Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

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The history of medieval and early modern Italian city-states is often told as a sequence of violent uprisings, rebellions, and cycles of insubordination that challenged the existing social and political hierarchies. Increasingly, historians have come to regard these disturbances of the social and political order as major drivers of political change, while they have also abandoned the traditional juxtapositions of elite versus popular and domination versus (in)subordination.¹ These new approaches to political history attempt to integrate into the political narrative historical actors formally excluded from institutionalized power.² Yet within this thriving field of politics from below, Venice is largely absent. Venice is still often remembered as the Serenissima, “the most serene one,” an image that was first publicized by Venetian thinkers and humanists at the end of the Middle Ages. Although scholars of Venice have extensively examined this mythical image, recognizing it as a rhetorical device that covered up internal factionalism and contestation, historians working on the history of revolts and popular contestation have not always followed suit. In overviews of late medieval and early modern revolts, Venice is often cast as the exception to the European rule, as the only city where popular politics and contestation had little to no impact on political life.³ As a result, one of Europe’s most significant polities is missing from the broader debate on how political power was contested and constructed before the nineteenth century.

The first aim of this book is to question the notion that revolt and political contestation were absent in Venice. The Venetian ruling elite remained in power for roughly a thousand years, until the French invasion of 1797. If we take successful rebellions as indicators of popular political engagement, we might inevitably conclude that nonelite Venetians did not challenge elite power effectively and therefore did not constitute a significant part of the political landscape. Yet we know that in other contexts popular politics and contestation could take forms that were perhaps less openly confrontational but not necessarily less impactful.⁴ The
chapters in this volume investigate whether Venice experienced popular unrest or contentious politics. Was Venice indeed a more peaceful city than others? Or can we identify political and social tensions that have been overlooked, because of either the continuing dominance of the *Serenissima* paradigm or a lack of historical evidence? Collectively, as editors and authors, we have tried to identify and analyze moments of political conflict and confrontation in late medieval and early modern Venice, taking into account that open revolts are far from the only form of political action and protest.

More broadly, the volume reflects on the ways in which ordinary people in Venice interacted with power and acted in a political manner, focusing primarily on the *popolani*, those Venetian inhabitants who did not belong to the categories of patricians or citizens (*cittadini*) and who constituted more than 80 percent of the city’s population. How did ordinary men and women—artisans, laborers, apprentices, servants, boatmen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, Arsenalotti (workers at the Arsenal shipyard), prostitutes, etc.—challenge patrician authority? And, in turn, how did the Venetian authorities monitor, punish, and often cover up instances of unrest and resistance?\(^5\)

Examining the political role of ordinary people in Venice also contributes to the broader historiographical debate on popular politics. Until recently, social and political historians focused their research predominantly on violent crowd actions, riots, and rebellions. Earlier studies were intent on uncovering a progressive trajectory between premodern revolts and the revolutionary movements of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\(^6\) More recent studies have criticized this grand narrative and have underlined the importance of nonviolent political actions.\(^7\) Instead of adhering to the more traditional model that juxtaposes elite and popular, powerful and disenfranchised, and deferential and confrontational actions, social historians have started to integrate into their analyses the notions that power was both more widely distributed and more complex than has traditionally been understood and that power relations were continually negotiated.\(^8\)

The second aim of this book is therefore to study how power was constructed and negotiated in Venice. How did ordinary Venetians shape the city-state’s political configuration? How did they collaborate and interact with patricians? What were the collective practices and institutions enabling them to participate in the construction of Venetian society? In asking these questions, we interrogate long-held beliefs about the structure of Venetian society, of which the dichotomy of powerful patricians versus powerless *popolani* is the most prevalent. In short, this volume aims to provide the basis for a more nuanced reading of Venetian history, in which political action is not the exclusive domain of the elite and in which the state-building process is not considered simply the result of patrician actions. In doing so, we build on the rich field of Venetian social history while integrating it more into the debate on pre-nineteenth-century political actions.

Venice, we argue, is not a unique exception to the European rule, but rather a fascinating case study: the lack of regime changes and shortage of iconic revolts force us to examine a broader range of political actions open to ordinary inhabitants, from collective protests to individual resistance and “infrapolitical” criticisms, such as

\(^{2}\) Maartje van Gelder and Claire Judde de Larivière
counter-rituals, discourses, and gestures at the expense of the elite.\textsuperscript{9} The chapters examine, among others, conflicts within and between guilds, the participation of innkeepers in the control of migration, and the role of popolano officers in regulating tensions in the everyday life of Venetians. These involvements of ordinary people were political just as the official meetings of patrician committees were, and they formed an integral aspect of the Venetian political sphere.\textsuperscript{10} By exploring these diverse forms of political actions, our intention is to contribute to the current reconceptualization of medieval and early modern power relations and political participation, a reconceptualization that does not view the elite as the only political actor or single producer of the political order.

