On feeling humiliated
The experience of humiliation in interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup contexts
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Chapter 4

Group-Based Humiliation and Intergroup Aggression:
The Role of Perceived In-Group Status

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We thank Kai Jonas, Gerben Van Kleef, Suzanne Oosterwijk, and Disa Sauter for their helpful comments on the studies reported in this article.
Conflict between groups has been a major feature of human history and an important topic of study in various disciplines. The question of how intergroup conflicts evolve, develop and resolve—or why they do not resolve and become intractable—has been studied extensively from different perspectives and paradigms in social psychology (Bar-Tal, 2011). In recent years, growing attention has been paid to the specific role played by emotions in intergroup conflicts. According to Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera (2007) “collective emotions play a pivotal role in shaping individual and societal responses to conflicting events and in contributing to the evolvement of a social context that maintains the emotional climate and collective emotional orientation that have developed” (p. 441). The current chapter focuses on the role of one specific emotion in intergroup conflicts, namely humiliation. We study whether humiliation experienced at the group level is related to intergroup aggression. In addition, we examine the potential role of (perceived) group-status in this association.

Intergroup conflicts often involve group-based feelings of anger, fear, hatred, contempt or shame. Another more specific, and very relevant emotion—related to both anger and shame (e.g., Fernández, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015; Leidner, Sheikh, & Ginges, 2012; Mann, Feddes, Leiser, Doosje, & Fischer, 2016)—is humiliation. Group-based humiliation refers to the feeling of degradation on behalf of a group that is important to the self. Thus, for this feeling to arise, one needs not necessarily to have experienced a humiliating event personally. Rather, we argue that it is possible to experience humiliation due to the identification with a group that is perceived as being humiliated, either at present or in the past. As humiliation is often related to social identity threat, studying this emotion in an intergroup context is deemed particularly important (e.g., Leidner et al., 2012).

Empirical research devoted to group-based humiliation and its associated action tendencies is still scarce. However, theoretical and anecdotal accounts suggest a strong impact of group-based and collective humiliation in intense, intractable
Group-Based Humiliation and Intergroup Aggression

Conflicts, involving war, mass crime, genocide or terrorism (e.g., Atran & Stern, 2005; Baumeister, 2002; Fontan, 2006; Klein, 1991; Lickel, 2012; Lindner, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2006, 2009; Scheff, 1994, 2007; Staub, 1989; Stern, 2003, 2004; Volkan, 1997, 2004). It is hypothesized that in such conflict situations, group-based humiliation forms a specific trigger for violence. This violence may be most likely targeted against the humiliating out-group. Alternatively—for example, when the humiliating out-group is perceived as being too powerful—such violence may be vented towards out-groups other than those involved in the humiliation evoking event, reflecting a type of displaced aggression. Drawing on Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET, Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999), the current research focuses on the relationship between group-based humiliation and aggressive tendencies towards an out-group that is unrelated to the humiliation evoking event.

Group-Based Humiliation and Intergroup Aggression

Humiliation is part of the family of self-conscious emotions and is defined as “the deep dysphoric feeling associated with being, or perceiving oneself as being unjustly degraded, ridiculed, or put down—in particular, one’s identity has been demeaned or devalued” (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999, p. 264). Whereas group-based shame and guilt have received considerable empirical attention (e.g., Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna, & Teroni, 2014; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; McGarty et al., 2005; Roccas, Klar, & Liviathan, 2006; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013, and see Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011, for an overview), humiliation has mainly been studied in an interpersonal context. This is surprising, given the frequent occurrence of group-based humiliation in daily life, as, for example, covered in the media (see the General Introduction of this dissertation).
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But why would people experience humiliation due to group membership? Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999) predicts that when membership in a certain group is part of the self, appraisals of events as relevant to that particular group in relation to (an) out-group(s) generate group-based emotions, emotions experienced on behalf of the group. It has been shown that such group-based emotions can be experienced even when there is no direct involvement of the self, such as when one feels happy when one’s favourite soccer team wins an important game (see Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002). Furthermore, group-based emotions can be experienced when membership of a certain group becomes salient, but not when one’s individual identity or membership of another group is salient. Someone can feel angry, for instance, when thinking about the disadvantaged position of women at universities, but this anger is not experienced when thinking about the self as part of the group of tennis players. Thus, self-categorization determines emotional responses and this is especially the case for highly identified group members (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; and see for example Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).

As indicated earlier, theories on intergroup conflict have ascribed an important role to group-based humiliation in conflict. For example, feelings of humiliation as a result of the treatment of Palestinians in occupied territories are regarded as one motivator for suicide attacks (e.g., Atran & Stern, 2005; Cook, 2004; Fattah & Fierke, 2009; Fontan, 2006; Lindner, 2001b). Another often mentioned example is Nazi Germany’s aggression against the Jews as a result of the humiliating Treaty of Versailles (e.g., Baumeister, 2002; Lindner, 2001a, 2002; Staub, 1989). Lindner (2009) even argues that: “the most potent weapon of mass destruction is […] the humiliated mind (whether the feeling of humiliation pre-exists or is manipulated)” (p. 141). These are strong claims that have not been thoroughly empirically tested. Thus, it is important to find empirical support for the assumed connection between humiliation and intergroup aggression.
There are a number of empirical studies on group-based humiliation that have shown, first of all, that humiliation—like other emotions—can be experienced in an intergroup context (Ginges & Atran, 2008; Jonas, Doosje, Lobel, & Pyszczynski, 2016; Leidner et al., 2012; Veldhuis, Gordijn, Veenstra, & Lindenberg, 2014). Second, these studies showed that humiliation might instigate specific behaviours in intergroup conflict situations. For example, Jonas et al. (2016) showed that group-based humiliation amongst Americans as a result of the terrorist attacks at 9/11 was related to harsher treatment of an out-group. However, opposite reactions have also been found. Ginges and Atran (2008) studied humiliation in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and found that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who felt more humiliated by the Israeli occupation were less supportive of suicide attacks against Israelis (although they were also less supportive of peace deals). They concluded that humiliation in an intergroup context leads to inertia rather than to political violence, and suggest that the perceived powerlessness inherent in humiliation causes this effect.

The Role of Status in Humiliation

The inconsistent findings of the few studies on group-based humiliation (aggression versus inertia as a result of humiliation) may be due to the fact that humiliation is a complex emotion that consists of appraisals that could be differently evoked depending on the specific context. Humiliation may entail appraisals such as powerlessness leading to inertia, but also appraisals of unfairness and anger leading to the goal of taking revenge (e.g., Leidner et al., 2012; Veldhuis et al., 2014). For example, Ginges and Atran (2008) studied a chronically low-power group, i.e. the Palestinians. Thus, members of this group may have felt powerless, and not angry, when humiliated. Humiliation experienced by a high-power (or high-status) group on the other hand, may lead to aggression because of the greater salience of unfairness and feelings of outrage and indignation resulting from the humiliating
event. This would imply that the experience of humiliation, at least in terms of its action tendencies, qualitatively differs depending on (perceived) group-status or power.

Besides a different experience of humiliation, i.e., a (stronger) aggressive response tendency, members of powerful or high status groups may feel more quickly or intensely humiliated than people from low status or less powerful groups, because they perceive the humiliating act as a strong reduction of their status. If one has a high personal or group self-esteem or even feels superior to others, such a status reduction may be seen as more unfair and more humiliating, leading to moral outrage and reactions of disbelief (“How dare you?” “Do you realize who we are?”). This may, in turn, result in stronger aggressive tendencies. In line with this idea is the finding that powerful people have stronger expectations to be treated fairly and they more quickly attend to situations in which they are unfairly treated than less powerful people (Sawaoka, Hughes, & Ambady, 2015). These people may also be more strongly inclined to perceive such situations as humiliating than less powerful people.

Another reason why powerful or high status groups may more readily feel humiliated is that there may be more at stake than when it concerns a powerless or low-status group. This could trigger a stronger need for restoration, which can be achieved by means of aggression. Research by Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) and Bushman and Baumeister (1998) showed that individuals with high, but unstable and threatened self-esteem, that is, people who are narcissistic (i.e., they perceive themselves as having a high status position), behave violently. According to Bushman and Baumeister: “it appears that people who are emotionally invested in grandiose self-views are the most aggressive, particularly in response to an esteem threat” (p. 227). In line with this, people with higher levels of narcissism are not only thought to be more sensitive to humiliation, but also to be more likely to react with
anger and violence than people who are low in narcissism (Besser & Zeigler-Hill, 2010; Torres & Bergner, 2010, and see Lickel, 2012).

