Intercultural and policies and Intergroup relations: case study: Breda, the Netherlands
van Heelsum, A.J.

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Intercultural policies and intergroup relations

Case study: Breda, the Netherlands
## Contents

About CLIP .................................................. 1

Introduction ............................................... 3

Background ............................................... 5

Profile of Breda ......................................... 12

Local intercultural policies in general .............. 16

Local intercultural policies towards Muslim communities 28

Intergroup relations and radicalisation .............. 36

Key challenges and lessons for CLIP ................. 40

Bibliography .............................................. 42

List of persons and organisations interviewed .... 44

List of immigrant associations ......................... 45
In 2006, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the city of Stuttgart and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) established a ‘European network of cities for local integration policies for migrants’, henceforth known as CLIP. The network comprises a steering committee, a group of expert European research centres and a number of European cities. In the following two years, the cities of Vienna and Amsterdam joined the CLIP Steering Committee. The network is also supported by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), and has formed a partnership with the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

Through the medium of separate city reports (case studies) and workshops, the network enables local authorities to learn from each other and to deliver a more effective integration policy. The unique character of the CLIP network is that it organises a shared learning process between the participating cities, between the cities and a group of expert European research centres, as well as between policymakers at local and European level.

The CLIP network currently brings together more than 30 large and medium-sized cities from all regions of Europe: Amsterdam (NL), Antwerp (BE), Arnsberg (DE), Athens (EL), Barcelona (ES), Bologna (IT), Breda (NL), Budapest (HU), Copenhagen (DK), Dublin (IE), Frankfurt (DE), Helsinki (FI), Istanbul (TR), Izmir (TR), Kirklees (UK), Liège (BE), Lisbon (PT), Luxembourg (LU), L’Hospitalet (ES), Malmö (SE), Matero (ES), Newport (UK), Prague (CZ), Strasbourg (FR), Stuttgart (DE), Sundsvall (SE), Tallinn (EE), Terrassa (ES), Turin (IT), Turku (FI), Valencia (ES), Vienna (AT), Wolverhampton (UK), Wrocław (PL), Zagreb (HR), Zeytinburnu (TR) and Zürich (CH).

The cities in the network are supported in their shared learning by a group of expert European research centres in:

- Bamberg, Germany (European Forum for Migration Studies, EFMS);
- Vienna (Institute for Urban and Regional Research, ISR);
- Amsterdam (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, IMES);
- Turin (International and European Forum on Migration Research, FIERI);
- Wrocław (Institute of International Studies);
- Swansea, Wales (Centre for Migration Policy Research, CMPR).

There are four research modules in total. The first module was on housing – segregation, access to, quality and affordability for migrants – which has been identified as a major issue impacting on migrants’ integration into their host society. The second module examined equality and diversity policies in relation to employment within city administrations and in the provision of services. The focus of the third module is intercultural policies and intergroup relations. The final module (2009–2010) will look at ethnic entrepreneurship.

The case studies on intercultural policies were carried out in 2009.

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1 See also http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip.htm.
Acknowledgements

The researchers of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam are responsible for this report on Breda. Together with the contact person of the municipality of Breda, Ria Bolink, who is responsible for the city’s policy on diversity, an enormous effort has been undertaken to access all necessary data on Breda for this report. First, interviews were conducted with officials and other parties who are involved in the development of integration policies and the support of immigrants (see list at the end of the report). These interviewees included the safety director of the municipality of Breda and the director of SCW Jongerenwerk, one of the two big social work institutions in Breda that cooperate with the municipality. Secondly, representatives of the Ar-Rahman Mosque, the Moroccan Islamitische Stichting, the Werkgroep Marokkanen, and the Turkish Stichting Islamitische Centrum Breda provided information. Thirdly, three members of the Bouwgroep, a group that takes part in the city’s policy development on diversity, were interviewed. Fourthly, the director of the board of the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Organisation (Nederlands Moslim Omroep, NMO) was consulted. Finally, researchers from the University of Amsterdam provided data and useful comments. The author wishes to thank all those who have cooperated in giving information and particularly Ria Bolink for coordinating the data search.

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This module of the CLIP project focuses on ‘intercultural and interreligious dialogue’: this includes the municipality’s policies on this subject, and the views and experiences of immigrants regarding this subject. As Heckmann (2008, p. 3) explains in his introduction paper for this CLIP module, the topic of this module,

**has to do with phenomena of urban life that are related to the multi-national, multi-ethnic and multi-religious structures of urban populations which challenge the ability of municipalities to establish or keep peaceful relations among the different segments of the population. In present day political discourse, relations between different ethnic and religious groups, immigrants and natives are predominantly discussed in terms of ‘intercultural dialogue’ and/or ‘inter-religious dialogue’. We will conceptualise these phenomena as cases of intergroup relations. This conceptualisation stands for an abstraction working with the assumption that there are similarities in the relations between quite different ‘groups’.*

This understanding has been established in the field of intergroup relations research in social psychology and sociology. The approach focuses on interactions and relations, and emphasises that general explanations and practical recommendations can be made regarding the relations between different groups. As Sherif and Sherif (1969, pp. 222–223) explain:

**Intergroup relations refer to states of friendship or hostility, cooperation or competition, dominance or subordination, alliance or enmity, peace or war between two or more groups and their members ... Intergroup behaviour refers to the actions of individuals belonging to one group when they interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group membership...**

As Heckman states (2008, p. 4), from both a political and practical point of view, two dimensions of intergroup relations are of particular interest for local governments: conflict between groups and policies to avoid or solve conflict between groups; that is, conditions of social cohesion in a city.

*The concept of ‘group’ on which intergroup relations research is based is rather broad. In the CLIP project, it includes the city administration, the city council, political parties, churches, labour unions, welfare organisations, foundations, local media and anti-immigrant movements among others in the majority society. On the part of the minorities, it includes religious groups and national minorities. Among the religious groups, Muslim communities find particular attention. Where Muslims are not the most relevant group, another faith-based community is of interest in our research. It is noteworthy that most of the religious groups are organised on an ethnic basis.*

This conceptual framework formed the basis of the questionnaire that was developed for this case study. It comprises three parts: local intercultural policies in general; local policies towards Muslim communities; and intergroup relations and radicalisation. This questionnaire was sent to the contact person for Breda. On receipt of the completed questionnaire, a visit to Breda was arranged. Interviews took place with officials of the administration, representatives of immigrant associations and projects and with researchers (see the end of the report for a full list of persons interviewed). A combination of the answers in the questionnaire and information from the interviews was used to write this case study. The report is organised in a similar way for all of the cities participating in the project, although this study has added a section on ‘Immigrant and religious associations and policies towards them’. Intercultural and interreligious dialogue is defined as cooperation at organisational level, either formal or informal. The study also examines attitudes in the population under the heading of ‘Relations between ethnic groups’.

During the city visit in May 2009, Breda was in the process of developing a new policy. As a new, bottom-up initiative, immigrants were involved in the writing and implementation of the policy. The policy paper has been completed and
will soon be considered by the city council. This process is a good example of intercultural dialogue in practice, and is described below.

This study also focuses on the Muslim population in Breda. Although Moroccans are the largest non-Dutch group in Breda comprising 2.9% of the population, none of the policy documents cover their religion. Breda promotes the principle of equality of all Dutch and non-Dutch groups and organisations, and keeps references to religion completely outside any of its documents. In the new policy paper, interreligious dialogue is not mentioned either, though it was present in earlier documents. Muslim organisations get support from the city, just as other associations would get support for social activities.

Finally, the study looks at the issue of radicalisation. Breda consciously avoids the term radicalisation, and avoids discussion on Muslim radicalisation at national level since the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. Right-wing extremist young people are found around Breda, but this is not considered an issue of concern and the authorities believe that raising awareness of the issue would only increase the problem.
Background

Brief history of migration to the Netherlands

The Netherlands was a destination country for immigrants as far back as the 17th and 18th centuries, when the country was a centre of trade and shipping and showed tolerance towards religious refugees. The proportion of immigrants, which stood at around 10% of the total population, diminished to a low level in the first half of the 20th century (Lucassen and Penninx, 2002). After the Second World War, emigration was dominant, as new farmlands were developed in the United States (US), Canada and Australia. As Table 1 shows, a negative trend – signifying more emigration – in the 1950s turned into a positive trend – more immigration – in the 1960s.

Table 1: Estimates of net number of migrants in the Netherlands, by five-year intervals, 1950–2000 (in 000s)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of migrants</td>
<td>-123,000</td>
<td>-31,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>161,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The few immigrants who arrived in the period 1945–1960 came from the former Dutch colonies of Suriname in South America and Indonesia in southeast Asia. The Surinamese elite tended to send their children to study in the Netherlands and Indonesians with one Dutch parent could retain their Dutch citizenship after the independence of Indonesia in 1949. Moreover, Indonesian army officials from the Moluccan islands who had fought in the Dutch army in Indonesia had to be resettled in the Netherlands because they were not safe in Indonesia.

Around 1960, immigration levels increased. The first large influx was a result of the regulations pertaining to the independence of Suriname in 1975. While independence was meant to curtail immigration, citizens of this former colony had the right to choose between Surinamese and Dutch nationality for five years – in the end, half of the inhabitants of Suriname decided to move to the Netherlands. A second large flow of immigrants was caused by the booming economy and the need for cheap labour from the 1960s onwards. Factory and shipyard owners recruited so-called guest workers first in southern Europe and later in Turkey and Morocco. After a period, their temporary immigration became permanent and their spouses and children also arrived. While the European Union (EU) was being further institutionalised, neighbouring countries – in particular Germany – also added to the number of immigrants.

In the 1980s, the Dutch economy declined and the first measures were taken to stop immigration. A significant refugee population was growing in that period, initially encompassing those from the then communist countries of the Soviet Union but later mainly from war-torn areas in the world: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and other countries. Since 2000, the number of Chinese and Polish immigrants has increased significantly and the number of Poles was expected to grow quickly from 2007 onwards.

The proportion of people with a foreign nationality in the Netherlands has been stable at about 4.3% since 1997. The number of naturalisations – that is, people acquiring citizenship – increased from 12,800 persons in 1990 to 82,700 in 1996 and declined to 45,300 in 2002, according to the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS).

Table 2 shows the largest ethnic groups in the Netherlands as at 1 January 2009 in three categories that are often distinguished in Dutch statistics, namely immigrants from western countries, from non-western countries and from refugee countries. On that date, the total Dutch population was 16,405,399, of whom 13,189,983 or 80% were considered as autochthonous or indigenous Dutch; it should be noted that anyone with one or two parents born abroad is not considered autochthonous.
As Table 2 shows, the older immigrant groups already comprise a large second generation. Within these groups, the male-female ratio is about 50%. The refugee populations consist to a larger degree of men – for example, 58% of the Iraqi refugees are men, and 53% of the Iranian refugees are men. The relatively new immigrant groups – Poles and former Soviet citizens – include a larger proportion of women (both 60%). The distribution of immigrants by age depends on the time of arrival. Among Indonesians, an ageing population is increasingly apparent. The first Moroccan and Turkish guest workers are now in their 60s and 70s. However, there are not many older people among the new immigrant groups, such as those from Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. In general, the non-western immigrant groups have larger families than the indigenous Dutch population and western immigrants.

The socioeconomic status of immigrants from neighbouring countries is either similar to the level of indigenous Dutch people or better. However, the socioeconomic standard of non-western immigrant groups is generally poorer than the Dutch level. This is particularly true for the former guest workers from Morocco and Turkey and for refugees – although it is not necessarily the case for every ethnic group. Figure 1 shows the proportion of people working and/or on welfare for each ethnic group. Welfare includes social security benefit, unemployment benefit, health benefit or disability allowance.
As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of working people among all ethnic groups is larger than the share of those on welfare, except for Afghan, Iraqi and Somali refugees. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work until they receive their refugee status, and this can take up to 10 years. The highest proportions of working people and the lowest shares of those on welfare are found among Dutch people, and among those from Hong Kong, the Philippines and China. Although the three refugee groups from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia are the most problematic in terms of lack of work, not all refugee groups have a larger proportion of people on welfare than working: for example, this can be seen for Vietnamese refugees (who arrived relatively earlier) and Iranians, of whom a significantly higher proportion are working than on welfare.

The four largest non-western immigrant groups – Turks, Surinamese, Moroccans and Antilleans (see Table 2 above) – have a relatively higher share of persons on a very low net social security benefit (a basic sum needed to survive). Indigenous Dutch people are more often eligible for a high net unemployment benefit, calculated as a percentage of previous last income. Among the Turkish population, a higher proportion of people are claiming a disability allowance than on social security benefit. Figure 2 shows the share of Dutch people and those belonging to ethnic groups who are unemployed as a proportion of the workforce.
Case study: Breda, the Netherlands

Figure 2: Unemployment as a percentage of workforce, by Dutch and largest ethnic categories, 2001–2008

As Figure 2 shows, unemployment levels among the Dutch people are considerably lower than among non-western immigrants and their children. The 2008 CLIP report on Breda (Van Heelsum, 2009) showed that this does not improve for the second generation, though it should be noted that not all ethnic groups have a second generation.