The volume’s chronological scope is broad, starting from the fourteenth century, the period that saw two (failed) conspiracies threaten Venetian order: namely, the Querini Tiepolo Conspiracy of 1310 and the attempted coup d’état by Doge Marin Falier in 1354. The events in 1310 led to the institution of the Council of Ten (Consiglio dei Dieci), which, first temporarily and then permanently, was charged with safeguarding state security.\textsuperscript{11} The volume ends in the late eighteenth century, with the fall of the Republic in 1797, which is always seen as a natural watershed in Venetian history.\textsuperscript{12} Throughout these five centuries, we focus on different moments of increased tension, from the fallout of the famous conspiracies, to the subsequent reinforcement of institutions in charge of police and justice, to the war and food crises in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and finally to the significant changes in the economic and social landscape of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{13}

The chapters, organized in a loosely chronological fashion, do not aspire to provide a comprehensive study of the entire period or of all the possible actors involved. We have made a conscious choice to focus on urban politics in the city of Venice, instead of on the Venetian territories in the Mediterranean and the Italian peninsula.\textsuperscript{14} Politics in Venice, however, did of course exist within that broader political realm, which is why three chapters directly engage with the presence of Venice in the Mediterranean by discussing, respectively, the afterlife of a revolt on Venetian Crete, migration and political control, and legal relations between the metropole and its Mediterranean colonies. Certain important topics are not covered by the volume, particularly an in-depth investigation of youth and disorder, and tensions surrounding the Jewish presence in Venice.\textsuperscript{15} Despite these lacunas, we have aimed for a coherent collection: chapters are interconnected through a set of recurring themes, such as popular politics, spaces, institutions, sources, and memory, as we discuss below. While presenting research that contributes to the understanding of the political and social history of one of the most important Italian city-states, the chapters also point out avenues for future research.

\textbf{An invisible popolo?}

Social stability and the absence of revolt form a crucial part of the image of Venice as an ideal republic, which knew no noble factions, no popular revolts, no uprisings, and no real resistance against patrician authority.\textsuperscript{16} According to this mythical image,
late medieval and early modern Venetian society was organized on the basis of a strict sociopolitical hierarchy: governed by a wise and benevolent patriciate, which chose from its own ranks a doge as head of state, bureaucratically run by a dutiful secondary elite (the cittadini), and populated by content and powerless popolani. The idea that the city’s provisioning system, in combination with patrician charity, rule of law, and civic ritual, appeased ordinary Venetians was already part of the earliest expressions of the myth.\footnote{17} How the myth subsequently shaped Venetian politics and society while serving specific interests has been the subject of a large number of studies.\footnote{18}

The myth prompted a counter-discourse, an anti-myth that was as much a construction and an exaggeration as was the positive myth.\footnote{19} Contemporary outside observers, but also some Venetian patricians, voiced their critique and denounced Venice’s failings. In his vehement attack against Venice, Benedetto Dei, the late-fifteenth-century Florentine historian, took aim at the city’s presumed social stability, claiming that “the city of Venice has undergone more revolutions and innovations and bloodshed than have the four most violent and warlike cities in Italy: Genoa, Bologna, Perugia and Città di Castello.”\footnote{20} Negative representations of Venice often stressed the repressive and secretive nature of its government and noted the passive role of nonelite Venetians. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, secretary to the French ambassador in Venice between 1743 and 1744, stated in his autobiography that he had written \textit{The Social Contract} (1762) as a reaction to his observations of the Venetian government. In his eyes, the patrician regime was despotic and secretive; the executive councils deliberated behind closed doors and the whole system relied heavily on a system of secret informers. Sclerotic and oppressive, it compared negatively to republican Geneva, his native city.\footnote{21}