These ideas can be extended to the group level (Lickel, 2012). For example, Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, and Jayawickreme (2009) studied the effects of collective narcissism. They found that narcissistic idealisation of the in-group predicts sensitivity to group-threat and it predicts retaliatory intergroup hostility. These findings may explain the positive relation between humiliation and harsh treatment of an out-group, as reported by Jonas et al. (2016). Jonas et al. studied people from a powerful country with high, sometimes inflated group-self-regard, namely the United States (e.g., Mandel, 2002), a view reflected in the commonly used term *American exceptionalism*. Thus, people who perceive their group as having high status, may be particularly prone to feel group-based humiliation and they may also be more likely to react aggressively towards other groups when they experience humiliation on behalf of their in-group.

In some instances, it is not possible to directly aggress or retaliate against the humiliator-group. Research on displaced aggression shows that people who are provoked, but unable to retaliate, show more aggression towards an innocent other than people who are not provoked (see Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000). In a group-context, this may be related to the so-called *scapegoat theory* (e.g., Glick, 2002), that is, an innocent group is the target of aggression and revenge by a frustrated perpetrator group. For example, the Nazis showed extreme aggression against Jews, Roma, Sinti and homosexuals. Yet, the humiliation of Versailles was inflicted by the allied forces (e.g., the United States, England, France, Russia). Why not only retaliate against them? Of course, eventually — usually after an intensive propaganda campaign — a scapegoat-group is considered the cause of all problems in society and thus becomes a psychological threat, but objectively it does not pose a direct threat to the humiliated group.
The Current Research

So far, we have treated status and power as similar constructs in order to capture studies that have been conducted on both these phenomena, but in previous literature these concepts have been distinguished. In general, power refers to one’s control over valued resources, whereas status is related to the respect one has in the eyes of others (Magee & Galinsky, 2009). In the current research, we specifically focus on the role of status in experiencing and acting upon humiliation. We study the effect of group-based humiliation on one’s reactions towards an out-group unrelated to the humiliation evoking event, in order to examine whether group-based humiliation evokes displaced aggression when there is no direct possibility of aggression towards the humiliator group. Such a reaction might function as a group-enhancement strategy, similar to self-enhancement at a personal level.

In three studies, we aim to evoke feelings of group-based humiliation by confronting participants with a defeat of their in-group in the context of an intergroup conflict. To this end, in Study 4.1, participants read a text about a current defeat of their in-group, whereas in Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 they read a text about a historical defeat of their in-group. In line with Jonas et al. (2016), we study people from the United States, who generally perceive their group as being of high status. We anticipate that for this group, reported humiliation is, in general, positively related to aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group.

We do not expect that reading a description of a defeat of the in-group would inevitably lead to strong feelings of humiliation. The use of humiliating words or phrases may increase perceptions of a defeat as humiliating and thereby evoke (stronger) feelings of humiliation. Thus, by framing the defeat in humiliating terms (versus more neutrally, in terms of loss) we aim to manipulate feelings of humiliation about this defeat. In addition, we prime group-status (high or neutral). In line with the theories and research described earlier (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1996; Besser & Zeigler-Hill, 2010; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Torres
& Bergner, 2010), we hypothesize that people who read a humiliating description of their in-groups’ defeat report stronger humiliation than people who read a more neutral description, in particular when they are primed with a high group-status. Furthermore, we hypothesize the same interactive pattern of emotion framing and group status prime on aggressive tendencies against an unrelated out-group. Thus, people who read a humiliating description of their in-groups’ defeat will report stronger aggressive tendencies than people who read a neutral description, in particular when they are primed with a high group-status.

Furthermore, on the basis of IET (Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999), we expect that when people identify more strongly with their in-group, they report more humiliation when they are confronted with a defeat of their group. In addition, identification with one’s group should be positively related to aggressive tendencies against another group after being humiliated. This relation should be mediated by group-based humiliation.

We use different framing operationalizations to investigate these hypotheses: in Study 4.1 participants only passively read a humiliating (versus loss) message pertaining to their in-group, while in Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 participants are more actively engaged in the production of such a message. We confirm that we report all data exclusions, all measures and all manipulations in the three studies.25

**Study 4.1**

In Study 4.1 we confronted American participants with a (at the time of the study) recent defeat, namely the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

25 As in Chapter 3, we did not include gender as a covariate in the current studies. When we checked for possible gender differences on emotion ratings, we found no differences for Study 1 and Study 2. However, in Study 3 men scored higher on humiliation, shame and anger than women. This is contrary to what is sometimes found in interpersonal contexts and may be further tested in future research on group-based emotions.
from 2011 to 2014. Many Americans perceived this withdrawal as a failure and in some American and international media outlets, it was described as humiliating.26

To manipulate the extent to which participants would perceive this withdrawal as humiliating (and feel humiliated about it), we described it either in humiliating terms or in terms of loss. In addition, we primed group-status (high versus neutral). We expected that participants who read a humiliating description of the withdrawal from Afghanistan would report stronger humiliation than participants who read about the withdrawal in terms of loss, in particular when they were primed with a high group-status. Furthermore, we expected that participants who read a humiliating description of the withdrawal would report stronger aggressive tendencies against an unrelated out-group (i.e., report more displaced aggression) than participants who read about the defeat in terms of loss. Again, we expected this effect to be more pronounced when participants were primed with a high group-status.

Additionally, we expected that, in line with IET (Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999), in-group identification would be positively related to reports of group-based humiliation and aggressive tendencies and that reported humiliation would mediate the relation between in-group identification and aggressive tendencies.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 203 people (68 female) living in the United States. They ranged in age from 18 to 72 years ($M = 34.41$, $SD = 12.18$). They were recruited via the Amazon-website Mechanical Turk and were paid .50 dollars for their participation.

When participants opened the link to the study named “What is your opinion about current U.S. politics?”, they were first instructed to write a short text about

26 See Appendix A for an overview of the headlines we used in the Humiliating Framing condition. These headlines were real and they were all selected from the Internet.
themselves. These texts were inspected for language, clarity, and serious participation (e.g., sometimes participants write nonsensical strings or copy-paste the instruction which could be a reason to discard their data). On the basis of these stories we did not exclude any data. Subsequently, participants completed a measure of in-group identification, which was followed by the status prime and the framing manipulation. Lastly, they completed questions about their emotions and about aggressive tendencies towards the unrelated out-group. Completing the questionnaire took participants about 11 minutes on average.

**Design and Materials**

We used a 2 (Status Prime: High vs. Neutral) x 2 (Emotion Framing: Humiliation vs. Loss) between subjects design. To prime status, we presented four statements to participants which either emphasized the strong and powerful nature of the U.S. and Americans (High status condition: “The United States is home to some of the world’s leading businesses,” “Americans are among the most inventive people in the world,” “The United States is one of the leading democracies in the world,” “The United States has one of the biggest economies in the world”) or were neutral (Neutral status condition: “The United States is part of the continent of North America,” “The United States is bordered by Canada to the north and Mexico to the south,” “The United States has 50 states,” “Basketball and baseball are two of the most popular sports in the United States”). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with these statements by clicking “yes” or “no.” In addition, they were requested to: “Please describe in a few words why the U.S. is one of the best and most esteemed countries in the world” (High status), Or: “Please name 10 states that belong to the United States of America” (Neutral status).

To manipulate the Emotion Framing of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, we asked participants to read a short text placing the withdrawal in the historical context of 9/11 and its aftermath. Next we told them that they would read some of the headlines from newspaper articles and columns that they may have come across.
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during reading on this topic. We varied the content of the text and headlines to be
either framed as humiliating (Example of headline: “The Afghanistan exit will
humiliate the United States more than Vietnam”) or in terms of loss (e.g., “The
Afghanistan exit will affect the United States more than Vietnam”; see Appendix A
for the full text and headlines). Importantly, all the humiliating headlines that we
used were selected from real (online) sources (see Appendix A). In the control
condition, the humiliation-phrases or words were either left out or replaced by the
terms: “loss” or “defeat.”

Measures

Unless mentioned otherwise, all items were answered on 7-point scales
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly).

In-group identification. This construct was measured to inspect its relations
with the other variables and to make participants’ national identity salient (see for
example Doosje et al., 2006). We used four items from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears
(1995), for example: “I identify with other Americans”. Items were answered on 7-
point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .92$).

