Securitizing capital: A processual-relational approach to pluralized security

Tessa Diphoorn
Utrecht University, The Netherlands

Erella Grassiani
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract
In this article, we introduce the concept of ‘securitizing capital’ as a new analytical tool to understand the pluralized landscape of security. We define securitizing capital as a process whereby different forms of capital are, consciously and unconsciously, used to acquire legitimacy and power. While other approaches have been developed to understand pluralized security, such as security networks, nodal frameworks and assemblages, we argue that, useful as they are, they tend to overlook issues of agency, how relationships are established and negotiated and the subjective experiences of security. In contrast, we introduce a processual-relational approach that is based on the translation and conversion of other types of capital, such as economic and social, to acquire a position of power within a specific (security) ‘field’. In order to elaborate on our approach and its relevance, we draw on fieldwork conducted in Kenya, Jamaica and Israel.

Keywords
Bourdieu, capital, pluralized security, policing

Introduction
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the provision of security extends beyond the nation-state and includes a range of actors. Such complexity is captured by concepts such...
as ‘plural policing’ (Jones and Newburn, 2006), ‘security quilts’ (Ericson, 1994) and ‘policing webs’ (Brodeur, 2010). In the policing and security literature, which largely stems from criminological and political science perspectives, authors have developed numerous frameworks to understand pluralized security provision, such as nodal frameworks (Shearing and Wood, 2003), security networks (Dupont, 2004), security assemblages (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011) and security regimes (Dupont, 2014). All move beyond a state-centred approach to analyse how security actors produce a particular type of social and/or political order.

Although insightful, these frameworks tend to focus on the different actors involved, such as the police, the military, private security companies, neighbourhood watches and so on. We suggest that further analytical tools are necessary to clarify how the relationships between these actors are constituted and negotiated and that such tools should also attend to non-human security elements, such as technology, symbols and discourses. We developed these insights through our ethnographic inquiries, which showed us the importance of the way relationships are established or severed, how they change and are negotiated, the crucial role of non-human elements within these interactions and subjective experiences of security. In order to encapsulate these various elements, we introduce a new concept of securitizing capital to refer to the process whereby different security actors use various forms of capital, both intentionally and unintentionally, to acquire legitimacy and power. In this process, other types of economic and social capital are translated and converted to acquire a position of legitimacy and (economic) power within a specific ‘field’.

By focusing on different forms of capital, we can better understand the relationships between people, materials, experiences and data. This article thus contributes to the literature on security and policing by moving away from an actor- and organization-oriented approach to security towards a processual-relational one. Rather than studying the ‘state police’ and/or the ‘private security company’ as single, independent institutions, we look at the various ways through which these entities are connected and disconnected and at the hierarchical relationships that develop from these multiple interactions. This approach allows us to emphasize the interdependence of public–private security and further explore how it takes shape.

We draw on empirical research in Kenya, Jamaica and Israel that focused on various elements and scales of security—from the institutional to the global. We primarily relied on three qualitative research methods: interviews; life histories; and participant observation. The first main method consisted of interviewing individuals whom we identified as key players, such as the owners of large private security companies, high-ranking police officers, participants of community policing initiatives and security consultants.1 The second method, life histories, were conducted across the field sites and provided rich data for a deeper understanding of personal practices, social networks and the production of particular knowledge systems, which are elements that we define as capital. Our third strategy was participant observation, ‘a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture’ (De Walt and De Walt, 2002: 1). In practice this ranged from attending particular operational meetings between the state police and private security companies to joining security seminars.
In addition, we also analysed secondary data, such as legislation, minutes of meetings, company websites and PR material.

The outline of this article is as follows: in the first section we briefly introduce the three cases we use in our analysis; after which we give a short overview of some of the existing frameworks that have been used to analyse the pluralized landscape of security. In the third section, we outline our proposed conceptual tool, namely ‘securitizing capital’, drawing from Bourdieu (1999, 2002) and Dupont (2004), which we subsequently explore further when we discuss examples of different forms of securitized capital taken from our three cases. In the concluding section, we further emphasize the relevance of our processual-relational approach; that is, how particular forms of capital are securitized, and how this provides new insights into the ways in which security is articulated and enacted across the globe.