National policy context

Integration policies

Rijkschroeoff et al (2004) divide Dutch national policies concerning immigrants into three phases. The first phase in the 1970s was a categorical policy focusing on specific fields. For example, special provisions were put in place for Moluccan ex-soldiers. The Surinamese, who were not expected in such large numbers, were supported by welfare associations on an ad hoc basis, funded by several municipalities. In the study Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers (Memorandum on migrant workers) (1970), guest workers were encouraged to retain their identity and culture of origin so they would not face difficulties on return to their home country. Due to the assumption that the workers’ stay would be temporary, no attempts were made to provide Dutch language courses or information on Dutch society. A long-term consequence of this is that the language proficiency of these low-educated workers is still often limited to this day.

The second phase of immigration policy started with a 1979 publication by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR), which led to the first policy document – entitled ‘Minority policy 1983’ (Minderhedennota 1983). The Dutch government realised that the stay of guest workers

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2 Refers to the Moluccan Islands, an archipelago in Indonesia.
Case study: Breda, the Netherlands

was no longer temporary and this raised concerns in relation to immigrants in the Netherlands. This policy phase was directed at stopping a trend whereby immigrants were acquiring a permanent disadvantaged social position – to this end, measures were taken in the spheres of education and the labour market. Integration was considered a two-sided process, and the policy document highlighted the importance of respect for the cultures of immigrants. There was a positive attitude towards the rights of religious groups, for instance with regard to establishing mosques and Hindu temples.


A fourth phase started around 2001 when representatives of politically conservative parties became minister for immigration and integration affairs: first Hilbrand Nawijn of the now defunct Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and then Rita Verdonk of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD). Both politicians were known for having anti-immigrant standpoints. Many proposals to limit the rights of foreigners to levels below those of Dutch people were discussed in the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal); however, implementation was not always possible because the inequality of law was too evident. The media debate became harsher and more hostile towards immigrants, and many of them felt uncomfortable. This period lasted until the elections of 2006. The new government that took office in 2007 seems to have a friendlier approach towards immigrants.

The latest Law on Integration and Citizenship (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), effective from 1 January 2007, led to substantial changes for the municipalities as they have become more responsible for supporting immigration guidance (see Van Heelsum, 2009 for further detail).

**Policies on immigrant associations**

Both on a national and local level, subsidies are given to immigrant associations. There is a high number of such associations in the Netherlands, including 1,125 Turkish associations, 881 Surinamese associations, 720 Moroccan associations, 399 Moluccan associations, 244 Chinese associations as well as many more which represent other ethnic groups (Van Heelsum, 2004a and 2004b). About one third of these organisations, particularly the religious ones, generate their own income through fundraising and private donations, in order to pay for their premises and activities. Some have limited budgets and operate from the homes of members – this is the case for many refugee associations. A smaller proportion of associations operate on a professional level; these are incorporated into the social, educational and media services. The final category, comprising approximately 45% of all immigrant associations, operates largely on limited subsidies – usually provided by municipalities – and supplements this income through entrance fees or voluntary contributions (Van Heelsum, 2004b). Municipalities providing such subsidies or premises usually insist that benefiting organisations cooperate with the objectives of the integration policy.

In the mid 1980s, the Dutch government promoted the establishment of national bodies representing the major immigrant groups. Each group is a federation of associations and they are consulted regarding policy issues concerning immigrants. Their structure is regulated in an act of parliament (statute) and they are fully financed by public funds. The National Council Minorities (Landelijk Overleg Minderheden, LOM) represents seven migrant groups in total: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Caribbean, South European, Chinese and refugees. The officials are employed by the ministry. Each body aims to represent the interests of all its member associations. In this way, they offer an opportunity for immigrant groups to voice their opinions and discuss their interests with government ministers and high-ranking civil
servants. Some are critical of this model, arguing that these bodies mainly serve to legitimise government policies regarding the immigrant community.

Another important body created and financed at national level is the Contact Group for Muslims and the Government (Contactorgaan voor Moslims en Overheid, CMO). This was also established as a platform for consultation between immigrant associations and the Minister of Integration Affairs; its member organisations represent most Islamic denominations in the Netherlands. The fact that it was set up by the government is, on the one hand, an advantage – otherwise the extremely different religious groupings would not come together as easily; on the other hand, it represents a disadvantage because traditionally powerful figures are chosen to represent the groups and young Moroccans, for instance, do not feel represented, as indicated by the interviews conducted for this report.

Policies on separation of church and state

The relationship between the church and state is set out in two articles in the country’s constitution: Article 1 on non-discrimination and equal treatment and Article 6 on the freedom of religion. A more explicit law on equal treatment, the General Law on Equal Treatment (Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling), was passed in 1994. Its purpose is to stop discrimination from taking place. Maussen described four principles that the Netherlands traditionally applies in the spirit of these laws (Maussen, 2006).

- Equal treatment, not only of citizens but also of religious and nonreligious organisations means that faith-based associations such as the Salvation Army (Leger des Heils) will receive the same support in their provision of social services as other non-religious associations. As early as 1977, a decree on meat inspection made Islamic slaughter possible; in 1991, a change in burial law enabled Islamic burial procedures.

- Religious freedom is not only a negative freedom, in the sense that it should not be obstructed. It is also a positive one. For example, the government can sometimes actively provide for religious needs by helping an organisation to access a place of worship. This is called the social component of basic rights. In this example, public space rules such as building safety and noise regulations would apply. However, following changes made to the constitution in 1983, the government no longer provides financial funding to religious bodies.

- The public sphere is pluriform and should not be dominated by the state. For this reason, it is considered better to have several types of schools rather than one state school. Within the Dutch school system, public, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Hindu schools are given the same subsidies, as long as they follow the national curriculum and apply certain quality criteria. Similarly, religious broadcasting organisations receive the same financial support as others within the national broadcasting system.

- There is an emphasis on freedom of choice. This means protection against religious coercion. For example, young people should have the choice of a religious or non-religious social service.

The history of church–state relations in the Netherlands has been strongly influenced by pillarisation (verzuiling) – a term used to describe the denominational segregation of Dutch and Belgian society – although this is no longer the case. As Maussen (2009) notes, the principles of pillarisation have become modern; this is because pluriformity is already important in this context and the system can easily apply to different ethnic and religious groups.

Church–state relations changed following the changes made to the constitution in 1983. Muslim organisations benefited from the new principle that Muslims have equal rights to having places of worship. In the past, there was no systematic policy on the provision of places of worship for minority religions, although support was occasionally provided by municipalities (Maussen, 2009, pp. 53–54).
From 2000 onwards, certain politicians have been instigating a public debate aimed at changing the current system so that the state would have as little to do with religious organisations as possible. However, since 2002 the national government has been supporting competence training for Imams, which includes a course and guidebook on citizenship for ‘spiritual caretakers’ (Maussen, 2006, p. 241). Following the events of 9/11 in the US and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, a debate has also been taking place regarding the extent to which the state should: support a liberal Islam; exert some form of supervision, particularly of schools; and implement anti-radicalisation policies. In March 2009, the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG) published a manual for municipalities about religion in the public sphere. This addresses the legal limits of religion in the public sphere and gives advice on integration policy and religious organisations, relations with religious associations and some best practice solutions.
Profile of Breda

Brief description of the city

Breda is a medium-sized city in the southern part of the Netherlands, with a population of 172,085 inhabitants on 1 January 2009 (Onderzoek en Informatie, O&I, Breda). It acquired the official status of a town with town rights in 1252 around the castle of Breda. In the 14th century it was surrounded with a defensive wall and canals.

Historically, Breda is an army garrison town. It has several institutes for middle and higher education in the army and since 1828 the castle has housed a small military academy that is unique in the country. These institutions were established as a result of the connection with the royal family, which has existed for over 750 years. Many historical buildings, in the centre of town (castle, cathedral, harbour and gardens) and outside the town (country houses and hunting lodges), also result from the royal connection. These buildings have since become tourist attractions.

Breda’s city centre is compact, the surface is well used and the density of building is quite high. From the 1950s onwards, the city expanded its borders, large new housing areas were built and several villages and industrial areas were incorporated into the city area. Furthermore, over the last decade new neighbourhoods have been established. Former villages, which now belong to the Breda municipality, have retained their special village culture and character. However, the housing projects completed in the 1950s now need improvement. The map of Breda outside the city walls resembles a patchwork of industrial areas, housing areas and green village areas.

Breda has always been a centre of trade. Because of its central position in the province of North Brabant in the south of the Netherlands, on the dividing line between north and south of the country, and located between the big harbours of Rotterdam in the west of the Netherlands and Antwerp on the Belgian coast, Breda has become an ideal place for establishing headquarters of international companies. Some industry had developed in the region such as textiles, chemicals, chocolate, beer and fruit products (juices, canned fruit and soft drinks), but almost all of them have since closed down. There were no big factories in the area attracting low-skilled workers. This is one of the main reasons why Breda has only about 10% non-western inhabitants. Breda is currently trying to establish itself as a modern, high-tech and cultured city. The high-tech and creative technical industry is progressing rapidly and thus Breda would like to promote itself as ‘game valley’. In recent times, a gaming academy was set up in order to train future game designers. In addition, Breda aims to develop its logistics services, knowledge industry and hospitality industry.

In terms of cultural amenities, Breda has one of the biggest theatres in the region, which attracts people from far afield. The cultural scene in the city is still somewhat conservative, although this has been changing slowly over the last few years. Experimental forms of art and theatre are not often found in Breda, in contrast to Tilburg, which lies about 35 kilometres east. Breda does not have a university, which may explain the conservative, somewhat ‘bourgeois’ culture. Breda is a middle-class town. Statistical research shows that Breda is often typically representative of the perfect average of life in the Netherlands.

Breda has a central function in the region of western Brabant, in terms of shopping, social services, hospitals and cultural facilities. It has a fast train connection with Rotterdam and Antwerp and the new High Speed Line (HSL) will pass through the city. When the HSL is completed, it will provide Breda with excellent connections to the cities of Antwerp, Brussels, Paris and Barcelona.

Breda is just to the south of the main rivers that divide the north and the south of the Netherlands. It is part of the Roman Catholic southern belt of the Netherlands and holds the seat of a bishop. Currently, about 60% of the population are officially registered as Catholic, and 2%-3% are registered as Protestant. The previous bishop, Bishop Muskens, was
famous for his comment that poor people have the right to steal bread if they have nothing to eat. Muskens initiated a lot of contact with other religious groups, including Jews and Muslims. However, the newly appointed Bishop van den Hende feels that such initiatives are the responsibility of the parishes.

The south has a reputation for being more laid back than the rest of the country, which is related to the practice of Catholicism and a more ‘Burgundian’ lifestyle. This means that the local people like to enjoy good meals, drink and like to party. This profile contrasts with the calvinist culture that rules the north. Breda is known for its abundance of bars and indeed its annual carnival.

City’s migrant population

Table 3 shows the current ethnic composition of the population of Breda. As of 1 January 2009, about 11% of the population of Breda consisted of non-western immigrants, including second generation immigrants with at least one parent of immigrant origin, while another 11% were immigrants of western origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>135,801</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>5,168</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilleans</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesians</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavians</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Somalis</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9,566</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Indies (Moluccans)</td>
<td>3,968</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>172,085</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research and Information Service of Breda (Onderzoek en Informatie Gemeente Breda, O&I Breda)

Between 1 January 2007 and 1 January 2009, the number of Moroccans in Breda increased from 5,007 to 5,168. The number of Turks also increased during this period, from 2,866 to 2,915. Small increases were also noted among Antilleans, Poles and Chinese, while the number of those from Indonesia and Suriname decreased slightly.

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3 The now retired Bishop Muskens was known as the bishop with the ‘social face’ or the ‘red’ bishop. He was against compulsory celibacy for priests and in favour of the use of contraception to prevent HIV/AIDS.
The gender division of the ethnic groups shown in Table 3 is equal in nearly in all cases, except among indigenous Dutch people and among ‘others’ where more women can be found, many of whom are from eastern Europe and South America.

A specific characteristic of Breda, compared with most other Dutch cities, is that it has a Moluccan neighbourhood. In 1951, soldiers in the former Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, KNIL) stationed in Indonesia were demobilised in camps in the Netherlands. The Dutch government requested that several cities establish neighbourhoods for these Moluccan people, since they wanted to stay together and thought that they would one day get the chance to move back to the independent Republic of South Moluccas (Republic Moluccu Selatan, RMS). Between 1963 and 1966, 93 houses were constructed in Breda for this specific group, followed by another 15 houses in 1982. Currently, 130 Moluccan families live in a neighbourhood called De Driesprong, which also has a Moluccan Evangelical Church and a community centre. The fact that the Moluccan community in the city comprised ex-soldiers and their wives and children made them feel at ease in a town like Breda with a military tradition. Because of the military academy in Breda, the city was one of the few places in the Netherlands that these people could identify with. To date, Moluccans have refused to take up Dutch citizenship. The Moluccan community signed an agreement with the local authorities to ensure that their culture and way of life is respected in light of the special historic circumstances. Breda is one of the 70 Dutch municipalities to have a Moluccan neighbourhood.