Emotions. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they feel several
emotions when they think about the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. For
humiliation we selected six items of Hartling and Luchetta’s (1999) Humiliation
Inventory based on their appropriateness to the topic (i.e., “discounted,” “laughed
at,” “powerless,” “put down,” “ridiculed,” “scorned”). We added the explicit
emotion label “humiliated” to this scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .95$). We also measured
shame and anger and selected items for these emotions from Roseman, Wiest, and
Swartz (1994), R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre (2002), and Spielberger, Jacobs,
Russell, and Crane (1983). Three items measured shame (i.e., “ashamed,”
“embarrassed,” “small”; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .85$) and three items measured anger (i.e., “angry,” “irritated,” “resentful”; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .90$).27

**Aggressive tendencies.** The following text was used to introduce another group to participants: “Even though the U.S. is retreating from Afghanistan, tensions in the Middle East are far from over. For example, in Syria civilians were recently attacked with chemical weapons.” We used this example because it was very relevant at the time of the study and Syria was considered a threat to the West and the United States. At the same time, it was rather unrelated to the withdrawal from Afghanistan.28

**Aggression: Endorsement.** We constructed 11 items starting with the text: “Thinking of the chemical weapon attacks in Syria, to what extent do you think that the U.S. should consider each of the following actions?” The items were: “taking military action,” “instituting capital punishment for the attackers,” “starting peace talks with the Syrian government” (reverse scored), “launching a dirty war,” “initiating a military invasion,” “conducting air strikes,” “deploying ground forces,” “exploring every possibility for a diplomatic solution” (reverse scored), “launching missiles,” “using the most sophisticated weapons possible to fight the attackers,” “ask other countries to launch a military intervention.”

**Aggression: Support.** We constructed a second measure (consisting of 8 items) asking participants how strongly they would support the following positions “if there were a U.S. response to the attack in Syria”: “adhering to international conventions” (reverse scored), “punishing those who are responsible for the chemical

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27 In addition, one control item measured “indifference” about the withdrawal in all studies. For Study 4.1, mean scores lay between 2.45 and 3.13 (on the same 7-point scale as the emotions). There was no effect of Status Prime or Emotion Framing on this item. For Study 4.2, means lay between 3.13 and 4.03. There was a trend for Emotion Framing ($p = .09$) indicating somewhat stronger reports on indifference in the Unfortunate Framing condition than in the Humiliating Framing condition. For Study 4.3, means lay between 3.17 and 3.98 and there was a trend for Emotion Framing; Scores were somewhat higher in the humiliating framing condition than in the other conditions.

28 To check this, we asked participants how similar they thought the war in Syria was to the war in Afghanistan. Answers ranged from 1 (not similar at all) to 7 (very similar). The mean score on this question was 3.20 (SD = 1.73). Thus, although participants considered these two wars to be somewhat similar, we still concluded that both conflict situations were generally perceived as different from each other.
attacks,” “ensuring that aggressors face harsh punishment,” “avoiding the use of violence” (reverse scored), “showing the perpetrators how strong and powerful the US really is,” “engaging in acts of retaliation,” “punishing the Assad regime,” “handing Assad over to the International Criminal Court.” We created a composite scale of the aggression endorsement and support items together which we called “aggressive tendencies.” The reliability of this scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .90$).\footnote{We also used the item: “do nothing” in all studies. There were no effects on this measure. Furthermore, in all studies, we asked participants to indicate what proportion of the military budget they would want the U.S. to spend “if there were a U.S. military invasion of Syria.” They could indicate this on a scale ranging from 0% to 100%. There were no effects on this measure, but it was positively related to emotions, aggressive tendencies, in-group identification, attachment, glorification, and hate (See Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 for explanation about these latter three variables).}

Results

Main Analyses

**Status prime and emotion framing.** To investigate whether Emotion Framing and Status Prime had an effect on reported emotions,\footnote{We did not include a manipulation check for status. Such a check is problematic because any question related to status asked before our measures of emotions and action tendencies would also prime participants in the neutral status condition. A solution is to include a manipulation check at the end of the questionnaire. In the current studies we chose not to do this because after the other measures (notably aggressive tendencies) we did not expect there would still be a difference between participants who were (subtly) primed with high or neutral status. However, we did check if there were differences depending on Status Prime on a more “hidden” item in the aggressive tendencies scale, namely whether people would support “showing the perpetrators how strong and powerful the US really is” if there were an attack against Syria. There was no difference between participants primed with high or neutral status (Study 4.1: $p = .78$), or participants primed with high or neutral status or without a status prime (Study 4.2: $p = .79$) on this item, suggesting that our status prime did not work.} we performed a MANOVA with Emotion Framing (Humiliating vs. Loss) and Status Prime (High vs. Neutral) as factors and humiliation, shame, and anger as dependent variables. Unexpectedly, there was no overall main effect of Emotion Framing: $F(3, 197) = 0.73, p = .534, \eta_p^2 = .011$, or Status Prime: $F(3, 197) = 0.95, p = .420, \eta_p^2 = .014$, and there was no interaction, $F(3, 197) = 1.87, p = .136, \eta_p^2 = .028$. In addition, there were no univariate effects on each of the separate emotions. For means and standard deviations see Table 4.1.

An ANOVA was performed with Status Prime (High vs. Neutral) and Emotion Framing (Humiliating vs. Loss) as factors and aggressive tendencies towards Syria as dependent variable. Unexpectedly, there was no effect of Status Prime and emotion framing.
Prime: $F(1, 199) = 1.68$, $p = .196$, $\eta^2 = .008$, or Emotion Framing: $F(1, 199) = 0.12$, $p = .726$, $\eta^2 = .001$, and there was no interaction $F(1, 199) = 0.03$, $p = .871$, $\eta^2 = .000$. For means and standard deviations see Table 4.1.

Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Humiliating Framing</th>
<th>Loss Framing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Status</td>
<td>Neutral Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.09 (1.34)</td>
<td>2.03 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>2.04 (1.30)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>2.27 (1.55)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression</td>
<td>3.15 (1.18)</td>
<td>2.97 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. There are no significant differences between the means in one row.

Correlations. Table 4.2 shows the correlations between reported emotions about the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, aggressive tendencies towards Syria, and in-group identification. As shown, reported humiliation, shame, and anger about the withdrawal were highly related. Furthermore, all three emotions were significantly related to reported aggressive tendencies. Thus, the more people reported to feel humiliated, ashamed, and angry about the withdrawal, the more they endorsed the use of aggression against Syria, and would support aggression in case the U.S. would attack Syria. Both reported humiliation and anger were positively related to in-group identification. Thus, the stronger people identified with Americans, the more they indicated to feel humiliated and angry about the withdrawal from Afghanistan. In-group identification was also positively related to aggressive tendencies, that is, the stronger people identified with Americans, the
more they endorsed the use of aggression against Syria, and would support aggression in case the U.S. would attack Syria.

Table 4.2
Descriptives and Correlations between reported Humiliation (1), Shame (2), and Anger (3) about the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Aggressive Tendencies against Syria (4), and In-Group Identification (5), Study 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation (1)</td>
<td>2.04 (1.37)</td>
<td>__</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame (2)</td>
<td>2.07 (1.37)</td>
<td>.88&quot;</td>
<td>__</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger (3)</td>
<td>2.18 (1.45)</td>
<td>.88&quot;</td>
<td>.83&quot;</td>
<td>__</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive Tendencies (4)</td>
<td>3.04 (1.08)</td>
<td>.38&quot;</td>
<td>.32&quot;</td>
<td>.41&quot;</td>
<td>__</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Group Identification (5)</td>
<td>5.27 (1.42)</td>
<td>.19'</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.19'</td>
<td>.36&quot;</td>
<td>__</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ***p < .001. * p < .01. † p < .06.

Mediation of humiliation on aggressive tendencies. To test whether reported group-based humiliation mediated the relationship between in-group identification and aggressive tendencies, we used bootstrap analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Based on 5000 bootstrapped samples, we found that the indirect (mediated) effect was significant, as zero was not included in the 95% Bias Corrected confidence intervals (lower CI = 0.01; upper CI = 0.09). However, the effect of in-group identification on aggressive tendencies was still significant when humiliation was taken into account. Thus, although the effect was small (i.e., a change in Beta-value from .36 to .30) humiliation partially mediated the positive relationship between in-group identification and aggressive tendencies (see Figure 4.1).
We also performed the same mediation-analysis with shame and anger instead of humiliation and found that shame was no significant mediator of the relationship between group identification and aggressive tendencies, but anger was. However, because of multicollinearity, we could not include both humiliation and anger in one model to test whether one of these emotions is responsible for the effect.

