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Welfare state attitudes and economic integration in the EU, 1992-2002

A multilevel investigation across 24 countries

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ABSTRACT

This study continues earlier research efforts that investigated the impact of the European Union (EU) on welfare states by examining the relationship between the welfare state attitudes of citizens and the economic dimension of European integration. Two waves from the European and World Values Study (EVS/WVS) are combined with UNCTAD data about EU trade. Multilevel analysis of this dataset including 67,346 individuals from the EU member states shows that there is a curvilinear relationship (a reversed U) between welfare state attitudes and economic integration in the EU.

KEYWORDS

Welfare state attitudes, economic integration in the EU, European welfare states

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Welfare states consist of social provisions funded with taxes collected from the citizens of a country and are organized at the national level. Such formal systems of obligatory solidarity collect individual contributions to cover the risks of people within the same country and are aimed at overcoming market failures associated with markets for voluntary insurances (Swank, 1998; Lindbeck, 2008; Koster, 2009). Although welfare states are based on solidarity between the citizens of a country, they are not isolated from international developments. For the member states of the European Union (EU), the ongoing process of economic integration due to the single European market is among the key international factors they face and it is widely debated to what extent and how this affects welfare provisions (Rhodes, 1995; Scharpf, 1997; Moravcsik, 1998; Ferrera, 2005; Pollack, 2005). The EU may have a direct effect through regulations and conditions due to its political dimension and it can also have an indirect effect due to increased economic integration, such as tax flight, migration, and policy competition amongst EU members (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000; Threlfall, 2003; O’Connor, 2005; Falkner, 2007). Researchers do agree that economic integration in the EU affects national social policies at the national level, but they disagree as to whether or not this results in welfare state expansion or retrenchment. Since empirical studies have generated contrasting results, the debate will continue in the future (Gould, 1999; O’Connor, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004).

Apart from the fact that the question about the direction in which welfare states in the EU develop is not fully answered, it turns out to be a difficult task to show that changes are related to European integration and are not caused by other developments at the national or international level. Distinguishing such effects from one another is particularly difficult given the relatively small number of EU member
states, which limits the possibilities of quantitative data analysis (Haverland, 2006). Most of the previous studies have focused on similar dependent variables, trying to show variation between welfare states in terms of social spending or the generosity of the social provisions in a country with country characteristics (Bennett, 1991; Greve, 1996; Leibfried, 2000; Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002; Bouget, 2003; López-Santana, 2006; Alsasua, Bilbao-Ubillos and Olaskoaga, 2007). Researchers applying quantitative analyses have dealt with this methodological issue in two ways, sometimes combining both solutions into a single analysis. First, some studies rely on longitudinal data to examine welfare state changes within the EU. A second research strategy involves the comparison of EU members with non-EU members. Studies using these analytical strategies have advanced our knowledge of the relationship between the EU and welfare states by showing trajectories of welfare state change and the extent to which these developments differ within and outside the EU. Nevertheless, most of these studies are descriptive and therefore lack variables explaining these developments.

The analysis reported in this article investigates a third solution to the methodological issue and explores its value for welfare state research. The approach applied here differs from that of earlier studies with respect to the dependent variable, the level of analysis, and the method of analysis. With regard to the dependent variable and the level of analysis, this study focuses on the welfare state attitudes of individuals instead of the formal aspects of the welfare state at the national level. As such, the present analysis is related to that part of the literature arguing that welfare states are not merely a matter of formal arrangements providing help to certain groups in society but that such systems also need to be legitimized by the public to remain viable in the future (Weatherford, 1992; Burstein, 1998). Apart from that, earlier
research shows that (1) there is a close relationship between the welfare state attitudes of citizens and the institutions within a country (Svallfors, 1997), providing a microfoundation for macro level theories of welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and others; and (2) that these individual values do influence the policies at the macro level (Brooks and Manza, 2006). Therefore, the attitudes underlying the welfare state are of theoretical and practical interest. From a theoretical point of view, investigating these attitudes generates insights into the processes that may lead to welfare state persistence and change. For policy makers at the national and the EU level, it provides information about the extent to which the public opinion towards the welfare state differs across EU countries and whether or not changes in the welfare states may be expected in the near future. The third major difference concerns the study’s empirical approach. Since this investigation combines empirical data at the individual and national level, multilevel analysis is applied. The European and World Values Study (EVS/WVS) provides data about individual attitudes from people living in a large number of countries, including EU member states. To date, five waves of the EVS/WVS have been released. Two of these waves – wave 2 (gathered around 1992) and wave 4 (collected around 2002) – include information about the welfare state attitudes of individuals living in the EU member states. The other waves do not provide sufficient data for most EU countries and are therefore not included in the empirical analysis. The attitudinal data are combined with information from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (UNCTAD, 2008).

**ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE WELFARE STATE**

People’s attitudes towards the welfare state can be placed on a continuum ranging from economic individualism emphasizing individual responsibility for a person’s
welfare to social equality endorsing the collective responsibility regarding individual welfare. Clearly, these two ideologies differ with respect to welfare state support; people in favour of economic individualism show less support for the welfare state than those appreciating social equality. Empirical research of welfare state attitudes initially focused on investigating factors as the individual level using information about public opinions from a single country (Feagin, 1975; Eismeier, 1982; AuClaire, 1984; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Shapiro and Young, 1989; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan and Levanon, 2003). These research efforts show that support for the welfare state is predicted largely by self-interest, even after controlling for other individual motives and characteristics. These investigations support the hypothesis that people with a higher risk of becoming dependent on the welfare state because of their vulnerable position are in favour of social provisions organized through the government. At the same time, these investigations acknowledge that individual motives alone do not explain attitudes towards the welfare state completely and that the analyses should include data from multiple countries to account for national differences. For a long time, lack of international comparative data restricted empirical studies examining country-level variables explain attitudes towards the welfare state beyond the individual level determinants found in the single country studies (Korpi, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Recently, the possibilities for data analysis widened due to the collection of international comparative datasets, sparking an increasing number of studies whose goals is to investigate the extent to which people’s attitudes towards the welfare state differ across countries and how national and international factors may explain these differences (Rothstein, 1998; Svallofors, 1997, 1999; Blomberg and Kroll, 1999; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom, 2003; De Beer and Koster, 2009).
Comparative welfare state research focuses on describing and explaining differences between countries. Globalization, the economic openness of countries and the extent to which they are integrated in international markets, are considered to be amongst the difference between countries explaining a country’s financial ability to fund the social provisions as well as the support and legitimacy it receives from the public (Swank, 1998; Koster, 2007). Whereas the effects of economic openness on formal welfare state provisions have received a lot of attention in literature (Mishra, 1999; Sykes, Palier and Prior, 2001; Brady, Beckfield and Zhao, 2007), empirical studies investigating the impact of globalization on welfare state attitudes across different countries are scarce. The extent to which European integration affects these attitudes has not been explored in literature to date (De Beer and Koster, 2009).

**ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE EU**

The notion of economic integration is central to both globalization – where it refers to the process through which countries become part of a world market – and the economic dimension of the EU. Given this conceptual overlap between the two kinds of economic integration, it is tempting to regard the economic dimension of the EU as a special case of globalization (Leibfried, 2000). Assuming such similarity implies that their impact on welfare states will also be the same. This leads to the prediction that European economic integration threatens the welfare state due to a race to the bottom or that the welfare state will expand because of increased market volatility, which are two of the main hypotheses formulated in the field investigating the link between globalization and the welfare state (Bowles and Wagman, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005).

