statements too. As Wittgenstein observes: “Believing that someone else is in pain, doubting whether he is, are so many natural kinds of behaviour towards other human beings; and our language is but an auxiliary to and extension of this behaviour.” To the extent that one needs to learn to recognize expressive patterns, this does not necessarily proceed from scratch, and our propensity to take other human being as other human beings rather than soulless automata is perhaps one of those things that always already comes naturally. That is to say, in so far as the acquisition of a full-blown third person perspective does not proceed from scratch, the natural or biological basis for it need not be exactly the same for all individuals. While the one person may for instance be born without the ability to see behaviour as expressive of mind at all – or be born soul blind, in the term used in the previous section – the other may, conversely, be capable of developing a much better eye for other people’s thoughts and feelings than the average onlooker – or come to possess “‘expert judgment’ about the genuineness of expressions of feeling,” in Wittgenstein’s words.

This can be said to hold for the first person perspective too, for not all individuals may be equally able to make expressive patterns their own. Certain mental matters have their life only in highly specialized doings, sayings and contexts (like confidence in one’s athletic skills or confidence in the financial markets), which means that persons who are for some reason unable to exhibit such behaviour and/or partake in such contexts are also unable to have or undergo these phenomena.

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127 LWi 925; see also LWi 918.
128 RPPi 630; see also RPPi 29; cf. Mulhall 1993, p. 75; Schatzki 1996, pp. 76-77.
129 RPPi 131; see also LWi 874.
130 Cf. the discussion on sense of self and others in newborns in chapter 5 (pp. 166-167).
131 PI II § xi 227h; see also LWi 915, LWi 916. To the extent that a naturally soul blind person might come to learn how to infer the occurrence of thoughts and feelings from the behaviour of other people, she can still be called soul blind, for the normal soul attitude consists precisely in not having to make any inferences. Also, to the extent that expert judgment about other minds is always acquired on the basis of experience rather than innate, some people may never be able to develop such a keen eye.
On Wittgenstein’s view, moreover, the ability to manifest sophisticated expressive patterns does not only distinguish individual human beings from each other, it also marks a difference between human beings on the one hand and non-human animals on the other. As he puts it: “A dog can’t pretend to be in pain, because his life is too simple for that.” Wittgenstein however does not think that this makes for a categorical distinction, for as he also points out, we would not necessarily refrain from saying of animals that they have basic sensations such as fear and joy, even though we would think twice before attributing non-human animals complex emotions such as remorse. Or, while we would be hesitant to ascribe a fly, say, beliefs of any kind, we are not unwilling to say of a dog that it thinks its master is at the door. As is the case with the difference between individual humans, it is a matter of degree (and therefore in many cases possibly also a matter of debate) what kind of life is complex enough to accommodate certain mental matters and what kind of life is not. Wittgenstein observes: “We don’t say of a table and chair that they think; neither do we say this of a plant, a fish, and hardly of a dog; only of human beings. And not even of all human beings.”

Having characterised the process in which the child develops its mental repertoire as a social one, but also having pointed out the biological preconditions and restrictions to this process, some remarks about the much discussed relationship between nature and nurture are in order here. Judging by the preceding exposition of Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychological development, he can in fact be said to consider the child’s upbringing not only a matter of a person being attuned to its social surroundings, but also of a biological organism growing into maturity. For even if a person can partake in an expressive pattern only after initiation into the customs of her community, she cannot be shown what to do and what to say on which occasions if the condition of her brain and body so far simply prevents her from doing and saying these things. The natural facts on the

133 LWi 862; see also PI 250, RPPii 16. In other remarks, Wittgenstein suggests that there is a more specific criterion for the ascription and exhibition of sophisticated patterns: the possession of language; see PI II § i 174a, RPPii 308, RPPii 310. Here, however, he is arguably using a pars pro toto, referring to the intricate and multifaceted phenomenon that is the human form of life by singling out one salient characteristic. If one underscores that psychological refinement is first and foremost a linguistic matter, as e.g. Mulhall does (see Mulhall 1993, pp. 65-66), one runs the risk of underexposing that the patterns in casu form complex constellations of both verbal and non-verbal behaviour in specific circumstances. (Though in Wittgenstein, of course, the linguistic by no means excludes the behavioural and contextual).

134 See also PI 650, PI II § i 174a, RPPii 308, RPPii 310, LWi 360; cf. Glendinning 1998, who argues that non-human animals can be attributed a third as well as a first person perspective (though he only mentions dogs and does not touch upon the differences that may exist among the many different kinds of non-human animals).

135 RPPii 192; see also LWii 41g-i.

136 Von Savigny’s claim that it is a purely conventional matter that infants cannot pretend (see Von Savigny 1996, pp. 141-155) accordingly seems to be too strong: this inability is also a matter of their bodily and cognitive capacities not yet allowing them to participate in the pattern of pretence.
basis of which the social formation of mental matters takes place thus not merely concerns the infant’s first and primitive reactions, but also includes the subsequent growth of its cognitive and bodily capacities.