![Diagram](attachment://diagram.png)

*Figures 4.1. Partial mediation of the relation between In-Group Identification and Aggressive Tendencies by Group-Based Humiliation, Study 4.1

**Discussion**

Study 4.1 failed to confirm our prediction that framing a defeat in humiliating terms induced higher reports of humiliation and aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group than framing the defeat in terms of loss, in particular when people are primed with a high status of their in-group. Moreover, we did not find main effects of the emotion framing or status prime on any of the measures. This may indicate that our manipulation of emotion framing and group-status failed (see footnote 30 for an explanation of why adding a manipulation check for status was problematic in the current study).

With regard to emotion framing, a failed manipulation could be due to participants’ lack of attention to the wording of the scenario, but this was difficult to check without disclosing our study goals. Therefore, we used a different framing manipulation in Study 4.2, which more clearly directs people’s attention to the way
the group defeat is framed. Further, even when participants did perceive the 
humiliation words and phrases, the manipulation was still quite subtle, which could 
be a reason why it failed. In Study 4.2, we therefore also used a stronger 
manipulation. Possibly related to this point is that we found emotion reports to be 
quite low. This may indicate that participants did not feel strong emotions as a result 
of the withdrawal from Afghanistan; it was not relevant enough to touch upon their 
concerns. One reason for this may be that people do not categorize themselves in 
terms of their in-group or they do not identify strongly with that in-group. However, 
in the current study, in-group identification was quite strong and the event clearly 
concerned the in-group. Therefore, the event itself may simply have not elicited the 
expected emotions, or people underreported their emotions. In Study 4.2, we used 
an episode in American history that very clearly evoked strong emotions at the time 
it happened and that is still a very salient, painful part of history at present.

Nevertheless, we did find that humiliation, as well as shame and anger, about 
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was related to higher reports of aggressive 
tendencies towards an out-group (Syria) that was unrelated to the conflict between 
the U.S. and Afghanistan. This is in line with findings by Jonas et al. (2016), but 
contradicts research by Ginges and Atran (2008), who showed an inertia effect as a 
result of reported humiliation (although these studies did not concern aggression 
against an unrelated out-group). Furthermore, in line with IET (Mackie et al., 2000; E. 
R. Smith, 1993, 1999), we found that in-group identification was positively related to 
group-based humiliation and shame, as well as to aggressive tendencies towards the 
out-group. In addition, reported humiliation partially mediated the positive relation 
between in-group identification and aggressive tendencies. However, the indirect 
(mediated) effect was—although significant—quite small. This may be due to the 
general nature of the measure of in-group identification that we used. Although in-
group identification is strongly related to group-based emotions such as anger and 
fear, its relation to humiliation may be more complicated. As discussed in the
General Introduction of this chapter, we argue that humiliation is more strongly felt by people and groups who feel threatened in their high self-regard. Thus, group-based humiliation may be felt especially strongly, and acted upon with more aggression, by people who have an inflated image of their group.

Relevant to this idea, research by Roccas et al. (2006) points to an important distinction between two dimensions of in-group (or national) identification that are related, but theoretically different, namely in-group attachment and in-group glorification. The first refers to emotional attachment to the group and a motivation to contribute to the group (Roccas et al., 2006), whereas the second refers to a view of the group as clearly superior to other groups, and thus has a comparative element. These modes of identification are found to be differentially related to certain group-based emotions. For example, guilt and shame about the in-groups’ immoral behaviour are positively related to in-group attachment, but negatively to in-group glorification (Berndsen & Gausel, 2015; Roccas et al., 2006).

We think that this distinction between modes of identification is also relevant for group-based humiliation. As discussed in the General Introduction of this chapter, people who highly glorify their group may more easily feel humiliated and be more prone to react with aggression when humiliated. Thus, in Study 4.2 we examined whether in-group glorification is positively related to humiliation and aggression, whereas attachment is not. Lastly, as hate and contempt towards out-groups are often associated with intractable conflicts (e.g., Halperin, 2008; Tausch et al., 2011), and related to humiliation (Scheff, 2007), we also measured these emotions towards the out-group in order to explore whether they may explain a positive relation between humiliation and aggression.

**Study 4.2**

In Study 4.2 we chose a different, stronger example of an (historical) episode that evoked feelings of group-based humiliation (e.g., Klein, 1991), namely the U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam War (1955-1975), ending with the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Vietnam. In addition, we used a stronger framing manipulation in Study 4.2. Rather than merely reading a description of an episode, we asked participants to read a text about the withdrawal from Vietnam and then to write about it, focusing either on the humiliating aspect of the withdrawal (Humiliating condition) or—more neutrally—on its unfortunate character (Unfortunate condition). Furthermore, as we did not find an effect of status manipulation in Study 4.1, we used a more elaborated status prime. Possibly, the neutral status prime also induced slightly stronger feelings of in-group-status. For ethical reasons, however, we could not use a low status prime, and therefore we added a condition in which people were not primed in addition to the neutral prime condition. We expected that participants who wrote about the humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam would report more humiliation and aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group than participants who wrote about the unfortunate withdrawal from Vietnam, in particular when they were primed with a high group-status.

We also measured U.S. in-group glorification and attachment (Roccas et al., 2006) and hate and contempt towards the out-group. We expected that glorification of the in-group, and not attachment to the in-group, would predict group-based humiliation and, in turn, aggressive tendencies. We explored the role of out-group hate and contempt in this context and examined whether these emotions play a role in explaining the potential relation between humiliation and aggressive tendencies. We used structural equation modelling to test this proposed model.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 203 people living in the United States. We discarded data of one participant because this person did not answer the questions in a serious manner. Thus, a sample of 202 participants remained (83 female). They ranged in age
from 18 to 73 years ($M = 31.66, SD = 11.38$). They were again recruited via the Amazon-website Mechanical Turk and were paid .50 dollars for their participation.

Participants opened the link to the study called “What is your perception of U.S. history and politics?” and wrote a short text about themselves, which was inspected for language, clarity, and serious participation. On the basis of these stories, we excluded data of one person (see above). After this, participants completed a measure of in-group attachment and glorification, which was followed by the status prime and the framing manipulation. Next, they completed questions about their emotions and about aggressive tendencies towards the out-group. Completing the questionnaire took participants about 14 minutes on average.

**Design and Materials**

We used a $3 \times 2$ (Status Prime: High vs. Neutral vs. No prime) x (Emotion Framing: Humiliation vs. Unfortunate) between subjects design. To prime status, participants were first asked to indicate their agreement with the same high- and neutral status statements as in Study 4.1. After this, participants in the high status prime condition were asked to: “Please describe in a few words why people may consider the United States of America as one of the best and most esteemed countries in the world.” We added “people may consider” in this sentence used in Study 4.1 because some participants had indicated that they felt the question in Study 4.1 was leading. Participants in the neutral status prime condition were asked to answer the same question as in Study 4.1 (i.e., “Please name 10 states that belong to the United States of America”). Participants in the no status prime condition did not answer any questions.

The framing manipulation consisted of a short text about the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975 and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. This text was the same in both framing conditions (see Appendix B for the full text). After participants read the text, we asked them to give a detailed description of how and why they think the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was seen by people as humiliating (Humiliating...
framing condition) or as unfortunate (Unfortunate framing condition) for the United States.

**Measures**

Unless mentioned otherwise, all items were answered on 7-point scales that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly).

**In-group attachment and glorification.** We used Roccas et al.’s (2006) scales of attachment to the national group (e.g., “Being an American is an important part of my identity,” “It is important to me to contribute to my nation”) and glorification of the national group (e.g., “Other nations can learn a lot from us,” “The United States is better than other nations in all respects”). Both scales consist of eight items that were answered on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) (Cronbach’s $\alpha$ was .93 for attachment and .88 for glorification; the scales correlated strongly: $r = .79$, $p < .001$).

**Emotions.** Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they feel several emotions when they think about the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The same items as used in Study 4.1 were used to measure humiliation (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .94$), shame (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$), and anger (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .85$).

**Aggressive tendencies.** The following text was used to introduce another—unrelated—group to participants: “Although the Vietnam War is some time ago, the U.S. is still involved in conflicts around the world. For example, the U.S. is considering intervening in Syria, where civilians were recently attacked with chemical weapons.” After this description we used the same measures as in Study 4.1 for aggression endorsement and support and created a composite scale of these items together (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .89$).
Emotions towards the Syrian government. Two items measured the extent to which participants felt hate and contempt when they think about the Syrian Government.  

Involvement in the Vietnam War. We checked whether participants had been personally or indirectly involved in the Vietnam War by asking the following questions: Were you involved in the Vietnam War? (“yes”/“no”; personal involvement). If yes, in what way? (Open ended). Do you have family or friends who were involved in the Vietnam War? (“yes”/“no”; indirect involvement). If yes, in what way? (Open ended).  

