Scaling the Romani grassroots: Europeanization and transnational networking

van Baar, H.

Published in:
Romani/Gypsy cultures in new perspectives. - 2nd. ed.

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
Scaling the Romany Grassroots: Europeanization and Transnational Networking *

Huub van Baar, University of Amsterdam

Abstract

This paper analyzes new Romany media networks in Europe and their relations to post-1989 processes of Europeanization. The paper breaks with the understanding of European governance as operating at and through different kinds of hierarchically organized levels. Instead, it introduces Foucault’s concept of governmentality to approach Romany networks and processes geared towards European integration as specific intersections of governmental technologies of agency and performance.

Keywords: Roma policy and politics in Europe; European integration; politics of scale; transnational networking; new media technologies; governmentality; development theory; risk management

Introduction: New Media Technologies, but of What exactly?

Allow me to introduce a recently launched project that could be considered a civic utilization of new media technologies. In the spring of 2004, Romea, a Prague-based non-governmental organization (NGO), introduced an educational project that deploys the Internet to try to fulfill its aim of challenging the dominant, often stereotypical representations of the Czech Roma minority in the domestic public opinion and, more generally, of contributing to a better social and historical understanding of the Roma in the Czech Republic. The educational section of Romea’s website provides information on the history, culture, and language of the Roma in the Czech Republic in particular, and in Europe in general. Furthermore, on its website Romea interactively discusses the social issues and problems that the Roma are currently facing in the Czech Republic, such as the relatively large number of Roma youngsters who are addicted to drugs. Through its website, Romea seeks to offer information that could be included in regular

* This paper is a contribution to the panel on ‘Civic Uses of New Media Technologies’ at the Re-activism: Re-drawing the Boundaries of Activism conference, 13-15 October 2005, a Budapest-based conference organized by the Central European University, the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, the Open Society Institute, and the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. This paper is a draft version. Please do not quote without permission. Comments and remarks are welcome. Please contact the author for further details: H.J.M.vanBaar@uva.nl.
Czech school curriculums. In the course of the spring of 2004, Romea contacted more than eleven hundred schools throughout the country, including elementary and secondary schools in both the regular and the special school system, in which Romany children, as a consequence of social and historical circumstances, are still over-represented. By the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year, almost seventy schools had registered at Romea’s ‘skola’ (school) website. Teachers at these schools began using the materials provided by Romea, which are not available in Czech history or language books.¹

Before I analyze the scope of these kinds of civic or ‘non-governmental’ Romany networks in and through the use of new media technologies—which is the main aim of the present paper—I want to discuss two concepts that are crucial to the matter at stake. The first one is the complex concept of civil society; the second the equally complex concept of new media technology. Civil society, when it is informed by traditional political contract theories from Hobbes to Rousseau or by critical theories from Marx to Habermas, is often approached as a realm of contractual, voluntary, private or privatized relationships independent from or external to the state. In these traditions, civil society is mostly considered an exclusive concept in which the binary opposition of public and private, or power and resistance, is inscribed onto the civil society/state dichotomy. Consequently, an economist or realist approach to power dominates, in which power is assumed to be a ‘property’ or ‘space’ that exclusively belongs to one group or to the state and that does not belong to or is accessible to other groups. Civil society is predominantly conceptualized as a set of non-state-actors and activities capable of mobilizing resistance to policies and structures informed and organized by the state or the government, and embodying forms of agency that are essentially different from the agency of the state or the government.

Poststructuralist approaches to civil society, as well as many theories of globalization, have largely broken with this paradigm, as a result of their official farewell to any kind of binary opposition or to the theoretical remnants that imply such dichotomizations. Accordingly, civil society is not ‘so much a definable social space as a complex web of processes and connections’ (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 154). The concept of civil society, understood as something that is socio-politically separate or separable from the realm of the state, is highly contested, as is the concept of the nation state itself. William Outhwaite and Larry Ray relate both developments in recent approaches to concepts of the nation state and civil society:

At the level of the national state there is a shift from government to governance … where the state becomes one agent among others operating in subnational, national, and international domains. The realm of the state, that was formerly “exterior” to civil society, becomes localized and hence “interior” to the realm of private interests (civil society) which becomes global, through transnational capital. Thus the local state may lose its cohesion and become a set of “disaggregated agencies” rather than the center of distributional politics … (2005: 174, their italics).

The approach of ‘multi-level’ governance that Outhwaite and Ray point to is also important with regard to analyses of post-1989 developments in Central and Eastern Europe, including the particular case study of the present paper: the post-communist ‘condition’ of the Romany minorities in the regions in question and in Europe in general.
In its general meaning, which I will take into account again below, multilevel governance refers to ‘the increased interdependence of governments operating at different territorial levels’ (hence: multilevel) and to ‘the growing interdependence between governments and non-governmental actors at various territorial levels’ (hence: governance instead of the prevailing notion of government) (Bache and Flinders 2004: 3). The concept of multilevel governance embodies a way to avoid the easy polarization of civil society and the state or (the prevailing notion of) government by embedding both now contested ‘poles’ in a network consisting of different kinds of governmental actors operating at a variety of levels.

Despite the enormous amount of recently published studies that break decisively with the civil society/state polarization, there are still many analyses of Central and Eastern European societies that maintain such a dichotomization uncritically, even while some of these studies are explicitly committed to modern media or network theories. As Outhwaite and Ray suggest, this tendency is to a great extent a consequence of the complex interaction between, on the one hand, the destruction of civil relations under communism and, on the other, dissident attempts to challenge the centralized and authoritarian power of the communist parties. Václav Havel’s appeal for ‘living in truth’ and György Konrád’s ‘anti-political politics’, for instance, were ways to shape society alternatively and develop forms of resistance that could progressively bypass, undermine, or ridicule the state and its institutions (for the Czechoslovakian case, cf. Tucker 2000). Moreover, the philosophies of dissidence prominent over the last long decade of socialism (1977-1989) did not fade away after 1989; quite the opposite, these thoughts were either remobilized to create alternative approaches to post-communist party politics—though unsuccessfully in almost all of the cases—or used to remodel sites of emerging civil society (cf. Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 1998).

Still, the tendency to conceptually or spatially juxtapose the state (or government) to civil society also dominates many approaches to the Romany minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether this is indirectly caused by the view that the Roma are ‘among the last groups in Europe … to struggle for a political space of their own’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997: 3, emphasis added), by attempts to challenge institutional forms of racism and discrimination in Central and Eastern European state mechanisms, or by a more general socio-political and cultural dynamics in post-1989 Europe, is part of my present analysis. Nonetheless, it can be asserted without hesitation that there are no minorities in Europe that have become such a focal point of NGOs and private foundations as the Romany ones have over the last one and a half decade. However, in post-1989 Europe the Romany minorities are also central to processes oriented towards European integration and to domestic national policy building and implementation. Put differently, the Romany minorities are actualized and actualize themselves at many different levels of governance. First of all, therefore, I want to ask: Why is it that the Romany minorities became such a central ‘issue’ in relation to questions of European governance? Of course, we may answer this question straightforwardly and simply say: because the Roma are poor, unemployed, unequally treated and represented, subjected to assimilationist views and practices as they were in the past, and because the Roma are a European nation or minority urgently in need of emancipation and integration. These answers, no matter how right and justified they might be, still work to largely isolate the Roma from mainstream European developments. Moreover, these answer do not give a
full account of important historical continuities and discontinuities in European governance, nor do they answer the concomitant question why the Roma have become a ‘targeted population’, not only by ‘non-Roma’ but also by many Roma themselves.