The second significant immigration was of Antilleans, Moroccans, Surinamese and Turks. Of course, Moroccans and Turks came to the Netherlands to find work, or were selected by the numerous agencies that ‘imported’ foreign labour. Breda is a so-called ‘Antillean city’ because more than 1% of the population comes from the Antilles in the Dutch Caribbean.

The immigration of refugees over the last decade is a consequence of national policy. When asylum seekers receive their refugee status, their names are forwarded to municipalities throughout the country, which are obliged to provide them with suitable housing outside the normal waiting lists. Another recent development is the growth of the Polish community in recent years, with the arrival of new immigrants from Poland.

The age structure of the larger immigrant groups is very different to the average in Breda. In particular, high percentages of young Turks and Moroccans live in Breda; for instance, 62% of Turks in the city are younger than 29 years of age, and 33% are younger than 14 years of age, while the proportions of young people among Moroccans is relatively similar. Among Surinamese people, 27% are aged between 10 and 27 years. In addition, half of the immigrants from the Antilles are aged between nine and 29 years.

Overall, 30% of the Antillean and Surinamese people live in a single-parent family, often with only the mother present. On the other hand, only 17% of them live in a two-parent family. With regard to the Moroccans and Turks, over 50% of them live in a complete family unit, with both the father and mother present.

The socioeconomic position of Antilleans, Moroccans, Surinamese, Turks and refugees is not particularly good. Most of the migrants have a low income and depend on social housing. They are also more often unemployed. Compared with the percentage of the total population, these ethnic groups are 1.4 to 2.8 times more often unemployed. Considering the fact that a lot of migrant women are not working, the rate of unemployment among these groups is even higher.

Unemployment among people over 40 years of age is particularly high, compared with indigenous Dutch people. People in this age group are often unemployed or in receipt of disability benefit for a longer period and thus have limited chances to find work again.
Information on the Moluccan group comes from a different source. In a ranking of all Breda’s deprived neighbourhoods, the Moluccan neighbourhood is ranked in 23rd position, while the neighbourhood where most Moroccans live appears to be at the top end of the list. This shows that the relative position of Moluccans in Breda has improved over the last 20 years.

**Breda’s Muslim population and its characteristics**

A rough estimate of the total number of Muslims in Breda can be found by adding together the populations of each neighbourhood in which Muslims form a majority. On 1 January 2009, Moroccans and Turks were the biggest subgroups of the Muslim population, comprising 5,168 people and 2,915 people respectively; together, this is 4.7% of the total population. Smaller Muslim communities include those from Iraq (301 people), Iran (150), Afghanistan (348) and Somalia (223). These groups comprise a total population of 9,105 Muslim people, or 5.3% of the total population of Breda. However, as some Turks and Moroccans are not actually Muslim, the correct proportion is probably closer to the original 4.7%.
Local intercultural policies in general

This chapter first addresses Breda’s policies regarding immigrant integration, which are referred to as intercultural policies. It then goes on to examine the city’s policies regarding immigrant and religious associations. The next section will consider both formal and informal intercultural and interreligious dialogue between associations. With regard to relationships between ethnic groups, the focus will be on attitudes in the population, rather than on associations. Finally, the chapter looks at communication and media in this context.

Responsibility in the city and general approach to ethnic issues

Responsibility
The city council of Breda has a broad coalition comprising four left-wing and centre parties: the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Green Left (Groen Links) and the local party Breda’97. There are six city aldermen. The diversity policy is partly the responsibility of the alderman for social affairs, labour market, well-being, integration, residential and land development, Breda operating companies (Bredase Samenwerkende Bedrijven, BSW) and accommodation.

The diversity policy is administered by the Department of Social Development (Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, DMO). Up until 2009, relevant policies were prepared by one individual (the CLIP contact person); the person liaises regularly with colleagues regarding specific issues. This is clearly a difficult method of working, as the official concerned cannot always have full awareness and understanding of all the issues. Continuity can be put at risk if the official is on sick leave. Moreover, all the contacts made would be lost if the official leaves this position. Officially, diversity policy is agreed by the city council.

General approach towards ethnic issues
The integration policy of Breda, effective in May 2009, is laid out in the city council’s most recent policy document, ‘Integration Agenda 2005–2006’ (Integratie Agenda 2005–2006). This document drew on research findings presented in the ‘Integration monitor 2004’, and basic principles from an earlier policy document, ‘Couscous with applesauce 2000’ (Couscous met Appelmoes 2000). A separate policy document on women, entitled ‘Dunya’, also comprises part of the city’s policy; this will be the case until the council issues a new policy paper.

Integration policy in Breda is based on three principles: equality of cultures, equal chances and opportunities, and reciprocity. Although it uses a definition of integration laid out in a national document presented by the Blok Commission (Commissie Blok), it was fully based on the concepts and thinking of a diversity policy.

The policy document consists of four main chapters:

- housing, including neighbourhood work and safety issues;
- work;
- care, subdivided into education, well-being and health;
- culture, including the performing arts.

Subjects such as political participation, migrant associations or religious services for migrants are mentioned in these chapters. Besides this, another chapter states that the implementation of the policy will concentrate on the neighbourhoods that are subject to restructuring and that have a high concentration of immigrants. Because of the range of problems in these areas, such as poor quality housing, safety issues, unemployment and high levels of school dropout, one goal should be to offer social and other relevant services at neighbourhood level.
As a direct consequence of the ‘diversity thinking’ approach, the next chapter is devoted to interculturalisation of services, starting with the local administration itself. This includes the proposal to set targets on the number of immigrant staff and a project aimed at improving intercultural competence among its employees. The last chapter on ‘communication’ also focuses on intercultural competences, as well as aiming to gain public support for the policy.

All chapters include lists of projects that are either already implemented or are planned; information is provided on their goal, the responsible department and partners, and the source and amount of funds required for each project. Not surprisingly, the largest list of projects and allocated funds are found under the headings of care and well-being, which correspond to the department of the officer responsible for preparing the policy.

The report entitled ‘Dunya’ was written in 2004 and is concerned with immigrant women in Breda. This is because of Breda’s involvement in the activities of the Dutch government’s Committee for Participation of Women of Ethnic Minority Groups (PaVEM), which aims to promote the participation of women from ethnic minorities. It contains a brief overview of demographic and socioeconomic information on migrant women in Breda, information on their so-called ‘participation agenda’, and a list of planned projects with possible financial sources. The Dunya approach focuses on language, social participation and work. Proposals include home-based language lessons for women who find it difficult to leave the home, schemes to attract more women to other language programmes via schools and nurseries, and plans for follow-up language courses called Taal-plus if language proficiency after the first course is too low to enable labour market participation.

The work programme in Breda involves, among other things, supporting 10 women with higher education qualifications to find work, introducing at least eight women to do voluntary work, arranging 50 work placements by organising an employer breakfast and providing an information centre for women, where they can access computers. The ‘P-team’ (P being for participation) was another tool developed by PaVEM to promote social participation. This is a group of 10–15 women with different cultural backgrounds who advise local authorities and organisations on the issues of cultural diversity and integration policy, from the viewpoint of migrant women. Breda was the first city to have such a P-team. In 2007, a junior P-team was established, comprising six to 10 young women aged 16 to 24 years; they provide advice to girls and young women on issues such as education, career and social participation.

The city’s policy towards integration seems to reflect left-wing political views; this is shown in the choice of the main subjects. The criterion for the success of each initiative is usually the participation rate. The city council, mayor and aldermen have tried to counterbalance the negative aspects of the national policy of the previous government, even when representatives of their own political party accepted it. The city was satisfied with the national integration policy of Ella Vogelaar, Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, who sent out a so-called helping hand (Handreiking) in 2008 with the title ‘That which connects us’ (Datgene wat ons bindt). Her approach was considered to be migrant friendly and multicultural, which the city liked. However, her views came into conflict with the national social democratic PvdA and on 14 November 2008 she was replaced by Eberhard van der Laan.

The city of Breda adopts a positive attitude towards immigration. The belief is that Breda is a city where everyone feels safe, welcome and respected. It aims to provide opportunities, facilitate dialogue and include immigrants in policy making, the labour market and politics. When a politically conservative party was in government at the beginning of this century, the municipality ignored certain aspects of the national policy. This is now happening again, in relation to security and anti-radicalisation (see the later chapter on ‘Intergroup relations and radicalisation’).

In 2007, a new policy document began to be developed. Focus groups and consultation meetings were held to hear the views of citizens regarding relevant issues. On 11 September 2007, the findings of this research were presented, leading to a proposal for the new policy paper. This seemed to be a positive and constructive meeting. However, afterwards the atmosphere changed.
In January 2008, the new diversity policy document for 2008–2012, entitled ‘Participating and Connecting’ (*Meedoen en Verbinden*), was publicly presented by the relevant alderman. It was supposed to be considered at the Council meeting of 23 January 2008. However, some representatives of migrant communities who had not been included in the focus groups became involved. They called a meeting, at which they argued that the policy document had been written by a white official behind his desk at the town hall; as such, it had been prepared for immigrants, rather than by immigrants. As a result of this strong reaction, the municipality halted the process and promised the protesters that they would be given the opportunity to participate in the development of a new policy paper.

This decision led to a completely new procedure and a new method of policy development. It was decided that a bottom-up public inquiry process would be adopted, with the help of the communications department of the Breda administration and the Foundation for Interuniversity Research and Development on the Subjects of Organisation, Change, Renewal and Leadership (*Stichting Interuniversitair Onderzoek en Ontwikkeling op het gebied van organiseren, veranderen, vernieuwen en leidinggeven*, SIOO). The chosen method of doing this is known as ‘appreciative inquiry’, developed by the American professor in organisational behaviour, David L. Cooperrider. In this bottom-up approach to governing, citizens are given the chance to fill in their tasks and the learning potential of each individual is recognised (Breda Municipality, 2009, p. 8). Unlike more negative, critical methods, appreciative inquiry (*Waarderend Vernieuwen*) is basically a positive process. The emphasis is on the realisation of people’s goals and on discovery and design. In adopting this approach, the aim was to inspire people to take part in the policy-making process, to encourage them to get actively involved, and to raise enthusiasm. As a starting point, a town discussion (*Stadsgesprekken*) took place, in which 14 issues were highlighted which then became project proposals. A Building Group (*Bouwgroep*) was set up to steer this process. Each member of this group was required to prepare a paper on an issue that was of importance to them, on which a discussion could be based. Many of the initiatives emerged through this process.

**Issues, demands and interests of immigrants**
The 14 initiatives that emerged through the process outlined above can be seen as the main issues, demands and interests of immigrants in Breda. They cover seven themes, as outlined below.

- Under the first theme of integration, the following projects will be (further) developed: Dutch language training for those long-term immigrants who never learned the language, and the scheme which brings together indigenous Dutch people and immigrants who are at risk of isolation, to provide language training and social support.

- The second theme is education. One concern shared by immigrants is that their children do not tend to perform well in the examination that determines their level in secondary school. Extra support measures are required to address this. It was also considered important to stimulate pupils through the method of appreciative inquiry to discover their dreams, identify a career they would like to pursue and explore their potential role in society, as well as develop a pathway towards realising this. It was also felt that reading aloud by older boys and younger girls would be beneficial to the learning of younger children.

- Three initiatives were developed regarding the field of work. One supported poor working people, so that they could become examples for people who were unemployed. Another brought employers and highly educated immigrants together, with the aim of alerting the employer to their unused potential. A third scheme focused on increasing the level of diversity among staff in the city administration. This initiative was driven by an employee of the personnel department of the Breda administration, rather than a citizen.

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4 For more information, see [http://www.12manage.com/methods_cooperrider_appreciative_inquiry.html](http://www.12manage.com/methods_cooperrider_appreciative_inquiry.html).

5 These discussions have been filmed and are available at: [http://www.breda-morgen.nl/stadsgesprekken.php](http://www.breda-morgen.nl/stadsgesprekken.php).
In the field of housing, neighbourhood initiatives were suggested, such as meetings in the community centre, public iftar dinners when Muslims break their fast during the Islamic month of Ramadan and other activities in the neighbourhood.

Five projects were suggested to address social integration. They included: a project where the parent acts as a guide, one that addressed the future of young people in music and radio, another called ‘keep moving, my friend’, which involved neighbourhood shows of art and culture, sport demonstrations by clubs to attract immigrant children, and one focused on bringing older people and younger people together.

The issue of active citizenship was addressed by organising a festival and forming councils of migrants in different neighbourhoods.