Results  
Involvement in the Vietnam War  
Of the sample, only two people (1%) had been personally involved in the Vietnam War. Sixty-one people (30.2%) had family or friends who had been involved in the Vietnam War. Controlling for these measures had no effect on the results, therefore we kept all participants in the sample.  

Main Analyses  
Status prime and emotion framing. We performed a MANOVA with Emotion Framing (Humiliating vs. Unfortunate) and Status Prime (High vs. Neutral vs. No

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31 We also measured whether participants felt indifference and warmth towards the Syrian government (in both Studies 4.2 and 4.3). We used these items because we did not want to create the impression that the scale was leading, by only focusing on negative emotions (hate and contempt). We did not have specific expectations about effects on these measures. Indifference was negatively related to hate (Study 4.2: r = -.21, p = .002; Study 4.3: r = -.26, p = .001) and contempt (Study 4.2: r = -.37, p < .001; Study 4.3: r = -.38, p < .001) and positively to warmth (Study 4.2: r = .26, p < .001; Study 4.3: r = .21, p = .008). Warmth was unrelated to the other measures in both studies.  

32 In both Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 we also included the questions: “How knowledgeable are you of the Vietnam War?” and: “How knowledgeable are you of the Syrian conflict?” Both were answered on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). In addition we asked “How prepared are you for American soldiers dying in Syria?”; answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Statistics for knowledge about the Vietnam War were: M = 3.90, SD = 1.55 (Study 4.2) and M = 4.18, SD = 1.42 (Study 4.3). Statistics for knowledge about the Syrian conflict were: M = 4.07, SD = 1.57 (Study 4.2) and M = 3.92, SD = 1.48 (Study 4.3). People were generally not very prepared for American soldiers dying in Syria (Study 4.2: M = 2.10, SD = 1.65), (Study 4.3: M = 2.15, SD = 1.72). Preparedness was positively related to aggressive tendencies in Study 4.2 (r = .37, p < .001) and Study 4.3 (r = .45, p < .001).
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prime) as factors and humiliation, shame, and anger as dependent variables. As in Study 4.1, there were no overall main effects for Emotion Framing: $F(3, 194) = 0.23, p = .878, \eta^2 = .003$, nor for Status Prime: $F(6, 390) = 0.72, p = .632, \eta^2 = .011$, and there was no interaction, $F(6, 390) = 0.02, p = .684, \eta^2 = .010$. There were also no univariate effects on each of the separate emotions. For means and standard deviations see Table 4.3.

An ANOVA was performed with Emotion Framing (Humiliating vs. Unfortunate) and Status Prime (High vs. Neutral vs. No prime) as factors and aggressive tendencies towards Syria as dependent variable. Again, there was no effect of Status Prime: $F(2, 196) = 0.21, p = .815, \eta^2 = .002$, and Emotion Framing: $F(1, 196) = 0.26, p = .609, \eta^2 = .001$, and there was no interaction, $F(2, 196) = 0.04, p = .965, \eta^2 = .000$. For means and standard deviations see Table 4.3.

Table 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Humiliating Framing</th>
<th>Loss Framing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Status</td>
<td>Neutral Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation</td>
<td>2.49 (1.64)</td>
<td>2.49 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>2.70 (1.56)</td>
<td>2.92 (1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>2.94 (1.48)</td>
<td>2.82 (1.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive Tendencies</td>
<td>2.94 (1.07)</td>
<td>2.98 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* There are no significant differences between the means in one row.
Relations between modes of identification, group-based humiliation, out-group hate and contempt, and aggressive tendencies. Table 4.4 shows the zero-order correlations between reported emotions about the withdrawal from Vietnam, aggressive tendencies towards Syria, in-group attachment and glorification, and contempt and hate towards the Syrian government.

In line with Study 4.1, reported humiliation, shame, and anger about the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam were strongly related. All emotions were positively related to aggressive tendencies. Thus, the more people indicated to feel humiliated, ashamed, and angry about the withdrawal from Vietnam, the more they endorsed the use of aggression against Syria and would support aggression in case the U.S. attacked Syria. Furthermore, in-group attachment and glorification were positively related to the emotions and to the aggressive tendencies. Thus, the stronger people indicated to feel attached to the U.S. and glorified the U.S., the more they reported humiliation, shame, and anger about the withdrawal from Vietnam, and the more aggressive tendencies they reported against Syria. In addition, emotions about the withdrawal from Vietnam were positively related to both contempt and hate towards the Syrian government, and in-group glorification was positively related to hate towards the Syrian government. Lastly, contempt and hate towards the Syrian government were positively related to aggressive tendencies towards Syria.
### Table 4.4
Descriptives and Correlations between reported Humiliation (1), Shame (2), and Anger (3) about the U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam, Aggressive Tendencies against Syria (4), In-group Attachment (5), In-group Glorification (6), and Contempt (7) and Hate (8) towards the Syrian government, Study 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation (1)</td>
<td>2.44 (1.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame (2)</td>
<td>2.77 (1.53)</td>
<td>.84***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger (3)</td>
<td>2.69 (1.56)</td>
<td>.79*** .77***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive Tendencies (4)</td>
<td>2.96 (1.00)</td>
<td>.35*** .30*** .24**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Group Attachment (5)</td>
<td>4.54 (1.43)</td>
<td>.32*** .33*** .35*** .39***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Group Glorification (6)</td>
<td>3.58 (1.25)</td>
<td>.34*** .30*** .30*** .51*** .79***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contempt (7)</td>
<td>4.12 (2.01)</td>
<td>.16' .18' .13† .23** .10 .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate (8)</td>
<td>3.25 (1.94)</td>
<td>.25*** .21&quot; .16' .35*** .08 .16' .16' .20***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .08.

We used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM; EQS 6.1 software, Bentler, 1995) to test our proposed model involving the relationships between different modes of in-group identification, group-based humiliation, out-group emotions, and aggressive tendencies. We allowed the predictors and the residuals of out-group emotions to correlate. First, we inspected a fully saturated model. Wald tests suggested removing the paths from in-group attachment to humiliation, contempt and aggressive tendencies. The fit further improved when we removed the path from in-group glorification to contempt and the path from contempt to aggressive tendencies. The resulting model fitted the data well: $\chi^2 (5) = 4.261$, $p = .512$, CFI = 1.000, NFI = .990, GFI = .993, SRMR = .022, RMSEA = .000, and is depicted in Figure 4.2.
In line with our predictions, in-group glorification (controlled for attachment) positively predicted humiliation, whereas in-group attachment (controlled for glorification) did not. In-group glorification further predicted hate, and this relation was partially mediated by humiliation. In contrast, there was a negative relation between in-group attachment and hate, indicating a suppression effect (as the zero-order correlation between these variables was positive). Humiliation predicted aggressive tendencies directly and also via out-group hate, but not via contempt, which was unrelated to aggressive tendencies. Furthermore, glorification, but not attachment, predicted aggressive tendencies directly, but also via humiliation and hate. Thus, group-based humiliation and out-group hate partially mediated the relationship between glorification and aggressive tendencies.

Figure 4.2. Structural model of the relationship between Modes of Identification, Group-Based Humiliation, Out-Group Emotions, and Aggressive Tendencies. Standardised parameter estimates are shown, Study 4.2. Note: Solid lines indicate statistically significant paths ($p < .05$). Dashed lines represent non-significant paths.

Alternative models. To rule out different explanations of our proposed model it is important to also test alternative models. We therefore tested the same model with different (although strongly related) group-based emotions, namely shame and anger about the withdrawal from Vietnam, and we tested the same model without the (group-based) emotion (i.e., humiliation, shame, or anger), see Table 4.5 for the results. Although the values of $\chi^2$ from two models can be compared, it is not
possible to test differences between these values. However, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a predictive fit index, can be used to select from a set of competing models, the model that is most likely to replicate (Kline, 2011). The model with the lowest AIC value is preferred over the other models. As can be seen in Table 4.5, our proposed model including humiliation has a lower AIC value (−5.739) than the model including shame (−2.990), anger (−.494), or no emotion (−4.349). Although the differences are not very large, our proposed model is thus preferred over the other models.

Table 4.5
Values of Selected Fit Statistics for the Proposed Structural Model and three Alternative Models, Study 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model 1: Humiliation</th>
<th>Model 2: Shame</th>
<th>Model 3: Anger</th>
<th>Model 4: No Emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>4.261</td>
<td>7.010</td>
<td>10.494</td>
<td>3.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA (90% CI)</td>
<td>.000 (.000, .090)</td>
<td>.045 (.000, .114)</td>
<td>.074 (.000, .137)</td>
<td>.000 (.000, .102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>−5.739</td>
<td>−2.990</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>−4.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.334</td>
<td>.325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* CI = confidence interval.

