International cooperation between politics and practice: how Dutch Indonesian cooperation changed remarkably little after a diplomatic rupture

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The five projects described in this chapter are characterised as cultural cooperation, although three of the five were initially part of the Dutch-Indonesian foreign aid structure. Cultural cooperation between two countries serves the aim of mutual understanding between the peoples of two or more countries. When in 1968 the governments of both countries undersigned a cultural agreement, the main objective was improving the diplomatic relations through mutual understanding. Through cultural cooperation many already existing linkages were given a formal place in the bilateral policies. After the ending of Dutch development cooperation, the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation gained a much larger role in Dutch-Indonesian relations.

In the first section Indonesian culture policy is described, with an emphasis on the problems Indonesia faced in the post-colonial period. A particularly troublesome heritage of the Dutch colonial times was that there was hardly any educational infrastructure. The second section describes the political game of Dutch international cultural policy. In the Netherlands, international cultural relations are part of its foreign policy, but managed by two departments: Foreign Affairs/DGIS and the Department of Education and Sciences (O&W). Then the Cultural Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands is discussed: how politics from both countries were translated into policy programmes. The subsequent sections investigate the history and aftermath of five projects that are classified as ‘cultural’. Some were undertaken under the Agreement of Technical Cooperation (foreign aid) as cultural development projects; others were part of the Cultural Agreement between both countries. Despite the differing policy agreements from which the projects were part, in practice there was not much difference in the objectives of the projects.

The study on the Program of Indonesian Studies (PRIS) is described in detail: it was the most developed and intensive form of cooperation under the banner of the Cultural Agreement between both countries. Many other initiatives of cultural cooperation that started in the 1980s can be directly related to the PRIS. Lessons had been learned and new ways to structure such cooperation were being found. The projects initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s seem to reflect the new way to relate and more importantly, came to grips with different interests and meanings.
Indonesia’s cultural development policy: high stakes, low priorities

The government of Indonesia actively pursues culture policy to create and strengthen a sense of unity amongst the many different ethnic, cultural and religious groups. Three aspects of Indonesian culture policy are discussed: language, religion and education. In article 32 of the Constitution of 1945 it is stated that the government shall develop the Indonesian national culture, as a unifier for all existing cultures. In every five-year plan (Repelita), cultural development has been recognised as the basis for overall national development. To stimulate the national culture, the government initiated three broad programmes: national language development, national history and the study of traditional values (Soebadio 1985). In the Old Order (1958-1965), led by president Sukarno, most of the foundations for a unified Indonesia had been established. Although the construction of a national culture in all its manifestations ultimately serves the goal of national unity, allocating funds and manpower have received low priority in the New Order era. Economic development was the key word for the New Order government.

Bahasa Indonesia, the carrier of a unified nation

It is estimated that 583 languages are spoken in Indonesia (Indonesia 1994: 24). The nationalist movement in the beginning of this century, desiring an independent Indonesian state, considered the creation of a national language for all Indonesian peoples the prerequisite for national unity. Up till the 1940s the Dutch language had been the language of the elite, of trade of science and the entry into modern culture (Groeneboer 1993). The Dutch language had also introduced Indonesian intellectuals with new concepts, theories and phenomena (Anderson 1990: 136-139). The question for the revolutionary leaders was on which language the new national language should be based. The Dutch language was out of the question, contrary to the English language for the new Indian nation. Javanese, the language spoken by the majority of the future Indonesian was not suitable for a national language either: accepting this language would imply that the Javanese were ‘more equal’ than the other cultures. Javanese is furthermore a complex and hierarchic language; it has three different levels of speech, one to address the commons, one to address the middle-class and one to address the nobility. The Malay language had been the trade language in the region for centuries. It is also a relatively simple language: the grammar is not as complicated as for example the Dutch language. Basing the new national language on Malay would not put any culture above the others: it was a neutral language (Alisjabana 1976; Groeneboer 1997: 73). In the 1920s and 1930s, the national movement started using Bahasa Indonesia in their congresses. A magazine, Pudjanga Baru was established to promote the language. The proclamation of independence on the 17th of August 1945 was written in the Bahasa Indonesia and the language became a symbol of Indonesian independence. The language would also be the vehicle to enter the modern world.
The political strength of the Indonesian language is recognised: Indonesia is one of the few countries in which revolutionary leaders were able to impose a new language as the national language. This imposition has served the revolutionary aim of uniting the people (Anwar 1980: 58-68). Ben Anderson observed another political aspect of the language: in political speeches the language proved to be extremely fitting to rhetoric, while critics of the government make good use of the flexibility of the language. Acronyms for institutions and concepts are well used in government, but also on the streets, where they often have hidden meanings to reveal the reactions of the public to politics (Anderson 1990).

Since independence, all Indonesian children learn *Bahasa Indonesia* at primary school. According to the census of 1990 the majority of all Indonesians master *Bahasa Indonesia*, but it is widely known that in the 1990s more than 80% of the people still used regional languages at home (Steinhauer 1994: 756-769). The majority of the older generation in rural areas does not use Bahasa daily. Even president Soeharto could not speak *Bahasa Indonesia* fluently; his home language is Javanese.

In the early 1950s a national centre for language development was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Culture (P&K in the following). The *Pusat Bahasa* has three main tasks: development and dissemination of the national languages, study of the regional languages and coordination of the education in other foreign languages – mainly English – as the international language. The first aim is reached through developing educational materials, advise on proper language use and promoting the correct use of the Indonesian language via the mass media. The *Pusat Bahasa* also `indonesianises' new foreign concepts. A former director of the centre admitted that the first aim is hard to reach: there is simply not enough manpower and money available to reach all Indonesians with a qualitatively sound method of language training. Nevertheless, even without too much governmental steering, it is likely that the national language will within three decades be the *Lingua Franca* over the archipelago due to the fast pace of communications development and the generation renewal.

Mastering foreign languages is in particular required for Indonesia's economic development. In the regional organisations in which Indonesian is involved, such as ASEAN and APEC the need for English speaking negotiators is great; English is the language for business. However, it is recognised that the knowledge of the English language by Indonesians is lacking, even of those educated in English-speaking countries. The difficulties Indonesians have with mastering English is caused by the fact that Indonesian have to learn two languages at minimum, the home language and Bahasa Indonesia (Van der Horst 1987). Furthermore, the grammatical structure of Bahasa Indonesia is much less complex than English, Dutch or Spanish.

**Indonesia as a religious rather than theocratic country**

Indonesia is regarded as one of the most tolerant countries with respect to religion. All government-offices have pursued religious tolerance, albeit with varying degrees of
success. The separation of religion from politics is included in the constitution. Religious fundamentalism, being a danger to the unity and stability the country, has always been suppressed. It is obligatory for every Indonesian citizen to have a religion. The first principle of the state ideology *Panca Sila* is the obligation to believe in the One Almighty, strange as it may sound in a country that like many western countries separates religion from politics. The five major religions are allowed under the *Panca Sila*: are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Since 1978 Javanese mystical religious practices (*kebatinan*) are also allowed. Each of these religions has a special place in Indonesian society. Islam has to largest number of followers, approximately 85% of the Indonesians is Muslim, although there are varying degrees of religiosity. Indonesian Islam has blended with Hinduism, Buddhism and animism and knows many concepts and customs not known in Middle East Islam. Hinduism and Buddhism are adhered by small minorities; the people of Bali are predominantly Hindu. Christianity (Protestants and Catholics) is confessed by some 10% of the country. Christians have, well after the Dutch colonisers left, played a relatively large role in the countries politics and economics, to the dismay of the majority of Muslims. In practice, it appears that Christianity and Islam are the most politically present religions and the opposition between them defines much of the dynamics in Indonesian politics (Vatikiotis 1994: 120-138). Since 1966, after the alleged communist coup, it is prohibited for every Indonesian citizen and even foreigners to confess atheism. Atheism is related to Communism, which is banned in Indonesia.

Although Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, establishing an Islamic state has never been an option for the government, although Islamic groups have ventured that wish. In the mid-1940s for example, the Darul Islam, a political Islam organisation wanted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Van Dijk 1981). The army, which perceives itself as the main defender of the unitary and non-theocratic state of Indonesia, is extremely suspicious of fundamentalist Muslim groups. In the past it has forcefully suppressed the alleged activities of Muslim groups (Tanjug Priok, Lampung, Aceh). Dutch Islamogolist Snouck Hurgronje devised the idea of containing Islam and keeping it out of politics (Van Koningsveld 1988). The Indonesian government adhered to this idea and has until now prevented the founding an Islamic state (Ramage 1995: 191-192). Also through education the government curbs fundamentalism. Future religious leaders are sent to western countries for their studies, rather than to Arabic countries. It is hoped that the students gain a broad, comparative view on religion. Up till the late 1990s Indonesians proudly presented their peaceful co-existence of religions and argued that Muslim countries could learn from their pragmatic approach towards religious tolerance.

The *de-party*-politicisation (see Chapter Four) also served the objective of curbing the desires for a religious state. The Muslim parties merged into the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, the party for unity and development. The words ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ were not even allowed in the party’s name (Van Dijk 1988: 47). Other religious organisations were not allowed to have religious principles as their mission: the *Panca Sila* would have to suffice. Muslims felt second class citizens, despite the fact that they
are a great majority in Indonesia: wealthy people were often Chinese and Catholic and a disproportional number of Christians have had top functions in the cabinets and army.