**Kenya, Israel and Jamaica**

All three countries in our study face high levels of insecurity. Jamaica and Kenya both have extremely high rates of criminal violence, especially in their capitals. In Kingston, known as one of the world’s ‘murder capitals’, crime is primarily concentrated in the downtown area and governed by criminal leaders known as ‘dons’ who have documented links with political leaders (Harriott, 2000; Jaffe, 2012). Nairobi, known by the unfortunate nickname of ‘Nairobi’, has similarly high rates of crime, however security concerns tend to also focus more broadly on the rise of terrorist attacks across the country (Ngugi et al., 2004; Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). In Israel, crime levels are relatively low, yet ‘the situation’, as Israelis often call the occupation and conflict with the Palestinians, underpins a sense of insecurity in which almost all measures for security are justified. ‘Security’ or ‘*bitakhon*’ in Hebrew is a central part of the daily and political discourse in the country, and is naturalized and seen as a ‘higher good’ (Ochs, 2011).

The second point of relevance of the three cases is a dominant and highly visible presence of state armed bodies faced with addressing the various forms of insecurity. In Kenya and Jamaica this primarily concerns the state police bodies created under British colonial rule. Both the Jamaican and Kenyan state police are widely regarded as corrupt, poorly trained, under-equipped, incapable of addressing the crime problem and have undergone numerous reforms throughout the past decades (Harriott, 2000; Ngugi et al., 2004). In Israel, the state police is mostly engaged with internal and criminal affairs within Israel (i.e. within the Green Line). The main state body responsible for national security is the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Israel is a highly militarized society and the military influences almost all aspects of society (Kimmerling, 1993; Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 2012).

The third issue that makes these cases important for our argument relates to the strong and growing presence of the private security industry (Epps, 2013; Mkutu and Sabala, 2007; Ronen, 2010). In Jamaica, the private security industry emerged in the 1960s and grew substantially during the political upheaval in the 1970s. Currently there are approximately 300 registered private companies that provide a wide range of security services. In Kenya, the industry also dates to the 1960s. It grew steadily during the 1990s, and experienced an exponential boom after the well-known Westgate mall attack in 2013. It
is estimated that over 2000 private security companies operate in Kenya. In Israel, there are approximately 150–250 companies, many security consultants that either work alone or within a company and hundreds of companies that focus on the international export of security and defence materials and knowledge, such as weapons, security systems and trainings.

Finally, community-based security initiatives exist in all three countries. In Kingston, residents are increasingly organizing community-based policing initiatives, often encouraged by international development aid programmes. In Nairobi, resident-driven initiatives are also common. One such initiative gained publicity during the Westgate mall attack, as some of its members were actively involved in rescuing the victims inside the mall. Furthermore, in October 2013, the Kenyan government launched an initiative known as ‘Nyumba Kumi’, as a form of community policing. In Israel the situation differs somewhat as the state agencies are relatively strong and well organized. However, Jewish settlers have long organized themselves into informal security organizations within the agricultural communities (such as kibbutzim). While private security providers generally protect those communities, Israeli settlers living in the Occupied Territories have adopted their methods. These settlers guard their own communities, often with weapons provided by the IDF.

Thus, although distinct, all three countries are shaped by high levels of insecurity, extensive security privatization and a complex public–private security landscape. In each case there is competition as well as interdependence between the various security actors, evident in the militarization of private security, the moonlighting of police officers, links between organized crime and the police and/or private security companies and much more (Jaffe, 2012; Konopinsky, 2009; Mkutu and Sabala, 2007). In the following sections, we discuss three existing frameworks to potentially approach these pluralized security landscapes, and then introduce and exemplify our own approach: securitizing capital. We then return to our empirical cases and outline how social, cultural and economic capital are translated into security-relevant symbolic capital in order to acquire authority.

The pluralized landscape of security

Several frameworks have been developed to analyse pluralized security landscapes. Before we outline our own approach in detail, we will here briefly review three theoretical frameworks: the security network; the nodal framework; and the security assemblage.

