The semantics of decolonisation

The public debate on the New Guinea Question in the Netherlands 1950-62

Kuitenbrouwer, V.

DOI
10.4324/9780429029363-7

Publication date
2020

Document Version
Final published version

Published in
Decolonising Europe?

License
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act (https://www.openaccess.nl/en/in-the-netherlands/you-share-we-take-care)

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
Chapter 4: The semantics of decolonisation

The public debate on the New Guinea Question in the Netherlands, 1950–62

Vincent Kuitenbrouwer

‘Imperialism is no word for scholars’.1 Australian historian W. K. Hancock’s aphorism has not held scholars back from producing a huge body of literature on the history of empires, including of the disentanglements of later empires following the Second World War. Anthony Hopkins argues that the concept of ‘decolonisation’ is key to understanding twentieth-century history, and draws attention to a process of ‘post-colonial globalization’ that started in Africa and Asia and influenced emancipation movements in British dominions and the US.2 Commenting on this assertion, Stuart Ward argues there is a problem in conceptualising the term ‘decolonisation’ in this manner as it can obscure the ways in which contemporaries used it. Ward points out decolonisation’s ‘European provenance’, in interwar Germany. In fact, before 1965 the word was used primarily by intellectual and political elites in West European countries seeking new strategies to secure global influence after the loss of overseas colonies.3

Ward’s thesis on the semantics of decolonisation is a point of departure for this contribution on the Dutch public debate in the press about the end of empire in Southeast Asia. The main source is the online newspaper databank Delpher, an open access repository hosted by the Royal Library in The Hague which has digitalised a representative selection from its press collection.4 A keyword search of the Dutch term ‘dekolonisatie’ reveals that it rarely appeared in newspapers until 1961, when it entered the Dutch debate with a significant peak, never to disappear again (Figure 4.1).5 Connecting this timeline to its historical context, it appears that contemporary Dutch newspapers did not report on the Indonesian struggle for independence (1945–49) in terms of decolonisation. The word’s use starting in 1961–62, however, can be connected to a matter related to the end of the Dutch empire in Southeast Asia: the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea.

This finding is supported by two other Delpher ngram-graphs representing the words ‘Papoea’ (Papua) and ‘zelfbeschikkingsrecht’ (self-determination). The use of these words, which was connected to the political emancipation of the local population of West New Guinea, peaked in 1961–62 (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). This essay argues that these terms are directly related to the appropriation of ‘dekolonisatie’ in the Dutch public debate, which was a result of government policy. This chapter complements Ward’s article, which considers the semantics
Figure 4.1 Delpher ngram-graph, use of term ‘dekolonisatie’, 1900–1990.

Figure 4.2 Delpher ngram-graph, use of term ‘Papoea’ (Papua), 1900–1990.

Figure 4.3 Delpher ngram-graph, use of term ‘zelfbeschikkingsrecht’ (self-determination), 1900–1990.
of ‘decolonisation’ from the narrower perspective of intellectual debates. It is striking that the term ‘dekolonisatie’ was used relatively little in newspapers, which suggests that it never was a ‘popular’ term. Therefore, it is important to look beyond the mere use of the word and to look at the broader semantic field to understand which notions and images were attached to the term and how it trickled down to the general public via the coverage of concrete news events via the process of ‘framing’.6 The last section of this chapter focuses on the media coverage of a group of Papuan spokesmen who tried to influence the debate on the political future of West New Guinea. That their agency was contested allows us to delve into the often conflicting European responses to empire’s end.

This chapter engages with the substantial historiography, mainly in Dutch, on the New Guinea Question. The Dutch government’s decision to hold on to West New Guinea led to conflict with Indonesia that almost escalated into armed confrontation; in the early 1960s, clashes on the island between Dutch and Indonesians caused fatalities on both sides. The US mediated, and under the aegis of diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, the two sides negotiated, leading to the New York Agreement of 14 August 1962, after which the territory passed into Indonesian hands. In 1969, Indonesians organised a plebiscite on West New Guinea’s political future, leading it to become part of Indonesia. Although groups of Papuans contested this result, claiming the vote was rigged (a claim supported by several scholars),7 Indonesian authorities repressed this opposition.

The main focus of Dutch scholarship on this topic has been on Dutch government motives for holding on to West New Guinea. A key early work was The Trauma of Decolonization (1966) by sociologist Arend Lijphart, which argued that Dutch policy towards West New Guinea was ‘motivated exclusively by irrational and subjective factors’ triggered by hurt national pride after the 1949 loss of Indonesia. Lijphart asserted that the ‘trauma’ of 1949 resulted in a deeply conservative attitude amongst key policymakers who ignored the tectonic geopolitical shifts breaking up empires into independent states. Lijphart argued this was comparable to other groups of reactionary westerners who clung on to the remnants of overseas empires, such as Algeria’s colonists or white settlers in the Congo, Kenya, or Rhodesia.8 Lijphart’s view long dominated the debate, but in his seminal 2005 book on the New Guinea Question, historian Pieter Drooglever criticised it. Although Drooglever agreed that some primary sources showed that the emotions Lijphart described were present, he contested the idea that these were the only considerations for the country’s opinion- and policymakers. Drooglever argued that genuine sympathy among the Dutch for West New Guinea’s inhabitants contributed to the refusal to hand it over to Indonesia.9