In the 1990s, a few moves in the direction of the Muslims have been made, according to some political scientists to satisfy the increasing demands for more recognition by this group (Liddle 1995). In 1990, with the blessing of president Soeharto, the ICMI, an organisation for Indonesian Muslims was founded. In conjunction with the ICMI, a research institute employing Muslim scholars was founded (CIDES), probably as an academic counter force to the prestigious CSIS, which is dominated by mainly Catholic and Chinese scientists (Asqua, Van der Meij & Meuleman 1995). After the election of 1992, Muslim ministers replaced three prominent Christian ministers. This move is seen as a reply to the complaint of the Muslims that the number of Christians in the cabinet did not represent the religious set-up of the country (Indonesia 1994; Bastin, Schmitt & Schulte Nordholt 1993).

In other ways the government interferes with religious life: there is a ministry of religion, that explicitly has the task to improve religious life. The objective of religious policy is to maintain and stimulate tolerance between the religions. Several non-governmental religious organisations were allowed to remain, such as the Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912) and Nahdatul Ulama (founded in 1926). The Nahdatul Ulama or NU ('awakening of the religious scholars') has under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid been transformed from a rather conservative organisation to an organisation advocating social change. Despite Wahid's initial stance that he would stay out of politics, personally and with the NU, in 1999 he founded the Party of the National Awakening (PKB). As a result of the deadlock between other Muslim parties, the PKB has won 11% of the votes in the 1999 elections and eventually delivered with Wahid the fourth president.

Religious tolerance being the usual state of affairs, in times of economic and political crisis, clashes between religious groups have occurred. In April and May 1998 – the last days of Soeharto as president – angry crowds sought scapegoats for their discontent over the economic crisis and turned to churches and the Chinese community. In 1999, the Moluccas were torn apart because of severe violence between Christian and Islamic groups. Officially, these violent reactions are labelled as religious and ethnic clashes, but other voices claim these are the result of economic disparity. Others contend that Muslim militias have been sent to Moluccas to stir up unrest. Religion is used both as an excuse by the violent crowds and by the government. Early 2000, at the end of the Ramadan thousands of Muslims gathered in the capital Jakarta and called for a holy war of Muslims against Christians. One of the most difficult tasks of the Wahid government is to pacify the increasing animosity between the Muslims and Christians. The question remains whether religious conflicts have always been suppressed successfully by the Soeharto government or have the conflicts after Soeharto's resignation been created by resentful former power-holders?
Education and human resource development

Both the Old and New Order government put education and literacy of the people on top of the political agenda, but they had to start from an absolute zero. The Dutch had never established a system of higher education for the indigenous people, education was for the elite and the colonial administrators mainly carried out research. After independence, many of the noted research institutes the Dutch had established and had international standing withered away. The exodus of Dutch scientists in 1958 moved away much of the intellectual capital these research institutes had (Messer 1994). The first government of Indonesia decided that education should be accessible to all, rather than exclusively for the elite. Soon after independence the first Indonesian universities had been established. Many other state universities were founded, especially in the 1950s. Each province of Indonesia was to have at least one State University.

The Old Order government faced several problems in the early years of building up a higher education system: lack of trained staff, low quality of courses and limited availability of education material. In addition, the division of students over the several faculties did not meet the needs of the development policies: especially in the early sixties, too many students choose law, economic and the social sciences and too little students opted for business, medicine and engineering. The drop-out rates were high as well (Thomas 1973; Rooyakkers 1985).

The overall priority for the New Order government was improving the primary education system and increasing the numbers of graduates. The national education system was viewed as an important instrument for the general national development plans. The emphasis of education policy was until the 1980s on primary education. In the 1980s and early 1990s almost 100% of the children in school age received primary education, reducing the illiteracy rate amongst age group 15-24 years to almost 95% (Jones 1994: 166-196).

The Indonesian ministry of Education and Culture (P&K) seeks to improve the quality of higher education by assigning guiding, supervising faculties (Fakultas Pembina) with the task to develop courses and aid the newer colleges with setting up their education system. To increase the numbers of graduates and PhD's foreign aid was sought: students were sent abroad to study with scholarships from American, Australian and also Dutch aid-funds (Wardiman 1988).

While the New Order government improved primary education significantly, the quality and quantity of higher education have in comparison lagged behind. Since the 1980s the number of institutes for higher education has expanded. Due to deregulation measures, a vast number of private schools has been established, next to the public institutes (Koesnadi 1981). The quality of education of both the public and private institutes is a matter of concern (Oey-Gardiner 1997: 160-161). The increasing demand for higher education was much larger than the availability of qualified teachers. The salaries of teachers were and are still insufficient; teachers have to have other occupations to provide in the necessary income. Highly qualified graduates prefer to
seek employment in private business, rather than become teachers. It is also noted that in comparison to other Southeast Asian countries, the Indonesian schooling system produces a very small number of students with a degree in science or engineering (Hill 1995: 92-94).

One of the heritages of the Dutch colonisers for the social sciences (in particular anthropology, law and linguistics) is a large number of studies on the languages and cultures of the Indonesian peoples, written by Dutch scholars. There is a vast storage in Dutch and Indonesian archives of studies on the regional dialects, cultures and customary law. The problem is that the studies are hardly usable: the younger generation of Indonesian social scientists is not able to use the material, because it is written in Dutch. These students did not learn Dutch as a child due to the abolishment of Dutch in primary schools in 1952. Research efforts in the New Order have mainly been focused on the development of Indonesia via applied research. Fundamental research was definitely not a priority, nor were there funds available to do so. If foreigners wanted to do research in Indonesia, approval by LIPI is required. LIPI assesses whether a topic is not politically sensitive and whether the research will be usable for Indonesia itself. Research should preferably benefit Indonesian society in its development efforts.

**Dutch international cultural relations as foreign policy**

Culture policy in the Netherlands does not primarily serve the goal of unifying the country, contrary to Indonesia. As a relatively old nation state, fear for separatist movements and cultural clashes between opposing cultural sub-groups are not a serious threat. The main objective of Dutch culture policy is to facilitate and stimulate cultural expression by individual artists. It does so by subsidising artists who are believed to have a renewing approach. In the late twentieth century, because of the increasing numbers of immigrants, Dutch culture policy fosters a multicultural society. Immigrants are since the late 1990s obliged to take a citizenship course and learn the Dutch language.

International cultural policy from the Netherlands has roughly three objectives, similar to those of other industrialised countries (Mourik 1989; Ninkovich 1981; Coombs 1964). The first objective is improvement of mutual understanding for world-peace. It is believed that hostility between nations is partly the result of miscommunication and misperceptions. The second objective is increasing prestige abroad, which is inspired both by economic motives and ‘national pride’ motives. Enhancing a positive image of the country abroad may serve the interests of business, science and other foreign policy goals. The third objective is protection of national identity, in view of the unification of Europe, some fear that the Dutch heritage may be lost and citizens who don’t feel they ‘belong’ may be a source of instability, apathy and prone to rebel (WRR 1987: 13-14). Depending on the cabinets and international developments (for example the end of the Cold War) one of the three objectives
gained dominance in the actual policy-making. Several policy documents, published since 1970, reflect the concerns and changes in accents the Dutch government makes in its foreign cultural policy.\textsuperscript{15} Debates in Parliament concerned the issue which objectives should prevail and why.

Because the objectives differ in character, there is not one single ministry in the Netherlands that deals with international cultural policy.\textsuperscript{16} In principle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main authority in executing, monitoring and controlling the policy, but the Ministry of Education and Sciences and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social welfare have had their share in executing the foreign cultural policy.\textsuperscript{17} Dutch foreign \textit{aid} policy also includes some of the objectives of foreign cultural policy, ever since it was realised that aid is not only technical or financial, but affects the social-cultural environment of people (Hettne 1990: 189-194). Furthermore, exchanges of students and scholars are singled out as the carriers of cultural dissemination. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the call for internationalisation of education became more manifest. Several programs and subsidies have been set up to stimulate study and research abroad, but also for attracting foreign students to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{18}

The involvement of three to four ministries causes a problem of coordination (Van Roon 1990; Mourik 1981). At several occasions, a better coordination was advocated by either establishing a national independent council or bringing all policy initiatives to one department \textit{(cf. WRR 1987: 39-45)}. The fact that cultural development has increased in importance for Dutch foreign aid means that another objective was added to Dutch foreign cultural policy: assisting other peoples in their cultural development. The question is whether we can see this as a part of Dutch foreign cultural policy, or strictly foreign aid. The delineation between foreign aid and international cultural policy was thus not clear, but what was clear in the financial accounting was that DGIS funded for a great part the international projects of the Department of Education and Sciences. Both the ambiguous lines of authority and the shifts to one or the other objective in foreign cultural policy have affected implementation of projects described in the sections below.

In the early 1990s, changes in the emphasis on objectives of international cultural policy were made. These changes were induced for a great part by the appointment of economist and engineer Jo Ritzen as minister of Education and Sciences in 1989. The second objective of foreign cultural policy – the benefit for Dutch society in economic and strategic terms – gained more importance. In particular international education and research programs should serve the economic interests of the Netherlands, while cultural manifestations were to present the ‘trademark’ of the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{19} These changes must be seen in the general change in attitude of the Dutch cabinets. Ritzen’s ideas on international cultural policy fit neatly into the general stance of the foreign policy document of 1995 \textit{(Herikingsnota)}. With regard to Indonesia, the new minister changed much as well. His predecessor Deetman was known for his ‘soft spot’ for Indonesia: during his term of office some 20 projects geared towards Indonesia had been started, while 50 scholarships were granted each year for Indonesian students to
study at Dutch universities. The majority of these projects was in the social sciences, of a very small scale and had not been evaluated on their effectiveness. The Cultural Agreement with Indonesia, under which these projects were undertaken, had in effect become an umbrella for all kinds of individual, unrelated initiatives that factually were assistance to Indonesian institutes.