This leads me indirectly to the second concept I proposed to focus on for a while, that of new media technologies. I would like to consider this second concept in relation to the governmental changes we are currently facing in Europe (though not exclusively there). When we study new media technologies, we can focus on a variety of aspects: the forms of knowledge, practice or interface they imply; the kinds of mechanical and technical devices they involve; the way we use, produce, and consume these technologies; the way they are oriented to produce certain wanted or unwanted practical outcomes, and so on. When we speak of ‘civic uses of new media technologies’, for instance, we seem to point predominantly to the differences from non-civic uses, to discrepancies in relation to the uses of old media techniques, and to the outcomes or by-products these new media technologies produce. However, I want to draw attention mainly to the forms of knowledge and practice the involved media technologies imply. By doing so, I in no way want to bypass the far-reaching implications of the new media or even to consider them merely as old media in another form. As is the case with any shift of or within a particular medium, issues of meaning and practice cannot be left aside, since they are the subject of paradigmatic epistemological, ethic, and aesthetic changes. However, in the present paper my focus is not so much on what is new in the new media as on what is new or renewed in the mediated technologies at stake. Consequently, I would like to shift round the focal point, so that it concerns not so much civic (versus non-civic) uses of new (versus old) media technologies, as the question what these technologies are actually technologies of.

In the current paper and in the context of the Roma case study in question, I propose to approach these technologies as ones of government. In their most general understanding, I consider these technologies the heterogeneous means through which the governing of others and of ourselves is accomplished. Here I follow Nikolas Rose, who describes technologies of government as follows:

Technologies of government are those technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired events. … A technology of government … is an assemblage of forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgement, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and so forth, traversed and transected by aspirations to achieve certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed (which also requires certain forms of conduct on the part of those who would govern). These assemblages … are never simply a realization of a programme, strategy or intention: whilst the will to govern traverses them, they are not simply realizations of any simple will (1999: 52).

Why do we need such a general and abstract concept of technology? First of all, because it is a way to challenge two of the most problematic prevailing understandings of technology. In the first place, the proposed concept of technology does not understand it as a way to simply transmit or (de)code ‘information’, without taking into account that
technology is itself a human construction and practice (roughly the Habermasian and constructivist approach). Secondly, the concept described above also avoids approaches to technology in which, often in the same breath with power, it is juxtaposed to concepts of subjectivity and forms of agency (roughly the Adornean approach). This points to the ways in which the concepts of technology and civil society are interrelated: following a Foucauldian approach to power and technology, we cannot ‘counterpose subjectivity to power, because subjectification occurs in the element of power; one cannot counterpose freedom to technology, because what we have come to understand as our freedom is the mobile outcome of a multitude of human technologies’ (Rose 1999: 54-55).

Consequently, civil society is neither a separable site of freedom and emancipation nor merely a set of non-state actors and activities embodying forms of agency, but is inextricably interwoven with power structures. Therefore, civil society can also not be opposed to state or governmental institutions and the multiple technologies or forms of instrumentalized thought these institutions would represent.

A second set of questions arises with regard to the issue of why these technologies have to be considered technologies of government. This issue requires further explanation and is the central one of this paper. Since I do not want to approach this theme theoretically only, but first and foremost in relation to the case study of the Roma, I want to reintroduce the Europe-wide involvement in Romany issues and take a circuitous route back to the theme of European governance. With regard to the structure of this paper, this means that in the next section I will continue with an analysis of the current tendency to aim for the inclusion of the European Roma. From this analysis, it will become clear that the civil society/state dichotomy returns in the form of a bottom-up/top-down polarization with regard to Roma policy building and implementation.

Thereafter, in the third section, I will argue that these more or less separated upper and lower levels of governance, including their hierarchical order, are intrinsically related to a ‘politics of scale’, where scales have largely been considered as the preexisting levels for politics rather than as one of its active, spatiotemporally constructed objects. Moreover, I will show that this politics of scale is central to the projects of Europeanization and has to be understood in the context of governmental technologies for spatializing and temporalizing ‘Europe’ in terms of development, integration, and inclusion. To reconsider this relation and its European context critically, I propose that we adopt a different concept of government in studying institutions and organizations in Europe. I confront a prevailing understanding of government with a Foucauldian one and subsequently focus on an analysis of so-called European ‘governmentalities’.

Foucault’s concept of governmentality asks for a reformulation of government that is no longer restricted to what is conventionally understood to be the state or politics. Instead, the analysis of governmentality should focus on a variety of discourses, practices, and rationalities that shape conduct. In my view, a genealogical study of European governmentalities shows that, while scales and agencies in Europe are often produced in accordance with hierarchically organized levels, this does not imply that we have to understand European policy building merely in terms of top-down or bottom-up approaches. Since it is fundamental to European governance to encourage the formation of multiple alliances within its sphere of interest, it is equally possible to challenge its dominant politics of scale and to approach these alliances not so much as the points of
departure for (e.g.) policy issues, but rather as the products of European governmentalities.

In the fourth section I will return to the beginning of my paper and analyze some of the recently emerged Romany networks in Central and Eastern Europe. I will show that they embody a politics of locality that challenges the general governmental attitudes towards the Roma within Europe. The networks of these grassroots movements operate through modes of ‘horizontal learning’; processes in which local knowledge and experiences are shared and exchanged transregionally and transnationally, rather than being informed predominantly by EU, state or NGO-based standardized practices. I will analyze these networks as the intersections of different kinds of governmental technologies and, alternatively, consider these networks as a better way to approach European governance. In the fifth, concluding section I ask how we should consider these networks and governmental technologies in relation to the ways in which the Roma have become a ‘targeted population’ in post-1989 Europe.²

By Way of a Second Introduction: A New Decade of Roma Inclusion?

On 2 February 2005 in Sofia, Bulgaria, governmental and Romany representatives from eight Central and South-Eastern European countries opened the so-called ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015’, which is a joint initiative of the World Bank and the Open Society Institute (OSI). The governments of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have officially adopted its program. Important international organizations, such as the European Commission, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (COE), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support it. Most importantly, when it comes to questions of Romany representation and agency, the Decade project is backed up by Romany organizations in the region, as well as by International Romany organizations, such as the Brussels-based European Roma Information Office.