The first framework, the security network, focuses on the interactions between security providers analysing relations between organizations (Dupont, 2004, 2006; Krahmann, 2005). Dupont (2004) distinguishes between four types of networks that he characterizes as local, institutional, international and informational. He argues that they are porous, flexible, continuously changing and dependent on the contextual environment. Some networks are supplementary while others are competitive. They are not necessarily ‘egalitarian social structures’ (2004: 84). One of the strengths of the ‘security network’ framework is that it provides a means of understanding how relations of power and dominance shape the operation of these networks. According to Krahmann (2005: 22), for example, network analysis offers ‘valuable insights into the structure and function of the multiple,
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diverse and frequently overlapping control and coordination arrangements’. Nonetheless, two main shortcomings remain. Despite the inclusion of informational networks that analyse the informational flow between actors, little attention is paid to the role of material objects. Similarly, the focus on connections disregards how the enactment of security is also shaped by non-connections; that is, the way in which different security providers are not linked.

The second framework, the nodal framework, addresses our second point of critique by not necessarily focusing on connections. The nodal framework largely draws from governance theory by regarding different security actors (public and private) as nodes, which are defined as governing entities. This framework does not inherently focus on interactions between nodes, as certain nodes may operate in segregation and/or (relative) isolation (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007). The main advantage of this approach is that no single node is prioritized over another, further emphasizing that security should not be analysed through a state-centric approach. Yet despite its wide usage, the nodal framework has some shortcomings, as others have observed. The first of these critics are Loader and Walker (2006, 2007), who offer in contrast their ‘anchored pluralism’ model. They argue that the state should act as a prioritized node, as the ‘anchor’ for security to function as a public good. However, this normative critique emerges from a focus on state policing institutions and does not always match empirical realities, especially in the postcolonial world. White (2011) offers another critique, arguing that the nodal framework over-emphasizes the economic determinants of domestic security and does not sufficiently incorporate the political rationalities that shape the emergence and operation of domestic security. For Dupont (2006), the idea of ‘nodes’ inherently casts security providers as distinct entities and thus fails to take into account how organizations consist of various individuals who can be part of various nodes. A private security company owner, may, for instance, also be an active member of a neighbourhood watch.

The third framework is the security assemblage, which draws from a growing body of work on ‘assemblages’ across a range of disciplines, including anthropology (Marcus and Saka, 2006; Ong and Collier, 2005). Haggerty and Ericson (2000) state that assemblages consist of ‘a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unit comes solely from the fact that these items function together, that they “work” together as a functional entity’ (Patton, 1994: 158, in Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 608). These items include public and private security actors, security technologies and security experiences. Additionally, Haggerty and Ericson argue that assemblages themselves comprise assemblages, providing multiple layers and scales of security. In a similar vein, Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) introduced the idea of ‘global security assemblages’ to analyse how various scales of security, ranging from the local to the global, produce new structures of political power and influence the enactment of security. The assemblage framework has gained momentum, illustrated by numerous studies, such as Gould (2015), Lippert and O’Connor (2003) and Schouten (2014), who have used it to examine how different security providers interact at particular sites. Like the nodal framework it encompasses the numerous ways in which different security providers connect and do not connect, raising the possibilities of assembly as well as disassembly. An assemblage is not a fixed entity with clear boundaries, but instead primarily consists of a ‘potentiality’ (Haggerty and
Ericson, 2000: 609) of connections. However, the assemblage framework includes two benefits that differentiate it from the previous two. The first is the inclusion of ad hoc and informal linkages, rather than solely focusing on formal and institutionalized ones. The second lies in the emphasis on the materiality of security by incorporating technologies, such as CCTV cameras, materials, such as firearms, and various forms of expertise, such as statistical risk assessments. This provides a much more encompassing idea of security that moves beyond actors and institutions. Despite these relative strengths, following Marcus and Saka (2006: 104), we argue that, although inclusive, the assemblage framework does not function as ‘a sustained analytical tool’, precisely because of its encompassing nature. The assemblage framework demands additional concepts to understand how security is enacted, experienced and articulated by individuals.