This raises the question as to what the exact contribution of nature and nurture are in the child’s mental development, or to what extent the latter might be an autonomous process that the infant’s social environment perhaps influences but by no means determines. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to both oneself and others (or acquisition of a theory of mind, in the unfortunate term commonly used in this context) evolves more or less automatically, barring abnormalities in the infant’s biological make-up. At around 9-12 months, for instance, infants will generally start to participate in what is called “joint attention” interaction, tuning in to the behaviour of adults toward outside objects and getting adults to tune in to their own interest in these objects. Around the age of four years, children normally pass the so-called “false belief task”, indicating their ability to understand the epistemological state of another person and distinguish it from their own.\(^{137}\)

Such data, however, do not contradict the Wittgensteinian notion that an infant enlarges its psychological repertoire partly or even primarily as a result of a socialization process.\(^{138}\) They may point to a natural development that makes the ongoing social formation of mental matters possible, and might even suggest that certain psychological phenomena emerge all but automatically - thereby also placing limits on the possible differences between persons from different social backgrounds - but they do not imply that children will always already come to exhibit the expressive patterns Wittgenstein describes, regardless of the context they grow up in.\(^{139}\) Reflecting the norms and values of a particular culture or community, a psychological pattern is essentially something one can only learn to participate in “by living with [these] people.”\(^{140}\) Even though a biological development may underlie this learning process.

\(^{137}\) For research on joint attention, see e.g. Liszkowski & Tomasello 2004, Moore & Dunham 1995; for research on the false belief task, see e.g. Wellman 2001; for research on a-typically developing children, see e.g. Baron-Cohen 1985 and Happé 1994.

\(^{138}\) Indeed, they do not show mental development to be an entirely natural or autonomous process because of the simple fact that the children studied do not live outside each and every social context.

\(^{139}\) I will come back to the topic of cultural differences shortly. With regard to the natural process making psychological refinement possible, Tomasello precisely argues that the “leaps” that children display at around 1 and 4 years of age (and especially the first leap) underlie their ability to participate in complex social institutions (see Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003). These leaps not being exhibited (or not in the same way) by non-human animals, Tomasello also claim that this explains the (what he takes to be) striking difference between human beings and even their closest primate relatives.

\(^{140}\) RPPi 29.
Leaving this topic behind for now, one more consequence of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the sociality of subjectivity deserves attention here. For if both the first and the third person perspective are to some extent acquired, and a person is only able to exhibit as well as recognize certain expressive patterns after initiation in the relevant social practices, there is a further non-Cartesian explanation for the uncertainty of third person statements, other reasons for which were discussed in section 2. What might also account for someone’s being at a complete and utter loss as to what is going on inside another, as now becomes clear, is the fact that the pattern of which this contextualized behaviour is an instance, is entirely unknown or foreign to him. In such a case, “the only way to understand someone else would be to go through the same upbringing as his -- which is impossible.” And, Wittgenstein points out, “there it is -- an external fact:" this uncertainty can be explained wholly in terms of a public pattern one happens to be unfamiliar with, rather than in terms of a closed-off realm one is always already prevented from accessing. Instead of being unable to look inside a stranger’s head, we simply “cannot find our feet with [her].”

Hence, according to Wittgenstein, we might be unable to understand instances of a pattern that is foreign to us, exhibited by the members of an entirely different (sub)culture or even of a wholly different species. However, just as there is no hard and fast rule as to what kind of life is complex enough to accommodate which mental matters, it cannot be stated beforehand what form of life is similar enough to one’s own in order to be able to understand the patterns that recur in its weave; “here, of course, there are degrees” as well. While we might be unable to get our heads around the finer things that possibly occupy lions, say - even if they were able to talk about these things to us - their pain, for instance, need not remain beyond our grasp. Yet whereas we fully understand the occurrence of such basic sensations in our fellow mammals, the life of spiders and bacteria seems so different from ours that we do not even know whether such phenomena have a place in their existence.

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141 I will look into the notion that Wittgenstein explains the subject as the product of a socialization process in more detail in chapter 5. Similar to the foregoing observations, pointing out that Wittgenstein takes both natural and social factors to play a role in child development, I will argue that he does not present the subject as socially constituted all the way through.

142 And let me remark that the fact that the first person perspective is in some respects acquired too, does not diminish the certainty of expressions such as “I hope she will come” that was also discussed in that section. This acquisition, namely, is a matter of incorporating certain behaviour and understanding, which does not automatically reintroduce a distance between a person and her thoughts and feelings of the kind Cartesianism always already assumes.

