This chapter will describe and interpret forced migrations, also known as population transfers or simply deportations, as one among the many tactics of social engineering. Deportation, or population transfer, is a distinct aspect of population politics. It can be defined as the forced movement of a large group of people from one region to another by state policy or transnational authorities. Most frequently the victims are selected on the basis of categorical, ascribed identity markers such as ethnicity or religion. The affected population is transferred by force to a distant region often causing substantial harm (including deaths) and the loss of all immovable and often movable property. There is a subtle difference between forced population transfers and ethnic cleansing: the former consists of internal penal transportation whereas the latter is the expulsion of undesired groups beyond national borders. What these policies have in common is the desire for ethnic homogenization of a particular territory and concomitantly, a sense of purification of the nation.

The process of a mass deportation generally passes through four phases. First and foremost, the coerced extraction of the targeted group from their native environment. The victims are rounded up, often by surprise or on very short notice, and severed from their existing social networks. Their possessions are often sequestered by the regime, or sold at below-market prices, or taken with them during the deportation. If this process of extraction is resisted by the targets, government forces will often deploy violent methods, in which case considerable destruction of life and property is caused. Secondly, the group is transported to its destination, often a distant place few of them will ever have been, often under very harsh conditions in cattle cars or on foot. If these conditions are particularly tough, in this phase, too, large numbers of people may die of exposure, exhaustion, or hunger. Thirdly, the group will eventually arrive at their destination and encounter the receiving society, often enduring an initial process of estrangement, adaptation, rejection, or sometimes a modus vivendi with the local population. In this phase, unemployment and famine is often experienced as a result of social ostracism and state neglect. Finally, in those cases in which the regime that deported the group has lost power, it proves possible for at least a part of the victim group to return to its native region, which often produces new problems of reintegration and reparations.818

This chapter will deal particularly with the deportations of Kurds from Eastern to Western Turkey in the course of roughly two decades. How did the Young Turk dictatorship use forced population transfer as a strategy of “Turkifying” the country’s eastern provinces? Before describing how the Young Turks organized three major phases of deportations, it will trace the aetiology of these policies in the immediate aftermath of the Young Turk seizure of power in 1913. In order to provide a more complete understanding of this process, the chapter will analyze the deportation process as a two-way project of deporting non-Turks away from, and settling Turks into the eastern provinces, in particular Diyarbekir province. These two vectors of population transfer geared into each other, potentially rendering the deportations an effective tool of demographic Turkification. The chapter aims to present a detailed narrative of three phases of Young Turk deportations of Kurds and settlement of Turks: 1916, 1925, and 1934. It will attempt to draw a systematic comparison between the three phases and emphasize the continuity of population policies in the Young Turk era, without overlooking the subtle differences between the three phases of deportations. Alongside many official texts including justification, laws, and procedures, the chapter will also draw heavily on memoirs and oral histories to portray the experiences of deportees.

1916: phase one

The Young Turk stance toward the Kurdish population of the Ottoman Empire was of a complex nature. On the one hand, the Kurds were perceived to be Ottoman Muslims, therefore not to be excluded from the new ‘national’ order. After all, among the first founders of the Committee of Union and Progress there were several Ottoman-Kurdish intellectuals, such as Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) and Dr. İshak Süküti (1868-1902), the latter being a native of Diyarbekir. Moreover, the doyen of CUP nationalist ideology was Mehmed Ziyâ Gökalp (1876-1924), a Diyarbekir Kurd. In addition to these influential politicians, local CUP elites were often Kurds too. Again, in Diyarbekir province for example, the Pirinççizâde dynasty had exhibited loyalty to CUP policy. In Mardin city, tribal leaders of the Deşi and Kiki tribes used the CUP (and vice versa) to push their agendas. Due to familial ties, ideological conformity, but especially political opportunism, many among these Kurdish...
elites had participated in and profited from the genocidal persecution of the Christians in that province.\(^{820}\)

Apart from regional administrative institutions, the relations between the Ottoman army and the Kurds were relatively cordial as well. The army profited from Kurdish manpower which it needed in its war effort against Russia. Diyarbêkir Governor Dr. Mehmed Reshid admitted in his memoirs that without the support of the Millî, Miran, and Karakeçi tribes, generally located in the west of Diyarbêkir province, it would not have been possible to provide the necessary resources and requisitions for the Ottoman army.\(^{821}\) In his memoirs, Commander of the Second Army Ahmed İzzet Pasha detailed some of his efforts to reach out to Kurdish tribal elites. According to İzzet, the stick-strategy had only alienated Kurdish tribesmen from the state, thus not produced the desired results. Therefore he had opted for a carrot-strategy to incorporate the tribes. Interestingly, he also wrote that one of the most successful Ottoman officials who had succeeded in gaining the Kurds’ confidence was the district governor of Mardin, İbrahim Bedreddin, who had zealously destroyed the Christian population in that district. Bedreddin had developed strong personal friendships with several influential Kurdish chieftains from the Cizre district.\(^{822}\)

Taking this bond between the CUP and Kurdish elites into consideration, the CUP seemingly had little to worry about concerning the Kurds. However, this loyalty problem was not as simple as it appeared at first sight. The outbreak of World War I put considerable pressure on the relations between the Young Turks and the Kurds. The key word was trust. There was fear of collaboration of powerful Kurdish tribes with the advancing Russian army, as well as with Armenian politicians. The CUP also harbored suspicion about Kurdish nationalism.\(^{823}\) The claims were not totally unfounded, for desertion, Kurdo-Armenian alliances, and nationalism all existed. Therefore, the CUP remained vigilant about which Kurdish families and tribes were potentially loyal to the government and which were not. It then pre-emptively distrusted those already suspected of disloyalty as a military precaution, just in case the tribes in question indeed crossed sides and joined the Russians. In that case, if a certain tribe turned out to be disloyal, a threat would have been eliminated; if the tribe was loyal after all, little was lost in the CUP’s eyes. Obviously, their actions did not advance

\(^{820}\) International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam), Hikmet Kivrículo Papers, inventory no.56, “İhtiyat Kuvvet Milliyet [Sark]” (unpublished handwritten manuscript, 1932), p.20.

\(^{821}\) Mehmed Reşid, Mülâhazât (Istanbul: n.p., 1919), transliterated in: Nejdet Bilgi, Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray’ın hayatı ve hâtblarları (İzmir: Akademi, 1997), p.82.

\(^{822}\) Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Feryadım (Istanbul: Nehir, 1992), vol.1, p.257.

\(^{823}\) According to the German journalist Harry Stürmer, who had had the opportunity to speak to CUP insiders during his two-year stay in Istanbul, the CUP feared the Kurds as a threat to state security in the eastern provinces. Harry Stürmer, Two Years in Constantinople (London: Gomidas, 2004), p.7.
Kurdish trust in and loyalty to the CUP either. A concrete example of CUP distrust in local Kurdish elites in Diyarbekir province can be found in the memoirs of Commander of the Second Army, Ahmed İzzet Pasha (1864-1937). The relatively accommodating and liberal İzzet was shocked by an anecdote Mustafa Kemal Pasha (the later Atatürk) had related to him. When Kemal Pasha arrived in Hazro district to explore the region for warfare conditions, he lodged with the local Kurdish notable Hatip Bey. But the mayor of Hazro told Kemal confidentially that the local Kurdish elite was not to be trusted. He suggested that the families needed to be “exterminated root and branch” as soon as possible.

There are manifold reasons why the CUP engaged in large-scale deportations of Kurds. First, there were direct political reasons, namely to thwart possible alliances between Kurdish tribes and the Russian army. Second, there were economic considerations: many Kurdish tribes were (semi-)nomadic and in order to tax them more effectively, they needed to be sedentarized. Nationalist assimilation was a third concern of the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior. In their efforts to “nationalize”, i.e. “Turkify”, the empire, the Kurds were targeted for cultural and linguistic assimilation, and political absorption into the Turkish nation. The combination between a long-term ideological program and short-term war exigencies drove the CUP to deport hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Kurds. The Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (İAMM, renamed AMMU in 1916) supervised the deportation of these people. Those Kurds who had fled west from the Russian occupation were incorporated in the deportation program as well.

Altogether, war exigencies, economic considerations, and assimilation policies led Ottoman Kurds to be deported en masse. Following the deportation of Armenians, on 2 May 1916 Talaat issued the following order to the governor of Diyarbekir:

It is absolutely not allowable to send the Kurdish refugees to southern regions such as Urfa or Zor. Because they would either Arabize or preserve their nationality there and remain a useless and harmful element, the intended objective would not be achieved and therefore the deportation and settlement of these refugees needs to be carried out as follows.
- Turkish refugees and the turkified city dwellers need to be deported to the Urfa, Maraş, and Anteb regions and settled there.
- To preclude that the Kurdish refugees continue their tribal life and their nationality wherever they have been deported, the chieftains need to be separated from the common people by all means, and all influential personalities and leaders

826 İzzet, Feryadım, pp.273-4.
need to be sent separately to the provinces of Konya and Kastamonu, and to the districts of Niğde and Kayseri.
- The sick, the elderly, lonely and poor women and children who are unable to travel will be settled and supported in Maden town and Ergani and Behremaz counties, to be dispersed in Turkish villages and among Turks. […]
- Correspondence will be conducted with the final destinies of the deportations, whereas the method of dispersion, how many deportees have been sent where and when, and settlement measures will all be reported to the Ministry.827

The deportation of Kurds had now begun, first of all targeting the Kurds deemed ‘disloyal’ by the CUP. When a group of mounted Kurds from Ahlat attempted to defect to the Russians, their deportation to Diyarbekir was ordered.828 Ahmed İzzet Pasha tried to prevent these deportations, suggesting to Talaat that “tribal cavalry units” should be established instead.829 His efforts had limited success as the İAMM improvised a makeshift solution. In May, it authorized the temporary settlement of Kurdish chieftains and tribesmen in areas close to the front. This was a local solution between deployment in the war and deportation to the west.830 Since hundreds of Armenian villages were empty, Kurds perceived as more soundly loyal to the government were to be settled immediately. In Diyarbekir province, Kurds enrolled in the tribal units were settled in the empty Christian villages around Mardin and Midyat.831 İAMM planners further authorized 280 members of the Zirkî tribe to settle with their families in empty villages in Derik district.832

The socio-economic motivations of the deportations were related to the CUP’s agricultural policy. Having destroyed hundreds of thousands of (Armenian) peasants, the peasant population of the country needed to be replenished. In 1911, Diyarbekir deputy Aziz Feyzi had already suggested the tribes of the eastern provinces be settled, in order to raise the revenue of the land, and to circumvent a possible German imperialist claim on that region.833 In the 1917 CUP congress an agreement was signed on (re)settling the tribes and redefining the administrative form of the settlements.834 From then on, one would find specific references to agricultural policy in the deportation orders. On 14 October 1916 the AMMU ordered Kurdish tribesmen from Diyarbekir province deported to central Anatolia via Urfa, specifying that on arrival, the settlers were to be employed in the “farming industry”. They

827 BOA, DH ŞFR 63/172-173, Talaat to Diyarbekir, 2 May 1916.
828 BOA, DH ŞFR 57/275, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 3 November 1915.
829 İzzet, Feryadım, p.257.
830 BOA, DH ŞFR 64/80, İAMM to the provinces of Erzurum, Sivas, Mamuret-ul Aziz, and Mosul, 20 May 1916.
831 BOA, DH ŞFR 57/328, İAMM to Bitlis, 7 November 1915.
832 Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913-1918) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.143.
833 Meclis-ı Mebusan Zabt Ceridesi 1327 (1911), first election period, third sitting, hundred and fourteenth session, p.3537.
834 Tanin, 21 September 1917.
were to constitute between 5 and 10 percent of the local (Turkish) population.\textsuperscript{835} Refugee-deportees who had fled the Russian occupation and had arrived in Diyarbekir province were supposed to work on the land too. The order read that the settlers were to be provided with pack animals and ploughs, in order for them to settle down and “begin agriculture immediately”.\textsuperscript{836} Due to shortages in Diyarbekir, the AMMU ordered seed potatoes to be imported from Elaziz.\textsuperscript{837}

Yet most İAMM/AMMU orders reveal that nationalist assimilation was the propelling force behind the deportations. German officials had understood what the CUP was pursuing in the war. A German teacher wrote in September 1916,

The Young Turks have the European ideal of a unitary nation-state in mind. They fear the Christian nations, the Armenians, Syriacs, Greeks, for their cultural and economic superiority and view their religion as an obstacle to Turkifying them in peaceful ways. Therefore they must be exterminated or forcibly Islamized. The non-Turkish Mohammedan races, such as Kurds, Persians, Arabs etc., they hope to Turkify through administrative measures and Turkish school education with reference to the common Mohammedan interest.\textsuperscript{838}

When initiating the deportations, Talaat personally paid attention to the efficiency of the Turkification project. In January 1916 he requested specific information on the Kurds living in more than a dozen provinces and districts. Talaat wrote, “How many Kurdish villages are there, and where? What is their population? Are they preserving their mother tongue and original culture? How is their relationship with Turkish villagers and villages?”\textsuperscript{839} In April he checked again, this time asking how and where which convoys were being deported, and whether the Kurdish deportees had begun speaking Turkish.\textsuperscript{840} These examples of correspondence indicate the nature of the deportations: they were a large-scale attack on Kurdish culture and language, constituencies that could define the Kurds as a nation and therefore potentially pose a threat.

\textsuperscript{835} BOA, DH ŞFR 69/8, AMMU to Urfa, 14 October 1916.
\textsuperscript{836} BOA, DH ŞFR 69/235, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 12 November 1916.
\textsuperscript{837} BOA, DH ŞFR 72/180, AMMU to Elaziz, 8 February 1917.
\textsuperscript{839} BOA, DH ŞFR 60/140, Talaat to the provinces of Konya, Kastamonu, Ankara, Sivas, Adana, Aydin, Trabzon, and districts of Kayseri, Canik, Eskişehir, Karahisar, Niğde, 26 January 1916.
\textsuperscript{840} BOA, DH ŞFR 62/187, Talaat to Sivas, 16 April 1916; BOA, DH ŞFR 62/278, Talaat to Adana, 9 April 1916.
As in the case of the deportations of Armenians the year before, Diyarbekir city became a hub for deportation. The local İAMM officials were appointed by the İAMM headquarters in Istanbul but were subject to the governors. They enjoyed more rights than other officials as they had clearance to send ciphers without prior authorization.\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 72/222, AMMU to provinces, 13 February 1917.} Whereas in 1915 Armenians were concentrated in the city to be deported to the south, in 1916 Kurds were sent off to the west. For the Diyarbekir Kurds, the deportations were a one-way trip out of their native province as no Kurd was allowed to (re-)enter the province. According to historian Hilmar Kaiser, Diyarbekir became a zone of “Turkification”:

Besides the ‘turkification’ of human beings, whole regions or critical localities were targeted as a second major aspect of the government’s program. Therefore, whole districts were designated as a ‘turkification region.’ Consequently, Ottoman officials did not allow Kurdish deportees arriving from the eastern borders areas in the province of Diyarbekir […] to remain there, as Muslims from the Balkans had been earmarked as settlers for these regions.\footnote{Hilmar Kaiser, “The Ottoman Government and the End of the Ottoman Social Formation, 1915-1917,” paper presented at the conference Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah, University of Zürich, 7 November 2001, at: <http://www.hist.net/kieser/aghiet/Essays/EssayKaiser.html>}

This strategy for Diyarbekir regulated a segregation of refugee-deportees from Bitlis into ethnic Kurds and ethnic Turks. The Kurdish refugees were not allowed to stay in Diyarbekir but forced to march on westward, whereas the Turkish ones were immediately settled in and around the provincial capital.\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 63/187, İAMM to Urfa, Maraş, Antep, 4 May 1916.} The official deportation order for Diyarbekir’s indigenous Kurds fell on 20 May 1916, eighteen days after Talaat’s national guidelines for deportation. The AMMU ordered “Kurdish tribes to be deported collectively to predetermined settlement areas”.\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 64/77, İAMM to the provinces of Diyarbekir, Mamuret-ul Aziz, Sivas, Erzurum, Mosul, 20 May 1916.} First they were deported to Urfa,\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 69/7, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 14 October 1916.} but after half a year Urfa became too full and they were rerouted back to Diyarbekir and settled around Siverek.\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 74/22, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 3 March 1917.} For all Kurdish deportees the general rule was applied that no one was allowed to return to Diyarbekir without prior authorization from the Ministry.\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 63/283, İAMM to Mamuret-ul Aziz, 11 May 1916.} The settlements were to be permanent: deportees arriving at their places of destination were ordered to immediately register at the local population registry before being settled.\footnote{BOA, DH.ŞFR 77/188, İAMM to Niğde, 19 April 1917; BOA, DH.ŞFR 85/262, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 28 March 1918.}

The conduct of the deportation of Kurdish tribesmen and refugees stood in stark contrast with the Armenian deportation, a year before. The Swiss missionary Jakob Künzler
was stationed in Urfa during the war and wrote in his memoirs, “Among the deportees I also saw many high-ranking Kurdish army officers, who had courageously fought the Russians in the field at the outbreak of the war, and who now bitterly perceived the treatment by the Turks as ingratitude”. Künzler personally witnessed convoys from Palu passing by in Urfa:

The treatment of these Kurds on their deportation routes differed considerably from that of the Armenians. No harm was done to them on the road, nobody was allowed to torment them. But the most terrible was, that the deportations occurred in the middle of winter. When such a Kurdish convoy arrived in a Turkish village at evening, the inhabitants quickly closed their doors out of fear. That way the paupers had to spend the winter night under rain and snow outside. The next morning then the villagers had to make mass graves for the frostbitten.

The deportees were often met with xenophobia by many Turkish villagers, who were not familiar with Kurdish tribesmen and therefore feared them. In the cities, the deportees were settled in the deserted Armenian neighbourhoods where they had no means to support themselves. After all, most Kurds were pastoralists and were not versed in agriculture and were often unfamiliar, if not hostile to urban life. The Kurdish poet Cigerxwîn (1903-1984) was deported from Mardin to the south of Urfa, where he became an orphan when he lost his parents due to famine.

A handful of missionaries and relief organizations tried to help the deportees,

849 Jacob Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes und der Tränen: Erlebnisse in Mesopotamien während des Weltkrieges (1914-1918) (Zürich: Chronos, 1999 [1921]), p.101: "dass ich unter den Deportierten auch kurdische höhere Offiziere sah, welche zu Anfang des Krieges mutig im Felde gegen die Russen gekämpft hatten, und die nun die Behandlung durch die Türken als bittersten Undank empfanden".


appealing to consulates and local Muslim clerics, and providing food and shelter. Even though
they left no stone unturned, due to the enormity of the deportation program their efforts were
a drop in the ocean.\textsuperscript{852}

At that time, inflation was rampant and the black market flourished. Fraudulent CUP
officials were massively embezzling funds designated for the population. Among them was
Kara Kemal, who was enriching himself under the cloak of “economic Turkification”. The
misappropriations became widespread among a privileged few, creating a stratum living in
unrestrained abundance. By the end of the war, the critical press even grumbled of a ‘class’ of
officials who had become very rich and constituted a “war bourgeoisie” (\textit{harb zengini}).\textsuperscript{853}
Among local AMMU officials too, corruption was expanding. Talaat considered this utterly
unacceptable because it counteracted the deportations and undermined the assimilation
program. In November 1916 funds were appropriated for the local AMMU branches: 30,000
Lira were sent to Diyarbekir, 7000 to Siverek, and 7000 to Mardin.\textsuperscript{854} When the Ministry
found out that the allotments were illegally exhausted by police chief Şeyhząde Kadri Bey
and by the district vice-governor of Mardin, an investigation was ordered.\textsuperscript{855} Another
corruption scandal was uncovered in Silvan, where the civil servants had neglected their
work, causing many refugee-deportees to starve and live under conditions of utter misery.\textsuperscript{856}
The AMMU headquarters soon found out that it was Silvan’s conscription officer Salih
Efendi and its mayor Cemilpaşazâde Adil Bey who were in charge of the embezzlements.
They had appropriated the daily rations unequally, leaving the deportees “in an outrageously
miserable and wretched state”.\textsuperscript{857} Mayor Adil Bey was discharged when the Ministry proved
he had been secretly selling sacks of rice, designated for the starving deportees, to the
population of Silvan for usurious prices.\textsuperscript{858}

At the end of 1917 the culture of embezzlement and moral bankruptcy, combined with
economic exhaustion and soaring food prices triggered a national famine that struck the
deportees in particular. Locally, prices for bread, meat, sugar, salt, rice, wheat, fat, tea, and
coffee quintupled. Even local products of which there had always been surpluses, such as

\textsuperscript{852} Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Zwischen Ararat und Euphrat: abenländische Missionen im spätoomanischen Kurdistan,” in: Hans-
Chronos, 1997), p.137.


\textsuperscript{854} \textit{BOA}, DH.SFR 70/149, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 30 November 1916.

\textsuperscript{855} \textit{BOA}, DH.SFR 70/237, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 12 December 1916.

\textsuperscript{856} \textit{BOA}, DH.SFR 69/191, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 5 November 1916.

\textsuperscript{857} \textit{BOA}, DH.SFR 71/53, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 21 December 1916.