Altogether, all three frameworks act as useful frames to understand pluralized security landscapes across the globe. They have consolidated a conceptual shift from a state-centric focus of security and have highlighted how security operates on various scales. Although they have been presented here as different frameworks, they are often used simultaneously and interchangeably. In this article, we draw from these works, but argue that two main points require emphasis. First, they are not analytical tools that can be applied to understand local interfaces and exchanges. We need more concrete analytical tools to help us comprehend how security is interpreted, enacted, articulated and given meaning and which particular elements are most important for its functioning. Second, these frameworks provide very little insight into the agency of individuals and how their choices and perceptions are related to their actions. The existing frameworks remain at present top–down and organization-centric in perspective, and overlook the motivations of particular agents as well as how they manoeuvre within these landscapes. It is these two issues that securitizing capital—the central concept of this article—aims to address. Securitizing capital entails a relational and processual approach that attends to the material and discursive elements that make relationships possible and changeable, and includes personal narratives and experiences.

**Securitizing capital: A new analytical tool**

We define securitizing capital as the processes of acquiring symbolic capital through other forms of capital in the field of security. In developing this idea, we draw on Bourdieu (1999, 2002) and Dupont (2004). Bourdieu (1999: 57) introduced the notion of capital in his analysis of the state, which he regarded as the ‘culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital’. Dupont makes use of Bourdieu’s ideas, yet his analysis is situated within a contemporary analysis of security as pluralized and globalized, and thereby moves beyond an analysis of state power. Despite these different points of departure, both scholars identify how various types of capital—economic, social, cultural and political—are used in order to produce legitimacy and authority. Similarly, others have identified additional types of capital that influence security practices, such as bodily capital (Diphoorn, 2015; Hobbs et al., 2002) and force capital (Martin, 2013).

These ideas assist in overcoming the shortcomings of the other frameworks discussed above. Instead of only focusing on institutions or actors, securitizing capital entails a process, and encompasses not only actors but also materials and technologies when explaining interconnections between different entities, and situates the workings of the
different forms of capital within this field. Bourdieu argues that social actors (individuals and institutions) all act within different fields, in which they compete for different forms of mutually dependent and intertwined capital (understood as a range of objects, things and people) in a hierarchy of power relations. In the security field, then, we see individuals, companies and institutions compete with each other through the use of language, technologies and social networks. For example, a private security officer who has personal ties (social capital) with police officers at a particular police station is likely to possess more political capital. However, this is only meaningful within the specific field of his security work, as these contacts are mostly meaningless outside of it.

Yet the most essential type of capital, perhaps its ‘ultimate’ form, is symbolic capital. Symbolic capital refers to recognized authority and can be ‘any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social’ that is perceived and recognized by social actors as being of value (Bourdieu, 1999: 62). It thus begets authority and becomes meaningful in the acquisition of status. Actors who do not possess the right economic, political, cultural and/or social capital are unlikely to acquire symbolic capital. Again, this is never a ‘general’ feat of a set of capitals, but can only happen within a specific field in which these assets are regarded as meaningful. In his work, Bourdieu (1999: 63) identified the state as the ‘site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power’. Although we do not deny the significant role of the state, our research is situated with an inherent assumption that security is pluralized, and thus that other non-state actors also possess a degree of symbolic capital. For example, several studies on private security (Button, 2002; Diphoorn, 2015; Mopas and Stenning, 2001) analyse how private security officers primarily acquire their authority—symbolic capital—through particular devices, such as uniforms and firearms. In fact, they argue for the necessity of this, as they cannot, in contrast to the state police, rely on legal rights and legal authority. This not only points towards the fundamental role that objects and symbols can play in conferring legitimacy to a security provider, but it also indicates that we cannot simply equate symbolic capital with the state, as Bourdieu does. However, uniforms and other symbols of authority of private security agents often mimic symbols of state institutions, such as the military or police, further highlighting the different ways in which symbolic capital is cultivated.