The present chapter continues along the lines of Drooglever’s revision, arguing that Lijphart’s thesis, appealing as it might be, is one-sided and does not reflect the complexity of the historical situation. Lijphart’s idea that ‘decolonisation’ was an unstoppable force in history and that those who opposed it were therefore outdated conservatives obscures the term’s meaning in the early 1960s. In fact, primary sources reveal that the word ‘dekolonisatie’ was first used in the Netherlands by people whom Lijphart considered to be conservative. In addition,
he overlooked newspaper coverage showing how Papuans contributed to the
debate on the West New Guinea Question. The analysis of the media coverage of
the Papuan self-determination campaign that follows supports Ward’s idea that
any reflection on the history of decolonisation needs to be rooted in specific his-
torical contexts. This moves us beyond a picture of decolonisation as a zero-sum
game according to which scholars, following Lijphart, divide European responses
to empire’s end into two camps: ‘rational progressives’ and ‘emotional conserva-
tives’. The process was more complex, leading to moral dilemmas and triggering
conflicted feelings amongst the public in (former) metropoles. In this respect, the
West New Guinea Question was not unique and can well be compared to contem-
porary events, such as the Congo Crisis, the invasion of Goa, and, later, the Biafra
War and border conflicts in the Sahara region.¹⁰

Policymaking and public debate on West New Guinea

The conflict over West New Guinea had its roots in the official Dutch recogni-
tion of Indonesian independence in 1949. After years of bloody conflict, fol-
lowing the unilateral declaration of independence by Sukarno in August 1945,
the two sides had been driven into negotiations by international pressure, result-
ing in the so-called Roundtable Conferences (RTC).¹¹ In the last phase of the
RTC deliberations, the Dutch delegation demanded West New Guinea be left
out of the agreements and that Dutch sovereignty continue there.¹² Indonesians
disputed this, but agreed to maintain the status quo for the moment to facilitate
the signing of the RTC treaty. It stipulated that the Netherlands and Indonesia
would form a bilateral committee to investigate the question of West New
Guinea and seek a solution. During the proceedings that followed, the two
delegations held such fundamentally different views that they failed to pub-
lish a joint report, instead publishing separate volumes on West New Guinea’s
political future.¹³

The dispute centred on whether West New Guinea and its inhabitants belonged
to the nation-state of Indonesia. Indonesian officials referred to pre-colonial times
to assert that West New Guinea had been part of Greater Indonesia (Indonesia
Raya) as a tributary state of the Sultanate of Ternate and that the land had been part
of the colonial state of which the Indonesian republic was the successor.¹⁴ Placing
their emphasis on biological and ethnographical arguments, the Dutch argued that
the local inhabitants in West New Guinea, the Papuans, were of a different stock
than the rest of the population of the Indonesian archipelago. Referring to research
from physical anthropologists from the 1930s, the report classified the Papuans
as a ‘negroid’ race, while Indonesians belonged to the ‘mongoloid’ type.¹⁵ The
Dutch report underscored cultural differences between the groups, Indonesians
being more influenced (and developed) by the outside world than the isolated,
primitive Papuans. Finally, the Dutch claimed that they themselves were best
equipped to take the lead in the development of the 700,000 Papuans of West
New Guinea, who trusted the administrators that were in the territory at the time,
and who mistrusted the Indonesians.¹⁶
In addition to these ethnographical arguments in the early 1950s, there were various lobby groups, connected to local administrators, which argued West New Guinea could be turned into a viable colony. These views echoed the strategies of Western countries that at the time still held colonies in Africa and that strived towards an intensification of administrative and economic ties, what some have called a ‘second colonial occupation’. This set of arguments, which promised great economic gain, had a certain appeal in the Netherlands, which at the time was rebuilding after the Second World War; but there was also a Southeast Asian aspect to it. Several lobby groups portrayed West New Guinea as a refuge or even a ‘promised land’ in the region for population groups in Indonesia that wanted to flee the Sukarno regime, particularly Eurasians.

Although these arguments formed the bedrock of the official Dutch standpoint throughout the New Guinea Question, there were shifts in policy framing. In late 1949, the Dutch government had facilitated a colonisation project for Eurasians, but by 1953 it was clear it had failed; the project was terminated. By that time a form of self-appointed ‘civilising duty’ towards the Papuans took centre stage in the Dutch official mind, particularly because this could be effectively connected to Article 73 of the UN Charter, on ‘non-self-governing territories’. The article states that self-determination of the local inhabitants of such territories is ‘paramount’, but also mentions that one had to consider the ‘varying stages of advancement’. One of the architects of the UN Charter, Jan Smuts, used ambivalent wording in Article 73 to enable Western countries to continue forms of overseas rule without having to call it ‘colonialism’. Dutch officials eagerly took advantage of this in their policy formation.

In 1953, Dutch officials from various departments discussed how to translate Dutch responsibilities into concrete measures to persuade the world that their rule in West New Guinea was legitimate and in line with Article 73. They recommended that the Netherlands make use of Article 73’s section obliging countries administering ‘non-self-governing territories’ to report annually to the General Assembly. The main goal was to make UN delegates aware of Papuans’ ‘primiveness’ in order to underscore the gap between ‘the theory of the United Nations and the reality of New Guinea’. Secondly, in reaction to the 1951 UNESCO report denouncing race as a social category, officials dropped the anthropological argument that Papuans were different from Indonesians. Instead, they placed emphasis on isolation and lack of development, which made West New Guinea more similar to rural regions in sub-Saharan Africa than to urbanised areas of Indonesia. This modernist developmental frame stimulated the notion that Papuans were more akin to Africans than to Indonesians.