Initiatives in the area of safety aimed to keep neighbourhoods free of crime, including violent crime, as well as to avoid polarisation, both through prevention and other measures.

All project proposals are coordinated by the Bouwgroep. A small group implements those that are agreed by the council.

Following this process, it became clear that the initiatives were more or less separate ideas, without a common philosophy underpinning them. For this reason, in 2008, a broader paper was developed by officials in consultation with relevant organisations and individuals called Social Vision for Breda 2020 (Maatschappelijke Visie Breda 2020). As Chapter 3 of the paper shows, this vision is formulated around four key themes: a nice place to stay (goed te even), growing up in Breda (groeien in Breda), participation (meedoen), and healthy and caring (gezond en zorgzaam).

A nice place to stay: The goal here is that Breda should remain a good place to live for its inhabitants, because organisations and the city administration continue to invest in citizens and their networks. Secondly, city and neighbourhood facilities should enhance communication, development and connections. Safety relates to this theme.

Growing up in Breda: This is about allowing young people to grow up in an attractive environment that allows them to develop and be challenged, as well as to relax, and that considers their views to be important.

Participation: The aim is to ensure that everyone can participate, as everyone is needed, and that the administration supports people regarding their creativity, new initiatives and ambitions.

Healthy and caring: The goal here is that the citizens of Breda and voluntary and professional care workers work together to create a healthy and caring society, in which care is accessible to everyone.

In Chapter 3 of the new policy paper, the 14 initiatives are connected to these four leading themes. In Chapter 5, they are related to the previously mentioned national document ‘Helping hand: that which connects us’ (Handreiking: Datgene wat ons bindt). This policy document also has a few extra themes that were not covered before, such as increased attention to security issues, anti-radicalisation and anti-polarisation, preventing the high concentration of immigrants in certain schools and neighbourhoods, and active policies to curtail discrimination in the labour market. In the city of Breda’s policy paper, some aspects of this national one are adopted. For example, it states that Breda will prevent a high concentration of new east European immigrants in certain neighbourhoods by taking an active part in the house allocation system; it plans to transfer this intervention to Breda’s housing policy document (Woonvisie). Activities to stop radicalisation and polarisation are not directly considered to be a local responsibility, although Breda commissioned the Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (COT) to conduct a research study in order to find out the extent to which this is an issue of concern in Breda.
The advantage of this consultative method of working is clearly that groups of volunteers are motivated to cooperate with the municipality in the execution of the policy. It is a bottom-up policy. The extent to which financial resources will be allocated to migrant groups rather than to generic social work associations still has to be clarified.

This new method of consultation also has problems. Firstly, the 14 issues that were raised had to be brought together in a consistent approach after the consultation process, and in fact some relevant issues seem to be missing. In addition, they do not address all the issues that the national government considers to be important. During the interviews with representatives of the religious associations and Muslim groups, it appeared that there are also religious and identity issues which did not come to light during the consultation process. Thirdly, the general public can overestimate the financial resources allocated to migrant associations, as some resources to meet their needs are actually allocated to general social services. Finally, a serious problem with these kinds of initiatives from citizens is that an unelected and random group can determine policy and claim representativity, while the elected bodies’ voice from the Second Chamber or City Council diminishes in weight. The challenge for Breda is to merge the top-down and bottom-up approach.

**Immigrant associations and immigrant religious associations**

This section looks at the number and types of immigrant and religious associations in Breda, the funding allocated to them, and those issues that these associations consider relevant.

**Associations of immigrants**

According to the database for the study ‘Migrant organisations in the Netherlands’ (Van Heelsum, 2004a and 2004b), Breda had seven Surinamese associations, 16 Turkish associations, eight Moroccan associations and seven refugee associations. Information from the Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel) shows that there have been some changes in the last five years. A list of the current and past associations has been added at the end of this report. Only two Surinamese associations remain active. In addition, there are six Moroccan associations, seven Turkish associations, one Turkish/Moroccan centre for young people, one Antillean association, five Moluccan associations (and three non-registered ones), one Chinese association (and three non-registered ones), eight African associations, one Cambodian association, three Polish associations, one Spanish association and one Bosnian association.

The authorities have contacts with one Surinamese association, and with most of the Turkish and Moroccan ones. They are also in contact with the Moluccan neighbourhood committee, the Spanish association and at least one African one. The Polish association of former soldiers in the Second World War is only contacted when war memorials are held. No communication takes place with the other Moluccan, Polish, Bosnian and Chinese associations. According to the city representative, the city has contact with all the dominant associations.

**Religious associations**

The largest religious community in Breda is the Roman Catholic Church – 60% according to the reverend interviewed. Not only are the indigenous Dutch people part of this community, but so also are some Africans, Antilleans, Greeks, Poles, Spanish and Surinamese. Besides the bishopric, there are two Catholic parishes in Breda: the Jerusalem Parish in central Breda, and the Bethlehem Parish in north Breda. A separate organisation for Polish Catholics (Poolse Katholieke Vereniging in Nederland) existed, but has been discontinued. According to the address list of a Chinese umbrella association, the Taiwanese Foundation for Evangelic Mission among Chinese in Europe (Taiwanese Stichting Evangelische Zending onder de Chinezen in Europa, CEME) has a branch in Breda, called Congregation CEME Breda (Kerkgenootschap CEME Breda), but this information could not be verified.

Only 5% of Breda’s population is Protestant, according to the reverend interviewed, of which maybe 3% belong to Dutch Protestant churches and 2% to new Protestant churches. According to the director of social work, there are four or five
new Protestant churches in Breda, which have a lot of Surinamese and Antillean members. A total of 90% of the Moluccan community in Breda is Protestant. Since the 1960s, the three Moluccan Protestant communities in Breda have used a church building called Immanuel, which is in the Moluccan neighbourhood. These communities are called: Geredja Injili Maluku, Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda and Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda Maart 53. The Chinese community has a separate Lutheran youth club, called Breda Lutheran Youth Club for Chinese (Breda Lutherse Jeugd Club voor Chinezen). There was a Congolese Protestant community called the Congolese Church of the Messengers (Eglise Kongolais Les Messagers), but it has either moved or closed down. An Evangelic Baptist community is also active.

There are five Muslim associations in Breda, and two official mosques: one Turkish, the Yeni mosque (Islamitische Stichting Nederland Yeni/Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi Yeni) and one Moroccan, the Ar-Rahman Mosque. The Turkish mosque is part of the Diyanet system, headed by the federation body, the Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN). This is associated with the national Islamic denomination in Turkey, and is mainly attended by first generation Turkish people in Breda. While the Turkish mosque is not a traditional example of mosque architecture, the newly built Moroccan one is. Besides these two actual mosques, there are two other well-known places where prayer services are held, one Turkish and one Moroccan. The Turkish one is the Breda Foundation Islamic Centre (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Breda); it is related to the Süleymançılars movement. It functions under the federation Islamic Foundation Centre of the Netherlands (Stichting Islamitische Centrum Nederland, SICN). It has a boarding school for girls in the same building. The SÜleymançılars movement is known to stress the devotional and mystical aspects of Islam and to promote Koran education. On a spectrum of conservative to modernist Islamic movements, it is more conservative, although not in an extreme way, while the two mosques are closer to the centre. For example, the SÜleymançılars movement advocates that girls wear the headscarf and that the sexes are separated during gymnastics.

The Islamic Centre for Young People in Breda (Stichting voor Islamitische Jongeren in Breda) is a second Moroccan organisation; it organises prayer services and has a more conservative view on Islam than the Moroccan mosque. The board members wear beards and do not shake hands with women. They particularly target young people, and fulfil a very useful role for those young people who are searching for the real Islam, as will be explained further later.

The Union of Islamic Young People in Europe in the Ar-Rahman district of Breda (Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Europa wilayah Breda Ar-Rahman) is another Muslim organisation, comprising Indonesians/Moluccans.

The Turkish Fetula Gülen movement has followers in Breda, although not all its activities happen there. The students of one organisation related to this movement, called 'Educatie Centrum Breda', joined 'Cosmicus Brabant’ in Tilburg (Cosmicus Öğrenci Derneği Tilburg/Güney Şubesi). There is no mosque of the Turkish Milli Görüş movement in Breda, the nearest being in Uden. During the interviews, Moroccan Muslims in Breda reported visiting the conservative Al Waqf Al Islami mosque in Eindhoven.

Breda has other religious associations, including a Buddhist group (Boeddhisme van Nihiren en SGI Breda), a Surinamese Hindu group called Dosti Armaan AUM Pracharak Sabha Breda, a Jewish synagogue and a Bahá’í group. It is interesting that the Surinamese Hindus in Breda perform services of both Surinamese Hindu movements – the modernist Arya Samaj and the more traditional Sanathan Darm, according to the schedule of services on their website.

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6 More information, time and date of services and pictures are available at: [http://www.mandierbreda.com](http://www.mandierbreda.com).

The board itself is from the Sanathan Darm movement, but clearly states that their Mandir (temple) is not bound to one movement or god, such as Vishna or Shiva. In 2006, the name Aum Pracharek Sabha was replaced by Vishwa-Hindu Mandir, which means World Hindu Temple. The services of the Vishwa-Hindu Mandir in Breda were held in premises belonging to the Jerusalem Parish – the Catholic Parish for Central Breda – up until 2007 in the St. Michaelskerk and more recently in the Petrus and Paulus Kerk.
Funding for ethnic and religious organisations

The national government, the Brabant province and the administration of Breda can provide subsidies for which both migrant and, to a lesser extent, religious organisations can apply. Up until now, none of the associations in Breda has operated at a national level, although some have accessed funds from the national PaVEM. In addition, some of them were supported by Steunfunctie Palet, the support body for immigrant issues at provincial level, with the aim of finding funding at provincial level. However, most migrant associations seeking funding do so at the municipal level. These kinds of subsidies are provided in principle for those who provide services, mainly at a city level. There are two types of funds they can apply for: diversity funds, which are directly linked to the municipal policy goals of stimulating participation, social cohesion and integration, and the Fund for Social Development (Fonds Maatschappelijke Ontwikkelingen, FMO).

In the current situation with the Bouwgroep, there is a lot of discussion on how the diversity funds should be allocated; the associations feel they should be given a greater share. On the other hand, some members of the Bouwgroep disagree as these organisations can also seek funding from the FMO, for sums that are nearly 10 times bigger than those allocated by the Bouwgroep. The aim of this funding resource of €10 million for 2007–1011 is to support citizens’ initiatives. Activities should address the following goals: stimulating citizens to come up with ideas about their surroundings, increasing social cohesion and supporting groups that are experiencing difficulties. The project must develop into a sustainable service once the subsidy is used up, so it has to be either profitable or be taken over by an existing service provider.

The FMO funding opportunity was advertised during information meetings at migrant associations. Between 1 January 2007 and 1 January 2008, a total of 117 ideas were suggested, many of them by migrant associations and aiming to improve the situation in neighbourhoods where immigrants live. When an individual or organisation makes a suggestion that sounds like a good idea, the officials support them in turning it into a well-written proposal with a budget; this support ensures that people with lower levels of experience and/or education are not excluded. In the third round in July 2009, three out of 12 proposals that were granted funding came from migrant associations. Many of the other proposals, although not submitted by migrant associations, also included migrants in their target population, such as those working with young people or people living in an area of the city with a high population of migrants, called Geeren Zuid.

Issues, demands and interests of immigrant and religious organisations

The issues, demands and interests of migrant associations overlap to a large extent with the interests of migrants already described in this report. One issue which particularly concerns migrant associations is their wish to take over some of the social work that is currently being carried out by general social services, as well as the budget that is allocated to these services. One of the Moroccan representatives complained that professional organisations take a large proportion of this funding, while in fact migrant associations carry out much more work with volunteers.

One issue that concerns religious associations is that of accessing buildings where they can organise their services. As already mentioned, Hindus are using the Catholic Church and the Muslims tend to buy, build or rent their own buildings.

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8 For further information, see the Breda page on the Palet website: http://www.palet.nl/subpagina.php?navid=354.

9 More information on FMO funds is available at: http://www.breda.nl.
Forms of dialogue

This section distinguishes between two forms of dialogue: intercultural dialogue and interreligious dialogue.

Intercultural dialogue

The consultative process described earlier that is used to develop a new policy paper is an innovative way of stimulating intercultural dialogue and is the most interesting example for this chapter. The method of appreciative inquiry brings together citizens of all nationalities and backgrounds and encourages them to dream about their common future, to formulate plans and carry out those that they feel to be important. Both the town discussions and the Bouwgroep were joined by people of various nationalities and backgrounds including Africans, Dutch, Indonesians, Moroccans, Surinamese and Turks.

