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Governing immigrants and citizenship regimes: the case of France, 1950s-1990s

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Does sustained and increasingly transnational immigration weaken the national character of citizenship regimes? This paper addresses this issue by examining French responses to immigration over a 40-year period. In spite of the changing character of immigration and changing state strategies, all governments throughout this period have sought to maintain the national character by making full access to rights contingent on one’s conformity to national values and moralities. As the government made accessing rights dependent on conformity to national norms, the legitimacy of immigrant activists seeking to expand their rights has depended on their abilities to conform to the rules of the national political game. Resisting marginalization therefore requires the assimilation of the immigrants into nationally specific political cultures, which contributes to reinforcing the national character of citizenship regimes. By examining the particular case of France, the paper aims to show how top-down and bottom-up processes by states and activists work in different ways to keep the nation at the center of citizenship regimes in spite of the ongoing and very real challenges presented by transnationalism and globalization.

Keywords: categories; citizenship; claims making

Introduction

The recent literature on globalization and immigration has introduced an interesting puzzle concerning national citizenship regimes. On the one hand, prominent scholars agree that modern citizenship regimes have been intimately coupled with the nation (Brubaker 1992, Mann 1993, Noiriel 2005). The concept of citizenship proposed that rights should be distributed to all members of the community regardless of their rank but the boundaries of this community should also be defined by national belonging. Access to equal rights has therefore long depended on nationality. Those dispossessed of a nation (i.e. immigrants, refugees, exiles) were deprived of the full array of rights needed to be considered fully human (Arendt 1958). On the other hand, transnational immigration and globalization have presented important challenges to this nation-centered account of citizenship (Beck 2004). The nation state is no longer the sole institution for distributing rights because international courts and multilateral institutions have assumed great authority in this domain. These institutions back immigrant claims that states should recognize their rights not on the basis of their being nationals but on the basis of their being human (Soysal 1994, 1997). Transnationalism has therefore challenged national citizenship regimes but it remains to be seen whether these challenges amount to a transformation in their national character.
This paper explores this issue by examining the French state’s response to 40 years of postwar immigration. In its strategy to exclude immigrants in the 1950s–1970s, the French state introduced institutions and discourses that brightened the boundaries between ‘foreign’ immigrants and national citizens. In doing so, it reinforced the national character of citizenship and made access to full rights contingent on one’s ability to become a full national. In its strategy to integrate what it deemed ‘acceptable’ immigrants in the 1970s–1990s, the state developed a range of regulatory controls and discourses to steer the integration of these populations into the national fold. While state strategies to immigration differed markedly in these two periods, a common effort was made to retain the centrality of national values and norms in defining the boundaries of citizenship. Moreover, across these periods and strategies, similar governmental techniques were used to achieve nationalizing goals. The state assessed the acceptability of migrants according to their conformity to national goals, cultures, and moralities; penetrated the associational worlds of immigrants to produce compliant immigrant subjects; and has deployed its powers to stigmatize, repress, and repatriate transgressors. Thus, in spite of the twists and turns of immigration flows and settlement patterns, this case study reveals the long-term struggles of the state to maintain the national character of citizenship regimes.

This is only one part of the story. While many immigrants complied with the prods and pushes of state power, others resisted. These forms of resistance were paradoxical because rather than challenging the national character of citizenship regimes, they often contributed to reinforcing this character. For immigrants seeking the recognition of their rights, they had to demonstrate that they were not as ‘other’ and foreign as the regime made them out to be. They had to show that they faced the same hardships and had the same values of nationals. Through these discursive and performative acts, immigrants demonstrated their normative and moral equivalence with nationals, thereby making it more difficult for the state to deny them rights. Rather than subvert the national character of citizenship regimes, these acts of resistance contributed to their reproduction by reinforcing the centrality of national values and norms as a way of gaining access to rights, recognition, and equality.

In sum, the historical case presented here identifies the symbiotic processes that reinforce the national character of citizenship regimes under conditions of advancing globalization. The top-down methods used by the state create different rules that maintain this national character. When immigrants struggle for rights, they must follow the rules of the game in order to be considered a legitimate voice in the field and have their demands taken seriously by the regime and public. However, following the rules of national citizenship regimes requires them to demonstrate their conformity with national values. Resisting immigrants help reproduce the principle that rights should be conferred to those who conform to national values and norms. Thus, transnationalism and globalization have certainly presented important challenges to the national character of citizenship regimes but top-down and bottom-up processes work together to ratchet up and reinforce the centrality of the nation in citizenship regimes.

The paper examines these issues in three parts: first, it provides a review of the current literature and an outline of the theoretical argument. Second, it analyzes the state’s ‘exclusionary strategy’ in the 25 years following the war. Third, it describes the new ‘integration strategy’ of the 1980s and 1990s to make immigrants into compliant national subjects. The empirical supports for the arguments made in the paper are drawn from the existing scholarship on French immigration policy and politics.
Maintaining national boundaries in a world of transnational flows

National citizenship regimes undone?

Contemporary citizenship regimes are the outcomes of long historical struggles over how rights and duties should be distributed within political communities (Brubaker 1992, Mann 1993). The emerging ideas concerning rights, duties, and membership coincided with the rising prominence of nationalism as the principal ideology for creating political communities (Mann 1993). This coincidence resulted in coupling nationalism with citizenship, with nationality becoming a basic requirement to access communities of free and equal citizens (Noiriel 2005). A key function of the state was to maintain the boundary between insiders and outsiders and distribute rights accordingly. Different states drew on different norms and intellectual traditions to decide who should be included and excluded from the community; what rights should be conferred to full citizens; and what kinds of laws, institutions, and techniques could be used to protect the rights of citizens and guard the boundaries of the community. Whereas Germany produced a model of national citizenship based on strict ethnic principles, France embraced a model whereby Republican values and norms could be acquired through national institutions (i.e. school and the army; Brubaker 1992, Mann 1993, Elias 1998). Thus, the combination of norms and institutions solidified into very different yet wholly national citizenship regimes (Castles and Miller 2003).

Most scholars believe that globalization and transnational immigration have challenged national citizenship regimes but there is significant disagreement over the changes that these challenges have induced.