The Cultural Agreement Indonesia-the Netherlands

A cultural agreement with another country is one of the instruments in international cultural policy. Cultural centres, translation of Dutch literature, exchange of scholars are other instruments the government can employ to put its objectives into practice. The Dutch government has cultural agreements with more than 30 countries. Some of them remain ‘sleeping’, no activities are undertaken because of other priorities. The current Cultural Agreement with Indonesia stems from 1968, when the political climate between both countries was favourable enough to come to such an agreement. Regularly, bilateral consultations are held between representatives of the ministries involved. Those consultations are affirmative and official of character, and in the case of the agreement with Indonesia, the agreement formed the banner of many activities. The cultural centre at the Dutch embassy (the Erasmushuis) was included, as well as the department of Dutch languages at the Universitas Indonesia and a host of other activities. Compared to other non-European countries with which a cultural agreement is maintained Indonesia has had the special attention of the Dutch government. Enforcing the Cultural Agreement actively was one way to maintain in some form the special relation.

Two years after the ratification of the Agreement, in 1970, a special committee was established to fill in the Cultural Agreement with activities. The Committee for Advice on the Cultural Agreement with Indonesia (NAC) was appointed by the minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns. Policy management, i.e. the translation from objectives to actual policy programs was delegated to the NAC. Professor Teeuw, who held a chair in Indonesian languages at the University of Leiden and was then chairman of the Royal Institute for Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV), became chairman of the NAC, until the NAC was dissolved in 1983. The NAC consisted of four subcommittees: Dutch language and literature, information and arts, social welfare and scientific and other education. In Indonesia a similar committee was established, but this committee met only once. Members came from universities, ministries and cultural institutes.

Some interviewees have referred to the NAC members as an ‘old boys network’. Many members had in the past lived or worked in Indonesia. Former administrators in New Guinea or the Dutch Indies found employment in either the Dutch universities or the ministries of O&W and Foreign Affairs. As civil servants or academics, they had a seat in the NAC. Via the newly set up policy or research programs directed to the independent state of Indonesia they pursued their interest in Indonesia. Their concerns on the withering of the Indonesian studies and their interest in maintaining the
relation must be seen as a driving force for the new agreements and programs of cooperation set up after the restoration of diplomatic ties in the mid-1960s. The choices made by the NAC reflected to a great extent the personal interest of the members. The (initial) support and goodwill for the activities of the NAC and the trust the government put in it can for a great part be explained as a result of the membership of these civil servant members. The department of Dutch language at the Universitas Indonesia (third section) and the program of Indonesian studies (fourth section) serve as primary examples of the beliefs and interests these 'Indonesia-experienced' people had. When these people retired or passed away, other ideas on how to relate to Indonesia found fertile ground, both in the political game and in the policy management game.

In 1992, as a consequence of the ending of Dutch foreign aid, the Cultural Agreement had to be renewed as well. This agreement should be cleared of inequalities and single benefit for one counterpart, which was exactly what Minister Ritzen had envisaged with respect to international scientific cooperation when he entered the cabinet. In fact, Soeharto's decision and the fact that it also applied to the DGiS-funded projects of O&W was a window of opportunity for minister Ritzen. From now on, every form of cooperation under the Cultural Agreement should benefit the Dutch society and the Indonesian society. Ritzen's ideas on International Cultural Relations bear much similarity to the US foreign policy in cultural matters. Rather than a broad definition of culture, including the exchange of arts, ideas and language, the new ideas can more be characterised as 'intellectual relations' (cf. Ninkovich 1981). The means to give shape to such a definition of cultural relations is joint research, which is a priori of mutual benefit and is directly able to serve strategic and economic interests. Financial burdens would be divided equally and proposals should be the result of the desires of institutes in both countries. When Minister Ritzen visited Jakarta in September 1992, president Soeharto received him in his residence, rather than the Palace where officials are customarily received. With this gesture president Soeharto wanted to emphasise that he was interested in establishing a new era also regarding the cultural relations between both countries. Subsequently, minister Ritzen undersigned MoU's with his colleague Fuad Hasan and with Minister Habibie of Technology and Research Development. The renewed Cultural Agreement reinforced the statements of mutual benefit and equality and some preliminary proposals for future cooperation were included in the first and second document.

A new policy management structure was set up in 1994: in the Netherlands, the Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW) was delegated the responsibility of administering the scientific cooperation between both countries. In Indonesia two steering committees were established: one for the beta sciences and one for the social sciences. Contrary to the NAC, the chairman of the Dutch steering committee was a top civil servant of the (reorganised) Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences rather than a scholar, as was the case in the NAC. In the last section some brief comments are made about the practical consequences of the renewed agreements and new policy management structure.
The Department of Dutch Language and Culture

One of the first projects endorsed under the general agreement on Cultural Cooperation was the assistance to the department of Dutch language of the language faculty at the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta. The Dutch department (Seksi Belanda) had not been operational since the New Guinea conflict. In 1967 the Department was reopened; after its ratification in 1968 the project became part of the Cultural Agreement. O&W allocated the budget for this project. Policy management was delegated to the NAC. From 1970 onwards the proceedings of the Seksi Belanda were discussed bilaterally during the joint meetings for the Cultural Agreement. Representatives of the Ministries O&W and P&K. Language experts within the NAC advised and decided on the Department.

The Language Faculty of the University of Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia – UI) was the Indonesian counterpart for implementation. The dean of the faculty of Letters at the UI is assigned the decision-making authority concerning the policies on the level of the faculty. Much of the outcome of the decision making on the Seksi Belanda depended on the affiliation of the dean with the Dutch language and culture and his relation with both the Indonesian and Dutch staff. The Dutch staff selected to work at the department were usually graduates from Dutch universities, willing to work for a longer period in Indonesia.

Until 1992 the project Seksi Belanda was an intergovernmental affair. After 1993, policy management was delegated to the NTU (Nederlandse Taal Unie), the Dutch-Belgium language union, which has as one of its tasks the promotion of the Dutch language and cultures abroad.

The meanings of the Dutch language: vehicle for science and carrier of culture

In the 1950s, President Sukarno had banned all western influences; Dutch influences were in particular politically incorrect. Since 1952 the use of the Dutch language was forbidden in all schools. Only at the university of Indonesia the study of Dutch was allowed for academic purposes, but after the New Guinea conflict even that department was closed. Towards the end of the 1960s, it was realised by Indonesian academics that the department of Dutch language was indispensable. Mastery of the Dutch language is a requirement for several academic disciplines in Indonesia, because laws and texts on the Indonesian history, languages and cultures are written in Dutch by the Dutch colonial administration and scholars. Students in law, anthropology, history and the regional languages relied heavily on the Dutch materials. They had to, at least passively, be able to read the Dutch language. Many of the academic staff in these fields in the late 1960s and early 1970s were still able to read the Dutch materials, since they had learnt Dutch as a child. For the generation born after 1945 this was not the case, Dutch had to be thought as just another foreign language.

When the diplomatic ties were restored, one of the first things the Indonesian academics did was to convince the Government of Indonesia to re-open the department.
of Dutch language. They foresaw the problem of a new academic cadre that would not have access to the many materials written in Dutch. Their problem-definition was thus not so much directed at having a department where the Dutch language was taught as one of the foreign languages, but they saw this department as a facilitator for the study of their own laws, culture and languages. In the late 1960s, when Indonesia was making the first attempts to recover from the financial crisis, salaries of expatriate teachers could not be afforded. The offer of the Dutch government to assist in the setting up of the department was therefore very welcome.

For the Dutch the study of Dutch in Indonesia was seen in a different light. The assistance to the Seksi Belanda was part of the international culture policy. Language, including literature is an important carrier of the Dutch culture. Spreading Dutch culture over the world was then the main objective of international culture policy. In addition, many of the Dutch who were sent to Indonesia saw their contribution to the Seksi as a moral obligation. The debt of honour includes not only economic aspects, but also education and information (Heyting 1987).

The objective for the Indonesian faculty of Letters was thus to create a core of Indonesian teachers who were able to teach the Dutch language as a source language for other faculties. Another objective was to increase the number of translations and translators for the many texts on all aspect of Indonesian society, which were still in Dutch. An increase in the number of graduate students was thus the direct task of the department. New course material had to be developed as well, since the students were not familiar with the Dutch language at all. How the stakes of the Indonesian staff-members lost ground to the Dutch stakes is explained in the next section.

A Dutch language department at an Indonesian university

It was agreed in 1967 that Dutch teachers would be sent to the department for assisting in setting up the courses and to teach. In 1969 the first lecturer for Dutch language arrived in Jakarta (Prof. Dr J.W. de Vries) and in 1970 Drs Gerard Termorshuizen came to assist with courses on literature and courses on Dutch culture and society. The Dutch lecturers defined the contents of the courses. They had better access to and more knowledge of the materials and developments in the study of Dutch. The aims of the Dutch teachers were more like the aims pursued for in their home universities: to educate the students in all aspects of the Dutch language and literature.

Of the total budget for the Seksi Belanda, 90% came from the Dutch government. The Indonesian staff received a small bonus and the Dutch government paid many of the textbooks. The Dutch policy managers hoped that by giving the Indonesian staff a bonus, they would have more time to perform their tasks. The wages in Indonesia for academic staff are not sufficient to provide a sufficient standard of living; therefore,
most of the staff-members have to take other jobs to provide in an adequate income. According to Professor Aart van Zoest, the aim was not reached: the Indonesian staff regarded this bonus as an extra and not as a provision in income (Van Zoest 1992:125).