\textsuperscript{858} \textit{BOA}, DH.SFR 87/345, Ministry of War (General Directorate for Supplies) to Diyarbekir, 30 May 1918.
Diyarbekir watermelons and rice, became very scarce.\textsuperscript{859} Although the AMMU ordered deportation officials to be guard against shortages,\textsuperscript{860} only in exceptional situations were the deportations cancelled or postponed. For example, only when an entire convoy from Beşirî became ill was their deportation postponed.\textsuperscript{861} As a result of Talaat’s insistence on deportation, the AMMU was often unable to provide even a minimal amount of food for the deportees. In Urfa, many Kurdish children died of starvation due to the delayed arrival of the designated amount of flour.\textsuperscript{862} In Sivas too, due to negligence “hundreds of children were wandering around hungry and wretched”.\textsuperscript{863} When there was no food at all, deportees ate doves, street cats and dogs, hedgehogs, frogs, moles, snakes, and the organs of slaughtered animals.\textsuperscript{864} In some extreme cases the deportees saw no other option than to eat their own relatives who had died on the road.\textsuperscript{865} Starvation was but one side of the problem, adequate shelter was another. When an Arab and Kurdish convoy was deported from Diyarbekir westward, nearly the entire convoy froze to death in the desert night. The few remaining survivors were distributed among the local villages.\textsuperscript{866}

The deportees often feared that they would be integrally killed like the Armenians. According to popular beliefs, the CUP elite had ostensibly agreed upon first destroying the “zo” (the Armenians), whereupon they would proceed to annihilate the “lo” (the Kurds).\textsuperscript{867} These fears were most acute in the maverick Dersim district, the south of which had actively opposed the genocide. In July 1915 rumors spread around Dersim that the Ottoman government would destroy the Kurds directly after their anti-Armenian campaign. Talaat immediately ordered counter-propaganda to be disseminated.\textsuperscript{868} When the Dersimites were indeed deported a year later, they sang lamentations, praying to God for survival and accusing the Germans of deporting them.\textsuperscript{869} The rumors spread over to other provinces as well.

\textsuperscript{860} BOA, DH SFR 74/258, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 26 March 1917.
\textsuperscript{861} BOA, DH SFR 68/91, Talaat to Diyarbekir, 23 September 1916.
\textsuperscript{862} BOA, DH SFR 78/237, AMMU to Urfa, 30 July 1917.
\textsuperscript{863} BOA, DH SFR 78/242, AMMU to Sivas, 30 July 1917.
\textsuperscript{864} Hasan Hisyar Serdi, \textit{Görüş ve Anılarım 1907-1985} (İstanbul: Med, 1994), p.139.
\textsuperscript{865} Mehmed E. Zeki, \textit{Kürdistan Tarihi} (İstanbul: Komal, 1977), p.168. This book was originally published in Arabic in Cairo in 1936 by an ethnically Kurdish officer who had served in the Ottoman army during World War I.
\textsuperscript{866} BOA, DH SFR 82/180, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 25 December 1917.
\textsuperscript{867} The words ‘zo’ and ‘lo’ are derogatory expressions in Turkish, referring to the Armenian and Kurdish languages, respectively. Firat Cewerî, \textit{Li Mala Mir Celadet Ali Bedir-xan} (Stockholm: Nüdem, 1998), pp.71-5.
\textsuperscript{868} BOA, DH SFR 54-A/128, Talat to the provinces of Mamuret-ul Aziz, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, 25 July 1915.
\textsuperscript{869} Apparently, the Dersimites were aware of the fact that the 1916 Dersim deportations were partly suggested and initiated by Ottoman Chief of Staff General Bronsart von Schellendorf. The deportees lamented: “German, oh German / Why have you issued a decree on us / May your honour be defiled German / You have brought ruin on our men / May your house burn down German / You have uprooted our men.” (Alamani Alamani / Te çıma mera qenûnek dananî / Ar di mala te kevi Alamani / Te paşıya mëran mera ani / Mala te bişewete Alamani / Te kokê mëran mera ani). Nuri Dersimi, \textit{Dersim ve Kürt Milli Mücadelesine Dair Hatırat} (Ankara: Öz-Ge, 1992), pp.80-1.
impelling some deportees to attempt escape from the deportation convoys. Kurdish tribesmen from Mardin and Karacadağ apparently overheard that they were to be deported to the interior and tried to seek asylum among the Viranşehir, Beşiri, and Savur tribes. They were tracked down, captured, and deported. But even when they were deported to the western provinces, some deportees still managed to escape. In July 1917 men of the Hasanani tribe were deported from Siverek to Istanbul. Five out of nine deportees escaped from the convoys and were lost without a trace.

On arrival the Kurds were rarely provided with sufficient material to make a living. As the German officer Ludwig Schraudenbach sarcastically wrote,

The Turks transplanted at that time thousands of Kurdish families from their mountains to Adana. They would ‘engage in agriculture’ there. Senior Lieutenant Schalzgruber reported that unfortunately up in the Armenian Taurus the streets were littered with such starved or starving colonizers. A crowd of them was squatting at the Mamouré station as well, their robust bodies in rags, dragging along sacks of fur and carpets, cooking pots put on their verminous heads. Is really anything going to be organized for their reception in Adana? Will they be given land, cattle, and tools? Or will they go to pieces in misery?

The evidence suggests that to various degrees, the last question could be answered affirmatively. The Ottoman directorate for deportation was predominantly interested in whether there were signs of any progress regarding cultural assimilation. When a convoy of Kurds arrived in Konya, the directorate ordered them settled and a report prepared including information on their native region, language, profession, and numbers. Increasing ethno-geographic homogeneity was prioritized over immediate concerns of subsistence.

The deportations caused many Kurdish children to be orphaned. Many of them were already half-orphans as their fathers had died in warfare. Their mothers and aunts tried to protect them from disease, hunger, and violence, thereby often sacrificing themselves. The government ordered the establishment of an orphanage in Urfa to lodge orphans of the Haydarani tribe. The construction of an orphanage in Diyarbekir was not possible due to the “Turkification” regulations: no Kurdish deportees, not even orphans, were to remain in that

870 BOA, DH.ŞFR 69/156, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 1 November 1916.
871 BOA, DH.ŞFR 78/142, Talaat to Diyarbekir, 16 July 1917.
873 BOA, DH.ŞFR 77/45, İAMM to Adana, 6 June 1917.
province. Only the strongest and luckiest orphans survived the deportations. In Palu, orphans were concentrated and needed to be deported. The AMMU knew their deportation would result in their decimation, but it decided to deport them anyway, adding that they were allowed to be nourished from the Elaziz army depots. The same order was issued for Diyarbekir: the Ministry of War was assigned to provide for widows, orphans, and orphanages. In mid-April 1918, when it had already become clear that an Ottoman defeat in the war was only a matter of time, orphans from Harput, Dersim and Palu were still instructed to march barefoot to Maraş and Elbistan.

The first phase of the Kurdish deportations demands some quantitative data, although it would require a separate study to calculate meticulously how many were deported. According to the Ministry of the Economy the total of all refugee-deportees numbered well over a million. Quantifying the deportations is difficult because many Kurdish tribesmen were deported together with Kurdish refugees from the border provinces Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis. In most accounts, the total number of 700,000 is mentioned, though there are no reliable statistics. According to one researcher, roughly half of these 700,000 deportees died. A concrete example can shed light on the death rate of the deportees. Celadet Ali Bedirxan, a Kurdish intellectual, met a group of Kurdish deportees and asked them how many had survived the death marches. The answer he received shocked him: the leader of the group answered that out of 787 people that were deported from the village, 23 had survived. It is even more difficult to determine precisely how many Diyarbekir Kurds were deported. İAMM/AMMU correspondence surmises some details on the magnitude of the deportations. In October 1916 the number of refugees that had fled the provinces of Bitlis and Van into Diyarbekir was estimated at 200,000. On 17 October 1916 the AMMU ordered the deportation of 15,000 Kurdish refugees to Konya. In November 800 people were deported from Palu to Siverek, an intra-provincial deportation. On 15 July 1917 40,000 Kurds were ordered deported from Diyarbekir to Konya and Antalya. Two weeks later, 40,000 refugees

874 BOA, DH.ŞFR 69/195, AMMU to Urfa, 5 November 1916.
875 BOA, DH.ŞFR 84/169, AMMU to Elaziz, 27 February 1918.
876 BOA, DH.ŞFR 85/290, Ministry of War (General Directorate for Supplies) to Diyarbekir, 31 March 1918.
877 BOA, DH.ŞFR 86/46, AMMU to Third Army Commander, 13 April 1918.
878 BOA, DÜTÜ, 14/28-3, Ministry of Economy memorandum (undated).
881 Serdi, Görüş ve Anılarım, p.140.
883 BOA, DH.ŞFR 69/35, AMMU to Fourth Army Command, 17 October 1916.
884 BOA, DH.ŞFR 70/74, AMMU to Mamuret-ul Aziz, 22 November 1916.
885 BOA, DH.ŞFR 78/128 and 78/129, AMMU to Adana and Diyarbekir, 15 July 1917.
from Mardin were sent off to the east, even though they were infected with contagious
diseases and there was a shortage of train carriages.\textsuperscript{886} In spite of the deportations further to
the west, in April 1920, 35,940 refugee-deportees in Diyarbekir still had not been settled.\textsuperscript{887}
These figures suggest that tens of thousands of Diyarbekir Kurds must have been deported to
the western provinces.

Along with deporting Kurds from Diyarbekir, the CUP also ordered non-Kurdish Muslims
deported to that province. This two-track policy would expedite the Turkification process.
Most of these settlers were Bosnian Muslims, Bulgarian Turks, and Albanian Muslims who
had fled the war and persecutions in the Balkans. Another group of settlers were refugees
from Bitlis and Van, the Turkish ones being filtered out for immediate settlement in
Diyarbekir. At first the settler-deportees were lodged in the Sincariye seminary, where other
poor and miserable Diyarbekirites were temporarily housed as well.\textsuperscript{888} These settlers were to
be housed in the empty Syriac and Armenian villages, mostly on the Diyarbekir plain. Some
were moved north and settled in Palu, others were settled on the Mardin plain. Beginning in
the summer of 1915, the settlement policy continued until the end of the war.

The settlers who were deported to Diyarbekir were Muslims who had sought asylum
in the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars. Many of them had lived in Istanbul in shabby
dwellings, impoverished and traumatized. When the war broke out, the CUP activated its plan
for ethnic reorganization and the settlers were incorporated in it. The Albanians were but one
group to be deported and settled. In June 1915 the İAMM ordered their “scattered settlement
in order for their mothertongue and national traditions to be extinguished quickly”.\textsuperscript{889} The
Albanians were to be settled all over the empire, including Diyarbekir province.\textsuperscript{890} The
Bosnian refugees were to be settled in Diyarbekir as well. On 30 June 1915 the İAMM
ordered 181 Bosnian families temporarily residing in Konya deported to Diyarbekir and
settled in its “empty villages”.\textsuperscript{891} The next day, the deportation and settlement of ethnic Turks
from Bulgaria and Greece was ordered from İAMM headquarters.\textsuperscript{892}

In the meantime, the genocidal persecution of the Diyarbekir Christians was raging in
full force. While the Armenians and Syriacs were being massacred, the Muslim settlers were

\textsuperscript{886} BOA, DHŞFR 78/253, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 31 July 1917.
\textsuperscript{887} “Muhacirîn,” in: İleri, 10 April 1920.
\textsuperscript{888} The Sincariye medrese presently serves as the ‘Museum of Archaeology and Ethnography’ in Diyarbekir city.
\textsuperscript{889} BOA, DHŞFR 54/216, İAMM to Konya, 28 June 1915.
\textsuperscript{890} BOA, DHŞFR 54/246, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 6 June 1915.
\textsuperscript{891} BOA, DHŞFR 54/246, İAMM to Konya, 30 June 1915.
\textsuperscript{892} BOA, DHŞFR 54/246, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 1 July 1915.
on their way. However, preparations were needed in Diyarbekir in order to lodge the settlers successfully. On 17 June 1915 the İAMM headquarters reiterated its request for economic and geographic data on the emptied Armenian villages of Diyarbekir. In order to send settlers to the province, the local capacity to absorb immigrants had to be determined. A week later it ordered educational commodities to be provided for the settlers:

It is necessary to appropriate the schools of the towns and villages that have been emptied of Armenians to Muslim immigrants to be settled there. However, the present value of the buildings, the amount and value of the educational materials needs to be registered and sent to the department of general recordkeeping.

This national order was a warrant for the seizure of all Ottoman-Armenian schools and their conversion into Ottoman-Turkish schools. School benches, blackboards, book cabinets, and even paper and pens were allocated to the yet-to-arrive settlers. The Commission for Abandoned Properties was assigned to carry out this operation in Diyarbekir.

The CUP intended the deportation and settlement of Albanians, Bosnians, and Turks to be a one-way trip into Diyarbekir province. Whether coming in from the west or east, non-Kurdish settlers were expected to “Turkify” the province. Turkish refugees from Bayezid and Diyadin (Ararat region) were selected from mixed convoys and directly settled in Silvan. Their livelihood was financed from the “abandoned property budget”. When non-Kurdish Ottoman refugees arrived in Diyarbekir from Bitlis, they were the only ones who were allowed to be settled in the provincial hinterland. They were Turkophone Ottomans and were therefore earmarked as “Turks” by the CUP. Only in exceptional situations were the refugees to be sent forth to Urfa, Antep, and Maraş. For example, Talaat personally took care that Muş deputy İlyas Sami and Genç deputy Mehmed Efendi were settled with their families in Diyarbekir city. The AMMU systematically set aside “abandoned property” for these settlers. In September 1916 it ordered “abandoned buildings in Diyarbekir assigned to Turkish refugees coming from Van and Bitlis”. The CUP probably considered it very important that the settlers remained in the province, considering that they reiterated this over and over. On 9 November 1916 the AMMU warned provincial authorities “to prevent by any means that the

893 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/39, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 17 June 1915.
894 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/101, İAMM to provinces, 22 June 1915.
895 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/331, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 7 July 1915.
896 BOA, DH.ŞFR 59/7, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 14 December 1915.
897 BOA, DH.ŞFR 61/121, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 26 February 1916.
898 BOA, DH.ŞFR 61/139, Talaat to Diyarbekir, 28 February 1916.
899 BOA, DH.ŞFR 67/174, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 3 September 1916.
Turkish settlers in the province be moved to other regions”.\footnote{BOA, DHŞFR 69/219, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 9 November 1916.} Four days later the order was repeated “with special emphasis”.\footnote{BOA, DHŞFR 69/248, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 13 November 1916.} Even after the Russian army had disintegrated and retreated in 1917 and when the Ottoman army swept all the way into Baku, Turkish refugees in Diyarbekir were not allowed to return to their native regions. The order was repeated in March 1918\footnote{BOA, DHŞFR 85/262, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 28 March 1918.} and in April 1918.\footnote{BOA, DHŞFR 86/46, AMMU to Third Army Commander, 13 April 1918.} The German official Von Lüttichau saw that those settlers who secretly attempted to return to their native regions “perished by the hundreds on the road back home, because they had no bread”.\footnote{BOA, DHŞFR 53/242, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 5 June 1915.}

The information on the settlements of the Muslim settlers in the districts and towns of Diyarbekir province is sparse. Little fieldwork has been conducted as to whether the settlers remained in the designated towns and villages, or if they migrated elsewhere. That they were allotted Armenian property can be established beyond reasonable doubt. Already in December 1915, Vice-Governor İbrahim Bedreddin requested 2000 Turkish Lira for settling the Turks, explicitly on “abandoned property” (emval-i metruke).\footnote{BCA, 272.74/64.2.5, Diyarbekir vice-governor İbrahim Bedreddin to Interior Ministry, 27 December 1915. This document seems to have strayed into the Republican archives, where it was found.} An Armenian survivor recalled how, in the late summer of 1915, Turks were settled in Palu. Local officials saw to it that the settlers were given the best houses of the deported Armenians.\footnote{Vahé Mamas Kitabdjian (ed.), “Récit de Garabed Farchian, né à Palou en 1906 ou 1907,” reproduced in: Yves Ternon, Mardin 1915: Anatomie pathologique d’une destruction (special issue of the Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, vol.4, 2002), pp.208-11.} According to a native of Palu, in the Republican period Palu town had a Zaza, a Kurdish, and a Turkish neighbourhood. The latter neighbourhood was populated by “immigrants” (muhacir), most of them Pomacs from Thrace.\footnote{Abed Mshiho Na’man Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho: Vergoten Bloed: Verhalen over de gruweldaden jegens Christenen in Turkije en over het leed dat hun in 1895 en in 1914-1918 is aangedaan (Glanerbrug, The Netherlands: Bar Hebraeus, 2002, transl. George Toro and Amill Gorgis), p.85.} Three weeks after the Qarabash massacre the İAMM ordered “the settlement of the immigrants, the confiscation of moveables and pack animals, and the reporting of the population settled in emptied Armenian villages”\footnote{Otto Jastrow (ed.), Die mesopotamisch-arabischen Qoltu-Dialekte (Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GmbH, 1981), vol.II, Volkskundliche Texte in Elf Dialekten, p.346.} Colonel Cemilpaşazâde Mustafa took control of Qarabash as Pomacs and Kurds were settled in that village.\footnote{BOA, DHŞFR 69/219, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 9 November 1916.} In Kabiye, all property of the autochthonous Christians was seized and assigned to the settlers: vineyards, watermelon fields, agricultural implements, and the carrier pigeons. The few survivors who dared to return to their village were chased out by the Muslim settlers.\footnote{PAAA, R14104, Karl Axenfeld to Embassy, 18 October 1918.}
village, on the Mardin plain, became a command post for the German army in 1917. The Germans demolished the Syriac Catholic church and built houses with its solid stones, settling Kurdish refugees from the Karahisar region in the village.\(^9\) The village of Tell Ermen, the Christian population of which had been integrally massacred in July 1915, was repopulated with Circassians and Chechens. Since the settlers already had ploughs and oxes, all they needed for subsistence farming was seed. The Ministry of War was ordered to provide the requisite seed, distributing 1000 cups of barley and 300 cups of wheat from storage depots to the settlers.\(^9\) When the Chechen population surpassed Tell Ermen’s capacity, the construction of a new village for the Chechens was ordered in September 1918.\(^9\) An assessment of the settlement of these communities in Diyarbekir province would produce rather ambivalent results. On the one hand they met with hardship as they had difficulties acclimatizing to the hot Mesopotamian climate, while on the other they were protected and well provided for by the Ottoman government, and later by the Turkish Republic.

CUP social engineering came to a halt only with the end of the war. In October 1918 the Ottoman Empire suffered a catastrophic defeat when all of its front lines disintegrated, triggering a sudden implosion of the army. On 30 October 1918 the parties signed a truce that sanctioned unconditional surrender.\(^9\) Paralyzed by panic and defeatism, that next night the inner circle of the CUP burnt suitcases full of documents, disbanded the CUP as a political party, and fled on a German submarine to Odessa.\(^9\) The power vacuum was filled by a new cabinet led by the liberal Freedom and Coalition Party, the CUP’s sworn enemy. They ruled the Ottoman Empire during the armistice (1918-1923) as long as the Istanbul government wielded sufficient actual power in the imperial heartland.\(^9\) The very day after their rise to power, the liberals immediately began reversing CUP policies: Armenians and Kurds were encouraged to return, orphans were allowed to go back to their families, and most importantly, the Ottoman press broadly exposed and discussed CUP war crimes. But with the resurrection of the CUP in Anatolia this process of reckoning would soon come to an end.