Nevertheless, a closer look at the two kinds of economic integration shows
that they do not coincide completely and that there are some important differences between them. The main question in this respect is whether or not integration into the world market and economic integration into the EU have the same consequences for countries. In addition, it can be questioned whether the single market within the EU is an example of a more advanced form of globalization or, instead, a trading block operating within the global market. The presence of such trade blocks is, in fact, a kind of de-globalization rather than globalization, which is defined as an integrated market at the global level visualized by the metaphor of a “flat” world (Keohane and Nye, 2000; Friedman, 2005). Therefore, the two kinds of economic integration differ at least with regard to one of their defining characteristics, namely the level at which the economic integration is situated, with globalization referring to the increased economic openness and economic integration at a global scale including all conceivable countries and economic integration into the EU excluding non-EU members. Globalization refers to worldwide developments while integration into the EU market can be regarded as a form of regionalization. Within this regional market, there are no trade barriers. In principle, goods, services, and capital can move freely between member states. This is not the case with the world market. A final difference between the world market and the European market is that the latter is supported by a large political body of EU regulations and laws.

All of these dissimilarities between the two kinds of economic integration makes it necessary to treat them as different kinds of integration that can have different effects on society (Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2001; Körpi, 2003; Hay, 2006; Beckfield, 2006). From the observation that European integration refers to the intensification of economic exchanges within the EU (Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002; Beckfield, 2006), it follows that a member state’s share of trade with other EU
countries, compared to its total international trade, indicates its level of economic
integration in the EU. Although it may be argued that all countries in the world can be
integrated within the European market by trading with EU members, the present
study makes a distinction between EU members and non-EU members. This is done
for the reasons outlined above, namely the lack of trade barriers within the EU and
the presence of EU regulations that do not apply to non-EU members. The measure of
economic integration in the EU as the share of trade between EU member states
enables us to empirically examine the effects of European economic integration, in
terms of international trade with the EU, on welfare state attitudes and thus extend the
existing studies on the EU and the welfare state that have remained rather descriptive
(Haverland, 2006).

Following earlier research regarding the effects of economic integration on
welfare state provisions and the level of income inequality in a country (Bowles and
Wagman, 1997; Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005; Brady, 2006), it is
expected that there are two opposing forces of economic integration influencing
welfare state attitudes. With regard to the welfare state, the basic argument underlying
this expectation is that the effect of economic openness on the welfare state differs
between countries that are relatively closed and ones that have a more open economy.
As the closed economies become more open, their level of welfare spending increases
whereas countries with an open economy will experience a crisis in their welfare state
with increasing openness. The prediction is therefore that economic openness and
welfare state effort have a curvilinear relationship, with less spending at low and high
levels of economic openness and the most extensive welfare states in the middle. In
quantitative studies such a pattern is found if there is a positive effect in the linear
term and a negative effect in the squared term (Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser,
2005). Provided that welfare state provisions at the national level are closely related to the welfare state attitudes at the micro level, this study’s goal is to examine whether or not these individual attitudes are affected by the extent to which a country is economically integrated into the EU. This leads to the following hypothesis: There is a curvilinear relationship (a reverse U) between economic integration in the EU at the national level and individual welfare state attitudes (Hypothesis 1).

DATA, MEASURES AND METHOD

DATA

Two data sources are combined to test the hypothesis. The European and World Values Study (EVS/WVS) dataset provides data about attitudes and background characteristics at the individual level. This large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research programme offers insights into the preferences and orientations of various populations covering a wide range of economic, social, political and cultural variations (Halman, 2001; ICPSR, 2006). The first wave of the EVS/WVS took place in the beginning of the 1980s and currently data from five waves are available. Throughout the years, there have been some changes in the data collection, regarding the countries in which the survey was held as well as the questions asked in the questionnaire. This study uses information from the 27 countries that belong to the EU as of 2007. Since the second wave (held between 1989 and 1993) and the fourth wave (collected between 1999 and 2004) include information about welfare state attitudes, these two waves form the empirical basis of the present study. These individual level data are merged with national level data indicating trade with the EU, taken from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (UNCTAD, 2008). It was possible to construct this combined dataset for 24 of the 27 countries. Since the data for Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg were not complete, these countries were excluded from the
MEASURES