A number of scholars have argued that globalization and improved technologies have permitted migrants to sustain intimate contacts with family and friends in their sending communities (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Guarnizo et al. 1999). The simultaneous connections across borders reinforce economic, emotional, and moral attachments to their ‘homes’ and stall their integration into national citizenship regimes (Gans 1997). At certain times, transnational ties between individuals can evolve into sustained connections between communities, towns, and associations. Members of hometown associations, for example, pool money and resources in receiving societies to invest in their sending communities. These activities create durable networks that facilitate the flow of resources, ideas, and people between distant places, completely bypassing national states. Finally, observers of social movement have suggested that immigrants who face certain constraints in national institutions often shift scale to friendlier international institutions (i.e. EU, UN, etc.). Elites in these institutions can be used to press national governments into recognizing the rights of immigrants residing within their territories. Politicking in international arenas also results in transnational activist networks where immigrants in different countries can talk with others about their common experiences and develop visions of citizenship that transcend national borders (Soysal 1994, 1997).

Others have argued that the national character of citizenship regimes has been challenged but not undone. Geddes (2003) and others have spent much time examining the state’s role in maintaining and reproducing immigration and citizenship laws over the past 50 years. Throughout this period, European states have created new methods and instruments to monitor and maintain their borders in the face of increased flows of migrants. In addition to this, Berezin (2009) argues that increased immigration, under conditions of neoliberal state de-regulation, has threatened the ‘moral ontologies’ of European residents and spawned the growth of populist and xenophobic parties. The growing prominence of these parties has compelled governments to embrace restrictive and coercive measures.
Moreover, the social movement scholarship has shown that states continue to be the central gatekeeper of key rights for immigrants, compelling activists to channel the majority of their energies into this arena (Ireland 1994, Giugni and Passy 2004, Koopmans et al. 2005). They develop alliances with national actors, target national politicians, and craft discourses in ways that resonate with the national public. In this instance, the institutional and discursive rules that structure the political practices of immigrants are primarily national in spite of certain transnational tugs.

The French case illustrates how ongoing immigration has caused states to constantly rework their national citizenship regimes but their national character has largely remained intact, if not reinforced.

**International immigration and national citizenship regimes: a general theory**

This section combines institutional and cultural perspectives within the literature to identify the mechanism through which national citizenship regimes are reproduced and reinforced in response to transnational immigration.

**Marking the boundaries between nationals and immigrants**

Inequalities in modern citizenship regimes become legitimate and normal because outsiders are represented as subjects who lack the basic attributes needed to be recognized as equals (Rancière 1989). This makes it ‘impossible’ for full citizens to see outsiders as possible equals and deserving of the same rights as themselves. New immigrants have long been viewed as lacking the core attributes needed to be recognized as possible political and social equals (Rancière 1992, Wahnich 1997, Ngai 2004, Raissiguier 2010). The lack of conformity between the values of immigrants and those of the nation makes it impossible for natives and the government to recognize the equality of immigrants. Stigmatized as ‘foreigners’, they are the bearers of multiple deficiencies and denied the rights and privileges granted to full citizens. ‘I use the concept of impossibility to conjure up the complex mechanisms (both material and discursive) that establish impossible subject positions within the French nation. These mechanisms include discursive practices that turn certain immigrants into unthinkable members of the national body as well as material/legal practices that locate them in spaces of impossibility’ (Raissiguier 2010, p. 3).

In addition to this, undocumented immigrants do not only lack the attributes to be recognized as possible equals, but such attributes also make them into ‘polluters’ or ‘threats’ to the national community (Alexander 2006). Their family size, religious beliefs, manners of talking, ethical dispositions, and so on can be highlighted as mortal threats to the moral underpinnings of the national community. This ‘othering’ provides the state with the moral legitimacy to not only deny undocumented immigrants with rights, but also to exercise its repressive and violent powers against this target population. While many nationals regret such actions, they are considered legitimate and just because such actions are viewed as needed to save the country from these ‘illegal’ and polluting groups.

**Classifying immigrants/differentiating regulatory strategies**

States accept that some immigrants reside within national territories and, in doing so, devise ways to distribute rights and obligations (well short of full rights) to large populations of noncitizens (Bosniak 2006). States use the attributes of immigrants (i.e. economic, cultural, political) to develop categories that measure the extent to which immigrants cohere to
national goals and values. Public administrators use these categories to assess the situations of immigrants, rank the population according to these categories, and distribute rights and obligations accordingly. Each category is supported by legal texts, administrative rules and criteria, and cultural norms; attributes individuals with specific rights and duties; and provides immigrants with different pathways to regularization and naturalization.

Immigrants with economic, cultural, legal, and political attributes that cohere with national norms may be deemed more ‘deserving’ than others and are provided more rights and a clear path to regularization and/or naturalization. These groups are more likely to become targets of state integration strategies, as governments develop a range of techniques to make them into disciplined subjects that comply with national norms and values. Other groups may not possess ‘acceptable’ attributes and are viewed as posing a greater risk to the government and national community. While these migrants may contribute in some ways to national goals (i.e. cheap labor), their overall profiles make them riskier bets for the government. Viewed in this way, governments are likely to develop strategies to exclude them from the national territory or from the national community (if residents of the country). Powerful legal and administrative barriers are erected to block these populations into the social, spatial, and political margins of the society. Thus, states devise different strategies to regulate different categories of immigrant, with these strategies producing remarkably unequal rights, opportunities, and constraints for these groups (Menjı´var 1997, 2006).

Making subjects through the associational worlds of immigrants

The categories and strategies developed by governments are not only aimed at regulating the behavior of different categories of immigrants but they are also intended to create civilized and disciplined subjects within national territories (Foucault 1995, 2000). They are, in so many words, aimed at creating a population that ‘knows its place’ in receiving societies. Ong (1996, 1999) has argued that governments do not necessarily shape immigrant subjectivities directly. More often than not, the civilizing projects of governments are carried out through the medium of immigrant civil society.