When the CUP dissolved itself in 1918, it continued functioning under other names and succeeded in launching Mustafa Kemal to organize the Anatolian resistance it had planned since 1914. After a transition process many of the CUP’s most diligent social

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\(^9\) Ternon, Mardin 1915, p.162.
\(^9\) BOA, DH.İUM E-26/9, 27 December 1916.
\(^9\) BOA, DH.İFR 91/197, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 22 September 1918.
engineers ended up working for Mustafa Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (RPP). The resurrection of Young Turk elites gave rise to the establishment of a modern dictatorship of repressive rule, driven by devotion to the tenets of a Gökalpist ideology, a set of ideas and goals that assumed the mystical character of religious doctrine.\footnote{Erik-Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926 (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in: Jacob M. Landau (ed.), Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp.25-44; Sabri M. Akural, “Ziya Gökalp: The Influence of his Thought on Kemalist Reforms” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1979); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” in: Studia Islamica, vol.86 (1997), pp.133-58.} As such, the Greco-Turkish and Armeno-Turkish wars (1919-1923) were in essence processes of state formation that represented a continuation of ethnic unmixing and exclusion of Ottoman Christians from Anatolia. The subsequent proclamation of a Turkish nation state on 29 October 1923 was more of an intermezzo than a start or an end. Its analytical use for the historiography of the Young Turk era has been convincingly proven shaky, due to compelling continuities in power structure, ideology, cadre, and population policy.\footnote{Erik-Jan Zürcher, Een Geschiedenis van het Moderne Turkije (Nijmegen: Sun, 1995), pp.7-8, 271.} No matter how thorough Young Turk social engineering was between 1913 and 1923, it was not the end to ethnic homogenization. Untroubled by restraints of any kind, it now continued behind the tightly closed curtains of national sovereignty.\footnote{Donald Bloxham, “Changing Perceptions of State Violence: Turkey’s ‘Westward’ Development through Anglo-Saxon Eyes,” in: Richard Littlejohns & Sara Soncini (eds.), Myths of Europe (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), pp.223-34.}

The continuity of discourse and practice of the Kemalist regime in relation to the CUP regime did not take long to manifest itself. Well before Kemalist population politics became well articulated and programmatic, ad hoc and pre-emptive deportations were used to serve the purpose of preventing trouble. Mustafa Kemal, a skilled and opportunist orator who tuned his words to his audience, held speeches and harbored opinions that were often mutually incompatible. In his declarations for foreign consumption, he reiterated time and again that his regime would respect the rights of the minorities, whereas behind closed doors he actively pursued a policy that was manifestly different. His reassuring principle articulated to Kurdish elites that the new Turkey would be a state of Turks and Kurds was disingenuous as well.\footnote{Andrew Mango, “Atatürk and the Kurds,” in: Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.1-25; Robert Olson, “Kurds and Turks: Two Documents Concerning Kurdish Autonomy in 1923 and 1923,” in: Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.15, no.2 (1991), pp.20-31.} Already in early 1921, amidst bitter warfare, Mustafa Kemal personally signed a decree ordering “the deportation of the Milli and Karakeçi tribes from Diyarbekir province to Thrace and their homes given to refugees for settlement.”\footnote{BCA, 30.18.1.1/2.29.7, decree dated 17 January 1921.} These policies were harbingers of the future. After his official appropriation of power in 1923, Mustafa Kemal would continue the CUP’s policies of persecution and deportation with equal vigor and focus.

The Kemalist abolitions of the sultanate and caliphate in 1923 triggered many different responses throughout Turkey.\footnote{Gavin D. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-1938,” in: Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), Turkey Before and After Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp.44-66.} For Kurdish elites the frontal attack on Islam was perceived as an eschatological intrusion into the collective identity of the Kurds, the state, and the fraternity between Muslim groups.\footnote{Hamit Bozarslan, “Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-1925),” in: Abbas Vali (ed.), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003), pp.163-90.} A group of Kurdish elites united in a 1924 conference of a clandestine organization called ‘Freedom’ (Azadî) to discuss the Kurdish issue. During the congress, consensus was reached on organizing a widespread, coordinated campaign of resistance in the eastern provinces starting from May 1925.\footnote{Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed, 1992), p.280.} Now, preparations were undertaken for a large-scale rebellion that would transcend the local and engulf the entire eastern provinces. The ambitious plan was in its planning phase when, remembering Mustafa Kemal’s promises to the Kurds, on 1 August 1924 a Kurdish delegation petitioned government officials in Diyarbekir for moderate claims of Kurdish local autonomy.\footnote{Osman Aydın, Kürt Ulus Hareketi 1925 (n.p: Weşanên Veqfa Şêx Seid, 1994), p.50. PRO, FO 424/261, p.44, no.63, Henderson to MacDonald, 16 September 1924.} The government ignored their demands, and distrust simmered on for several months until the Kurds ran out of patience. A local grab for power in the small town of Beytüşşebab, east of Diyarbekir, was organized under auspices of Colonel Xalîd Beg Cibranî (1882-1925).\footnote{Xalîd Beg was a chieftain of the large Cibran tribe and a graduate of the Military Academy in Istanbul. He had served in the Hamidiye regiments under Sultan Abdulhamid II, served on two fronts in World War I earning decorations and promotions, and after World War I spearheaded a Kurdish-nationalist group of officers called Azadî (Freedom). Most significantly, he was Sheikh Said’s brother-in-law. Cemil Gündoğan, 1924 Beytüşşebap İşyanı ve Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasına Etkileri (Istanbul: Komal, 1994).} The initiative failed and its leaders were arrested. Although at that time the rebellion was being planned by the Freedom group, the arrest of Colonel Xalîd Beg was the last straw for many. This Kurdish resistance to Young Turk policies was based on a broad spectrum of Kurdish elites: tribesmen, pious clergy, atheist intellectuals, village elders, Hamidiye military, but also ordinary peasants and tribesmen.\footnote{Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1989).} The leaders of the resistance capitalized on aggravating grievances as Kurdish discontent with twelve years of Young Turk rule now translated into openly violent resistance.

The general revolt erupted prematurely in the Piran district, north of Diyarbekir, on 13 February 1925. During a routine search gendarmes were engaged in a gunbattle with a group
loyal to Sheikh Mehmed Said (1865-1925), member of a Zaza family originally from Piran and revered sheikh of the Naqshbandi Sufi order.\(^{928}\) The gendarmes were fired on and a local outburst quickly spread in the region as Sheikh Said skillfully organized the resistance with the assistance of experienced Kurdish military officers who had served in the Ottoman army during World War I, as well as powerful chieftains of large tribes. His declaration of war against the regime reveals a complex mix of motives for the resistance:

For several years we have been able to read in the newspapers and official documents about the oppression, insults, hatred, and enmity that the Turk Republic [sic] accords to the Kurdish notables and dynasties. There is a lot of evidence available from authentic sources that they want to subject the Kurdish elite to the same treatment to which they subjected the Armenians and as a matter of fact, this subject was discussed and decided in parliament last year.\(^{929}\)

Elsewhere Sheikh Said bitterly condemned the Young Turk regime as having “occupied our country and reduced it to ruins,” as a result of which “[n]ever in its history has Kurdistan been in such a state of devastation”. For the sheikh it was “obvious that the Turks are oppressive and vile towards the Kurds. They do not honour their promises. We must teach them a lesson so the entire world understands their hypocrisy, bloodshed and barbarism.”\(^{930}\) It seems that the conflict had a pragmatic and an ideological aspect. On the one hand, the Kurds were fed up with Young Turk persecution; on the other hand the secular and Turkish nature of the new regime was despised and fundamentally antithetical to the Islamic and Kurdish nature of the sheikh’s identity.\(^{931}\) According to one of his grandsons, the sheikh considered the Kemalists “betrayers of Islam” against which resistance was every Muslim’s duty.\(^{932}\)

With surprising military prowess, Sheikh Said’s forces, estimated at 15,000 infantry and cavalry, conquered large parts of the eastern countryside.\(^{933}\) Provincial towns were stormed and state officials, including district governors and public prosecutors, were arrested.

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\(^{929}\) Ahmet Süreyya Örgeevren, *Şeyh Sait İsyani ve Şark İstiklâl Mahkemesi* (İstanbul: Temel, 2002), pp.31-2.


\(^{931}\) Mustafa İslamoğlu, *Şeyh Said Ayaklanması* (İstanbul: Denge, 1991). Scholars have discussed the seemingly mutually exclusive explanations of Islamic and nationalist motives in the Kurdish resistance. The question often posed in this exercise is whether the movement was a religious or nationalist one. These approaches were not mutually exclusive, neither as a motivating factor nor as a matter of the diversity of the resistance’s cadre. In a sense, the movement resembled the Turkish War of Independence, during which an elite, mostly of a nationalist persuasion, deployed an Islamic rhetoric in order to mobilize a maximum number of soldiers. One could interpret the 1925 military conflict between the Saidists and Kemalists as a belated continuation of the Turkish Independence War, after all a war primarily conducted against (former) internal minorities and not against Western powers. For this discussion see: Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, pp.300-2.

\(^{932}\) Kasım Firat, “Röportaj,” in: *Dava*, vol.8 (1990), pp.8-16.

By late February, the northern parts of Diyarbekir province were in Said’s hands, with one front extending southwest to Siverek and another east to the city of Muş, which they were unable to take. More than 50,000 Turkish soldiers, “a good half of the Turkish army”, were mobilized and the airfield near Harput road, on a patch of confiscated Armenian property, was used for aerial bombardments of the Kurds. Sheikh Said then installed his headquarters in a village just north of Diyarbekir city and personally took the strategic lead of the front. But government forces were anticipating the attack. General Hakkı Mürsel Bakü Pasha (1881-1945) of the Seventh Army, General Mustafa Muğlalı (1882-1951), and General Kâzım İnanç Pasha (1881-1938) of the Third Army were in charge of the defense of Diyarbekir. These experienced men were veterans of both Balkan wars, as well as World War I and the War of Liberation. They declared martial law and a strict curfew for all residents in the city, ordered the city gates to be closed, and sealed off the city hermetically. In the night of 6 to 7 March 1925, Sheikh Said’s cavalry of 5000 men laid siege to Diyarbekir. The Kurds attacked the city at all four gates simultaneously but were repelled with machine gun fire and mortar grenades.

Photo 23: Sheikh Said’s forces in 1925 (Bayrak, 1993)

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934 PRO, FO 424/262, p.169, no.175/1, Harenc to Lindsay, 2 June 1925.
Despite both heavy military engagement and shrewd tactics by special operatives to penetrate the city walls, Diyarbekir was an ancient citadel and very difficult to take. From their vantage point in the many towers Turkish officers had an excellent view of the situation on the ground. The fighting went on all night and by the time the Kurds broke contact and retreated the next morning, the grounds around the city were strewn with dead bodies. A second wave of attacks failed as well, and by 11 March the siege was lifted.936

In the end, Diyarbekir never fell. When fresh troops arrived from western Turkey, the pendulum now swung back in favor of the government. On 26 March the Turkish army launched a counter-offensive, shattering the Kurdish forces and causing many to abandon their positions and flee. At this point some Kurdish tribes refused joining the conflict as desertion too became a serious problem. As the resistance collapsed, many rebels saw no other choice than surrendering to government forces. Sheikh Said now realized the battle was lost and retreated, according to one account to regroup in the northeastern district of Hani, and according to another account to flee to Iran.937 Said had no other choice than to move east, where he took Silvan, with the Turkish army following him at a distance. There, the sheikh was surrounded by Turkish forces and the Murat river, at that time impassable due to heavy rainfall. When the government succeeded in exploiting intertribal rivalries and mustering in important Kurdish chieftains such as Cemilê Çeto of the Pencînar tribe and Emînê Perîxanê of the Raman tribe (see Chapter 3), it compounded the difficulties for Sheikh Said. His ranks diluted, his morale sunk, and he was arrested with his companions when attempting to cross a strategically important bridge on the

937 Nurer Uğurlu, Kürt milliyeçiliği: Kürtlер ve Şeyh Sait İsyani (İstanbul: Örgün, 2006); Yaşar Kalafat, Şark Meselesi Işığında Şeyh Sait Olayı, Karakteri, Dönemindeki İç ve Dış Olaylar (Ankara: Boğaziçi, 1992).
morning of 15 April 1925. Together with the execution of Colonel Xalîd Beg Cibranî, the day before, his capture meant that the Kurdish rebellion had been smothered.

When the hostilities began, the government initially announced martial law in the eastern provinces on 21 February 1925 for one month, as all eyes turned to the relatively moderate Prime Minister Ali Fethi Okyar (1880-1943). Okyar addressed parliament on 24 February and declared his government “determined to take all kinds of measures to protect the Turk Republic [sic]” and went on to promise that “those who prepared and incited this rebellion will be punished with the heaviest measures and with force.” The radical wing of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) was not satisfied with Okyar’s response to the Sheikh Said movement, calling for harsher measures and subjecting Okyar to severe criticism, to which he answered: “The measures we have taken are sufficient, I will not bathe my hands in blood with unnecessary violence.” But the hardliners were still not satisfied and declaimed provocatively, “Are you afraid of a handful of Kurds?” The tide would turn with the intervention of Mustafa Kemal, who summoned his loyal subordinate Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) from a brief vacation on the Istanbul islands. On arrival in Ankara, Kemal personally picked up İnönü’s family at the train station in Ankara and briefed him on the situation, also providing directives as to how to deal with the event. By calling in İnönü, a hardliner, Kemal gave a clear sign to the Okyar government that he was discontented with their approach. On 2 March 1925 the RPP held a meeting demanding the resignation of Okyar, who buckled under the pressure and resigned.

The ‘rebellion’ gave radical Young Turks a pretext to silence all criticism of the press and the opposition. They exploited the incident and endowed it with propagandistic value by fueling the panic and linking it to larger narrative frameworks about the ostensible innate insubordination of Kurds. Built into their system of domination was the tendency to proclaim its own normalcy. Thus, to acknowledge resistance as a mass phenomenon would have amounted to an acknowledgement of the possibility that something might have been wrong with that system. On 3 March 1925, the day after its inauguration, the İnönü government

proclaimed the Law on the Maintenance of Order. It gave the government sweeping authority to wield power as it saw fit. At the same time, the government prolonged martial law and reinstated the Independence Tribunals, one in Ankara, another in Diyarbekir. These courts had unleashed a campaign of terror during the Greco-Turkish war by executing hundreds of deserters, and now again held unrestricted authority to enforce the law. At the same time, the whole political spectrum ranging from leftist to liberal and conservative opposition was silenced with the closure of their parties and prohibition of newspapers and periodicals. Okyar was removed and assigned to the Turkish embassy in Paris, far away from domestic politics.

The crackdown on (potential) adversaries was so thorough that even provincial Young Turk loyalists were targeted. Pirinççizâde Aziz Feyzi (1879-1933), for example, had been working for the Republican People’s Party from day one and during the siege had supported the government from within the city, dropping propaganda leaflets from airplanes. In June 1925 he was accused of having backed the Sheikh Said movement because his brother-in-law was caught up in it. His adversaries were intent upon implying his participation in the rebellion and suggested his appearance before an Independence Tribunal. Feyzi denied the charges, declaring his loyalty to the party and adherence to its ideological principles in a public session. Finally, he was considered more useful alive as a local supporter and sent back to Diyarbekir. Pirinççizâde Sıdkı, notorious mass murderer of 1915, came under suspicion too when one of his friends was charged with supporting Sheikh Said. The conspiracy seemed to be everywhere, and Kemalist paranoia was rampant in the spring of 1925.

This development, the abolition of parliamentary politics and trias politica, marked a caesura in which a radical core of men around Mustafa Kemal assumed dictatorial powers in the country. Again, Young Turk radicalism reigned superior. As a result, especially in May 1925, this radicalization at the center reverberated in the eastern provinces, as a wave of mass violence swept across Diyarbekir province. In a country-wide circular of 25 February 1925, the government had already promised “severe measures” against the insurgents, though

946 The law was accompanied by the ‘Directive on Censorship to be Applied in the Eastern Region under Martial Law’ which silenced all significant publications in the eastern provinces. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931 (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1995).
949 PRO, FO 424/263, p.16, no.16, Hoare to Chamberlain, 9 August 1925.
950 Ahmet Süreyya Örgeevren, Şeyh Sait İşyanı ve Şark İstiklâl Mahkemesi: Vesikalar, Olaylar, Hatıralar (İstanbul: Temel, 2002), p.149.
repeatedly declaring the local population to be essentially “naive, innocent, and patriotic”. The counter-insurgency warfare that followed after the reconquest of Diyarbekir province was total: villages were torched, civilians as well as combatants summarily executed. The killings followed the methods of the destruction of the Armenians, a decade ago in the same region. Upon invading a village, the villagers were routinely disarmed, stripped of their belongings (including gold teeth), and collectively tied by their hands with rope. They were then taken to trenches and cliffs, where they were executed with machine guns. Another method was cramming people into haylofts and sheds and setting fire to the buildings, burning the people alive.

Two men in particular were the executioners of both clear orders and vague directives from above. Major Ali Haydar (1884-?) was assigned to pacify the northeastern districts of Pasur (later renamed Kulp), Hazro, and Lice. He inflicted cruelty upon the population to wreck morale and produce quick results in order to receive approval from his superior, General Mürsel Bakü. When his troops were ambushed and decimated in one battle, he abandoned his men and fled to Lice with his four bodyguards. Enraged and frustrated, he unleashed terror in broad daylight in the small town. At his arrival in Lice he randomly arrested 17 men from the market, took them away to a nearby ditch and had them shot dead one by one. He then moved on to the village of Serdê, a known hotbed of Sheikh Said adherents, and committed a second reprisal massacre. At least fifty-seven unarmed civilians were tied together with rope and mowed down with machine gun fire. The corpses were left to rot in the sun as Ali Haydar’s units marched on to the next village. Acts of violence perpetrated by the Major’s troops included stoning, beheading, and torture with hot irons and boiling water. The Zirkî tribe of Lice was targeted for supporting Sheikh Said, and their villages (Bamitnî, Barsum, Zara, Matbur and Çaylarbaş) were destroyed and the inhabitants murdered. The tribe’s large mansion and cemetery were levelled, and all livestock was seized, slaughtered, and cooked as provisions for the soldiers. According to survivors, the same units that had destroyed the town’s Armenian population a decade ago, had been sent to the Kurdish villages with similar instructions. This unit was known among the population as the “butcher battalion” (kasap taburu). The attack on certain tribes announced that the killings

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953 Zinar Silopi (pseudonym of Cemilpaşazâde Kadri Bey), **Doza Kurdistan: Kürt Milletinin 60 Yılındaki Esaretten Kurtuluş Savaşı Hattalari** (İstanbul: Özge, 2001), p.92.
955 Interview with Nihat İşik conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Şeyhmus Diken, **İşyan Sür günleri** (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), pp.259-61.
targeted certain categories associated with the enemy: according to official reports, in the Lice
district Major Ali Haydar “had annihilated most of the sheikhs”.

In the north-western districts of Hani, Piran (later renamed Dicle), Palu, and Ergani,
Major Ali Barut commanded the army units. Ali Barut became infamous for robbing his
victims before killing them. In his districts too, indiscriminate massacres were committed. In
the Palu district, they invaded the village of Gülüşkür and robbed all the houses of their
movable property, including cattle. One group of soldiers lashed together and murdered the
inhabitants with bayonets, whereas another group burnt the village to the ground. In Erdürük,
a large village of more than 100 households, a total of 200 people were crammed into a large
stable and burnt alive. According to survivors, the nauseating smell of burnt human flesh
lingered in the village for days. Even villages that had never joined Sheikh Said but stayed
loyal to the government suffered the same fate. The villagers of Karaman, for example,
welcomed the Turkish army with water and buttermilk, but its population was nevertheless
massacred and its property seized. As a result of this campaign of carnage, panic and
disbelief spread throughout the countryside of northern Diyarbekir. People fled into the hills,
caves, and mountain valleys to reach safety; in vain, because army units pursued them into

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957 Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları (Istanbul: Kaynak, 1992), vol.1, p.313.
these remote sites as well. According to official army reports, while hunting down a group of survivors on Çotela, a mountain just north of Pasur/Kulp, army units had slaughtered 450 people and burnt 60 villages, rendering the mountain bare of settlement.959

The massacres produced innumerable orphans. Hasan Hişyar Serdi (1907-85), secretary to Sheikh Said, was roaming the countryside with a group of Kurdish fighters as the number of orphans they picked up on the way grew more and more. When they entered a village where clearly a massacre had just been committed, a girl, sole survivor of the slaughter, was crying at her dead mother’s breast. They took the child with them and delivered the orphans to a large cave where women provided care for survivors.960 The Kurdish author Yaşar Kemal (1923-) was a toddler when his family fled from Van to Diyarbekir, and was further deported from Diyarbekir to Adana. In his memoirs he related the experiences of the child deportees: “Children were swarming around, hungry, miserable, and naked. [...] They were roaming around like flocks”.961 The Kurdish author and poet Musa Anter (1920-92) was still a child when one day he saw a group of women and children walk into their village. According to Anter, the “miserable survivors were impoverished and malnourished”. When he ran towards the children to play with them, he marveled at their language, which was Zazaki and incomprehensible to him. His mother clad and fed the traumatized families and sheltered them in the caves near the village.962 When the violence halted in the early summer of 1925, the bodycount was considerable. Precise data is lacking, but according to one account, altogether 206 villages had been destroyed, 8758 houses burnt, and 15,200 people killed.963

Why were so many civilians killed? One report mentioned that a gendarmerie major who was on short leave from Diyarbekir told a friend that “he was disgusted with the work he had had to do and that he wanted to be transferred. He had been in the eastern provinces all through the period of tranquillisation and was tired of slaughtering men, women and children.”964 A British diplomat travelling in the region after the war noted about the killings,

No doubt the repression of the 1925 rising was accomplished with a brutality which was not exceeded in any Armenian massacres. Whole villages were burnt

959 Ibid., p.170.
960 Serdi, Görüş ve Anılarım, p.246.
962 Musa Anter, Hatıralarım (İstanbul: Avesta, 1999), p.361.
963 Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1965), p.52. This source also mentions that the whole operation had cost the Turkish government 20 million Turkish Lira, but this must be a very rough estimate, especially because Ghassemlou never conducted research in the Turkish military archives. The Turkish military sources themselves do not mention the exact numbers. Halli, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Ayaklanmalar.
964 PRO, FO 424/267, p.125, no.72, Hoare to Chamberlain, 14 December 1927.
or razed to the ground, and men, women and children killed. Turkish officers have recounted how they were repelled by such proceedings and yet felt obliged to do their duty. No doubt also that whenever there is any further attempt at rebellion it is repressed with an equally heavy hand.965

At least two explanations seem to account for the level of violence. First of all, Young Turk officers viewed the population of the eastern provinces as inherently treacherous and anti-Turkish, hence threats to security against which Turkish state and army personnel had to be permanently on guard. Such a colonial attitudinal climate would prove to be highly conducive to the harsh treatment of the civilian population of the East and the committing of atrocities. Second, Young Turk military officers had been in wars since 1911 and were thoroughly brutalized by 1925. The barbarization of warfare, manifesting itself in indiscriminate killings, was a legacy of the previous wars, especially the Balkan wars. These had been ethnic in scope and annihilatory in military ethic: in the Thracian theatres of war, battling the enemy had included massacring enemy civilians and destroying enemy villages. By 1925 this had become a customary practice and distinctions between combatants and non-combatants were hardly made.966

That the eastern provinces became a lawless enclave was attested to by the establishment of the Diyarbekir Independence Tribunal, which boiled down to a show trial of the Kurdish elite. The committee assigned to prosecuting Sheikh Said and his colleagues consisted of Young Turk bureaucrats, lawyers, and military officers such as chairman Mazhar Müfit Kansu (1873-1948), prosecutor Ahmet Süreyya Örgeevren (1888-1969), Ali Saip Ursavaş (1887-1939), Avni Doğan (1892-1965), and Lütfi Müfit Özdeş (1874-1940).967 They arrived in Diyarbekir on 12 April 1925 and were taken to the citadel prison, where the Kurds had been incarcerated. The tone was set very early, when in a private discussion Özdeş told his colleague Örgeevren that the courts had to serve “a specific national goal” for which it was necessary to “surpass the law”. Nationalism interfered with and was superimposed on the rule of law. Prosecutor Örgeevren agreed and wired to Prime Minister İnönü about the Kurdish political elite that “it is a most sacred objective for this spirit to die and be killed. Therefore all harmful persons that could become leaders in Kurdistan should absolutely not be pardoned.”968 This ominous statement meant that the Kemalists would cast a wide net to rid

965 PRO, FO 424/272, p.116, no.68, Edmonds to Henderson, 21 May 1930, “Notes on a Tour to Diarbekir, Bitlis and Mush.”
967 Ahmet Süreyya Örgeevren, Şeyh Sait Isyanı ve Şark İstiklâl Mahkemesi (İstanbul: Temel, 2002), pp.100-3.
society, not only of Kurdish intellectuals who indeed posed a threat, but of those who might do so in the future.