143 RPPii 568.

144 PI II § xi 223f; see also RPPii 700.

145 RPPii 30.

146 See PI II § xi 223h, LWi 190.

147 A seemingly self-evident way to settle the question about animals and pain, say, is to investigate whether their underlying neurology is similar to that of humans in pain; models for animal pain are accordingly developed by empirical scientists (though often with the aim, not of answering the
When it comes to our fellow human beings, as was just indicated, an upbringing in an entirely different social context may prevent us from comprehending the patterns that others manifest, but this does not mean that everything a person from a different background thinks or feels is always already unfathomable.\textsuperscript{148} Also leading a human life, albeit in a somewhat different form, many of her thoughts and feelings, from stomach aches to financial worries, may in fact be perfectly evident. This may thus concern both basic sensations and more sophisticated phenomena; it is after all not merely infant lives that can be said to bear resemblance to each other. Indeed, assuming that psychological patterns are acquired on the basis of the same biological process, the possible differences between specific cultural patterns may in fact be limited. And even if one encounters a radically different pattern nonetheless, the fact that strangers are human beings too could also make the most outlandish practices somewhat less impenetrable. The “common behaviour of mankind,”\textsuperscript{149} Wittgenstein suggests, provides a foothold for unravelling foreign manifestations of the mental. However, given that the familiarity with psychological patterns is not a thing one easily obtains, and similar concerns can also be expressed in diametrically opposing ways,\textsuperscript{150} there is no guarantee that this common frame of reference will lead to a mutual (or even one-way) understanding.

Hence, to come back to my suggestion at the end of the previous section, Wittgenstein can be said to situate the inner not so much on the outside of the demarcative question, but of improving the means to measure the pain inflicted to animals in clinical drug tests; cf. Walker 1999). Yet as Allen 2004 argues (see pp. 622-624, p. 637), empirical data do not suffice to settle the question, for not only has research been restricted to a limited group of vertebrates (perhaps by and large to those used in drug tests), it is also the case that for every similarity between human and animal neurology there is a dissimilarity that can be used to argue against the ascription of pain, resulting from the fact that human and animal neurology are not identical. The usefulness of empirical data in ascertaining whether/which animals feel pain is also undermined by the multiple realization argument (cf. Kim 1998, pp. 69-70), pointing out that similar phenomenal experiences might spring from very different physiological bases. Regardless of the biological (dis)similarities that may exist between humans and animals, moreover, Wittgenstein’s arguments concerning human neurology apply to animal neurology too: a physiological occurrence does not yet make for pain or joy since we only ascribe these phenomena to entire, embedded living beings. And the lives of e.g. invertebrates are so different from ours that we would at best be at a loss about their ability to have pain, but would probably not be prepared to extend our concept of pain to these creatures when pushed on the question, though we might be willing to ascribe them a different form of pain. From this perspective, the demarcative question thus calls for a conceptual decision rather than empirical research.

\textsuperscript{148} As Ekman argues (see Ekman 1977 and Ekman 1999), there are in fact universal psychological phenomena whose manifestations are not culturally determined. He identifies six basic emotions (sadness, happiness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise) that are displayed across cultures (and, to some extent, across species) and whose expressions, especially in the face, are universally recognized.

\textsuperscript{149} PI 206; since I do not take this to mean that there is a specific set of behavioural dispositions that occurs in all human communities and also distinguishes human from non-human forms of life, my reading does not make for a version of the interpretation contested by Von Savigny (see Von Savigny 1996, pp. 74-93).

\textsuperscript{150} See RFGB 127a.
subject as in the interspace between subjects, and he can be said to do so, not only in the sense that epistemology is part and parcel of his ontology – mental matters being manifest only to those with the appropriate perspective – but also in the sense that it is only in the context of a recurring social pattern that a person’s doings and sayings make for, and can be taken as, instances of psychological phenomena such as hope or grief.

On Wittgenstein’s view, much of a person’s psychological life only develops in the course of her upbringing; her manifestations of the mental, or at least the more sophisticated ones, are variations on the expressions of her fellow men. As a result, an onlooker has to recognize or learn to recognize a person’s doings and sayings as an instance of this larger pattern; otherwise, he will not be able to understand them as expressive, not just of mind, but of the specific phenomena they are manifestations of. The pattern in question may be more or less prevalent among humans and other animals but needs to be recognized nonetheless. Wittgenstein states: “Not what one man is doing now, but the whole hurly-burly [of the actions of a variety of humans] is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions.”

3.6 Aspects of the human being

In the course of the preceding explorations leading up to the conclusion that it is, according to Wittgenstein, in between a community of subjects that psychological phenomena have their place, the concept of seeing-as has already been mentioned, namely, in the segment on the distinction between Wittgenstein and behaviourism. In the current and final section of this chapter, I will return to Wittgenstein’s comments on this phenomenon - also known as aspect perception - in somewhat more detail in order to bring my reading of his philosophy of psychology to a close. There are a number of interesting parallels between his remarks on our thoughts and feelings on the one hand and his remarks on seeing-as on the other, not all of which have been properly addressed so far, but several of which can be used to summarize Wittgenstein’s views on the reality of mind and all matters mental. He himself also hints at the possibility of putting the aspect analysis to work in this way, for as he explains in one of his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, in contrast to the Cartesian notion that psychological concepts refer to private inner objects, “I would like to say: Psychology deals with certain aspects of human life”.