The number of students at the Seksi Belanda remained low. Students in Indonesia choose a study based on the job perspectives it offers. The first choice of most students is medicine, computer sciences or economics (accountancy); studying humanities and languages often implies becoming a teacher, which is not paid well. Students with the highest grades are admitted to the study of their first choice. Students with lower grades may choose for studies of their second choice, which is usually the 'softer' studies, languages, social sciences or law. In languages, English is the most popular study. For some of the students the fact that the parents or grandparents still speak Dutch is a motivation to learn the language. They choose to study Dutch out of respect, curiosity and because in some circles, Dutch is regarded as a language of the elite, comparable with the usage of French in elite circles some 100 years ago in Europe.

The ability of the students to speak and read Dutch was less than aimed for. At high school it is commonly known that the quality of the teaching in foreign languages is low. The level at which students could start their studies was very elementary. Another reason for the difficulties has to do with the system of education in the secondary level. Reading habits and self-study are not particularly encouraged. Perhaps the most important reason why results were less than expected was the educational system used. The Dutch staff reasoned from the Dutch situation and had developed a curriculum that resembled the Dutch study of the Dutch language and culture. That curriculum did not address the needs identified by the Indonesian staff, and it assumed more knowledge of grammar than most students had had at secondary school. Suratminto, the head of the Department in 1999 said that until 1992 the organisation of the department resembled the colonial times. The Dutch decided and managed, and the Indonesians followed the directions of the Dutch. But, both the management and the contents of the curriculum were not what the Indonesian academics had envisaged.

Three quarters of the students who graduated at the Dutch department found a job in teaching. The current (young) staff-members of the Seksi have all graduated from the Seksi itself. Many students find a job in a completely different environment simply because they have obtained their Bachelors degree (S1). But, since most of the students are women, and after marriage they often do not continue working or studying, there were a lot of dropouts. Another reason why only a relatively small number of students got a S2 (Masters) or S3 (PhD) degree was caused by the internal problems in the Seksi. Each new dean changed the program and requirements, which often resulted in students having to redo their thesis or acquire more credit points. Indonesian students who were sent to the Netherlands for further study had to redo the work they had done in the Netherlands because it was not accepted by their Indonesian professors (Augusdin 1996). The obstruction of the deans must be seen as a reaction to the ambiguous situation: the Dutch paid and defined the curriculum, an undesirable
situation, but unavoidable because of the limited budgets in Indonesia. The following figure visualises the situation: a Dutch organisation in an Indonesian setting.

**Figure 5.1** A Dutch department in an Indonesian university

1992 and afterwards

In principle, the decision of 1992 should not have affected the Seksi Belanda, since it was a project under the Cultural Agreement and funded by the department of Education and Sciences, not DGIS. But it soon became clear that the decision implied that all governmental forms of aid should be stopped. And it was clear that the project 'Seksi Belanda' was aid: compared to other departments, the Dutch share in the financing and assistance with the contents was large. The Dutch staff-members had to leave, because their salaries stopped. From now on, the Indonesian, young staff was responsible for the carrying out of the program.

Kees Groeneboer, a staff member of the Seksi, noted that the decision of 1992 did unexpectedly more good to the Seksi than any other political decision could have done. The Indonesian staff was in a way forced to become independent and use the skills they already had. The 'year of no Dutch involvement' also gave the time for the dean, Anton Moeliono, to reflect on future ways of cooperation and what was needed from the Dutch, if any assistance was allowed again. He was of course not the only one who saw the need of having a well operating department of Dutch studies. The members of the new Committees for the Cultural Agreement were fully aware of the vital position the study of Dutch had for other disciplines. Although the Indonesian staff performed well, assistance could be used with the preparation of courses and teaching methods. For the Indonesian staff it was hard to keep informed about new teaching methods in the Netherlands. The need for extra advice was also caused by the age of all staff-members, they had all just graduated and for young teachers it is normal to have
seniors for guidance. Since the only seniors up till 1992 had been Dutch, they were missed as seniors, not particularly as Dutch seniors (Suratminto 1996).

The dean Anton Moeliono found a way to include some Dutch input in his department within the renewed Cultural Agreement. During the meetings in November 1992 and February 1993, it was jointly decided that the NTU would be the best counterpart for both the Seksi.Belanda and considering the Dutch and Belgium international cultural relations. Already in 1986 it was noted in joint meeting for the Cultural Agreement that the NTU would be considered to carry out the implementation of the language program, but until 1992 the Dutch department of Education and Sciences had been directly responsible for the sending of teachers. Probably because the NTU's aims are to promote the Dutch language, as it is used in Flanders and the Netherlands, as well as the respective cultures, and has both Belgium and Dutch personnel, the involvement of this foreign counterpart is 'freed' from any colonial connections. The NTU pursues the same policies all over the world.

The way the Seksi operates now is a completely Indonesian affair and now it can be said that it is an Indonesian department at an Indonesian University for the teaching of the Dutch language and cultures. The curriculum is defined by the Indonesian staff, and reflects the Indonesian needs. Contrary to the former methods, which were based on the Dutch education system, courses in translation do not primarily focus on mastering the language, but on using dictionaries. Students from other faculties are now able to translate Dutch texts within six months. In the course ‘Nederlandenkunde’ (Knowledge of the two Netherlands) students learn of both Flanders and Holland. This course is also considered as a comparative course to gain more insight on the cohabitation of the different cultures in Indonesia itself. Teachers from Belgium, the Netherlands and even South Africa come on guest lectureships, which also enables the Indonesian students to recognise the different accents and dialects. Excellent students are given a scholarship to pursue their studies in Leiden, this scholarship is also provided via the NTU.

At this moment, there is one permanent advisor working at the Seksi, Kees Groeneboer. He organises guest lectureships, mainly for the training of the Indonesian staff. Teachers from Flanders and the Netherlands are selected according to their expertise. They stay for only two months, to give guest lectures, so as to avoid that they become too involved in the organisational matters of the Seksi. The NTU finances the guest lecturers, because supporting the dissemination of the Dutch culture is one of its main tasks. The NTU furthermore finances part of the materials, because these are expensive and hard to obtain in Indonesia itself.

One other interesting development needs to be mentioned, after 1992, the academic study of Dutch was put out of the ban it had had since the 1950s. Until 1950, no other university was allowed to set up a complete study, except the University of Indonesia. Nowadays, universities in Medan, Surabaya, Ujung Pandang and Bandung the Dutch language is taught. Dutch is now considered as just any other foreign language, with the special feature of being a source language for other academic disciplines.
In summary, the decision of 1992 altered the objectives of the department in a subtle way. The Dutch objectives, learning Dutch as a Dutch student, were replaced with the Indonesian objectives: learning Dutch as a source language. The management of affairs changed as well: from a colonial way of organisation to an Indonesian organisation. The need for expatriate teachers remains, but the department hires Dutch native speakers and their contracts expire. The differences are clear in Figure 5.2.

![Diagram showing the Seksi Belanda after 1993](image)

**Figure 5.2** The *Seksi Belanda* after 1993: an Indonesian department teaching the Dutch language

**Program of Indonesian Studies (PRIS)**

The Program of Indonesian Studies (PRIS) has been a long-standing cooperation; it lasted almost 20 years. The PRIS was the most developed form of cooperation under the Cultural Agreement. Some have said that the PRIS was the Cultural Agreement. A lengthy section is devoted to this program, because the program survived a number of political waves and was so central in the Cultural Agreement. The initial success of this program led to a number of other projects. The lessons learnt on how to set up and manage cooperation have been of importance for these subsequent projects. The objective of PRIS was scientific cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the field of Indonesian studies. The meaning of 'Indonesian studies' was limited to the social sciences and humanities. The aims of the program were

- the formation of a new generation of scholars, both in Indonesia and the Netherlands in the field of Indonesian studies by means of bilateral training programmes;
- strengthening the Indonesian studies at universities in the Netherlands and Indonesia through stimulating research;
Cultural cooperation

The improvement of the infrastructure in the field of Indonesian studies by making sources of knowledge about Indonesia more accessible, both in the Netherlands and Indonesia.\(^8\)

The disciplines involved from the social sciences were anthropology, sociology, economy, political sciences and social geography. Archaeology, history, linguistics, literature, musicology, philology and religious studies represented the humanities.

The program consisted of three sub-projects: education, research and improvement of the scientific infrastructure. The first two sub-projects are described in detail. The infrastructure project consisted of translations, shipping of books and making archives in both countries accessible. In the course of time, the relative importance of the three projects changed. The increase in importance of the education sub-project was a reaction to the constraints of Indonesia’s problems in higher education, but was also proof of a lack of understanding amongst the participants. How the research sub-project was evaluated revealed the insurmountable differences in scientific approaches between the participants. That the project was discontinued was seen as a result of a change in policy of the Department of C&W, but perhaps the main reason for its discontinuation was a lack of will and perspective amongst the counterparts.

From the onset of the project it was clear to the participants that the PRIS served different interests for the counterparts of both countries. For the Indonesian government, a program like the PRIS generated the required means (finances and expertise) to improve the condition of the social sciences. For the Dutch government the PRIS was to be the realisation of the Cultural Agreement with Indonesia and until the 1990s it was silently agreed that the program also served as an impulse for the withering Indonesian studies in the Netherlands. Managing the PRIS was the main occupation of the NAC. For the Dutch scientists involved the PRIS offered opportunities for Dutch Indonesianists to enter the country and to maintain the Netherlands as centre of excellence on Indonesia.\(^9\) For the participating Indonesian social science and humanities faculties, this program would enable them to make use the scientific material that the Dutch had left after de-colonisation. The PRIS was also straightforward aid to their daily business of teaching and research. Yet, the different meanings the PRIS had for the participants did not exclude each other, they formed a synthesis and were of mutual benefit, at least in theory.