By that time, blanket arrests of Kurdish elites were taking place. From as far as Istanbul intellectuals and community leaders had been arrested and sent to Diyarbekir. Among these were thirteen members of the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan along with dozens of intellectuals, many of whom never resisted the Kemalist regime. The defendants were not represented by defense lawyers, and were severely pressured and maltreated to provide names of Kurdish nationalists, upon which those people were declared co-conspirators and targeted as well. The first men executed were not the active participants of the rebellion but Istanbul’s Kurdish elite. Five members of the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan were brought to Diyarbekir, sentenced to death on 23 May 1925, and executed on 27 May. These included Dr. Fuad Berxo (1887-1925), who was fluent in five languages and had not even been in the region for years. His friend Hizanizâde Kemal Fevzi (1891-1925) from Bitlis was a noted poet and journalist for Kurdish newspapers. The most noted name was Seyid Abdülkadir (1851-1925), chairman of the Society and leading Kurdish-nationalist intellectual. None of these men was affiliated with Sheikh Said, but all were hanged. Taken to the gallows in front of the Great Mosque with his father, Seyid Abdülkadir’s

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970 Malmişanij, Bitlisli Kemal Fevzi ve Kürt Örgütleri İçindeki Yeri (İstanbul: Fırat, 1993), pp.82-7.
971 Ismail Göldaş, Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti (İstanbul: Doz, 1991), pp.16-21.
son Seyid Mehmed acrimoniously promised a Pandora’s box: “The government has brought calamity on itself.”\textsuperscript{972} The hanging of these men set off a long sequence of executions. One eye-witness was a child living in the Mountain Gate district when he saw a long line of gallows “from the Mountain Gate to the Urfa Gate... every morning at wake-up we saw new people dangling from the gibbets.”\textsuperscript{973} Law had become a tool of power as the Diyarbekir trials developed into a travesty of justice. The elaborate set-up of the court only served to lend the proceedings an air of legality. In the end, countless innocent men were executed and walked to the gallows in shock and disbelief. The Diyarbekir court prosecuted a total of 5010 people, of whom 2779 were acquitted and 420 sentenced to the death penalty. The actual number of people put to death was much higher than this figure due to to the many extralegal and summary executions that followed in the months after.\textsuperscript{974}

![Photo 27: Kurds being hanged in Diyarbekir in May and June 1925 (Bayrak, 1993)](image)

After his arrest, Sheikh Said was taken into custody in the notorious Diyarbekir prison. The reader will remember that only a decade ago the Armenian elite of Diyarbekir city had been incarcerated there (see Chapter 3). As was the case then, within prison walls arbitrary terror reigned. According to one eye witness, “gendarmes would take Kurdish inmates from the prison to the banks of the Tigris, shoot them, and come back. Then the gendarmes would sell the silk belts of these Zaza young men in prison.”\textsuperscript{975} During his trial, the sheikh made a calm impression and maintained his resistance to the regime. Although he repeatedly denied

\textsuperscript{973} Interview with Ali Küçük (an Armenian convert formerly named Markar), conducted by Ahmet Kahraman, published in: Kahraman, \textit{Kürt İsyanları}, p.167.
\textsuperscript{974} Aybars, \textit{İstiklâl Mahkemeleri}, p.228.
even knowing the Cemilpaşazâde brothers (noted Kurdish nationalists who were a thorn in the flesh of the Young Turks), the prosecutors insinuating they had been working together for an independent Kurdistan.\footnote{Örgeevren, \textit{Şeyh Sait İsyanı}, pp.192, 200. The government later sent out orders for the arrest of the Cemilpaşazâde brothers, but unable to tie them to Sheikh Said, they were acquitted. Ibid., p.279.} In the end nothing the sheikh said mattered. In an interview with the sole remaining pro-government newspaper, prosecutor Örgeevren predicted that “elements that had incited and created the rebellion” would be “annihilated root and branch” so that the “danger in the East” could be neutralized once and for all.\footnote{\textit{Vakit}, 19 June 1925.} The judicial authorities had already determined Said’s guilt and the actual trial, retributive rather than correctional, had as its main goal to present the accusation and the verdict to the observing public as an awe-inspiring example to the opposition and a warning to Kurds with defiant ambitions.

On 28 June 1925 Sheikh Said was sentenced to death with 47 of his adherents, including his son. One of the sentences was commuted to 10 years in prison because the defendant was under 15 years of age.\footnote{\textit{Vakit}, 19 June 1925.} On 29 June 1925, early in the morning Sheikh Said was taken to the Mountain Gate. Before execution he turned to prosecutor Ali Saip Ursavaş, smiled, and spoke his last words: “I like you. But on Judgement Day we shall settle accounts.” The Sheikh stepped on the stool, the noose around his neck was tightened, and he was hanged. After his death, the others followed, as dozens of spectators watched the mass execution.\footnote{For a list of the names of those executed see: Aybars, \textit{İstiklâl Mahkemeleri}, pp.213-5.} Said’s remains were buried anonymously in a ditch dug below his gallows, to destroy his memory and to prevent the graves from becoming places of pilgrimage. Later, the Diyarbekir city council symbolically erected a statue of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the very spot where Sheikh Said had been hanged (see Chapter 7). None of this precluded Said from becoming a legend, many epic poems being
written and laments sung in his honor.\textsuperscript{980} Up to this day, his descendants are traumatized and vindictive because their (grand)father was executed and his remains had vanished without a trace.\textsuperscript{981}

The massive resistance to Young Turk rule served to confirm the government’s fears that Kurdish society was a potentially separatist threat that needed to be dealt with urgently. In their eyes, they had once again narrowly escaped losing the eastern provinces. Now, the Young Turk cohort was resolved to obviate once and for all any potential for secession in the eastern provinces. After the political radicalization of March 1925, Mustafa Kemal personally took the lead in arranging population politics in the eastern provinces. For him, the Sheikh Said movement in particular corroborated that Kurdish resistance to the regime depended on the organization by sheikhs and other religious leaders. A general crackdown on religious brotherhoods followed the next summer. The devoted CUP veteran Hasan Tahsin Užer (1878-1939) wrote a report entitled “The Function of the Dervish Lodges in Kurdistan”, advocating drastic measures to be taken against the Kurds. Most significantly, Užer drew on his previous experiences as governor in the eastern provinces to lend authority to his argument “to completely eradicate this social disease”.\textsuperscript{982} Mustafa Kemal could hardly ignore these suggestions by his childhood friend from Salonica. On 30 November 1925 Law no. 677 decreed the closure and prohibition of lodges, shrines, and other forms of religious organization. Kemal legitimized this rigorous measure by arguing that “in the face of the light that enlightenment, science, civilization nowadays radiates, the guidance of this or that sheikh can absolutely not be accepted in a civilized Turkish society.” According to Kemal, “the Turkish Republic can never be a country of sheikhs, dervishes, disciples, adherents. The truest and most real path is the path of civilization.”\textsuperscript{983} These words, spoken after having crushed a sheikh’s resistance movement in the eastern provinces, were very soon followed by action.

On 8 September 1925 Mustafa Kemal personally authorized a special council to draft a comprehensive report on “reforming Eastern Anatolia”. This “Reform Council for the East” (Şark Islahat Encümeni) was chaired by İsmet İnönü, and major positions were held by military officers and government bureaucrats. The men solicited for writing the policy


directives were the same Young Turk officials who had gained experience in this field. CUP members such as Şükrü Kaya (1883-1959), Mahmud Celal Bayar (1883-1986), and Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (1881-1957), as well as military officers such as Lieutenant-General Kâzım Fikri Özalp (1882-1968), Interior Minister Lieutenant-Colonel Mehmet Cemil Uybadin (1880-1957), and Chief of Staff Marshal Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950). Renda and Uybadin, who had travelled in the region, were assigned to write reports on which “necessary measures” to take in shaping population politics in the eastern provinces. Their assignment, containing language of ‘radical solutions’ and ‘final solutions’, was the crux of Young Turk political thinking on the eastern provinces and forebode more violence ahead. Although Mustafa Kemal’s exhortations for “necessary measures” in the East made clear the general direction government policy was to follow, they were barren of specifics. On the one hand, these exhortations constituted a green light to the various Young Turks descending on the East, indicating that the restraints under which they had operated thus far were now lifted. No one was going to be called to account for being too ruthless or energetic. On the contrary, ambitious Young Turks now had to prove themselves capable of living up to their rhetoric. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal’s epideictic oratory was an incitement to social engineers to produce proposals for policies that would turn his vague nationalist pronouncements into specific programs with well-defined goals. Those who authorized proposals most attuned to Mustafa Kemal’s wishes were rewarded with enhanced powers to carry them out. Those who not only proved themselves capable of carrying out the drastic measures of “reform” but also displayed an organizational finesse became the instruments of these more articulated policies.

Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda wrote his report within a week and presented it in Ankara on 14 September 1925. Renda had traversed the eastern provinces and had “determined where the Kurds live and how many they are” and “what language the population uses”. According to Renda, the registered population east of the Euphrates was 1,360,000 of which 993,000 were Kurds, 251,000 Turks and 117,600 Arabs. He charted the ethnic composition of the eastern provinces region by region, lamenting the “dominant economic and linguistic position of the Kurds” and “gradual growth of the Kurdish population” in most provinces, including Diyarbekir. Since “the entire region was full of Kurdish villages and the Kurds were surging into Armenian villages,” he rejected the idea of Kurdish-Turkish coexistence and deemed it “necessary to settle Turks in strategic axes.” In Diyarbekir province, an axis of settlement needed to be carved out from Antep to Diyarbekir over the Urfa road. Moreover, “it is

984 Bayrak, Kürtler, p.481.
possible to settle Turkish immigrants on the fertile land... of the Armenian villages” and prohibit Kurds from living there. Renda believed that the program of deportation would be easier to implement by building railways and declaring a decade of martial law. Besides using forced population transfer as a method of “Turkifying” the eastern provinces, he called for forced assimilation and total disarmament “to make Turks out of the Kurds”.985

Simultaneously, Cemil Uybadın wrote his own report and approached the eastern provinces with the same nationalist mindset of social engineering. Uybadın enunciated entire categories of Kurds to be deported: “overlords, sheikhs, tribal leaders and chieftains, landholders, village elders” and especially “all supporters of Kurdism”, as well as other “harmful persons”. These categories of people were to be deported to Western Turkey and Eastern Thrace with their families. Then, “those Turks present in the East need to be supported and supplied and Turkish immigrants from abroad need to be collectively settled and the Agricultural Bank needs to favor the Turks”. Uybadın assessed that it was possible to settle 400,000 households in Diyarbekir province within a year, and to settle 5000 households per year in the future. Turkish immigrants from Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia were to be settled in the Urfa, Mardin, and Diyarbekir districts to achieve the “economic and political domination of the Turks”. Kurds who had settled in Armenian villages were to be evicted and the houses were to be given to Turkish immigrants. Moreover, “the increase in Diyarbekir of Armenians and Syriacs, Chaldeans, Nestorians and other Christians, which always produces inauspicious results, needs to be prohibited and conditions need to be brought about for these harmful elements, who will always be the instruments of the English, as well as Syriacs and Yezidis in the villages, to be expelled from this region”. Their property and enterprises would be redistributed to Turks. These measures would “procure the densification of Turks and extinguish Kurdishness”. Uybadın then made two important suggestions: the East needed to be governed by a “General Inspector” endowed with “a colonial method of administration” (müstemleke tarz-tı idare). Such a governor would wield extraordinary authority over “a civil service solely consisting of westerners and Turks”. Indeed, no state official in the Eastern bureaucracy, whether civic, legislative, judicial, or military, would be allowed to be Kurdish; all existing Kurdish civil servants were to be deported away. Disarmament would be ethnically discriminatory as well: whereas the Kurdish population of the eastern provinces was to be totally disarmed, the Turkish settlers would be allowed to bear arms.986 Uybadın thus explicitly interpreted the ‘reform plan’ as a form of internal colonization.

986 Bayrak, Kürtler, pp.467-80.
Within two weeks after Renda’s and Uybadın’s reports, the final report of the council was completed and presented to parliament for evaluation. The final report the council signed on 24 September 1925 incorporated many of Renda and Uybadın’s suggestions and was nothing short of a radical expansion of existing Young Turk ideology and methods of social engineering. It reflected a staunch belief in the feasibility of crafting a society through large-scale, top-down authoritarian policy, coupled with an ethno-nationalist vision of ‘landscaping the human garden’ at distance. The report sketched the East’s future, recommended patching together the eastern provinces and rejoining them into “Inspectorates-General” that would exercise authority over an expanded military administration, thereby ruling all of the eastern provinces by martial law for indeterminate time. A total of seven million Turkish Lira would be allocated to help supervise a comprehensive set of measures. The Kurdish political and social elite was to be prevented from reviving as a ruling class once and for all, so that the East would never again become a battlefield. The territory would be cleared of “persons, families, and their their relatives whose residence in the East the government considers inappropriate” through deportation to Western Turkey. East of the Euphrates a policy categorically prohibiting “the use of all non-Turkish languages” and “the employment of Kurds in even secondary offices” would be put into vigorous practice. Kurds who had taken up residence in Armenian villages were to be immediately evicted and deported to the western provinces, while Turks were to be settled in those villages.987

The government wasted no time in actuating the plan. In the fall of 1925 it drew up lists of Kurds earmarked for deportation and on 10 December 1925 it passed law number 675, vaguely titled ‘Law on Migrants, Refugees, and Tribes Who Leave Their Local Settlements Without Permission’. The Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Exchange, Development, and Settlement (charged with all tasks of rebuilding war-torn areas and population management, such as settling exchangees, immigrants, refugees, and the homeless) were assigned with the implementation of the laws.988 In his memoirs, Prime Minister İnönü wrote that “the first security measure was to remove and deport to the West the sheikhs, chieftains and lords of the East.”989 The list of more than 500 people deported from Diyarbekir contradicts İnönü’s assertion and the council’s decision that those actually deported necessarily fell within the categories of “sheikhs, chieftains and lords”. It included a wide range of men drawn from the local elite, from outright atheists like Cemilpaşazâde Ekrem to Sheikh Said’s social orbit.

The deportation of oppositionists was a logical measure in itself. But the puzzling fact was that the deportees also included government loyalists such as Ganizâde Dr. Osman Cevdet Akaynak, Halifezâde Salih, Pirinççizâde Edip and Nedim, Pirinççizâde Bekir Sıdkı, and Cercisağazâde Abdülkerim. These CUP veterans had not only sided with the government during the Sheikh Said crisis, but had even cooperated in the extermination of the local Armenians a decade before. Among these loyal Kurds figured men like noted chieftain Hazroolu Hatip Bey, who had provided Mustafa Kemal with accommodation in his house during World War I.990 Another Kurdish notable, Avenal Kâmil Bey of the Sürgücüzâde tribe, had assembled many armed men to support the government during the siege of Diyarbekir city. To his shock, after the suppression of the siege, he was arrested and sentenced to death. Only an intervention by Pirinççizâde Aziz Feyzi prevented his execution sentence, which was commuted to life in the prison of the northern Black Sea town of Sinop.991 Now, in the words of Cemilpaşazâde Kadri Bey, “instead of receiving a reward or at least acclaim… those persons who had helped the government… became the first victims of the government’s operations.”992 All of these men, more than 500, were deported to İzmir, Aydın, Manisa, Bursa and Antalya, where some were settled on government-allocated property and others were incarcerated in prison.993

991 Interview with Vahit Altınakar conducted by Şeyhmust Diken, published in: Şeyhmust Diken, İlyan Sürgünleri (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), pp.233-8.
992 Silopi, Doza Kurdistan, p.102. This paradoxical targeting of loyalists was a Stalinist style of rule as well. See for example the arrests and executions of NKVD bosses Yagoda and Yezhov: J. Arch Getty & Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.276, 538.
The disparate backgrounds of the deportees converged into the reality and experience of expropriation and forced migration. Kârerli Mehmet Efendi (1887-1959), a Kurdish intellectual from the northernmost Diyarbekir district, was sentenced to 101 years of imprisonment with hard labor in Afyonkarahisar. Within two days of his conviction he was shackled and deported. Since Diyarbekir had not yet been reached by the railway, he had to walk to the Fevzipaşa station, east of Adana. Mehmet Efendi, suffering from rheumatoid arthritis, was unable to walk that distance and had to rent a cart. After a journey of ten days he arrived in Fevzipaşa, where they were herded into cattle cars and deported to Afyon in a two day journey. On arrival he was locked in solitary confinement to serve his sentence. His experiences as an individual contrast with those of villagers, who were deported collectively. Feyzullah Koç from the village of Erdürük recalled that a few days after his father had been killed, soldiers came to the village and gave all survivors 24 hours to evacuate the village for deportation to the Central Anatolian town Niğde:

Quickly we packed up. Our relatives helped us. They deported me, my mother, and my sister to Elaziz… Our final destination was declared to be Niğde. It was the first time we heard of the name Niğde. We didn’t even know where, in what region it was… We rented a carriage for 100 Lira. We got on with the clothes and food we could take. We took the road. During the journey we passed through villages, cities, and towns, taking care of our needs, sleeping outside, cooking and eating whatever we brought with us. Everywhere, villages and towns were empty. The Greeks and Armenians had fled and left, leaving behind their houses and shops… The bricks in the walls of those beautiful houses were varnished. Clean, whitewashed…

After twenty days, the Koç family reached Niğde, where for a long time they were homesick for Diyarbekir. They regretted the fact that the local population treated them as pariahs for years. Hasan Hişyar Serdî was deported at a time “when snow covered the surroundings and the waters froze to ice”. His village burnt down, his family murdered, he was taken from prison, shackled by his neck, ankles, and wrists, and deported on foot with eighteen others. After two days they reached the Euphrates and caught up with a group of deportees, consisting mostly of women and children, who had been dispatched earlier. According to Serdî, the convoy was beaten with sticks by the escorting gendarmes and looked “utterly miserable”. The next day his convoy reached Malatya, where they were locked in prison.

