International cooperation between politics and practice: how Dutch Indonesian cooperation changed remarkably little after a diplomatic rupture

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CHAPTER 2

The quest to solve the riddle: another model of the policy process

A willingness to be puzzled by the simplest phenomena is the very beginning of science. The attempt to formulate questions about simple phenomena has led to remarkable discoveries about elementary aspects of nature, previously unexpected (Chomsky 1996).

The message of the first chapter was that a not too complex phenomenon could be quite puzzling. The diplomatic rupture of 1992 was meant to result in a redefinition of bilateral cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Apart from the question whether the decision to end Dutch foreign aid resulted in a change in the characteristics of cooperation, we saw that the practicalities of the decision generated a riddle in terms of the policy process. One would expect that the Indonesian government analysed the desirability of the joint policies, materialised in the projects. Perhaps the Indonesian government instigated a massive evaluation of all projects, that assessed whether they were eligible to continue or not. A preliminary assessment of what happened after the decision, the information available at the onset of the research and the seven explanations given by those involved did not yield answers on the riddle. The question remained why some projects were continued and others were ended. One wonders what the Indonesian evaluators have looked at, how they assessed ‘equality’ or ‘interest’ or ‘mutual benefit’. In principle all Dutch projects must have had similar characteristics. They were all part of the list of projects in the so-called ‘Blue Book’ of the Indonesian government, a list of desired projects that donor-countries could sign up for. They all pursued recognised interests and were based on similar principles from both governments.

Using common-sense knowledge did not solve the puzzle. At first sight, the events in 1992 started as a non-violent conflict between two countries, and appeared to be an issue of international relations. One may rightly question whether the conflict between the Indonesian government and the Dutch government is a resultant of the changing patterns between industrialised and developing countries, or the last shudders of a post-colonial relation. Solving the riddle formulated in the former chapter must indeed take into account that the decision of 1992 was taken in a social and political environment that is different than for example in the 1960s. After all, the two nations experienced significant changes in the past fifty years. The Netherlands changed from a pillarised society in which the elites made decisions based on consensus (Lijphart 1968) to a post-parliamentary, post-national network-democracy (Anderson & Burns 1994 cited in Hoppe 1998). Indonesia had changed from a newly
independent developing nation into an autocratically ruled 'lower middle income' country where the third wave of democratisation stirred the nation back again into political chaos (Uhlin 1997; Vatikiotis 1999). While these changes in the political and social context have definitely been of influence on the onset of the conflict, the aftermath of the decision needs to take into account more than the political climate of the two countries.

Several authors observed that Soeharto's decision did indeed serve domestic purposes, but he could only have made the decision now that the international position of Indonesia had significantly changed. 30 years of successful economic development and industrialisation had increased the leverage of the Indonesian government, domestically and internationally. The decision served international purposes indeed: by ending Dutch chairmanship of the IGGI, the World Bank could take over and this was proven to be the right step, since the new consortium pledged a much larger amount of foreign aid than it had under the chairmanship of the Dutch. Furthermore, Indonesia being the chairman of both the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN, this forceful step would increase its standing and leverage in these multilateral organisations (Van den Ham 1993; Schulte Nordholt 1994; Baehr 1996).

Robert Putnam's work on 'two-level games' offers an interesting way of analysing such inter-state relations. Decision-making among nations is perceived as powerplay in two games: the domestic game, where politicians must accommodate the wishes of the electorate; and the international game where the same politicians must assure that the interests of his country are not harmed by international agreements (Putnam 1988). In a later volume, Putnam and others apply this theory to several other cases of international decision-making and show how this new approach transcends the common, yet ubiquitous notion that 'domestic policy influences international policy.' (Evans et al. 1993). Putnam's idea that international relations must be understood as a game played on two levels — the domestic and the international — is a starting point in this policy-oriented study.

While the decision of 1992 was indeed an issue between two nations in a post-colonial era, the riddle is about the effectuation of a 'high politics' decision on the practice of cooperation between the two nations. Putnam's models, but also other theories of state behaviour, have another unit and level of analysis: the cause and nature of decisions and not the effects for the societies involved. Some foreign policy studies however have questioned the effects of international agreements on the domestic 'real' world (cf. Clarke & White 1981; Smith & Clarke 1985; Everts & Walraven 1989; Knill 1998). These studies took internationally reached decisions as a given and concentrated on the effects within the countries involved. If one takes a close look at the methods and points of interests, then such analysis of international agreements or conflicts is basically the same as domestic policy analysis. Thus, the focus of this study should be extended to a policy analysis. How then can the riddle be solved? I will argue in the next two sections that another model of the policy process can serve as a searchlight to solve the riddle, as to why some projects were continued, and others not. To arrive at the policy oriented method used in this study, the orthodox model of the policy pro-
cess is addressed first, also to understand why the explanations summarised in the last section of Chapter One could not explain the riddle.

On rationality

Policy more often than not involves contradictory interpretations on what the problem or solution is. Deborah Stone argues in her textbook on the policy process that the orthodox view on the policy process assumes rationality of the policy actors, but that in real life, different views on the policy objectives generate complete different meanings on objectives and reality. Policy-analysis is in her view the struggle on meaning capture, rather than establishing hard facts and subsequently choosing the best policy. In her book she supports her argument by showing the multiple and fluid meanings of goals, problems and solutions in the policy process (Stone 1997). Charles Fox and Hugh Miller criticised the orthodox model of the policy process in a similar vein (Fox & Miller 1995). The division between politics and administration is a legitimising principle for policy makers and analysts, rather than a reflection of reality. This is so because the foundation of representative democracy – the premise that voters rationally choose their representatives and that choices of representatives are controlled by the electorate – does not occur in reality, even in the most democratic political systems. It has been aptly demonstrated that rational choice by the electorate for parties and policy programmes is not possible (cf Lindblom & Woodhouse 1993). When it comes to controlling bureaucracies that implement policies, more and more rules to do so have been established. However, the more rules are created, the more likely it is that they will either contradict each other, or be trespassed to make implementation possible at all (Gruber 1987). Rational choices by the electorate and obedient implementation of public and political choice are a fiction, as many empirical studies and articles in the media continue to demonstrate. In the next sections we will dwell on why we cannot assume that a decision by government will be implemented accordingly.