It is precisely in liberal democracies … that the governmentality of state agencies is often discontinuous, even fragmentary, and the work of instilling proper normative behavior and identity in newcomers must also be taken up by institutions in civil society… These are the ideological fields within which different criteria of belonging on the basis of civilized conduct by categorically distinguishable (dominant) others become entangled with culture, race, and class. (1996, p. 738, emphasis added)

Local and national institutions penetrate the associational worlds of immigrants and use their dominance within these worlds to shape ideas, discourses, and strategies concerning their lives. They may provide funding to associations, influence the range of opinions circulating in these spheres, provide legitimacy to some voices while silencing others, introduce their own associations, co-opt leaders, etc. Governments use the associational spaces of immigrants as a medium to translate rules and expectations of states into the world views and dispositions of actual immigrants. States therefore make immigrants into reliable and compliant subjects by exercising power through the trenches of immigrant civil society. This is done for ‘integrated’ and ‘excluded’ immigrants alike.

Resisting: challenging or reproducing the order of things

Where there is power, there is also resistance (Foucault 2000). When immigrants make claims to equality, they disturb the normalized order by opening up questions of who
should be granted full rights and who should not. The act of undocumented migrants making claims to equal rights disturbs the system because the hidden lines of exclusion are brought out into the open and people are compelled to take a stand on whether the existing order is just or not (Rancière 2007, p. 560). Disturbances create breaches in normative systems but attaining rights depends on the ability of immigrants to craft a representation of themselves as a subject deserving of equality. As noted before, the marginalization of many immigrants is justified because they are said to lack the attributes and values that cohere with those of the nation. Immigrants mobilizing within this discursive context must demonstrate how they fit within the norms of the country. This may result in immigrants demonstrating that they are hard-working, family-loving, and patriotic people who just want to live and prosper like everybody else. Immigrants therefore resist their marginalization by using national discourses, values, and moralities to make their cases for greater equality in the country. The acceptance of these national discourses serves only to reinforce their legitimacy as keys of gaining access to citizenship regimes.

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Immigrants certainly challenge the national character of citizenship regimes but states have responded in such a way to retain their national character. They develop methods to maintain the national boundaries of citizenship regimes, distribute rights unevenly within national territories, and make immigrant residents into compliant and disciplined subjects. Even in the instances when immigrants resist, their acts ultimately help to reinforce rather than undermine the national character of citizenship regimes.

The exclusionary regime: 1950s–1970s

Excluding migrants in France: making immigrants into foreigners

After the Second World War, France like other western European countries faced an important labor shortage because of war causalities and rapid economic growth. Recognizing the need for a strong population infusion, the De Gaulle government laid the legal ground to expand the state’s capacities to regulate migration flows. The Ordinance of 2 November 1945 provided the legal criteria and instruments to control the terms of recruitment, residency, and naturalization. The National Office of Immigration (ONI) became the principal agency charged with recruiting and negotiating migration contracts with individual countries. It identified the sectors in need of migrant labor, developed contracts and agreements with countries to recruit foreign labor, and recruit foreigners to work in France. While all officials agreed that immigration was necessary, many also feared that immigration could introduce social and governance problems. Demographers were particularly concerned about North and West Africans, arguing that their cultural, political, and religious backgrounds made them risks for French society (Weil 1991). As a consequence, the ONI targeted Italy for its labor recruitment drives but it soon expanded these efforts to Spain and Portugal in the early 1960s. These efforts resulted in relatively large flows of migrants but private sector recruiters continued to recruit North African workers because of their insatiable thirst for labor (Hargreaves 1995). In an effort to reassert its control over who was recruited and the terms of their stay in the country, the ONI developed bilateral migration agreements with Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria during the 1960s. However, as the mechanisms of ‘chain migration’ began to set in, these efforts were largely unsuccessful as 70–80% of migrants bypassed formal state channels (Ireland 1994, p. 26).

The importance of non-European immigrants for the French economy led most officials to recognize them as a necessary evil that needed to be controlled and regulated.
The state depoliticized the issue by taking it out of the legislature’s hands (Hayward and Wright 2002). Rather than parliament debate the issue in the open, the Minister of Interior silently passed decrees and circulars and technocrats implemented them. While the state developed this method to keep the issue of immigration out of public debate, it also developed powerful barriers to exclude immigrants from participating in the public sphere. Immigrants were officially designated ‘foreigners’ and as such, they were legally barred from engaging in politics on the principle that foreigners should remain neutral in national affairs. Violating the principle of foreign neutrality was grounds for deportation. Moreover, officials could use the ill-defined label ‘menace to the public order’ as further justification for deporting unruly immigrants. Immigrants were also barred from creating their own associations unless they were given special permission by the Minister of Interior. This restriction stemmed from a 1939 decree that sought to block the seditious activities of the country’s German immigrant population (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2001, p. 27). Immigrants were also restricted from starting or running their own newspapers. Though immigrants were allowed to join unions they could not take on leadership roles or participate in courts designed to weigh employee grievances.

In the early years, policy makers failed to develop a plan to settle new immigrants in cities. Rapid industrialization and high rates of urbanization resulted in sharp housing shortages. The sudden explosion of large shantytowns (i.e. bidonvilles) unleashed grievances by native residents and local politicians (De Barros 2004). As these settlements became negatively associated with immigrants, immigration became an issue in public debate in spite of government efforts to silence it (Weil 1991). Officials in 1958 created a new welfare agency – Social Action Fund for Immigrant Workers and their Families1 (FAS) – to regain control over immigrant settlement process. The FAS was charged with providing a range of welfare services including employment services, literacy classes, and housing but housing occupied the majority of its resources (70% of expenditures between 1959 and 1970) (Heins 1991). FAS assumed a general coordinating role in housing and a public-private housing corporation (SONACOTRA – National Society for the Construction of Housing for Workers2) actually produced, distributed, and managed immigrant housing. Housing options for immigrants varied according to national origin, with some groups steered into the hostel system (North and West Africans) while others enjoyed access to the mainstream public sector.

The SONACOTRA hostels were designed to provide an essential service to migrants but they were also intended to control and discipline the lives of immigrants settling in France. First, restricting housing to single males reduced the possibilities of family migration and reinforced the temporary character of North African migrants in particular. Second, hostels were designed as ‘total institutions’ that could ensure the social and spatial isolation of this group from French nationals. The social and living functions of residents were contained in the hostel (i.e. housing, religious, social activities, etc.), which minimized the need of migrants to leave the hostels for other services. Finally, as total institutions, immigrant residents were submitted to intense surveillance and disciplinary control. Hostel managers were recruited from non-commissioned officers who had served in the Indochina and Algerian wars. This experience was viewed as an asset for managing and civilizing North and West African migrants (Hmed 2006). Thus, in response to a growing uproar over immigrant shantytowns, the state devised a series of welfare measures that allowed it to better regulate this population and steer it away from disruptive interactions with native communities.