995 Interview with Feyzullah Koç, conducted by Ahmet Kahraman, published in: Kahraman, Kürt İsyanları, pp.182-3.
Upon arrival the local inmates, many of whom were Kurds from Diyarbekir, received them cordially and sang laments that “resounded through the market of Malatya”. During roll call the next morning, an officer called for Sheikh Said’s soldiers to assemble in the courtyard. Serdî was severely beaten and again, escorted by ten gendarmes, his deportation continued westward. The rest of the deportation was equally harsh as gendarmes frequently whipped and maltreated their captives, and did not allow them to pray. After almost a month of hardship the exhausted men reached the town of Niğde, where Serdî was incarcerated to spend the rest of his life.996

The single batch of deportees who were accorded the severest measures were undoubtedly Sheikh Said’s family. In his village nobody but women and children remained. The oldest male in the village was one of the sheikh’s nephews, the fourteen-year old Muhammed. The family’s immovable property had already been confiscated by the government when, the day before deportation, gendarmes showed up and carried off his movable property too. His extended family’s belongings were sold off on the Piran marketplace and the revenue was distributed among government officials. The night before being deported his family slept in an empty house. When the gendarmes came for the final departure, the women and children were marched off “barefoot amidst snow and thunderstorms” to Erzurum, where they were registered and sent off to Trabzon. From that port city they were embarked on a boat leaving for Istanbul. In the end, the sheikh’s family was deported to Thrace and settled in a small Turkish village.997

996 Serdi, Görüş ve Anılarım, pp.311-30.
Whereas the 1925 deportations had been improvised without much forethought or planning, by the spring of 1926 the ‘Reform Plan for the East’ gradually came into effect. On 31 May 1926 the government passed the ‘Settlement Law’, authorizing the Interior Ministry to target people “who do not fall under Turkish culture, those infected with syphilis, persons suffering from leprosy and their families, and those convicted of murder except for political and military crimes, anarchists, spies, gypsies, and those who have been expelled from the country,” as well as “migratory tribes in the country and all nomads” to be “transported to suitable and available places.” In particular the law prescribed the sedentarization of nomadic tribes.\textsuperscript{998} An appendix to the law stipulated that “Pomaks, Bosniaks, and Tatars are included in Turkish culture.”\textsuperscript{999} By trial and error, the Kemalists were refining and elaborating the time-tested method of deportation as a tool of population politics. The ideology informing had evolved since the days of the CUP, but had essentially stayed the same: demographically strengthening “Turkishness” and demographically diluting the ethnic Others.

One aspect of the deportations had changed noticeably: whereas the CUP had mostly kept them secretive, now both the deportations themselves and their objectives were openly propagated. At this point, the deportations were widely discussed in the regime’s inner circle. At a conference, the delegate for Bitlis projected the “procurance of a critical Turkish majority in the Eastern provinces” and emphasized that this change could only be brought about through a policy of “resettlement”.\textsuperscript{1000} Two reasons for this discursive shift were the regime’s confidence in its own political legitimacy and sovereignty, and their adoption of an ideology legitimizing the deportations. The man who justified the deportation policies to the outside world was Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras (1883-1972), experienced in deportation during World War I. He stated to the British administrator of Iraq Sir Henry Dobbs (1871-1934) that the regime was “determined to clear the Kurds out of their valleys, the richest part of Turkey to-day, and to settle Turkish peasants there.” He added that the Kurds “would be treated as were the Armenians.” Aras underpinned his argument as follows: “The Kurds would for many generations be incapable of self-government… He always said long before the war that Turkey must get rid of the Albanians, Bulgarians and Arabs, and must become more homogeneous.”\textsuperscript{1001} Although the operative word in this exchange seems to be “homogeneous”, Aras’ use of the word “must” merits attention. For the first time the Kemalists explicitly evinced their ideological convictions. This was a amalgam of various

\textsuperscript{999} Kökdemir, \textit{Eski ve Yeni Toprak}, p.193.
\textsuperscript{1001} PRO, FO 424/265, pp.50-52, no.46/1, Memorandum by Henry Dobbs, 22 November 1926.
philosophies they espoused. First of all, the ideological blend was based on historicism, the ideology that there is an organic succession of developments in society. Widely popular in Europe at that time, it was based on assumptions of historical prediction and historical determinism, bent on identifying patterns and discovering the laws that underlie the evolution of history. Second, the evolving Young Turk conscience adopted a particular interpretation of progressism, a trend of thought which affirms the power of human beings to make, improve and reshape their society, with the aid of scientific knowledge, technology and practical experimentation. In this interpretation, social evolution into one particular direction could be (or had to be) steered from above. Posited as a scientific theory, this notion of social evolution was used to support and justify policies of population control – not unlike European colonialism. Combined together, both these ideological constructs revolved around a specific notion of time that the Kemalists had ethnicized: the past was Ottoman, the future would be Turkish. In other words, Turkish culture would be the pinnacle of social evolution. For the ethnic minorities of Turkey this meant that although they were living in the objective present, in ideological terms they were living in the subjective past. It was now deemed possible and necessary through “Turkification” to ‘push’ people forward into time towards the identity of the future.

The laws that Kemalist officials thought governed time were those of social Darwinism. For this too, Aras provided the vindication of the Kemalists’ ideological position to British Ambassador George R. Clerk:

He enunciated his theory of historical philosophy. The pendulum swings between a period of empire of federation and one of independent nations and races; the British Empire alone in history has had the political wisdom to adapt itself to the growth of separatist forces and so to preserve its structure; the pendulum has now reached the maximum of swing towards individual and separate nations and the swing back into groups, if not into empires, is already noticeable. The process is inevitable, but in its course small national units must disappear, or only survive precariously because their absorption by one of their bigger neighbours means war with the others, independent existence for all small nationalities of 1 or 2 millions, e.g, Albania, is henceforth impossible. Thus the Kurds, too, are inevitably doomed, but in their case their cultural level is so low, their mentality so backward, that they cannot be simply assimilated in the general Turkish body politic. Like what his Excellency called “the Hindus of America,” by which presumably he meant the Red Indians, they will die out, economically unfitted for the struggle for life in competition with the more advanced and cultured Turks,

1004 For a study of how human beings living in various social regimes shape their perception of time see: Johan Goudsblom, Het regime van de tijd (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1997).
who will be settled in the Kurdish districts. After all there are less than 500,000 Kurds in Turkey to-day, of whom as many as can will emigrate into Persia and Iraq, while the rest will simply undergo the elimination of the unfit.1005

In the press, these opinions were reinforced by senior Young Turks, such as İsmet İnönü, who regularly made statements such as: “In this country only the Turkish nation has the right to claim ethnic and racial rights. Nobody else has such a right”.1006 This paradigm (known as Kemalism) rationalized the deportation-and-settlement program.

For the Kemalists this was all the justification the regime needed for more deportations to ensue. In the year following the May 1926 law a new wave of deportations was organized by the regime. These were better considered, and targeted elite families such as the Cemilpaşazâde dynasty. Cemilpaşazâde Ekrem Cemil, a prominent Kurdish nationalist, was arrested and sentenced to ten years imprisonment and deported to Kastamonu state prison. He was incarcerated in that prison from September 1925 to May 1928, where he taught the Koran, French and Turkish to forty-four fellow Kurdish deportees. He wanted to teach the inmates Kurdish as well but that was prohibited. Ekrem was then deported to Istanbul and detained for another six months.1007 In total, of the Cemilpaşazâde family, the siblings and cousins Ekrem Cemil, Ahmed Cemil, Mehmed Ferid, Memduh, Muhiddin, Ömer Ali, Bedri and Fikri were deported with their wives and children and settled in the town of Buca near İzmir.1008 The police commissar of İzmir had the men followed and kept under close surveillance.1009

Other powerful and notable families followed. Members of the Azizoğlu tribe, in particular the family of noted chieftain Hüseyin Azizoğlu (1894-1957),1010 who had been arrested during the 1925 conflict, were deported from their native regions of Silvan and Estel. His daughter Fatma Azizoğlu was seven years old when gendarmes arrested her family took them to a nearby mosque, where they waited for further instructions. After a few days, they were taken to a train station on the Berlin-Baghdad railway and herded into cattle cars, which, Azizoğlu recalled, “smelled of horses, donkeys, and coal”. On the way, they changed wagons once at the Aleppo train station and finally halted in the southern town of Tarsus.1011 Sürgücüzâde tribesmen who had survived the massacres in the east were deported as well.

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1005 PRO, FO 424/266, Clerk to Chamberlain, 4 January 1927.
1006 Milliyet, 31 August 1930.
1007 Ekrem Cemil Paşa, Muhtasar Hayatım (Brussels: Institute Kurde, 1991), pp.61, 82.
1008 Malmîsanî, Diyarbekirî Cemîlpaşazâdeler ve Kûrt Milliyetçiliği (İstanbul: Avesta, 2004), p.189.
1009 BCA, 272.12/55.137.11, İzmir police commissar to Interior Ministry, 23 October 1927.
1010 For a short biography of Hüseyin Azizoğlu see: Feqi Hüseyin Sağınç, Portreler (İstanbul: İstanbul Kürt Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2000), pp.57-61.
1011 Interview with Fatma Azizoğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyan Sürgünleri, pp.82-4.
When government officials collected all remaining men, the tribesmen feared they would be killed. Their relief was great when the aim of the operation was announced as deportation to the west. In small groups, the men were taken away by their escorting gendarmes to the Fezziapa/Keller train station and deported westward. Of the extended family, one group was sent to Nazilli, another to Aydin, another to Akseki, and so forth. All of these destinations were isolated places.1012

These deportations did not satisfy the Kemalists and were the harbinger of more. Whereas the 1926 law had aimed to deport groups from across the entire country, on 10 June 1927 the Kemalists passed the ‘Law Regarding the Transportation of Certain Persons from the Eastern Regions to the Western Provinces’. This enabling law, number 1097, focused on the eastern provinces and decreed the deportation of 1400 persons and their families, and 80 “rebel families” from the “eastern martial law region” to the western provinces, “for administrative, military, and societal reasons”. The deportations were to be implemented in August 1927, but those with crops were allowed to stay in their native regions until after harvesting season, in November. Although the law stipulated that the government would cover all the costs of transportation, there is evidence that deportees were forced to pay not only for their own transportation, but for the accompanying gendarmes as well.1013 The deportees were obliged to stay within the boundaries of a specific area of settlement the government had assigned to them. It was strictly prohibited for them to travel beyond that area and especially back to their region of origin. According to article 9, all their immovable property was forfeited to the Turkish government. On arrival in their final destinations in the west, they would be settled on farmland.1014 The Kemalist use of forced relocation was shifting back from pragmatic to ideological reasons. No longer did it aim at retributively pacifying “insurgent elements”, but was developing into a corollary of their ideology of historicism, progressism, and social Darwinism.

The experiences of deportees during this phase of deportations did not differ markedly from those deported before. According to one deportee, gendarmes surrounded the village, assembled a long convoy, and took them to the railway station, where, she remembered, “they crammed us in the wagon, threw in a sack for us to defecate in, that was it.”1015 Another deportee was a baby when they were deported: “They loaded my grandmother’s family on

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1013 Ibid.
1014 Kökdemir, Eski ve Yeni Toprak, pp.28-30.
1015 Interview conducted in Bursa with Medine Kaya, 23 June 2002.
cattle cars. The wagon was crowded. People could not breathe in the cramped wagon, they traveled one piled up on top of another, hungry and thirsty for days, in the dirty smell.1016 A British military attaché in Turkey witnessed the August 1927 wave of deportations:

I saw three separate convoys of Kurds in process of transportation. The first was between Nigde and Develi Kara Hissar. It consisted of three men with about 150 women and children. Their goods and chattels were piled on bullock waggons, most of them were walking, with one or two of the elder women riding on donkeys or in the carts, and they were escorted by ten gendarmes. The second, also on the march, was between Karaman and Konia. It was pointed out to me from the train by a fellow-traveller, and was about 300 strong. Lastly, at Chumrah, near Konia, there was a camp of about 600. I remarked to a station-hand that there were a lot of gipsies about and he corrected me, saying that they were transported Kurds. At Chumrah, also in camp, was about a battalion of infantry and half a company of engineers. They, according to the station-hand, arrived about a fortnight earlier, and were there to guard the Kurds.1017

On arrival, the deportees faced a new environment, a new culture, and often a new language. One deportee arrived in the central Anatolian town of Kütahya as more deportees kept flowing in. On a given day, he remembered, a trainload of deportees from eastern Diyarbekir arrived in Kütahya. One man walked up to him and asked him: “Where is this place, are we far from our native regions?” They were in Kütahya but had no clue where Kütahya was.1018 The August deportations were followed by those of November, as projected in the 1927 Law. On 20 November 1927 the government moved a total of ten households (extended families) from the region east of Diyarbekir province to Western Turkey.1019 Despite these ambitious forecasts, much of Kemalist population politics remained on paper: a 1928 scheme to import 60,000 Muslims from the Caucasus to settle among the eastern Kurds never took place.1020 This was a signal of how difficult it was to accomplish a high level of effectiveness in ambitious social engineering policies (see Chapter 8, “Conclusion”).

The deportations were not a simple transfer from A to B. During most of 1927 and 1928, the Kemalist regime took measures to settle and provide for the deportees on arrival at their final destination. It ordered all receiving provinces to register the names, sexes, ethnic or tribal backgrounds, numbers and other characteristics and report these to the Interior Ministry. Furthermore, the receiving provinces were to supply the central government with precise

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1016 Kahraman, Kürt İsyانlar, p.343.
1017 PRO, FO 424/267, pp.63-4, no.24, Clerk to Chamberlain, 9 August 1927.
1018 Kahraman, Kürt İsyанlar, p.184.
1019 BCA, 272.11/23.120.18, 20 November 1927.
1020 PRO, FO 371/13090/E129, Clerk (Istanbul) to Chamberlain (London), 9 January 1928.
statistics on the ethnic composition of their villages. The report written by the governor of Edirne province is a good example of this policy. It contained lists of deportees and settlers classified by region of origin, date of arrival, and “race”. Another destination of the Kurdish deportees from Diyarbekir was the town of Polatlı, shortly south of Ankara. Its district governor too, drew up lists of all villages according to household, gender, and “race”. Table 3 shows the totals in Polatlı district.

Table 3: Ethnic composition in Polatlı district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>10,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>2,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevi</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,523</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BCA, 272.65/6.5.4.

Another receiving province was Bolu, whose governor appended district reports written by mayors and district governors. The deportees in that province were settled in villages “abandoned by Greeks”. A total of 6013 people, around 350 households, had been settled in 14 villages. The precision of these headcounts would serve to calculate the percentages of Kurds: nowhere they were allowed to comprise more than 5% of the local population. In accordance with policy directives, the governor of Bolu had a detailed table prepared, charting “the places populated by non-Turkish elements”. These people were Kurds, Georgians, Laz, Abkhazians, and Circassians. According to one source, the total number of Kurds moved to Western Turkey between 1920 and 1932 totaled 2,774. This seemingly limited number is deceptive: rather than the quantity of deported Kurds, one needs to look at the social classes deported away. It then appears that the deported constituted the top of the pyramid of the eastern Kurds, namely the (surviving) religious, intellectual, and social elites. As long as the Kurdish elites were separated from the general Kurdish population, the policies seemed to pay off, for no nationalist ideas were being propagated to the latter.

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1021 BCA, 272.12/60.171.3, Edirne governor to Interior Ministry, 11 September 1928.
1022 BCA, 272.65/6.5.4, Polatlı district governor to Interior Ministry, 12 and 23 March 1927.
1023 BCA, 272.12/59.161.6, Bolu governor to Interior Ministry, 12 June 1928. It is important to keep in mind that these settlers also included refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus.
1024 İskân Tarihçesi (İstanbul: Hamit Matbaası, 1932), p.137.
Settling the deportees was not always an easy task. Apparently, the settling did not proceed as smoothly as the regime would have it, as some deportees attempted to flee. The governor of Sivas reported to the Interior Ministry his fear that “Kurdish elements leave their local settlements without permission and flee to their native regions.”\textsuperscript{1025} Another problem was the resistance of locals against the arrival of unwanted strangers, out of rural conservatism or ethnic xenophobia. In Bolu province, some local residents openly complained about the influx of the Kurdish newcomers. A Turkish war veteran and local official sent a letter to the general staff, listing his grievances: the deportees had been frustrated, violent, and abusive to him and moreover, “they refused to Turkify”\textsuperscript{1026} The complaint reached Chief of Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, who wrote to the Prime Minister’s Office that “it is important to assimilate these foreign-minded crowds of people, who are filling these important and precious Turkish regions, into the Turkish nation.”\textsuperscript{1027} In other words, the settlement campaign needed more than just the transportation to a place and the allotting of a house; it required a cultural component. Çakmak’s advice was valued and acted upon by the regime. In a top secret order issued by the Interior Ministry the year after, settlement directives included the clause that the Kurds who were sent west were to be “made Turkish in language, tradition, and desire.”\textsuperscript{1028}

The north-western province of Balıkesir was another important destination. In the first half of September 1927, the provincial authorities settled batches of deportees in the province. The governor’s report included long lists of deportees from the provinces of Van, Mardin, Muş, Genç, and Diyarbekir. From all regions and neighborhoods of Diyarbekir, Kurds had been sent to Balıkesir. The margins of the governor’s report include notes on specific families, such as, “Has been settled”, or in a sporadic case, “Has fled”. The deportees were then spread out over dozens of villages in the province, without knowledge of who had been settled where.\textsuperscript{1029} But in this province too, the local population was not keen for Kurds to settle in their villages. As one deportee from Diyarbekir remembered, “They dismounted us from the train and took us to a village in Balıkesir. But the villagers didn’t want us. ‘Piss off!’ they yelled. Later they attacked us with stones and sticks. My grandfather was lynched on the village square.” The escorting officials, realizing the difficulty of settling the Kurds in that village, retreated with the families and settled them in another one.\textsuperscript{1030}

\textsuperscript{1025} BCA, 272.12/60.170.16, Sivas governor Süleyman Sami to Interior Ministry, 29 September 1928.
\textsuperscript{1026} BCA, 272.12/59.161.6, Mustafa Asım to general staff, 17 July 1928.
\textsuperscript{1027} BCA, 272.12/59.161.6, Chief of Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak to Prime Ministry, 3 March 1928.
\textsuperscript{1028} Bayrak, Kürtler, p.509.
\textsuperscript{1029} BCA, 272.11/23.119.34, Balıkesir governor to Interior Ministry, 17 November 1927.
\textsuperscript{1030} Kahraman, Kürt İsyanları, p.343.
Other deportees faced better circumstances on arrival, for example in the southern districts of Turkey. In November 1927, the governor of Antalya reported that deportees from Diyarbekir had arrived. They would be “scattered with three to four men, with their families and wives, in the countryside of Antalya”. The Azizoğlu family had been deported to the southern town of Tarsus. Local government officials assigned them, according to Fatma Azizoğlu, “a lovely house amidst orange orchards.” Living conditions were so good, her father Hüseyin Azizoğlu had even considered relinquishing the idea of a possible future return to Diyarbekir altogether. The locals, mostly Turks and Arabs, often invited them to dinner and shared their resources with them. The family later moved to the nearby town of Mersin and for years entertained cordial relations with the locals.

On 1 January 1928, the Kemalist government established the First Inspectorate-General, centered in Diyarbekir, and appointed Dr. İbrahim Tali Öngören (1875-1952) its first Inspector-General. Öngören was a graduate of the military medical academy and had met Mustafa Kemal during the 1911 Turco-Italian War in Tripolitania. In World War I, Öngören served as an army doctor in Diyarbekir, where he met Kemal again during the latter’s command there in 1916. According to British sources, Öngören had visited Bombay and had studied “Anglo-Indian administration”. In line with the call for a “colonial administrative method” recorded in the 1925 Reform Plan, this corroborates the notion that the colonial tendencies embedded in the regime’s language and power structures were to put into motion for the internal colonization of the eastern provinces. The Inspector was accorded a relatively wide autonomy in decision-making to implement the general policies laid out in the 1925 Reform Plan in the large area under his jurisdiction. The Inspectorate would play a leading role in the organization of the deportation-and-settlement policies. It would track down, arrest, and deport Kurds earmarked for removal, and receive, register, and assign property to Turkish settlers moving in from the west.

1031 BCA, 272.11/23.121.1, Antalya governor to Interior Ministry, 28 November 1927.
1032 Interview with Fatma Azizoğlu conducted by Seyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyon Sürgünleri, pp.82-4.
1034 PRO, FO 424/272, p.116, no.68, Edmonds to Henderson, 21 May 1930, Notes on a Tour to Diarbekir, Bitlis and Mush.
1035 For a study of the First Inspectorate-General see: Cemil Koçak, Umumi Müdettiszlikler (1927-1952) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), pp.53-126.
In 1928, the regime felt secure enough to proclaim a partial amnesty. With its elites gone, the Kurdish resistance was thought to have collapsed for good. Those left behind were not expected to pose a threat to the regime. When Olaf Rygaard passed the plains of western Diyarbekir in 1928, he noted that the local population was “even more impoverished in these areas where their dwellings and meagre acres, laboriously tilled little vineyards [sic] up in the gorges, had been destroyed and their small sheep and goat flocks had been taken from them when the punitive campaign in 1925 laid waste the area. The fear is still in their blood.”

With the revoking of the Law on the Maintenance of Order, in March 1929 some of the deportees were allowed to return to Diyarbekir. Families of the Sürgücüzâde tribe were in exile in the west when the news of amnesty was announced. It took them three days by train to reach their native regions, where they found their house “miserable and flooded... the mice had ripped to shreds all of the furniture.” They barely made it through the harsh winter and tried to pick up agriculture again. Sheikh Said’s family too returned to their ruined villages and resumed their lives as best as they could. Most returning deportees recovered whatever was left of their movable and immovable property. This only lasted until 2 June 1929, when the Kemalists passed the Law on the Distribution of Lands to Needy Farmers in the Eastern Regions (no.1505). It authorized the government to confiscate from landowning tribal chieftains and redistribute their estates to “villagers, tribesmen, nomads, and immigrants.”

