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**Incomplete cartels and antitrust policy : incidence and detection**

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*Citation for published version (APA):*

Bos, A. M. (2009). *Incomplete cartels and antitrust policy : incidence and detection*. Tinbergen Institute.

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# Contents

<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>Acknowledgments</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>1 Motivation and Outline</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction . . . . .	1
1.2 Motivation . . . . .	3
1.3 Methodology . . . . .	5
1.4 Outline . . . . .	9
<b>2 The Economics of Incomplete Cartels</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 Introduction . . . . .	11
2.2 Incomplete Cartels in Practice . . . . .	14
2.3 Foundations of Cartel Theory . . . . .	19
2.3.1 The Incentive Constraint . . . . .	21
2.3.2 The Participation Constraint . . . . .	22
2.3.3 Why are Cartels Bad? . . . . .	23
2.4 On the Profitability of Incomplete Cartels . . . . .	25
2.4.1 Collusive price leadership . . . . .	27
2.4.2 Differentiated goods . . . . .	29
2.4.3 Quantity competition . . . . .	30
2.4.4 Comparison . . . . .	33
2.5 On the Sustainability of Incomplete Cartels . . . . .	33
2.5.1 Collusive price leadership . . . . .	34
2.5.2 Differentiated goods . . . . .	34

2.5.3	Quantity competition . . . . .	35
2.5.4	Comparison . . . . .	36
2.6	The Participation Puzzle . . . . .	37
2.6.1	Collusive price leadership . . . . .	38
2.6.2	Differentiated goods . . . . .	39
2.6.3	Quantity competition . . . . .	40
2.6.4	Comparison . . . . .	42
2.7	Coalition Formation with Positive Externalities . . . . .	42
2.7.1	Simultaneous cartel formation . . . . .	43
2.7.2	Sequential cartel formation . . . . .	45
2.8	Incomplete Cartels and Firm Heterogeneity . . . . .	47
2.9	Incomplete Bidding Rings . . . . .	49
2.10	Discussion . . . . .	53
<b>3</b>	<b>A Theory of Incomplete Cartels with Heterogeneous Firms</b>	<b>55</b>
3.1	Introduction . . . . .	55
3.2	A Model of Collusion with Asymmetric Capacity Constraints . . . . .	58
3.2.1	Static Nash Equilibrium . . . . .	59
3.2.2	Infinitely Repeated Game . . . . .	61
3.3	Optimal Cartel Size . . . . .	64
3.3.1	Costless Collusion . . . . .	65
3.3.2	Costly Collusion . . . . .	67
3.4	Incentives to Collude . . . . .	70
3.5	The Most Profitable Cartel . . . . .	75
3.6	Incomplete Cartels and Mergers . . . . .	77
3.6.1	Merger Incentives . . . . .	78
3.6.2	Coordinated Effects of Mergers . . . . .	80
3.7	Concluding Remarks . . . . .	89
<b>4</b>	<b>Cartel Detection and Antitrust Law Enforcement</b>	<b>93</b>
4.1	Introduction . . . . .	93
4.2	Goal and Scope of Cartel Detection . . . . .	95
4.2.1	Why do we need Cartel Detection? . . . . .	96
4.2.2	Why do we need Economics to Detect Cartels? . . . . .	97
4.3	Economic Methods of Cartel Detection . . . . .	99
4.3.1	Market Structure . . . . .	100
4.3.2	Cartel Conduct . . . . .	105
4.3.3	Market Performance . . . . .	110
4.4	Potential Pitfalls in Cartel Detection . . . . .	111
4.4.1	No Result, is a Result . . . . .	112
4.4.2	Descriptive Flaws, Empirical Limitations and Theoretical Complications . . . . .	112
4.4.3	On the Problem of Defining a Workable Benchmark . . . . .	114
4.5	Detecting Incomplete Cartels . . . . .	114
4.5.1	A Variance Screen for Collusion: an Example (1) . . . . .	115
4.6	The Need for Industry Specific Detection Tests . . . . .	118

4.6.1	A Variance Screen for Collusion: an Example (2)	120
4.7	Discussion	121
<b>5</b>	<b>Tracing the Base: A Topographic Test for Collusive Basing-Point Pricing</b>	<b>123</b>
5.1	Introduction	123
5.2	Basing-Point Pricing	126
5.3	A Model of Basing-Point Pricing	131
5.3.1	Competitive Basing-Point Pricing	134
5.3.2	Collusive Basing-Point Pricing	135
5.4	Detecting Collusive Basing-Point Pricing	137
5.4.1	Variance Screens	138
5.4.2	Bid-distance Correlation	139
5.5	Tracing the Base	141
5.5.1	Base Recovery	142
5.6	A Likelihood Measure of Collusion	144
5.7	Concluding Remarks	149
<b>6</b>	<b>Summary and Conclusions</b>	<b>153</b>
6.1	Introduction	153
6.2	Main Findings	153
6.3	Implications for Antitrust Policy	156
6.4	Future Research	158
6.4.1	Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms	158
6.4.2	Disentangling Overt Collusion and Tacit Collusion	159
<b>A</b>	<b>BaseLocator<sup>®</sup></b>	<b>163</b>
A.1	Steps to Trace the Base	163
A.2	Kernel of the Software	165
	<b>References</b>	<b>171</b>
	<b>Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)</b>	<b>185</b>