Several other attempts have been made in the past to develop migrant councils and platforms. However, most of these did not work out because they could not satisfy requirements regarding representativeness, and because of internal disagreements. In 2004, the so-called Migrant Council (Migrantenraad) was set up by an Indonesian and a Moroccan representative. It was supposed to represent the voice of all immigrant associations. In 2008, it split into two councils due to internal quarrels, with Migrant Council 1 led by the Moroccan representative forming the Working Group of Elderly Moroccans (Werkgroep Marokkaanse Ouderen); later, he joined the Bouwgroep. Migrant Council 2, led by the Indonesian representative, continued, with one Surinamese and one Moroccan representative; later, the Indonesian representative also joined the Bouwgroep. In 2008, an Algerian representative set up the Platform of Moroccans (Platform Marokkanen), but not all Moroccans liked the fact that he was not Moroccan. Following this, another fully Moroccan Platform was established by a younger Moroccan man. It brought together the Moroccan mosque, the women’s group, Muslim young people, as well as a group of fathers who were concerned with safety in their neighbourhood. Currently, there are three Moroccan platforms, as well as one intercultural group called the Institute Profit Multicultural Development (Instituut Winst Multiculturele Ontwikkeling, IWMO), led by a Surinamese representative.

To summarise the situation, immigrants in Breda continue to form platforms though they do not manage to achieve long-term cooperation. Due to the size of Breda, the respective migrant communities are small and the same individuals tend to turn up in every council that is created; this leads to the same arguments being repeated. On the other hand, because the Bouwgroep addresses actual policy and is therefore also concerned with funding, there is more motivation among participating organisations to cooperate. The future will show whether or not the associations get the funds that they are now expecting and to what extent funding will continue, following the initial evaluations.

In addition to the platforms, there were also several less politicised initiatives, directed at facilitating networking and communication between different groups. As there are too many to mention all of them, a number of examples are mentioned here – the next chapter outlines in further detail the iftar fast-breaking meal during Ramadan.

In 2007, the diversity officer arranged informal ‘Meet and greet’ gatherings between staff members of the departments of the municipality and groups of immigrants. The first one took place in the summer of 2007 in the town hall and comprised some 60 representatives of African organisations. Another meeting was held with Moroccans in the autumn of 2007. The rationale was to improve interculturalism among staff members through direct contact with migrant citizens. Training in interculturalism is not enough; it is necessary to develop practical knowledge among officials. A relationship must develop between people in order for them to communicate well. Here, officials have the opportunity to talk to immigrants and are directly confronted with their issues and questions. They learn to understand immigrants’ point of view and develop personal contacts within immigrant communities. It also means that officials are more accessible to African representatives when they need something from the municipality. For instance, direct contact with the official working with older people can lead to direct phone calls with them.
Interreligious dialogue

The most obvious initiative on interreligious dialogue is the interreligious working group (Interreligieuze Werkgroep). According to the Protestant reverend interviewed, who was a member of the group, this was a consequence of an earlier cooperative initiative between Catholics and Protestants in the town parish (Stadspastoraat). This first initiative was established in 2000 by the well-known Bishop Muskens of Breda. The Protestant reverend interviewed joined the group in order to carry out all kinds of social work.

As a result of the 9/11 attacks in the US, efforts to improve dialogue accelerated. A month afterwards, the first event was organised, namely the interreligious working group. This was a discussion evening under the title ‘Islam, curse or blessing?’. Some famous national figures took part, such as Mohammed Cheppi and VVD representative Henk Kamp, as well as a representative from the synagogue.

The reverend remarked regarding the goal of this working group:

*the liveability of the city depends very much on stimulating discussion between groups. There is considerable xenophobia in Breda [evident] when you hear people talking among each other, and talking ... with other religions is necessary. We’ve also consciously involved non-religious parties. There are a lot of rich young people in Breda who have negative views of immigrants.*

The former Bishop Muskens was also interested in the dialogue with Islam, since he had previously worked in Indonesia.

Not only did Protestants and Catholics cooperate, but now those from other religions are also involved, including very active involvement by Jews, and active participation of Moroccan Muslims, although their representative kept changing. In the beginning, there was also a Turkish Muslim representative and a representative of the Protestant Indonesian Church (Pesekutuan Oikamene Indonesia Nederland). A Hindu organisation came twice to the group meeting and the organisations of Japanese Buddhists attended on one occasion. There has been no contact with the three Moluccan Protestant Church groups; no information is available about the participation of the two Chinese groups or the Polish group (see list at the end of the report).

The diversity coordinator of the municipality attended all meetings, both because of personal interest and because the municipality thought that the administration ought to be represented. Participation in this group resulted in broader viewpoints regarding the separation of church and state among local politicians. Informal contact between politicians and religious groups developed, and it even influenced the official speeches of the mayor and aldermen: they began to use quotes from the Koran and the Bible which was highly appreciated by local Muslims.

Meetings took place more or less on a monthly basis, during which preparations were made for an annual big event. The next event with Bishop Muskens took place in the large church of Breda, and the Turkish imam of the Diyanet mosque was invited to read an excerpt from the Koran. Another event was a quiz organised by Muslim young people, involving humorous questions regarding controversial issues. The answers made it clear that people do not know much about each other’s religion and that they are actually more alike than they might think.

Traditionally, cooperation has existed between the church and the municipality, partly because of the presence of royalty in Breda and the fact that the director of the military has always been the administrator of the church funds. However, financial relations were abolished with legislative changes in 1983. The current mayor and aldermen are positive about cooperation, and would for instance give a speech at the departure or welcome of a bishop. Both the fact that the diversity coordinator joined the interreligious working group on an informal basis and that the administration organised an
‘interreligious dinner’ in the city hall show that there are many informal ways of addressing the issue of the separation of church and state. The working group was active from 2001 to 2007.

Unfortunately, both the town parish and the interreligious working group were abolished when Bishop Muskens retired in 2007 and the Pope replaced him with the less progressive Bishop van den Hende. The new bishop thought that this kind of cooperation should take place at parish level, and not at the level of the bishopric/diocese, and the progressive Catholics in Breda were too cautious to protest. Currently, the Bethlehem Parish of north Breda still cooperates actively with the Moroccan mosque, since the mosque is on parish territory. The activities at the Jerusalem Parish in central Breda, however, have stopped.

Some other interreligious initiatives have also been established and still continue. As already noted, cooperation occurs in the use of church buildings, exemplified by the Hindus’ use of the Catholic Church buildings. Another example is the collective support of the churches, also involving Africans, for undocumented immigrants, represented in the Foundation for Undocumented Foreigners (Stichting Ongedocumenteerde Buitenlanders, STOB) and the financial support provided for food and beds in the Refuge House (Stichting Vluchtbed). Funds come from churches, as well as social work departments of churches (diaconieën), and from a social fund that is indirectly paid by the municipality – direct payment for undocumented migrants would not be possible. Besides this, the church social work departments directly support Christian immigrants in Breda, such as the Arians from Iran and Iraq; this has always been part of their humanitarian work in the city.

Relations with the national workshop on interreligious cooperation (Werkgroep Interreligieuze Samenwerking, WIS) which recently changed its name to Foundation for Interreligious Dialogue (Stichting Interreligieuze Dialoog) remain intact.

Although Breda city council has no official policy on interreligious matters, the city pays regular attention to this issue, as shown by the example of including religious items from Hinduism and Islam in Breda’s celebration of ‘Nassau 600 years’.

**Relationship between different ethnic groups in the city**

The last survey on communications between different ethnic groups in Breda was conducted in 1996. No surveys have been identified on the attitude of citizens of Breda regarding ethnic or religious issues. The findings of the citizens’ survey (Burgerenquête) from 2000 to 2008, which are published on the Breda website, do not address social or attitudinal issues. While not a single question addresses ethnic diversity or other social issues, questions are asked about issues in public spheres that the municipality can directly resolve, such as unsafe viaducts. In 2003, qualitative research was conducted on how to improve intercultural communication in the city; however, it has not been possible to access the findings of this study.

From the interviews, it seems that a lot of prejudice exists in Breda, particularly towards Moroccans and Muslims. One interviewee stated that Breda was much more openly racist than another area in the Netherlands, Zaandam in the area of North Holland, where he had previously lived. Another interviewee told us that serious racist incidents happen in Breda and surrounding areas that would be immediately publicised in the media, were they to happen in Rotterdam. The municipality of Breda chooses not to focus attention on this matter, believing that publicity will make things worse. However, as the municipality does not give a clear message that this racist behaviour is wrong, people feel free to make negative comments about Moroccans and Muslims. At the same time, the easygoing attitudes that are promoted in Breda as typically ‘southern and associated with Brabant’ tend to ease relations between different groups. Some of the
immigrants interviewed do not seem to worry too much about negative remarks about immigrants and Muslims, but it would be no surprise if there is hidden anger among members of the Moroccan community.

As in all parts of the Netherlands, Breda has a regional anti-discrimination office. In addition, it has an active anti-discrimination policy and the city mayor has been actively involved on several occasions in efforts to curtail racism in bars and clubs.

**Public communication**

As shown earlier, Breda tends to promote itself as a relaxed and easygoing place, where conflicts do not easily escalate. No formal focus is made regarding prejudice against immigrants or against Muslims in the city’s policy documents, or in the way the authorities deal with the media. Generally, the policy aims to mitigate any negative situation that could escalate.

The newly developed communication strategy known as ‘appreciative inquiry’ is not a media strategy; rather, it aims to involve citizens in policy making. As the representative of the communication department explained, a top-down approach – whereby citizens are consulted after the plan has been prepared – is considered to be old-fashioned. Summaries of the city discussions that have taken place have been provided in the form of short films that one can watch on the website of the city council of Breda.

**Summary and lessons learnt**

Breda has had a turbulent history of platforms of migrant associations trying to influence policy. Up until recently, the staff of the city council comprised only indigenous Dutch people and was not very open to newcomers. However, following protests from immigrants, in 2008 the city developed a completely new and innovative method of involving immigrants in policy making. Through the method of appreciative inquiry, active immigrants were given the opportunity to determine priorities and to develop concrete plans. As a result, many initiatives were developed by those involved. Nonetheless, the extent to which resources will really go to migrant associations as opposed to general social services, and the extent to which this process will lead to best practice and stable services, is yet to be seen.

Breda promotes itself as a Burgundian, relaxed and easygoing place, where everyone has time to chat to each other and where conflicts do not escalate. Breda’s small size adds to this image, as does the good level of communication between officials – particularly the municipality’s diversity coordinator and social workers – and the migrant associations. Political parties cooperate closely, which makes it easy to spot problems. Direct communication with associations seems to work very well, although more so regarding Moroccan and Turkish associations than for those representing smaller communities such as the Chinese people living in Breda. Although the advantages of this informal approach are evident, its disadvantage is reflected in the fact that the administration does not directly address certain issues. For instance, it does not clearly communicate the message that racist incidents are unwanted. The consequences of this informal approach will become clearer later in the report when assessing the way in which Breda copes with radicalisation.
Local intercultural policies towards Muslim communities

Major issues, demands and interests

The Muslim community in Breda consists of Moroccans, Pakistanis, Surinamese and Turks, as well as many smaller groups such as Afghans, Egyptians, Iranians and Iraqis. The murder of Theo van Gogh resulted in tense relations between people not only in Amsterdam, but also throughout the rest of the Netherlands. In fact, prejudice towards Muslims is one of the biggest issues of concern for most Muslims in Breda. They feel that this is the main reason why Muslim people encounter difficulties with the educational system and the labour market. On the other hand, some indigenous Dutch people feel that Muslim people are generally conservative, that they suppress women and that they do not actively curtail their children’s involvement in criminal activities. Some also feel that some Muslim people become sympathisers of fundamentalist movements. Research conducted in other cities shows that the prejudices are more likely to be directed towards Moroccan Muslims than towards Turkish or Surinamese Muslims (O+S Amsterdam, 2009). Moroccan Muslims tend to be the scapegoat for these beliefs about Muslims; not surprisingly, they have also reacted more fiercely to them.

The issue of identity is an important one for second generation Muslims, particularly in the context of these prejudices held towards them in Dutch society. For them, the key question is how to be a good Muslim in a western society. This can be difficult to answer, especially in relation to gender roles and finding the ‘right’ Islam. Relevant concerns include whether or not to wear a headscarf, and if wearing one, whether to choose a modern or traditional one,\(^{10}\) virginity before marriage, marrying someone from a different ethnic background, sports, voluntary or forced partner choice, and acceptance of homosexuality. Other questions also involve the rest of Dutch society – for example: Can an employer refuse to hire someone because they have a beard or headscarf? Can civil servants refuse to shake hands with women?

Parents with low levels of literacy, who follow traditions from their villages in north Morocco, are not considered to be helpful by young people who are used to reading and finding information from books and the internet. Generally, young Muslim people in the Netherlands struggle with their identities, and their search for information. The fact that they have to defend themselves from the outside world makes this even more difficult. Some young people adopt a more conservative interpretation of Islam than their parents, telling them that they are not good Muslims (De Koning, 2007). Research into the reasons why some Muslim young people become radicalised found that the process of searching for one’s identity and feeling rejected by Dutch society plays an important role (Slootman and Tillie, 2006; Demant et al, 2008).