Managing the program: keeping the cooperation going

Without the dedication of two men the PRIS would probably not have been established. The late professor Harsja Whardana Bachtiar played a crucial role in all games. He was a professor of sociology and social history, executive secretary of the consortium of social sciences at the department of P&K and advisor to the respective ministers of education and culture.\(^6\) As a top-official at the Indonesian ministry of Education and Culture, he had outlived many a minister and was the epitome of the fourth power. Professor Teeuw, in his capacities as professor of Indonesian languages at the
University of Leiden, chairman of the KITLV and chairman of the NAC, had the respect of policy-makers and scholars in the Netherlands. Both men were knowledgeable in their respective scientific fields and held a strategic position in the policy management game. In effect, they were the links-in-person between the three games. Their influence and standing explains much of the initial success in and support for the PRIS.

After the opening conference in 1975, steering committees were set up in both countries. In the Netherlands, the PRIS was object of the sub-committee for scientific education of the NAC. Professor Teeuw took care the members of the steering committee were representatives of all relevant Dutch universities, so that the program would not be a 'Leiden' affair. The University of Amsterdam and some individual scientists did not want to join, arguing that this program benefited the Indonesian regime. The objection of mainly younger Dutch academics was that, in a way, the PRIS signified the continuation of already existing research programs of the 'old boys network'. They believed that research programs should focus on contemporary issues in Indonesia.

The Indonesian members had for the greater part finished their studies in the Netherlands; they spoke Dutch and had a special affiliation with the Dutch. Most members knew each other personally and knew each other’s customs and habits. Some kind of a love-hate relation was developed among the members; liking that they could work together on developing their own disciplines, disliking the fact that they were, in different ways, dependent on each other.

In Leiden the Bureau of Indonesian Studies (BIS) was established as a department within the KITLV. In Jakarta matters were organised by professor Bachtiar himself, aided by his personal secretary Mien Joebhaar. Every two years, the two steering committees met and discussed progress and project proposals. All members of the committees, Dutch and Indonesian mentioned the fact that professor Teeuw and Bachtiar arranged most of the contents and decisions beforehand. There was no such thing as democratic decision-making, although most of the interviewees agreed that these two men knew best what was possible in the ever-changing political climate. Members of the Indonesian committee were selected by professor Bachtiar, often they were informed by telephone a few days before a meeting whether they were members or not. A protocol or agenda was not given beforehand. One professor asserted that the informal character of the meetings had its strengths and weaknesses. A strength was that professor Bachtiar could in his capacity as director at the ministry of P&K accomplish a lot more and faster if he had to consult with members of the steering committees. To a lesser extent that strength also applied to Professor Teeuw. The program relied heavily on the input and knowledge of two influential men; until the 1990s this was one of the major strengths of the program. The informal decision-structure and unilateral character was a weakness because there was no full support for many of the projects professor Bachtiar proposed. On the Dutch side the unilateral decision-making led to discontent. Some Dutch proposals submitted by interested parties were rejected, while most Indonesian proposals were endorsed. The argument of having the Indonesian demands prevail was to maintain the cooperation.
The financial input of the Netherlands was much larger than the Indonesian input. All participants knew this, but the program was not perceived as pure aid to Indonesian faculties, because the Dutch scientific interests were served as well. One can argue that it is not the purpose of the Cultural Agreement to fund scientific activities from and to the benefit of Dutch scientists, but the topic 'Indonesia' was considered as part of the cultural heritage of the Netherlands. Minister of Education and Sciences W. Deetman shared that opinion of 'Indonesia' as a cultural heritage. He issued in 1982 a special committee for the upkeep of the Indonesian Studies, and saw a major role for the PRIS for the enhancement of the Indonesian Studies in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, throughout the implementation of the PRIS the ties between the Dutch steering committee and the Dutch government were loose. The permanent representative of the KITLV in Jakarta, Jaap Erkelens, wrote in a letter to the BIS that it was strange that the Dutch embassy was not involved in the biannual meetings of the steering committees: 'It is after all a government-to-government project.' Internal memos between the committee's members described some apprehension towards the Dutch government; they were not consulted when the Dutch minister of Culture visited Indonesia and the Dutch cultural centre at the Embassy in Jakarta. In the steering committee in the Netherlands, the department of IDW played only a marginal role and until the evaluation of 1990, the ministry had never interfered in the decisions of the committee.

Administration and financial accounting was done in Leiden by the BIS. The employees of the BIS were supposed to work on their PhD's for one fifth of their time, so that they would have intimate knowledge of the field. Most of them indeed finished their PhD’s. The BIS also organised the reception and guidance of Indonesian students who came to the Netherlands for their studies. Some interviewees mentioned that the Indonesian students were pampered, both in their social life as well as in graduation. Historian Taufik Abdullah said the American ‘survival of the fittest’ system was better for Indonesian students: ‘We need that kind of strictness’. A Dutch lecturer mentioned that grades often had to be ‘moderated’: if Indonesian students kept on failing their (language)tests, that would endanger the cooperation.

Many of the Dutch interviewees said afterwards that the Dutch counterparts complied too much with the Indonesian wishes. Why did they do so? The first answer given was that the cooperation had to be kept going and that was why standards were lowered and the Indonesian wishes had to prevail. Asked why it was so important to keep up the cooperation, some answered that it was a debt of honour that Dutch science should help the Indonesians with the backlash and the heritage left by the colonial government in their social sciences. Some Dutch interviewees suggested that some of the Indonesian counterparts made use of this guilt complex of the Dutch. The Indonesian interviewees said that anti-Dutch feelings with respect to the colonial past only came up when they displayed haughty behaviour, only then Indonesians will remember and act ‘bitchy’. Whether the Dutch were compliant and whether the Indonesian made use of it remains a question. The best explanation for the prevalence of Indonesian demands must be found in the characteristics of professor Bachtiar, he
had a tremendous advantage in knowledge on the inside of politics in Indonesia, was knowledgeable in social sciences and knew exactly what he wanted and was not hesitant to venture that. Even at his ministry fellow officials could not compete with him.\textsuperscript{51}

Figure 5.3 shows the loose connection between the Dutch political game and the other games. In Indonesia there was no well-organised policy management (depicted by an interrupted line), but the interaction and influence ran via a small number of influential persons, who had positions both in government and in the field, the implementation game. Although the program meant different things to different actors, such was not problematic, at least in the beginning.

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**Figure 5.3** The PRIS in its heydays

**Education: more than originally planned**

The purpose of the education-project in the PRIS was twofold: 1. to train Indonesian students in their respective disciplines and use Dutch as a source language and 2. to provide Dutch students with the opportunity to study Indonesian society and Indonesian languages. The need for academically trained staff at Indonesian social science faculties was urgent and the program provided the much-needed assistance in developing the curriculum.

In the period 1975-1978, when Dutch as a source language was taught as a separate program, 87 Indonesian scholars and students participated in a course. In 1978 it was decided to give the training in Dutch only as part of the other training programmes.\textsuperscript{52} Dutch students have used the facility for learning the Indonesian languages much more, 187 students took classes either as a major or minor. Table 5.1 represents the figures for the education activities in the other disciplines based on the figures of the
internal BIS report of 1991.\textsuperscript{53} The courses were given to scholars already working in the field and students who would eventually obtain a degree. The numbers of students who obtained their S1 or S2 degrees are printed in bold, the numbers of students who were still busy for the S3 or S2 degree are printed between brackets. Because the program ended in 1992 and some students were still busy writing their dissertations, exact figures on how many students obtained their PhD degrees as a result of participating in the PRIS cannot be given. Note that the figures are inversely cumulative: the students in anthropology and history who followed an all-round program in which they obtained their S2 degree are also represented in the S1 category. In the other disciplines, the education activities existed of upgrading courses and individual supervision over S3 thesis.

\textbf{Table 5.1} Number of Indonesian participants in the education project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>(upgrading) courses</th>
<th>S1 (bachelors)</th>
<th>S2 (masters)</th>
<th>S3 (PhD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13 (10)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeology</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13 (3)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philology</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The BIS claims these PhD’s as being a result of participating in the PRIS courses, but these students had already obtained their S1 and S2 without participation in the program: they did participate in the (upgrading) courses for staff members

** These dissertations were written in cooperation with the Ildep project (see fifth section of this chapter)

The number of students who obtained a degree was rather low, regarding the duration of the program and the amount of funding. Many Indonesian students dropped out of the program. Indonesian students found studying the Dutch language more difficult than expected. Most students learn English at school, so in general Dutch, which is also a more complex and unfamiliar language is the fourth language they learn. Learning Dutch as an additional requirement to their discipline is for most students and extra-ordinary effort.\textsuperscript{54}

The selection of students was in the first years done by professors Bachtiar and Teeuw themselves, but the pool of eligible students was not that large. The same problems that the Seksi Belanda encountered as to the type of student hampered the program here: social sciences and humanities are not the most popular studies and do not attract the best students. The result of this negative selection was that students needed more time to finish their studies and often failed for their examinations. To keep the program going and ensure the presence of students, the standards were lowered (on request of the BIS), much to the discontent of the Dutch and Indonesian lecturers.

While at the onset it was understood that the meaning of the program was different for both countries, during the course of in particular the education project, this difference caused some discontent. Indonesia needed ready-to-start graduates, who
after obtaining their degrees could function as teachers or researchers for Indonesia's development plans. Students are judged on efficiency and in terms of accumulation of knowledge. The Dutch regard students as pure scientists-to-be and judge the performance of students accordingly: critical thought, creativity and the ability to develop one's own research projects are important in the Dutch perspective. The difference seems to be the debate between applied science and pure science: Indonesian professors do value the merits of pure scientists, but they are of the opinion that considering the developmental status of Indonesia first and foremost teachers and researchers to assist in development are required. Only when Indonesia has reached a certain phase of socio-economic development, there is a place for pure science.