The idea of the Decade project was publicly introduced in the summer of 2003 at the Budapest conference ‘Roma in an Expanding Europe: Challenges for the Future’ organized by the OSI and the World Bank at the Central European University (CEU). Two weeks after the conference, on 16 July, the Romanian Romany intellectual Nicolae Gheorghe was one of the first to discuss the Decade project. He was rather reserved with regard to the policies the project was to introduce. In his lecture at CEU he discussed more generally the question of whether the Roma-related policy that was introduced at different local, national, and international levels over the previous decade (1993-2003) has really contributed to a substantial change in the living conditions of the European Roma. He asked why a decade of European integration of the former socialist states and their Romany minorities has predominantly led to a wide variety of Roma policy at different levels, instead of to the introduction of what he termed ‘Roma politics’. At the beginning of his lecture, he briefly explained his use of the terms ‘policy’ and ‘politics’. His rather general definition of politics refers to a state of awareness of the national interest and the subsequent promotion of this national interest in international life, both in the relation with other states and in the context of international organizations. He
considered policy the set of actions or measures adopted by governments or other identifiable agencies towards certain aims and programmatic rights, such as access to health, education or housing.

Gheorghe considered a number of processes of Roma policy building at different levels. In about half an hour, he summarized the interim results of a decade-long introduction of national and European Roma policy by listing the initiatives taken by national governments and European and international organizations. Contrary to most of the Western European governments, almost every country in Central and Eastern Europe has by now introduced and detailed its own particular Roma policy as part of the processes geared towards accession to the EU. This has taken shape in a motley collection of governmental documents, action plans, strategies, projects, recommendations, and initiatives. To illustrate this, Gheorghe somewhat ironically referred to the introduction of the ‘Stage I and Stage II Strategy’ with regard to the Roma minority by the Slovakian government; to the short, medium and long-term ‘Roma Action Programme’ as initiated by the Hungarian government; to the ‘Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma’ agreed upon by the government in Sofia; and to the long-term Roma project implemented by the Romanian government.

As for the European level, Gheorghe listed a couple of institutional initiatives introduced within European bodies over the last decade. The COE, for example, has its Specialist Group on Roma/Gypsies; the OSCE has, within its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, a Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues, of which Gheorghe is the head; the United Nations have their Belgrade-based Focal Point on Roma within the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and the EU has (among other initiatives) its Guiding Principles to improve the living conditions of the Roma.

However, the ongoing tendency to introduce ever new projects, new conferences, new NGOs, new meetings, and new forums with regard to the Roma in a variety of European institutional contexts—among which the Decade project is undoubtedly the most pretentious one—led Gheorghe to reconsider seriously the effects of Roma policy building on the actual social circumstances of the majority of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. Though he recognized an increasing Romany participation and representation in political and social institutions, he wondered whether this contribution could not be characterized as largely an elite’s affair. ‘[W]e have a small elite; we have a Roma intelligentsia, a Roma bourgeoisie, a Roma middle class, a Roma nomenclature,’ Gheorghe put forward. But he added:

I think we are starting to lose the contact with the grassroots, with the communities.3 We are not managing to enter there in a systematic way, on such a scale that we can really generate a change. … [I]n the 1990s, we hoped to generate a major change in the mentalities, and then in the institutions of the states, and then in the everyday life of the people, including the mentalities and everyday life of the Roma. I think we are starting to lose that; we are rather in a threat of creating bodies, documents, whose impact on the real life [of Roma] is very difficult to measure (2003).

Gheorghe did not want to be pessimistic or cynical—although he definitely gave this impression in many of his statements—but aimed to bring forward questions concerning
the growing gap between Roma policy and politics. However, he did not have concrete suggestions on how to challenge this worrisome tendency. Instead, he encouraged his listeners at CEU to analyze the extent to which particular political structures and institutions, as well as the seemingly ongoing machinery of national and supranational policy-making, are responsible for the threatening gap he perceived between Roma policy and politics.

Apart from his rather general definition of politics, Gheorghe did not explain what he considered explicitly Roma politics. But from the broader context of his lecture it became clear that he intended to understand it in at least two related ways: a representational one, in which equal participation of Roma in institutions must result in a strong say in their own affairs, and one that provides an account of the needs of the Romany grassroots and their inclusion in mainstream society in general. Six years before his lecture at the CEU, he had argued that ‘[t]he Romani community itself needs new ideas to govern and mobilize itself’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997: 22). In his 2003 lecture, Gheorghe no longer mentioned the Romany communities as a site of self-mobilization. Instead, he predominantly focused on what he by now clearly considers to be the biggest problem: the inability to combine Roma policy and politics in a way that would structurally advance the Romany grassroots communities.

Once we take seriously Gheorghe’s call to reconsider the structures and tendencies in question, we also need to take it a step further and reconsider what is often conventionally termed politics and policy with regard to the Roma and to European integration in general. Though I largely agree with Gheorghe’s analysis regarding ineffective policy building and implementation, as I will show below, he does overlook a budding Romany grassroots movement. Since Gheorghe does not explain why Roma policy has not yet led to the intended results, I will briefly consider the social scientific analyses of Will Guy (2001a, 2001b) and Martin Kovats (2001a, 2003). Both of these analyses chiefly agree with Gheorghe’s perception and give a more or less comparable answer to Gheorghe’s central question; Guy with regard to the overall situation in the region, and Kovats mainly regarding European institutions. They conclusively analyze the ineffectiveness of Roma policy and the subsequent failure to reach the Romany grassroots. In particular, they show that the ethnicization of policy has resulted in its disconnection from the wider politico-economic and socio-cultural context of the Roma in Eastern European societies. Moreover, they criticize top-down policy approaches and the ways in which the asymmetrical power structures of both non-governmental and governmental organizations hamper real and equal Romany representation (cf. also Trehan 2001). Here, however, I will not focus on the details of their analyses, pointing only to their general recommendations concerning the political approach to the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe by NGOs, national governments, and European institutions.

Kovats, in his call for alternatives, speaks in terms of a ‘channelling of policy initiatives through state-level structures’ (2001a: 110, emphasis added). Though he does not deny that much remains to be done at the state and NGO-levels, he primarily addresses his recommendations to European institutions. He considers it ‘the role of European policy … to overcome the political and financial obstacles to effective policies within national politics’ and, subsequently, argues that ‘[o]nly “Europe” has the authority and the resources to provide the framework for addressing the multifarious policy problems affecting Roma/Gypsy people across the Continent’ (2001a: 110, emphasis
Huub van Baar

added). As regards the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Guy suggests that the future of Roma politics and its mobilization ‘will depend largely on whether the Czech and Slovak Governments, with the help of Roma and pro-Roma organisations and NGOs, can successfully implement their policies at local level[s] …’ (2001a: 306, emphasis added).