Dependent variables

The EVS offers two variables indicating people’s welfare state attitudes. The first measure concerns the distribution of responsibility with regard to people’s welfare. This variable is measured by asking respondents to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 if they think individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves (1) or that the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (10). This variable reflects a preference between two social ideologies: economic individualism (individual responsibility) and social equality (government responsibility). Compared to variables used in previous studies, the advantage of this measure is that its interpretation is straightforward. Other measures consisting of items on various issues like redistribution, provision of basic income and public responsibility concerning specific groups, on the other hand, may involve the combination of variables measuring different theoretical dimensions (Kangas, 1997; Jæger, 2006). Moreover, this measure offers respondents a clear choice about the division of responsibility between individuals and the government, whereas welfare state attitudes are usually measured by asking individuals for a number of issues whether they think the government should take care of them or not. Critics of such an approach argue that it may not validly measure attitudes towards the welfare state since there is no clear alternative provided in the question (Arts and Van der Veen, 1992; Arts and Gelissen, 2001).

The second dimension of welfare state attitudes focuses on the effects that welfare states have on the level of equality within countries. As welfare states
redistribute financial resources by collecting taxes and providing assistance to the needy, they may equalize differences within countries (e.g. Koster and Bruggeman, 2008). In particular, differences in income may be altered by the welfare state. People’s attitudes towards this aspect of the welfare state are measured by asking respondents to indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 whether they think that *incomes should be made more equal* (1) or that *we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort* (10). This item is reverse coded to measure the two policy preferences in line with the other measure: economic individualism (less equality) and social equality (more equality). Computing the correlation coefficients between the two indicators of attitudes towards the welfare state shows that they are somewhat but not strongly related \( r = 0.11; p < 0.01 \). This indicates that they measure different aspects of these attitudes. The indicator about income equality is covered in all 24 countries by the second wave of the EVS/WVS. The fourth wave does not include information regarding eight countries, namely Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden.

**Independent variables**

The *economic dimension of European integration* refers to the economic exchanges between countries within the EU. The variable *trade with the EU as a share of a country's total international trade* indicates a country’s integration into the EU market. The squared term of this variable indicates whether or not this kind of economic integration has a curvilinear effect on the welfare state attitudes; the relationship follows a reverse U pattern if the squared term has a negative sign (Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005; Beckfield, 2006). Although both member states and non-EU members can be integrated into the EU market, there are important
differences between their positions. First of all, EU members have easier access to
this market because they do not face trade barriers like non-EU members. Secondly,
the member states fall under the same EU regulations whereas this is not the case for
non-EU members. To make sure that these differences are taken into account, a
dummy variable indicating *EU membership* is added to the analyses. Moreover, using
this dummy variable the mutual effect of being a EU member and the level of
integration into the EU market are investigated by including the interaction between
the EU dummy and the trade with EU variables.

**Control variables**

The analysis includes several control variables. At the national level, the economic
development may have an effect on public attitudes towards the welfare state. To
control for that the variable *GDP per capita* is added to the regression analysis. To
account for possible variations in GDP during the data collection for the different
EVS/WVS waves, the mean GDP level was computed for 1989-1993 and 1999-2004.
Furthermore, individual level variables are included based on earlier studies
investigating determinants of attitudes towards the welfare state, like socioeconomic
status and perceived program waste (e.g. Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989). Here, a
number of these variables are added to control for their possible effect on welfare
state attitudes. The EVS/WVS provides information about the socioeconomic status
and other individual background variables including *gender, age, and employment
status*. In addition, two indicators of the social context of the individual are measured,
namely *religious denomination* and *town size*. Furthermore, the dataset is gathered at
two points in time and therefore a dummy variable is included controlling for *wave of
the EVS/WVS* (wave 2 = 0; wave 4 = 1).
METHOD
The dataset contains information at the individual level (level 1) and the national level (level 2). The dependent variable welfare state attitudes is measured at the individual level, and the independent variables reside at the individual and national level. Given this hierarchical structure of the data, it is not possible to use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis (e.g. DiPrete and Forristal, 1994). Moreover, such a dataset violates the assumption of independent explanatory variables because the national level variables are the same for all people within the same country. The use of multilevel regression analysis allows the investigation of effects at different levels of analysis and at the same time (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Multilevel models explain micro level outcomes by showing that the parameters at the micro-level are a function of the macro-level and that this relationship can be expressed in terms of the macro-level variables (Diprete and Forristal, 1994). In its general form, the multilevel model has a fixed part (the linear function of the independent variables) and a random part (in this particular case the unexplained variation at the individual level and the unexplained variation between the countries) (Snijders, 2003). All variables, except the dummy variables, are standardized to make it possible to compare the size of the effects.