Rationalities: multiple meanings and interests

Early models of the political process and public administration departed from the assumption that governance would be improved if only the most rational choice could be identified. Herbert Simon’s challenge in his classical study on administrative behaviour to this assumption was that people can only be boundedly rational: no person can completely oversee the consequences and alternatives of his or her actions. Instead, humans ‘satisfice’, which means that they jump on any solution that satisfies a rather simple set of criteria. This might not be the best solution, as that is only proven in the course of time (Simon 1945/1976). Charles Lindblom applied that idea to the policy process, arguing that changes in policy only come about incrementally, through mutual adjustment between the policy actors involved in devising new policy
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The idea that a governing body could indeed assume rationality was a basic premise in what Vincent Ostrom called the ‘Classical Perspective’ in Public Administration studies (Ostrom 1973; cf. Bogason & Toonen 1998). Most students of policy and politics indeed acknowledge that rationality is bounded, dispersed over many actors and that we therefore must speak of multiple interests. Understanding decisions jointly made in two polities with two civil services and departing from different cultural backgrounds makes it even more imperative to abandon the idea of univocal rationality.

Understanding human rationality is required to the study of any policy-making process, since it is about humans making decisions. Sir Geoffrey Vickers designates the mental process of the individual (policy actor) in the ‘Art of Judgment’. Policy makers select facts relevant for the appreciation of a certain policy issue. In a lucid example on decision-making in a firm, Vickers shows how a manager and a buyer are constantly appreciating the situation and the changes that occur after decisions have been made. With every new event in the market, the buyer has to evaluate the situation and change his strategy of buying. The manager on his turn learns more of the market situation and the capabilities of the buyer. The new information is judged on the facts and on the values and the manager in his turn must change his strategy of managing the firm. This reiterative process of appreciative judgement is a constant process of ‘translations’ of the problem and the solution by the actors involved. In the entire policy process, many an actor is involved, each adding to, refining and changing the situation and the problem to be solved (Vickers 1965: 36-48). He stresses furthermore that: ‘(...) the value judgements of men and societies cannot be proved correct or incorrect; they can only be approved as right or condemned as wrong by the exercise of another value judgement’ (Vickers 1965: 71).

The definition of a (policy) problem then is a crucial issue (cf. Dunn 1994: 137-152). If we define a problem as the gap between the actual situation and a desired situation, then norms and values determine the characteristic of the problem. Defining problems across countries (international policy-making) offers perhaps the clearest example: because of different norms and contexts, an at first sight unambiguous problem might lead to different approaches in solving it, because of the different end-situations desired. The tedious international conferences on environmental issues are prime examples of the difficulty to arrive at shared problem-definitions. A (policy) problem can therefore be defined as a social construct, depending on what norms and values are held. Dunn suggests that policy analysis should focus on structuring problems. Thus it ‘... can assist in discovering hidden assumptions, diagnosing causes, mapping possible objectives, synthesising conflicting views, and designing new policy options’ (Dunn 1994: 17). By focusing on the way in which a problem may be structured, one can discover the different meanings actors attach to a specific policy, meant to change or improve a situation. If a policy problem is a social construct, then interests – as objectives to be attained to solve the problem as defined – are also a social construct. In their textbook on policy and politics, Henk van de Graaf and Rob Hoppe coined
this phenomenon as 'problem-solution-combinations' (Van de Graaf & Hoppe 1989).

The former must not be understood as a statement that rationality is a myth. Quite the contrary, there are many rationalities, but the very existence of multiple rationalities demands a rejection of the assumption of one rationality. Studies in cultural anthropology taught that what is completely rational for one group of people is not so for another group. For example, to take 'interests' as the vehicle for explaining different rationalities, we know that the perception of interests differs markedly over all cultures (cf. Geertz 1973: 311-326; Douglas 1978). Depending on how one sees the world and one's identity, facts of life are interpreted. The implication is that the 'politics of interests' model as a single problem/single answer model cannot be maintained. Thomas Sowell explains the origins of political controversies as the reflection of radically different visions of the nature of humans. He developed two archetypes of visions, the constrained and unconstrained vision of man and analysed several political issues, such as criminal justice, income distribution and war and peace. He asserts that the controversies over these issues can be seen as the opposition between the two fundamental visions on humans (Sowell 1987). Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson flatly assert that explaining political behaviour as the pursuit of interests suffers from circular reasoning: 'to know what is in one's interest, one much know what is in one's interest' (Schwarz & Thompson 1990: 49). The question how it is that different people have different interests is not asked in traditional policy analysis.

The question whose interests prevail has been asked though, but the answer is simple: those with power and wealth. Power is then the means with which one can pursue his interests better than someone else. Related to the exercise of power, subjectivism can even endanger the very notion of democracy. Elmer Schattschneider wrote on how the definition of conflicts is a source of political power: 'Political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which opponents agree in advance on a definition of issues. A matter of fact, the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. ... He who determines what politics is about runs the country' (Schattschneider 1960: 68). Peter Sederberg, adopting a radical view on the social construction of reality, states that the one that has the power to determine the meaning of (political) concepts has the ultimate power (Sederberg 1984). His view on the politics of meaning is somewhat more radical than I wish to use it in this study, but the main point that must be made is that perception and construction are essential for understanding what happens in the real world. The politics of interest model fails to address the question where the interests come from. In my view interests are the tangible objects (material and immaterial) that are the means to achieve the ultimate norms and values. Different norms and values lead to different definitions of interests and therefore varying (political) behaviour.

To summarise: humans endow meanings to their actions, based in how they perceive the world and how they relate to the world; therefore action is meaning-oriented behaviour. In the same vein, meaning precedes interests. Therefore, we cannot a priori
take the contents and directions of interests for granted, nor can we assume that one interest (for example the pursuit of wealth) motivated all actors under study. With this in mind we should be better able to understand why one concept can have different meanings. The difference or concurrence between these meanings is one of the factors to help understand how implementation, in this study projects of bilateral cooperation can have different meanings to different people.

Institutions constraining and enabling rationality and action

The former section seems to imply that humans act in a social vacuum and that human rationality is the main explanation for social and political processes. However, the criticism of Fox and Miller on the assumption that once a political objective is set it will subsequently be implemented does of course not imply that actors only act as a consequence of their own cognition. The seminal article of March and Olsen on the rediscovery of institutions focused the attention of political scientists once again on the role of the state, laws, bureaucracy, rituals and symbols, these institutions being essential to understanding the modern political and economic systems that guide contemporary life. (March & Olsen 1984: 734; 1989). The main interest of the so-called neo-institutionalists is how institutions of politics, particularly administrative institutions, provide order and influence change in policies. The question is in short: do rules define the play or do players define the rules?