**Discussion**

In line with findings from Study 4.1, Study 4.2 showed that reported humiliation, shame, and anger about the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam were positively related to aggressive tendencies towards Syria. Again, the out-group, Syria, is distant from the group that evoked the humiliating episode, in this study the
Vietnamese. This is not only the case in terms of relatedness (Vietnam and Syria have very different cultures), but also in terms of time, as the Vietnam War ended almost 40 years ago, whereas the conflict in Syria was ongoing during the time of the study. This strengthens the idea that experienced humiliation about a defeat in the past can be related to aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group in the present.

Study 4.2 was also aimed at improving our operationalization of emotion framing. However, these changes did not result in effects of this manipulation on reported emotions or aggressive tendencies. In Study 4.3, we therefore again changed our framing manipulation. We now included questions about the text that participants had to answer before they continued, in order to increase their attention to the specific wording of the text. We also included a neutral condition to the unfortunate and humiliating framing conditions.

Although, again, our status prime did not cause the predicted effect, a more stable measure of perceived group-status, in-group glorification, did show interesting results. Our model testing indicated that only glorification (when attachment was controlled for) was positively related to humiliation, whereas attachment (with glorification controlled) was unrelated to humiliation, instead of positively as indicated by the zero-order correlations. In-group glorification was positively related to aggressive tendencies and this relation was partially mediated by reported humiliation and out-group hate. Interestingly, the positive relation between humiliation and aggressive tendencies was partially mediated by hate, but not by contempt. We further showed that our proposed model including group-based humiliation was preferred over models including other, related group-based emotions and a model without (in-group) emotions.

**Study 4.3**

In Study 4.3, we no longer used the status manipulation, but focused on the more stable measures of in-group glorification and attachment, and on emotion
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framing. We used three framing conditions: a humiliating framing, an unfortunate framing, and a neutral framing condition. As the Vietnam War had a great impact on American collective identity, we wanted to keep this as the target-episode in the framing manipulation. We, again, wrote a text about the withdrawal, but we asked participants to read the text and answer some specific questions about it, instead of writing a story. We expected participants who read and responded to questions about the humiliating text to report more group-based humiliation and more aggressive tendencies toward the out-group than participants who read and responded to questions about the unfortunate or neutral texts. Furthermore, we aimed to replicate the findings with regard to the relation between modes of in-group identification, group-based humiliation, out-group hate and contempt, and aggressive tendencies. We used Structural Equation Modelling to test the same model as in Study 4.2.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 155 people living in the United States, again recruited via Mechanical Turk. We discarded data of two participants because they did not answer the questions in a serious manner. Thus, a sample of 153 participants remained (62 female), ranging in age from 18 to 71 years ($M = 33.78$, $SD = 12.44$). They were paid 0.50 dollars for their participation.

As in Study 4.2, participants opened the link to the study called “What is your perception of U.S. history and politics?” and wrote a short text about themselves which was inspected for language, clarity, and serious participation. On the basis of these stories and other checks (e.g., time participant spent answering the questionnaire), we excluded data of two people (see above). After this, participants completed the measures of in-group attachment and glorification, read the framing manipulation and completed questions about their emotions and about aggressive
tendencies towards the out-group. Completing the questionnaire took participants about 12 minutes on average.

**Design and Materials**

We used three Framing conditions (Humiliation Framing vs. Unfortunate Framing vs. Neutral Framing) that we tested between subjects. For all conditions we rewrote the text used in Study 4.2. The Humiliating framing condition consisted of a short description about the Vietnam War and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. It was described in humiliating terms and was entitled: “A modern story of David and Goliath.” In the Unfortunate framing condition this text was framed in terms of loss. The title was “A modern story of horses for courses.” In the neutral condition only a very factual description was presented entitled “A story from modern history.” After participants read the text, we asked them some questions about it to enhance the manipulation and check whether they had read the story carefully (see Appendix C for the full texts and questions in all conditions).

**Measures**

Unless mentioned otherwise, all items were answered on 7-point scales that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly).

**In-group attachment and glorification.** We used the same scales for these constructs as in Study 4.2 (Cronbach’s α = .94 for attachment and .90 for glorification; the correlation between the two variables was strong: \( r = .78, p < .001 \)).

**Emotions.** As in Study 4.2, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they feel several emotions when they think about the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The same items as used in Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 were used to measure humiliation (Cronbach’s α = .94), shame (Cronbach’s α = .83), and anger (Cronbach’s α = .81).

**Aggressive tendencies.** The same text as used in Study 4.2 and items as used in Study 4.1 and 4.2 were used to measure aggressive tendencies. We again created a composite scale of the endorsement- and support-items together (Cronbach’s α = .88).
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**Emotions towards the Syrian government.** The same two items as in Study 4.2 measured the extent to which participants felt hate and contempt when they think about the Syrian Government.

**Involvement in the Vietnam War.** We used the same checks as in Study 4.2 for personal and indirect involvement in the Vietnam War.

**Results**

**Involvement in the Vietnam War**

Of this sample, three people (2%) had been personally involved in the Vietnam War and 46 people (30.1%) had family or friends who were involved in this war. Again, controlling for these measures did not change the results, thus we kept all participants in the sample.

**Check**

Of the sample, 11 participants (16.83%) made one mistake in one of the three check questions after reading the framing manipulations. Removing the data of these people had no influence on the results, therefore we kept the data of these participants in the sample.

**Main Analyses**

**Emotion framing.** We performed a MANOVA with Framing (Humiliating vs. Unfortunate vs. Neutral) as factor and humiliation, shame, and anger as dependent variables. There was an overall main effect, $F(6, 29) = 2.84, p = .010, \eta^2 = .054$, which was significant for humiliation, $F(2, 150) = 6.57, p = .002, \eta^2 = .081$, shame, $F(2, 150) = 7.05, p = .001, \eta^2 = .086$, and anger, $F(2, 150) = 3.36, p = .037, \eta^2 = .043$. Simple contrasts showed that for humiliation, means were higher in the Humiliating framing condition ($M = 2.76, SD = 1.50$) than in the Unfortunate ($M = 2.01, SD = 1.07$) and Neutral ($M = 1.97, SD = 1.14$) framing conditions ($p = .003$ and $p = .002$ respectively). For shame, means were also higher in the Humiliating framing.
condition \((M = 3.07, SD = 1.60)\) than in the Unfortunate \((M = 2.15, SD = 1.14)\) and Neutral \((M = 2.24, SD = 1.34)\) framing conditions \((p = .001\) and \(p = .003\) respectively) and for anger means were marginally higher in the Humiliating framing condition \((M = 2.61, SD = 1.46)\) than in the Unfortunate condition \((M = 2.14, SD = 1.20, p = .063)\) and significantly higher in the Humiliating framing condition than in the Neutral framing condition \((M = 1.98, SD = 1.16, p = .014)\). For all three emotions, the Unfortunate and Neutral conditions did not differ significantly \((all\ p’s \geq .527)\).

An ANOVA was performed with Framing (Humiliating vs. Unfortunate vs. Neutral) as factor and the aggressive tendencies as dependent variable \((M_{\text{Humiliating}} = 3.09, SD = 1.00; M_{\text{Unfortunate}} = 2.86, SD = 0.88; M_{\text{Neutral}} = 2.91, SD = 1.04)\). There was no effect, \(F(2, 150) = 0.82, p = .442, \eta^2_p = .011\).

Relations between modes of identification, group-based humiliation, out-group hate and contempt, and aggressive tendencies. Table 4.6 shows the zero-order correlations between reported emotions about the withdrawal from Vietnam, aggressive tendencies towards Syria, in-group attachment and glorification, and contempt and hate towards the Syrian government.

As in Study 4.2, reported humiliation, shame, and anger about the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam were strongly related. In addition, all emotions were positively related to the aggressive tendencies. Thus, the more people indicated to feel humiliated, ashamed, and angry about the withdrawal from Vietnam, the more they endorsed the use of aggression against Syria and would support aggression in case the U.S. attacked Syria. Furthermore, in-group attachment and glorification were positively related to these emotions and aggressive tendencies. Thus, the stronger people indicated to feel attached to the U.S. and glorified the U.S., the more they reported humiliation, shame, and anger about the withdrawal from Vietnam, and the more aggressive tendencies they reported against Syria. Furthermore, emotions about Vietnam and aggressive tendencies towards Syria were positively related to both contempt and hate towards the Syrian government. In-group
glorification was also positively related to contempt and hate, and in-group attachment was positively related to hate, but unrelated to contempt.