The wide definition of the law betrayed a deep-seated Young Turk tradition of legalizing population politics _ex post facto_. Passed in the days of ethnic deportations, it amounted to an accelerator of existing practices of expropriating chieftains and landholders. A British traveller wrote in the summer of 1929 that “one of the main weapons employed was the deportation of rich and powerful Kurdish families. Many of these have since returned under the amnesty, but in the process they have lost all their belongings, and there is not, so I was told, a single wealthy or powerful Kurd in Turkish Kurdistan to-day.” But especially after the third phase of deportations (dealt with in the next section), this law and policy elicited both conservative traditional resistance from landholding chieftains who were dispossessed, and ethnic resistance from eastern Kurds who saw their land being allotted to Turkish settlers.

1037 Interview with Vahit Altnakar conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, _İsyon Sürgünleri_, pp.240-1.
1038 Kaya, _Mezopotamya Sürgünü_, p.43.
1039 Kökdemir, _Eski ve Yeni Toprak_, pp.34-35.
1040 PRO, FO 371/13828/E3538, Clerk (Istanbul) to Henderson (London), 15 July 1929. Enclosure in No.1., “Notes on a Journey from Angora to Aleppo, Diarbekir, Malatia, Sivas and the Black Sea Coast, June 9-29, 1929”.

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As in the case of confiscated Armenian property, the property of Kurdish elites was redistributed to Turkish settlers as well. As early as May 1927, the Kemalists prepared the colonization of those villages that were planned to be depopulated according to the 1927 law. The fact that it was possible for settlement plans to predate deportations might conceivably denote that the deportations were but a pretext for clearing out high-quality living quarters for Turkish settlers, although there is no definite evidence for this claim. Whatever its timing, as a receiving province, Diyarbekir needed to be prepared for the influx of Turkish settlers. The vice-governor of Diyarbekir reported to the Interior Ministry that preparations were being made to receive the settlers. Of the seventy-five households of settlers from Yugoslavia, thirty-five households had gone off to various regions and thirty households had still not been settled. The provincial authorities of Diyarbekir settled these refugees from the Macedonian towns of Kumanovo and Veles (Köprülü) in “empty houses” in the province. According to the governor, since these people had suffered “destitution and misery” they were compensated with additional immovable and movable property.1041

These reports suggest that the settlement campaign did not always seem like an easy affair either. British reports were often skeptical about it:

For the filling of the void made in the Kurdish district by the removal of Kurds, the settlement of immigrants is contemplated. It is hoped that Moslem immigrants may be obtained from Jugoslavia, from the Dobruja, from Bulgaria, from Cyprus and from the Caucasus… The experiences of the Moslems who were transplanted into Turkey from Greece are far from encouraging. Peasantry who in the land of the giaour are fairly prosperous and may wear their fezes and say their prayers without loss of esteem are not likely to be anxious to be dumped in the inhospitable regions of Kurdistan in order that they may make a new start in cloth caps.1042

Travelling through eastern Turkey in the late 1920s, the author Harold Armstrong came across a Turkish migrant on his way to be settled:

His language was Greek and he could as yet only speak a little broken Turkish with a thick Greek accent, though his ancestors had come from Constantinople. The Turkish and Greek Governments had been exchanging Christians and Moslems, he told me. He had been forcibly rooted up and sent here. He bemoaned his fate. In Crete he was happy and well off. His great-grandfather's father had owned the farm he had inherited, but the Greeks would only have Greeks in Greece. In the village, he said, were refugees from all parts: from Western Thrace,
Greece proper, Salonika, Macedonia and even from Cyprus. They had tried to start life again, but they had no capital; the land was not theirs and at any moment they might be moved, so they had patched the houses just sufficiently to live in, and did only just enough work on the land to make it produce. The fruit was beginning to ripen in the gardens and the vineyards; the country was full of foxes and thieves, so that if they did not watch they might be ruined in one night. He was like a child, helpless, lost, pathetic, homeless.  

For the Kemalists, the long-term well-being of the settlers was not their primary concern. As long as it increased the demographic ratio of Turks in the eastern provinces, the settlement campaign continued unabated. Time and again, the Interior Ministry wrote to the First Inspector-General’s office in Diyarbekir that it had screened individuals and groups of people who wanted to settle in the eastern provinces. The Kurds in these groups were not allowed to settle there, whereas the others were. This practice of barring Kurds’ entrance to Diyarbekir province was identical to the 1916 regulations of the CUP. The First Inspectorate-General regulated population movements along ethnic lines: only those of whom it could be “proven” they were “Turkish in regards to their blood and language” were allowed to settle and be allotted free land to settle in the east. The “free land” the Inspectorate-General had in mind was the now empty villages of Armenians and Kurds. One of these was the village of Tcherouk/Çarıklı in the Silvan district. The Armenian inhabitants of the village had been massacred in 1915, and the Kurds who had moved in shortly after had been deported in 1925. Official reports described the village being in a state of “ruins”. An inventory was set up by construction vice-director Mustafa Hilmi of the Seventh Army Corps, who drew a map and charted a precise list of the village’s buildings and fields. Each of these were now numbered and allotted to the settlers when they arrived (see Maps section). After settling in, the Turkish settlers sent a letter to the Inspectorate-General, expressing their gratitude. In this period, 2123 households totalling 8017 people were transferred and settled in the eastern provinces.

Not unlike the deportations of Kurds away from the east, the settlement of Turks into the east was propagated in national discourse and international diplomacy as well. In July

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1047 *BCA*, 030.18.01.02/015.49.3, decree dated 5 August 1925.  
1930 Aras told Clerk that “it would be necessary to re-people the whole district with Turkish refugees from elsewhere”.\textsuperscript{1050} An American scholar wrote about the attack on tribal life: “There were a number of serious Kurd rebellions from 1925 onwards. These have been ruthlessly crushed and tribal autonomy has practically vanished.”\textsuperscript{1051} American diplomatic sources in 1930 reported a rumor that “the Turkish authorities plan to exterminate the Kurds and to repopulate Turkish Kurdistan with Turks now resident in Soviet Russia, notably in Azerbaidjan, where they are numerous.”\textsuperscript{1052} In light of future developments, this report was exaggerated but at the time taken seriously by the Kemalists. In November 1930 Aras spoke at the League of Nations about the “possibility of a future intense Turkish colonization in order to smother the Kurds in a considerable mass of Turkish population.”\textsuperscript{1053} The third phase of Young Turk deportations of Kurds would herald the keeping of this promise.

**1934: phase three**

The 1930s brought interstate and intrastate crises to Turkey, a country exporting raw materials to the West. The Great Depression affected the fragile Turkish economy, especially in the economically devastated eastern provinces. As international trade, incomes, tax revenues, prices, and profits declined sharply, Diyarbekir too was hit hard. Impoverished city-dwellers and struggling villagers now faced even greater difficulties to make ends meet.\textsuperscript{1054} On the level of internal politics, the regime faced a new wave of resistance in the east. This time the Kurdish-nationalist organization ‘Independence’ (\textit{Xoybûn}) entrenched itself in the Ararat region and forcefully resisted the Kemalist government with demands for autonomy. Again, the Kemalists responded with violence and a local conflagration grew into a guerrilla war quite similar to the Sheikh Said conflict.\textsuperscript{1055} These two developments combined would ultimately lead to a sharp radicalization of population politics and persecution in the eastern provinces.

The main platform for Kemalist discussions of population politics was parliament. In plenary sessions and closed-door meetings, members of parliament evaluated the previous campaigns of social engineering and discussed the possibilities of new ones. Deputy for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1050] PRO, FO 371/14579/E3898, Clerk (Istanbul) to Henderson (London), 21 July 1930.
\item[1052] National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944, SD 867.00/2047. Buxley (Izmir) to the State Department (Washington), 3 October 1930, News of Izmir September 1930.
\item[1053] PRO, FO 371/14578/E?, Drummond (Geneva) to Cadogan (London), 18 November 1930, “Note sure un Entretien avec S.E. Tewfik Rouschdy Bey”.
\end{footnotes}
Kütahya province and Kemalist ideologue Mustafa Naşit Hakkı Uluğ (1902-77), posing with Sheikh Said on photo 24, argued that new strategies for deportations needed to “exterminate root and branch all of the remaining social institutions from the Middle Ages” so these would “never blossom again”. Giritli Hasan Rusenii Barkın (1884-1953), veteran of the CUP’s Special Organization and deputy for Samsun, agreed with Uluğ and drew a parallel with Russification and Americanization policies. Elsewhere, Barkın wrote that Turkey’s minorities, naming specifically the Laz, Circassians, Persians, Albanians, Arabs, Kurds, Bosnians, Tatars, and Jews, were “treacherous citizens” that needed to be “Turkified with rapid and destructive measures… of precise propaganda, unreserved laws, and settlement… facilitating their Turkification”. According to him, this would “salvage” Turkey from the “plague” of these disloyal groups, who, he argued, needed to be confronted with the following question: “Are you a Turk? Join us and mingle with us. Are you a stranger? Take off your masks and join the enemy’s ranks.”

The main mastermind of the new call to arms was the veteran social engineer Şükrü Kaya. During discussions in parliament, he explained the need “to separate the country into west and east,” arguing that in the east, it was the government’s task to “render the Turk the master of the soil”. Kaya noted that “there are approximately two million pure Turks abroad in our near surroundings. It is almost mandatory for them to come to the homeland little by little… It is then our obligation to settle them according to the social and economic principles that the science of settlement necessitates.” In his view, nomads were to be sedentarized and “settled in a civilized and economic manner.”

To determine the criteria for the identification and selection of the deportees, Kaya pushed for the use of the term “race” (ırk) instead of “lineage” (soy) which, he believed, meant ‘family’ rather than ‘race’. As discussions continued, Kaya provided a legitimization for new deportations: “A nation’s biggest duty is to annex everybody living within its borders to its own community, to assimilate them. The opposite has been seen with us and has dismembered the homeland. If the Ottomans in their early age had converted the population of the

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Photo 32: Şükrü Kaya
(Republican Archives)

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1056 Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabiti Cerdesi (henceforth TBMM ZC), vol.23, period IV, session 3 (7 June 1934), p.68.
1058 TBMM ZC, vol.23, period IV, session 3 (14 June 1934), p.139.
places they went, our Danube borders would still begin at the Danube. We have suffered much from this.”

This portentous vindication of nationalist population politics was practically identical to the CUP’s discourse that had justified genocide two decades previously. Şükrü Kaya’s speech was met with applause and chants of “Bravo!” in a parliament with a climate strongly hostile to Turkey’s ethnic minorities. In later discussions, Çanakkale MP Ziya Gevher Etili threatened the “traitors” that it would prove necessary to invade their space and “destroy this serpent in its own nest”, adding: “If it is necessary we will do this. We will send the army and annihilate the treacherous nests.”

Deputy for Aydın Dr. Mazhar Germen (1887-1967) identified these “traitors” as “the Kurds, who for years have made an art and duty out of committing various betrayals to the Turks’ blood and lives… and who have played no other role than being a thorn in Turkey’s flesh.” Finally, he requested from the government that it “thoroughly eliminate all of these elements from this region (chants of bravo)”, whereupon someone exclaimed: “They should be deported!“

And so it happened. During the first half of the 1930s, the Kemalists rapidly expanded and organized new deportation plans. Apart from the setting up of the identification and selection, this wave of deportations also implied major political-administrative decisions: establishing a clear line of command regarding the responsibility for and the implementing of the deportations, as well as determining the criteria for the identification of the deportees. Due to an advanced ethno-territorial vision of Turkey’s geography, the new approach also demanded negotiated arrangements with various national or local authorities in the western provinces. In the spring of 1932, Young Turk thought on how to solve the Kurdish question in the eastern provinces crystallized and reached an apex with a new ‘Settlement Law’, which came into force on 14 June 1934 and was published a week later.

This law was directly modeled after the previous deportation laws, in particular the 1926 law with the same title. Discussions leading to the drafting of this law were a continuation of the ideological exchanges in parliament and concentrated on the themes of historical justification, language, and how to learn from mistakes and make future population politics more efficient.

The document began with historical visions blaming the Ottoman Empire for neglecting to assimilate the minorities, and continued to prophesy how the new era would herald “the scientific explanation and dissection of the Turkish sociological corps” that would “render dominant the Turks as the autochthonous element,” ultimately resulting in “the
Turkification of their territory.” The other “elements”, being the minorities, were “to be distributed household by household in Turkish towns and villages in order to melt and be assimilated”. The Turkish Republic would “safeguard, consolidate, and homogenize our national body” because “it was time to pursue and implement a population policy crafted by government hand to develop… in quality and quantity, population masses suited for our national culture and modern civilization.” The law would further aim at populating sparsely populated areas and sedentarizing nomads and tribes to develop agriculture.  

Language was an important ethnic marker and selection criterion. “Population masses whose mother-tongue is not Turkish will be prohibited from gathering, and the existing ones will be scattered… this way measures will be taken for the unity of culture”. Strict measures would be taken so that nowhere would these non-Turkish peoples constitute more than 10% of the general population. In order to “Turkify” the eastern provinces, in particular the north of Diyarbekir province, the First Inspectorate-General needed to settle at least twice as many Turks as it had settled so far. The Kemalist deportation proposals and decrees contained formulations, provisions, and distinctions directly modelled on the wording of the CUP’s previous deportations. Thus the Young Turk jargon of dividing and subdividing settlers into two categories reappeared: those who had come to Turkey of their own volition were called “immigrants” (muhacir), and those who came “as a result of exigencies” were called “refugees” (mülteci). The latter category was subdivided into two further categories, those who were needy and those who were not. To the needy free land would be distributed. The Kemalists also wanted to improve their existing techniques of social engineering. From their evaluations of the 1925-27 deportations they concluded that the cadre of civil servants was insufficiently staffed and salaried for the deportation and settlement campaign to be truly effective. Their advice was to expand, within one year, the cadre of trained and experienced experts with the skills required for this specialized area.

In the draft version of the law, the first article captured its essence. It stipulated that the law would operate upon “the residence and spread of the culturally Turkish population”. The law would be enacted according to “a program determined by the Cabinet” and under auspices of the Interior Ministry. Article 2 detailed how this would occur. The Cabinet would approve of a map according to which Turkey would be divided into three types of zones: “Zone number 1: Places where the influx of the population of Turkish culture is wanted; Zone

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1065 *TBMM ZC*, vol.23, period IV, session 3 (7 June 1934), Appendix no.189, “I/335 numaralı İskân kanunu лäyihasи ve İskân muvakkat encümeni mazbatası” (2 May 1932).

1066 *TBMM ZC*, I65, c1, Appendix no.189, “İskan kanunu лäyihasи muvvакat encümeninin tadili,” p.28, article 3.

number 2: Places assigned to the transfer and settlement of the population whose pervasion into Turkish culture is wanted; Zone number 3: Places that will be evacuated, and where settlement and residence will be prohibited due to local, sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and security reasons.” The attraction of Turkish settlers from abroad would be bound by restrictions: “Those who are not culturally Turkish, anarchists, spies, nomadic gypsies, those who have been evicted from the country will not be taken into Turkey as immigrants. Those who are not from Turkish stock… will have to settle in places assigned by the Government and are obliged to stay there… those who move elsewhere will be taken back to their initial places of settlement; in case of repetition they will be denaturalized by the Government.”1068

For the eastern provinces, the second part of the law, titled “Measures on internal population transfers, culture, and administration”, bore at least as much significance. Article 9 stipulated that “nomads not culturally Turkish will be collectively dispersed and settled in towns that are culturally Turkish”, that “those of whom espionage is sensed… and nomads who are not culturally Turkish will be expelled beyond national borders.” These “nomads” were specified in the next article, which opened a frontal attack on traditional tribal life: “The law does not accord legal recognition to the tribe… all rights based on any decree, document, and decision that have been acknowledged so far are abolished. Tribal chieftaincy, lordship, squirearchy and sheikhdom, and all of these types of organizations based on any document or tradition are abolished.” These people would be deported to “an appropriate place”: non-Turkish tribes in particular would be deported to zone number 2. The article further stated that all property belonging to the aforementioned categories of people would be forfeited to the state, which would redistribute it to various settlers. Language would serve as a prime selection criterion. The law prohibited “those whose mother-tongue is not Turkish to assemble in villages and neighborhoods, and to gather together as workers and artisans”. Moreover, the cabinet was authorized to “take all kinds of measures based on cultural, military, political, social, and security reasons” against “those who are not culturally Turkish.” They were never to form more than 10% of the local population and were not allowed to establish their own neighborhoods anywhere.1069

The third part of the law specified how the country would be sectionalized into the three zones. Article 12 summed up the settlement procedures for zone number 1, which was

1068 **TBMM ZC**, vol.23, period IV, session 3 (7 June 1934), Appendix no.189, “I/335 numeralı İskân kanunu lâyihası ve İskân muvakkat encümeni mazbatası” (2 May 1932).

synonymous with the eastern provinces. In this zone, a range of people would be prohibited from residing, from tribesmen and nomads to “people who are not culturally Turkish” – both indigenous and former deportees wishing to return. Instead, three categories of people would be allowed to settle in the zone. First, the indigenous Turks, i.e. people from the local villages and towns who were “racially Turkish”, would be allotted land. Second, indigenous Turks who had lived in zone 1 before 1914 but had been forced to leave due to warfare, were encouraged to return and settle in their native lands. Third, “people who are culturally Turkish” from zone 2 would be transferred and settled in zone 1, “according to suitable living and climatic conditions”. There, these Turkish settlers would receive a number of benefits, including exemption from various taxes and military service. Military and bureaucratic personnel “of Turkish race or culture” were especially encouraged to settle in zone 1. Zone 2, roughly speaking the western provinces, would absorb those deported from zones 1 and 3, in particular “those from zone 1 who are not racially Turkish”. In other words, zone 2 would be the ground on which the eastern deportees would be scattered and settled, according to the regulations for at least ten years. The law further stipulated that all the transfer costs would be covered by the government.

In a later addition to the Settlement Law, the regime laid out with exact precision what constituted the first zone. In zone 1, lands allocated to Turkish settlers would be inaccessible to non-Turks. In the First Inspectorate-General, which included the greater province of Diyarbekir, on both sides of the tracks along the entire network of railroads, from Diyarbekir city east to Tatvan, west to Urfa and north to Elazığ, a strip of twenty kilometres of land would be reserved in which non-Turks would be prohibited from residing. The same regulation was foreseen for the border (a strip of 25 kilometres of land along all eastern borders of Turkey), and all paved roads (a strip of 15 kilometres of land on both sides of the roads in the zone) would be prohibited for non-Turks. Also, a radius of 20 kilometres around Diyarbekir city was an off-limits area for non-Turks. This meant that a large territory in the wider region of Diyarbekir was marked for demographic “Turkification”. The bureaucratic apparatus for the project was divided into provincial centers, where two departments would supervise the deportations and settlements. One department would take care of logistics (sending and receiving people, confiscating and assigning property), one to command the “cultural front”, involving the monitoring of the measures applied, and research on populations, such as the minorities and “our kin and fellow culture folk abroad”. The second

1070 Ibid.
1071 Kökdemir, Eski ve Yeni Toprak, pp.166-70.
department would be a mobile one for the provinces and the rural areas and would see that the deportation and settlement proceeded smoothly.1072

The law announced that tribes were a major category to be dissolved, abolished, and “melted” into the mainstream Turkish population. Their property would be liquidated according to regulations and all leaders, lords, chieftains, and sheikhs were to be “eliminated” (tasfiye), and to preclude new ones from “sprouting up”, their families were to be immediately deported. The comprehensive attack on tribal life and tribal leadership re-targeted Kurdish elites more forcefully. As George Clerk wrote, “The policy of breaking up the Kurdish tribes, disarming everyone and deporting at any rate the leaders, is still being followed… nearly half the entire army is occupied in putting this policy into effect with varying success.”1073 This policy shift was ideologically informed: in the Young Turk interpretation of sociology, Kurds did not manifest nationhood. Therefore it was sufficient to decapitate the nation (i.e. deport their elites) and leave the population (seen as ethnic ‘raw material’) for mass forced assimilation (see Chapter 6). Thus, two strategies of social engineering were seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing. To this end, the government prepared a detailed, top-secret inventory of Kurdish tribes and published it strictly for internal circulation.1074 These lists, supplemented in the 1970s and republished in book form in 2000, identified for every province dozens of Kurdish tribes classified as “loyal” or “disloyal”, with details provided on the nature of their relationships with each other.1075 The booklet included ten pages on the tribes of Diyarbekir province and detailed which tribes had stayed loyal to the government and which ones had not.1076 This report would be functional in the process of selecting deportees.

The 1934 Settlement Law read as a typical document of an interwar nation state fortifying its ethnic boundaries through restricting citizenship, expressing a nationalist ideology, and introducing nation formation on an alien population by force. It captures the essence of demographic engineering: the Kemalists sought to increase the relative size and power of the dominant ethnic group, the Turks, at the expense of ethnic minorities. The latter were expected to decrease determinately, and ultimately evaporate into insignificance or disappear some time in the future. Ethnoterritorialist nationalism, pervading the Kemalists’ minds, came to full expression in the division of the country into two ethnicized zones,

1072 TBMM ZC, vol.23, period IV, session 3 (7 June 1934), Appendix no.189.
1073 PRO, FO 424/266, Clerk to Chamberlain, 12 January 1927.
1075 Asiretler Raporu (İstanbul: Kaynak, 2000).
1076 Asiretler Raporu, pp.92-102.
roughly the Turkish west and the Kurdish east. For Diyarbekir province, this formula maintained, expanded, and systematized important elements of continuity with the CUP’s wartime practice of rendering the province a “Turkification zone” (see Chapter 3).