These representations have influenced how Venice has been studied from the nineteenth century onward.\footnote{22} Modern scholarship, at least until the 1980s, was partly shaped by the debate about the myth and the anti-myth. This was especially the case for the history of the Venetian political system, which focused on the discourses of patricians—texts that, unsurprisingly, highlighted the beneficial effects of patrician actions. Influential studies such as Gaetano Cozzi’s \textit{Il Doge Niccolò Contarini} (1958) and Frederic C. Lane’s \textit{Venice, a Maritime Republic} (1973) idealized Venice as a model republic, ruled by a generous and fair patriciate.\footnote{23} In Lane’s book, still one of the most important syntheses of Venetian history, the rest of the population was mostly absent. Lane states that the “little people” of Venice showed no discontent at being excluded from political power,” primarily because the guild structure gave them an opportunity to hold certain honorary offices and “have some voice in matters which concerned their daily work.”\footnote{24} When, in 1973, John Hale in \textit{Renaissance Venice} presented an overview of current research on the city’s social, political, and intellectual history, inevitably all contributions focused on the elite.\footnote{25} As Dennis Romano reminds us in the first chapter of this volume, Alberto Tenenti, in his contribution to Hale’s book, described the popolo as “hardly more than a spineless multitude,” thereby following a long tradition that can be traced to the characterization by Giorgio Cracco of the popolo as a “dead body” (“corpo morto”).\footnote{26}
Obviously, the myth presented a perfect ideal that in practice the Venetian republic could never meet. Donald Queller and Robert Finlay, between the late 1960s and 1980s, revealed intense patrician factional strife and exposed the myth as a rhetorical device used by patricians to promote their institutions: the Venetian government was neither more just nor more efficient than its Italian and European counterparts. Stanley Chojnacki stressed the continuing development and internal dynamics of the patrician class, based on competition, factions, and conflicts, in which patrician women played a crucial role. Yet although Finlay insisted that there “is every indication that the Venetian patriciate was very sensitive to the moods and needs of the popolo, that, to some extent, the caste relied on ‘the consent of the governed,’” he added that the “political connections between patricians and popolo will always remain elusive.” The popolo remained largely ignored in this historiography until the 1980s.

Social and cultural historical studies from the 1980s to the 2000s focused on groups once considered marginal to Venetian society, such as women, laborers, artisans, household servants, slaves, sailors, foreigners, and migrants. Especially important was new scholarship on the role of women, such as the pioneering work done by Chojnacki, Jutta Sperling, Daniela Hacke, Mary Laven, Monica Chojnacka, and Joanne Ferraro. They, and others, have shown how Venetian women interacted with the political system and how they influenced and manipulated patriarchal authority. Together, these innovative studies in the social history of Venice have corrected the image of an inherently static, patrician-dominated society, divided into three orders. Whereas Brian Pullan in his impressive study *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice* (1971) still focused predominantly on the institutional organization of patrician and state-organized charitable activities, Romano, in his *Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundations of the Venetian Renaissance State* (1987), was the first to focus on the social organization and hierarchies within Venetian society, by underlining the importance of patronage relationships between the elite and popolani. Romano saw these relationships as forming the source of Venice’s social and political stability, instead of public institutions or the structure of Venetian society. In her innovative study, ‘Sopra le acque salse’ (1992), which drew on environmental history and cultural history, Élisabeth Crouzet-Pavan explored the relationships between water and land and the resulting complex cultural and social configurations, highlighting the ways in which different social groups shaped the urban territory in the late medieval period. Her central thesis was that the Venetians’ struggle with water resulted in social concord: the specific urban morphology and infrastructure resulted in harmony, which was then represented through the city’s architecture, representations, and rituals.

Edward Muir’s groundbreaking and influential *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (1981) argued that civic ritual and festivals communicated a shared political culture, aimed at convincing nonelite Venetians that they participated in a system that in practice excluded them. More recently, Muir—nuancing his earlier work—stated that “one can no longer assume there was any comprehensive, single Venetian point of view, a universally Venetian way of finding meaning and constructing
reality” and asked how official Venetian political culture interacted with other cultures within the city. Given the centrality of his work, we are grateful that he has provided this volume with an afterword, which reflects on the chapters and returns to the question of how broadly Venetian political culture was shared among the city’s constituents.