Thus, initial changes to Dutch New Guinea policy in the 1950s were made with an eye to the international situation. But there was also a domestic factor, even if initial government efforts to influence Dutch public opinion seem to have been limited. In the first half of the 1950s, there was little need to influence public opinion, as there was widespread support for the government’s policy on West New Guinea. There was little dissent in the press, although left-wing newspapers like the Communist De Waarheid and intellectual periodicals such as Vrij Nederland.
and *De Groene Amsterdammer* did criticise the government. The majority of the mainstream media shared a dislike of Sukarno, framing him as an archetypical dictator who would do anything to get his hand on West New Guinea. The Catholic newspaper *de Volkskrant*, which was closely affiliated to ministers in subsequent cabinets in the 1950s and early 1960s, even became an important mouthpiece for the government on this issue.

In addition, the Dutch pro-colonial lobby group worked hard to spread a romantic image of West New Guinea and the Papuans, particularly the communities living in the interior, whom they portrayed as people living in the ‘stone age’. Much of this imagery derived from a well-known book by a local administrator, Jan van Eechoud, who described the hinterland of West New Guinea as *Forgotten Earth* (1951), a dark forest inhabited by backward Papuans waiting to be developed by white, adventurous officials. In a bestselling trilogy of adventure books, the writer Anthony van Kampen created a heroic image of Vic de Bruijn – who had actually commanded a group of Papuan warriors against the Japanese during the Second World War – casting him as the ‘jungle pimpernel’. Through the 1950s, de Bruijn and Eechoud (who died in 1958) continued to work in the Dutch administration in West New Guinea. Their reputation as heroic and dedicated officials supported official policy framing according to which the Dutch, unlike the predatory Indonesians, worked with the Papuans to develop them towards self-determination.

After 1956, Dutch domestic support for this policy line faltered in light of the deteriorating relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Invigorated by the success of the Bandung Conference of 1955 – the final declaration of which stated that West New Guinea was to be handed over to Indonesia immediately – Sukarno embarked on a policy of confrontation. In 1956, Indonesia unilaterally revoked the RTC treaty, and in 1957 the government nationalised most Dutch companies that had remained in the country, eliciting shock in the Netherlands. A deadlock in bilateral relations ensued, worrying several groups in Dutch society so much that they sought ways to improve relations with the Sukarno regime.

The first public sign of discontent with the Dutch government line was a statement by the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church, issued to its congregations in June 1956, calling for contemplation on the government policy, which was, according to the Synod, rooted in a colonial mentality that bred ‘selfishness’ (*zelfzucht*). Taking a different perspective, the eccentric journalist Willem Oltmans wrote articles criticising Dutch New Guinea policy, and reporting that Sukarno, whom he admired and had met, said he would restore relations with the Netherlands once the territory had been handed over. In 1957, Oltmans maintained pressure on the Dutch government, in conjunction with businessmen with interests in Indonesia, including Unilever CEO Paul Rijkens, but to no avail. In fact, at that moment these expressions of dissent mainly generated negative reactions in government circles, in Parliament, and in the press.

Opposition then grew. The dilemma was deciding which goal to pursue: good relations with the former colony Indonesia or Papuan self-determination. After 1960, domestic tensions surrounding this issue became more intense in
light of international developments, including the inauguration of US president John Kennedy, who expressed sympathy for Third World countries. Moreover, Sukarno’s government hinted at an all-out invasion, to which the Dutch government responded by sending military reinforcements. Some Dutch officials felt increasingly constrained regarding West New Guinea. Although in many ways the romantic image of New Guinea as a ‘forgotten earth’ lingered on in the formation and framing of policies, the Netherlands now forwarded other arguments to defend its position.

Substantial or semantic? Bot’s West New Guinea policy, 1960–61

The main thrust behind the changes in Dutch policy in the last phase of the New Guinea Question was given by Theo Bot, who became ‘State Secretary for Dutch New Guinea’ in November 1959, a position now within the Ministry of Interior Affairs instead of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. In fact the latter ministry (which was renamed several times after 1949) had been completely abolished in the years following the Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Statute for the Kingdom of the Netherlands) of 1954, which made the overseas territories in the Caribbean (Suriname and the Dutch Antilles) part of the Dutch realm. Although West New Guinea did not receive the same privileges as the Caribbean territories, the government tried to assert its sovereignty over the territory by framing it as a domestic issue – not dissimilar to how France asserted the Algerian conflict was a ‘police action’ or how Portugal declared its colonies ‘overseas provinces’ in 1951. Bot also employed other strategies to boost the legitimacy of Dutch West New Guinea rule, focusing on development. Bot (a colonial administrator in Java from 1936 to 1942) had been closely involved in the RTC negotiations, and was at the secretariat of the Dutch Indonesian Union until 1954, which meant he had intimate knowledge of the late colonial system and the end of the Dutch empire. Some have called Bot the ‘last minister of colonial affairs’.