Put differently, Wittgenstein’s account of mental matters does not only converge with his account of aspects and their perception when it comes to the kind of perspective involved, as was already pointed out - the parallel also holds with regard to the kind of phenomena at issue, as I will now have the chance to

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151 RPPii 629.
152 RPPii 35.
fully explain. My specific rationale for returning to the topic of seeing-as accordingly brings a somewhat restricted focus with it. The following discussion of what is in fact a fascinating psychological phenomena in its own right will not cover Wittgenstein’s treatment of aspect perception in its entirety, nor reflect on the overall importance of the topic that concerned him remarkably consistently throughout his later work. I will confine myself to those elements that contribute to a firmer grasp of the Wittgensteinian alternative to the Cartesian account of the nature of man.

In Wittgenstein’s numerous remarks on this topic, aspect perception does not emerge as a strictly uniform phenomenon. He not only wonders how to describe what is the case when one suddenly sees a duck (or a rabbit) in the well-known duck/rabbit figure; under the heading “seeing-as”, he also discusses noticing the likeness between two faces, recognizing a hesitant posture, taking a two-dimensional picture to represent something three-dimensional, and even pretending that a chest is a house, as children might do. Despite their differences, however, these cases confront one with a similar paradox or puzzle.

What is puzzling about these cases is not so much that what one observes “has not changed; and yet I see it differently.” Whereas this is the form that the paradox may assume in the case of suddenly seeing a duck in the duck/rabbit, most notably, it does not capture what is intriguing about the recognition of a hesitant posture, say, which does not involve a similar change in perception. The question

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153 Again, for more extensive discussions of the remarks on seeing-as, see Budd 1989, pp. 77-99; Ter Hark 1990, pp. 160-186; Mulhall 1993, pp. 6-34. They respectively argue that the topic of aspect perception was of importance to Wittgenstein because of its connection to the topic of seeing tout court, because of its connection to the meaning-as-use thesis, and because seeing-as constitutes our primary relation to the world. While I will focus on the parallels between aspects and mental matters, I do not want to suggest that they form the only or main reason for Wittgenstein’s interest in seeing-as; the adequacy of the following account does not depend on whether that was or was not the case either.

154 Cf. Cavell 1979, p. 368 ff; Johnston 1993, pp. 182-184; Mulhall 1993, pp. 53-90. These commentators also put the parallels between Wittgenstein’s account of seeing-as and his account of the inner to work; I will point to some differences between these readings and mine later on.

155 The duck/rabbit puzzle was first explicated by the psychologist Jastrow; see PI II § xi 194b. As Ter Hark points out, Wittgenstein’s account of seeing-as can be said to combine his critique of Köhler’s Gestalt theory with his critique of James’ theory of perception (to which Köhler’s was an alternative), avoiding the vices of both theories whilst accommodating their respective virtues (see Ter Hark 1990, pp. 165-186).

156 PI II § xi 193c.

157 It could be stated that this is a difference between what Wittgenstein calls aspect dawning and continuous aspect perception; see PI II § xi 194c. Baz 2000 criticizes interpreters like Johnston and Mulhall for not properly distinguishing between these forms of aspect perception; he even argues that it makes no sense to speak of continuously seeing something as something at all (see pp. 120-121). While I do not think that Baz’s reading of Wittgenstein is entirely incorrect, I do feel that it is a bit one-sided. There are for instance certainly remarks that support his point against the importance or even possibility of continuous aspect perception (e.g. PI II § xi 210d, RPPi 1028), but there are also remarks that speak against it (e.g. RPPi 358, LWi 776). Moreover, Baz’s argument to the effect that psychological concepts are not aspect concepts because grammar tells
with which the phenomenon of aspect perception confronts one rather is: “Is it seeing? [Or] is it thinking?” For when a person suddenly sees a duck in the duck/rabbit, notices the similarity between two faces or recognizes a posture as a hesitant one, she each time observes something that is right in front of her eyes yet at the same time cannot point to anything clear and distinct in order to explain what it is that she perceives. Or, while aspect perception is not beyond description or justification, a person seeing a duck in the duck/rabbit cannot draw on unambiguous information to describe or justify what she sees. This raises the question as to whether seeing-as still belongs to the category of seeing or ultimately belongs to the category of thinking, or to what extent seeing-as is a matter of perceiving objective facts and to what extent it is a matter of subjectively interpreting the facts. In many remarks on the topic of aspect perception, Wittgenstein explores both of these options.

Let me discuss his findings on the possibility of explaining seeing-as in terms of seeing first. When a person takes the duck/rabbit to be a duck or two faces to be similar, Wittgenstein claims, she can certainly be said to see the duck and the similarity. If she were to close her eyes or lose her eyesight, both the duck and the similarity would cease to be present to her; judging by her verbal and non-verbal actions and reactions, also, “perception” is the right term to describe her current relation to these things. When she suddenly sees a duck in the duck/rabbit, for instance, she “describe[...], the alteration like that of a perception; quite as if the object had altered before [her] eyes,” and goes on to treat the figure as nothing but a picture-duck. This can even be said of a child pretending a chest to be a house: “He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it actually is a house.” Wholly absorbed in play, one arguably fails to capture the child’s experience when one denies that it sees a farm or a manor, say.