The political restrictions on immigrants provided them with few formal channels to express grievances about work, housing, and living conditions. As migration had been
negotiated through bilateral agreements, French officials encouraged the consulates of sending countries to take an active role in treating the grievances of nationals. These countries were happy to comply as this provided a way to monitor the activities of their nationals and develop supportive clients abroad. Consulates transmitted workplace and housing grievances to the appropriate French authorities, they developed ‘friendly societies’ or associations (amicales) with the approval of the Minister of Interior, they ensured religious instruction by providing government-trained imams, and they provided a range of legal services. In assuming these roles, foreign consulate offices played two essential functions in the lives of foreigners: they served as their brokers by transmitting grievances to French authorities, and they provided the resources needed to create stable communities of ‘foreigners’ in the receiving context. By playing these two roles, foreign governments – with the encouragement of the French state – dominated the associational life of immigrant communities, shaping their worldviews, representations, and political dispositions. The severe political restrictions facing North African immigrants provided consulate offices with a virtual monopoly over the associational and political life of these migrants. By 1970, about 10% of all Algerians in France were members of the Amicale des Algériens en Europe (AAE; Ireland 1994, p. 38). The amicales, therefore, helped make immigrants into ‘foreign’ political subjects; subjects that were not only barred from French politics but also viewed themselves as temporary outsiders with little interest in the domestic affairs of France. Opportunities for dominance were greater in national communities that faced greater restrictions.

The French government’s efforts to cordon off immigrants and exert control over them created a legal and administrative space that made it difficult if not impossible for some immigrants to integrate into the national community. They were restricted from entering the French political world and the welfare regime channeled them into self-contained housing complexes on the outskirts of cities. By isolating and containing immigrants, the national community could prosper from the cheap labor while reducing exposure to any significant risks associated with North and West Africans. However, these methods were not only seeking to confine the spatial, social, and political movement of immigrant ‘bodies’ but they were also directed at shaping their ‘souls’ (Foucault 1996). The methods of the government were as much about restricting the conduct of immigrants as they were about shaping their thoughts and aspirations. Through the hostel systems, immigrants were given repeated instructions on how to become ‘good guests’ in French society, with colonial managers training immigrants to conform to this designated status (Hmed 2006). Through the work of the consulate-sponsored associations, foreign governments came to dominate the ideological and cultural life of immigrant communities. They were encouraged to retain their ties to the sending society and not involve themselves in French domestic affairs. The status of being temporary, of being an outsider was therefore transmitted through the everyday networks that made up immigrant life. Many immigrants came to view themselves as the stranger who temporarily occupied the margins of the French social and political order. Such beliefs and dispositions were by no means ‘natural’. Government measures helped create a subject that saw itself as foreign and ‘chose’ not to engage in areas of life that did not concern it. The state’s efforts to protect the national community from risky immigrants resulted in the construction of a category of foreign and temporary immigrants, which sharpened the lines (legal, political, discursive, spatial) between the foreign other and national citizen.
Excluding migrants from France: making immigrants into criminals

The principal focus in the 1970s shifted to excluding and removing foreigners entirely from the national territory. In addition to restricting new immigration, the state introduced measures to make immigrants with a right to legally reside in the country ‘illegal’. By creating a population of undocumented immigrants, the government possessed the legal and moral grounds to launch a large-scale deportation program at the end of the decade.

In 1972, the Minister of the Interior introduced the first of many directives to close down labor migration. The Marcellin–Fontanet circular made the acquisition of a visa dependent on proof of permanent employment and ‘decent housing’. Thousands of people who had been in the country legally for many years could not furnish the proper documents and were stripped of their legal right to reside in the country. In 1974, the circular was followed up by the suspension of all labor and family migration to the country. The effort to ban family migration violated international conventions and the Council of State demanded the government to retract its initial ban. The Minister of Interior signed a decree that recognized the right to family reunification but introduced a long list of requirements to qualify for family visas. Among other things, family members wishing to gain a visa had to demonstrate that their sponsors possessed stable employment and ‘decent housing’. This presented a particular problem because a single spouse in France was expected to earn enough income to rent an apartment large enough to be considered ‘decent’ family housing (Péchu 2004, p. 129). For many working at the bottom end of the labor market, this proved to be a difficult if not impossible task. The state recognized the right to family reunification in accordance with its international obligations but these and other restrictions made it difficult for working class families to attain this right. Family migration grew during this period but most migrants came without a legal visa, hoping to legalize their status while inside the country (Péchu 2004, p. 126). Lastly, a ministerial decree in 1976 stripped visas from migrants who found themselves ‘...without employment or regular resources for six months’ or who spent more than six months outside the country (Siméant 1998, p. 184). This decree revoked the visas of thousands of established migrants and turned them into ‘illegals’.

The growing numbers of ‘illegal’ immigrants – a population produced largely by government design – ‘compelled’ the government to introduce new measures to remove them forcefully from the country. In 1977, the Minister of Interior, Lionel Stoléru, initiated a series of large-scale deportation raids that targeted immigrant neighborhoods while simultaneously providing financial aid for the ‘voluntary return’ of regular immigrants. In 1980, the Minister of Interior, Christian Bonnet, introduced the first legislative bill to amend the Ordinance of 1945. In keeping with the spirit of repatriation, the law tightened conditions for visas, lowered the deportation threshold, and facilitated the detention of undocumented immigrants. Lastly, the Peyrefitte law of 1981 legalized identity checks for people ‘suspected’ of being undocumented immigrants, essentially making all minorities and immigrants suspects of illegality and susceptible to police interventions. In addition to this, it tightened the housing requirements for family reunification, increased minimum salary requirements, and required new supporting documents (including a letter from the mayor) to prove that minimal criteria were met.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the government responded to the growing population of ‘risky’ immigrants (i.e. North and West Africans) by developing a strategy to exclude them from national society. By creating and reinforcing sharp boundaries between nationals and foreigners, the state hoped to reinforce the temporary status of these immigrants and encourage their return home. France could prosper from their labor without having to
expose the nation to the cultural, social, and political risks associated with this population. In the 1970s, the downturn in the economy prompted the government to further sharpen the boundaries between foreigners and nationals by seeking to exclude and remove immigrants from the national territory by barring new immigrants into the country and criminalizing established residents. In both instances, rather than undermine the national character of the citizenship regime, the strategies reinforced it by sharpening the lines between foreigners and nationals.