Bot was acutely aware of the international changes brought about by the end of the European empires and wrote about them, arguing for changes in Dutch policy. Already in 1950, when the conflict with Indonesia was in a nascent state, Bot wrote an article for the Internationale Spectator (the Dutch equivalent of Foreign Affairs, the US magazine of international relations) in which he implored his government to abandon ‘colonial’ or ‘semi-colonial’ policies. Developing Papuans towards self-determination was necessary, and Bot explicitly indicated this could entail sacrificing Dutch sovereignty there to mobilise support from international bodies such as the UN or the South Pacific Commission. Bot envisioned West New Guinea becoming a ‘model company’ (‘model bedrijf’): a Western-style democratic order serving as an example for emergent nation-states. Development of the Papuans was in this way a double-edged sword: it would benefit both Papuans on their way to self-determination and the Netherlands as its sponsor, in a Dutch quest for standing in a world without empires.
In March 1960 Bot presented to his Dutch Cabinet colleagues a memorandum on Papuan development, and in the years that followed, he repeatedly referred to his article from 1950. In his memorandum, he was more outspoken than before, literally underlining the importance of the West New Guinea policy to convince the world of the Netherlands’ ‘anti-colonial objectives’. Bot proposed concrete steps towards Papuan self-determination that went beyond Article 73’s formal requirements, beginning with a deadline for the process of Papuan political emancipation and a plebiscite to be held within ten years. He further promised the creation of a representative body for West New Guinea, a *Nieuw-Guinea Raad* (New Guinea Council). The Dutch government adopted – and the Parliament approved – both suggestions, and later agreed to a hike in the 1961 budget for West New Guinea to fl. 91 million to achieve these goals. Although it seemed a new phase in the Dutch New Guinea policy had begun, the question remains to what extent this was truly the case.

After meeting with Bot, US Assistant Secretary of State Harland Cleveland characterised his plans as ‘partly semantic, partly substantial’. To this reading, Bot’s policies instigated reforms advancing Papuans’ political emancipation, but his conservative tendencies made him wary of too much assertiveness on their part. The establishment of the New Guinea Council, which Bot pushed for together with West New Guinea governor P. J. Platteel, is a case in point. Modelled on the *Volksraad* (People’s Council) inaugurated in colonial Indonesia in 1919, the New Guinea Council was to serve as an advisory body on matters related to Dutch policy in West New Guinea. This contrasted with parliaments in the parts of the Dutch realm in the Caribbean, which received a substantial measure of political autonomy in the 1950s. In addition, the franchise in West New Guinea was limited. Whereas inhabitants of ‘developed’ towns on the coast were allowed the vote, administrators in the interior appointed delegates to the New Guinea Council, many of whom were of European descent. The reforms went forward in early 1961 and the New Guinea Council’s inauguration took place on 5 April.

Bot wanted to exploit the council’s inauguration for its public relations value as part of an international charm offensive. A great number of journalists representing international media outlets came to Hollandia, so many that the Dutch authorities had to moor a ship in adjacent Humboldt Bay to accommodate them all. The Dutch press was heavily represented, including major daily newspapers, Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, even special correspondents of smaller newspapers and television crews who were flown in. Bot was pleased, later reporting how ‘splendid’ it went. He was particularly happy with the media performances of several Papuan members of the New Guinea Council who had expressed loyalty to the Dutch and whose conduct Bot described as ‘professional’, meaning that he found them convincing. One of them, Nicolaas Jouwe, even refuted Indonesia’s claim that the Dutch West New Guinea presence was a ‘continuation of colonialism’. As Jouwe put it, ‘We, the Papuans, now have firm evidence at hand that this is not the case and we are happy that also people from abroad can convince themselves of this’.

Although the inauguration of the New Guinea Council was widely reported on in the Dutch press, editorial commentaries were mixed. Several newspapers that
supported the West New Guinea policy of the government, such as the right-wing *De Telegraaf*, hailed Jouwe’s words. The editors accused Indonesia of a ‘policy aimed at conquest, which can only be compared with the colonial or imperialistic policy it claims to detest’. The Communist newspaper *De Waarheid* criticised the inauguration as a ‘fuss’ to mask the government’s failing policy and suggested Jouwe did not write his own statements, but that he had ‘been given the task’ by Dutch officials to say what he had said.

Many historians consider most influential the coverage that appeared in *Het Algemeen Handelsblad*, at the time one of the country’s most respected papers – it was without a clear party affiliation, and enjoyed a strong reputation in international news. In the month before the New Guinea Council’s inauguration, the paper’s editor-in-chief, Chris Steketee, had travelled the territory, writing a series of articles called ‘New Guinea in the surf’ (‘Nieuw-Guinea in de branding’). The final piece, appearing just before the inauguration, drew far-reaching conclusions about future policy on West New Guinea. Steketee set out to debunk several ‘myths’ on which current policy was based, such as that New Guinea did not belong to Indonesia on ethnographical grounds, and that the material circumstances in the territory were sufficient to enable a gradual evolution towards Papuan self-determination. Although he also criticised the Indonesian hardliners who seemed prepared to use violence to reach their goal of annexing the island, he expressed the hope that a ‘bridge’ could be built enabling Indonesia and the Netherlands to find a solution including a handover with guarantees for Papuan political rights. He expressed concern about the statements of several New Guinea Council members adamantly opposed to the idea of joining Indonesia. Tellingly, in the days after this commentary by its editor-in-chief, the *Algemeen Handelsblad* did provide coverage of the ‘solemn inauguration’ of the New Guinea Council, including photographs, but did not mention the content of Jouwe’s speech.

Lijphart argues that Steketee’s reports made a decisive contribution to the public debate about the New Guinea Question in the Netherlands, as they ended the taboo on the idea of handing over the territory to Indonesia. Indeed, in the months that followed, Oltmans, with support of the business lobby of Rijkens, restarted his campaign to convince the public that the New Guinea Question was harming Dutch interests, although their effort stalled after a public row in June 1961. However, other voices joined the choir of dissent, including Professor F. J. F. M. Duynstee, a Catholic public intellectual, which was damaging for Bot and foreign minister Joseph Luns, both of whom were affiliated with the Catholic People’s Party. In addition, Indonesian officials such as S. Ujeng and General Nasution started a charm offensive, meeting with Dutch opinion makers, members of Parliament, and even Papuans studying in the Netherlands, persuading them to come to Jakarta.