One especially lively element of Venetian popular culture was the collective mock battles on bridges, which Robert Davis studied in 1994. These yearly battles were fought between members of two working-class factions of early modern Venetian society: the Castellani, representing the workers of the Arsenale, and the Nicolotti, representing the fishermen. To Davis, these ritualized battles acted as a safety valve, allowing ordinary Venetians to vent their aggression without threatening the state, as did the condoned violent eruptions during Carnival. This interpretation, though, veers toward an overly functionalist analysis of political relations. In his History and Social Theory (1992), Peter Burke cast Venice as the example of functionalism. Partly taking his cue from Lane, he allocated each segment of Venetian society a specific role, which closely corresponded to the mythical ideal, resulting in a peaceful status quo. Each group lower in the hierarchy than the political elite was placated in one way or another: the cittadini were pacified by the formal and informal privileges attached to their offices within the state administration and the scuole (religious fraternities), and also by the opportunity to marry their daughters to members of the patriciate. The commoners were, in the words of Burke, “pacified like the populace of ancient Rome by a combination of bread and circuses.” Although formally more inclusive than the traditional interpretation that focused exclusively on the patriciate, the functionalist model again denies nonelite Venetians a political role and simplifies their relationships with the political elite.

In 2000, a collective volume published by John Jeffries Martin and Romano showcased the results of the three decades of social and cultural historical research on Venice since Hale’s volume. Venice Reconsidered conveyed a more dynamic and complex portrait of the city and highlighted innovative research themes: environmental history, gender relations, social fluidity, and political communication. Yet in their introduction to the volume, the editors pointed out that “issues of resistance and opposition” within Venetian society remained largely unexplored. Despite historians periodically signaling the importance of resistance and the political relationship between elite and nonelite, and despite the many evolutions of social history, the tradition of excluding the popolo from Venetian political history is still quite pervasive, especially in overviews of the city’s history.

Moreover, twenty-first-century studies of Venice often portray the city as a vibrant, cosmopolitan melting pot, where men and women, natives and immigrants, rich and poor contributed to the building of the social fabric. By stressing social fluidity and cultural interactions, these studies have enriched our image of Venetian society, showing us a city that is more inclusive and dynamic than earlier representations allowed. Yet perhaps this depiction of Venetian society also carries the risk of producing another version of the myth, one in which a multicultural and complex society was able to avoid conflict and tensions. What is still lacking, in our view, is the
connection between these social-historical studies and the political agency and power of the nonelite, which the present volume aims to provide.

The last two decades have seen the publication of studies that invite us to reconsider the way the Venetian state and society worked. Andrea Zannini has insisted on the complex identity of Venetian popolani, while Claire Judd de Larivière and Rosa Salzberg have argued that it is no longer tenable to define this group as a category by default, that is, as simply consisting of those who did not belong to the patrician or cittadini circles. Filippo de Vivo’s research has dispelled the image of a city-state shrouded in secrecy by showing how political information reached practically every layer of Venetian society in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Elizabeth Horodowich, in turn, argued that language could be both a tool for statecraft and, drawing on the ideas of the anthropologist James C. Scott, an instrument for resistance. These studies are in part inspired by the increased interest in early modern public political communication and the role of urban hotspots, such as coffeehouses, salons, taverns, and pharmacies. It is becoming increasingly clear that ordinary Venetians were not only politically informed but also were able to voice their political opinions loudly, especially in times of crisis. A recent article by Maartje van Gelder has shown that, despite being officially excluded from formal politics, popolani could and did influence Venetian decision-making, even at the highest level. That politics from below has a place within Venetian history was demonstrated by Judd de Larivière’s reconstruction of a revolt-like incident on the island of Murano in the early sixteenth century. These studies complement the rich historiography on the Venetian Terraferma and Stato da Mar, which have shown the fragile balance between the centralized power exercised by patricians and local forms of government and resistance.

A new interpretation of Venetian stability

Venice was called the Serenissima for a reason: although there were many forms of resistance, protest, unrest, and violence—sometimes even in the form of mass protests in Piazza San Marco—these events seem to have had relatively less impact than they had in other cities, where major conflicts or revolts were regular events. How do we explain this phenomenon? Instead of locating the origins of stability in the excellence of patrician institutions and government, we have tried to establish whether it was the city-state’s complex social relationships and interactions—of which tensions and conflicts were an inherent part—that generated a specific balance. The “serenity” of Venice then becomes the product of the society as a whole, not just of its upper class. To better understand it, a more inclusive approach to politics is needed, going beyond a dichotomous reading of political configurations, which casts elite rulers and institutions versus the people and noble order versus popular disorder. Undeniably, ancien régime society was intrinsically unequal, and commoners were subjected to the political and economic authority of the elites. But there was also a constant dialogue between different levels of political actions and actors, and the authority exercised by powerful men did not prevent ordinary people from acting in a political manner.
Such dialogue and challenges to authority were certainly part of political life in Venice, as the following chapters demonstrate. Beyond institutions and power, we can observe more fluid political actions, which allowed popolani to participate in the construction of everyday politics, even when they did not have any formal political representation. Economic policies were also decided in guilds, as Zannini’s chapter in this volume shows; responses to immigration were implemented by albergatori, as Salzberg demonstrates, and everyday politics was the mission of many subaltern officers (Judde de Larivière). And as Cristina Setti claims, popolani actors also agreed with many of the moral values that formed the basis for patrician institutions and politics. Patricians and popolani shared juridical languages and practices as well as a common legal horizon d’attente.