The multilevel analysis is performed using the following steps. First, an empty model is computed (Model 0). This empty model is an unconditional model without independent variables and serves as a baseline for comparing the next model that includes the control variables at the national and individual level (Model 1). Model 2 includes the EU trade and the EU dummy, whereas the final model (Model 3) tests for the curvilinear effect of EU trade for the member states by adding the squared term of
this variable. The parameters in these models are estimated by the maximum likelihood method (Goldstein, 2003) and the regression coefficients are tested by Wald tests (Snijders, 2003). The deviance (the difference in log likelihoods) between the models evaluates the fit of the different models.

RESULTS

DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS

Table 1 provides information about the country level means and standard deviations of the two welfare state attitudes regarding responsibility and equality, and a country’s level of economic integration in the EU. In the final columns, the changes between the two waves are reported for these three variables. With regard to the question whether individuals or the government should be responsible for the welfare of the people, the mean levels differ across countries: in Austria, Sweden, and France there is a stronger preference for individual responsibility and people in Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia are more in favour of government responsibility. This shows that this dimension of welfare state attitudes may be a response to the size of the welfare state at a certain moment, too much or too little welfare spending, and the direction it should move in the future according to public opinion. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that, on average, the preference for government responsibility increased slightly between the two waves of the EVS/WVS, i.e. by 0.16 points. In one-third of the countries people’s preferences shifted towards individual responsibility, with the UK having the largest change (of 0.84 points). In the other countries people’s attitude changes somewhat in favour of government responsibly, especially in Sweden where there was a change of 0.93 points towards this preference. The changes in welfare state attitudes are markedly different from the attitudes that people have towards
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income inequality. First, there is somewhat more variation across countries in the attitude towards this dimension of the welfare state. Secondly, the mean level increased far more – with nearly 1 point – between wave 2 and wave 4. It should be noted that this might result, in part, from the fact that for some countries there is no data available for wave 4 and thus no changes could be computed. Nevertheless, in some countries, such as Romania and Lithuania, the preference for income equality increased by more than 2 points, which is a much more marked change than is found for these countries regarding the people’s preference for individual or government responsibility. The final indicator shown in Table 1 is the variation regarding the trade shares with the EU. This variable ranges from 43.50 (Romania during wave 2) to 86.00 (Estonia at the time of wave 2), and remained relatively stable between the two EVS/WVS waves. Some countries increased their trade with EU countries; for Latvia and Romania the share rose by 27 points. Other countries saw a decrease of a similar magnitude, such as Malta where the share of EU trade declined with 22 points.

MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

The results of the multilevel analyses are presented in Table 2 – investigating the attitudes towards individual versus government responsibility – and Table 3, which focuses on the attitudes towards income equality. Although the outcomes for the two dimensions of welfare state attitudes differ in some respects, the analyses lead to
similar conclusions about the effect of economic integration in the EU.