In our research, we are interested in finding out which types of capital are most important in acquiring symbolic capital in the field of security. In other words, which objects, social connections or forms of expertise are most important in acquiring a ‘dominant’ position within the pluralized landscape of security? We thus argue that symbolic capital, especially legitimacy and authority, is the one possible end result and that other forms of capital are translated and converted for this goal. This is what we refer to as securitizing capital: a process by which different types of capital, such as social and economic capital, are mobilized in order to acquire symbolic capital in the field of security. In the following sections, we will use ethnographic examples from our three cases to show different ways in which securitizing capital works.

**Social capital: ‘We all know each other’**

Social capital—an entire range of social connections such as memberships, social activities, neighbourhood contacts, friendships, colleagues, kinship relations, but also objects
that are exchanged between social connections, such as gifts—plays a fundamental role in shaping interactions between security providers (Crawford and Lister, 2006; Diphoorn, 2016b; Rigakos, 2002). In Israel, social capital primarily derives from the military and other public services such as the Israeli Security Agency (ISA). Past military experience is crucial in Israel: it is here where people establish social connections, which they maintain throughout the rest of their lives and careers. This is clearly evident in the security industry, where relationships made during an individual’s regular or extended military service stand at the base of many personal and professional relationships. This is apparent during security conferences, where speakers from the private security world and the public services, particularly the military, are clearly acquainted. During their presentations they use phrases such as ‘old friend’ and personalized nicknames. These relationships are crucial for success and are critically framed as a ‘revolving door’ mechanism, where important positions within the industry are divided by a select group of actors who help one another. People working in the higher levels of the security industry cannot do without a prestigious military background, while state agencies and companies employ people who know each other from these same security networks (Sheffer and Barak, 2013).

In Jamaica, networks established during military service, namely the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), also act as a key source of social capital. Most of the owners we interviewed were ex-JDF members with one claiming that ‘the security industry in Jamaica grew out of the Jamaica Defence Force’. The social network of many company owners thus revolves around a background in the JDF. One owner highlighted how his military background ensured that ‘the doors have opened a little easier’. Another company owner even jokingly stated that their company was referred to as ‘Down Park Camp’, in contrast to the JDF, which is at ‘Up Park Camp’, further highlighting the association between the two. In general, most company owners highlighted the social closeness between companies, despite the competition between firms. Phrases such as ‘we all know each other’ and ‘you know all the personalities and you have worked together’ were common. This closeness is unquestionably shaped by the size of the industry: with 300 registered companies, of which about five dominate the market, employees, owners and managers regularly meet. This is particularly so when owners also participate in the Jamaica Society for Industry Security (JSIS), an industry association that acts as a representative body of the industry.

The Kenyan situation was different in terms of how social capital was securitized. Although most company owners are ex-police officers or ex-army personnel, this experience did not play a particularly significant role in social networking. Rather, in Kenya we identified two groups of social contacts associated with two (rivaling) employers: namely the Kenya Security Industry Association (KSIA) and the Protective Services Industry Association (PSIA). Due to a lack of state regulation, these two associations play a large role in regulating and setting standards for the industry (Diphoorn, 2016a), and they act as distinct social groups. “In May 2016, the Private Security Regulation Act was implemented in Kenya, marking the start of state regulation of the private security industry. As this Act had not yet been implemented at the time of writing, it is excluded from the analysis of this article.” Although a simplification, the members of the KSIA generally include the foreign owned and larger companies, such as KK Security and
G4S, and the PSIA comprises the smaller and Kenyan owned companies, such as Lavington Security. KSIA members differentiate themselves by describing themselves as ‘legitimate and legal’, while the PSIA members profile their ‘local’ status. Although there are some interactions between members from the two associations, they operate rather distinctly and serve different clients. KSIA members are more focused on acquiring contracts with international clients, particularly international NGOs, ex-pats and embassies. In doing so, they profile their international orientation and their adherence to the law (particularly those concerning the minimum wage), and they distance themselves from the Kenyan government. On the contrary, PSIA members actively seek out government tenders and locally owned businesses. In this regard, KSIA members are primarily interested in using their social capital among each other for lucrative international clients—that is, converting their social capital into economic capital—while PSIA members use their social capital among each other and government officials for economic purposes, but also for acquiring more political capital.