Yet one could argue that these ordinary inhabitants, despite being integrated into the political organization of the city, lacked a collective identity. Fishermen, boatmen, workers, apprentices, officers, innkeepers, and prostitutes in Venice never had, during the communal period and later, the political ability, power, or representation their counterparts enjoyed in Florence and in other Italian cities. In the Venetian ideology, il popolo was not a defined political group and was not embedded in the city’s social and economic reality. There was no consciousness of “class,” and inhabitants did not act in the name of il popolo, something we can find, for example, in Genoa, Florence, and Rome. Consequently, the group as a whole was never in the position to act and claim rights collectively. The absence of a strong corporate body identified as the popolo could be one of the explanations for the absence of large collective protests in Venice. Those who acted collectively were professional entities such as guilds, religious groups, and territorial communities, who were able to claim specific rights for their own group, as described in the chapters by Martin, Zannini, and Robin Quillien and Solène Rivoal.

This lack of collective identity also explains the patricians’ evident mistrust of scuole, confraternities, and guilds, institutions that allowed people to gather and form a collective identity. They were under surveillance right from their creation, and as Romano points out, “Almost from the time of its creation, the Council of Ten had been worried about the scuole and their potential to serve as foci of collective action that could be directed against the ruling elite.” The same could be said about the general assembly, the Arengo, which disappeared in 1423. This mistrust was also expressed by the Venetian church and government toward the small groups formed by heretics and designated as compagnia, scuola, or setta (Martin). Institutions such as the Council of Ten were created precisely to counter the risk of potential popular actions. As many scholars have noted in past decades, police and the justice system more generally developed far-reaching means of control. Changes in the role of the guilds and the language used within these organizations is evident when we compare the two chapters that act as book-ends to this volume, that is Romano’s chapter on alternative popular visions of Venetian politics between the late thirteenth and fifteenth centuries and Zannini’s chapter, which focuses on the guilds in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But coercion was not the only way the state monitored people’s activities: many other procedures of negotiation helped to produce a dialectic relationship between
the authorities and inhabitants, as was the case elsewhere in Europe. The Council of Ten, the Milizia da Mar, the Savi alle Acque, the Giustizia Vecchia—all institutions studied in the various chapters—exercised their control and power. As Setti shows, judicial institutions created a common legal culture between rulers and inhabitants, which guaranteed the functioning of these institutions and their efficiency. And in his afterword, Muir reminds us that “Venetian justice is a good example of how corruption could serve the interests of the lower classes, especially if they were ‘connected’ to use the modern vernacular.”

As Salzberg demonstrates in her contribution, in the sixteenth century growing immigration presented the authorities with new challenges in the hospitality sector. Numerous magistrates were involved, which can give an impression of institutional disorder and bureaucratic overlap. But it also appears to have been a way to better control different problems associated with immigration, in many different sites throughout the city and with many different actors collaborating and combining their knowledge and means of action. As in other premodern contexts, the state also collaborated with the church in a combined effort to monitor both political claims and moral disorder, regarding the actions of women (Ferraro) and of the religious heterodox (Martin).

Finally, one aspect of the government’s effort to control popular contestation and resistance was its attempt to regulate memorialization and history writing, a practice used by elites in many places, but perhaps nowhere as successfully as in Venice. This practice obscured popular discontent, as Monique O’Connell’s chapter shows, and further research is needed to uncover these silences in the archive. Romano also describes how the Ten sought to suppress evidence of disaffection, pointing out that their records are notoriously elliptical, especially so in cases involving verbal outbursts. There was no organized scheme, but rather a patient and coherent way of dealing with records, archives, and documents, aimed at sustaining the Serenissima myth. But the authorities could never completely suppress all resistance and opposition, or the memory of discontent, as O’Connell’s and Romano’s chapters reveal. Knowledge of the political practices in the guilds, the inns, the streets, and the markets needs to be integrated into the ways we define and study the Republic of Venice. It is not enough to recognize that these practices existed: they need to be studied just as the well-known patrician and institutionalized politics have been.