The Kemalists wasted no time in putting the plan into action. In November 1934, Diyarbekir’s second Inspector-General, Ahmet Hilmi Ergeneli, wrote a report on the new deportation and settlement phase. Identifying and selecting the Kurds earmarked for deportation was relatively easy since they had been deported before. However, the mode of settlement of “our racial brothers” (ırkdaşlarımız) in designated places in his district, was not going to be an easy task, he argued: “A part of the local population does not perceive the settlers warmly.” He indicated that the incoming Turks should be settled in living conditions qualitatively better than their places of origin, in order to satisfy them. Ergeneli called for settling the Turks near the railways, a policy killing two birds with one stone: strategic areas would be populated by a “reliable population”, and the settlers would probably be satisfied by their proximity to the railways. Among the benefits offered to the Turkish settlers were financial rewards and advanced educational opportunities, high-quality housing, children’s playgrounds and sports facilities, and others. These were not extended to ethnic and cultural non-Turks. Ergeneli also called for more funds and more consistency in the settlement. 1077 These suggestions clearly reveal the discriminatory practices inherent in the Settlement Law. It created a complex pattern of interaction between state and society, in which a regime favored its kin peoples in a distant geography populated by locals deemed hostile.1078

The intense correspondence between Ankara and Diyarbekir did not go unnoticed by the population of the east. The promulgation of the law sent a wave of rumors through the eastern provinces, which had the “effect of causing a great deal of disquietude amongst the thousands of the inhabitants to whom such a law would be applicable.”1079 In Diyarbekir, the Kemalist dictatorship’s political paranoia produced a climate of persecution which became contagious along social networks. Tribes and families who were related to central targets of the Settlement Law were summarily included in the deportation plans. Anybody related to the Kurdish elite families of Diyarbekir province, by profession or by marriage, was going to be deported as well. This expanded the number of deportees exponentially. Furthermore, the atmosphere of an omnipresent conspiracy was compounded by the governor of Diyarbekir,  

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1078 The policy of governing a distant land to send settlers in order to shape its demographic similarly as in the homeland is called settler colonialism. For a collection of essays see: Caroline Elkins & Susan Pedersen (ed.), Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (London: Routledge, 2005).
1079 PRO, FO 371/17958/E4912, Catton (Mersin) to Loraine (Ankara), 7 July 1934.
who, motivated by a desire to appear diligent in his superiors’ eyes, drew up blanket lists of deportees and unleashed a witchhunt upon Diyarbekir to produce as many deportees as possible. Most significantly, he urged the residents to turn informer on any Kurdish “chieftains” and “lords”.\textsuperscript{1080} Scores of impoverished citizens coveting their neighbors’ property gathered at the governor’s office and in the end, the policy of open denunciation inevitably led to a great deal of private settling of old scores. There is evidence that the family most likely responsible for fanning the flames of Kemalist paranoia in Diyarbekir were the pro-government Pirinççizâde. According to one eye-witness, Pirinççizâde members assisted Diyarbekir’s chief of police during the selection process of drafting lists of chieftains and tribes, and details on kinship relations between the tribes.\textsuperscript{1081} Moreover, the Pirinççizâde lobbied the government to deport Kurdish families they saw as their rivals in the Diyarbekir area. If this was true, the Pirinççizâde dynasty had again managed to collaborate with the regime in exchange for power, and most importantly, had again influenced the government’s population politics on the local level. These were some of the local mechanisms that underlay and controlled the patterns of population politics in Diyarbekir in the 1930s.

After the first deportation had sent them to Tarsus, in 1928 the Azizoğlu family had returned to their estate in Silvan. In the summer of 1934, Fatma Azizoğlu was sitting on the porch of the family mansion when she suddenly noticed that gendarmes had surrounded the house. She ran inside but before she could tell the family, they heard a loud knock on the door. The commanding officer was standing on the doorstep and asked: “Where are the men of the house?” The men were out, doing business and working the fields. The officer then read a list of names of people whom he declared would be taken to Diyarbekir city. The family was counted and assembled in the courtyard, and given one hour to gather their personal belongings. The Azizoğlus were loaded onto two trucks and taken away, leaving hundreds of grieving tribesmen behind. When they arrived in Diyarbekir city, their chieftain Hüseyin Azizoğlu, in the city for business, had already been arrested. The whole group was taken to the railway station, locked in a wagon and sent off to Istanbul, escorted by gendarmes. After a few days, they arrived in Istanbul, made a transit to the Thracian city of Kirklareli, and finally ended up in the nearby town of Babaeski.\textsuperscript{1082} Although the intelligence report on tribes had identified the Azizoğlus as a loyal and obedient family that had not resisted the government, in 1934 they were rounded up again and deported to Thrace. They

\textsuperscript{1080} Interview with Vahit Altınakar conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, \textit{İsyan Sürğünleri}, pp.242-3.
\textsuperscript{1081} Interview with Şahin Cizrelioğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, \textit{İsyan Sürğünleri}, p.213.
were not the only ones. The Zirkî tribe in Lice too, had been deported in 1926. Now, as one deportee related, they were rounded up more comprehensively as even the tribe’s pro-government families were deported.\textsuperscript{1083}

The Cizrelizâde tribe was deported from their native regions when their chieftain Ahmet Mümtaz Cizrelioğlu, an intellectual educated in law, was arrested in Diyarbekir in the summer of 1934. The Cizrelizâde, at that time living in the eastern border town of Eleşkirt, were rounded up and, without permission to take any belongings, driven to Sivas. From there they were deported by train to Beyşehir in the central province of Konya.\textsuperscript{1084} Similar experiences were shared by the Sürgücüzâde tribe. On 15 September 1936, Vahit Altunakar (at that time an adolescent of sixteen) was threshing wheat when he saw a boy from his village running towards him in panic. The boy brought the news that gendarmes had raided the village and told him his mother wanted him to hide under a pile of straw. Only after the gendarmes had left, did he dare to return to the village. His family was gone and the remaining villagers, “in great anxiety”, told him his family had been taken away by gendarmes at gunpoint. Where they had been taken, nobody knew. Vahit decided to go to Diyarbekir city to gauge what was going on and found a huge mass of people at the train station. Spectators were staring at them by the roadside, as susurrant voices murmured: “They are being deported”. The young Vahit was arrested for having “escaped” the round-up, held at the Inspectorate-General for several hours, handcuffed, and put in a wagon with the rest of his family. Contrary to the Settlement Law, the Sürgücüzâde had to defray the expenses of the train tickets as they were deported to Kütahya.\textsuperscript{1085}

After their return to their native villages, Sheikh Said’s family had barely recuperated and were trying to make a living when the second deportation struck them in 1934. Again, an extended family largely consisting of women and children was taken from the northeastern districts of Diyarbekir to Trabzon, where they were boarded on a ship for Istanbul. There, the family was split up and sent to various parts of Thrace. The core of the family ended up in the village of Sergen in Edirne’s Vize district. That village was populated by a majority of Turks and a small minority of Albanians.\textsuperscript{1086} The noted Bukâr dynasty, a family of sufis and sheikhs from Diyarbekir city, were deported as well. They were scattered across the western Anatolian plains to the small towns of Uşak and Kütahya province. The authorities took special care not only that a family was broken up in groups and scattered, but also that none of

\textsuperscript{1083} Interview with Nihat Işık conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, \textit{İsyan Sürgünleri}, p.260.
\textsuperscript{1084} Interview with Şahin Cizrelioğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, \textit{İsyan Sürgünleri}, pp.212-4.
\textsuperscript{1085} Interview with Vahit Altunakar conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, \textit{İsyan Sürgünleri}, pp.243-4.
\textsuperscript{1086} Kaya, \textit{Mezopotamya Sürgünü}, pp.45-6.
the various Kurdish families would be deported to the same location. Ignorance of each other’s whereabouts upset them and precluded them from contacting each other.1087

One of the main targets of the Kemalists was undoubtedly the wealthy and influential Cemilpaşa dynasty of Diyarbekir. The 1926 deportation campaign had not included the Cemilpaşazâde as much as others, and therefore the local authorities attempted to make a ‘clean sweep’ and not leave anyone behind this time. The family was living in the village of Qarabash when in the middle of the night, a sergeant arrived with ten soldiers. The sergeant read the deportation order out loud, and arrested them. No exceptions were made: their smallest child Felat Cemiloğlu was included in the deportation list and his brother Nejat Cemiloğlu, ill with a high fever, was lifted out his bed, and taken away, leaving behind their house and property as they were. At Diyarbekir central station they were loaded into a cattle car with their relatives. The young man barely survived the train journey, which took him and his family to the northern Black Sea town of Ordu.1088 Other family members were deported to central Anatolia and Thrace. Nejat’s cousin Şermin was a young girl in primary school when she was arrested and deported:

> It was a rainy, misty, and cold day. The commissioner and two or three officers came. Whatever they ordered, you know, we were able to take two mattresses, three sheets, one kettle, spoons, forks, a portable gas cooker. We had to argue to take a part of our belongings with us. My father was already under arrest. He was not around. We didn’t even know where he was. That evening the truck came. We had lots of precious property. Persian rugs, silver, and so forth. They didn’t allow us to take any of it… They threw us in the truck. Later they brought my father. With my mother and two little children we took the road. We children were not aware of what was going on.1089

The Cemilpaşazâde were taken to the Fevzipaşa train station in Malatya, where they were locked in wagons and deported to Eskişehir. The father tried to comfort the children by entertaining them and buying toys in towns where the train stopped. This way, the children experienced the deportation as an exciting game. After arrival in Istanbul, the family was deported to the Thracean town of Lüleburgaz.1090 The persecution of the Cemilpaşazâde developed into a witchhunt: the initial investigation was carried out ostensibly to uncover “subversive activities”, but now it was used to harass and undermine the Cemilpaşazâde

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1087 Interview with Mehdiye Çetin-Öngören conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, *İsyan Sürgünleri*, p.25.
simply for being a Kurdish elite family. Fed up with the persecution, some Cemilpaşazâde sought asylum in Syria, which was under French mandate. Among those who fled there were Nazime Cemiloğlu’s parents, who were unable to travel back and forth to visit their family members. The moment they attempted it and set foot on Turkish soil in 1932, they were arrested and deported west. Those from the Cemilpaşazâde the regime could not catch were all denaturalized in a sweeping 1933 decree, for “having fled to Syria”. In 1935, not a single Cemilpaşazâde was left in Diyarbekir province.

The 1934 deportations distinguished themselves by more precision. Besides the transfer of entire categories of humans, the Kemalists also micromanaged the deportation of certain individuals. For example, in November 1935 Kemal Atatürk ordered the deportation of a former Ottoman police officer, who had been living in Syria but desired Turkish citizenship, away from Diyarbekir to Kütahya. His residence in Syria was considered enough justification for deportation. An Armenian tailor living in Diyarbekir was ordered deported because, according to Atatürk’s decree, the tailor was “a staunch enemy of Turks who had

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1091 See the file of Turkish intelligence on the family: BCA, 030.10/113.771.1 up to and including BCA, 030.10/113.771.9.
1093 BCA, 030.18.01.02/40.80.15, decree dated 12 November 1933.
1094 BCA, 030.18.01.02/59.84.18, decree dated 11 November 1935.
converted to Islam in order to escape the deportation and served the Armenian cause with his entire being.” The decree accused him and his sons of travelling to Beirut, Marseille, and Aleppo, where they allegedly were involved in “pursuing harmful aims”. In this case, travel abroad sufficed for deportation: his family of a dozen women and children was deported to Çorum.1095 In October 1936 the priest of Diyarbekir’s Armenian church was ordered deported to Sivas for being “suspicious” and living in a border province.1096 The mufti of Diyarbekir’s northern district of Kulp, son of a Naqshbandi sheikh named Mehmed Emin, reportedly took the locals up the Andok mountain for spiritual retreat. In doing so, he had violated the law and in November 1937 was ordered deported to Aydın with his family.1097 Many other people were deported this way, some for “reactionary behavior”, others for marrying more than one woman. If the regime sensed anybody’s disloyalty, deportation was often the answer.1098

The deportees who arrived first often witnessed new ones coming immediately after them. One deportee remembered: “The year was 1938… one day we were strolling around the train station. A train arrived. The doors opened. The people came tumbling out. They were muddled. Many of them were suffering because of lack of air, dirt, hunger and thirst… some of them were wailing and yammering. Their dress resembled that of our Diyarbekir people… They were a train load. Dirt, disease, hunger, death, there was everything in the train…”1099 Due to strict travel restrictions, few foreigners were able to witness the deportations. The noted Ottomanists Robert Anhegger (1911-2001) and Andreas Tietze (1914-2003) were two of the exceptions. Traveling in central Anatolia in their young years, they witnessed a convoy of deportees arriving in Aydın. Anhegger wrote in his diary that the Kurds were “simply removed there and distributed over the country. They are then dumped anywhere, without a roof over their head or employment. They do not know a single word of Turkish.”1100 John Frödin, a Swedish geographer, had been permitted to conduct research in Turkey when he witnessed deportees during his travels. He wrote that “the male population of over 12 years was deported to concentration camps in Western Turkey.”1101 (In reality, there were never any concentration camps as the deportees were settled in cities, towns, and villages.)

1095 BCA, 030.18.01.02/68.77.9, decree dated 28 September 1936.
1096 BCA, 030.18.01.02/69.85.6, decree dated 26 October 1936.
1097 BCA, 030.18.01.02/79.89.7, decree dated 2 November 1937.
1098 See e.g.: BCA, 030.18.01.02/89.112.15, decree dated 20 November 1939.
1099 Kahraman, Kürt İsyanları, p.184.
Not unlike eight years before, the authorities of the western provinces where the deportees were sent supplied the Interior Ministry with data. In the autumn and winter of 1934, the governorships of various western provinces sent Ankara long lists of individuals sent to their province. These were ethnically segmented according to family and village. Other necessary information was appended to the communications.\footnote{BCA, 272.12/69.190.10, various reports dated 30 December 1934.} The deportees arrived in provinces where local circumstances ranged from favorable through tolerable to dreadful. Şermin Cemiloğlu of the Cemilpaşazâde, for example, grew up in Thrace among Balkan Muslims expelled from Greece, with whom she claimed relations were good.\footnote{Interview with Şermin Cemiloğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyang Sürgünleri, pp.183-6; Malmişanî, Diyarbekirî Cemilpaşazâdeler, pp.210-3.} The Sürguçüzâde tribe ended up in a town in Kütahya amidst Bosnians and Albanians, who were themselves migrants. According to Vahit Altınakar, \textquotedblleft if if wasn’t for the goodness of those folks, we would have suffered so much wretchedness… the Bosnians were so genial and candid, they had nothing but good intentions.\textquotedblright\footnote{Interview with Vahit Altınakar conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyang Sürgünleri, pp.246-7.} The Bukârs in Kütahya soon realized that there were cultural differences between them and the local Turks. The occasional awkward intercultural moments, however, were more a matter of ignorance than xenophobia. According to Bukâr deportees, the adult population was generally open and cordial, although their children were bullied in school for being different.\footnote{Interview with Mehdiye Çetin-Öngören conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyang Sürgünleri, pp.26, 32-3.}

The experiences of the Arat family were markedly different. According to Sakine Arat, \textquotedblleft the period of exile was quite difficult. We were different.\textquotedblright” The locals would hurl racial epithets at them such as “Tailed Kurd! Tailed Kurd!”, and would mock them for speaking Kurdish.\footnote{Interview with Sakine Arat conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyang Sürgünleri, p.52.} The Azizoğlu, who after the 1926 deportations had fared relatively well in the south, now found themselves amidst a heavily bigoted society in Thrace. According to Fatma Azizoğlu, the Turkish population in the town of Babaeski despised, insulted, and intimidated them to the degree that her father Hüseyin Azizoğlu moved away to Konya without permission. The government quickly tracked him down and ordered him to return to his designated settlement area, but Azizoğlu refused.\footnote{Interview with Fatma Azizoğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyang Sürgünleri, p.94.} The Cizrelizâde probably suffered the worst ordeal. Şahin and Mümmtaz Cizrelioğlu, always the only Kurds in school, were often bullied, threatened, and assaulted by Turkish children who used racially offensive language. The two brothers were beaten up so often that their mother (who was half Circassian) solicited their Chechen neighbors to gang up on the Turks. The call for Caucasian solidarity worked,
for from then on, Şahin and Mümtaz stood stronger. At one point in time they stabbed one of the bullies with a knife, and were left alone for the remainder of their exile.\textsuperscript{1108} The social reception was not the only climate vexing the Diyarbekir Kurds. Used to the arid climate of the Upper Tigris basin, within days they found themselves on the humid shores of the Anatolian peninsula or the rainy hills of Thrace. Many found the climate unbearable and got sick, such as Sheikh Said’s son Abdülhalik and Sheikh Ali Rıza’s eighteen-year old son, who succumbed to pneumonia.\textsuperscript{1109} In Ordu province, the Cemilpaşazâde contracted diseases such as malaria. Their request for permission to travel to Istanbul for treatment was granted.\textsuperscript{1110}

The government monitored the deportation process with great care. In the summer of 1935, most deportees had arrived at their destinations when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ordered Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to undertake an inspection tour of the eastern provinces. İnönü was to report on how nation formation was developing in a general sense. The Prime Minister toured a large area in the east and southeast of the country and reported that the government’s population policies were gradually yielding their fruits. According to İnönü, the government’s efforts were sufficient to turn Diyarbekir into a “strong center of Turkishness” in the long term. He argued that the army and the Inspectorate-General facilitated the policies, and advised the government to keep their presence intact. He concluded: “In a well organized East the Republic will be based on a very important foundation. From any viewpoint, such a foundation is necessary for Turkish dominance.”\textsuperscript{1111} İnönü’s report was crucial to the direction that the policy would take. His observations and recommendations were funnelled back into local-level administration for implementation.

On 8 December 1936, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya convened a conference of all four General Inspectorates in Ankara with the aim of evaluating the progress of the regime’s governance of the eastern provinces. The conference, chaired by Kaya, featured First Inspector-General Abidin Özmen, Second Inspector-General General Kâzım Dirik,\textsuperscript{1112} Third Inspector-General Tahsin Uzer, Fourth Inspector-General General Abdullah Alpdoğan, and gendarme commanders Naci Tınaz and Seyfi Düzgören. This arrangement of persons at the conference clearly showed that veteran Young Turk social engineers were in charge of ruling the East. Over three long days, the inspectors briefed Kaya on how nation formation was

\textsuperscript{1108} Interview with Şahin Cizrelioğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyän Sürgünleri, pp.214-5.
\textsuperscript{1109} Kaya, Mezopotama Sürgünü, p.47.
\textsuperscript{1110} BCA, 030.18.01.02/97.65.4, decree dated 5 July 1939.
Özmen presented his report on Diyarbekir province and promised that the government’s measures would obviate the ethnic questions in his area. However, he also complained that former locals who were now living abroad were collaborating with their friends and family in the region to get back into Turkey and “disrupt security”. According to Özmen, the border with Syria needed to be sealed off hermetically, and anybody resisting the regime needed to be denaturalized and expelled. He identified these resisters as Kurds, Armenians, Syriacs, and Yezidis living in Syria, who were “working for the establishment of a greater Armenia and unified Kurdistan”. Their cross-border incitements of ethnic minority elites in Turkey were to be prevented by more gendarme presence in the countryside and a continued deportation and settlement program. Besides these proposals, Özmen also argued that simply continuing the physical removal of people would not solve the Kurdish question durably. In his opinion, long-lasting solutions necessitated propaganda and sustained efforts for forced assimilation, such as linguistic and cultural assaults on the Kurds’ identity. These cultural policies will be dealt with in the next chapter.