For each of the models it holds true that adding the control variables improves their fit (Model 1 in Tables 2 and 3). Overall, the results show that there is a stronger preference for government responsibility and income equality during wave 4 as compared to wave 2 ($b = 0.28; p < 0.01$ and $b = 1.43; p < 0.01$, respectively). And if the GDP per capita is higher, people are more in favour of individual responsibility ($b = -0.12; p < 0.01$) and less in favour of income equality ($b = -0.75; p < 0.01$). It should be noted that the latter effect changes after the other national level indicators are added to the model. This may indicate that the GDP per capita mediates these relationships with individual preferences for income equality. With regard to the individual level control variables, the results show that the preference for government responsibility is stronger among women, employed persons, and people who do not belong to a religious denomination and that income equality gets more support from women, older people, jobless people, those belonging to a religious denomination, and people who live in smaller towns.

Adding the dummy variable indicating EU membership and the variable
measuring trade with the EU (Model 2 in Tables 2 and 3) further improve the models. It turns out that people living in EU member states are more in favour of government responsibility. However, there are no differences between people in member states and non-EU members when it comes to their attitude towards income equality, as this variable has no significant effect. Moreover, trade with the EU is associated with a lower preference for government responsibility, while it is positively related to the preference for income equality.

The final models (Model 3) in Table 2 and 3 test the hypothesis stating a curvilinear relationship between economic integration in the EU and welfare state attitudes by including the squared term of trade with EU. Both the overall effect and the effect for EU members are investigated. The same patterns are found for the two dimensions of welfare state. When all countries are included, the squared term of economic integration in the EU is positive and significant \( (b = 0.09; \ p < 0.01 \) for the responsibility variable and \( b = 0.11; \ p < 0.01 \) for income equality). However, the squared term has a negative sign when it is interacted with the EU membership dummy \( (b = -0.39; \ p < 0.01 \) for responsibility and \( b = -0.15; \ p < 0.05 \) for income equality). This shows that the effect of trade with the EU differs for member states and non-EU members. Figure 1 and 2 provides stylized representations of the relationship between economic integration in the EU (on the x-axis) and attitudes towards government responsibility and income equality, respectively.

Figure 1 about here

Figure 2 about here
These results provide support for Hypothesis 1: the welfare state attitudes in EU member states have a curvilinear relationship (following a reverse U) with economic integration in the EU.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

This study offers at least two possible contributions to comparative welfare state research in the EU. First, a different dependent variable is used than those that features in earlier studies; instead of examining national-level indicators such as social spending and generosity, the focus is on individual-level opinions towards the welfare state. Secondly, cross-national differences in these attitudes are investigated using explanatory variables at the national level to establish whether or not economic integration within the EU influences people’s attitudes towards the welfare state. Future work is needed to determine how valuable these contributions are for studying the effects of EU integration on other aspects of the welfare state and if the conclusions from this single study will hold after additional investigations. Apart from that, these future studies could include variables measuring the political dimension of the EU and investigate its impact on welfare state provisions and individual attitudes. The current investigation offers a point of reference for the comparison of the outcomes of such extensions. Furthermore, the present investigation contributes to the growing number of publications on international comparative research into welfare state attitudes since it shows that these do not only
differ across countries but can also be explained by economic integration into the EU. Finally, the literature on Europeanization and globalization can benefit from this study since it suggests that these two processes refer to different kinds of international developments that therefore may also have different consequences. Again, further research is needed to investigate the relationship between the two kinds of economic integration and individual opinions more closely.

The finding that the preference for government responsibility and income equality increases needs further examination. There are two contrasting ways in which to interpret this empirical finding from this study. On the one hand, this may imply that the EU serves as a safeguard against other international developments like globalization. According to this interpretation, the EU forms a buffer against these international threats and increases people’s trust in the welfare state and their support for such collective arrangements. On the other hand, the explanation may be found in the opposite direction and be in line with research focusing on the increased insecurity from international trade, stating that people demand more security from their government (Rodrik, 1998). This would imply that citizens experience more insecurity due to EU integration. In that case, the changes in welfare state attitudes found here result from what may be called the “Europeanization of insecurity” and a growing public demand for governments to take action. The current study does not make it possible to decide which of these two contrasting interpretations is correct and additional research may be aimed at providing information to do so. An investigation such as this will be especially valuable from a policy perspective because the two interpretations differ with respect to the reason why people are in favour of government responsibility. According to the safeguard interpretation, people support the welfare state and since there is an upward convergence of these opinions,
this may even give way to coordination at the EU level. In contrast to that, the insecurity interpretation implies that European integration increases the demand for protection rather than that it leads to a higher level of welfare state support. If that argument holds, increasing European integration and coordination will not be advisable since it results in increased insecurity that, in turn, results in an even higher demand for social security.