**Unrest**

Though the image of Venice as a stable state remains valid, the chapters in this volume reveal many forms of action and manifestations of unrest, contention, subordination, and disorder. Some specific moments in the history of Venice favored the expression of dissatisfaction. These moments could be of a cyclical nature: as Van Gelder shows, the regular elections of a new doge—and the funeral of the old one—could become highly tense situations instead of reaffirmations of the political ideal. In the family life cycle, marriages or widowhood also presented opportunities for the reorganization of the family and, as a consequence, could
become moments of disorder, as Ferraro demonstrates. But international tensions, diplomatic conflicts, and economic crises could also become the ground of growing internal social and political pressure. The fourteenth century leaves a long record of political instability (O’Connell). The first third of the sixteenth century brought more social and political turbulence, with the Italian Wars, religious movements from Northern Europe, and constant demographic growth and increased immigration to Venice accompanied by a lack of food and regular famines (Salzberg; Martin; O’Connell). In the late Middle Ages, as in the late sixteenth century, conscription could also prompt popular protest (Romano; Quillien and Rivoal). As Zannini demonstrates, Venetian artisans, workers, and apprentices had numerous opportunities to express their dissatisfaction with their working conditions or wages in moments of economic difficulty or crisis.

To understand the significance of such protests and expressions of dissatisfaction, we need to read the sources without preconceived ideas about how popular dissatisfaction and discontent, social tensions and fissures, transgressions and alternative views may have been expressed, either individually or collectively. There was a broad repertoire that *popolano* Venetians used to express their displeasure and to protest, as the different chapters demonstrate. And before defining a particular political action, we should consider how it may have been defined by or what it may have meant for the actors we study.

The volume’s contributors have been keen to stress the central role of a vast range of social actors in political actions, far beyond the restricted group of patricians and rulers. Ferraro focuses on women and their many means of actions. Martin follows heretics and Venetian millenarians, a small group of cobbler workers, hatters, gloverers, knife-grinders, and sword smiths, who mostly were migrants from German-speaking territories, the Grisons, the Tyrol, and the Trentino. Likewise, many of the inn-keepers and their clients studied by Rosa Salzberg were themselves migrants, providing housing for travelers and more permanent migrants. Zannini as well as Quillien and Rivoal show the complexity of professional groups and communities, guilds, fishermen, and fishmongers of San Nicolò, boatmen who plied the extensive network of canals, all of them deeply involved in political organizations. Judde de Larivière focuses on subaltern officers from the *popolo* who worked for public institutions. All these ordinary inhabitants participated in Venetian society and impacted—indirectly and at times quite directly—the Venetian political scene.

How were these people able to express their opposition to the patrician order and the political control it imposed if not through large collective movements? The risks inherent in resisting the political order could be smaller, latent, and more tacit than in large and clamorous revolts. Women as well as men resisted arranged or coerced marriages or forced enclosure, challenging a moral and religious traditional structure that supported patrician power. Heretics also challenged religious stability and hence patrician authority, a danger the rulers could not neglect or ignore. Workers, organized or not, had different means of action in the workshop or in the guild. Asking for better wages, negotiating their participation in conscription, debating with institutions, and discussing their working conditions could rapidly
become open conflicts and lead to strikes. Conflicts took shape on a broad spectrum in terms of intensity: some were very limited; others were resounding and momentous. But all of them had a political dimension.

Actions could take different forms, some more pacific, some more violent. Graffiti and defamatory notes were, for example, regularly found around Piazza San Marco and Rialto and elsewhere in the city. They could express discourses against patricians and rulers, which were considered as direct attacks against the honor of the state and God. Cross-dressing women used their appearance to express their refusal of a patriarchal order, as Ferraro shows. Subjects of the Stato da Mar were also conscious of the symbolic value of clothes, as the case studied by Setti shows. Venetian inhabitants regularly used what Scott defines as “weapons of the weak” and “everyday forms of resistance,” sometimes silent, rarely coordinated, passive ways of reaction. And Scott’s concept is a useful lens to understand the Venetian context, much as it has more broadly become a classic reference for medievalists and early modernists. Still, bearing arms and fomenting more or less violent collective demonstrations were the most obvious forms of protest—against public officers, for example, or representatives within a guild—even though these types of protest remained relatively less frequent in Venice than elsewhere.