Although both counterparts were aware of the differing needs and resulting differing academic standards, it did lead to problems in the supervision and examinations of the students. Dutch professors complained that Indonesian students did not show initiative, were not creative and only wrote compilations of texts, rather than critical and individual theses. Indonesian professors on the other hand did not appreciate the theses that were approved by their Dutch counterparts. According to them the theses did not meet the requirements of the Indonesian universities: too little pages, the format was not right and they were disappointed that the supervision of the students was done by assistants instead of professors in the Netherlands. More crucial was the different emphasis on qualitative and quantitative methods: the former was dominant in the participating Dutch social science faculties, while the latter was practised more at Indonesian universities and perceived to be more rigorous. Individual students were the victims of this dispute on academic standards: after having written a thesis in the Netherlands, they were often required to rewrite their theses in Indonesia. After a few years the steering groups decided that Indonesian students would write their final thesis in Indonesia, to avoid being measured by different standards and writing the thesis twice.

Even after the many changes and improvements and sometimes lowering of standards, the number of graduated students on the Indonesian side remained disappointing. However, the PRIS was one of the few programs with enough funds to enable students to receive training in the Netherlands and to use Dutch material. Over the years the steering groups committed an increasing share of the total budget to training, because, as we will see in the next section, it was concluded that before research could be done, a core of students had to be trained first. The following graph shows how since the 1980's the amount for education increased to from 19% to 58% of the budget, as opposed to research, that initially amounted to 39% of the budget and decreased to 13%. The main cause for the sudden increase after 1986 of the budget for education was the fall of oil prices in 1986. Whereas before Indonesia had an amount to spend on overseas training for the students, after 1986 the commitments to students agreed upon in the years before had to be taken over be Dutch funds.
To summarise, the education project had encountered a number of constraints that were not foreseen at the onset of the project. Through constantly revising and changing the requirements and adapting the contents of the courses, solutions were sought to overcome the problems emerging during implementation. But even after all the revisions, the original goals were not achieved, numbers and quality of the students remained disappointing, even though a major share of the budget and activities was eventually allocated to education.

Research: divergent needs and views on science

For Indonesia it was important to gain more knowledge on its many different cultures and societies and the PRIS offered an opportunity to carry out research in certain regions on which little research had been done. The Dutch had produced much knowledge in the colonial era, that could be used, updated and developed further. For the Dutch on the other hand the PRIS, as a program of cooperation with Indonesia, opened the way to carry out research in Indonesia. The Netherlands had until the 1950s been the country that had the largest collection of material and scientific knowledge on Indonesia. This centre-of-excellence position had gradually withered, partly because Dutch researchers were not allowed to do research in Indonesia after the break of diplomatic ties in 1958. One of the main concerns of the Dutch scientific community was that no bibit had been bred, the scientist still active would retire within a few years.  

At the opening conference in 1975 it was decided that the research activities would take place in a limited number of regions or should be directed towards specific problems in the form of major research projects. These larger research projects would
ensure that several research efforts would be coordinated and mutually adapted, so that a comprehensive pool of knowledge could be created on these areas or problems. Funds for individual research projects were also available. To stimulate the research activities of both the Indonesian and Dutch researchers, scholarships and travelling grants were provided for. The research results were regularly presented in seminars and conferences. These seminars and conferences were also a means to bring the researchers in contact with each other.

Two regions were selected as major research projects: Madura and Halmahera in the Moluccas. Madura was chosen because it was socio-economically an interesting area: a strong migration movement from this island took place and the Chinese traders entering Java from Madura have significantly influenced the economic development of Indonesia. Five Dutch researchers wrote a dissertation on aspects of Madurese society, mainly on contemporary socio-economic topics. The other region, Halmahera was of interest because little was known about Halmahera and its surrounding islands. Four Dutch researchers obtained their doctorate degree on Halmahera topics. The topics of these dissertations focused on the cultures in these regions. Two Indonesian researchers did fieldwork on Halmahera, but their fieldwork did not result in a dissertation: they did not have as much time and budget as their Dutch colleagues. In 1981, the Indonesian project coordinator proposed to turn the Halmahera project into a broader project, a multi-disciplinary Moluccas-Irian Jaya project, which was started in 1982. One of the reasons for this area of study (Eastern Indonesia) was that by this choice, more scholars from eastern Indonesian Universities could be involved in research, which would enlarge the scientific activities in these universities.

The Cimanuk river basin project in West Java was a joint research in social geography. The objective was to make both Dutch and Indonesian archival sources concerning the Cimanuk river basin accessible and to process this material in the light of a historical and sociological research framework. A similar project was carried out for the Serayu river basin in Central Java.

**Differences in quantity and quality**

Individual researches concerned the fields of anthropology, archaeology, history, linguistics, literature, philology and sociology. Twenty Dutch researchers finished their dissertations within the PRIS and one Indonesian researcher obtained her PhD in 1987. After 1992 when the PRIS was dissolved two Indonesian PhD candidates were still in the process of writing, finished their dissertations with Indonesian funds. At first sight the inequality in results in Dutch and Indonesian output is clear. Several reasons can be listed for this. The differences in the organisation of scientific activity in both countries account for a great deal of the apparent inequality in results. The number of Indonesian research proposals to the Steering Committees has always been smaller than the Dutch proposals. Many Dutch professors knew of the possibilities the PRIS offered. Compared to Indonesian students, Dutch doctoral students, the prospective researchers, are more encouraged to formulate proposals. Some interviewees
remarked that all proposals had to go through professor Bachtiar, who sometimes sifted the proposals according to controversial standards. Methodological differences also came to the fore in the course of implementation; for some scientists the debate on methodology almost equals religious warfare. The Dutch consider fieldwork as a crucial part of the research: the empirical search has to be done by the individual researcher. In particular for anthropologists, it is considered part of the job to spend a considerable amount of time doing fieldwork (cf. Watson 1999). Whereas it is normal for a Dutch researcher to carry out the data collection personally, Indonesian researchers often send out students to carry out surveys. The results from pre-structured surveys were the empirical base for Indonesian researchers. In the interviews with Dutch participants I often heard snide remarks about the rigid belief of Indonesian social scientists in quantitative methods.

Apart from the ‘beliefs’ in methods, differences in salaries and time available influenced the ration between Indonesian and Dutch researchers as well. Indonesian researchers have far more difficulties in finding time and funding for their fieldwork and writing. They have families to take care of and often have to have other jobs to provide in the family income. A fieldwork period of a few months is virtually impossible. For Dutch PhD candidates conducting research can be a full-time job with a sufficient income. Since it was a bilateral program, in which both countries would provide in the funds for their own researchers, the Dutch funds could not be spend on Indonesian researchers, it was after all not an aid program.

In the conferences in which joint research products were presented, the Dutch found that the quality of the Indonesian papers was wanting, amongst other things due to the fact that the Dutch had more access to material and research facilities than their Indonesian colleagues. Indonesian participants attributed the low quality to the same infrastructure problems. Professor Bachtiar on the other hand said that the Dutch research often lacked a thorough methodological basis. According to professor Teeuw, professor Bachtiar judged from an ideal, his criteria probably being derived from his experiences at Harvard University. The Dutch have different academic criteria and they are more prone to judge from the start-situation and assess improvements. It was also said that the Indonesians were very critical amongst each other, but could not accept criticism from the Dutch.

All researchers interviewed said that there was no such thing as cooperation. Most of the research was conducted and funded by the Dutch; one could not speak of a joint endeavour. The Steering Committees took care that two researchers would not cover the same topic and published results under a common banner, but that was it as far as coordination was concerned. However, one should take into account that scientific research is in essence an individual endeavour. Experience in any university shows that joint activities are extremely hard to realise, even more if the activities should involve researchers located at a large distance, with different cultural and working environments.

In the course of time, an increasing part of the budget was spent on education, rather than research (see also graph 5.1). The shift in attention is partly due to the reali-
sation that before Indonesians could carry out research, more training was required. The director of research development at P&K summarised the reasons for this neatly: Human Resource Development is the core policy goal for her department. Research in Indonesia should always include training of young researchers. Most counterparts realised that the program was for the larger part ‘aid’, but seen from the objectives, Indonesian needs and the Dutch debt of honour this characterisation was not perceived as problematic. Silently it was agreed that the distinction between cooperation and aid was not that sharp, it did not have to be at that time.

*Dutch criticism on the research project*

Apart from the ‘technical’ impediments that hampered the goal of joint research and equal results, other critical remarks have been made on the content of the research. This criticism from Dutch actors pointed to the Indonesian dominance in the choice of subjects, the benefits for the Indonesian government, the historical focus and the dominance of ‘Leiden’ in the research activities.

In the 1970s, following the student revolts of 1968, many groups in Dutch society were actively concerned with the political situation in developing countries. Critical study groups sprouted at Dutch universities, advocating the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, supporting the guerrillas in El Salvador, Ecuador, Fidel Castro in Cuba and many more revolutionary causes. The attention for Indonesia displayed by students was on the regime in Indonesia, rather than the fine arts, cultures and languages. Some groups even demanded that the official relation of the Dutch government with the Indonesian regime should be ended. The criticism was also directed to organisations or programs that maintained relations with official institutions with Indonesia, for example the KITLV. When the KITLV celebrated its 125th birthday, Henk Maier and Lars Vikör wrote a critical report. According to them, too little attention had been paid to the political and societal context of the activities of the KITLV. Because the KITLV and the PRIS were for the greater part dependent on governmental subsidies, they were extensions of the Dutch government and its policies towards Indonesia. Development policy, which was at that time the main policy field towards Indonesia aimed to improve the situation of the poorest and according to Maier and Vikör, the aid for Indonesia and also the Cultural Agreement wrestled with a fundamental dilemma. The dilemma was that the Dutch counterparts had to cooperate with Indonesian counterparts who were ‘... top-figures in the Indonesian scientific community, without doubt with the best intentions, but in the end they are controlled by the military regime. ... In the Netherlands, one should realise that there is an all-encompassing limitation on the cooperation: the control, also on scientific projects, is in last instance with the military. This implies that the framework in which criticism (and critical research) is possible is defined by the military regime and this framework becomes more narrow ... Science is never carried out in a social-political vacuum’.