**Resisting exclusion: making immigrants into workers**

The assocational life of immigrants continued to be dominated by relatively conservative foreign governments and they played a particularly prominent role in North African communities. However, by the early 1970s several pockets of immigrants began to mobilize outside these channels to critique French immigration policy directly. The Marcellin–Fontanet circular and succeeding decrees introduced new restrictions that deprived thousands of immigrants the right to reside in the country.

In 1972 and 1973, small numbers of immigrants around the country launched hunger strikes to protest government policies. In the town of Valence, a young Tunisian immigrant began a hunger strike to protest his deportation for having violated the principle of foreign ‘political neutrality’. His crime was to have attended several meetings of a small left-wing group. Two other hunger strikers in Paris, members of a pro-Palestine group, were also targeted for deportation on the same grounds (Wihtol de Wenden 1994). By questioning the practice of denying immigrants the right to free speech, these activists opened a debate concerning the legitimacy of the government’s exclusionary strategies. ‘For the immigrant, ... speaking out was already a very political act in a country where they didn’t have the right to speak politically; a country where they lacked the right to vote, the right to create an association, or the right to publish articles or newspapers without special authorization from the state’ (Zancarini-Fournel 2002, translated by author).

The French intellectuals and activists of their group came out in vocal support of the immigrants and formed the Defense Committee of the Life and Rights of Immigrant Workers. This defense committee was heavily influenced by the participation of Maoists and activist intellectuals like Michel Foucault, Jean Paul Sartre, Roland Barthes, and Jean Genet (Cordeiro 2001, Artières 2002). As the defense committee gained strength, human rights and antiracist associations provided an additional level support. The growing prominence of this campaign prompted other immigrants to join the hunger strikers, expanding to 28 strikers at the highest point of the campaign.

The native activists played a crucial role in elevating the struggle. They used their cultural and symbolic capital to represent the claims of immigrants through frames that resonated with French political culture. For radicals, this was a population that had not been pacified by factory regimes, trade unionism, and middle-class aspirations and values. If there were a fraction of the working class that showed the greatest promise to revolt, it was the immigrant working class. Representing immigrants in this way, the figure of the ‘immigrant worker’ gained great prominence within the more extreme currents of the French left. The more natives wrote and spoke of immigrants in ways that resonated with the cultural dispositions of left intellectuals, activists, and workers, the more the immigrant activists gained support for their cause. Moreover, the prominence of these mobilizations and the increased centrality of this ‘workerist’ presentation helped activists recruit the support of the country’s second largest union (CFDT). The union embraced the slogan, ‘French and immigrant workers, same boss, same combat.’ This was an important
turn because the union provided a certain degree of legitimacy and it helped disseminate the idea of ‘immigrant workers’ to broad segments of the mainstream French working class (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2001).

Similar hunger strikes started to spread to other cities including Lille, Montpellier, Marseille, Toulouse, Lyon, and Nice. In each of these cities, aggrieved immigrants occupied public buildings and churches, launched hunger strikes, and denounced the sudden change in their immigration status. In each city, local support committees made up of radicals, human rights groups, and church activists sprouted up to support their efforts. A national organizing committee was created in 1978 – ‘SOS-Refoulements’ – by prominent human rights associations, activist intellectuals, and several unions. The aim of this committee was to coordinate the actions across the country, create a sustained legal and moral critique of the government’s mass deportation policy, and represent the case of the immigrant to the government and public. This mobilization, alongside several other campaigns, significantly raised the profile of the immigrant as a subject that could engage and participate in French political life.

These struggles also spurred the rise of one of the first distinctly Marxist immigrant associations in the country, the Movement of Arab Workers (MTA). This association was created by members of pro-Palestine committees in Marseille and Paris. The aim of the organization was to establish an autonomous association for North African migrants. The political and associational space of North African immigrants had been dominated by amicales sponsored by home-country consulates. Dissident immigrants saw the amicales as responsible for channeling immigrants toward home country affairs and neutralizing their political voice in France. The MTA was seen as a way to break the dominance of these foreign associations. It stressed the distinctive character of the immigrant voice but also emphasized its connections with the general struggles of the native working class. Lastly, the MTA served as a model for a new generation of immigrant groups from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey. They were Marxist, oriented toward French politics, and highly suspicious of the old amicales. While native organizations would continue to play an important role in the associational lives of immigrants, the proliferation of new associations provided an important contrast and counterweight to their traditional dominance. Rather than joining the old, conservative, and foreign amicales, a new generation of immigrant activists joined immigrant groups like the MTA, pro-Palestine groups, Maoist factions, and an assortment of other left-wing organizations. These organizations provided immigrant activists with an ideological, social, and political space to establish contacts with the native world. Through these exchanges, they learned to think and represent themselves as workers and not as foreigners, reinforcing ‘workerist’ discourse within the community and their connections to the national political culture. Thus, the MTA and its sister associations in the North African community provided an organizational and discursive bridge between the political worlds of immigrants and national political worlds.

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The state’s efforts to politically silence, spatially isolate, and forcefully repatriate immigrants precipitated powerful grievances and mobilizations throughout the 1970s. By speaking out and developing connections with native groups, immigrants challenged state efforts to make them into temporary, foreign, and criminal subjects. As native radicals spoke and wrote about immigrants, their representations of them as ‘workers’ resonated with the political and cultural norms and permitted more people to see these people less as irreconcilably foreign and more like themselves: workers who were struggling to survive within a system of capitalist exploitation. Their growing legitimacy did not result from
stressing the qualities that made them ‘other’ and different from the French but rather the qualities that made them the same as other French workers in the country. Thus, in a discursive and political climate that stressed the sharp boundaries between foreigner and native, immigrants had to demonstrate their moral and cultural equivalence with nationals. In doing this, they did not challenge the rules of the game but actually reinforced them by demonstrating that assimilation into the cultural norms of the nation was in fact the only way to achieve a certain degree of political legitimacy for immigrants long cast out of the system.