To be sure, Wittgenstein continues, what a person sees when she takes the duck/rabbit to be a duck or two faces to resemble each other cannot be described in purely spatial terms. She need not be able to explain her duck perception to another onlooker by merely tracing the outlines of the duck/rabbit, for these same lines can also be taken to represent a rabbit, and she might similarly be unable to convince a third person of the resemblance between two faces by producing even the most accurate drawing. Yet on Wittgenstein’s view, one unduly restricts or

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us exactly what e.g. sadness is (see pp. 119-120), wholly disregards Wittgenstein’s remarks on the indeterminacy characterizing our psychological practices (see my discussion in section 3). I will come back to the difference between aspect dawning and continuous aspect perception at the end of this section; for now suffice it to say that while Wittgenstein indeed and with reason distinguishes between these two forms, he also distinguishes them both from seeing tout court for presenting one with a similar paradox or puzzle.

158 RPPi 544; see also PI II § xi 204d, RPPi 1, RPPi 369, RPPi 546, LWi 179, LWi 595, LWi 641.  
159 PI II § xi 195i, LW 476; see also PI II § xi 194d, PI II § xi 204a-b.  
160 PI II § xi 206f, LW 689; see also RPPi 874.  
161 See PI II § xi 193b, RPPi 919, RPPi 954, RPPi 991, RPPi 556, LWi 180, LWi 439. Such remarks can also be taken to contain a Wittgensteinian argument against explaining seeing-as or
distorts the use of the verb “to see” if one insists that this only applies when one faces something photographically or metrically exact. As he points out, and as was also discussed in section four, there is more than one concept of seeing, or there is more than one type of things we count among the objects of vision. “The question “What do you see?” gets [a variety of answers],”\textsuperscript{162} ranging from clear and distinct shapes and sizes to the most delicate nuances and shades. One may not be able to convey the similarity between two faces or the timidity of a posture by means of an exact copy of these faces or posture, but this does not mean that one cannot be said to see these things. Wittgenstein declares: “ ‘That is what it is to see something ’” I should like to say. And that’s really the way it is: the situation is exactly like that in which the word is used elsewhere; - except the technique is somewhat different here.”\textsuperscript{163}

However, emphasizing that seeing-as is a kind of seeing, too, does not yet remove the puzzlement that befalls one when reflecting on this phenomenon, as it does not yet make clear how it is that a person can see things like similarity and timidity - or in the terminology of the previous quote, what the exact technique is that one employs in a such case.\textsuperscript{164} It is at this point that the connection of aspect perception, not to seeing, but to thinking, begs to be explored. For as Wittgenstein brings to the fore, what could be said to account for one’s seeing the similarity between a person’s face and that of his father, say, is that one brings certain memories to bear on what one perceives; similarly, what appears to be a precondition for one’s recognizing a hesitant posture is that one possesses the concept of hesitancy and applies it to this case.\textsuperscript{165} In other words, in so far as seeing-as is a kind of seeing, this seems to be due to one’s performing an intellectual act in addition to passively taking things in with the eye: “It is as if one had brought a concept to what one sees, and one now sees the concept along with the thing. It is itself hardly visible, and yet spreads its ordering veil over the objects.”\textsuperscript{166} From this perspective, seeing-as actually seems closer to interpreting than to seeing.

Be that as it may, Wittgenstein observes, that aspect perception contains a cognitive component does not mean that it can automatically be filed under the category of interpretation. “The cases in which we interpret what we see are easily recognized,” he explains: “When we interpret we put forth a hypothesis which may

\textsuperscript{162} RPPi 964; see also PI II § xi 193a & 200a, RPPi 981, RPPi 965, RPPi 1068, RPPi 1102, LWi 431.
\textsuperscript{163} RPPii 371.
\textsuperscript{164} Similar to my earlier observation in footnote 99, it should be noted that Wittgenstein wonders whether seeing is ever a straightforward affair, thereby already making seeing-as less paradoxical, or at least not much more puzzling than seeing in general; see also RPPi 963, RPPi 966.
\textsuperscript{165} See PI II § xi 198e, RPPi 71, RPPi 518, RPPi 1030, LWi 564 LWi 731, LWi 737, LWi 741.
\textsuperscript{166} RPPi 961.
turn out to be wrong.”167 This, however, is far from the case when seeing-as is concerned. When a person takes the duck/rabbit to be a duck or a posture to be hesitant, she is not speculating about what could possibly be said about this figure or posture - she is making a statement about what she sees before her. The point is not so much that she could not turn out to be mistaken about the posture, or that one could not see the duck/rabbit differently. The point rather is that when she exclaims “It’s a duck!” or jumps in to help someone (re)gain confidence, this is not the response that she deems most accurate after reflecting on the situation, but an immediate reaction indicating that she experiences what she faces as a picture-duck or a case of hesitancy. So even though the “aspect seems to vanish”168 if one tries to unthink or exclude everything non-perceptual from an instance of seeing-as, it cannot be said to be a matter of subjectively interpreting the facts, Wittgenstein finds. Aspect perception concerns a direct and receptive relation between subject and object, not one mediated by a process of reflection. And precisely this immediacy suggests that seeing-as is closer to seeing than to thinking after all.