Both authors criticize Roma policy in an illuminating way for its internal ambiguity and insufficient focus on the wider context, and both recommend the improvement of policy building, the channeling of policy through state-level structures, and the strengthening of the institutional infrastructure that guides policy implementation. These far-reaching recommendations have to be taken seriously, but they are insufficient in questioning the powerful policy machinery discussed by Gheorghe. The authors in question tend to understand institutional and organizational levels as preexisting. In addition, since they deal with a reified notion of these levels, they consider them to be the main channels in and through which policy has to be built and implemented. In so doing, they do not take into account ‘the complex geographies of power that give rise to “scales” and indeed space more generally’ (Larner and Walters 2004: 14). To analyze the ‘politics of scale’ in the political context concerned we need to adopt a concept of government that takes into account the scaling effects of Europeanization.

**European Governmentalities and Practices of Liberty**

In a 1978 lecture at the *Collège de France*, entitled ‘Governmentality’, Michel Foucault introduced a concept of government that removes it from what is often understood to be the domain of politics or the state (Foucault 1991). Based on Foucault’s restatement of the prevailing governor-governed relationship, Mitchell Dean has succinctly reformulated the concept of governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’. In his view, it is:

any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (1999: 11).

Foucault’s concept of governmentality gives an account of the different arts, technologies, programs, apparatuses, and numerous other sites in and at which governing as the conduct of conduct is actually practiced. This practicing occurs through and by environmental security or ‘museological’ techniques, as well as by practices of risk management, therapy, self-esteem, childcare, etc. (for the different fields in which Foucault’s concept is taken into account, see e.g. Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996, Bratich, Packer, and McCarthy 2003). The intended analysis concerns in particular regimes of discourse and practice that are involved in historically variable or intersecting governmentalities.

An approach to government based on a concept of governmentality has a number of advantages. First of all, it avoids both the positivism that dominates much social scientific research and the textual focus of many poststructuralist studies.
Governmentality studies analyze power and governing practices by linking them to different technologies. They allow for a genealogical approach to political rationalities and their paradigmatic or subtle changes over time. Governmentality is here both historical and empirical in its focus. It encourages us to analyze political formations such as European or international institutions, regions, and NGOs ‘not by projecting them against a given field of political-economic forces (for example, globalization), nor slotting them into conventional categories of political forms (federalism, confederalism, etc.), but by interrogating the particular subjects, objects, arts and spaces that they bring into existence’ (Walters 2004: 156). Furthermore, the locus of governmentality is, as Nancy Fraser suggests, ‘unbundled, broken up into several distinct functions, and assigned to several distinct agencies which operate at several distinct levels, some global, some regional, some local and subnational’ (2003: 167). However, I believe even Fraser’s understanding of governmentality should be taken a step further so that it allows for a critical dealing with what we may call ‘a politics of scale’: the ways in which scales are themselves discursively and practically mobilized to govern, shape or transform particular places and populations. Governmentality should not imply the reification of an understanding of government as practiced at, for instance, preexisting and distinct levels, but should be grounded in a perspective where a politics of place and scale is critically interrogated. In Fraser’s concept of governmentality, it is merely understood in line with multilevel governance theories, in which levels are still predominantly considered as fixed. Here, however, I want to propose that governmentality break with any such approach.

Returning to the analysis of European policy, we accordingly need to shift our focus to the following questions: What are the particular rationalities and technologies involved in European governmentality? How do they relate to issues of poverty and practices of aid and policy regarding the Romany minorities? While studies concerning Europeanization are characterized by a multifarious focus, they often omit an analysis of Europe’s discursive framing, its changes over time, as well as its accompanying rationalities and technologies of government. However, once we give, for instance, an account of the differences in the trajectory from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) to the actual EU, we can genealogically notice the different manners in which ‘Europe’ has been discursively and geo-politically framed. While the ECSC ‘geo-graphed’ Europe as a unitary space of coal and steel production in order to reconstruct ‘the continent’ in the aftermath of the Second World War, and while the EEC was dominated by the Cold War discourse of security, modernization, and economic development, the EU is predominantly led by the language of integration and enlargement, and by its desire to speak more and more in the name of Europe (cf. Walters 2004). Above all, the latter attitude entails that the EU countries, but also the ones that are not (yet) EU-members—the South-Eastern European countries in particular—are measured and increasingly perceive themselves in terms of their compatibility with EU norms. This leads to the question of how authority is actually constituted, and what particular governmentalties we can differentiate in light of the actual processes of European integration.

William Walters (2004) distinguishes three interrelated grids of intelligibility by which European integration is inscribed in its apparatuses: tabulations, temporalizations, and geo-spatializations. By means of tables, graphs, charts, and scoreboards the degree of
integration is made calculable; by means of timetables, deadlines, and agendas integration is split up into different trajectories and made ‘processable’ over time; and by means of differentiating levels of progress (e.g. towards accession or with regard to the stability pact or the entrance into the Euro or Schengen zones) integration has acquired a spatial dimension, in which regions or countries can be distinguished.

These grids, included in a governmentality of European integration and harmonization, are inextricably interwoven and express the ways in which the production of particular European politics of space and time are interdependent. The desire to make the processes of European integration and development quantifiable involves the production of a particular politics of scale, in which scales are predominantly framed as levels or sizes and in which European institutions are consequently considered the highest or largest scales among other lower or smaller levels and areas of governance. Moreover, Europe’s spatial representation in terms of regions, urban zones or countries that are more or less developed and integrated, involves the production of a particular politics of time, in which these areas could be framed, for instance, in terms of different speeds regarding Europeanization. In other words, temporalizations and spatializations are both the medium and the outcome of the complex ‘dialectic’ of European transformation we currently face. ‘Europe’ is temporalized and spatialized and, moreover, space and time are Europeanized. Non-EU countries at the borders of or within the actual EU approach themselves and are approached increasingly according to EU ‘standards’. Subsequently, these countries are conceptualized more regularly as particular regions—e.g. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), South-East Europe (SEE) or Central Eurasia (CEA)—and targeted as such in policy documents (cf. e.g. EC 2003). Furthermore, border regions have become a particular focal point of EU policies in the form of so-called ‘euregions’; cross-border territorial spaces that are conceptualized differently from the spaces of national states (cf. Kramsch and Hoper 2004).

When we take a closer look at recent conceptualizations of European government, such as the influential open method of coordination (OMC) introduced at the EU’s Lisbon summit in 2000, we can perceive a decisive turn in the ‘conduct of conduct’ toward ‘the systematics of peer review, the systematization of comparisons and evaluation, and the repeated call for performance indicators, for the quantification of objectives and hence for the establishment of their measurability’ (Haahr 2004: 219). Under the Portuguese presidency, it was concluded that the OMC involves:

fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium, and long terms; establishing … quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks … as a means of comparing best practice; translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences; [and] periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review as mutual learning processes (European Presidency 2000, § 37, cited in Dale 2004: 175).