It is also relevant that, up until recently, the two main mosques in Breda were first generation institutions and were dominated by older men. This made it difficult for young people to come with their questions and demands. In the Moroccan mosque, the imam spoke Arabic, while the first language of Moroccans is likely to be either Berber or Dutch. Moreover, first generation imams may not be aware of the problems that young Muslim people face in Dutch society. For some time now, internet imams have been in operation – the Dutch convert Abdul Wahid Van Bommel is an example of one. Because of these unmet needs of young Muslim people, representatives of the second generation have begun to set up their own associations.

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\(^{10}\) Dutch Moroccan girls designed a fashionable headscarf, consisting of a tight black part and a colourful headscarf.
This is more of an issue in the Moroccan mosques than in the Turkish ones. Turkish young people have fewer language problems, as they are more likely to speak Turkish than Moroccans are to understand Arabic, and Turkish boys are often involved by their fathers in the mosques. In the Moroccan community, active young people tried to get involved with the existing mosque, but were unable to arrange a means of doing so in a way that fitted their needs. They then set up their own institution, called the Foundation for Islamic Young People (Stichting voor Islamitische Jongeren, SIJ), in a former factory building. It includes a prayer hall, a space for sports and several other rooms for educational and social activities. Up until now, the organisation has functioned without receiving any subsidies from the municipality, although it recently made its first request for funding. This group has a more conservative view of Islam than the main Moroccan mosque. The board members wear beards and do not shake hands with women. However, they adopt an open approach and are in contact with the municipality. They are also extremely active in taking care of young people, both in providing them with social and sporting activities, and in the provision of religious education. They have imams and organise prayer services. The lectures are in Dutch, since many young people do not speak Arabic, and those attending can raise any question that concerns them.

The chair of SIJ explained that young people need a lot of support. This was particularly the case since the 11 September attacks in the US after which much more attention was suddenly placed on Muslim people. The role of the mosque grew in importance, and discussion was necessary on subjects such as radicalisation. In the early years, there was a healthy level of competition between the new organisation and the mosque. The activities are very well attended; up to 800 persons can be present at them. Parents feel reassured of their children’s safety when they go to the foundation: they feel that it is better than hanging around in the street, even though the views of SIJ are more conservative than their own. The foundation usually arranges separate activities for boys and girls. This is despite the fact that they believe that separating boys and girls is a tradition from north Morocco and not something that Islam prescribes. The issue of what comprises the real Islam is a matter of debate between the two generations. As the parents are not educated, they do not know the difference between tradition and the religion. In Mecca in Saudi Arabia, where Muslims go for the Hajj (annual pilgrimage), prayer takes place with men and women in one room; this issue became the subject of a major debate on what real Islam means, between the first and second generations in Breda. The first and more moderate generation argued for a separate room for women, while some of the members of the more conservative second generation actually argued that both sexes should pray together in the same room.

The chair of SIJ explained that everything the foundation does is knowledge-based. Attendees have to learn about many of the issues that get discussed. He pointed out that he does not understand where the Taliban in Afghanistan found support in the Koran for stopping girls from attending school; in his view, this is actually unlawful as Mohammed’s wives were all tutors and Mohammed taught that women were even obliged to educate themselves. Another issue that was often discussed in the foundation – again relating to knowledge – is the meaning of the word Jihad. He explained that a negative connotation has developed regarding this word, because it is associated with terrorism. However, it actually means to improve oneself by banning bad habits, taking care of those around you, and defending one’s land if under attack. Only if a person is attacked is a man-to-man fight allowed. Another issue that is often discussed is that, according to the Koran, a man can have four wives. The SIJ chair pointed out that not many people seem to realise that this can only happen under the following condition: the man must treat the women equally in relation to love, money and care, and that this is extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible, to do.

When the Ar-Rahman mosque noticed how much activity was taking place among young people in the new centre, it decided to also encourage the involvement of young people. Over the past few years, the gap between the first and second generations of Muslims in Breda has been diminishing. The young fathers who now patrol the streets as part of
a neighbourhood safety project in North Breda are more aware of the dangers that young people have to face. More recently, a group of moderately active young Muslim people has been developing around the Ar-Rahman mosque. The fact that the interview with representatives of both groups took place in the SIJ buildings shows that the two organisations cooperate rather closely. The Ar-Rahman mosque recently hired a Dutch-born imam, something that would not have been possible 10 years ago. The older generation now sees that young people urgently need this support, and many things are becoming possible that were not possible before.

The representative of the Ar-Rahman mosque explained that the anger felt by Moroccan young people reflects a time bomb, one that needs to be controlled. He felt that this was particularly an issue for young men, as they watched anti-Muslim views being articulated on Dutch television without any consequences for those sharing these views, while they themselves are forced to stay quiet. He noted too that many young, highly educated men cannot find work, which also angers them.

As already noted, the Turkish case is slightly different. In the moderate Diyanet mosque in Breda, elderly men are in control, although some young Turkish people sometimes visit, such as the person interviewed, who is also a member of the Bouwgroep. Turkish young people tend to go to organisations outside Breda which have more possibilities for them. Some of them, as already mentioned, visit associations of Muslim movements outside of the mainstream such as the Süleymancılar, Fetula Gülen in Tilburg or Milli Görüş in Uden. Others find moderate Diyanet mosques that have more activities for young people, and others stay at home. This means that the Süleymancılar organisation is the only place in Breda where Turkish young people who are religious but who also have a lot of questions about Islam can access more information.

The Süleymancılar organisation consists of the Islamic Centre (Stichting Islamitische Centre), which has a prayer hall and religious centre where questions regarding marriage, religion and social life as a Muslim in the Netherlands can be raised. It runs educational activities too. The Süleymancılar places a focus on cultivating a spiritual attitude that reflects the core of Islam, over superficial rules. Since 1996, the Süleymancılar organisation has run a ‘boarding school’ for girls called Stichting Respect, where girls of secondary school age can stay while they attend the regular secondary schools in Breda. This ‘boarding school’ is not supposed to cater for problem cases; all girls stay voluntarily, and can return home if they wish. It means that part of the upbringing of girls is taken over from the parents, with a systematic Islamic basis. They are not allowed to hang out in the street; alcohol, smoking and sex are forbidden; they must wear a headscarf; and after school they are helped with homework and have some religious educational activities.

The organisation gives the girls who stay there and the visiting young people a clear sense of direction and it provides them with active support. For these reasons, this organisation prevents, in its own way, the development of fundamentalist tendencies that may exist among Turkish young people in Breda: it clearly explains to them what their view on Islam means and what is unwanted. In the current context, the importance of this role should not be underestimated. The Diyanet mosque has not yet reached the stage where it can involve active young people, but it is expected that this will happen soon.

The interviewees gave the impression that Turkish people living in Breda are more aware of the different denominations within Islam than Moroccan people are. It would be unlikely for someone to attend prayer in the Süleymancówlar organisation without knowing what kind of organisation it is. It is likely that such denominations are normal in Turkey and relatively new in Morocco, where the king is the religious leader. This is probably why the debate regarding the real Islam is more necessary in the Moroccan community than in the Turkish one. However, there has also been an increase in the number of Turkish people in the Netherlands who are interested in more conservative movements, such as Fetula Gülen and Milli Görüş.
In addition to issues such as identity, finding the true Islam and prejudice against Muslim people, some more practical issues have occupied Muslims in Breda over recent years. The next sections address mosque building, Islamic burial rites and Islamic primary schools.

**Mosque building**

The Ar-Rahman mosque was completed in 1999. A Moroccan representative who was closely involved in the construction process explained that the first phase of its development occurred a few years previously, and involved the gathering of funding from the community. This commenced with 1,000 guilders (€454) being donated by each family. Subsequently, members of the community were asked to give more donations. A site containing an old building was then purchased.

At this point, an indigenous Dutch architect was approached. The intention was to use a light colour and to have one Moroccan square minaret, in the traditional Moroccan style. The idea was that the architect would apply for planning permission, and that the Moroccans themselves would draw up most of the plan. But this approach became too expensive, since the architect charged for the design and requested 15% of the total building costs. In the end, those involved negotiated the price down to €39,000. A lot was done by the Moroccans themselves, and the necessary maquette (scale model) was made by architecture students; the architect only carried out what was required of him. Requirements for planning permission were as follows: the building had to blend in with the surrounding area in terms of its colour and shape, the minaret could not be higher than 13 metres, and safety requirements had to be adhered to, both during the building process and afterwards. The interviewee proudly explained that he added the blocked tiles to the design, and that the minaret is actually slightly higher than 13 metres.

Finally, after a very long process, the building plan was approved. The next phase involved getting a building contractor. This was a faster and more successful process. A contractor with a good reputation was found who was available to commence work immediately and who agreed to do the work for a low price. When the building started, many Muslim men assisted with technical aspects of the work. In practice, the mosque was built by these members of the community, which was a very positive experience for them. Many men joined in enthusiastically, each offering their own expertise: one did the stucco work (ornamental interior plaster work), another did the tiling and a third person installed the electrical system. In the end, everyone was happy. There was even money left over. Immediately, a larger space was built for Muslim women.

Figure 5: Front view of the Ar-Rahman Mosque in Breda

© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010
Once the mosque was completed, a neighbourhood meeting was arranged. There had been some issues with neighbours of the mosque, but these soon disappeared after the mosque opened. One issue related to parking: there is no parking space on the grounds of the mosque, but there is a lot of parking space on the nearby streets. One older woman requested that those using the mosque would not park large vehicles in front of her house – such requests were met with a friendly and positive response. In fact, neighbours of the mosque soon grew curious and friendly and, at the time of writing, the mosque runs information meetings and excursions with different groups such as Catholics, military personnel and primary school children, on an almost weekly basis. It also regularly organises iftar dinners for the neighbours during Ramadan. The parking situation has not improved, however, since a school has now also opened close by.

**Islamic burial**

As reported in an article in the Breda newspaper *De Stem* on 21 May 2009, a plan was accepted to increase the size of the cemetery in Oudenbosch, near Breda, so that it could accommodate an additional 230 burial places directed towards Mecca, for Islamic burials. Nearby, in Oosterhout, there is also an area for 40 burial places that will be reserved for Muslim burials once the extension of this cemetery is completed. No such initiatives have been reported in Breda. Efforts in this area are supported by the Foundation for Islamic Cemeteries in Western Brabant (*Stichting Islamitische Begraafplaatsen West-Brabant*) which is based in Bergen op Zoom in North Brabant.

**Islamic schools**

Breda has one Islamic primary school, the Okba Ibnoe Nafi School which is located in Archimedesstraat 2. It offers the normal curriculum, but from the viewpoint of an Islamic background. The board of this school consists of representatives of both moderate and orthodox movements. As is normally the case with schools having a religious basis, the general School Inspection Service monitors this school. Koran and Arabic lessons are not given in school but at the migrant associations.

Islamic schools are often the victims of extra media attention. The Islamic primary school in Breda had an additional investigation carried out on it by the auditing service of the Ministry of Education in 2007, following receipt of an anonymous letter stating that certain procedures that Dutch schools are legally obliged to follow were not being implemented. The auditing service concluded that the accusations were completely false.

**General approaches and policies towards Muslim groups**

According to official policy documents, Muslims in Breda are not targeted by policy in any particular way. As a religious group, they have the same rights as other religious communities, and as members of the Moroccan, Turkish and other ethnic groups they have the same rights as other disadvantaged communities. The mayor of Breda would be as likely to attend a Catholic celebration as he would be to attend a Muslim or Jewish festival. In practice, the diversity coordinator is more closely involved with some of the Muslim organisations than for instance Jewish or Hindu organisations. This is due to the relatively large size of the Moroccan and Turkish communities in Breda, the personal interest of the coordinator, and probably also the national attention these groups receive.

**Examples of concrete activities and measures improving relations with Muslim groups**

All measures that the Breda administration takes to improve intergroup relations apply equally to Muslims. However, following the 11 September attacks in the US, some activities have been directed towards Muslims such as the large iftar celebration in the town hall in 2007. All relevant groups were invited and it became a large event. Almost 200 people took part, including the city mayor and aldermen, as well as a number of highly placed employees of the municipality. The municipality worked together with the Ar-Rahman mosque in planning the event and costs were shared. In addition, annual meetings take place between the mayor, some aldermen and Islamic associations. During Ramadan, the mayor
and the aldermen frequently visit Muslim associations when iftars are being held. The alderwoman for well-being participated in a conference about Islam in the Netherlands, at which she commented on the other speeches. The fact that she used citations from the Koran in a positive way was considered to be a large step for a member of the Social Democratic Party.

Simple steps have been taken to improve relations. For instance, during a visit to the accommodation provided by the Foundation for Young Muslims, the mayor and alderman learned that they did not have a permit for public use, as there may have been a conflict with safety regulations. The municipality offered to conduct a safety check according to fire prevention rules and to give free advice on steps that should be taken in order to meet these regulations. Following this, the members of the association implemented measures themselves and received the permit from the fire brigade.