In summary, this study shows that welfare state attitudes are related to the process of economic integration within the EU. Both the enlargement of the EU and the continuation of individual data gathering across countries, offer a chance to investigate the link between the ongoing process of European integration and people’s attitudes towards the welfare state in much more detail. For policy makers, this will generate even more information about whether or not the economic integration is followed by the integration of welfare state arrangements and to what extent this is supported by EU citizens.
REFERENCES


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Politics 36: 397-412.


TABLES

Table 1
Descriptives per country and wave

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Trade with EU</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.78 (2.78)</td>
<td>5.08 (2.91)</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>5.74 (2.83)</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.17 (2.76)</td>
<td>4.25 (2.78)</td>
<td>66.00</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.53 (2.93)</td>
<td>5.08 (2.88)</td>
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<td>4.68 (2.21)</td>
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<td>3.29 (2.20)</td>
<td>4.55 (2.39)</td>
<td>62.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.63 (2.80)</td>
<td>4.13 (2.77)</td>
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<td>3.23 (2.31)</td>
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<td>6.22 (2.77)</td>
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<td>3.70 (2.82)</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>4.54 (2.80)</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>67.56</td>
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Sources: EVS/WVS and UNCTAD
### Table 2
Multilevel analysis of people’s attitude towards government responsibility

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<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
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<td><strong>National level (Level 2)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Member (1 = yes)</td>
<td>0.41 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU trade</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.17 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Trade²</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.09 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member * EU trade</td>
<td>0.12    *</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.18 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Member * EU Trade²</td>
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<td>-0.39 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave (1 = wave 4)</td>
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<td>0.53 ***</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-0.37 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = female)</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.31 ***</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>Employed (1 = yes)</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.18 ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Religious denomination (1 = yes)</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.08 ***</td>
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<td>Town size</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>5.57 ***</td>
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</table>

N = 67,346 respondents in 24 countries

Standardized regressions coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses

Empty model: intercept = 5,11 (0.16); Intraclass Correlation (ICC) = 0.08; -2Loglikelihood = 315,140.16

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
### Table 3

**Multilevel analysis of people’s attitude towards income equality**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>(3)</th>
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<td><strong>National level (Level 2)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Member (1 = yes)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
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<td>-0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Member * EU Trade$^2$</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>EU Member * EU Trade$^2$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.63</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td><strong>0.11</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level (Level 1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = female)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td><strong>0.01</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (1 = yes)</td>
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<td>-0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious denomination (1 = yes)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.01</strong></td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.01</strong></td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.01</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>6.61</td>
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<td>6.21</td>
<td><strong>0.20</strong></td>
<td>5.86</td>
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Intraclass Correlation (ICC) 0.14 0.07 0.09

-2Loglikelihood 249,328.92 249,073.58 249,029.75

Deviance 19,730.07*** 255.34*** 43.83***

N = 54,871 respondents in 24 countries

Standardized regressions coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses

Empty model: intercept = 6.06 (0.18); Intraclass Correlation (ICC) = 0.086; -2Loglikelihood = 269,058.99

*p < .10, **p <.05, ***p <.01
FIGURES

Figure 1

The relationship between economic integration in the EU and people’s attitudes towards government responsibility
Figure 2

The relationship between economic integration in the EU and people’s attitudes towards income equality

- EU member
- All countries