Confronted with the possibility of political unrest among inhabitants, rulers were anxious to monitor inhabitants’ actions, especially in moments of collective gatherings. Patricians were obsessed with the threat represented by people gathered together: in the tavern, the Arengo, the scuola, or the Piazza San Marco (Romano; Van Gelder; Salzberg). More attention to this spatial dimension could provide an interesting avenue for future research, especially given the (perceived) specificity of Venice’s morphology. As Ferraro notices in her chapter: “Not the council hall or the piazza, where historians have conventionally located power and politics, but rather in places under the radar of secular authorities like the domestic hearth, coaches and gondolas, taverns and inns, or within convent walls.” There were many spaces, outside Piazza San Marco and Rialto, where actions could spread. And even in the Piazza and at Rialto, as Van Gelder’s contribution shows, more popular unrest happened than we have previously assumed. Rulers exercised control over taverns not only to regulate immigration but also to ensure that these spaces of leisure, drinking, and playing did not become places of secret plotting and protest (Salzberg). More broadly, communities in the lagoon—at San Nicolò or Murano, for example—were also closely monitored because patricians feared their collective action.

Finally, what did Venetian inhabitants seek to achieve in acting out their discontent, especially considering that they lacked a collective popular identity? What were their aspirations and their objectives? These are the most complicated questions to answer, since Venetian popolani did not produce any rhetorical discourse on their aims and desires. As the chapter by Romano indicates, their aspirations for an alternative order were hidden behind more prosaic demands: better wages, respect for traditional economic practices, consideration for their existing structures of solidarity, and opposition to conscription. Perhaps only in religious heterodoxy do we find clearer aspirations for alternative moral and political models, as Martin shows for the sixteenth century.
All in all, our conclusion is that—as Ferraro points out in her chapter—many of the transgressions studied here had a political dimension. The consistent resistance against Venetian laws and the structures of the state may not have caused revolts, but it does constitute part of that elusive connection between the elite and the rest of society. This volume demonstrates that contestation, resistance, and transgression had a lasting impact on the political structure of Venice as a whole, and we hope that the ideas presented here will invite more research over the coming years on both additional forms of political actions and the popular ideologies underlying them. Such research in turn will contribute to the social, cultural, and political historiography on the premodern period that concerns itself with the relationship between elite and popular politics and with why and how people acted politically. In short, the time has come to discuss how ordinary inhabitants coproduced the state.

Notes

3 Venice is practically absent from Cohn’s Lust for Liberty, 159, which analyzes more than a thousand uprisings in late medieval Europe. The author depicts Venice as the “city most renowned for its social control over its masses and for political stability.” See also Michel Mollat and Philippe Wolff, Ongles bleus, Jacques et Ciompi: Les révolutions populaires en Europe aux XIVe et XVe siècles (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1970), 76–7, on the absence of revolts in Venice. For a similar perception of Venice, with an emphasis on the repressiveness of the Venetian regime, see Jan Dumolyn and Jelle Haemers, “‘A Bad Chicken Was Brooding’: Subversive Speech in Late Medieval Flanders’, Past & Present 214.1 (2012): 45–86, 59: “In Venice, the mormoratione [rebellious speech] was harshly repressed by the doge and his army of spies.”
4 For a historical and comparative perspective on different forms of political contestation, see, for example, Patrick Lantschner, ‘Revolts and the Political Order of Cities in the Late Middle Ages’, Past & Present 225 (2014): 3–46, and his The Logic of Political Conflict in Medieval Cities: Italy and the Southern Low Countries, 1370–1440 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
6 See, for example, the work by Charles Tilly, The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1986). For a recent study that emphasizes violent crowd actions, see Michael T. Davis (ed.), Crowd Actions in Britain and France from the Middle Ages to the Modern World (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
7 For example, Christopher B. Friedrichs, Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); John Walter, ‘Crowds and Popular Politics in the


9 James C. Scott, influenced by the work of E. P. Thompson, coined the term *infrapolitical* to denote political actions that are covert instead of openly confrontational, often taking place on an everyday basis in the form of rumors, gossip, and small acts of sabotage. See his *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) and *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).


12 Even though this falls outside the chronological scope of this volume, we would encourage more research that bridges the 1797 divide, by comparing Venetian social and political relations during the pre- and post-revolutionary periods. During the nineteenth century, while under French and Austrian rule, Venice gained a reputation for resistance. See, in particular, Piero Brunello, *Colpi di scena. La rivoluzione del Quarantotto a Venezia* (Verona: Cierre, 2018).