Another initiative to improve relations with Muslims was one that aimed to solve the problems that arose during the Muslim slaughter feast (Eid-el Korban). There were not enough places where the animals to be sacrificed could be slaughtered according to the religion’s traditions. The municipality convinced one of the bigger slaughter houses to open their doors to Muslims.

Initiatives to create more understanding between Muslims and others are actively supported. An example is the weekend event that was organised by a rather orthodox Islamic women’s group. They invited non-Muslim women to attend their meetings in order to learn more about each other. In another case, a young Muslim lady was supported in organising a debate in the local central library.

As already noted, the Interreligious Working Group that was established by the Catholic Church has also played an important role in improving relations. Its work in this field began with the discussion meeting entitled ‘Islam – curse or blessing?’ which was followed by several other meetings and events – for example, the church service at which the Turkish imam read the Koran, and the quiz organised by Moroccan girls that drew attention to the similarities between Islam and Christianity.

The municipality actively commemorates Kristallnacht, at which the mayor and/or aldermen participate in the programme. Naturally, this event also involves representatives from the Jewish community and the Muslim community. Most of the costs of this event are covered by the municipality.

The social work office was asked to get involved in organising a demonstration against the Israeli invasion in Gaza in early 2009. This initiative was spearheaded by Moroccan Muslims, who asked for this support because they felt it was necessary to involve authorities due to concerns regarding people’s safety. The director of the social work department advised the organisers to broaden the target group by asking Jewish organisations to also attend; in this way, it would not become a Muslim-only demonstration. In the end, groups other than the Moroccan Muslims became involved; as a result, the extreme right did not organise a counter demonstration and the demonstration went ahead peacefully.

The Catholic parish, Jerusalem, in North Breda also arranged events, such as the Week of Peace (Vredesweek) which was held on 20–28 September 2008. The programme was opened by the alderman for social affairs, and a lot of attention was paid to the value of bringing immigrant religious groups together, encouraging dialogue between religious groups and

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12 This was an anti-Jewish pogrom in Nazi Germany and Austria from 9 to 10 November 1938.
peace in countries of origin (one evening, for example, was devoted to the situation in the Congo). A working group was set up with the aim of developing a monument to peace in Breda. There were so many of these activities that one elderly Moroccan lady remarked, ‘nowadays, I spend more time in the church than in the mosque’.

Immediately following the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, all neighbourhood councils gathered together to discuss and follow social developments in their neighbourhoods. At that time, the social work office Vertizontaal also took some steps to address this issue; youth workers in particular were active in organising discussion meetings for young people. A meeting place for Muslim girls was set up, at which support was provided for sporting and other social activities. Several projects have also been introduced to support young Muslim people at school and in finding work. From 2005 to 2006, an Islamic sports club for ladies was subsidised. This was a group of strict Muslim women who wanted to do aerobics without music. Although there were other sporting activities taking place in the neighbourhood, this project was supported because the municipality felt that it could help to prevent social isolation. As Zannoni et al (2006, p. 60) note, the level of attention placed on Muslims decreased in 2006, but at least contacts were established.

Public communication

As shown earlier, Breda tends to promote itself as a relaxed and easygoing place, where conflicts do not easily escalate. Policy documents do not place any structural attention on prejudice against immigrants or against Muslims specifically, or on the way in which the authorities deal with the media. Generally, policies aim towards softening any situation that could escalate or ‘dampening’ such occurrences, as the security coordinator put it. An example of how such a tense situation was handled arose when the right-wing politician Geert Wilders made his movie Fitna available on the internet.

Immediately, the mayor told the crisis manager (an officer based at the city hall but who is directly connected with the police to coordinate any crisis that may arise) and the director of the social work department to gather together all the involved parties, including police and representatives of Muslim associations. All parties came together at very short notice and worked constructively towards addressing the issue. Imams appealed for calm, and as those involved explained, there was a striking level of solidarity between them. In the end, nothing significant happened.

A similar strategy was adopted following a fire incident in the mosque which occurred immediately after the murder of Theo van Gogh. On 7 November 2004, someone set fire to material behind the Ar-Rahman mosque. The fire was stopped before it reached the mosque. In the same week, there were 11 cases of arson in Islamic buildings in the Netherlands, including a school that was completely burned down, and this went on for the next two weeks (NRC Handelsblad, 2004). In the case of the Ar-Rahman mosque in Breda, although there were suspicions of anti-Muslim intentions, the mosque representatives reacted calmly, holding the view that ‘nothing actually happened, just a bunch of material, and let’s now first find out who has done this’. The next day it turned out that a 14-year-old boy from the neighbourhood was responsible for the fire. He was called to the mosque and told how dangerous it could have been if the building had caught fire. No further action was taken. Over the subsequent weeks, the mosque board received several threats (Zannoni et al, 2006). The board asked for the support of the police, and as a result a better level of cooperation developed between the police and Muslims. While the level of fear among the Moroccan community increased, the board of the mosque repeated its request for everyone to remain calm. In this case, the municipality’s public communication strategy was mostly reactive. Events happened behind the scenes: a meeting of the relevant individuals (security managers, Muslim representatives, social work representatives and others) was held before Geert Wilder’s film was released, as those involved foresaw that this could provoke a huge reaction, and plans were made to give a calming message. At the same time, additional police patrols were provided in order to protect potential targets.
A national Muslim Broadcasting Association (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep, NMO) was set up during the pillarised system of the 20th century. The chair of the NMO board described the three central goals of the association as outlined below.

- It aims to emphasise the unity and diversity within Islam in the Netherlands and to promote mutual recognition and tolerance among followers of Islam, thus encouraging good relations between different groups and ethnic backgrounds that exist among Muslims in the Netherlands.

- Muslims in the Netherlands live in socially deprived circumstances. The negative image of Islam makes this worse and can cause structural disadvantage for this group. The NMO wants to combat this stereotype by fighting for integration and equal treatment of Islamic groups, and by improving relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Dutch society.

- The NMO chooses to support the improved social position of Islamic young people, women and older people, by recognising that these groups are not only vulnerable in society as a whole but also within Islamic circles and also that they deserve support.

Although the NMO is a national service and is therefore not particular to Breda, provisions such as this help all immigrants to feel that they and their religion are accepted.

**Summary and lessons learnt**

On the one hand, national policies in the Netherlands and those developed by the municipality of Breda have all kinds of provisions for Muslims, such as those relating to Islamic schools, the building of mosques and the provision of Islamic cemeteries. There is even a broadcasting organisation on national television. These provisions aim to give equal rights to all religious groups, and allow Muslims to feel accepted. These issues are implemented well in Breda, in cooperation with the municipality.

On the other hand, there are additional issues which the Muslim community feel are important, and these are only addressed by the municipality to a limited extent. The issue of prejudice towards Muslims and a perceived lack of acceptance of Islam in the Netherlands is one of them. A second issue is that of discrimination in the labour market which is experienced by young, second generation Muslim men with a high level of education. These young men wish to advance socially and economically and so they find it very frustrating when their job applications are refused, just because of their religion.

The third issue is the search for a positive identity as a Muslim in Dutch society. With all the prejudice that exists towards Islam, it is extremely difficult for young people to say that they are Muslim with any degree of pride. In particular, young people feel that they do not receive sufficient support from the Dutch authorities. Of course, a local or national administration cannot interfere with religious discussions; however, they could consider supporting institutions that help young Muslim people in this search to become a good Muslim. For example, they could open a library offering religious literature, asking well-known Egyptian speakers to lecture on Islam. They could organise discussions at which young people are shown the different standpoints of Islamic denominations. They could also provide additional support to moderate Islamic institutions, thereby ensuring that young people do not feel a need to attend more extreme ones. Such steps could comprise a useful addition to existing policy. This is not only because some young Muslim people may otherwise become involved in fundamentalist movements, but these efforts would avoid further polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims in Breda.
Following the 11 September attacks in the US, the national Institute for Safety and Crisis Management (Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement, COT) was set up and began to investigate the issue of radicalisation in Dutch cities. Reports were published on the situation in many Dutch cities. From 2005 to 2006, COT representatives studied polarisation and radicalisation in the police district of Breda; this consists of the city of Breda and six surrounding smaller municipalities. The report distinguishes between polarisation and radicalisation. According to it, polarisation is the sharpening of disagreements between groups in society which can result in increasing levels of tension between these groups, and can cause a risk to security (Zannoni et al, 2006, p. 12). Radicalisation is the support of or active intention to carry out drastic changes in society that can cause a threat to the existing democratic legal order, possibly by the use of undemocratic methods, and can result in the destruction of the democratic legal order (ibid, p. 20). Polarisation can lead to radicalisation, although it does not do so automatically.

As already shown, polarisation is taking place to a certain degree in Breda, though not everyone talks about it openly. In addition, some indigenous Dutch people are frustrated about the existence of a Dutch ‘multicultural’ society. For more than 15 years, about half of them have believed that there are too many non-indigenous people living in the Netherlands; since 2000, a similar percentage have felt that the western way of life is not compatible with a Muslim way of living (Zannoni et al, 2006, pp. 15–16). The views of anti-immigrant politicians such as Wilders which are expressed on national television legitimise anti-immigrant views on the street. As a consequence, anti-immigration behaviour has become more common. This forms a breeding ground for polarisation.

Zannoni and others show that the step from polarisation to radicalisation has not really been taken in the case of Muslims in the Breda district. However, they did find that steps were being taken towards right-wing radicalisation; this was particularly observed in the smaller municipalities around Breda. They referred to this development as latent right-wing extremism. As Breda is the entertainment centre for these villages, these individuals and groups can also be found there.

As a consequence of the high level of attention being placed on polarisation and radicalisation at national level, Breda has increased the responsibility of the safety coordinator, a police officer residing in the mayor’s office. Now, the safety coordinator must also provide a central coordination point for polarisation and radicalisation. In practice, this means that he is briefed on relevant matters and takes action in the case of incidents occurring. After the report by Zannoni et al came out, the social work office, together with the anti-discrimination office (Bureau Radar Rotterdam) organised a course for teachers, police officers, social workers and officials on recognising the signs of polarisation and what to do about it. As the research identified greater levels of right-wing polarisation than radicalisation, more attention was placed on polarisation. Moreover, the ministry did not provide additional resources to address this issue due to the low level of radicalisation identified in the research.

**Radicalisation within the majority population**

Zannoni et al (2006, p. 58 and pp. 73–74) describe how fights and incidents between indigenous Dutch and immigrant groups occur with a certain level of regularity in Breda’s night life district, as well as on football fields and in schools. Some fights start because of minor reasons, but when friends are called for support these conflicts can escalate, often involving racist motives; for example, with indigenous Dutch shouting ‘foreigners out’. There are also stories of young indigenous Dutch people intentionally mobbing Moroccans or Antilleans and vice versa.

For reasons that are unclear, there is a strong youth culture in the district of Brabant. It consists solely of indigenous Dutch people, who wear clothes from the brand Lonsdale, and are therefore called Lonsdale young people or Lonsdalers. They use extreme right-wing symbols such as the swastika and white power signs, they listen to hardcore punk music, and they openly convey their negative feelings about non-indigenous people. They can be seen in Breda and in the villages around Breda. Members do not tend to come from Breda’s ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, where Dutch
people and immigrants know each other better, but rather from predominantly white areas and villages. Some schools in Breda have forbidden the Lonsdale dress code and try to discuss this ideology with students. According to Zannoni et al (2006, p. 74), extreme right-wing political ideas, if completely developed, do not tend to lead to radical behaviour, so people in this group are not considered neo-Nazis. However, their common ground is clearly that they are against foreigners. Sometimes they come together to attack non-indigenous people.

Not all individuals who adhere to anti-immigrant statements or symbols are part of an organised group such as the Lonsdale one. Even the Lonsdale group does not have an organised, hierarchical structure, although there is a network of communication, and they often meet at concerts. There are also individuals who express extreme-right statements and use extreme-right symbols. Part of the problem is that young people can repeat the anti-immigrant, discriminatory views of their parents. Moreover, in the current social context in the Netherlands, young people can be more open about these views. Twenty years ago, there was a general consensus in the Netherlands that the swastika was not acceptable; currently, there is hidden as well as more open support for these kinds of symbols.

In 2005, the police counted 10 instances of graffiti messages that represented racist views. Some extreme anti-immigrant statements, especially against Muslims, are also expressed on the internet, on websites such as Polinco, Stormfront and Holland Hardcore (Van Donselaar and Rodriguez, 2006).

As already mentioned, following the murder of Theo van Gogh, anti-Muslim attacks were carried out by white Dutch individuals against Muslims. These attacks included a fire incident in the mosque, as well as threats to the mosque board and the Islamic school.