The integration regime: 1980s–1990s

Integration strategies by generation: differentiating the first and second generation

The election of a Left government in 1981 introduced a break with the policies of the past. While the Socialist and Communist parties were not at the forefront of immigrant rights struggles, these struggles had nevertheless gained the support of large parts of their supporters by 1981. Immigrant rights became an electoral issue not because immigrants voted but because immigrants had the support of key segments of the French Left. Moreover, as some immigrants began to naturalize and their children started to reach voting age, Socialist leaders were interested in developing a reliable constituency among this group. Soon after the elections, the Left government introduced a large-scale amnesty that resulted in the regularization of approximately 200,000 immigrants over a two-year period. The government also legalized immigrant associations and removed all restrictions on political speech. Lastly, the government simplified the visa application process, lowered eligibility criteria, and made the 10-year visa the standard for most immigrants.

While the Socialists opened the door for immigrants to integrate in French society, they also designed new measures to regulate their integration. The government differentiated their integration strategies according to the attributes of different groups. In particular, the generational divide was a prominent way to distinguish between ‘good’ immigrants from riskier ones.

The first generation was perceived as a population that was somewhat problematic. In the early 1980s (1982–1984), first-generation immigrant factory workers were at the forefront of a series of highly disruptive strikes in the Paris region. Adopting the discourse of the 1970s, left-wing unions and immigrant associations framed these struggles as part of the general working class struggle. ‘André Sainjon, General Secretary of the Federation of Metallurgy Workers, assessed the achievements of the strikes and focused on workers’ cohesion. The conflicts were not described as immigrants’ struggles, but rather as “a struggle for workers, for unskilled workers to undermine old forms of taylorism”’ (Gay 2010, p. 10). Initially, this discourse resonated with the Left government’s own discourse on the struggles of the immigrant working class. However, as the strikes wore on for two years and spread throughout the country, the government hardened its line. This change of position was reflected in the new discourse used to describe the strikers. Rather than highlight the qualities that connected immigrants to French workers (i.e. class), the government highlighted the qualities that made these strikers irreducibly different. In 1984, the Socialist Prime Minister Mauroy stated, ‘The main difficulties in this situation come from immigrant workers who are influenced and agitated by religious groups. These groups define themselves with criteria that are disconnected to the social realities of France’ (Mauroy, in Gay 2010, p. 12, emphasis added). The Minister of Interior described the strikers as ‘fundamentalists and Shiites’. Lastly, the Minister of Labor, Jean Auroux, stated that, ‘There is an obvious religious and fundamentalist aspect in those protests which turns it into something that is not exclusively unionist. Some people aim at destabilizing the
social and political bases of our country, because we embody too many things as regards freedom and pluralism’ (Auroux, in Gay 2010, p. 12).

First-generation immigrants were at first celebrated as ‘workers’ but they were increasingly viewed as a population that retained traditional cultural and religious dispositions that made it impossible for them to assimilate fully. To make matters worse, their low rates of naturalization and voter turnout meant that few political gains could be expected from this population. From a strictly political calculation, this population represented all risks and no real benefits for the party in power. Viewed in this way, officials devised a strategy to allow this population to continue a life in France but a life that was also submitted to certain controls. The government sought to assert its dominance within the associational milieu of immigrants and direct them away from disruptive ideas, critiques, and practices. The government provided subsidies to associations through the agency charged with immigration affairs (FAS). Subsidies were used to steer associations away from politics and toward apolitical cultural and social activities in immigrant neighborhoods (Wihtol de Wenden 1994). Immigrant associations were also expected to meet new bureaucratic and professional standards. Submitting the directors of associations to these controls compelled them to spend more time building up and professionalizing their organizations and less time on planning protests and other kinds of contentious activities. Thus, rather than exclude immigrant associations from engaging in national politics (as was the policy with previous governments), the Socialist government re-directed the energies of first-generation immigrants into non-threatening activities. This would help pacify the immigrant community, encourage associations to provide needed services, and produce cultural activities that the French people appreciated (i.e. multicultural events, breaking of Ramadan, ethnic festivals, couscous potlucks, etc.). The strategy aimed to produce a population of immigrants that was politically tame and culturally ‘likable’ by the rest of the native population.

Second-generation immigrants were viewed in a rather different light from their parent’s generation. This group soon came to be seen as an important, albeit volatile, actor on the political scene. Soon after the inauguration of the new Left government (summer of 1981), a series of riots broke out in the Lyon suburbs of Vaulx-en-Velin and les Minguettes. Youths were incensed over police repression and deportations targeting families and friends (Este`be and Donzelot 1999, Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2001, Dikeç 2004, Este`be 2004). The riots unleashed a political renaissance for the second generation. This period witnessed the rapid growth of youth associations in urban areas across France. The associations provided youth services but they also became vehicles for expressing a new political voice. They denounced the economic conditions found in these neighborhoods and the discriminatory practices that blocked their social and spatial mobility. Activists also abandoned the ambiguous label ‘second generation’ and embraced the more political identity of Beur. They also created two new radio stations (Radio Beur in Paris and Radio Gazelle in Marseille) where youths were able to express ideas and develop a distinctive culture of their own (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau 2001, p. 39). These activities culminated in the famous ‘March for Equality and against Racism’ in late 1983. The march began in Marseille and ended at the presidential palace in Paris, with 150,000 people coming out in support of the marchers. The peaceful character of the protest, the claims for equality, and favorable media coverage produced relatively strong support for them across France (Cordeiro 2001, p. 12). In the light of this massive show of force, the Socialist Party apparatus threw its support behind the marchers and a delegation of Beur activists was received by President Francois Mitterand.

This generation posed similar risks as the first generation, but it also possessed attributes that differentiated them from their parents. The youths demonstrated their high
mobilization capacities and the ability to put forth a message that resonated with the general French public. Moreover, this generation had the right to vote that made it a potential client of the Socialist Party. Lastly, the youths possessed cultural and social attributes that made it more likely for them to assimilate easily into French society. In this way, the second generation was conceived as a population that could be more easily assimilated into French society but also a population that still needed to be disciplined into the national mold. The Socialist government of the 1980s introduced two initiatives to steer youths in a favorable direction:

First, it introduced the *politique de la ville*\(^6\) in 1981 (Estèbe and Donzelot 1999; Dikeç 2004, 2006; Estèbe 2004; Garbaye 2005). This program aimed to redevelop neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty and immigrants. The program was envisioned as a form of territorial affirmative action because neighborhoods were provided with additional public resources needed to help them catch up with the rest of the metropolitan area. Such resources included educational funds for failing schools; increased public services like transit connections to the city center, pools, libraries, jobs services, and financial services; and incentives to attract private sector investors to these areas (Estèbe 2004, Wacquant 2007). The *politique de la ville* was also inspired by the ‘bottom up’ and empowerment wing of the Socialist Party (Nicholls 2006). Philosophically speaking, this wing argued that the state should ‘empower’ neighborhood associations to participate in the development of their neighborhoods. Politically speaking, partnerships between associations and Socialist mayors would provide local parties the means to build stable bases of support within these cities. The government encouraged partnerships between second-generation associations operating in these neighborhoods and local mayors. Associations would provide services and support in their neighborhoods in exchange for public subsidies. Moreover, city officials turned the activities of associations away from contentious politics and toward apolitical cultural and social activities (Garbaye 2005, Nicholls 2006).

Second, party elites introduced initiatives to create large associations that would recruit second-generation youths. The most important of these associations were SOS Racisme and France Plus. Soon after the March for Equality in 1983, party members with close ties to Francois Mitterand (Julien Dray, Laurent Fabius, and Jack Lang) created SOS Racisme. Their aim was to reinforce the antiracist struggle and use it against the growing extreme right party the National Front. This association was also seen as a useful way of redirecting the energy of the second generation into the Socialist Party. Julien Dray recruited the first president of the association, the charismatic Harlem Desir, through a friend who was a university professor (Juhem 2001). France Plus was the creation of another leading member of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin (who would go on to become Minister of Education and Prime Minister). It was designed to recruit candidates and develop electoral supporter among the second generation. These associations were very important because they helped create political connections between the second-generation immigrants and the Socialist Party. Since government and party leaders sponsored these national associations, they had a direct line into shaping how this generation would think about key issues and the ways in which to frame their claims and concerns in the political sphere.

The government’s approach to second-generation immigrants was very distinct from its approach to the first-generation. Rather than neutralize this generation, it sought to craft a subject that would cohere with government narratives about the well-integrated immigrant and provide long-term electoral support for the Socialist Party. It did this by placing the government in a position of dominance over associational life. At the national scale, the Party created two of the most prominent ‘second-generation’ associations in the
country. At the local scale, the government created a development program that placed mayors in a position of dominance over smaller neighborhood associations. In both instances, the Party sought to establish its dominance over the associational life of the second generation to create a stable client base and shape the ideas, discourse, and identities of those operating in this milieu. In this way, the state became actively involved in constructing a new political subject that corresponded with its vision of a nice and stable multicultural France. However, instead of creating a new, well-adjusted, and likeable subject, the government’s strategy severely damaged the associational tissue of the second generation by de-legitimating it among youths and exacerbating powerful inter-associational conflicts (Garbaye 2005, Nicholls 2006).

Integration strategies by gender: differentiating between men and women

By the 1990s, the second generation failed to assimilate in a way that government officials had hoped for. The bad culture of these youths rather than the broken system was increasingly attributed as the principal cause of persistent unemployment, urban decline, and deviant behavior (Dikeç 2006). The election of a Right government in 1993 resulted in a sharp departure from their predecessor’s polices. Second-generation males were seen as particularly susceptible to embracing the culture of their parents (i.e. religion, political sympathies, etc.) and these deficient cultures made it difficult for them to assimilate smoothly into the country. These males were the ones most likely to reproduce religious practices that were not only seen as foreign but increasingly viewed as a threat to the principles of the French Republic. Lastly, as youths took vocal stands on international affairs (i.e. Gulf War I, the Intifada, the Algerian Civil War, etc.), their loyalty to France increasingly came into question. Even innocent gestures like cheering on the Algerian football team became the basis of polemics over their loyalty to France. This dramatic shift in representation fueled calls by government officials to pursue more punitive policies against second-generation (mostly male) youth (Dikeç 2004, Wacquant 2008).

While males in this generation were heavily stigmatized, their female counterparts were represented in a more positive light. In the 1990s, young women were viewed as the group that possessed the attributes to assimilate easily into the country. As the Minister of Social Affairs noted, ‘Why hide it, the demands by young women for a western lifestyle is the cause of serious family conflicts. Because of this, these actors are helping to liberate female immigrants and can be seen as essential actors of integration’ (Simone Veil, in Schain 1999, p. 128). The feelings of the Minister were corroborated by a growing number of sociological studies that demonstrated higher performance of young second-generation women in education and the labor market (Tribalat 1995, Silberman and Fournier 1999, Simon 2003). These findings were used instrumentally to provide scientific corroborations for the ideological statements of government officials. Public funding agencies – politique de la ville, the region, and the FAS in particular – were directed to target associations that supported the autonomy of women and ‘the prevention of practices and behavior that victimize too many immigrant women, and are contrary to our values and often to our laws’ (Veil, in Schain 1999, p. 129).

Most of the associations that benefited from these measures were rather mixed in their orientation, with most providing apolitical services and activities to their members (Hamidi 2003). However, several associations emerged in the 2000s that articulated a more radical stance on these issues, the most prominent of these was Ni Putte, Ni Soumises. The association gained rapid ascendancy because it critiqued the treatment of
young women in the *banlieue* by their fathers and brothers. This critique was clearly expressed in the name of the organization, which literally translated into Neither Whore, Nor Submissive. It was argued that the everyday oppression experienced by these young women did not come at the hands of racist French or ‘the system’ but by their fathers and brothers. ‘How can we tolerate in the 21st century that Sohane and Chahrazad are burned alive by a man in the heart of the neighborhood? How can we accept that Gohfrane is stoned to death in Marseille? … For five years we have broken the silence in working class neighborhoods…’ (http://www.niputesnisoumises.com, translated by author). They argued that the culture and religion of their parents oppressed young women and that this culture was used by their brothers and male peers to brutally repress them.