Although in autumn 1961 an opinion poll showed that a majority of the public still thought the Dutch should remain in New Guinea until the Papuans had achieved self-determination, the percentage wishing for a deal with Indonesia had grown. This put pressure on the government and its ministers. The hardliner Luns fumed that the ‘extra-Parliamentary opposition’ undermined his diplomacy, although this did not prevent the government from losing control over the matter.
Bot launched another strategy to take back the initiative. In the absence of Luns (who was on sick leave) he convinced the Cabinet to implement his 1950 resolution to internationalise the New Guinea Question by offering a handover to a UN mission, while guaranteeing full funding of the project. Although Luns did not like this plan, he was the one who launched it in a speech at the UN General Assembly in September. At the UN, Luns connected the Dutch commitment to Papuan self-determination to the international discourse on decolonisation. First, he indicated that the offer to relinquish sovereignty to a UN mission was in line with UN Resolution 1514, which had been adopted (with Dutch support) the previous year and which called for the liquidation of the remnants of colonial empires. Ironically, his speech echoed the Bandung Declaration, which was influenced by Sukarno himself. Thus Luns chose to fight his main rival with his own weapons. But he went even further by indicating a Dutch plan to find an international road to Papuan self-determination connected with the wider process of the end of empires: ‘Considering the fact that these proposals embody a completely new concept in the history of the decolonisation, the General Assembly would perhaps like to study them more thoroughly before taking a final decision’.

Covering the speech, Dutch newspapers engaged with the official framing that moving towards Papuan self-determination was a form of decolonisation. Reactions varied considerably. The Communist De Waarheid once again took aim at the government, arguing that Luns’ plan was an attempt to prevent a handover to Indonesia. De Waarheid’s editors did not use the word ‘dekolonisatie’ and put the term ‘self-determination’ in quotation marks to emphasise that Dutch policy was aimed to undermine the territorial integrity of its former colony. Other newspapers embraced Luns’ speech and used it in a dig against government critics. The Catholic De Tijd-Maasbode wrote about the plan launched at the UN:

No precedent exists for such a decolonisation of a territory not yet ready for self-determination. Come on, you anti-colonials, and show to what extent you are really serious about self-determination of old-colonial peoples. Nobody can beat around the bush now, a choice has to be made: are the Papuans entitled to self-determination or not?

In a nuanced editorial, the Algemeen Handelsblad criticised the project of Papuan self-determination, deeming it unlikely to get enough votes in the General Assembly, yet supporting the government for trying. Such a solution, the paper argued, would be good for the international reputation of the Netherlands: ‘What is certain, is that one cannot blame the Netherlands anymore of frantically clinging to a territory of which the sovereignty originates in its “colonial” period’.

Algemeen Handelsblad editors were correct: the UN General Assembly failed to adopt a resolution on the West New Guinea Question. It is often asserted that this botched attempt at internationalisation forced the Dutch government to the negotiation table in 1962, as domestic support for the cause of Papuan self-determination crumbled. It would seem Bot’s attempts to shift public opinion failed. Viewed from this perspective, these efforts to get the Netherlands on the
bandwagon of decolonisation can be seen as a cynical game of words, obscuring a deeply conservative state of mind, as Communist critics alleged at the time and as Lijphart echoed later in *The Trauma of Decolonization*—although he hardly mentions Bot.69 But this narrow view overlooks the changes that took place in the political organisation of West New Guinea in 1961. Bot’s reforms created a platform for campaigners for Papuan self-determination, who drew on international discourses on decolonisation. As Drooglever has asserted, this enabled Papuans to make a significant contribution to the political and public debates on West New Guinea’s future.70 A number of them eagerly took this opportunity.

‘Puppets’ or ‘pioneers’? Papuans in the Dutch press

The September 1961 Dutch internationalisation plan came as a surprise to New Guinea Council members and it raised questions about support from the Netherlands for self-determination. This spurred action, with council members repeatedly referring to Bot’s speech at the council’s inauguration, in which he had asked them for advice on the process towards Papuan self-determination. The debate on this matter was at times was fiery, and it exposed different attitudes towards Indonesia. A minority of council members argued that good relations with Indonesia were important and might even prompt some form of federation.71 One prominent member of the Papuan community who sought reconciliation with Indonesia was Frits Kirihio, a student at Leiden University, who visited Jakarta over the Christmas holiday in 1961–62. This trip caused controversy in West New Guinea, where several council members criticised Kirihio, saying he did not have any mandate of the Papuan people.72 Yet the majority of politically active Papuans were outspoken in their dislike of the Sukarno regime and called for self-determination, some even designing a set of national symbols for a Papuan nation-state. An October 1961 meeting of the ‘National Committee’ voted, among other things, in favour of a design for the Papuan flag, and formulated a national motto, ‘diversity in unity’, which was a provocative inversion of Indonesia’s motto. The New Guinea Council soon approved all these symbols.73 On 1 December 1961, the flag was hoisted for the first time. Governor Platteel wrote that the council nurture[s] the hope that with publicity … they can form “a dam against the rising tide that threatens their right to have a say in [the New Guinea Question]”74. A group of council members wanted to visit the Netherlands and also demanded that a delegation be flown to New York. Despite fears that this would overburden Dutch officials who were focusing on the lobby for the Luns plan, Bot agreed.75 Jouwe, accompanied by two colleagues, left for UN headquarters in mid-November, and two weeks later a delegation of New Guinea Council members arrived at Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport.