The study of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman and that of Anthony Giddens emphasise that, although humans ultimately act based on their own will, certain rules do in fact limit and enable our thought and behaviour. For example, the institution of marriage, as some specific rules of behaviour toward another person, has become a social reality which guides and denounces the behaviour of a great many people. Rules of behaviour help us making decisions amongst others by limiting the choices available (Berger & Luckman 1966). Human beings, and for that matter, policy makers act both based on their own assessment and for a large part according to the social and political rules in a given system. Laws are a prime example of social constructs: in the course of years people have codified norms and values into rules and based on these rules, human behaviour is rewarded or punished. Laws are not physical entities but the result of negotiation and agreement between political and social actors.

Anthony Giddens has probably done the most serious attempt to outline the relation between structure and human action in his theory of structuration. He argues that humans structure social relations themselves, while at the same time institutions guide their conduct. He rejects the mechanistic views of both parties: structure is both the medium and the outcome of the conduct it continually organises. The properties of structures are not somewhere 'out there', but are constantly produced and reproduced by the action of people.

'Social life may often be predictable in its course ... But its predictability is in many of its aspects "made to happen" by social actors; it does not happen in spite of the
reasons they have for their conduct. If the study of unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of action is a major part of social research, we should nonetheless stress that such consequences and conditions are always to be interpreted within the flow of intentional conduct' (Giddens 1984: 285).

The discussion above can be summarised as follows: institutions, rules of conduct and cultures are the result of human cognition and interaction. Once they are set, they are seen as more or less stable ‘facts’ that guide further action. How we interpret institutions and act upon them may differ: humans are able to question the structures they live with. That is what makes structure and cognition the two sides of a coin. Therefore, we need to have an understanding of those social rules and political institutions that constrain and enable the decisions of (political) actors in this study. One could also assess how the environment influences political behaviour by looking at how actors involved either as implementers or as target groups perceive the environment and how they act upon it in the practice of policy-making and implementation. The way humans act upon facts they encounter in the real world is probably the closest one can get in understanding causal mechanisms. In the social sciences the researcher can actually only ask ‘how’, but hardly ‘why’. Assuming that a researcher can know why people have acted as they did implies a generally applicable theory of human action, close to behaviourist models of man, models that have been rejected by many social scientists (cf. Elster 1989).

On hierarchy

If we must establish that there is no such thing as a univocal rationality and humans construct their own options for action and interests, then the idea of true hierarchy (as opposed to formal hierarchy) must be reconsidered as well. As we saw in the former section, no single decision-maker (or small group) has all the knowledge required for overseeing the consequences, side effects and limitations of its decisions. In fact, in most political systems the principle of delegation and decentralisation is applied, simply because being responsible for everything in a policy area, of for that matter a country is too much for a minister or president. The assumption that the Indonesian government was the only decision-taker and that the decisions were consistently implemented was identified as another obstruction for solving the riddle. But again, in the practice of policy-making, there is, in the words of Tuner and Hulme, ‘a persistent myth or perhaps a naive assumption that politicians make policy and public servants implement it rationally, and even more naive, obediently’ (Turner & Hulme 1997: 75). Crozier’s study on the ‘fourth power’, emphasised that civil servants have much more discretionary power than they should have according to the principle of the separation of the three powers (Crozier 1964). This section considers the studies that show the fallacy of the assumptions that the policy process is a hierarchically and chronologically ordered process. Rather, we should take into account that much more
actors are involved in the actual decision-making and that policy as a plan does not always precede practice as reality.

More than one rational decision-maker

The earliest attempts to analyse what actually happens after a policy decision is made were made in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Prior to these attempts, studies have been made of the policy programs meant to make smaller or bigger changes in society, but these concentrated more on the decision-making process and the effects thereof. But not until Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky wrote their seminal work on implementation, much attention was given to what actually happens once a decision has left the political arena and how it is that once decisions are made, the eventual outcomes do not reflect the initial intentions (Pressman & Wildavsky 1973). These authors made a study of the implementation of an economic development project in the United States. The study showed that the actual process of implementation is more often than not a highly complex process, with numerous decision-points, imprecise policy guidelines and conflicting or incompatible interests and priorities of the implementing actors. In many cases shortages of funding hampers the realisation of the aims, and the aims itself are often not clear or diverge.

Often the actors at the rendering side of policies have to cope with a different environment and have different problem perceptions than the decision-making body. In his study on bureaucratic processes in the United States, Lipsky showed how 'street-level' bureaucrats deal with orders from above and demands from the people they have to serve. In many cases street level bureaucrats have to make decisions going beyond their authority and are based on criteria which are not spelled out in the official policy-documents (Lipsky 1980; cf. Dunsire 1978). Many others have taken up the study of the actual process of implementation and this proved to be a fruitful effort in the gaining of understanding of how policies ‘become’ after decision-making by the relevant authorities (Bardach 1977; Lewis & Wallace 1984).

The studies conducted in the seventies mainly had a ‘top-down’ perspective; i.e. departing from the government decisions and then assessing if, and to what extent these decisions were implemented. Other authors turned the world upside down and showed that in order to understand fully what affected success or failure of policies one should look at what is happening in the field where policies are actually carried out (Hjern & Hull 1982; Elmore 1978; Fox 1987). Not only government (the policy makers) decide, decisions are made on all levels, albeit in different capacities and with varying effects. Each of the actors responsible for outcomes has a different perspective of the situation, as a result of the different environment, constraints and resources he or she has to deal with. In a later article, added to the third edition of the Pressman & Wildavsky book Implementation, Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky assert that implementation is evolution: the implementation of a policy also shapes the policy. Faced with the complexity of the real world, implementation must be seen as a continuous interaction between what is feasible and what is desirable, and policy
ANOTHER MODEL OF THE POLICY PROCESS

objectives are altered accordingly. ‘In the interaction model, implementation is the continuation of politics with other means’ (Majone & Wildavsky 1979/1984: 175). The conclusion resulting from several years of studying implementation in industrialised and developing countries is that many actors influence outcomes and that the societal context is an important determinant of the eventual outcome of a certain policy. Instead of starting with a policy decision or a law, the policy area (sub-system) should be studied. In particular, at all governmental levels the strategies of various actors to deal with policy-issues should be studied, because these actors have their own rationality and influence the eventual outcomes (Mazmanian & Sabatier 1986: 304).