Thus, in both Jamaica and Israel, a (combat) military background lies at the basis of a person’s social capital while in Kenya we see that social capital consists of, and operates in, two different ways through two employers’ associations. Nevertheless, in each case, knowing particular individuals is crucial in being able to operate successfully in the security field. In other words, social capital is a core capital that is used to acquire status and power; that is, symbolic capital.

**Cultural capital: ‘We know security, we live it’**

These various forms of social capital are unquestionably related to cultural capital; contacts from the past are often intertwined with experiences from the past. In most of the studies on policing partnerships, the sharing of crime intelligence and information has been identified as the key form of potential collaboration (Diphoorn and Berg, 2014; Hummer and Nalla, 2003; Shearing et al., 1980). Crime intelligence and other forms of data are a type of cultural capital, which Dupont (2004: 86) defines as the ‘aggregate of knowledge and expertise’ at the individual and collective level. Bourdieu employs a more abstract understanding of culture to include social codes, ritual and values. In our analysis, we perceive cultural capital to include forms of data, such as crime statistics, but also knowledge and skills, such as training and specialized experiences.

The intertwining of social and cultural capital is evident in the Israeli case: a person’s past in the military establishes certain contacts and the acquisition of certain skills (e.g. intelligence gathering, combat skills) and knowledge, particularly for those who were part of an elite military unit. For example, the specialized military training acquired during conscription functions as the key form of cultural capital, so that even though ‘regular’ military service is a must to gain full citizenship, real status is only received after combat service, particularly in special units. The hierarchy established in the IDF continues within the private security sphere; one class of security guards receive a short training and work at shopping malls, while others, coming from special IDF units, train for longer periods to qualify for ‘high-profile’ work at airports or embassies for example. After a military or ISA career, the most obvious career choice is to work in the private security sphere. These men, often consultants, then use their capital to train other
security officials, and even the police, who are specialized in law enforcement, but not in ‘security’. On a different level, but very much related, being Israeli in itself is a form of cultural capital: in many countries, a person’s Israeli background and/or nationality is perceived as a guarantee of an excellent skill set, an assumption actively used by Israelis to sell security products (Grassiani, 2016). This is evident in the following quote of an Israeli security professional who frequently works in Africa: ‘there [in African countries] your technical skills are seen as “holy”, as absolute, once they are convinced of it, everything you say is the “last word” (the truth).’

The transformation of military experience into security capital is also reflected in Jamaica and Kenya, where a military background is translated into having certain (perceived) necessary skills. One company owner in Jamaica highlighted that a military background signified ‘good credentials and a good reputation’ and that ‘they knew our background’ and ‘what you stood for’. It is also for this reason that most companies have ex-JDF members training their security officers. As there is no uniform training system in Jamaica that all companies must adhere to, companies provide in-house training sessions and they employ ex-JDF members to provide this training. There is thus a perception that a certain level of training (cultural capital) will provide private security officers with more skills, so that they can acquire more legitimacy when conducting their work. The same process was identified in Kenya, which also lacks a uniform training system for the private security industry. This is slowly changing through the setting up of training facilities, such as the Private Security Training Academy, which was established in 2011. Like the Jamaican case, this academy has recruited ex-army officials to act as trainers, motivated by the belief that military skills—associated with qualities such as ‘discipline’ and ‘respect for authority’—are essential in the industry.

We therefore see in all three cases that the possession of specific skills, through particular types of training, are regarded as essential in the field of security, and this cultural capital is used to influence one’s position. This occurs both on the level of individual actors, such as a security consultant that advertises his skills, and on a more systematic or structural level, such as the widespread practice of hiring particular trainers to pass on certain skills to security officers. In general, we have found that a policing and/or military background is regarded by most people, both in and outside the industry, as essential. However, there is also a growing discourse that a private security company is a business like any other and that management, marketing and financial expertise is more important. Therefore, the specific skills (i.e. forms of cultural capital) that are regarded as necessary, and bestow a certain degree of authority and legitimacy onto an individual, do differ, despite a preliminary emphasis on particular military-based skills. Nevertheless, all three cases show that particular security expertise is translated into a position of power and that cultural capital is securitized in several ways in order to gain legitimacy and power.