14 The last decade has seen an abundance of studies on Venetian relations with the eastern Mediterranean, for example by Eric Dursteler, Natalie Rothman, and Monique O’Connell.


19 Muir, *Civic Ritual*, 49–50; Fasoli, ‘Nascita’.

21 “I had conceived its [i.e. of the *Political Institutions*] first idea thirteen or fourteen years before, when—being at Venice—I had had some occasion to notice the flaws of that so vaunted Government,” in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Confessions and Correspondence, Including the Letters to Malesherbes*, Christopher Kelly (trans.) and Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. Stillman (eds.) (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1995), 339–40.


29 Finlay, *Politics in Renaissance Venice*, 45.


Virgins of Venice: Enclosed Lives and Broken Vows in the Renaissance
Martin and Romano, 15
Andrea Zannini, 
John J. Martin and Dennis Romano (eds.), Women, Sex and Marriage in Early
Modern Venice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2004). See also Monica Chojnacka’s work on non-
patrician women, Working Women of Early Modern Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

32 Brian Pullan, Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institution of a Catholic State, to
1620 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Dennis Romano, Patricians and Popolani:
The Social Foundations of the Venetian Renaissance State (Baltimore and London: John

33 Élisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, ‘Sopra le acque salse’: Espace, pouvoir et société à Venise à la fin du

34 Muir, Civic Ritual.


36 Robert C. Davis, The War of the Fists: Popular Culture and Public Violence in Late Renais-
sance Venice (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). In his review of
more explicitly political explanation: namely, that repression of the bridge battles would
seriously damage the relationship between the ruling elite and the popolo, thus threaten-
ing the popular consensus on which patrician rule depended.

37 On Carnival, see Muir, Civic Ritual, 156–81, and Linda L. Carroll, ‘Carnival Rites as Vehicles

38 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 128–33.

39 Burke, History and Social Theory, 132.

40 John J. Martin and Dennis Romano (eds.), Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of
an Italian City-State, 1297–1797 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

41 Martin and Romano, ‘Reconsidering Venice’, in Martin and Romano (eds.), Venice
Reconsidered, 26.

42 For instance, in the recent A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797, Alfredo Viggiano’s
chapter ‘Politics and Constitution’, 47–84, focuses exclusively on the patriciate class and to a
lesser extent on the cittadini. The chapters by Anna Bellavitis and Benjamin Ravid con-
centrate on social issues to the exclusion of politics: ‘The rest of the population is defined, as
has been recently noted, especially in negative terms, but nevertheless always represents
between 80 and 90 per cent of the population and includes the most mobile categories,
constantly replenished by immigration, both temporary and definitive’ (Anna Bellavitis,
‘Family and Society’, 319–51, here 325) and ‘The remaining approximately 90 per cent of
the population of the city, the popolo minuto, had no political or economic rights and served
as the large working force needed to keep the city functioning’ (Benjamin Ravid, ‘Venice

43 See Ferraro, Venice: History of the Floating City, which is the best single-authored history of
Venice, incorporating social and cultural history. For recent studies on different groups of
immigrants in Venetian society, see Maria Fusaro, Una passa: Una guerra commerciale tra
Venezia e l’Inghilterra (1540–1640) (Venice: Il Cardo, 1996); Maria Fusaro, Political Economies
of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England,
1450–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Maartje van Gelder, Trading
Places: The Netherlands Merchants in Early Modern Venice (Leiden and New York: Brill,
2009); E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and
Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Rosa M. Salzberg, ‘Controlling and Doc-
umenting Migration via Urban “Spaces of Arrival” in Early Modern Venice’ in H. Greefs
and A. Winter (eds.), Migration Policies and Materialities of Identification in European Cities Papers

44 Andrea Zanini, ‘L’identità multlpla: essere popolo in una capitale (Venezia, XVI–XVIII
secolo)’ in A. Savelli and G. Dellile (eds.), Essere popolo: Prerogative e rituali d’appartenenza
Judde de Larivière and Rosa M. Salzberg, “Le peuple est la cité.” L’idée de popolo et la
52 Judde de Larivière and Salzberg, “‘Le peuple est la cité.’”
54 See Dennis Romano’s chapter in this volume. On the state’s control over scuole and confraternities, see Mackenney, *Venezia as the Polity of Mercy*.
59 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*.


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