The arrival of the New Guinea Council delegation coincided with the news that the UN had not adopted the plan to internationalise the New Guinea Question. In fact, that same evening an exhausted Luns also returned from New York to Schiphol, where a crowd of reporters awaited him. In the chaos, officials hastily improvised a press conference for the New Guinea Council delegation, and some
40 journalists crowded in. A ‘messy’ interview followed. Delegation members were barely audible because of the lack of a good sound system, and there was no translator available, causing a ‘language barrier’ between the Papuans (who only spoke Malay) and most journalists present. One of the Dutch-speaking Council members, of Eurasian descent, started to translate, but soon stopped when he noted that reporters from *De Waarheid* and the Indonesian press agency Antara were asking ‘polemical questions’. A reporter from *Algemeen Handelsblad* wrote that the New Guinea Council members ‘had a better political understanding than the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which had not thought about a qualified special translator’. The reporter suggested another press conference be organised to enable the delegation to express itself on issues ‘not unimportant for Dutch domestic and foreign policies’.

The opportunity for another press conference presented itself about three weeks later, when Steketee, accompanied by several reporters of the *Algemeen Handelsblad*, met with the New Guinea Council delegation for an exclusive interview in a stately lounge room in their hotel in The Hague. The journalists had a ‘frank’ conversation with the delegation, which by that time had been joined by the Papuans, including Nicolaas Jouwe, who had travelled to New York. The journalists were particularly impressed by Jouwe. The interview focused on whether the Netherlands should start negotiations with Indonesia after the failure of the Plan Luns. Jouwe rejected this idea on principle, but other members seemed more open to talks. At the end of the article the (Dutch-born) president of the New Guinea Council, J. H. F. Sollewijn-Gelpke, noted that the views expressed by delegation members were their personal ones, and that the council as a whole would formulate a formal position. As Sollewijn-Gelpke affirmed, ‘[O]ur main assumption is the right to have a decision on [our] own future’.

In the following weeks, the New Guinea Council formulated advice on the territory’s political emancipation in close cooperation with Bot, who suggested several editorial changes. The text was presented and discussed during a special meeting of the New Guinea Council, which lasted deep into the night of 14 February 1962. The document contained many arguments as to why West New Guinea did not belong to Indonesia, drawing heavily on previous Dutch reports. The focus of the argumentation was on the UN discourse, arguing that the Papuans, as inhabitants of an Article 73 country, had the right to be led to self-determination. Although the text stated that the New Guinea Council preferred to remain under Dutch tutelage in the process, it suggested that a UN mission would come to West New Guinea to investigate the views of the Papuans on ‘the quickened [process of] decolonization’.

As before, reactions in the Dutch press varied. This time, the focus was on the question of the authorship of the New Guinea Council’s advice, and thereby the Papuans’ agency. *De Waarheid*, in line with its pro-Indonesian views, argued that Dutch officials had drafted it, considering its complex ‘judicial wordings’ (‘rechtsgeleerde bewoordingen’). The editors argued that Luns had mustered his ‘vassals’ and ‘straw men’ to ‘torpedo’ Indonesian claims. An *Algemeen*
Handelsblad editorial subtly implied the Papuans, none of whom had studied law, had not authored the text completely themselves. This did not mean, however, that Algemeen Handelsblad did not take the Papuans seriously. Jouwe’s speech was quoted in its opening lines asserting that the New Guinea Council seriously engaged with ‘world politics’, and it argued that the Papuans had the responsibility of ending the ‘stalemate’ with Indonesia and supporting Dutch plans to start negotiations. ‘One thing is clear: no attempt [to find a diplomatic solution] will be successful, if it is not supported by the Papuan population’.81

Soon afterwards, US intervention forced the Dutch and Indonesian governments to the negotiation table. US attorney general Robert Kennedy visited both countries in February 1962 and gave all involved a ‘knock on the head’, making it clear his brother’s administration wanted a swift end to the conflict. The US could mediate. Secret talks between the Dutch and Indonesian delegations, held at the Middleburg estate near New York, did not yield progress until US mediator Ellsworth Bunker proposed a deal for a gradual handover, first to a UN mission, to be followed five months later by a handover to Indonesia, which would avoid Dutch embarrassment over a direct transition. Bunker further proposed a plebiscite for the Papuans.82 Despite these compromises, the plan largely fitted the Indonesian agenda, as the country would get full control of the administration of West New Guinea and the Papuan population.

On 3 April 1962, the outline of the Bunker Plan was published by the Catholic newspaper de Volkskrant.83 Historians have asserted that some Dutch Cabinet members reacted emotionally when they heard about the plan, calling it ‘treason’ towards the Papuans whom they had pledged to develop.84 In addition, most members of the New Guinea Council rejected it fiercely, frustrated that they had not been invited to the talks. They demanded that the Netherlands host a visit of a Papuan delegation at The Hague. On 17 April, a committee of five Papuans, including Jouwe, arrived at Schiphol. At an airport press conference, Jouwe made it clear he thought the Bunker Plan was ‘unacceptable’ because it did not contain guarantees that Indonesia would respect the right to self-determination of the Papuans once in control of West New Guinea.85