Judging by these observations, then, Wittgenstein simply seems to leave the aspect paradox intact, or only brings it out more accurately. According to what can be said to be his final diagnosis: “The question whether what is involved is seeing or an act of interpreting arises because an interpretation becomes an expression of experience. And the interpretation is not an indirect description; no, it is the primary expression of the experience.”169 That is to say, when a person sees the duck/rabbit and exclaims “It’s a duck!” she does not observe something purely visual, yet her perception, which accordingly seems to be more of an interpretation than a perception, does not result from an interpretative process either. On Wittgenstein’s view, however, this only makes for a paradox if one presumes that seeing-as is either a matter of pure and passive observation or a matter of strong and active interpretation but cannot be anything in between. His investigations precisely show that aspect perception contains a perceptual as well as a cognitive component and cannot be reduced to either of them. According to Wittgenstein, seeing-as is seeing and thinking at the very same time: it is “half-visual experience, half thought” or forms “an amalgam of the two,”170 he suggests.

Hence, Wittgenstein does not leave the aspect puzzle intact but removes the puzzlement by demonstrating that seeing-as is a combination of seeing and thinking or occurs at the intersection of the objective and the subjective. When a person sees a duck in the duck/rabbit, she does not see something purely visual but is therefore not automatically performing an interpretative act. What she perceives may not be “a property of the object,”171 Wittgenstein explains, but hers is a perception

167 RPPii 547; see also PI II § xi 204c, PI II § xi 212e, RPPi 8, RPPii 515, RPPii 516.
168 LWi 564.
169 PI II § xi 197d;& see also RPPi 1025, LWi 553.
170 PI II § xi 197d;& see also RPPi 33, RPPi 531, RPPii 378, RPPii 390, LWi 542, LWi 554, LWi 710.
171 PI II § xi 212a.
nonetheless; she can be said to perceive “an internal relation between it and other objects.” 172 In other words, when she sees a duck, she does not take in one clearly definable characteristic of the figure considered in isolation but connects the entire picture to a specific group of animals or objects (namely, ducks or picture-ducks) and instantly takes it to belong to that class. Her seeing the duck/rabbit, not in isolation, but against the background or in the context of other (picture-)ducks accounts for the subjective or cognitive component of aspect perception, yet does not make it into a speculation mediated by reflection; it also accounts for what she actually sees.

To come back to the main topic, not just of this section, but of this chapter in its entirety, let me now explicate in more detail how Wittgenstein’s suggestion that psychology deals with certain aspects of human life can be said to encapsulate his entire non-Cartesian outlook on psychological phenomena. While his remarks on seeing-as may seem to be of a purely epistemological nature, they can be applied to his analysis of mental matters in order to convey the specific combination of epistemology, ontology and sociology, so to speak, that Wittgenstein offers as an alternative to the Cartesian account of human subjectivity. Putting the aspect analysis to work in this way accordingly allows me to recapitulate virtually all the insights that have been accumulated in the previous sections.

After discussing Wittgenstein’s arguments against the possibility of explaining thoughts and feelings as literally inner entities in section 2, my explorations of the positive Wittgensteinian alternative to Cartesianism took off in section 3 with a reading of his remarks on psychological asymmetry. As I explained, Wittgenstein maintains that first person expressions such as “I am overjoyed” are not descriptions based on inward observation but immediate expressions that are already part and parcel of the psychological state someone is in. Indeed, on Wittgenstein’s view, this goes for what a person says as well as what he does; it is someone’s (subtle and contextualized) behaviour that is always already expressive of mind. And far from doing away with the certainty distinctive of the first person perspective, this non-descriptive, non-observational account accommodates first person certainty without further ado. As I concluded section 3, Wittgenstein does not hold the outer to be an inessential consequence of the inner but takes it to be the very locus thereof.

However, as I then pointed out in section 4, this does not mean that Wittgenstein reduces the inner to the outer in either a physicalist or a behaviourist sense of the word. After describing the various positions that can be referred to

172 Ibidem; see also RPPi 868, RPPi 960, LWi 516, LWi 706, LWi 733. Both Budd and Ter Hark only mention this remark to indicate that seeing as is both related to and distinct from interpreting (see Budd 1989, p. 95; Ter Hark 1990, pp. 182-183), but I think that this remarks precisely captures how seeing is a combination of both seeing and thinking, without being reducible to either of these. But e.g. Budd also only takes Wittgenstein’s solution to the aspect puzzle to be that is a kind of seeing yet at the same time not a kind of seeing, in an attempt to undermine traditional and one-sided theories of seeing (see Budd 1989, pp. 97-99).
with the labels “physicalism” and “behaviourism”, I argued that Wittgenstein cannot be said to subscribe to any of them. While the difference between his account and reductive behaviourism, most notably, may not seem that big, the latter in fact shares some important characteristics with the Cartesian outlook so consistently contested by Wittgenstein. Both Cartesianism and behaviourism, that is, assume that the public world only houses material or measurable things, the difference being that Cartesians subsequently posit psychological phenomena inside the subject, whereas behaviourists claim that if a person’s thoughts and feelings cannot be pinpointed in the outer world, they cannot be said to exist at all. Wittgenstein, in contrast, refuses to defend that all that is out there must take a quantifiable form or can partake in only one, clearly definable category. On his view, I concluded section 4, behaviour is always already filled or overflown with soul. Having had a closer look at Wittgenstein’s remarks on seeing-as, another way of conveying his embodied or enacted ontology in a non-reductive way now suggests itself: it is not the outer tout court but aspects of the outer in which the inner comes to life or resides.

But Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception clearly resonate with his observations on the third person perspective as well. As I also explained in section 3, Wittgenstein’s reorientation of the Cartesian account of first person expressions goes hand in hand with his alternative account of third person statements, according to which these are descriptions rather than conjectures. For if one holds inner and outer to be intrinsically connected instead of only contingently related, what a person says and does need not be set aside as purely external clues, and a sentence like “She is over the moon” can be taken to genuinely describe the state that another person is in. In our day-to-day dealings with other minds, Wittgenstein observes, this is also how third person statements are generally used. Now just as the interrelatedness between inner and outer can be captured by means of the notion of aspect, Wittgenstein’s account of the third person perspective can be explained in terms of seeing-as. Indeed, given that Cartesians hold sentences like “He is in pain” to be speculations based on a prior inventory of someone’s doings and sayings, Wittgenstein’s arguments against taking aspect perception to ultimately be a matter of interpreting can be said to be arguments against this element of Cartesianism too. Just as the exclamation “It’s a duck!” is not mediated by a reflection on what the duck/rabbit could possibly represent, “He is in pain” signals someone’s immediately taking another person’s behaviour to be a plain instance of agony. Both sentences are not hypotheses but report what a person actually sees before his or her eyes.

173 The concept of seeing-as also played a vital role in my explanation of the difference between Wittgenstein and behaviourism; as I claimed, the difference is one of ontology and epistemology combined. I will come back to this shortly.
However, as I also discussed in section 3, this does not mean that Wittgenstein explains the uncertainty distinctive of third person utterances away. Just as his denying that “It’s a duck!” is a hypothesis does not mean that the duck/rabbit could not also be seen differently, Wittgenstein’s denying that “She is overjoyed” is a speculation does not imply that one can never be mistaken or misled about another person’s thoughts and feelings. On Wittgenstein’s view, there is evidence on the basis of which we can ascertain what someone else is thinking or feeling but this evidence is, to a bigger or smaller extent, ambiguous and diffuse. It is after all not just someone’s concrete doings and sayings, but also the fine shades and contexts thereof that one takes or has to take into account. In other words, third person statements report the perception of aspects, not the clear and distinct objects that may be the most conspicuous but are certainly not the only objects of sight.\footnote{Which is of course not to say that mistakes and deception is not possible when it comes to the perception that is not of the seeing-as kind - it is merely to try and bring out how aspect perception itself can be described.}

This brings me to the findings of section 5, in which I explored the Wittgensteinian insight that the inner is not merely always already outer but is always already social too. In contrast to Cartesianism, I pointed out, Wittgenstein maintains that a person’s psychological life stands to be developed, and more precisely holds that this development occurs as a result of a socialization process. That is to say, Wittgenstein identifies certain biological facts – from the infant’s primitive reactions to the subsequent growth of its cognitive and bodily capacities - that make the social formation of mental matters possible, but even so observes that there are many thoughts and feelings a person can only have or undergo after having made a communal expressive pattern her own.

This notion of pattern, I suggested, serves to bring across, not just the vagueness and multifariousness of mental matters, but also the unity or recognizability that nonetheless exists when it comes to (non-basic) psychological phenomena. Two different constellations of behavioural and contextual elements can for instance both be manifestations of gratefulness because the persons \textit{in casu} have incorporated the same reactive prefiguration to what they have learned to be thankworthy occasions. This accordingly has ramifications for the third person perspective as well. In order for someone to recognize a behavioural complex as an instance of gratitude, she has to be able to take it as an instance of this larger communal pattern. And this ability, Wittgenstein maintains, is also something one only develops in the course of a socialization process.

Returning to the parallel with his analysis of aspect perception, Wittgenstein’s remarks on seeing as can even be used to recap his observations about the sociality of subjectivity. For similar to a person’s seeing the duck/rabbit, not in isolation, but against the background of other (picture-)ducks accounts for her having a duck perception, an onlooker is able to see gratitude or grief in someone’s contextualized shades of behaviour because she instantly takes it to be a manifestation of the larger
expressive pattern that the first person has made his own. In Wittgenstein’s words: “We combine diverse elements into a ‘Gestalt’ (pattern), for example, into one of deceit.”\(^{175}\) Moreover, that this delicate and dispersed evidence has to be taken together and brought under a concept - and may therefore not be accessible to just anyone - does not make gratitude or grief into something imaginary, just as the fact that noticing a duck is not a matter of taking in unambiguous information does not yet make it into a matter of subjectively interpreting the facts. That psychological phenomena are aspects of the human being also captures that thoughts and feelings can be said to have their life, not so much on the outside of the individual subject, as in the interspace between the subject and its fellow men.

Yet, I claimed, there is more than one sense in which the notion of an interspace is appropriate when it comes to mental matters, and this brings me back to my initial reason for introducing the concept of seeing-as. For in order for an onlooker to be able to see a third person’s hope or grief, she need not only recognize someone’s doings and saying as an instance of a larger expressive pattern; she also has to take these doings and saying as expressive of mind in the first place. As I argued in section 4, this always already taking another person’s actions and reactions to be more than mere behaviour is a matter, not of seeing \textit{tout court}, but of seeing-as. In the preceding pages, it should have become sufficiently clear what this attitude towards other human or living beings implies, but there is in fact one element of Wittgenstein’s aspect analysis I have not yet addressed; an element that can however not be left out if one wants to use the aspect analysis to summarize Wittgenstein’s view on mind and mental matters in its entirety.

In his reflections on seeing-as, Wittgenstein remarks that there is an important distinction to be made: “I must distinguish between the ‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect and the ‘dawning’ of an aspect.”\(^{176}\) While both the suddenly seeing a duck in the duck/rabbit, say, and the taking a two-dimensional picture to represent something three-dimensional, may make one wonder whether it is seeing or interpreting that is the case, there seems to be a difference between such a momentary and such an uninterrupted kind of seeing-as. Wherein exactly this

\(^{175}\) RPPii 651. Let me use this opportunity to point out that my working out the similarities between Wittgenstein’s analysis of aspect perception and his analysis of mental matters differs slightly from the way in which e.g. Johnston and Mulhall put this parallel to work. In addition to Johnston (see Johnston 1993, p. 183), I do not only think that these analyses converge when it comes to the directness of the perception involved and the vagueness of the phenomena at issue; as my reading brings out, the parallel also holds because the ambiguous information that is observed has to be brought under a \textit{Gestalt}. This is also mentioned by Mulhall (see Mulhall 1993, p. 77), but in addition to his reading, I take this \textit{Gestalt} or pattern to be a social affair and thus use this element of the aspect analysis to bring across the sociality of subjectivity (which is by no means denied by Mulhall but not described in the same manner). For the difference between my applying the aspect analysis and Cavell’s, who is perhaps most famous for pointing to these similarities, see my remark in footnote 50 of this chapter, explaining that Cavell is more interested in drawing out the ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s account of (other) mind(s) than in spelling out what Wittgenstein’s non-Cartesian ontology amounts to.

\(^{176}\) PI II § xi 194c.
difference lies is unclear; it can for instance be debated whether continuous aspect perception is a prolonged form of the sudden noticing of an aspect or an experience of a different kind - if it can be said to be an experience at all.\(^{177}\) Wittgenstein himself nowhere gives an unambiguous description of the distinction between continuous and suddenly seeing-as.\(^{178}\) A similar distinction, however, can clearly be said to be at work in his account of mind. For on his view, as was just recapitulated, a person is only able to see someone else’s thoughts and feelings - or notice these aspects of her being – if she takes these doings and saying to more than just behaviour – or always already sees it as expressive of mind. Even if it is unclear wherein the exact difference between continuous and sudden aspect perception lies, Wittgenstein’s analysis of mental matters mirrors his analysis of seeing-as in this respect too. In both senses, psychological phenomena can be said to be aspects of human life or human being.

This, then, is what I take to be Wittgenstein’s alternative to the Cartesian view on the nature of man. The notion of aspect can be used, as I hope to have shown, to succinctly convey that Wittgenstein locates psychological phenomena on the outside rather than the inside of the subject, or even in the interspace between a community of subjects. Dubbing psychological phenomena aspects of the human being thus brings out both the embodiedness and the embeddedness that distinguishes Wittgensteinian from Cartesian subjectivity. For when Wittgenstein states that “The human being is the best picture of the human soul,”\(^{179}\) he obviously does not have a homunculus in mind, but he is not thinking of the isolated individual subject either. He is thinking of a person living amongst her fellow men.

\(^{177}\) See my earlier remarks in footnote 157 on Baz’s 2000 arguments against the use that many interpreters make of Wittgenstein’s concept of continuous aspect perception.

\(^{178}\) Compare for instance PI II § xi 210c-d and RPPi 1028 with RPPi 358 and LWi 776.

\(^{179}\) RPPi 281. According to the remark included in PI II (§ iv 178g), it is the human body that is the best picture of the human soul. There are four versions of this remark to be found in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, and only the one of the latest date uses “human body” rather than “human being”. Yet even though this could indicate that Wittgenstein considered it to be a better formulation, I prefer to avoid its behaviourist connotations and use RPPi 281 instead.