The recognition that not only the respective government-members decide or have been responsible for the outcomes of specific policies may help to solve the riddle. The search for answers should also be directed to non-government actors, whose interests and actions may have influenced the outcome for the projects.

Development administration: hierarchy in another socio-cultural context

Important lessons on how the policy process works and does not work have been drawn by ‘exporting’ public administration of the industrialised countries as a recipe for welfare to developing countries. What development administration as a sub-discipline of public administration taught us is that policymaking must be understood in the context of the respective country. In the first post World War II years the efforts of the industrialised countries aimed at developing less fortunate countries consisted of ‘technical’ advice on how to set up efficient administration. However, it was soon realised that the western recipes did not work in non-western countries. Being an action-focused discipline, it taught practitioners of public administration that the context in which public administration is set up and policy is made matters for the policy process as a whole (Turner and Hulme 1997: 12-21). Fred Riggs was one of the first authors in the field to point to the differences in the context in which development administration was to be set up. Making a distinction between the ‘office’ in the industrialised countries, where Weberian principles of bureaucracy rules, and the ‘sala’ of developing countries, where modern and feudal principles were mixed, he demonstrated that the study and advice on public policy and administration should take into account the differing context: the culture and political and financial practices in non-industrialised countries. The hierarchy assumed in the Weberian model, but also the Eastonian model of the political system did not quite work in those countries (Riggs 1964: 241-318).

The relation between state and society and its consequences for policymaking became a central focus in the study of bureaucracies of developing countries. Joel Migdal’s famous study into weak states and strong societies is a prime example of the application of the inclusive study of administration and policy. He shows why some countries have had such difficulties in directing their societies to economic and social wellbeing: state agencies work with principles different than the established social organisations in such countries. State actions can thus not find fertile ground for their
policies (Migdal 1988). Wuyts argues that the public sphere is socially (and variously) constructed under the impulse of public policy and public action. 'Understanding policy as a process implies that we examine how public policy and public action respond to tensions and crises within society and, in turn, bring about transformations in society' (Wuyts, Macintosh & Hewitt 1992: 198). The focus thus broadened from studying the administration and policies as such, to the interrelations with society.

Still concerned with the question on how to generate welfare in developing countries, many studies in the 1980's were devoted to the effects of (development) policies. Such studies into the success and failure of projects in developing countries have aptly demonstrated that the outcome of projects differs markedly from what the policy designers (donors and governments of developing countries) had envisaged (Bates & Lofchie 1980; Cheema & Rondinelli 1983; Porter et al 1991; Cassen 1993). John Thomas and Merilee Grindle therefore proposed an interactive model of implementation, that contrasted with the linear, hierarchic model implicitly present in the efforts for development. These authors suggest that analysis of implementation feasibility should also become part of policy analysis (Thomas & Grindle 1990).

Another study project pointed to the so-called hidden crisis in development: a tremendous complexity that emerges in administrating and carrying out development policy. Philip Quarles van Ufford pointed to the inter-organisational character of development administrations: the bureaucratic linkages are much more complex than in industrialised countries with a relatively old system of administration. In case studies the authors point to the multitude of organisations and goals a bureaucratic organisation in de developing country must respond to. In trying to achieve an objective, these organisations are literally torn between the political demands of their own and donor country politics, and by the societal subsystem they must cater for (Quarles van Ufford et al 1988).

The interesting fact is that the recipes for administrative reform did not work in developing countries did not work in industrialised countries either. The division between politics and administration and a Weberian, efficiently organised civil service, is an ideal rather than practice in industrialised and developing countries alike. Donald Horowitz concluded the same in a special issue of Policy Sciences on policymaking in developing countries (Horowitz 1989: 197-212). A hierarchical chain of command between politics and administration must be replaced by another notion of how the policy process is actually organised. The next section discusses the network approach, which offers another mode of analysis to remedy the mistaken assumption of hierarchy in the policy process.

Networks rather than pyramids

Only analysing from the bottom to the top can neglect the fact that policy analysis deals with authoritative decision-making and tends to loose sight of the policy and political context. Richard Elmore suggests that analysts and policy-makers should think
both from the perspective of the target groups – backward-mapping – as well as from
the perspective of the decision-makers – forward mapping (Elmore 1985). We there­
fore need a model of the policy process that comprises both 'top' and 'bottom' and the
various interactions between these levels.

The network approach offers an answer to the more general question of govern­
nance in a complex, diverse and dynamic society, where the private sector and other
non-government actors become increasingly involved in the making of policy. Govern­
nance must according to Jan Kooiman not primarily be understood as what govern­
ments do by themselves (the official point of view) but as a continuous process of
interaction between social groups and public or semi-public institutions and author­
ities (Kooiman 1988: 2; Kooiman et al. 1993).

Changing constellations of actors involved in governance are studied as the con­
cept of (interdependent) networks. The network approach emerged from organisa­
tional theory, implementation studies and research on political agenda-setting. This
approach includes various public and non-public actors in the study of the policy pro­
cess. The studies by Hanf and Scharpf (1978), Lauman and Knoke (1987), Perrucci &
Porter (1989) and in the Netherlands the Rotterdam and Delft schools for public
administration (cf. Hufen & Ringeling 1990; De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 1991) all
point to the inter-organisational character of policy processes. Networks in
policymaking are characterised by the interdependency of actors from different levels
of government and outside government, which take shape around policy problems
and/or policy programmes. Instead of picturing the policy process as a pyramid, with
the minister on top and the rest obediently following the rules, the process is depicted
more as a level network, in which none of the actors has a dominant position. One of
the basic features of the network approaches is that the government may legitimately
claim an authoritative role for itself in the network, but that this does not necessarily
entail a dominant position in terms of resources of power (De Bruijn & Ten
Heuvelhof 1991: 26). Rather, policy-making is a process of bargaining and mutual
adjustment between the actors involved in the policy problem at stake. The strength
of the network-approach is that it includes all actors involved, that it is able to deal
with the reality of non-hierarchic policy-processes and that it generates an accurate
description of the complex interpersonal process that policy-making is.

The contribution of the network approach is that it helps analysts to understand
the complex inter-organisational process of how actors from different levels are con­
nected around one policy problem. The interaction patterns and inter-dependencies
are considered crucial for understanding how a policy problem is dealt with. Interac­
tion is not only talking and discussion, but also acting upon events that have hap­
pened before, or as is the case in Easton's renowned model of the political process,
feedback.