These characteristics point to the above-mentioned politics of scale, for they depart from a multi-level approach in which places and areas in ‘Europe’ are considered sites into which benchmarks can be translated top-down by means of policy building and implementation. This intensified governmentality of harmonization is exemplified by the
ways in which the EU monitors its candidate member states. Regarding the Roma, these techniques of government are represented also in the Roma policies introduced by countries in the region (such as, for instance, the short, medium and long-term Roma national action plans that Gheorghe mentioned). Remarkably, in the ‘concept note’ written in preparation for the Decade project, it is suggested that governments first have to plan ‘Decade benchmarks in their particular country’; then they and Romany delegations have ‘to agree on benchmarks and timelines’; and finally they have to ‘define measures to monitor, evaluate and report on progress’, to find ‘agreement on monitoring mechanisms for the period 2005-2015’ (Decade project 2005). This attitude affirms what I have described above: it shows a calculating rationality inscribed in a governmentality designed to manage, develop, and discipline European populations, which is to be internalized not only by EU-member states, but also by candidate or non-members and by non-governmental and international organizations operating in Europe.

However, it would be too easy to consider European or international institutions as the new centers of powers or as the only agencies of the production and politics of scale. It would be wrong to understand the underlying rationale as solely one of discipline (in its negative-exclusive meaning). The practices and technologies at stake could be considered as ‘practices of liberty’: ‘practices which establish and facilitate liberty, but which also discipline and constrain the exercise of it’ (Haahr 2004: 216). Both the ability to implement new policy strategies and the attitude of monitoring and ‘self-monitoring’ countries on the basis of successful policy implementation, are part of a dynamic specific to the governmentality in question: to produce and perform multi-layered identifiable agencies that can subsequently be considered responsible for forming and implementing policy. Hence, the governmentality at stake is inscribed within a wider narrative, accurately described by Jens Henrik Haahr:

This is a narrative of self-improvement via purposeful self-control and conscious self-management, and it reflects at the level of national and international agencies and bureaucracies a predominant construction in contemporary societies of subjects as responsible, rational and self-controlling entities, responsible also in the sense of having responsibility for their own destinies and being both able and obliged to turn themselves into ‘successful’ achievements (2004: 223).

This narrative of self-improvement returns in another important governmentality I want to introduce briefly. It intersects with the dominant one described so far, and is at stake in the international concern with poverty and aid. We only have to look at the title and the summary of the latest extensive report on the Roma by the UNDP—‘Avoiding the Dependency Trap’—to become aware of the complex yet clear ways in which the development of policy and developmental approaches to the Roma (e.g. capacity development, community or grassroots development, human development, sustainable development) come together. In its summary, interestingly called ‘Towards a common code of conduct’, the report mentions that Roma-related ‘projects should not promote dependency cultures, and should elaborate a phase-out strategy at the very beginning’ (Ivanov et al. 2002: 11). Hence, the narrative of self-improvement is projected onto Roma policy making by considering projects viable if and only if they produce responsible, independent, and self-controlling subjects. As Cristina Rojas (2004) shows
convincingly, this narrative of self-improvement goes hand in hand with the
governmentality concerning representations of poverty and the distribution of aid that has
been dominant over the last decade. Identifiable agencies (e.g. subjects, organizations,
national governments, communities) are increasingly considered as either capable of self-
reform or not. The latter ones are consequently perceived as living in a situation of
poverty or disorder, which can only be relieved by structural, less peaceful ‘adjustment
reforms’.

We need to ask whether Romany communities—once they are considered ‘subjects
of self-improvement’ and approached by means of technologies of ‘representation’ as
well as quantifiable comparison—will be able to produce their own contexts. So far, we
have not yet dealt with the ways in which the Roma themselves try to challenge the
current attitudes used to approach them. How, for instance, do they deal with the ‘politics
of scale’ inscribed in the European governmentalties? If the practices and discourses
implied by these governmentalties are really ‘practices of liberty’, how do they
 guarantee resistance to dominant power structures and relations? Foucault already took
into consideration the ambivalent and double character of governmentality, which
includes ‘on the one hand, rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentations through
which to operate, and, on the other, strategic games that subject power relations they are
supposed to guarantee to instability and reversal’ (1997: 203). Over the last few years,
there has been a growing awareness, partly due to the frustration of the Roma with the
current mentalities of government, that new forms of collaboration are needed to turn the
opportunities these governmentalties offer ‘against themselves’. In the next section, I
will focus on a particular case study to illustrate this new tendency.

**Networks as the Intersection of Technologies of Agency and Performance**

Kriva Palanka is a town in North-Macedonia, close to the borders with Serbia and
Bulgaria. The Romany ‘mahala’ or neighborhood, in which about 2,000 Roma live
(almost ten per cent of the town population), is situated in a valley that is accessible only
with difficulty. The mahala lacks basic infrastructure and its inhabitants live in
deplorable social circumstances. Late in 2002, the electricity company ended the power
supply of the Romany mahala when the Roma could not pay their bills. Before the
company was privatized, electricity had been supplied in exchange for votes. Because
most of the members of the Romany community are unemployed, they could not pay
their debts. The cut-off mobilized the community more or less spontaneously. After a few
internal meetings, they agreed to form a delegation, which subsequently went to
negotiate with the company’s manager. After several unsuccessful attempts, the Romany
community consulted Fundatia Avundipe, a small-scale regionally operating Romany
organization based in Kriva Palanka and known for its constructive collaboration with
local and national authorities. Avundipe organized a meeting with the mayor of the town
and representatives of the mahala and the company. This round table discussion was
successful in the end: electricity was reconnected in exchange for labor offered by
members of the community to the company; electricity meters were installed to see who
was able to pay and who was not (thus making the Roma accountable individually rather
than collectively); and the company advised the Roma on how to save energy.4
This is not the end of the story, for it describes only a moment in the self-mobilization of this Romany community. With the assistance of Avundipe, pre-school activities have been organized and attempts have been made to include Kriva Palanka’s Roma in the regular school system. Furthermore, Avundipe has improved its own expertise and extended its scope to a few other villages. This is due not only to Avundipe’s pioneering work in the region and its positive interaction with local Romany communities, but also, importantly, to its involvement in the European Roma Grassroots Organizations network (ERGO), established in 2002. ERGO is a transnational network of Romany grassroots organizations from Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia, which has been gathering experience in local Romany community building for a few years already (Serbian and Moldavian Romany partners will probably also join the network). Spolu International Foundation, a Dutch NGO, provides the administration for the network, but has no voting rights. From its beginning in 1995, Spolu has intensively supported processes of Romany ‘community development’ in the region, mostly by means of contracts and loans, and on the basis of projects that are invented, prioritized, and agreed upon by the local Romany communities themselves.