Young second-generation women could only achieve freedom by breaking with this culture, rejecting cultural relativism, and embracing the values of the French Republic. In this sense, the French were no longer the problem but the solution to the oppression of young second-generation women. This discourse resonated with the political mood at the time and the government’s own discourse on the strategic position of women. Moreover, the media-conscious leader of the association, Fadela Amara, crafted discourses, images, and performances that maximized the group’s public exposure (Amara 2006). Its growing media profile allowed it to capture more public subsidies and dominate the public voice emerging from the second generation. No other association from the second generation during this time was able to achieve the same level of prominence or influence in public discussions concerning the conditions of this group. For other associations operating in the milieu, this discursive strategy of celebrating national norms of French Republicanism and criticizing ‘old’ immigrant cultures was replicated throughout the associational sector. In this discursive space, any second-generation activist that wanted a voice in the public sphere needed express their concerns in this way. If they failed to conform to these increasingly nationalistic norms, they would lose any legitimacy and find themselves on the far margins of the public debate. Thus, this organization is rather interesting because it introduces a new mobilizing strategy that explicitly uses nationalistic discourses to advances its political and ideological goals. In using this strategy, the national character of the citizenship regime was reinforced while the boundaries separating good nationals from problematic immigrants were sharpened.

**Conclusion**

Transnational immigration has transformed France’s citizenship regimes in rather important ways. However, rather than undermining the national character of the country’s citizenship regime, the continued importance of migrants has reinforced this character in the two historical periods covered in this paper. In the postwar period, the state permitted immigrant ‘guest’ workers to reside and work within the national territory but it also developed countless techniques to bar this population of foreigners from disrupting the lives of French nationals. The exclusionary strategy essentially sought to create a population that was ‘temporary’ in time and space; placing immigrants in encapsulated and temporary migrant housing, severely limiting their political and civil rights in the country, and channeling them away from French political and associational life and into home-country affairs. In this instance, the French state did not only attribute this group of migrants with the status of temporary guest workers, it actually sought to create an immigrant subject that was truly temporary in both time and space. During the 1980s and 1990s, political authorities recognized the permanent character of immigrants as families...
and children settled in the country. Policy makers soon developed a new range of
techniques to identify the attributes of different immigrant groups that would make them
more or less susceptible to national ‘integration’. Both generation and gender became
categories to differentiate between more and less acceptable populations, with policy
makers developing different instruments to facilitate the assimilation of acceptable
immigrants and to neutralize those deemed to be inassimilable. Thus, state strategies to
immigration differed markedly between these two periods, but both sets of strategies
aimed to protect and reinforce the national character off the country’s citizenship regime.
Even in the instances when immigrants resisted, their acts ultimately reinforced rather than
undermined this national character because they used values, discourses, and moralities
that resonated with those of the national political culture.

The general trend toward the nationalization of citizenship has only been reinforced in
recent years. In confronting recent issues like urban riots and the public expression of
Islamic religious practices, the two right-wing governments in the 2000s have pursued a
two-prong strategy of exclusion/integration. On the one hand, Nicolas Sarkozy, as
Minister of Interior and President, has associated the attributes of immigrants with
criminal behavior in order to justify state repression. For example, the government in 2010
justified its ban on full-faced veiling on the grounds that this represented a threat to public
security. In another instance, in a July speech after a 2-day urban riot in Grenoble, Sarkozy
asserted that the levels of insecurity in these urban areas were the ‘the consequences of 50
years of uncontrolled immigration’ (Le Monde 2010b). Soon following this speech, his
Minister of Industry Christian Etrosi stated that ‘...between French or thug (voyou), they
will have to choose’ (Le Monde 2010a). These statements conflated immigrants,
criminals, and dangerous urban places and drew a bright line between this polluting other
from good, hardworking, and law-abiding French citizens. This discursive move provided
the government with a moral justification to launch a new round of repression against
immigrants and minorities in France. On the other hand, Sarkozy has been quite public
about creating opportunities for integrating immigrants and minorities willing to
assimilate into the national norms and values of the country. For example, he named two
women of North African descent and one woman of West African descent to prominent
positions in his government. This was a way to demonstrate his belief that more
opportunities should be made available for well-assimilated minorities. His integrationist
position has also been on display concerning his treatment of Islam. At a speech to a
Muslim confederation in France he argued that, “for Islam to be completely integrated
into the Republic, its major representatives should themselves be perfectly integrated into
the Republic, and thus trained in France. We do not need to depend on other countries for
finding imams who speak not a word of French” (Sarkozy, in Bowen 2004, p. 49). Thus,
Sarkozy has used both strategies highlighted in the paper: sharpening attacks on the
cultural and behavioral attributes of unassimilated foreigners while simultaneously
offering assimilated migrants and minorities a pathway to social and political mobility.
These strategies have worked to complement one another as a stick and carrot to
encourage migrants and their offspring to conform to the values and norms of the national
community.

While nationhood is still a central quality of citizenship regimes, immigrants and their
children continue to have transnational lives. They continue to live between borders and
engage in associational activities in multiple countries at once. We can therefore say an
immigrant may operate at the intersection of national and transnational scales
simultaneously, with national citizenship regimes structuring dispositions and outlooks
in one way and transnational networks shaping subjectivities in another way. This type of
co-positioning in national and transnational networks produces an immigrant that is both national and transnational. When seeking to expand rights and power they are more likely to direct their energies to the national political field that requires them to deploy their national dispositions and discourses. When interacting in social, economic, and cultural networks, their transnational dispositions and cultures can help them circumnavigate the complex borders of global life. Thus, the aim here is not to say that one is more important than the other but simply to identify how the national scale continues to play an important role in structuring the political worlds of immigrants and natives.

Notes
1. Fonds d’action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leur familles.
2. Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs.
3. Comité de défense de la vie et des droits des travailleurs immigrés.
5. The Beur identity would most likely be equivalent to the Chicano identity in the United States.
6. Urban Policy.

References