Attractive as it is, since it provides a description and explanation of the non-exis­
tent predominance of government, there has been critique on the network approach.
When the premise that there is no hierarchy is taken as a matter of fact, then the for­
mal role of the elected government becomes an empty phenomenon. David Rhodes
regrets the absence of the topic of accountability of networks in a democracy, as well as a discussion on how to open networks for citizens (Rhodes 1997: xiii). David Caputo criticises the total absence of a clear definition and function of power in this intra-organisation approach (Caputo 1987: 111-117). Another problem with network approaches is that hardly any distinction is made between the several actors involved (Grin & Van de Graaf 1994). A civil servant or engineer responsible for the implementation of, for example the construction of a highway, plays a different role and has a different perception of the policy problem than the civil servant or the parliamentary committee that prepared the bill for the highway. Hanf, Hupe and O'Toole suggest that a distinction be made between the networks in the implementation and policymaking phase of the process (O'Toole, Hanf & Hupe 1997: 137-151). But the question then is: why use the concept of one single network around a policy problem, if several networks must be distinguished? Or, as Klijn and Teisman suggest in the same volume, several games around the policy problem (Klijn & Teisman 1997: 98). The critique on the network approach calls for an adequate conception of the role and function of each of the actors.

An alternative model: the policy process as three games

Having considered some problems and solutions to the basic premises of traditional models of the policy process, I have a collected a number of items on the shopping-list for another model to study a complex policy process. This model must capture the conclusions drawn on rationality and hierarchy: the model must take into account the different actors, their rationalities and go beyond an 'a priori' hierarchy. The model must also take into account the different socio-cultural and political contexts and elucidate the interaction between the different levels through which the policy process proceeds. The model must be able to shed light on domestic policy processes to understand where they both come together: the international policy scene. Such a model could provide the means to understand the confusion in both the Netherlands and Indonesia as to what the decision to end all Dutch foreign aid actually meant. That alternative is needed because with the seven explanations offered in the former chapter the outcome could not adequately be explained.

The distinction Laurence Lynn made between three levels of the policy process comes close to an approach that will help solve the riddle. Lynn's metaphor of the policy process consisting of three games is a lucid metaphor for understanding the domestic policy process in an alternative way. He studied the relation between policies (as authoritative decisions) and administration and the carrying out of these decisions. As others before him, Lynn concluded that the process of implementing policy is subject to many pressures, constraints, organisational difficulties and external factors outside the realms of administration. But he goes further by developing a model that highlights the political and substantive pressures associated with problem solving in government. This model can be used to develop criteria or yardsticks by which the perfor-
mance of political executives can be judged. It proposes a way of looking to the echelons of administration that are supposed to carry out decisions by the legitimately elected official. To be effective a political executive should find an appropriate way to relate to the contexts that will be affected by his or her decisions (Lynn 1981: 139).

The model distinguishes between three levels in which political decisions are 'processed.' These levels are called games, distinct social processes that revolve around different stakes, consist of different actors, and operate according to different rules. The high game typically involves legislative bodies and the highest levels of government. The middle game mostly involves top ranking administrators, responsible for reformulating the decisions taken at the higher game. The low game consists of the policy actors, be it street level bureaucrats or hired-in experts who implement and realise the decisions made in higher games. On the three levels of the game the following questions are asked, questions that reflect the stakes of that game:

- The high game: is there a need for government action at all? If so, what would be the purposes or fundamental directions of such action?
- The middle game: to move to a general direction or to accomplish broad purposes, what means or instruments should government employ? Which agencies or branches or levels of government should be authorised to act? How should financial, personnel and other necessary resources be allocated among them?
- The lower game: precisely how shall the means or instruments of government action be designed and used? How shall programs be organised and administered? What procedures, rules and routines shall be adopted? (Lynn 1981: 143-144).

Lynn acknowledges that at all levels questions may be asked and decisions may be made which strictly do not belong to that level. For example, when an immigration official has to decide on whether or not to permit a foreigner to stay in the country, often he has to judge according to standards which are not outlined by the higher institutions. According to Lynn

'Policymaking, in other words, when conceived of as the determination precisely what actions will be taken, is a ubiquitous activity of government. Policy significance impregnates decisions and actions taken at all levels: high, middle and low. Political executives who would be concerned with policymaking must be concerned with activities taking place above, beside, and below them, with games at all levels. Policy-making is virtually indistinguishable from public management. Acceptance of this proposition provides a powerful motive for rethinking the power of relationships among participants at different levels of the executive branch. Decisions taken at different levels should somehow be interrelated. Competence in government is a matter of establishing patterns of communication and mutual influence from high to low levels of the game. Improving governmental competence requires, among other things, improving these patterns of communication and mutual influence' (Lynn 1981: 157).
This lengthy quote covers precisely the scientific and societal goals in this research: the quest involves finding these patterns of communication and interaction, to be able to give sensible advice to those policy-makers concerned with improving their tasks as managers of the policy-process. The approach proposed includes study of political decision-making within the societal context, the management of politics into policy-programmes as well as the practice of implementation and the recognition of the three processes as games.

The names of the games can be made more specific and their hierarchic connotation should be removed, if we do not want to assume that decisions are always made in a top down manner. The high game is simply labelled the *political game*, the level at which political decisions are made. In Chapter Four some aspects of institutional choices – the main aspiration of the constitutional world – are described as more or less stable matters of fact for the subsequent games. The middle game will in this research be called the *policy management game*, in most cases the executive bureaucracy that translates political decisions into policy programmes, guards budgets and monitors proceedings of the implementation of policy objectives into practice. The low game will be the level in which the choices are made for the implementation of policy, denoted as the *implementation game*. Each of the games is thus understood as a separate entity, with a different rationale. This will do right to the insights that government and non-government actors have a distinctive role in the policy process. Finding and establishing interaction patterns between these games is an important element in the analysis.

The three game approach is made visible in figure 2.1, which will serve as an explanatory device throughout the empirical material. The levels of politics, policy management and implementation are considered as distinct processes of the policy process. The three games are considered for both countries. The interaction between

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Figure 2.1  Ideal type of the games metaphor, applied to the bilateral policy process
the Dutch and Indonesian political and policy management games, but in particular in the implementation game, pictures the bilateral cooperation. The three levels of the game are assumed to mutually influence each other: decisions and actions by one game lead to decisions and actions by other games. The policy process, which in this model is the totality of the Dutch and Indonesian games, is embedded in the societal and economic contexts. The vectors depict the interaction, or mutual influence, of both the contexts as well as the games. The interaction between the political games of the Netherlands and Indonesia (international politics) is now explicitly linked to the domestic politics of both countries. This model does not have hierarchy as a default: the implementation game can in principle influence the political or policy management games as well, shown by the vectors linking all games in both ways.