Table 4.6
Descriptives and Correlations between reported Humiliation (1), Shame (2), and Anger (3) about the U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam, Aggressive Tendencies against Syria (4), In-group Attachment (5), In-group Glorification (6), and Contempt (7) and Hate (8) towards the Syrian government, Study 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation (1)</td>
<td>2.25 (1.29)</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame (2)</td>
<td>2.49 (1.42)</td>
<td>.89***</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger (3)</td>
<td>2.25 (1.30)</td>
<td>.83***</td>
<td>.78***</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive Tendencies (4)</td>
<td>2.95 (0.98)</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Group Attachment (5)</td>
<td>4.62 (1.43)</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Group Glorification (6)</td>
<td>3.64 (1.37)</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.78***</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contempt (7)</td>
<td>3.77 (2.11)</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate (8)</td>
<td>3.25 (1.94)</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05.

We used SEM to test the same model as in Study 4.2. We allowed the predictors and the residuals of out-group emotions to correlate. Even though we were interested in whether we could replicate the model from Study 4.2, in order to keep the same analytical strategy as in Study 4.2, we again started out by inspecting a fully saturated model. Wald tests suggested removing the paths from in-group attachment to humiliation, contempt, hate, and aggressive tendencies. The fit further improved when we removed the paths from glorification to contempt and contempt to aggressive tendencies and from humiliation to aggressive tendencies. The resulting model had an excellent fit: $\chi^2(7) = 4.469, p = .724$, CFI = 1.000, NFI = .986,
GFI = .990, SRMR = .035, RMSEA = .000, and is depicted in Figure 4.3.

Replicating the findings of Study 4.2, in-group glorification predicted humiliation, whereas in-group attachment—contrary to what the zero-order correlation indicated—did not. There was also a positive relation between glorification and hate, which was partially mediated by humiliation. Humiliation, in turn, predicted aggressive tendencies via out-group hate, but not directly. Thus, in the current Study, out-group hate fully mediated the relationship between humiliation and aggressive tendencies. As in Study 4.2, there was a direct significant path from glorification to aggressive tendencies, but also an indirect relation between these variables via humiliation and out-group hate. Again, contempt towards the out-group played no role with regard to aggressive tendencies, although it was positively related to humiliation and hate. Attachment was unrelated to all other outcome variables.

**Alternative models.** Again we tested three alternative models, one with shame, one with anger and one without the (group-based) emotions (see Table 4.7 for the results). Replicating the results of Study 4.2, our proposed model including humiliation has a lower AIC value (−9.531) than the model including shame (−7.978), anger (−8.675), or no emotion (−4.564). Thus—although the differences are again not very large—our proposed model is preferred over the other models.
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Figure 4.3. Structural model of the relationship between Modes of Identification, Group-Based Humiliation, Out-Group Emotions, and Aggressive Tendencies. Standardised parameter estimates are shown, Study 4.3. Note: Solid lines indicate statistically significant paths ($p < .05$). Dashed lines represent non-significant paths.

Table 4.7
Values of Selected Fit Statistics for the Proposed Structural Model and three Alternative Models, Study 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Model 1: Humiliation</th>
<th>Model 2: Shame</th>
<th>Model 3: Anger</th>
<th>Model 4: No Emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>4.469</td>
<td>6.022</td>
<td>5.325</td>
<td>5.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Df$</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td>.537</td>
<td>.620</td>
<td>.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA (90% CI)</td>
<td>.000 (.000, .073)</td>
<td>.000 (.000, .091)</td>
<td>.000 (.000, .084)</td>
<td>.024 (.000, .117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>$-9.531$</td>
<td>$-7.978$</td>
<td>$-8.675$</td>
<td>$-4.564$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. CI = confidence interval.
Discussion

Study 4.3 showed that when participants were forced to focus on the emotional framing of a group-defeat in a text by answering specific questions about the content of this text, the hypothesized effects of this framing appeared. Participants reported more group-based humiliation, shame, and anger after reading a text that is framed in humiliating terms than after reading a text that is framed in terms of loss, or after reading a neutral text. The emotion framing manipulation had no effect on aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group.

Replicating findings of Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we found that reported group-based humiliation, as well as anger and shame, were positively related to aggressive tendencies towards the out-group. Furthermore, our model testing largely replicated the patterns found in Study 4.2, providing evidence that it is the glorification of the in-group, not attachment to the in-group, which intensifies feelings of humiliation about an in-group defeat. This humiliation in turn, predicts—via out-group hate—aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group (although in-group glorification also predicts aggressive tendencies directly). In line with results of Study 4.2, once controlled for hate, contempt was not related to aggressive tendencies anymore. Again, our proposed model including group-based humiliation was preferred over models including other group-based emotions (shame and anger) and a model without in-group emotions.

General Discussion

In the current research, we investigated the relation between group-based humiliation and aggressive tendencies towards an out-group in an intergroup context. We specifically focused on displaced aggression as a reaction to group-based humiliation, that is, aggression towards a group other than those involved in the humiliation evoking event. We also focused on the role of status in experiencing and
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acting upon humiliation. Furthermore, we investigated relations between humiliation and different modes of in-group identification.

Results of all three studies indicated a positive relation between group-based humiliation and aggressive tendencies towards an unrelated out-group. These results are in line with theories (e.g., Atran & Stern, 2005; Baumeister, 2002; Klein, 1991; Lickel, 2012; Lindner, 2002; Staub, 1989) and previous findings (e.g., Jonas et al., 2016) indicating that group-based humiliation causes intergroup aggression. They contradict other research (i.e., Ginges & Atran, 2008) showing an inertia effect of humiliation. Importantly, all of our studies included American participants, who may have more favourable, or even superior, views of their groups’ status, and are generally from a more powerful group than Palestinians (who were the participants in Ginges and Atran’s (2008) studies). This may explain an aggressive reaction to humiliation rather than a response of inertia. Of course, other (cultural) differences may also play a role here.

Another important difference between our studies and the research by Ginges and Atran (2008) is that we studied the reaction towards a group other than the one causing the humiliation, whereas they studied the reaction towards the humiliator. Moreover, in their case, the humiliator-group was the Israelis, which is exactly the group that Palestinians are in an unequal power-relation with. In such a situation, a reaction of inertia—a kind of learned helplessness—may be more likely. It would be interesting to see what Palestinians would (report to) do when the situation concerns another group with which they do not have a history of (unequal) power-relations. These issues should be addressed in future research to which we will come back later.

As would be predicted from IET (Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999), in-group identification was positively related to reported group-based humiliation and aggressive tendencies, and reported humiliation partially mediated the relation between in-group identification and aggressive tendencies (Study 4.1). Priming
status did not affect the amount of humiliation, nor the amount of aggressive tendencies against the out-group that people reported. However, in Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 we replaced the general measure of in-group identification with measures of two different (but related) modes of identification, namely in-group glorification and in-group attachment (Roccas et al., 2006). In-group glorification may be regarded as a measure of perceived group-status, which is more stable and possibly stronger than a group status prime.

These measures showed results in line with our hypotheses. We found that only glorification (when attachment was controlled for) was positively related to humiliation, whereas attachment (with glorification controlled for) was unrelated to humiliation. Glorification predicted aggressive tendencies directly, but also via humiliation and out-group hate. This indicates that people who strongly glorify their in-group, and thus perceive their group as being of high status, seem to be more prone to feel humiliation about a past defeat of the group. In turn, they experience more hate against the out-group and may be more likely to react aggressively toward that out-group, even when that group is unrelated to the source of humiliation.

Interestingly, when controlling for out-group hate, out-group contempt played no significant role with regard to aggressive tendencies. In contrast, research on collective action shows that contempt predicts non-normative collective action, such as violence (Tausch et al., 2011). The fact that we did not find this relation may be explained by our inclusion of out-group hate. That is, the link between contempt and aggression may be explained by hate towards the out-group. This is in line with Fischer and Giner-Sorolla’s (2016) analysis that: “[...] contempt towards another group implies derogation or exclusion of that group, whereas hate calls for more direct and aggressive action” (p. 349).

Although the current research showed some interesting results, there are a few limitations. First, in Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 both our status prime and the framing manipulation failed to have effects. For both manipulations it is difficult to determine
whether they did not work or that they did work, but just did not have the hypothesized effect. Because we did find an effect of emotion framing in Study 4.3, we may tentatively conclude that this manipulation was not strong enough in the first two studies or did not stimulate participants enough to focus on the manipulation. However, further research should use the same manipulation to see whether the result in Study 4.3 replicates.