The projects had to be accorded by LIPI, as the scientific institution of the Indonesian government and later by BAKIN, the internal security agency. The report
included a critical assessment of the Cimanuk River Basin project. Maier and Vikör argued that the basis research question of this project would give the Indonesian government scientific lessons in how to control an area under development. Some members of the Dutch scientific community even refused to participate in the PRIS, for example professor Pluvier of the University of Amsterdam, because of the links with the Indonesian government.

Dutch scholars - mainly those who did not participate in the PRIS - had criticism from an academic point of view. As chairman, professor Teeuw had always chosen as many different scholars with differing views in the Committee in order to have a representation of the varying approaches in Indonesian Studies and universities. The criticism on the PRIS activities (both education and research) was that the scope was too narrowly oriented on the past. According to some there was no place for critical, contemporary research on social-economic topics (Vlasblom 1992). However, if we look at the Dutch dissertations, this criticism does not seem justified, a main part of the topics was oriented on contemporary phenomena. Other criticism pointed to the Indonesian dominance in the choice of the regions to be studies in the larger research projects. Not all Dutch faculties involved saw the scientific relevance of Madura and Halmahera and preferred other regions to be studied. They argued that if the program were a real bilateral program, the Dutch would have to have an even say in the choice of the regions. One interviewee explained that this criticism has its origin in the different scientific approaches of the Dutch universities involved. Amsterdam has a more socio-economic, contemporary approach, whereas Leiden’s approach is characterised as historical and anthropological.

Indonesian criticism on the research

Indonesian criticism on the research projects of PRIS was geared to the definition of ‘Indonesian studies’, the applicability and also the political correctness of the topics. Professor Bachtiar’s criticism was that the scope of the Indonesian studies in the Netherlands was too narrowly defined (Bachtiar 1983: 47-56). For Indonesia, there is no such thing as ‘Indonesian Studies’: Indonesians study all aspects of the society. The Dutch ‘Indonesian Studies’ are limited to the languages, cultures and history of Indonesia. He noted with astonishment for example that the study of major religions (in Indonesia) was regarded by the Dutch report only as incidental to the study of languages and culture. The Christian religion was not even mentioned in the report, while this religion has been of great significance for Indonesia. The narrowness of the scope also concerned the historic focus. He said that it is perfectly reasonable for a country to support the academic investigations in a certain area to serve concrete national interest, rather than some esoteric reasons. He compared the area studies supported by the USA, which serve their strategic and economic interests. These area studies can cater for present and future needs. According to Bachtiar, Indonesia Studies as they were carried out did not encompass enough knowledge on modern Indonesia and had to be oriented more on multi-disciplinary academic training, if the Netherlands wished to serve their own future needs and interests in Indonesia. Another point
professor Bachtiar touched upon was the narrowness in scope geographically. He said that the Dutch should focus more attention on the ASEAN region, since this region would become of more importance for the Netherlands (Bachtiar 1983: 56).

Edy Masinambow, professor in Anthropology, formulated the Indonesian criticism in other words at the Fifth International Workshop on Indonesian Studies, concerned with the Halmahera research project. His criticism was that the research that had been carried out was not directly applicable for the developmental efforts in the region. 'In my opinion, the primary role of expatriate researchers is to carry out basic social science research for the advancement of knowledge that may constitute the basis for more applied or policy oriented research' (Masinambow 1994: 221). However, it is not so that Indonesian criticism on the research within PRIS was solely focused on its scope and applicability. The criticism of Indonesian philosopher Ignas Kleden is similar to that of the Dutch students. Kleden agrees that Indonesian scientific research is not critical (in Habermas’ terms), serves the interests of the regime and is too much focused on the applicability for Indonesia’s development needs (Kleden 1995: 9-33).

Eventually the research component of the PRIS had evolved into something that was not appreciated by the majority of stakeholders, neither in policy management, nor in implementation. The topics were controversial, the low extent of applicability was regretted, mainly Dutch PhD students benefited and the scope of the definition was either too narrow, or too historical. Last but not least, the research element had become an extra facility for Dutch faculties of humanities and social sciences and could remotely be connected to the objectives of the Cultural Agreement. The figure below shows how in implementation the research project begot a life of its own, how education became the major share of the program and the discongruency of it all with the Dutch and Indonesian political games.

Figure 5.4 How the PRIS had evolved after some 15 years of implementation
Around 1992: a stick to hit the dog

It is clear from the former sections that some cracks had begun to appear in the PRIS in the late 1980s, early 1990s. Paul Brouwer, the cultural attaché for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from 1993 until 1998 ambassador to Jakarta, remembered that professor Bachtiar said he wanted to get rid of the PRIS-structure in the early 1990s. In the bilateral meeting on the Cultural Agreement similar wishes had been ventured by the Indonesian party. According to the Indonesian delegation, cultural relations, represented mainly by the PRIS should hinge less on the past and be more directed towards the present and future.

In the late 1980s, early 1990s the Grand Efficiency Operation swept through the Dutch government: all ministries had to economise and operate in a more efficient manner. To Minister Ritzen’s astonishment, the PRIS had never in its 15-year duration been evaluated on efficiency and goodness of fit with the policy of his department. In 1990 he commissioned an evaluation committee to conduct an evaluation on the PRIS. The conclusion of this report was that PRIS could continue, but in a drastically different way. The evaluators noted that the program had evolved into an education-oriented program benefiting Indonesian and Dutch faculties. This was far from the objectives of cultural policy: support for Dutch universities belonged to domestic science policy and support for Indonesian faculties belonged in the department of his colleague Minister Pronk. The evaluators also observed that the relation with Education and Sciences was too loose, implementation of the project took place virtually without any consultation with the Dutch government. Implicitly criticism was ventured on the orientation of the research: the research projects were too much oriented towards the past and the Dutch heritage from colonial times. Too little attention was given to the present and the future interests of the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, PRIS could continue, the representative of O&W in the committee had the mandate to promise that PRIS would receive 215,000 million guilders in the coming years, provided that the changes proposed in the evaluation would be made.

In the mean time, in 1991, a new postdoctoral institute was established as a centre of excellence on Asia in Leiden. The International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden would have enhance the knowledge on contemporary Asia and create networks of scientists between Europe and Asia. In the preparatory meetings in the department of O&W, PRIS was discussed as well. None of the civil servants at the department and scientists involved saw a role for PRIS in this new institute. PRIS would not fit in the postdoctoral set up and it was too much oriented to the past. But the PRIS and BIS still existed, next to the new institute, only a few yards away in Leiden. In 1991, Professor Teeuw retired as chairman of the PRIS. He remained involved until the new chairman Professor Pim Schoorl assumed the position in 1992.

At first, when the decision of the Indonesian government rocked the Dutch development cooperation community, people involved in Cultural Agreement projects did not perceive any danger for their activities. In April 1992, minister Ritzen sent a memo to his colleague Pronk to confirm that the decisions of the Indonesian government
would not affect the budget of Education and Sciences, since there were no political strings attached to the funds of that department. Somehow, a copy of this memo was sent to the embassy in The Hague (the Indonesian embassy), rather than the Dutch embassy in Jakarta (see also Chapter One). Some interviewees believed this memo was purposefully leaked to Bappenas: president Soeharto read this letter and ordered that all bilateral projects should be screened on possible 'DGIS viruses'.

Suddenly an earlier financial agreement between Education and Sciences and DGIS turned out to be the sword of Damocles for the PRIS and many other projects of the department of Education and Sciences. Since 1986, Ministers Deetman and Bukman (DGIS) had agreed to ascribe a part of the O&W budget to the DGIS budget. This arrangement was advantageous for both ministries: DGIS always had had problems in allocating the funds (1.5% of the NNI) and it was not uncommon that other ministries 'helped' DGIS in spending the reservoir of foreign aid funds. This implied that PRIS had to be ended as well if no other funds were found.

The new chairman of PRIS and KITLV, professor Schoorl, made one attempt to rescue the PRIS and advocate it with the ministry, but the attempt was in vain. Professor Bachtiar only tried to have a number of students continue their studies, who were in the Netherlands at the time for the decisions. On 20 November 1992 the BIS received a letter that it should stop its activities, pending projects could be finished on a limited budget from Education and Sciences. In April 1993 the PRIS and BIS were dissolved. Interviewees say that the ending of Dutch foreign aid to Indonesia in 1992 was used as a stick to hit the dog; an opportunity for the Dutch Department of Education and Sciences to get rid of the PRIS. They were disappointed that the Indonesian counterparts did not undertake any action ('where were our friends in Indonesia? We felt betrayed and left alone'). A program such as PRIS did not fit anymore in the principles set out in the political game of the Netherlands and the Indonesian counterparts were not that eager to keep the old structure in tact. Indonesia did want to cooperate, but in a new structure. Professor Bachtiar saw in the renewed Cultural Agreement and the more businesslike set-up of the management new chances. After the visits of minister Ritzen and the undersigning of the MoU in September 1992 he immediately formed a new Indonesian steering committee, to the surprise of the Dutch. He was actively involved in promoting new projects in social sciences, until he passed away in October 1995.