**Economic capital: ‘Donations’ and ‘perks’**

The third form of capital that was often securitized in our sites of research was economic capital. This has also been identified as playing a prominent role in public–private partnerships, in which private security companies often hold more economic capital. Studies
have shown how private security companies often provide financial assistance, either through monetary donations or technological assistance, to other security providers, particularly those aligned to the state (Diphoorn, 2016b; Dupont, 2004).

The translation of economic capital into symbolic capital is particularly common in Kenya. Private security companies and residential policing initiatives often use their economic capabilities to assist the police and this primarily occurs through providing resources and direct payment. Several resident associations and private security companies, particularly in the more affluent parts of Nairobi, assist the state police by providing them with resources and equipment, such as vehicles for joint patrols. After these joint patrols, the police officers in question often receive financial rewards through direct cash payments, of which the head of the police station in question receives a margin. Police officers referred to these payments as ‘donations’ and ‘perks’ and they acted as a financial incentive for them to go on these patrols. For the community initiatives, the main aim in supporting the police financially is to reduce crime in the area and to enhance cooperation with the state police. The latter is also important for private security companies, yet their interest also lies in acquiring more publicity and clients. These dissimilar motivations further show that different security actors securitize economic capital for diverse reasons.

The securitization of economic capital was also evident in Jamaica, albeit less prominently. Here too company owners mentioned providing ‘donations’ to the police station, such as stationery and televisions. In general, such acts were regarded as a means to establish better working relationships with the state police, which many described as difficult and problematic. Furthermore, many company owners highlighted that it was particularly difficult to establish long-lasting relationships due to high turnover of police officers that rotate between police stations (a policy intended to reduce corruption).

In Israel, economic capital did not play such a prominent role in the daily operation of security practices. In contrast to Kenya and Jamaica, the (armed) state bodies in Israel are not undermanned, poorly equipped and in need of financial assistance. Nevertheless, economic capital is crucial on a different level, such as the vast amount of funds flowing into the development of new technologies, weapons and training. This not only results in an enormous defence and security export that is based on a large amount of economic capital, but it is used by Israelis as a means of acquiring authority on an international level.

This difference between these case studies suggests that the different position of the countries in question within a globalized political economy plays a fundamental role in the securitization of capital; that is, determining what is needed in the larger security landscape. In Kenya and Jamaica, for instance, unlike Israel, non-state actors regularly use their economic capital to augment and facilitate their relationship with state authorities. In Israel, matters are different as state armed forces have substantial economic capital and a vast amount of money is invested into the development of security and defence products, which is used on the international security market. This dissimilarity not only points towards divergent political economies that shape the various fields of security, but also towards a distinct relationship between state and non-state entities. We can therefore draw on Bourdieu’s analysis of the state as the political entity that equates and beholds symbolic capital to analyse the Israeli context, wherein the state is a central player.
However, this is different from Kenya and Jamaica, where the state police is not necessarily the leading player and is perhaps compelled to convert some of its own capital in order to acquire power and legitimacy.

From our analysis of three forms of capital across three different cases, we want to emphasize three issues that define the process of securitizing capital. The first is that it is a processual approach: this entails that we distinguish between the possession of capital and the actual mobilization of capital. We argue that these two phases should be held analytically distinct: a security actor may enjoy access to particular capital, but if not used, it does not necessarily impact the power struggles within the field. Yet when used, both purposely and unknowingly, the nature of that capital changes and it has an effect. For example, the owner of a private security company may know an important political figure, but if he/she never makes use of this social capital, it does not influence how security is enacted and understood. This also highlights the performative nature of securitizing capital: the translation of capital has an effect on and influences how security operates. Mobilizing one’s capital will determine whether one is a ‘dominant’ or ‘dominated’ actor and as such, it is directly linked to larger power relations. Therefore, by making the distinction between the possession and mobilization of capital, we can analyse how, when and why particular capital is mobilized for a particular goal.