A second limitation of all three studies was that the correlations between reported group-based humiliation, shame and anger were very high. This possibly creates multicollinearity, which makes it impossible to investigate the effects of humiliation above and beyond shame and anger (although we could compare structural models with these emotions). This issue touches upon a broader question, namely whether humiliation—either interpersonal or at the group level—is a discrete emotion that is related to, but different from anger and shame, or whether it is a mixed emotion: a blend of anger and shame. Previous studies on humiliation that we have conducted on the interpersonal level also showed moderate to high correlations between these three emotions (Mann, Feddes, Leiser, et al., 2016). However, some other research shows relations between these three emotions to be somewhat lower (e.g., Fernández et al., 2015). It is important to find out whether there are contextual factors that cause variation in these relations.

**Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Research**

The current research is in line with the idea that humiliation plays an important role in intergroup conflict (e.g., Atran & Stern, 2005; Baumeister, 2002; Klein, 1991; Lickel, 2012; Lindner, 2002; Staub, 1989). People who glorify their in-group may be more prone to feeling humiliated when they are confronted with a defeat of their group, and they may react more aggressively to an out-group that is unrelated to the humiliating evoking episode.
Importantly, future research should focus on the effect of group-based humiliation on different groups, namely powerful versus powerless, or high- versus low-status groups. Such research should also compare the response to humiliation of these groups towards the humiliator-group with their response towards unrelated out-groups.

Another interesting option for future research would be to study the effect of group-based humiliation on different types of group members. For example, Ellemers and Jetten (2013) indicate that the behaviour of marginal group members is much more difficult to predict than the behaviour of core group members. In the case of humiliation of the in-group, one option is that marginal group members do not care as much as core group members and are not very motivated to respond (in particular when they are not highly identified with the group). However, as humiliation is such an extremely negative feeling, in some cases even marginal members may feel motivated to defend their group after being humiliated. This likely depends on the type of marginal group member (e.g., socializing marginal versus independent marginal). It would thus be interesting to learn whether there are specific humiliating events (e.g., when core group values are threatened) that touch upon some marginal group members’ feelings in a similar way, or even stronger, than upon core group members.

In the current research we focused on one potential response to experienced group-based humiliation, namely aggressive tendencies. However, in an interpersonal context, it has been shown that the tendency to withdraw is also an important consequence of humiliation (e.g., Mann, Feddes, Doosje, & Fischer, 2015). As we studied the response towards a group other than the humiliator, it would be somewhat illogical to also focus on withdrawal tendencies towards this group. However, in future studies it may be interesting to see whether, in certain contexts, the humiliated group shows withdrawal tendencies toward the humiliator group, but (displaced) aggression towards another unrelated group.
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The current research provides insight into the potential role of humiliation during intergroup conflict. Humiliation may be experienced more intensely and reacted upon with more aggression by people who highly glorify their in-group. Although theory already points in the direction of such associations (e.g., Lickel, 2012), the current research is the first that we know of to empirically show a link between collective feelings of superiority, experiences of humiliation and aggressive tendencies as a result of humiliation of the in-group. These findings strikingly cohere with observations of intergroup conflict situations. For example, many Germans who felt attracted to the Nazi party after the First World War had inflated ideas of Germany as a great and special nation and felt strongly humiliated as a result of the Versailles Treaty. In hindsight, it is often said that imposing this treaty on Germany was the most unproductive strategy the allied forces could have chosen. One of the reasons for the devastating consequences of this decision could be that humiliation in combination with strong feelings of in-group superiority is a particularly dangerous mix.
Appendix A

Framing manipulation (Humiliating versus Loss), Study 4.1.

In 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan and other countries. After almost 10 years of fighting, in summer 2011, President Obama announced a gradual withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan that would be completed in 2014. This withdrawal has been covered extensively in the media. A large number of commentators and journalists have argued that the withdrawal is humiliating (Humiliating framing condition), a setback (Loss framing condition) for the United States.

If you click on the “next” button you find some of the headlines from newspaper articles and columns that you may have come across when reading on this topic. Please read each headline carefully, as afterwards we will ask you some detailed questions about them.

Headlines presented to participants in the humiliating framing condition:

1. “U.S. defeat in Afghanistan coupled with humiliation in Libya and Iraq marks end of “Super Power” era.”
2. “President Obama is allowing the heroic US Military – and, therefore, the American People – to be humiliated in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
3. “The Afghanistan exit will humiliate the United States more than Vietnam.”
4. “Afghanistan rejects talks with Taliban and the U.S. on brink of humiliating defeat in Afghanistan.”
5. “Negotiating the terms of America’s Humiliation.”

1. Source: http://www.islamtimes.org/vdciw3av.t1a5z2lict.html
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http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/03/19/us_on_brink_of_humiliating_defeat_in_.afghanistan.html


Headlines presented to participants in the loss framing condition:

1. “U.S. defeat in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq marks end of era.”

2. “President Obama is allowing the heroic US Military – and, therefore, the American People – to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.”

3. “The Afghanistan exit will affect the United States more than Vietnam.”

4. “Afghanistan Rejects Talks with Taliban and the U.S. on Brink of Defeat in Afghanistan.”

5. “Negotiating the Terms of America’s Withdrawal.”

Appendix B

Framing manipulation (Humiliating versus Unfortunate), Study 4.2

The Vietnam War (1955-1975) has been an important episode in American history. U.S. involvement in the war was part of its ‘containment’ strategy, a fight against the spread of communism. This involvement was unsuccessful though. After 1968, U.S. ground forces gradually withdrew from Vietnam until U.S. involvement ended in 1973. This withdrawal had a significant impact on American politics in the years following and it triggered emotional reactions in politicians, opinion makers and the general public.

Many people thought the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was humiliating (Humiliating framing condition), unfortunate (Unfortunate framing condition). We would
like you to give a detailed description of how and why you think this withdrawal was seen as humiliating/unfortunate for the United States. Please use at least 300 characters for your description.

Appendix C

Framing manipulation (Humiliating versus Unfortunate versus Neutral), Study 4.3.

Condition 1: Humiliating loss

A modern story of David and Goliath

The Vietnam War (1955-1975) has been an important episode in American history. U.S. involvement in the war was part of its ‘containment’ strategy, a fight against the spread of communism. However, the Vietnam War ended in a humiliating defeat for the United States whereby Goliath (the US) was beaten by David (the Vietcong). Despite the fact that the US had the strongest army in the world, they lost to a poorly equipped Vietcong, lacking the many advanced weapons, planes, helicopters and highly trained soldiers that the US army had at their disposal. After 1968, U.S. ground forces gradually withdrew from Vietnam until U.S. involvement ended in 1973.

Check questions:

In what year did the US involvement in Vietnam end?

a. 1986
b. 2003
c. 1973

What was the name of the strategy to fight communism?

a. Entertainment
b. Containment
c. Red Race
Can you please indicate who was the David and who was the Goliath in this story?

**Condition 2: Non-humiliating loss**

**A modern story of horses for courses**

The Vietnam War (1955-1975) has been an important episode in American history. U.S. involvement in the war was part of its ‘containment’ strategy, a fight against the spread of communism. However, the Vietnam War ended in a defeat for the United States. Despite the fact that the US had the strongest army in the world, they were up against an army (the Vietcong) that were much better equipped to deal with the challenges that fighting in the jungle entails (rough environment and tropical climate). The Vietnamese ground forces were well trained in guerrilla warfare and had the support of local people to provide them with intelligence and supplies. After 1968, U.S. ground forces gradually withdrew from Vietnam until U.S. involvement ended in 1973.

In what year did the US involvement in Vietnam end?

- a. 1986
- b. 2003
- c. 1973

What was the name of the strategy to fight communism?

- a. Entertainment
- b. Containment
- c. Red Race

Can you please indicate who was fighting on foreign territory and who was fighting on familiar territory?
Condition 3: Neutral

A story from modern history

The Vietnam War (1955-1975) has been an important episode in American history. U.S. involvement in the war was part of its ‘containment’ strategy, a fight against the spread of communism. After 1968, U.S. ground forces gradually withdrew from Vietnam until U.S. involvement ended in 1973.

In what year did the US involvement in Vietnam end?

a. 1986  
b. 2003  
c. 1973

What was the name of the strategy to fight communism?

a. Entertainment  
b. Containment  
c. Red Race

Can you please indicate which two nations were involved in the conflict?