The ERGO network has found and still develops alternative ways to combine local initiatives and activism with experiences and knowledge shared on the basis of ‘horizontal exchanges’ between Romany communities in different districts and regions. Increasingly, the participants in the network recognize the common problems and issues they face in their own communities. The strong distrust of many Roma against projects informed by state, NGO or even EU and UN-based standardized practices is challenged by a politics of ‘locality’ and ‘self-empowerment’. While processes of issue solving, self-organization, and ‘learning by doing’ are the key elements in initiatives to mobilize a particular Romany community, they are also central to the ways in which the network itself operates (cf. Schuringa 2005). Moreover, the very structure of the network enables particular actors to strategically vary their position in the network in coordination with other more or less autonomous actors in the network or to temporarily transform its structure to achieve particular aims more effectively. ‘As part of its strategy, ERGO has started to work towards different, more open network structures. … This way, the entire network or some of its members can enter into temporary alliances with organizations and people that do not have a formal relation with the ERGO member, but face the same problem’ (Spolu 2005: 12).

Though the network is strongly locally oriented, the local does not bind it. Quite the opposite, the very ability to organize and affect the network transregionally or even transnationally illustrates ‘the extent to which local groups, far from being passive receivers of transnational conditions, actively shape the process of constructing identities, social relations, and economic practice’ (Escobar 2001: 155). While the self-organization of Romany communities is still often initiated by negative impulses—cut-offs, reduction of social benefits, segregation in education or housing—small successes in trying to turn the tide contribute to the Roma’s self-esteem and enable the concerned communities to change from a predominantly ‘context-driven’ into a ‘context-generative’ neighborhood, in which they themselves start to deal with the construction of their locality practically and discursively (for an accurate theoretical background of the production of locality, cf. Appadurai 1996: Chapter 9).
Arturo Escobar suggests that the concerned politics of ‘self-empowerment’ has to be found at the intersection of the emergence of new and renewed identities, on the one hand, and the scaling effects central to networking on the other:

Networks can be seen as apparatuses for the production of discourses and practices that connect nodes in a discontinuous space; networks are not necessarily hierarchical but can in some cases be described as self-organizing, non-linear and non-hierarchical meshworks … They create flows that link sites which, operating more like fractal structures than fixed architectures, enable diverse couplings (structural, strategic, conjunctural) with other sites and networks. This is why I say that the meaning of the politics of place can be found at the intersection of the scaling effects of networks and the strategies of the emergent identities (2001: 169).

Escobar’s understanding of networks avoids the problematic dichotomy between top-down or bottom-up approaches to policy implementation, as well as the dichotomy between civil society and state apparatuses. Moreover, his concept of network enables a consideration of a politics of scale that is distinct from one that departs from a reified notion of governmental levels. This does not imply that such reifications do not take place in governmental practices. Rather than presupposing reified levels and agencies, however, this concept of network gives a clear account of the ways in which identifiable agencies and group identities are produced, performed, and strategically organized on a non-permanent basis and according to particular rationalities of government. It is at the intersection of the scaling effects of networks and strategies aimed at, for instance, Romany community or grassroots development, where two important types of governmental technologies intersect as well, namely technologies of agency and ones of performance:

[G]overnment is at one and the same time an activity which enables and enforces agency, involvement, deliberation and the creation of partnerships through technologies of agency, and an activity which conditions this agency, its involvement and deliberation, and subjects it to certain standards of rationality through the application of a range of technologies of performance (Haahr 2004: 226, cf. Dean 1999: 167-70).

Governmental technologies of agency contain all the different ways to encourage and organize our possibilities of agency. The governmental technologies of agency have an important feature in common: government is supposed to be the use of techniques for the release of forms of capital (e.g. human, social, cultural) that have to be produced in a domain outside of what is prevailingly considered government.

Anna Yeatman (1998) and Barbara Cruikshank (1999) have specified the scope of these technologies of agency within two distinct but interrelated fields. Yeatman points to the relevance of technologies that are based on extra-juridical or quasi-juridical types of contract, which are found, for instance, in the ‘contracting-out’ of public services to private or non-governmental agencies. The ‘contracts’ between the NGO Romea and Czech schools I introduced in the beginning of this paper, for instance, could be subsumed under the technologies in question. The agreement between the Macedonian
Roma organization Fundatia Avundipe, the Roma community of Kriva Palanka, the municipality, and the electricity company is another example of this ‘new contractualism’. At a different scale, we may consider the Decade Action Plans initiated within the Roma Decade project as quasi-contracts, insofar as these plans specify, on the one hand, the requirements they impose on a variety of agencies involved, and, on the other, the results in the fields of education, health care, housing, and employment that have to be achieved by 2015, the end of the ‘contract period’.

The technologies of agency also include what Cruikshank (1996; 1999) describes as ‘technologies of citizenship’: strategies for the transformation of subjectivity from mere powerlessness to active citizenship. These include the numerous ways of empowerment, of self-esteem and of negotiation and consultation that are employed in activities such as the combating of dependency, community building, health promotion projects, women’s participation programs, and commemorations or other memorial practices. These technologies of citizenship engage us ‘as active and free citizens, … as members of self-managing communities and organizations, as actors in democratizing social movements, and as agents capable of taking control of our own risks’ (Dean 1999: 168). Through the use of these technologies, agency is brought into being and interlaced with a specific system of purposes. The central approaches of the ERGO network, such as issue solving, self-organization, and ‘learning by doing’, could be subsumed under these technologies of citizenship. In the case of the Roma, the two discussed kinds of technologies of agency are often combined, most of all in the government of the unemployed. In the example of the Roma of Kriva Palanka and the arbitration of Fundatia Avundipe, the unemployed Roma of the community made an agreement to subject themselves to particular technologies of citizenship, e.g. free labor offered to the electricity company and counseling by Avundipe and the company to improve self-esteem and to reduce the risk of ‘wasting’ energy. In such cases, the extra-juridical contract acts as a kind of obligatory step: the Roma have to agree to a variety of training procedures invented to empower them, increase their self-esteem, and improve their changes to enter the labor market ultimately.

However, the governmental technologies in question are not only ones of agency. As Haahr puts forward:

[The practices of government] also set norms, standards, benchmarks, performance indicators, quality controls and best practice standards, to monitor, measure and render calculable the performance of [the] various individuals and agencies. Thus the concept of a ‘free subject’ has … taken on the meaning of a potential technical instrument in the achievement of governmental purposes and objectives, of being an entity which can be constructed and shaped by governmental practices (2004: 216).