By doing so, we also have the opportunity to uncover the different motivations behind the securitization of capital that differ across field sites and security actors, which is our second insight. For example, our data show that leaders of neighbourhood watches are concerned with the perceptions of residents from the neighbourhood, primarily because their legitimacy hinges upon such perceptions. Owners of private security companies are also concerned with acquiring legitimacy from citizens (i.e. potential clients), but additionally also focus on economic gains. Securitizing capital thus has dissimilar meanings for different security actors within different fields. Different forms of capital are very interdependent and only ‘work’ within specific fields. As we saw with the Israeli case, the military background of a security consultant is meaningful within the Kenyan ‘security field’, while in Israel it does not add much value, due to general conscription. Furthermore, a police officer may overtly display his/her firearm in a particular situation within which it is meaningful, such as during a patrol, while it may have no effect during an operational meeting with private security company owners. The value of capital is thus inherently connected to the ‘field’.

The third issue is that securitizing capital can happen across various scales. Capital is securitized from the local to the global or from the global to the institutional, which again, results in different fields that give it meaning. For example, the way capital is securitized by a private security owner is different when he/she is speaking to a local client than when he/she attends an international security fair. Although other theoretical frameworks also highlight this, our approach tackles the problem of scale in a unique way: namely that the securitization of capital can occur at the level of individuals, such as a police officer, but also at the level of the organization, such as the police force. Our processual-relational approach provides space to include this diversity, further emphasizing the plethora of relationships and interfaces that influence how security is enacted and experienced.
Concluding remarks

In this article we have introduced a new analytical tool—securitizing capital—that can be used to understand security across the globe. Although existing frameworks, such as security networks, nodal frameworks and security assemblages are productive and insightful, we argue that additional tools are needed to analyse particular hierarchies of power as well as to describe the circulation of particular objects, people and knowledge within such frameworks. We have tried to develop such a tool through the concept of securitizing capital, which refers to a process by which particular types of capital are translated in order to acquire authority in the field of security. We have shown how this works by using empirical material collected in three different field sites: Israel, Kenya and Jamaica. Due to the scope of this article, we have purposely presented a brief overview of these three cases and emphasized specific issues while leaving others aside.

In these three cases, we see different and shifting power balances due to the translation of different types of capital. This entails that different elements, such as objects, connections and experiences, are crucial in order to acquire power across the three cases. Therefore, by focusing on how various types of capital are securitized, we have been able to identify some similarities and differences between the cases. Rather than analysing security through institutions and actors, securitizing capital focuses on the ways in which relationships are constructed and negotiated, the role that non-human elements play in these interactions and the subjective experiences of security. As a processual-relational approach, securitizing capital thus acts as a useful comparative analytical tool that sheds further light on how security is enacted, constituted and experienced by individuals across the globe.

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Notes

1. When using interview material we draw from data collected by both authors and do not differentiate between which author conducted which interview, as some interviews were also conducted together.
2. The Green Line refers to the armistice line of 1947 and is often seen as the unofficial border between Israel and Palestinian territory.
3. All of the figures in this paragraph were provided during interviews conducted in 2014.
6. See, for example, https://hamushim.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/10649599_883962504981424_3600951479547013578_n.jpg where this issue is critically tackled by the Israeli organization Hamushim (‘armed’) (accessed 27 August 2015).
12. At the time of writing, a training system with various levels had been set up by the Heart Trust Training and Human Resource Department, yet several company owners had not adopted the system.
15. Israel’s defence budget in 2014 amounted to US$14 billion.
16. This assertion stands in contrast to Dupont (2004), who does not differentiate between the two.

References


**Author biographies**

**Tessa Diphoorn** is an assistant professor at the Department of Cultural Anthropology at Utrecht University. She is the author of *Twilight Policing: Private Security and Violence in Urban South Africa* (2016).

**Erella Grassiani** is an assistant professor at the University of Amsterdam. She is the author of *Soldiering under Occupation: Processes of Numbing among Israeli Soldiers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada* (2013). Her current research is part of a wider project on privatization and globalization of security with a specific focus on Israel and security mobilities.