Yet again, the arrival of the Papuan delegation in the Netherlands triggered different reactions in the Dutch press. De Waarheid kept to its editorial line and insinuated that this delegation was part of a government conspiracy to sabotage Indonesia’s claims. One headline read, ‘Luns-Papuans here to block handover’, another read, ‘Bot instructed Jouwe before press conference’. By that time, the Communist newspaper regularly referred to Jouwe as a ‘puppet’.86 A few days later De Telegraaf published two long articles on Papuan political life that painted a different picture. De Telegraaf hailed Jouwe, among others, as a ‘man of the first hour’, a ‘pioneer’ who had one goal in life, the political mobilisation of his people. De Telegraaf argued that these efforts preceded Dutch reforms that had led to the New Guinea Council, starting already at the end of the Second World War, when some Papuans had resisted the Japanese occupation.87 In this way, Papuan self-determination was presented as an organic principle that had come from the people themselves.
In the following weeks, Jouwe travelled between New York, where he assisted the Dutch UN delegation, and Hollandia, where he consulted with the New Guinea Council. On 31 July 1962, he had a brief stopover at Schiphol on his way to the US, when he was confronted with the breaking news that the Bunker Plan had been largely adopted in a draft treaty between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Although Jouwe declined to comment specifically, he made statements on the situation as a whole. He denounced Papuan student Frits Kirihio, who had joined the Indonesian delegation in the UN, as a ‘traitor’ who had been ‘bought’ by Sukarno, whom he called a man of ‘a dozen tongues’. He referenced the unfolding crisis in the former Belgian colony, warning that a ‘Congo-like situation’ (‘een soort Congo-situatie’) would erupt in West New Guinea if the Papuans’ wish for self-determination was not granted.88 The *Algemeen Handelsblad* published a photo of Jouwe’s arrival, marking it as an important event, but only gave an abbreviated version of the press conference, mentioning Jouwe’s remarks on Kirihio, but not the insult to Sukarno nor his Congo comparison – both of which risked upsetting the fragile deal that had been reached.89

Editors’ fears that Papuan radicalism might derail the final phase of negotiations proved unfounded, however. By the time Jouwe reached New York, Dutch negotiator Herman van Roijen had left for Schiphol where he gave an official press conference on 2 August during which he presented the agreement with the Indonesians that made the Bunker Plan a fait accompli. When asked if he had met with Jouwe or other Papuans at the New York airport the previous evening, van Roijen replied that he had lacked the opportunity to do so.90 Jouwe and van Roijen did meet two weeks later, when they both travelled on the same plane from the US to the Netherlands just after the New York Agreement had been signed. On arrival at Schiphol they posed together for photographs, but refused to give a joint press conference, although they did give statements to journalists who met them. According to the *Algemeen Handelsblad*, when van Roijen said that he thought that ‘the present agreement contains the best that could be reached’, Jouwe replied, ‘I do believe that this was indeed the best outcome for the Netherlands. … What this means for the Papuans I will leave aside’.91

**Conclusion**

Looking at the outcome of the New York Agreement, Lijphart has described the plea for Papuan self-determination by the Dutch government as unrealistic and irrational. However, contemporary newspaper material shows that the public debate in the Dutch metropole about the matter was more complex. Rather than the zero-sum game between ‘rational’ (in favour of the handover) and ‘emotional’ (against it) considerations that Lijphart described, the Dutch New Guinea question revolved around a moral dilemma in which the Dutch commitment towards the Papuans had to be weighed against good relations with the former colony, Indonesia. In addition, several Papuan spokesmen played an active role in the debate and journalists took their voices seriously, adding to the moral overtones of the issue. The moral dilemma that the New Guinea Question posed to the Dutch
public is clearly reflected in an opinion poll taken in the Netherlands in September 1962. Fifty-five per cent of respondents approved of the New York Agreement because it avoided war with Indonesia, but the polling organisation noted that ‘the abandonment of the Papuans was uncomfortable for many’. This mix of relief and regret affected the metropolitan responses to the end of the last outpost of the Dutch empire in Southeast Asia.

It was in the context of the West New Guinea dilemma that the word ‘decolonisation’ entered the Dutch public debate when officials connected it to the cause of Papuan self-determination. In the second half of the 1950s, government policy towards the Papuans, which was firmly based on Article 73 of the UN Charter, started to be criticised by various Dutch commentators who worried about the escalating conflict with Indonesia. To counter this mounting dissent, the government, mainly on the initiative of Theo Bot, implemented a set of far-reaching reforms aimed at democratisation of the Papuans and internationalising the question. The government framed the cause of Papuan self-determination as a form of decolonisation, making use of the contemporary international discourse, particularly in light of UN Resolution 1514, as was shown in Luns’ speech at the UN General Assembly. To a certain extent this was a semantic trick to cover up continuities with the colonial past. On the other hand, it led to shifts affecting the public debate. One of the most significant reforms Bot initiated was the establishment of the New Guinea Council. Although the power of this body and of its members were limited, it created a platform for Papuans to make their voice heard internationally. International ventures such as Nicolaas Jouwe’s visits to the Netherlands and New York generated great media attention, which he used to advocate Papuan self-determination.

Responses in the Dutch press to pleas by Jouwe and others varied, ranging from all-out criticism of Papuan ‘puppets’ in the Communist De Waarheid to fulsome praise for these ‘pioneers’ in the right-wing De Telegraaf. All this highlighted the growing controversy about West New Guinea in the Netherlands. The coverage of the Algemeen Handelsblad is probably the most relevant to consider from a historical point of view. Lijphart noted that the editorial policy line, the start of which coincided with the inauguration of the New Guinea Council, contributed significantly to the domestic pressure on the Dutch government to start negotiations with Indonesia because it denounced the cause of Papuan self-determination as a ‘myth’. Contemporary newspaper material reveals that the Algemeen Handelsblad in fact developed a more nuanced view as it paid sustained attention to Papuan opinion which it deemed an important factor. From December 1961 onwards, Jouwe attracted the most attention after he made a good impression on the editor-in-chief during an exclusive meeting. At the same time, the editors of Algemeen Handelsblad explicitly disagreed with his irreconcilable stance towards Indonesia and even passed over his more radical statements against Sukarno towards the end of the negotiation process.