The strength of the games metaphor is that with familiar notions and comprehensible causalities, such metaphors can help reduce the complexity of social processes into insightful representations of reality. Fritz Scharpf makes a strong argument for using the game metaphor in real life situations (Scharpf 1997). In traditional game theory, for analytical purposes, ‘non-cooperative’ game situations are assumed. (Tsebelis 1990; Morrow 1994). However, as Deborah Stone argues, society cannot be equalled with markets, in which people only act on their own and to their own pursuit of interests (Stone 1997: 17-34). In politics and society, cooperation – and thus communication and interaction – with other people is no less frequently sought, in order to make the best choice. Scharpf explains how the concepts of interdependence and strategies are equally applicable in empirically observable situations. In empirical studies of policy processes we usually find individual, corporate or aggregate actors that are ‘engaged in purposeful action under conditions in which the outcomes are a joint product of their separate choices. Moreover, these actors are aware of their interdependence; they respond to and often try to anticipate one another’s moves. In other words, the game theoretic conceptualisation of strategic interaction has a very high degree of prima facie plausibility for the study of policy interactions’ (Scharpf 1997: 5).

As a scientific objective, I intend to contribute to the understanding of how foreign policies become practice. Regarding the importance of actors in all levels where policies are made, the game metaphor understands the outcome of a policy process, in this research the aftermath of projects, as an interplay between policy-makers, policy-managers and policy-implementers. The knowledge gained from this approach could improve government competence, in particular of Dutch foreign policy. In the next section the elements of the games are outlined and the issue of interaction between the games is addressed.

**Elements of the games**

Scharpf calls for ‘a framework that conceptualises policy processes driven by the interaction of individual or corporate actors endowed with certain capabilities and specific cognitive and normative orientations, within a given institutional setting and within a
given external situation' (Scharpf 1997: 37). The elements of Scharpf's definition of a game are explained below. Note that this description applies to all three identified games: the political, policy management and implementation game. Similar to games we know as recreational activities and as metaphors, a game thus consists of players, stakes, interaction, rules and a policy environment.

The players: individuals or corporate; orientations and capabilities

Players in the games are distinguished by their orientations and capabilities (Scharpf 1997: 51). Orientations must be understood in the light of the section on rationality: humans construct preferences guided by their perceptions. The method to reconstruct those perceptions and preferences is described in the next chapter. Players can act as individuals or act in a corporation; an individual can act as a representative of a group of people or act on his or her own behalf. Rather than conceptualising actors as members of a certain group, or departmental agency, here actors are seen as a collective if they share the same orientations. Particularly in this research, where players come from different countries, but work together in one project, it is more useful to distinguish on orientations of actors, rather than positions. In that way a better analysis can be made of the actual differences – or similarities – between the players.

Capabilities of actors (as individuals or groups) vary from expertise and level of information, to wealth and standing; and add to a player's power over another player. We will not assume that the political automatically has power over the other games. It can very well be that because of an advance in information and expertise, players in the implementation game actually had more power than players from the political game. Defining power as the sum of both material as well as cognitive capabilities refers to the third dimension of power as ascertained by Stephen Lukes: the ability to influence ideas (Lukes 1974; cf. Sederberg 1984). Such also fits with the idea that the three games are in principle independent and not a priori ranked in a hierarchical order, where the political game has primacy in power. In Chapter Three the methods to find relevant players are explained.

Stakes: problem-solving at three levels

The stakes of any of the three games is to solve problems pertaining to that game. In the second section of this chapter Dunn's concept of 'problem-definition' was introduced as the difference between a desired objective and the actual situation. Stakes are not a stable entity: the attention for the combination between problem and solution may change over time, as a result of new (scientific) insights, public pressure and changes in the resources available (Dunn 1994; van de Graaf & Hoppe 1989: 210-212, 432-436). Especially in foreign aid policy, such changes in perception as to what is the problem and what should be the solution have been observed (cf. Hettne 1990). Scharpf speaks of the cognitive and normative orientations of the players, matching the propositions on the existence of multiple rationalities, and interests preceded by
meanings. Stakes are thus defined as the changing conception of problem-solution-combinations. Ideally, the stakes of the three games relate to each other. Evidently, such congruence can not be assumed in the case studies that follow. Rather, the stakes as they appear to be defined are investigated in each of the three levels. The degree to which stakes of the three levels of the games have been congruent may be a factor explaining whether or not a project is continued.

The stake of the political game is to decide whether the problems presented to them by society must be solved by political intervention and make the decisions that are desired by the elected representatives. Indonesia’s general approach to societal development and the Dutch development cooperation policies are discussed in Chapter Four. In order to give a more specific introduction each case chapter starts with an overview of choices made in the sectoral policies in Indonesia and how they convened with objectives of Dutch foreign policy. Information about the stakes of the political game are found in political debate, general policy-documents such as the five year plans of the Indonesian government and comments in the media of executives and the literature on politics in both countries. The decision-making process itself is not discussed in detail. This reflects the fact that hardly any political choice was made in direct relation to implementation. Thus, outcomes and final choices in the period under study are considered as a given.

The political stake of the Indonesian government in 1992, soon thereafter adopted by the Dutch government, was to create a bilateral relation and cooperation that reflected equality and mutual benefit. In principle all actions of the policy management game and implementation game should be measured to these two yardsticks. The main question of the research is therefore devoted to that political desire: to what extent and how did Indonesian and Dutch partners in cooperation achieve equality and mutual benefit in cooperation activities?

The stake of the policy management game is ideally to device policy programmes so as to realise the objectives set by the political game. Policy management consists of formulating policy programmes and instruments that effectively and efficiently reach political objectives, within the limits of the national budget. In general, lower echelons of ministries, embassies and public and private organisations to which tasks are delegated are responsible for policy management. Information on policy management choices and practices has been obtained from policy documents, internal notes found in the archives and interviews with civil servants. Taking the political stake of equality and mutual benefit seriously implies that policy-instruments and measures must be found which enhance the new definition of the bilateral relation.

The stake of the implementation game is, in theory, to solve problems targeted by policy programmes. The mitigation ‘in theory’ points to the changing nature of stakes and the fact that what is written may differ from what is done. In implementation, knowledge on what is feasible, or what the actual problem is, is likely to change, since this game takes place in the actual world and not in policy documents. Stakes of the implementation game are found in progress-reports, evaluations and archives concerning a specific project. Many civil servants warned me that not all information can
be found in the archives or written materials. By asking and interviewing the actors involved the actual definition of the stakes of the implementation game is to be found.

The definition of problems and thus stakes is done by actors, be it politicians, practitioners or target-groups, but a stake of a game is not the same as the preferences held by an individual or corporate actor. Stakes are the objectives that players in a game have to achieve, or the objectives that players in a game have agreed to pursue. Stakes are thus the result of a decision-making process within a game, between the players in that game. The question in the empirical research is to what extent the stakes were congruent, that is, whether the problem-definitions of the different players involved led to an acceptable solution for all parties involved.

Interaction between the games: modes and actor constellations

Recalling Lynn’s comments about interaction, adequate communication patterns and mutual influence points to competence in government. Improving such competence requires improving these patterns of communication and mutual influence (Lynn 1981: 157). Thus, finding and understanding the nature of interaction patterns is an important element in the game approach. How the interaction between the games took place is a central empirical question in this research.

Central to Scharpf’s conceptualisation of games is that actor constellations (rather than single actors commonly used in game theory) interact in a specific way and that combing the analysis of these constellations and modes of interactions provide a powerful tool in explaining the outcomes of a specific policy process (Scharpf 1997: 48). Knowledge on how interaction, as communication and mutual influence took place in that game will give more insight in the nature of cooperation. The issue of equality and mutual benefit is directly related to how people interact.

Scharpf distinguishes four modes of interaction within a game: unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote and hierarchical direction (pp. 46-47). Unilateral action denotes action with little information on how another actor will react, similar to the limited interaction assumed in non-cooperative environments. Negotiated agreement means action of actor a after communication and information about the actions of actor b. Hierarchical direction implies that actor a can alter the choices of actor b, with or without communication or information (p. 172). These modes can occur only in specific institutional settings. Unilateral action, that is, the traditional game theoretic proposition that people are in principle non-cooperative have no information about other people’s choices and act independently can occurs in all kinds of institutional settings. Negotiated agreement is the mode of interaction that occurs when actors are interdependent on each other: to achieve results, actors must negotiate on choices. Majority voting as a mode of interaction assumes an institutional setting of associations, constituencies and representative assemblies. However, since we are particularly interested in how actors from both countries interacted in the game in which cooperation was sought, this mode that is present only in a political game will be left out as a category. Hierarchical direction is only possible in an institu-
tional (rule bound) environment of hierarchical organisations, where there are well-defined authoritative positions.

However, a policy process is in our game metaphor made up of three sorts of games: and the interest is thus in the interaction between these games. When Robert Putnam speaks of two level games, the actors who play in both games form the interaction-links between the domestic political game and the international game (Putnam 1988). Similar to that conceptualisation, we expect that interaction between the political, policy management and implementation game is carried by actors who have a role in more than one game. In this study the modes of interaction distinguished by Scharpf pertain to the aggregate of the three games.

The three modes of interaction that are likely to occur between the games are put in the next table. In the columns the type of relation between the actors in a game is put, in the rows the mode of interaction that is likely to be found in those types of relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>Modes of interaction with types of actor relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mode of relation</td>
<td>type of relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unilateral action</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negotiated agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchical direction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Rules: formal and informal institutions

Rules are an important element of a game; they define how the game can be played. If in a chess game one player starts moving his horse diagonally and his bishop in a straight line, he will be either accused of foul play, or the game will lose its essential features. Without rules a football game would not be half as exciting. In political life it is somewhat different: not everybody knows all the rules and as the Italians convincingly demonstrate, observing tacit, interpersonal rules does not necessarily lead to anarchy. Nevertheless, understanding the rules of political life and the policy process is to understand the outcomes of human interaction. Conflicts over rules are perhaps even more important to understand politics and policies.

Scharpf defines the rules of the game as institutions: ‘systems of rules that structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose’. These rules are not only the formal legal rules that are sanctioned by a court system or the state apparatus, but also ‘social norms that actors will generally respect and whose violation will be sanctioned by loss of reputation, social disapproval, withdrawal of cooperation and rewards, even ostracism’ (Scharpf 1997: 38). Thus, a distinction is made between formal and informal rules. Rules define membership (entry and exit), authority and leverage, disposal over resources, division’s of costs (after 1992 costs should be born fifty-fifty) the
allowed duration of a project, or decision procedure, division of work and authorities in cooperation and what actions or speech are allowed. Organisational arrangements define to a great extent what is to be done and what the outcome of a given project will be. Allison’s second model to explain the Cuba crisis draws the attention to organisational routines and how such fixed structures of organisational behaviour can help explain the decision-making process (Allison 1971: 78-96). Janice Love and Peter Sederberg emphasise the importance of acknowledging organisational rules and the differences between formal and informal rules. In a study on a refugee project in Somalia they concluded that the failure of the policy objectives of the project could be attributed to clash between the formal organisation of the implementing agencies and the informal organisation of the targetgroups (Love & Sederberg 1987: 155-173).

The question concerning rules is to what extent formal or informal rules influenced the outcomes of projects. The issue of whose rules prevailed in the cooperation is the most interesting aspect of rules in a bilateral game: a policy process between two countries whose stakes and rules possibly contradict each other. For students of international cooperation it is interesting to know how observance of whose rules makes cooperation possible – or impossible. Conflicts over the several rules in the implementation game (where both countries’ rules come together) receive particular attention. Does observing the rules of the donor, or those of the country in which projects take place enhance cooperation? If and how these conflicts are resolved directs the investigation regarding rules. The following table summarises the sorts of rules that are to be investigated. The types of rules are derived from Larry Kiser’s and Elinor Ostrom’s framework for understanding the relation between institutional rules and individual behaviour (Kiser & Ostrom 1982: 193-195). These rules are not addressed individually, but as they, or conflicts about them, appear in the cases.

**Table 2.2 Rules of the games**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rules of the three games</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boundary rules</td>
<td><strong>Who can be a player in each of the games</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope rules</td>
<td><strong>Allowable actions and allowable outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position and authority rules</td>
<td><strong>How the organisation is set up, tasks, duties and leverage of players</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregation rules</td>
<td><strong>Terms of references on evaluations, minimum requirements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural rules</td>
<td><strong>Making evaluations and accountant reports over the budgets, phase of a project</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information rules</td>
<td><strong>What kind, how and when information is disseminated.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whose rules prevailed?
The playing field: the policy environment

Games – the policy processes – are not played in a vacuum but take place in a socio-political and economic context. Scharpf identifies the 'policy environment' from which policy problems emerge and policies are directed to (Scharpf 1997: 44). To understand the 'borders' of the playing field, an accurate description of both countries, in particular the most salient differences must be given. It is useful, both for the background information of the reader, as well as for the analyst, to have an accurate description of the context in which the games are being played. The description of the policy environment consists of a brief outline of the political system, the organisation of government, structure of society, basic socio-cultural values, the economy and geographic and physical condition of a country (Dahl 1989: 213-264; Blondel 1982; Guy Peters 1995). The latter four features can be found in country studies and a secondary analysis is made from the wealth of information and numerous studies on these topics. The policy environment is not solely the context for the political games: each of the parameters affects the policy management and implementation game as well.

The three games approach requests that it is investigated how players in each of the games act upon the usually stable but sometimes changing, aspects of their environment. For example, the changes in the Indonesian economy due to the declining prices in oil in the mid-1980's must not only be seen as a factor influencing politics. Those implementing a certain project were suddenly faced with a tighter budget, which limited their options, but also encouraged them to anticipate on future policy guidelines. Presenting the project as an environmental friendly endeavour that advocates a frugal use of gas increases the likelihood of having the follow up phase of the project. Such changes in behaviour and orientations in all games as a result of a change in the policy environment can explain why a project, or a policy guideline, evolved in the course of time.

Table 2.3 Elements of the policy environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy environment for all games</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal make up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic and physical conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The policy environment is quite stable, but not unchangeable. One can endlessly debate how stable and factual political systems, socio-cultural values and the economy actually are. Since the research is about a limited time span (about 30 years) these entities can be assumed to be stable in that period. The period addressed concurs with the New Order in Indonesia, ending in 1999, when with the election of Abdurrahman Wahid a transition to another political system was initiated. In Chapter Four the
parameters of the policy environment for all cases are briefly described, ordered to the
six elements listed below. The first sections of each case highlight aspects of the envi­
ronment that are of direct importance for the projects investigated.

**Research questions**

In the first chapter the decision of the Indonesian government to change the nature of
bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands resulted in a riddle: why
some projects, that before 1992 were the implementation of General Agreements
between both countries were continued and others not. Equally puzzling were the
explanations offered by civil servants, Indonesia-observers and journalists: they
pointed to different directions. The riddle was manifested also in the chaos that
occurred right after the decision. It was unclear what was actually meant by the catch-
all phrases ‘equality’ and ‘mutual benefit’. We concluded that the orthodox model of
the policy process, implicit in some of the explanations offered, was the essence of the
riddle. This chapter analysed the underlying assumptions and working of the ortho-
dox model and suggested another model of the policy process: the three games
approach. It was argued that not only the political game defines what a relation or
bilateral cooperation is about, but equally so the other levels of the policy process, in
which cooperation is put into practice. The model points to the fact that there are no
univocal criteria or stakes guiding the policy process, but that we can expect many
more. The three games approach serves as a map to solve the riddle of the policy pro­
cess that accounted for the differing outcomes of the projects. The riddle is reformu-
lated into a central question, which asks how the policy process, defined as three inter-
acting games led to different outcomes of the projects after the decision of 1992.

Elements of which games consist were elaborated in the former section: players,
stakes, interaction, rules and the policy environment. These elements all have differ­
ent properties in the cases, cases that are seen as an interplay between the three games
of which a policy process consists. The properties of the elements are the factors that
can explain how the outcome of a case came about. The empirical research is thus
focused on factors that contribute to the aftermath of projects, so that at the end of the
empirical search, more light is shed on what actually influences policy outcomes and
how in the case of a unilateral redefinition of cooperation policy, the policy process
worked. How such factors work and in what relation they must be seen is formulated
as the first partial question.

As said, the game approach considers each level of the policy process as a distinctive
process, with distinct stakes, players and rules. The direction of the vectors, that is, the
sequence in which the policy process proceeds, is open to investigation. The second
partial question asks for the roles and functions that each of the games has played in the
development and changes in the cooperation. The assumption is that when each of the
games has performed according to the tasks delegated to them, policy change, in this
research, a redefinition of the bilateral relation is successfully induced.
The last partial question refers to the political stake of the Indonesian government, to come to a relation based on mutual benefit and equality. Having studied the interplay of the three games and the factors that attribute to continuation or ending, some general remarks can and should be made about the desired change in the bilateral relation.

The questions guiding the research are thus the following:

**Central question**

To what extent can a model of the policy process as interacting games explain different outcomes for projects which, until 1992, were the implementation of the General Agreements between the Netherlands and Indonesia?

**Partial questions**

1. To what extent and in what way did the elements that constitute the policy process contribute to the (dis)continuation of the bilateral projects in 1992?
2. What was the role of each the games – political game, policy management game and implementation game – in the bilateral policy process?
3. Did the projects that were continued after March 1992 more than before reflect the principles of equality and mutual benefit?

Having translated the riddle into these questions, in the next chapter the methods for applying the game metaphor are further elaborated, so that in part II the research can be conducted in a clear and consistent way.

**Overview of the book**

The first three chapters form part I of the book: questions were raised and suggestions to arrive at answers were presented. The research design is described in Chapter Three.

The following four chapters are the core of the empirical search. The political and social context in which the empirical search must be understood is outlined in Chapter Four. Here basic features of the Indonesian and Dutch political systems and societies are described. Particular attention is given to Indonesia’s development policy and Dutch foreign policy: the two countries met in these two policy areas. In the three subsequent cases, three different policy areas and projects of cooperation are investigated with the analytical tools developed in this and the next chapter. Part II is thus the empirical heart of this book.

Part III consists of the concluding chapter and an epilogue. In Chapter Eight a cross-case analysis is done. The cases are compared and an assessment is made of how the factors contributed to the outcomes. Answers to the questions posed in the above will be addressed. It is demonstrated how the three games approach solves the riddle of the first chapter. The last chapter recapitulates the scientific merits of the approach
and relates the model to the thinking on the relation between politics and society. Suggestions for further study and the practice of policymaking are offered, focusing on the new era in Indonesia. Now that the Indonesian political landscape has changed so drastically – after the free elections of 1999 and the choice for Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth president of Indonesia – bilateral policymaking between the Netherlands and Indonesia should be reconsidered accordingly.