A second evaluation of the policies implemented up to then was a report presented to the Party’s General Secretariat in 1939-40. In this report, Kemalist social engineers reviewed the 1934 Settlement Law and praised it as a productive tool: “The spirit of the law is assimilation and internal colonization… to dismember the territorial unity of the Kurds.” Deportations needed to continue to be implemented “comprehensively” and should “be elevated to the main politics of the government which will work with full authority to establish and operate a special machinery for internal colonization”. This phrasing clearly suggested that subordinates called on their superiors for stronger measures. They continued to argue that minorities needed to be “taken to the interior and the villages of these races, wherever they are, need to be scattered… in places and conditions where this is not possible, Turks need to be settled in their richest and most fertile villages at a rate of at least 50% [of the local population]”. The report further iterated that deportation alone was not enough to “Turkify” the eastern population. It pressed for more realism in dealing with the Kurds, urging their superiors to abandon the self-deceiving discourse of calling the Kurds “Mountain Turks” or “Valley Turks”, which, they claimed, was a fallacy that only masked the reality of the problem: “With this propaganda we cannot convince either them or anybody else that they are Turks… we have to acknowledge and admit that in a large part of the country a foreign

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1114 Koca, *Yakin Tarihte*, pp.452-94.
element are living in a collective fashion, and to take measures accordingly.” Therefore, the report proposed more radical measures in two fields: “psychological measures” and “deportation measures”. The bottom line was that cultural policies were needed to complement the deportation program.\textsuperscript{1115}

At that time, foreign diplomats recognized that the administrators of the east had been summoned to Ankara, and the Kemalists’ preoccupation with ethnic homogeneity was sensed by them very clearly. As a British diplomat wrote,

In short, Turkey’s only policy to-day is to rid itself of extraneous population, without real regard to the eventual results on her population and in the hopes of building up in course of time from the remnants a homogenous Turanian people. Her Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews and, indeed, any people that can, possibly, by tradition, sentiments or blood be linked however remotely to other countries she eyes with the same suspicion as in the past and is determined to supplant and even root out.\textsuperscript{1116}

Another diplomat reported,

The Kurds of the Eastern provinces, the Arabs of South-Eastern Anatolia, the Moslems from Russia, the territories detached under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek islands, Greece, the Balkans and Roumania will be scattered among pure Turkish populations, so that they may lose the characteristics of the countries and districts of their birth, and, in a generation, be Turkish in speech, dress, habits and outlook, undistinguishable from their old-established neighbors.\textsuperscript{1117}

In the end, the demographic ramifications of the third deportation phase were considerable. According to official sources, the total number of Kurds deported to the west in the 1930s was 25,381 people in 5074 households.\textsuperscript{1118} Now again, for the third and last time, the voids they left behind were filled by Turkish settlers.

According to the regulations of the 1934 Settlement Law, Diyarbekir was part of zone 1, the zone where “people who are culturally Turkish” would be transferred from zone 2 (the western provinces) and settled. Inspector-General Abidin Özmen’s projections were ambitious. He assured that “the area would be organized in sections and commissions of expertise such as artisans, administrators, settlement bureaucrats, judges, doctors, engineers,

\textsuperscript{1116} PRO, FO 424/268/E129.
\textsuperscript{1117} PRO, FO 371/17970/E6434.
architects, and scientist bureaucrats will be set up and at least 300 houses per year will be constructed.” These commissions would build three to five Turkish villages of 100 houses every year at a cost of 600 lira. When the settlers finally came in, Özmen argued, “this way our progressive nation can assimilate the backward nation” and establish “economic dominance in a Turkish center.” According to official sources, from 1928 to 1938 a total of 1988 migrants were sent to Diyarbekir province. For the year 1938 another 2143 households were expected to settle there. Because the Republican province of Diyarbekir was much smaller than its Ottoman predecessor, to this number needs to be added (parts of) the settlers sent to Elazığ province in the north. There, from 1932 on, a total of 1571 households were sent, totalling 6045 settlers from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and some from Syria. As all the settlers were peasants, they were settled in the rural areas.

Of these settlers, twelve households were settled in Kabiye village, fifty in Karabash, 105 in Anbarçayı/Ozmen households, five in Şimşim in the Silvan district (all of these were old Syriac and Armenian villages), thirty-four on the banks of the Tigris, seventy-five in Altok in the Bismil district, thirty-five in Harbato in Ergani district, fifteen in Osmaniye city center. Besides these directed settlements, the government confiscated another 200 houses from Kurds and appropriated them to the settlers. For a large part the resources, considerable in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, emanated from the Armenian genocide and the various confiscations from Kurdish elites – some of which were also formerly Armenian goods. According to official sources, this movable property included at least the following additional resources in Diyarbekir: 284 ploughs, 636 oxes, two mares, two donkeys, twenty-two shops, sixty-one drags (large four-horse coaches), 51,975 kilos of seed, 16,407 acres of land, and 68,907 cents in cash.

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1119 Koca, Yakın Tarihten, pp.495-7.
1121 For examples, see: Diken, İsyân Sürüşleri, pp.36, 51, 98, 220, 239.
In official propaganda texts, the settlement of Turks in Diyarbekir province was painted as an unequivocal success. One brochure published by the governorship boasted that it was working hard to “attract our Turkish brothers from beyond our national borders, settle them in the homeland, and turn them into productive people truly connected to the superior ideal of the nation.” Here, the distinction between the ethnic “Turkish brothers” versus “Turkish citizens” is poignant for understanding Young Turk visions on nationalism and citizenship. The local authorities in Diyarbekir did not want to lose face by lagging behind in the settlement of Turks, compared to other provinces. They acclaimed the settlement of the Turks in the same discourse as national directives: “Three beautiful and brand new villages have been established near Diyarbekir city for our brothers from Bulgaria and Romania… the settlers have now passed into a state of being fully productive people.”

Another official wrote in the same vein: “The attention given to the settlers is considerable. After having provided for their maintenance, farm animals, ploughs, seeds, and land have also been supplied. Their sick are being taken care of by the state. The Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants work hard and have rapidly transformed into productive people.”

But internal correspondence and oral history suggest otherwise. In his 1935 report İnönü remarked in an uneasy tone: “There have been efforts to settle immigrants from everywhere. A population of about fifteen hundred toil on very fertile and water-rich terrain. There are three groups of immigrants with a gap between them of three to five years… Almost all of them complain to government officials about their condition… The people are needy, destitute, the fields have not yet been productive. The pastureland has been distributed poorly. They are complaining.” The issues vexing the settlers were not always economic. One elderly Turkish settler remembered that even though his parents were allotted plenty of property by the government, in his childhood they used to deplore Diyarbekir as “this

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1124 Usman Eti, Diyarbekir (Diyarbakır: Diyarbekir Matbaası, 1937), p.44.
1125 Nazlı, Elazığ, p.51.
accursed place,” nostalgically longing for their estate in Thessaloniki.1127 Another family of settlers faced a culture which, in their own words, they “never understood”. They felt overwhelmed by Diyarbekir’s “cutthroat” economic rivalry and higher levels of everyday violence. They also felt intimidated by their Kurdish neighbors, who envied and despised them for their connectedness and preferential treatment at government offices.1128 The deportations and settlements also sowed the seeds of conflict among local Kurds and Turkish settlers in Diyarbekir province. For these settlers, the climate did not alleviate their lives either, even though the Settlement Law clearly bore a clause that the Turks should be settled “according to suitable living and climatic conditions”. Although the law had promised to take into consideration the acclimatization of the peasants from the Balkans, who were used to green hills with plenty of precipitation, some became ill in the scorching, arid Tigris valley and some died.1129 Much like the Kurdish deportees in western Turkey, many Turkish settlers in eastern Turkey too, often felt alienated and regretted having migrated and being settled.

The settlement campaign continued until the very end of the Young Turk dictatorship. In 1950, on the eve of the Kemalist loss of power, there were still Kurdish deportees in the west who were not allowed to return, and there were still Turkish settlers being sent to Diyarbekir province.1130 Most Kurds who were allowed to return did not need much time to consider the matter. Mehdiye Çetin remembered her father was determined to return as soon as possible. When the news of the amnesty came through, the deportees rushed back to Diyarbekir by train, a journey which took them three days and three nights. Mehdiye saw how “all of the deportees had poured onto the roads to return”.1131 According to her sister Sakine,

1127 Interview conducted in Diyarbekir with Kerim B., 14 August 2007.
1128 Interview conducted in Diyarbekir with A.S., 15 August 2007.
1131 Interview with Mehdiye Çetin-Öngören conducted by Şeyhumus Diken, published in: Diken, İcian Sürgüntleri, pp.33-4.
on arrival in their village their fellow villagers were delighted and received them well. Surrounding villagers who had profited materially from their deportation, however, feared they might want their property back and therefore resisted their return. When the Azizoğlu family received the news of the amnesty, according to Fatma Azizoğlu, they “played instruments and organized parties”. But the return was disappointing: their house was in ruins and the Kemalists had turned the large family mansion into a military barracks. Şermin Cemiloğlu of the Cemilpaşazâde claimed she could clearly remember the date of the amnesty: 14 March 1947. On that day, the family was undecided, for once again they would have to migrate and abandon a life they had built. When she returned to Diyarbekir, she felt alienated. “We felt like strangers when we arrived,” she said in an interview. One of the most poignant accounts of the problems surrounding return was that of Şahin Cizrelioğlu of the Cizrelizâde family. He remembered his return as follows:

The deportees’ return aroused indignation in certain circles because the real owners would get their property here back. It sparked competition. The separation into political parties increased this issue. Those in the People’s Party found those in the Democratic Party against them… Among those in the middle class and in the villages there were people who returned us our lands or handed us small amounts of money and pledged loyalty to us. But in the city, certain circles who were reigning in luxury opposed this. Later, unpleasant incidents happened… Those who profited from the void in the period of our absence and claimed to be the owners of Diyarbekir tried to make trouble for us. In fact, they even worked for us to be deported from here again.

Although he did not name any names, Cizrelioğlu undoubtedly thought of the Pirinççizâde and Müftüzâde families. These local families, who had urged the Cizrelizâde’s deportation in 1934 and profited from it, were irritated and, out of fear for losing power, urged the local authorities to deport them again. Other families who returned faced similar difficulties. Some deportees simply stayed in their places of exile, either because life was treating them well, or in the expectation that if they returned they would be re-deported in a next wave anyway.

But the fourth wave of deportations never came. On 14 May 1950 the first democratic elections in the history of the Turkish Republic were held. The Republican People’s Party suffered a crushing defeat with 39,5% of the votes, as their rival the Democrat Party took the absolute majority: 52,7%. In Diyarbekir, the Democrats won 53.7% of registered voters, a

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1132 Interview with Sakine Arat conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyán Sürgünleri, p.52.
1133 Interview with Fatma Azizoğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyán Sürgünleri, p.98.
1134 Interview with Şermin Cemiloğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyán Sürgünleri, p.190-1.
1135 Interview with Şahin Cizrelioğlu conducted by Şeyhmus Diken, published in: Diken, İsyán Sürgünleri, pp.220-1.
sign that the population was discontented with decades of Young Turk rule. The 1950 elections ended the Young Turk dictatorship and their brand of nationalist population politics in eastern Turkey. A sigh of relief blew through the eastern provinces. The Democrat Party, however, failed to come to terms with the legacy of the Young Turks and their crimes were neither discussed nor punished. It did express more tolerance than the Republican People’s Party for traditional ways of life and relaxed much of the RPP’s anti-Islamic antipathy. In the eastern provinces, this meant that sheikhs and their followers who had survived the Young Turk dictatorship could slowly reopen their seminaries and educate their students. By that time, the human map of Eastern Turkey had been significantly altered.

**Discussion**

The scholarship on the deportations of Kurds during Young Turk rule is in its infancy, especially in comparison to deportations in other dictatorships such as Nazi Germany or Russia under Stalinism. One of the first scholars to ever study Young Turk population politics was the Turkish sociologist İsmail Beşikçi, who wrote a trailblazing series of books on Kemalism. His volume on the Young Turk deportations of the Kurds analyzed the 1934 Settlement Law and explained the deportations. Beşikçi began his periodization in 1923 and thus ignored the CUP deportations during the First World War and the continuity between these episodes. In other words, in his attempt to criticize Kemalism, Beşikçi used Kemalist assumptions and cast a Kemalist historical gaze. The trap of ‘methodological Kemalism’ is one of the most common pitfalls that surround scholarship on the Young Turk era. Two other scholars who have studied deportations approached the subject matter similarly, either periodizing from 1923 on, or until 1923. This chapter has attempted to challenge these approaches by looking at the long-term processes of population policy. At this point, we can return to the question that was raised: how did the Young Turk dictatorship use forced population transfer as a strategy of “Turkifying” the country’s eastern provinces?

Three major waves of deportations struck the Kurdish population of the east. The first generation of deportees (1916) suffered perhaps the most amidst the harsh conditions of war and the seasons. The second cohort of Kurds deported right after the establishment of the

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Republic from 1925 to 1927 did not stay away from their native regions very long and many deportees returned within a year or two. The third deportation was organized after the consolidation of the single-party dictatorship in 1934 and was more sophisticated and categorical. Only when the Young Turks were ousted from power in 1950 were Kurds no longer deported.1140 The deportations show a distinct process of evolution from the first to the last phase. Young Turk social engineers accumulated experience and as they muddled through, learnt from their prior mistakes and thus sophisticated and perfected the craft of deportation. The three phases of deportations exhibit an evolving dialectic: ethno-territorial thinking, the promulgation of a law, the implementation of the deportation, the separation of elites from populace, and the monitoring of the ‘output’ of the deportation back into the process to regulate the ‘input’, or keeping track of the deportees’ experiences to improve the method.

This evolution towards more sophistication in population policies ran parallel with the biographies of their organizers. In order to support this claim of continuity it is sufficient to cross-reference CUP social engineers with RPP social engineers and accentuate overlap in the composition of the political elites ordering and carrying out the campaigns. It is no coincidence that names such as Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda, Mahmud Celâl Bayar, Kâzım Özalp, İbrahim Tali Öngören, Ali Cenani, and especially Şükrü Kaya appear throughout the 1913-1950 era in reports and operative documents regarding population politics. After 1923, these were the men to be employed in policies of social engineering since they had acquired the requisite know-how and experience in this field during CUP rule. Even though some men were tried and hanged in 1926, most in mid-level positions remained in office and many were even promoted. Moreover, the Kemalist deportation proposals and decrees contained clauses, provisions, and formulations directly modelled on the wording of the CUP deportations. The modus operandi of the deportations, with “zones of Turkification” and percentage regulations (5% and 10%), bore the unmistakable traces of previous deportation formulas. In some cases

1140 Yet a brief caveat is in order about the survival of deportations into the post-1950 era. Avni Doğan, the fourth Inspector-General in Diyarbekir, wrote about the Kurdish “danger” and the necessity to resume deportations well into the 1960s. Avni Doğan, *Kurtuluş, Kurtuluş ve Sonrası* (İstanbul: Donya, 1964); Koca, *Yakın Tarihi*, p.550. According to recently discovered documents on the 1960 military junta, the State Planning Organization established an ‘Eastern Task Force’ that spurred the leaders to resuscitate Young Turk methods of population politics. The Eastern Task Force toured the region on 8, 10, and 16 February 1961 and presented a report to the junta on 24 March 1961. The report included the following clause: “In order to transform the structure of the population in the region in favor of the Turks, those who believe they are Kurds need to be transferred outside the region and the excess population of the Black Sea coasts and Turks migrating from abroad need to be settled here.” The cabinet discussed and accepted the report on 18 April, and authorized its implementation by a governmental decree to the Ministries. With the overturn of the junta following the October 1961 elections, the plan was discontinued. *Milliyet*, 22 January 2008.
the deportees of the 1934 phase were settled close to villages of Kurds who had been deported from the same regions in 1916.

Continuity also existed on the level of the Kurdish resistance. Rather than concomitant effects of the Kemalist abolitions of sultaneate and khalifate, resistance was a relatively autonomous process that had been going on since 1913. Many of the tribes and families that resisted the CUP later continued to resist the RPP as well. And vice versa: the deportations themselves were not responses to Kurdish ‘uprisings’ or ‘rebellions’ but pro-active, purposeful policy by Young Turk social engineers to which Kurdish elites responded in various ways. Local elites too, remained largely intact and assisted in continuing policies of social engineering. Kurdish collaborators and their families profited from the deportations, became even richer, and are still highly influential in the eastern provinces. However, it also becomes clear from the list of deportees in 1925 that Kemalist notions of Kurdish loyalty could fluctuate: several deportees had sided with the Young Turks but during a severe crisis could paradoxically become targets.

This chapter has argued that the two elements (deporting Kurds away from and settling Turks into the eastern provinces) in Young Turk population policy constituted an indivisible whole in which these two parts reinforced each other. This interpretation of interdependency is based on the presence of elements of construction besides the obvious elements of destruction in the policies. The deportations were destructive, not only for the integrity of the tribes and families affected, but for the Diyarbekir region as well. The deportees obviously saw their social ties disrupted, their property confiscated, and their power fractured. But how genocidal were the policies against Kurds between 1913 and 1950? Although thinking in ethnic categories, and the resultant wishful thinking that those ethnic groups disappear, was certainly genocidal in mind, the accompanying violence was too piecemeal to be actually genocidal in practice. The mass executions and persecution of Kurdish elites would qualify as proto-genocidal. Indeed, within a decade, the Young Turk regime had successfully eliminated the social elites of the minorities in the eastern provinces: Armenian elites had been murdered in 1915 and Kurdish elites had been executed, deported, expelled, and isolated in 1925. However, the deportations were also constructive. They were part of a plan to reconstruct the Kurds as Turks. The cases of Kurdish elites exemplify the double-edged nature of inclusion and exclusion in nation formation. Their deportation and expropriation was expected to obviate competing loyalties and pave the way for cultural

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assimilation of the general Kurdish population in the 1930s. Construction was mostly aimed at the Turks. The elimination of Armenians and Kurds left the state an infrastructure of property that was used for the progress of Turkish settler communities. At least on paper, the Young Turks’ plans to turn the eastern provinces into Turkish “Lebensraum” appear obvious. They romanticized the agrarian life of the Turkish peasantry, whom they believed were “racially pure Turks”. The regime took great care that adequate resources were allocated to the settlers: ploughs, oxen, land, seed, and housing. Bundled together, what seem like two isolated phenomena were part and parcel of a process of nation formation through large-scale social engineering.

Did the deportations “Turkify” Diyarbekir province? This is hard to assess, for two reasons. If one attempts to enter into the Young Turks’ minds and assume their nationalist worldview, then the answer would be negative. In 2009, demographically Diyarbekir still consists for at least three-quarters of Kurds. But if one interprets the question culturally, the answer might differ. For a long time, Turkish culture was the only culture permitted to be produced and consumed. Martin van Bruinessen has argued that by 1960, “there were quite a few cases of successful assimilation”, but adds that this was an urban phenomenon. The mass settlements of Turks into Diyarbekir province did not “Turkify” the region either. It seems that the settlers’ efficacy for “Turkification” was overestimated by the Young Turks. Many Turks simply left the area after 1950. Decades after the deportations, it seems that most of the Turkish settlers who continued to live in Diyarbekir province themselves became “Kurdified” rather than “Turkifying” their Kurdish neighbors. Besides the demographic preponderance of the Kurds, ethnic intermarriages and economic ties have undoubtedly contributed to this result. Did the deportations “Turkify” the Kurdish deportees? Although little systematic longitudinal research has been conducted on the fate of the Kurdish deportees, the available evidence suggests that for most Kurds the deportation project produced limited results. Well into the 1990s, Kurdish communities living in Central Anatolia preserved their tribal and ethnic identities and languages, with the exception of those who moved to the metropoles. Moreover, in the end, neither combined nor in isolation did the three phases of deportations “solve” any Kurdish “question”. On the contrary, they were

1142 Martin van Bruinessen, “Race, Culture, Nation and Identity Politics in Turkey: Some Comments,” paper presented at the Annual Turkish Studies Workshop Continuity and Change: Shifting State Ideologies from Late Ottoman to Early Republican Turkey, 1890-1930, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 24-26 April 1997, pp.8-9. In the meantime, Kurdish peasants living in their villages were not deeply affected by assimilation into Turkish culture (see next chapter).
counterproductive, disrupting the local economies and shifting power relations in the East in favor of local families who had stayed aloof during the waves of deportations, especially the Pirinççizâde, Müftüzâde, and Direkçizâde. They had now become even more powerful.

The Young Turk attack on the Kurdish intelligentsia deepened existing grievances and accentuated conflicts across generations. The elites, who initially saw themselves as Muslims or Ottomans, were now constructed, treated, and deported as Kurds and as such, made into Kurds. For the deported Kurdish elites, the galvanizing impact of the Kemalists’ policies brought frustration and vindictiveness. British diplomats did not fail to record that “outside Government circles the opinion is freely held that the Kurds were too deeply embittered by the earlier policy of repression for a policy of conciliation to succeed now.”¹¹⁴⁵ The experiences of the 1930s were remembered and transmitted across time and space to new generations of Kurds. These new generations assimilated these narratives and constructed a paradigm based on their nation’s suffering and a longing to return to their homeland, which many had never actually seen. The Azizoğlu family, for example, was deported so often they named one of their children “Settlement” (İskân). The child, İskân Azizoğlu, grew up to become a politician and still carries the legacy of the Young Turk deportations with him. The deportations are still a major political issue – the memory of the massacres and deportations played a major part in the Kurdish-nationalist movement. The deportations had a profound effect on the Kurdish elites of the eastern provinces: most of all they sensitized Diyarbekir’s Kurdish elites of their identities, causing a backlash. The Kurdish-nationalist movement that sprouted from the 1960s on reached an important stage with the establishment of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). The PKK was spearheaded by many deportee families, and was symbolically established in a village in the Lice district of Diyarbekir province, had been largely massacred and deported in 1925.¹¹⁴⁶ The war that ensued cost 40,000 lives and enormous material and ecological destruction. This form of Young Turk social engineering and nation formation had largely failed.

¹¹⁴⁵ PRO, FO 424/267, p.125, no.72, Hoare to Chamberlain, 14 December 1927.
¹¹⁴⁶ Yet, some Kurds, such as some individuals of the Azizoğlu and Cemilpaşazâde tribes, remained loyal to the Republican People’s Party. This resembles how some victims of Stalin maintained their loyalty to him after returning from the Gulag.