These findings support Stuart Ward’s remarks on the semantics of decolonisation, expanding on them by considering the way people used the term ‘decolonisation’ to frame Dutch policy in West New Guinea, focusing on Papuan
self-determination. This case study reveals there was significant agency on the part of the Papuans, who promoted their cause to different publics. Ironically, Lijphart ignores this non-Western agency in his efforts to expose the ‘conservative’ forces in the Netherlands which, as Drooglever has argued, results in a one-sided and simplistic view of the West New Guinea Question. This is all the more painful considering the outcome of the conflict for the Papuans, who since 1963 have suffered Indonesian repression. Jouwe and several other members of the New Guinea Council moved to the Netherlands in 1962, where they continued their campaign for self-determination. This has received coverage in Dutch newspapers for decades, the latest instance being the dramatic return of Jouwe to New Guinea in 2009, which was the subject of the documentary Land without a King. This film showed how the elderly Papuan leader met with local officials, and recognised their authority. In return, Indonesia’s government allowed him to stay in the country, where he died in September 2017. In a way, and contrary to Lijphart’s thesis, it was Jouwe who really had suffered a trauma of decolonisation.

Notes
5 Looking at this article’s ngram-graphs (which represent the relative use of a keyword in the total dataset of one year), it looks as if ‘dekolonisatie’ occurred in newspapers throughout the twentieth century. Most of the hits before 1945, however, are produced by problems with Optical Character Recognition, a known problem with Delpher. Most of the time before 1945 sources read ‘de kolonisatie’ (the colonisation).
The semantics of decolonisation

11 For an overview of Dutch policymaking during the Indonesian decolonisation war, see H. van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië. De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië, Amsterdam, Prometheus, 2000.

12 Drooglever, Een daad, ch. 4.


16 Rapport van de commissie, vol. 2, pp. 69–70.


25 De toekomstige ontwikkeling, pp. 211–212.

26 De toekomstige ontwikkeling, p. 19.


28 Lijphart, The Trauma, pp. 228–229.


32 A. van Kampen, Jungle pimpernel, controleur BB, Amsterdam, C. de Boer, 1949; idem., Het laatste bivak, Amsterdam, C. de Boer, 1950; idem., De verloren vallei, Amsterdam, C. de Boer, 1951.


36 Meijer, *Ze zijn gék*, chs. 2–3.


43 Ibid.


45 Memorandum of conversation between T. Bot and H. Cleveland, 13 June 1961, box 59, 3011, Record Group 84, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD (US).


49 Memorandum, 15 March 1961, inv. nr. 15117, 2.05.118, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55-64, NL-HaNA.

50 List of attending journalists, inv. nr. 15117, 2.05.118, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55-64, NL-HaNA.

51 Memorandum Bot, 5 April 1961, inv. nr. 15117, 2.05.118, Buitenlandse Zaken/Code-Archief 55-64, NL-HaNA.

52 *De Telegraaf*, 6 April 1961.

53 *De Waarheid*, 5 April 1961.

54 *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 1 April 1961.

55 *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 5 April 1961. Days later the paper published a photo of Jouwe giving his speech, but also did not mention any of his words. *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 8 April 1961.

56 Lijphart, *The Trauma*, p. 236.

57 Meijer, *Ze zijn gék*, ch. 6.


61 Jansen van Galen, *Ons laatste*, p. 117.

62 Ward, ‘European Provenance’, p. 256. In years following, this resolution generally became known as the ‘Declaration on Decolonization’, although the original text had not used the word.
Luns’ complete speech was published in the local newspaper De Friese Koerier, 27 September 1961.


For details, see Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma”’, pp. 317–320.


The book’s index mentions Bot only twice, Luns 13 times.

Drooglever, Een daad, p. 410.

Drooglever, Een daad, p. 535.

E.g., De Tijd-Maasbode, Algemeen Handelsblad, Vrije Volk, 3 January 1962; see also Drooglever, Een daad, pp. 539–540.

Drooglever, Een daad, p. 533.

Secret telegram Platteel to Bot, 17 November 1961, inv. nr. 11566, 2.10.54, NL-HaNA.

Secret telegram Bot to Platteel, 14 November 1961, inv. nr. 11566, 2.10.54, NL-HaNA.

Algemeen Handelsblad, 30 November 1961.


Drooglever, Een daad, p. 549.

Algemeen Handelsblad, 15 February 1962.

De Waarheid, 16 February 1962.

Algemeen Handelsblad, 17 February 1962.

Drooglever, Een daad, pp. 449–450.

De Waarheid, 3 April 1962.


Algemeen Handelsblad, 18 April 1962.

De Waarheid, 18 April 1962.

De Telegraaf, 20 and 21 April 1962.

Vrije Volk, 31 July 1962.

Algemeen Handelsblad, 31 July 1962.

Algemeen Handelsblad, 2 August 1962.

Algemeen Handelsblad, 20 August 1962.

Zo zijn wij, pp. 89–90.

Land zonder koning, NTR, 2009. This was a sequel to Koning zonder land, NTR, 2008, in which Jouwe said he would never set foot in West New Guinea as long as it was part of Indonesia.


References


———, Het laatste bivak, Amsterdam, C. de Boer, 1950.
———, De verloren vallei, Amsterdam, C. de Boer, 1951.
von Vree, F., De metamorfose van een dagblad: Een journalistieke geschiedenis van de Volkskrant, Amsterdam, Muelenhoff, 1996.