Anti-immigrant attitudes were also reflected in the national election results: in the 2006 national elections, 5.6% of voters in Breda voted for Wilders’ right-wing party, Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), the same as the national average. In the European elections in 2009, the proportion of those voting for Wilders increased to 16%; a total of 17% voted for him on a national level. The proportion of voters in Breda who voted for him is close to that of the adjacent municipality Zundert, where 20% voted in his favour; Lonsdale young people are a visible category in Zundert. Of course voting is a democratic form of expressing views, but it is clear that it can reflect and compound the process of polarisation between groups.

Radicalisation within the migrant and/or minority population

As Zannoni et al (2006) have shown, there is no sign of radicalisation occurring among Muslim young people. The representative of SIJ agreed with this statement as far as it concerns Moroccans. He remarks that there are certain Dutch converts about whom he is not sure. According to a national report, Somali people who are not in contact with organisations represent another risk group. Both SIJ and the Ar-Rahman mosque are well aware of the danger of radicalisation, and consciously try to steer young people in the ‘right’ direction. They also communicate with each other in case someone tries to distribute pamphlets with a message that they do not agree with. In the Ar-Rahman mosque, anyone who wishes to distribute pamphlets must get an approval stamp from the mosque board. There has only been one case where a travelling preacher distributed pamphlets in 2005, but this was immediately reported to SIJ.

The two orthodox Islamic organisations in Breda were both studied by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and were both described as holding extreme views. SIJ was accused of having a financial connection with the Wahabi movement Al Waqf Al Islamia, in the Al Fourkan mosque in Eindhoven. SIJ protested and declared publicly

13 The imam was accused of recruiting soldiers for the militant Islamist group Al Qaeda.
that they have no ties whatsoever and that they did not agree with the political and religious ideas of Al Waqf. The Turkish organisation, Süleymançılıar, was also described as being extremist. It managed to have this corrected on national television, where it explained that it is an orthodox Islamic organisation, interested in serious religious piety, but that this has nothing to do with the political goals of fundamentalist movements. Over the last 10 years, these organisations tend to adopt unfamiliar names, in order to avoid media attention. Outsiders are not immediately aware of the connections. For the general public, it is difficult to distinguish the difference between orthodox religious views, which also exist among indigenous Dutch people and pose no problem within the law, and political extremism based on Islamist views that agree with the use of violence to change society. The outsider only notices that a boy starts to wear a beard, wears a jellaba (a long, loose-fitting outer robe) and cites a lot from the Koran, but the extent to which this is just orthodoxy or political extremism is not directly visible.

It is striking that the two more orthodox Muslim religious organisations in Breda have been the first to become active in guiding young people in their search to become a good Muslim. The moderate Ar-Rahman mosque followed suit rather quickly, but the Diyanet mosque still needs to get involved in this field.

**Communication strategy concerning radicalisation**

Breda avoids the term radicalisation in all its communication. According to the representative of the Municipal Department for Diversity, radicalisation is an extreme concept that does not reflect the reality in Breda. Using that concept in relation to Muslims would actually make things worse, because it is easily taken as an insult by Muslims. The view of the municipality is that radicalisation either does not exist at all in Breda or it does so only to a very limited extent. The national attention placed on this is considered to be mere hype.

Right-wing radicalisation, exemplified by the Lonsdale groups, is mainly addressed by youth workers. Efforts are made to keep it from becoming a public issue. For instance, as part of a project called ‘Together we go for it’ (*Samen er Tegenaan*, SET), youth workers gathered together a group of Lonsdalers that were causing some trouble in the predominantly white neighbourhood of Ginneken, at which they provided them with information about Moroccan culture and organised a meeting with Moroccan young people. This is supposed to have resulted in more moderate ideas among these young people regarding Moroccans (Zannoni et al, 2006, p. 74).

**Radicalisation: Summary and lessons learnt**

There are a few lessons to learn from Breda on the subject of radicalisation. The first one is that the network of migrant associations, youth workers and police has the capacity to prevent radicalisation from taking place. The fact that Muslim radicalisation has stopped is mainly due to the fact that Muslim associations have taken a proactive approach, and have managed to convince young people to join them and to discuss what is the right path for them to take, and actions that are acceptable as well as those that are unacceptable. Orthodox associations have actually become more open and cooperative since they have taken on this role. The municipality could encourage associations that are not yet active in providing this support for young people to get involved, in particular the Turkish Diyanet mosque and the Indonesian Muslim associations. Perhaps contact could be usefully established with the Somali community. In doing so, care needs to be taken that the municipality does not interfere in religious affairs; nonetheless, it seems that it would be useful to convince the municipality that some attention should be focused on this issue.

Another lesson that has been learned is that the approach taken by the youth office in addressing the issue of radicalisation was a successful one. It is one that could be extended to other settings, in cooperation with the police and schools. Useful steps include creating contact between non-Muslim and Muslim young people, ensuring that teachers can cope with tensions in the classroom and that they can talk about it with students, organising excursions to the
mosque, and intervening effectively when it comes to violence. Including young people from the junior P-team, as outlined in the section on general approaches to ethnic issues, could also be interesting.

A third lesson is that it is better to face reality rather than hide it. If racist incidents occur, they ought to be addressed. If the city administration wants to stop racist incidents from taking place either against Moroccans or Lonsdalers, it must send a clear message that this behaviour is not acceptable.
This report has addressed Breda’s policies on intercultural and interreligious dialogue, focusing special attention on Muslim associations and the issue of radicalisation. It appears that immigrant associations, including religious ones, are traditionally supported by the municipality of Breda. This has led to a network of immigrant associations forming an active civic community, one which the municipality can depend on to provide support in the case of a crisis. This is true for both cultural and religious associations. This is facilitated by Breda’s small population and by easygoing attitudes among its citizens. The relations with the Moroccan mosque became stronger after a fire incident and threats to the mosque; as a result, there is more open and direct communication between the mosque and the municipality.

The report has shown how the new method of appreciative inquiry which involved citizens in policy formulation was put into practice following complaints that minority ethnic communities were not represented within the city administration. One member of the Bouwgroep – the group that takes part in the city’s development of diversity policy – formulated some preconditions for the successful operation of this approach. Firstly, active citizens are required who are happy to work together with others. Secondly, officials and aldermen have to be open to the development of bottom-up initiatives and should hire experts to support this process. Thirdly, officials need to accept an ideology that supports the development of specific policies for specific groups, rather than feel a more general approach is appropriate. Fourthly, one has to identify and involve suitable members of the group. In this case, a core group of 11 to 12 individuals were recruited, along with about 25 to 26 associate members. Fifthly, a strong feeling of community is required within the group. Finally, one has to be aware that stamina and resilience are required from the officials. The long-term goal of the Bouwgroep is that diversity policy becomes something that is self-evident, at which point the Bouwgroep can disband.

This report also examined the issues of particular relevance for Muslim people living in Breda. Surprisingly, issues arose during interviews that did not emerge during the process of appreciative inquiry, even though Muslim associations participated in that procedure. The first issue was that of anti-Muslim prejudice. The second one was the search of young Muslim people for a positive identity – in other words, how to become a good Muslim in the Dutch context – and the role that religious associations play or should play in giving these young people a sense of direction and in helping them to avoid developing extremist Islamic views. Muslim associations have a key role in combating radicalisation, and the two more conservative movements actually took the lead in this area, followed by the Moroccan mosque. These organisations are dealing with such issues independently, without a lot of support from the authorities.

It is not clear why these important issues did not become an item in the bottom-up process of policy development. Although the municipality states that no steering took place, it may be that socioeconomic issues were considered by officials to be real policy issues that they could work on; issues regarding the labour market are relevant here. Another possible reason is that Muslim associations thought that the municipality could not get involved in religious issues. However, these matters are in fact very relevant and require attention.

In relation to intergroup relations and anti-radicalisation, a very limited number of policies were developed in this field. This is because the municipality holds the view that radicalisation is too strong a word for what is taking place in Breda, and that the actual number of radicals is very low. However, it became quite clear that a breeding ground for polarisation exists in Breda and surrounding areas. There are the frustrations shared by Muslim young people, who are influenced by the negative views that are being expressed about their religion and ethnic group. Then there are the Lonsdale groups, who openly express anti-immigrant views and use extreme rightwing symbols. Even though some members of these groups do not have the extreme goal of changing society through anti-democratic behaviour, anti-integration tendencies are clearly prominent. This was exemplified by the painting of a swastika on a carnival wagon in Zundert, which was considered to be humorous by those living in the area; this response suggests that the people living there agreed with the message. As Zannoni and colleagues (2006, p. 110) write in their recommendations, the municipality needs to give a clear message about what is and what is not acceptable behaviour. This would eventually serve to prevent further
polarisation. It is also important to establish cooperation with schools. The fact that one mosque is attended on a weekly basis by many interested tour groups is a positive sign. If policymakers made greater efforts to address the issue of polarisation, this could help the municipality in meeting the first objective set out in the document Social Vision 2006–2010, which is that Breda should remain a nice place to stay for everyone.
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Donselaar, J. van and Rodriguez, P.R., Monitor Racisme en Extremisme, 7e rapportage, Anne Frank Stichting, Universiteit van Leiden, 2006.


List of persons and organisations interviewed

Ria Bolink, official responsible for the diversity policy of Breda municipality and the CLIP contact person

Jan Klerx, Regional Manager of Surplus Welzijn, one of the two big social work institutions in Breda

Henk Boelen, Safety Director for Breda municipality, whose tasks involve coordinating the work of the municipality with the police, with particular focus on radicalisation and polarisation

Luis Simoes, member of the ‘Bouwgroep’ which takes part in the process of preparing the city’s policy paper on diversity, and representative of the organisation Oneness Africa

Osman Erbas, member of the ‘Bouwgroep’ which takes part in the process of preparing the city’s policy paper on diversity, who is also involved with the Turkish community in Breda

Hassan Kaya, Turkish representative of Stichting Islamitische Centrum Breda and Stichting Respect

Driss Siraji, representative of the Moroccan working group (Werkgroep Marokkanen) which has been involved in the building process of the Ar-Rahman mosque, and is also involved in the ‘Bouwgroep’

Agdel Kadi Ouahabi, board member of the Ar-Rahman mosque

Abdelmajid Boudzra, Chair of the Moroccan Foundation for Young Muslims (Stichting Islamitische Jongeren), treasurer of the Islamic primary school and secretary of the Moroccan Platform

Reverend Piet Warmerhoven of the Protestant Church in Breda, and member of the interreligious working group in Breda

Aissa Zanzen, Chair of the board of the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Organisation (NMO)

Marcel Maussen, researcher of Mosque buildings and author of ‘Space for Islam’, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam

The authors also attended a lecture by Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie of the University of Amsterdam on the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation.
List of immigrant associations

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## Case study: Breda, the Netherlands

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<td>Bestuur ‘Angkatan-Muida’ Noodgemeente Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kulit Kenari (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kumpulan Hena Poput (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
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<td>Kumpulan Titawaai (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting Woonzorgcentrum Raffy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stg. Toma (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Kerkgenootschap CEME Breda</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Breda Lutherse Jeugd Club voor Chinezen</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese school in Breda (ACV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Sectie Chinees van de Vereniging voor Leraren in Levende Talen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting Oneness Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting Afro Brabant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting Africa Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting African(s) Rights International Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting Save Ethiopian Children (SEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stichting Somalische Cultuur Nederland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stichting Hulp voor Dakloze Kinderen in Bosnie-Herzegovina (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Vereniging Bosniers en Vrienden van Bosnie en Hercegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Cambodjaanse Vereniging in Nederland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stichting Somalisch Rehabilitatieprogramma (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stichting Missieluchtvaart Dungu-Republic Du Zaire (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Les Messagers (Eglise Kongolais) (not in Chamber of Commerce)</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>De Stem van Soedan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stichting ter Behartiging van het Grieks Orthodoxe Leven (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
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</tbody>
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### Currently active

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centro Español de Breda (Español Centro Breda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaanse Ouders- en Leerlingenvereniging (Asociacion de Padres de Alumnos de Breda) (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verenigung voor Spaanse Vrouwen (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Hulp aan Poolse Kinderopvangtehuizen (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Poolse School Breda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poolse Folkloristische Dans en Zangensemble KARPACZ (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poolse Katholieke Vereniging in Nederland (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stichting Poolse Vriendschapsbanden Moerdijk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verenigin 1e Poolse Panserdvisie Nederland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationale Vereniging tot Behartiging van Belangen van Zigeuners Passepartout International Romano (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boeddhisme van Nichiren en SGI Breda, Baronie/West-Brabant</td>
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<td>Bahai groep Breda</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Other (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Poolse Vriendschapsbanden Moerdijk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Note: According to the CLIP contact person, there are also Russian, Polish, Sierra Leonean, Iraqi and Nigerian associations, but no names and addresses were supplied.

**Source:** Chamber of Commerce *(Handelsregister Kamer van Koophandel)*

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**Anja van Heelsum**, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam