

cross-examine each other. The citizens would then evaluate the experts' arguments, "focusing on both the scientific aspects and value judgments required to reach a decision" (p. 121). Although the citizens would not be able to assess the relevant evidence directly, they would make an indirect assessment based on which experts demonstrate "dialectical superiority—that is, the ability to justify one's position, answer challenges, come up with further evidence, and provide effective rebuttals" (p. 115). The aim is not for citizens to determine what is true, but rather "what can be relied on for the purposes of a particular policy given that there is disagreement about what the truth is, and the science is uncertain and incomplete" (p. 118). Science courts would then make recommendations to government policy makers.

Pamuk says the science court should be advisory only, but it remains somewhat unclear how decision makers should weigh the court's recommendations in relation to other factors. On the one hand, she suggests that public officials should defer to a science court, because its authority is derived from "descriptively representing the public" and it indicates what other citizens would think if they also had a chance to examine expert views (p. 124). She argues that such deference can be "legitimated on the basis of a claim to democratic representation" and that measures should be taken to "make it difficult for decision makers to ignore its outcome" (p. 125). And due to the court's combination of epistemic and democratic aspects, she says decision makers should give it "special weight and attention" (p. 128). These statements make Pamuk's argument vulnerable to the common concern that minipublics may allow a tiny group of citizens to dominate policy making. On the other hand, Pamuk notes that the science court could also acquire policy influence indirectly (and arguably more democratically) by shaping public opinion (p. 125). And if public opinion remains unchanged, "then decision makers would simply have to consider the court's verdict alongside other views" (p. 127).

Given these considerations, it is unfortunate that the book ignores relational and systemic theories of political representation, developed over the past few decades by Iris Marion Young, Jane Mansbridge, Nadia Urbinati, and Michael Saward, among others. According to these accounts, political representation is best understood as a mutually constitutive relationship between representatives and constituents, and representative democracy should include diverse institutions that each represent citizens in different ways. Pamuk does not examine the specific modes of representation potentially offered by both established expert advisory bodies and her proposed science court (pp. 82–83, 96, 125). They arguably represent citizens in part by facilitating the public scrutiny for which she calls. This amounts to a missed opportunity for strengthening Pamuk's argument, but it also suggests promising avenues for future research.

One might also question Pamuk's decision not to engage in detail with relevant empirical research in science and technology studies (STS), especially because her main arguments echo a long tradition of STS research (pp. 15–16, 69). Pamuk calls her book "a largely theoretic project," and she presents her institutional suggestions "as practical illustrations of the theory" (p. 16). Pamuk also restricts her project with a declared focus on the natural sciences, explicitly bracketing social scientific expertise (p. 19), even though effectively responding to issues like climate change and COVID-19 clearly depends in part on the social sciences. Of course, no book can do everything, and this book already draws on an enormous literature in political theory, the philosophy of science, and other fields. Pamuk provides an exceptionally clear and nuanced analysis of many complex issues, and she offers promising institutional proposals for improving the role of scientific research and expert advice in democratic politics.

Recognizing Resentment: Sympathy, Injustice, and Liberal Political Thought. By Michelle Schwarze. Cambridge:

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Recognizing Resentment is a tightly organized study that will interest social and moral psychologists and historians of political theory. The core of the book consists of a chapter each on Butler, Hume, and Adam Smith. These are book-ended by a substantial introduction, a chapter on seventeenth-century moral philosophy, and a conclusion that brings the material of the book in conversation with contemporary, interdisciplinary work on political emotions. It is the first monograph devoted to sympathetic indignation in liberal political theory. In what follows I describe the analytic core of Michelle Schwarze's book, and then offer a chapter by chapter summary and broad assessment.

While there are established traditions in moral and political philosophy that frown on the expression of anger and resentment, Schwarze explores a historically salient argument that suggests there is a style of moral judgment in which impartial spectators find certain harms done to victims—in particular those that show contempt or lack of respect to the victim—worthy of sympathetic resentment and, thus, she argues that they would approve of the indignation felt by the injured as worthy of rectification (p. 8). Such recognition in turn presupposes a judgment about the moral status of the victim: It seems to indicate normative equality or equality of worth (pp. 8–9).

Schwarze argues from this equality of worth that spectatorial resentment "leads to the recognition of and support for the equal *political* status of others" (p. 8; emphasis

in original). On her view, liberals should argue from recognizing “equal moral status” to recognizing “equal political right” (p. 9); in particular, sympathetic indignation may well lead to a call for “political rectification of what we deem unjust” (p. 9). In her conclusion, Schwarze reiterates that “spectatorial resentment can and should motivate justice in liberal societies ... because it entails the victims’ equal moral and political status” (p. 130). Schwarze effectively establishes the victims’ equal moral status from the arguments she provides, but I would have appreciated more attention being paid to how the argument for equal political status is supposed to work by, for example, a treatment of how to think about social and political contexts in which one would expect or like to see sympathetic indignation. For example, a major theme of Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem* is the “moral collapse” in Nazi Germany that is exemplified by the absence of indignation among Germans, even *after* the war. But such examples are not sufficiently forthcoming.

The spectatorial element also has an important epistemic dimension: it focuses “our attention on evidently vulnerable populations: victims of injury” (p. 9). Such sympathetic recognition might well prevent or rectify a kind of “affective injustice,” that is, “the injustice that victims and the marginalized face in having to choose between their righteous resentment and the desire to better their condition” (pp. 10–11). Here Schwarze builds deftly on Amia Srinivasan, who, in turn, develops ideas found in Audre Lorde and the civil rights movement.

Chapter 1 expertly surveys seventeenth-century views on how the passions contribute or compromise sociability (p. 27). Schwarze treats Hobbes and Spinoza as psychological egoists (p. 28), and then argues that for Hobbes and Spinoza fellow-feeling compromises moral judgment (p. 30). This is not quite right when it comes to Spinoza, who thought we wish to free from its distress the object of compassion (see Ryan Patrick Hanley, “The Eighteenth-Century Context of Sympathy from Spinoza to Kant,” in *Sympathy: A History*, 2015, p. 176).

Grotius is treated as the exemplary thinker who treats passions, and resentment in particular, as disruptive of social life and in need of moderation by reason and natural law (p. 32); Grotius anticipated Locke (p. 30). And Pufendorf is treated as the paradigmatic thinker who recognized the “socializing effects of some passions, but nevertheless still viewed them as immoral or strictly selfish” (p. 28). Pufendorf captures “the promise of conscience as a faculty that would facilitate sociability” (p. 42). The overall effect of the first chapter is to emphasize that resentment was central to seventeenth-century debates, but that its constructive role in a “rightful sense of justice” (p. 45) was overlooked.

This conclusion is largely right, but by skipping Descartes’s influential *Passions of the Soul* the evidence for it is exaggerated. Descartes was no proto-liberal and a critic of

sympathy, but he treats indignation as a moralized reactive attitude that presupposes considerable impartiality by an observer to intentional harm done to someone not deserving of it; when indignation functions properly socially—Descartes also thinks it can deteriorate into virtue signaling—it is proportioned by the size of the harms. This anticipates how Schwarze sees Adam Smith (p. 116).

In chapter 2, Butler takes central stage because he “directly tied duty to sympathetic resentment” (p. 49). Schwarze shows how resentment is for Butler a “moral motive” for justice (p. 58). One of the highlights of the book connects Butler’s moral psychology to his political theory; Schwarze shows that Butler is an early liberal, defending “mild, equal, government” (p. 63) in which the powerful are restrained by the rule of law, and in which each of us can act as we see fit. Butler reinterprets the Golden Rule as suggesting that we abide best by it when we pursue our own interests and don’t harm others (p. 61). Lurking in Butler is a proto-Utilitarian defense of duty. Doing our duty directly promotes our happiness (p. 61), and indirectly, as he writes, “the happiness of that society.” Schwarze notes that Butler presupposes a teleological conception of human nature (pp. 51–52). Hume, by contrast, rejects providence (p. 66).

In chapter 3 Schwarze aims to show that Hume’s account of the origin of the “artificial” convention, justice, is ground in sympathetic resentment (p. 68). In particular, that such sympathetic resentment “could inspire a sense of common interest in justice” among self-interested beings (p. 68). Schwarze claims that it “is constitutive of the ‘sense of common interest’ that makes individuals feel justice is mutually advantageous” (p. 69). Schwarze attributes to Hume the claim that prior to the establishment of the convention of justice “*the strongly felt* belief that others see the mutual advantages of cooperation” (p. 84; emphasis in Schwarze). However, it is not obvious how agents prior to the establishment of the convention would sense it is mutually advantageous to abide by it and how they would coordinate on it. Adam Smith famously suggests that Hume presupposes—the utility of the convention of justice—what he needs to prove in its original foundation (p. 78). By suggesting that sympathetic resentment is such an original motive that it can provide a “general sense of common interest” (pp. 68, 82), Schwarze attributes to *Hume Smith’s* solution to the problem *Smith* diagnose in Hume.

Unfortunately, Hume never suggests that sympathetic resentment leads to mutual trust. Moreover, it is not obvious it could lead to such trust prior to the establishment of the convention of justice (as Schwarze recognizes in her conclusion [p. 131]). It is not obvious that sympathetically felt resentment can “constitute” common interest or social trust (p. 95); it seems it would be the *effect* of social trust. Avital Hazony suggests more plausibly that such trust presupposes group loyalty, which is available to

Hume as a motive because the way others become part of expanded selves (see “Group Loyalty as the Motive of Hume’s Conventional Obligations,” 2022). Hume is not especially interested in articulating how resentment relates to the victims of injustice.