Taken together, we can call the technologies that indirectly and in a certain sense ‘at a distance’ aim at regulation and quantitatively or qualitatively effective performance, governmental technologies of performance. These are the numerous technologies devised to subject important domains of e.g. medical, educational, psychological or social expertise to new formal regimes in which professionals are transformed into ‘calculating individuals’ within ‘calculable spaces’ (cf. Miller 1992, Rose and Miller 1992). The privatization of services that used to be public, the decentralization of budgets and their
supply, the launch of (semi-)commercial service providers, the setting of benchmarks and performance indicators, and the tools to compare best practice, could all be considered illustrations of techniques to include the shaping of conduct into the optimization of performance. In the previous section, I already referred to the ways in which the Roma Decade project is both committed to and complicit in these governmental technologies of performance. We can perceive the same tendency in the UNDP’s so-called ‘human development’ approach, which seeks ‘to assess development levels of groups or communities according to a broad set of criteria. With the ultimate goal of expanding people’s choices, human development looks at indices of life expectancy, education and per-capita income, which provide a broader perspective on the options available to groups such as the Roma’ (Ivanov et al 2002: 1). In the conclusion of the UNDP report, the authors point to the relevance and necessity of performance: ‘Whenever possible, standardized assessment systems for evaluating the impact of Roma projects in the field, with internally consistent, measurable benchmarks and indicators, should be introduced’ (2002: 85).

The description of governmental technologies of agency and of performance allows me to analyze the ways in which they intersect in network structures. Roughly, we can distinguish two different kinds of intersections. First, by using technologies of agency, actors in a network can try to establish institutional spaces as self-managing local centers (cf. Dean 1999: 169). Here, we may think of decentralized governmental departments or offices, private or privatized service providers, and NGOs of different kinds. With regard to the Roma, we can distinguish many of these kinds of self-managing local centers. Apart from the hundreds of NGOs that deal with Romany issues in Europe, we need to mention in particular the Romany community centers that have become such a central institution in the post-1989 condition of Romany minorities. We may also think of the Hungarian Romany minority self-governments, which are indeed a result of the Hungarian Minority Law of 1993, but which have simultaneously become the subject of many extra-juridical contracts between different kinds of actors.

On the other hand, technologies of performance establish these local centers at the same time as self-regulating and accountable units, in which the regulation of services and the management of cultural, social, human, and economic capital is carried out by various kinds of accounting. In the UNDP report on the Roma referred to above, we read that ‘donors should invest more into investigating the background of NGOs, as well as monitoring their activities. Developing “who’s who” profiles of potential partners and exchanging information would help increase transparency and accountability, and reduce opportunities for corruption in the third sector’ (Ivanov et al 2002: 85). The most recent report of the World Bank on the Roma illustrates in a single sentence this kind of intersection of technologies of agency and performance: ‘Responsibility for policy development on Roma issues, coordination, and implementation has been distributed among a number of government bodies, leading to challenges in transparency, accountability, and coordination’ (Ringold, Orenstein, and Wilkens 2005: 132).

The second type of intersection of technologies of agency and performance concerns the ways in which different kinds of rights of citizens as critical consumers and users regulate the internal management of companies, bureaucracies, governmental offices, and other kinds of service providers. The agency of citizens or groups of citizens can enter into contestation with professional knowledge and practice. The numerous ways in which
the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) and a variety of Roma press agencies ‘monitor’ professional divisions illustrate how the national government, including the police and employment offices, as well as companies, shopkeepers, and international agencies are critically interrogated in their turn as well. I in no way want to overestimate the impact of these developments, but I believe it is time to suggest that the rights of Roma—both juridical and extra-juridical—have increasingly also become contributory criteria for the evaluation of the performance of professionals and, furthermore, have provided ways in which different kinds of authorities can be open to a source of policy innovation and important information about changes among the Romany minorities.

As Appadurai (2002) has shown in the context of the Indian metropolis Mumbai, new forms of self-organization by the poor and techniques to convince potential social and civil partners of their local projects and encourage them to invest in these projects, are key elements to the functioning of networks and may lead to policy changes as well. Once organizations can set a precedent—for instance by legally registering in land registers—other communities might mobilize themselves too in temporary or permanent links with the network to try to achieve the same. This has already happened successfully as a result of mediating work done by a Bulgarian Romany partner in ERGO. In this particular case, and perhaps more generally, we may conclude:

[The strategy of precedent-setting might turn] the survival tactics and experiments of the poor into sites for policy innovations by the state, the city, donor agencies, and other activist organizations. It is a strategy that moves the poor into the horizon of legality on their own terms. Most important, it invites risk-taking activities by bureaucrats within a discourse of legality, allowing the boundaries of the status quo to be pushed and stretched—it creates a border zone of trial and error, a sort of research and development space within which poor communities, activists, and bureaucrats can explore new designs for partnership (Appadurai 2002: 34).

**Concluding Remarks**

The emergence of transnational Romany networks is itself embedded in a field of different and opposing forces, of which some are effectively centrifugal and others dramatically implosive. This could be illustrated by the protests in East-Slovakia in February 2004. The curtailing of social benefits by the Slovakian government mobilized the concerned poor, among whom were many members of Romany communities, in a manner that was both spontaneous and intentional. After the effective ethnic framing of the protest by some influential Slovakian media and politicians, and a couple of incidents of looting in shops and supermarkets, the Slovakian government decided to mobilize a considerable military and police force to intensively monitor Romany communities and settlements in the eastern part of the country (cf. Magdolenová 2004). In the course of 2004, many Romany families who could not pay their rents due to cuts in their social benefits were evicted from their apartments and moved into ‘substandard’ housing or even worse—a practice increasingly popular among Czech municipalities as well (cf. ERRC 2004, Víšek 2003). In this particular context, we are clearly beyond discussing whether we are dealing with the self-regulation or self-mobilization of the Roma in...
question or with their brutal repression. Roma ‘policy’ here has become the equivalent of policing the Roma.

Yet even in this extremely dramatic example there appears to be a growing awareness among the Roma that they need to share and exchange their experiences on the basis of regional and transnational collaborations. Pioneering work has already been done, for instance, by the Slovakian Roma Press Agency (RPA), established in Košice in 2002, in connecting the initiatives of local Romany communities to so-called ‘counterframing’ to rebut stereotypical representations (cf. Benford and Snow 2000), to legal defense strategies, and to the formation of alliances with other involved partners. Not only does this agency operate on a local and regional basis, it also participates in Rrommedia, a transnational Romany media network of about twenty members, which was established in September 2004 in Montenegro. As part of their strategy to challenge stereotypical representations of the Roma in mainstream European media and by populist or right-wing politicians, members of the Rrommedia network have strikingly formulated their own ‘code of conduct’ (Rrommedia 2004). Comparable initiatives to collaborate transnationally in the field of Romany cultural organizations have been undertaken, for instance, to challenge mainstream representations of the Roma’s history and to actively construct their own historical conceptualizations (cf. van Baar forthcoming).