Adam Smith is interested in showing how resentment is a necessary response to injustice for the victims and spectators (p. 99). Schwarze’s account of how Smithian moral spectatorship epistemically allows to distinguish between improper anger and proper resentment is quite helpful. Schwarze emphasizes how on Smith’s view we “need” resentment to motivate our concern for injustice (p. 108, emphasis in Schwarze). Even in well-governed states injustice may flourish, and Schwarze shows that for Smith the psychological consolations offered by religion are the functional effect(s) of unsatisfied needs of (and for) resentment. I would have liked to see Schwarze reflect a bit more on what this entails for societies in which (say) Christianity has declined. One missed opportunity here in Schwarze’s argument is lack of attention to the role of biblical religion in articulating and legitimizing sympathizing indignation.

In her conclusion, Schwarz connects the book’s historical material to recent work in social and moral psychology, especially focusing on how work on deservingness illustrates and seems to confirm Butler’s and Smith’s ideas. She closes with a call for more interdisciplinary work on moral motivation and political obligation. Hers is a clearly written and excellent contribution to such an enterprise.

Hope for Democracy: How Citizens Can Bring Reason Back into Politics.

By John Gastil and Katherine R. Knobloch.
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Hope for Democracy, by John Gastil and Katherine Knobloch, tells the story of Oregon’s Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR). This story is well worth telling, and Gastil and Knobloch are well placed to tell it: both “have been present since the inception of the CIR itself” (p. 179) and played a meaningful role in its evolution (p. 183). But at the same time, Gastil and Knobloch sometimes confuse telling this story with other, admittedly worthy tasks—with using the CIR, for example, as a case study of how citizens can bring reason back into politics (to quote the book’s subtitle). This confusion occasionally detracts from the narrative.

The story of the CIR begins in 1971, when Ned Crosby, then a political science graduate student, came up with the idea of a Citizens Jury (now known as a “Citizens’ Jury”—Crosby “chose to leave off the

apostrophe when he coined the term, though the unwelcome punctuation mark became the convention”; see p. 194). As conceived by Crosby, a Citizens Jury “would enable a [randomly selected] microcosm of the public to sort through complex policy data, while reflecting on the lives and circumstances of their fellow citizens” (p. 48). Crosby founded what would become the Jefferson Center in 1972 to develop and promote Citizens Juries, which were used to examine policy issues and evaluate political candidates. The former usage proved frustrating, because “time and again, citizens would arrive at thoughtful recommendations that would end up having negligible influence on policymakers” (p. 50). The latter usage provoked a fight with the IRS over the Jefferson Center’s nonprofit status, which precluded any form of political advocacy (see p. 51).

Undaunted, Crosby searched for other contributions that Citizens Juries might make to political reform. Having relocated to the state of Washington—a state that made extensive use of ballot initiatives—he conceived with others the idea of using juries to “evaluate ballot measures rather than candidates” (p. 51). This marked the birth of the CIR. Crosby worked from 2005 to 2007 to persuade the Washington state legislature to fund CIRs but consistently received a lukewarm reception. Around the same time, however, Crosby met up with Tyrone (“Ty”) Reitman and Elliot Shuford, a pair of Oregon activists frustrated by conventional politics and interested in political reform (pp. 56–57). Reitman and Shuford together founded Healthy Democracy Oregon, later renamed Healthy Democracy, with the aim of bringing CIRs to their state (p. 186). They persuaded the Oregon state legislature to pass House Bill 2895 in 2009, establishing “CIR pilot panels in the 2010 statewide general election” (p. 60). The pilot panels were successful enough for Healthy Democracy in 2011 to propose HB 2895, which “would renew the CIR in perpetuity and include the statements produced by its panels in the *Voters’ Pamphlet* for future initiative elections” (p. 95). With the help of six participants in the original CIR pilot panels, Healthy Democracy shepherded the bill through the state legislature, and it was signed into law on June 16, 2011 (p. 101).

The introduction of the CIR to Oregon politics marks an important step in a process of democratic innovation—a process focused on bringing *deliberation* back into democratic politics—dating back to Crosby’s Citizens Juries and Peter Dienel’s Planning Cells in Germany (p. 13, figure 1.1). In particular, the CIR demonstrates well the contribution that a *mini-public*—“a small microcosm of the public [convened] to deliberate on an issue and make a judgment or recommendation” (p. 152)—can make. It therefore behooves deliberative democrats to understand the ins and outs of the Oregon CIR experience. That experience offers many lessons, both regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the CIR itself and