Consequently, we have to admit that the governmental interferences in Slovakia in the winter of 2004 do not appear in a vacuum or exclusively in a field of disciplinary technologies. As Foucault has suggested himself, ‘in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-governmentality, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security’ (1991: 102). In other words, even while the Roma are often faced with repressive measures, we still need to try to unravel the relation of these measures to the post-1989 condition of European governmentalities. Therefore, to address the case of the European Roma, we maybe need to focus on the relevance of the second part of the Foucault citation. To what extent can we consider Romany minorities ‘targeted populations’ involved in governmental technologies that solely aim at security? In this paper I have problematized the prevailing approach to these kinds of questions in terms of state/civil society or top-down/bottom-up polarizations. Instead, I have argued that we have to look at governmental rationalities and technologies differently. Consequently, terms such as ‘security’ and ‘targeted populations’ need to be approached from another viewpoint than the prevailing one. Dean has clearly formulated this issue:

Today the appeal for freedom is made because security depends on the constitution of individuals, professionals, communities, organizations and institutions as sites for the exercise of a ‘responsible autonomy’ that can be indirectly regulated by the technologies of performance. In this sense one might say that freedom, agency and choice become artifacts of particular governmental practices (1999: 196).

Following this line of reasoning, the Roma have become a ‘targeted population’ in the sense that they have to be empowered and have to empower themselves in partnerships with NGOs, governmental offices and bureaucracies, activists, international organizations, and other kinds of service providers in order to become self-managing citizens capable of taking control of their own risks. In this context, Romany community
or grassroots development means that, by strategically deploying technologies of agency in partnership with the different types of agencies and specialists, groups of Roma are enjoined to manage, mobilize, and secure their own communities. One of my questions concerning these issues is the way in which the vocabularies of security and risk appear implicitly or explicitly in relation to the situation of the Roma minorities and the dominant discourses of development in Europe. Again, the UNDP report on the Roma can serve as an illustration. The word ‘risk’ is omnipresent: in relation to the Roma the report speaks of poverty risks, (money) lending risks, undernourishment risks, HIV/AIDS risks, starvation risks, malnutrition risks, health risks in general, and high-risk behaviors. Moreover, it explicitly relates these risks to the inclusion of the Roma in mainstream Central and Eastern European societies:

The risk is that, if [the productive integration of the Roma into their home societies via employment, education and political participation will be] postponed, the cost of finding solutions for marginalized groups will be immeasurably higher and will have few chances of success. The human security costs of exclusion will spiral, potentially resulting in political extremism and setbacks for the democratic process (Ivanov et al 2002: 5, emphasis added).

Here, risk clearly does not appear as a naturally occurring entity; it is, rather, considered a form of calculation about reality. As modern political theorists (Beck 1992, Ewald 1991, O’Malley 1996) have argued, risk is a form of modern rationality, a way of representing and thinking about issues and events in terms of their calculability, even when they cannot really be calculated in the normal understanding of that term. I believe we have to interrogate critically the appearance of risk as something that is now devolved onto Romany individuals and communities and managed by governmental technologies, such as Roma Decade benchmarks and so-called ‘Roma Human Development Indices’ (cf. note 5), which try to provide transparency and accountability.

Almost a decade ago, when Nicolae Gheorghe and Andrzej Mirga wrote that ‘[t]he Romani community itself needs new ideas to govern and mobilize itself,’ they concluded that the ‘Roma must … take the risk [to be changed by their integration into mainstream society] if they are to overcome their present marginalization and underdevelopment’ (1997: 22). Now perhaps we should put it the other way around and ask what the self-governing and risk-taking of the Romany minorities could imply under the conditions of the current European governmentalities.

Huub van Baar is a Ph.D. candidate at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis (ASCA), University of Amsterdam. His dissertation deals with the relation between processes of Europeanization and Romany identity formation in East Central Europe. He analyzes the ways in which new or renewed forms of the Roma’s marginalization, as well as their emancipation, are related to particular political formations (the nation-state or European institutions) and their history. In particular, Van Baar examines the extent to which new Romany media, cultural, and social networks embody alternative sites of Romany identity formation. His project is part of the research program Globalization and the Transformation of Cultural Identities in East Central Europe, funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Van Baar holds master’s degrees in mathematics and philosophy.
Notes

1 I would like to thank Jarmila Balážová and Zdeněk Ryšavý of the Czech Romany organization Roma o.s. for providing me with information concerning their projects and for discussing them with me.

2 Although I have introduced the issue of European governmentalities before (van Baar 2005), in the present paper I will deal with them more thoroughly and point to issues that differ substantially from the ones I put forward at the conference on (Trans)nationalism in South East Europe at the University of Oxford in June 2005. Consequently, when we try to understand the scope of Foucault’s concept of governmentality, I believe we do not need the additional concept of ‘countergovernmentality’ that Appadurai has introduced (2002: 35-36). Either his concept falls back on classical binary oppositions or it can be understood as already being in correspondence with Foucault’s understanding of governmentality.

3 Gheorghe puts forward an understanding of the relation between the Romany elite(s) and the Romany grassroots that is to some extent debatable. While he suggests that ‘we’ are losing contact with the Romany grassroots or communities, he also presupposes a past in which they were systematically or effectively related to the Romany elite(s). I would like to thank Anikó Imre for bringing up this point.

4 I would like to thank Jef Helmer, Ruus Dijkerhuis, and Froukelien Yntema of Spolu International Foundation, as well as the representatives of Fundatia Avundipe (Macedonia), Združenie Spolu (Slovakia), and Zajedno Vojvodina (Serbia and Montenegro) for the encouraging discussions on the ERGO network and for providing me with information concerning Spolu’s activities in Central and Eastern Europe.

5 When Gabriela Hrabáňová, one the Romany representatives of the Roma Decade project in the Czech Republic, introduced this project to the audience at a seminar in Prague, she spoke exclusively in the language of benchmarks and performance indicators (International seminar ‘Minority Policy in the Member States of the EU 25 regarding the Roma and Sinti Minority’, Prague, 14 May 2005).

6 The UNDP has also introduced so-called ‘Roma Human Development Indices’ as one of their governmental technologies of performance. These Roma HDIs are introduced in the following, rather dubious way: ‘The material deprivation experienced by Roma and their limited development opportunities can be measured by computing human development indices (HDIs) for Roma populations. Due to data inconsistencies … the standard methodology cannot be applied directly. Initial attempts have been made to estimate HDIs for Roma living in Romania. These are crude estimates, but they are consistent with other sources of information and case studies’ (Ivanov et al 2002: 17). Hence, despite data inconsistencies, the deprivation and reduced opportunities of Roma could still be ‘computed’ in the form of performance indicators that would be in line with other sources of information and case studies (which are not mentioned in the report). This is a classic example of a circular argument.

7 Studies on the Hungarian Romany minority self-government system often focus on its legal aspects and side effects as well as on the state-minority relation (Kovats 2001b, Danka and Pallai 2003), while it could be productive to look at it more extensively from the perspective of the extra-juridical (semi-contractual) bonds the involved Roma have with all kinds of different social and cultural agencies (Pallai 2003 goes into this direction).
References


scaling the romany grassroots: europeanization and transnational networking  

huub van baar


ivanov, a., zhelyazkova, a., slay, b., márczis, m., vaščka, m., o’higgins, n., cace, s., and sirovatka, t. (2002) avoiding the dependency trap. the roma in central and eastern europe. a regional human development report. bratislava: undp.