Professor Teeuw said afterwards: 'It was time to put an end to the PRIS, it was enough. It was time for something new, because it was over, also on the Dutch side. The common background, the people from the old times had gone, retired, passed away... It has all changed and a new time has come, there are new people...'. New people, new policy principles and another emphasis on foreign cultural policy on the Dutch side seem to have struck the final blow to the PRIS, that could not live up to the expectations of the first participants.
The Indonesian Linguistics Development Project

Another long-standing project of cooperation was the Indonesian Linguistics Development Project (Ildep). The project aimed to intensify the study of the languages of Indonesia and to improve the capacity of the Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa – the centre for language development and cultivation – in carrying out its national language development policy. The Pusat Bahasa is a centre under the responsibility of the ministry of P&K and is responsible for implementing language policy over the entire archipelago. Some 100 staff members work at the centre, which is a small number to investigate the more than 500 languages of Indonesia. In the early 1970s, only a small percentage of the employees had an MA or PhD degree.

The origins of Ildep lie in the early 1970s. Via the so-called ‘RUL-18’ project thirteen Indonesian Masters students were enabled to do their PhD research on several of the regional languages of Indonesia. It was a ‘sandwich program’: the students did parts of their research in the Netherlands and finished in Indonesia. Professors Teeuw and Uhlenbeck acted as the Dutch supervisors. In 1972, professor Teeuw visited Indonesia to assess the possibilities of a larger project, not only involving linguistics, but social sciences in general (which resulted in the PRIS program). It was clear from his meetings with the staff of the Pusat Bahasa and authorities from the department of P&K and the State secretariat that continuation of the RUL-18 project was desired. In 1973 a proposal for the regional language project was made for DGIS. Language is a means to nurture identity and culture in the many societal changes concurring with development, in particular when a new national language is imposed (cf. Castells 1997: 52). Enabling people to know and uphold their own regional languages should be part of a development process that takes into account diversity. The new minister of Development Cooperation Jan Pronk (he had come into office in that same year) saw the beauty of the project: it was a fresh wind in the list of technical projects he had inherited from his predecessor. In particular, the project offered a new perspective on the one sided, top-down view of development, because it emphasised diversity. In 1974, the project was started, known by DGIS administrators as the ‘Regional Languages Project’. DGIS administrators regarded it as a peculiar project: until that time they had administered irrigation, infrastructure and health projects.

The Pusat Bahasa was the benefiting counterpart in Ildep and cooperated with the Department of Cultures and Languages of Southeast Asia and Oceania, at the University of Leiden (DSALCUL) in the implementation of the project. It was funded by DGIS for approximately 60% and for 25% by the Dutch Ministry of Education and Sciences. The Indonesian contribution was a bit less than 14% of the total amount. The Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture (P&K) was the counterpart of the Dutch departments. Seen from a broader time perspective, one can speak of three different projects, concerned with the same objectives: the RUL-18 project (1971-1973), Ildep I (1974-1985) and Ildep II (1988-1992). The project’s policy management from the Dutch side was delegated to the NUFFIC, a subsidiary organisation of DGIS that administers projects in higher education.
The development and dissemination of the national language, as a means of unifying Indonesia is a national matter and foreign involvement has always been a delicate matter. Involving foreigners in the study of regional languages is sensitive as well: the Indonesian government has repeatedly been criticised on the way it dealt with its many cultural groups and minorities. However, the involvement of DSALCUL in the activities of the *Pusat Bahasa* has never led to any problems. The way in which the project was set up and the fact that in the project only Indonesians benefited from training and research activities took the angle out of potential conflicts.

Ildep I: how to classify a project

Ildep I was a training program for linguists built up of seven cycles of five years duration with different subjects of the field. It consisted of courses that were given in Tugu (West Java) and due to built-in selection mechanism, after each phase the best of the participants were enabled to continue their studies. Earlier, professor Teeuw had asked two graduates in the Slavic languages, Hein Steinhauer and Wim Stokhof whether they were interested in working in the Timor area to study Papuan languages. For Slavists, there were no jobs at the time and since they were trained in mastering languages quickly, their capacities could be employed in the studies of the Indonesian languages. Steinhauer and Stokhof have since the start of Ildep been involved. Professor Anceaux and Wim Stokhof taught in Jakarta, while Hein Steinhauer taught classes and supervised students in the Netherlands. The Ford Foundation, the German and French government funded three lecturers as well. The thirteen former RUL 18 participants became permanent staff and teachers in linguistics. They worked at Universities and the *Pusat Bahasa*.

Since its start there had been problems with the meaning and classification of Ildep. First of all, DGIS and the embassy did not have experience or standard procedures to manage a 'peculiar' project such as Ildep. The programs of International Education or University Cooperation were focused on cooperation in the technical sciences. A linguistics project for development did not fit into the ideas on what development was. The confusion also had to do with the fact that the *Pusat Bahasa* was not a university, but a government agency. Yet, in Indonesia, the development of the national language was a very important aspect of development: it enhanced communication in all other sectors of development (Van der Horst 1987). In the mean time, the International Education program, out of which Ildep was funded was narrowed down to additional courses in Netherlands based institutes: a Sandwich program that entailed education in Indonesia and the language department in Leiden had no place in the new structure of the program.

The staff of the *Pusat Bahasa* hoped that the Ildep students could finish their studies with a dissertation. But this was not possible: since 1973 Dutch development policy adhered the principle that human resource programs should not support PhD students. Such would create and support an elite, while Dutch development policy was directed towards the poor. Implicitly, the creation of egalitarian societies was pursued.
Therefore, Ildep activities had to end when Indonesian participants reached the stage of starting their dissertation research.

In 1984 the Ildep (1) project had reached the end of the cycles. From the perspective of the project’s implementers it was obvious that the contribution of the Ildep project to the needs of the language development plans of Indonesia had been small. Moreover, the project had to be ended in full momentum: now that there were MA holders, they could not proceed to their PhD’s. The need for more infrastructure facilities, such as a well-developed library system, more documentation and publication and the automation of Lexicography in the *Pusat Bahasa* was also evident (Van Olden 1985).

It took the Ildep staff three years to convince DGIS and NUFFIC that continuing Ildep would be beneficial for general development of Indonesia. The belief that a bottom-up approach for disseminating a national language should be applied had to be unravelled. A top-down approach – more PhD’s who could teach and guide others – was in this case considered to be the appropriate way. The meaning of development prevalent in DGIS circles had to be expanded as well: in Indonesia, the national language had to be seen as a premise for a better infrastructure. What eventually helped for starting Ildep II was some support from above: Frans Seda, formerly Minister of Finance, wrote a letter to Dutch minister of Development Cooperation Jan de Koning and convinced him that language policies were equally important for socio-economic development. Ildep II was to carry through the work done in Ildep I: the former Ildep I students were to be enabled to finish their PhD’s. Gradually, the ideas in the Netherlands on what development included and the various ways in which development could be achieved changed.

**Ildep II: a perfect aide**

The objective of Ildep II was extended to the overall improvement of the infrastructure in Indonesia to carry out its language development policies. The long-term objective was to contribute to Indonesia’s development and self-reliance in the field of communication, language policies, language development/cultivation and language teaching. The ultimate objective was to provide Indonesia with a core of high qualified experts, able to operate the new local *Pusat Bahasa* branches that were to be established during Repelita IV and V. The activities involved Human Resource Development: enabling former Ildep I participants to obtain their PhD. This was permitted again in Dutch development policies since the 1980s. Professor Moeliono said that unlike most of the Human Resources programs, the Ildep resulted in an extra-ordinarily high number of (Indonesian) PhD graduates. 300 linguists have been trained, of which 38 obtained their PhD degree. The difference with PRIS, which approximately had a similar duration clear (see table 5.1). Library development took place in the Jakarta branches of the *Pusat Bahasa* and in the regional centres. This activity involved the training of librarians and collection of data. Relevant study material was distributed over the branches of the *Pusat Bahasa*: journals and publications in the...
field of language study. Major works were translated, over 4000 books were sent, which the post graduate students of the UI could use as study-material. 85 Books were published under the Ildep banner between 1985 and 1992. The dissertations, researchers and thesis of the participants were published in the so-called Seri Ildep. This Seri was made available for all universities, institutions, even in the bookstore of the airport in Jakarta. A special Ildep magazine on the proceedings, activities, promotions and other relevant events was publicised (Berita Ildep). The Ildep project accelerated the standing of the Pusat Bahasa: the increase in highly qualified staff and number of publications were remarkable in the Indonesian academic and bureaucratic context of that time.

With regard to organisation and management, Ildep was for the Pusat Bahasa part of the ongoing activities, rather than a separate project. According to the CESO report this was the strength of the program: the Ildep staff in Indonesia was integrated in the centre and therefore, if the Dutch input were to stop, the Ildep activities would likely be continued. On the organisation of the project professor Moeliono said: 'Everything went really very smoothly, due to the complete equality. I was country director here, Dr Steinhauer was chief of staff in Jakarta and professor Stokhof received all people that were sent to the Netherlands. I believe the success was mainly due to our personalities, we regarded each other as real colleagues'.

The evaluators noted that Ildep was organised in the form of a network rather than a fixed structure. Wim Stokhof sees the network created by Ildep in a broad perspective: a group of linguists all over the world that are kept in contact with each other (through the newsletter) and through which a framework for scientific communication and development is built. He explained: 'A newsletter keeps these people together; you inform them about scientific events, but also births, obituaries and other personal things. A network is a building and you can't let that rest on one person'.

The evaluation-report mentions some impediments that have hampered the project. For example, viruses hindered the computerisation of the work. Viruses on software are the result of sloppy use and unauthorised copying of programmes. The evaluation committee recommended a stricter management. In some of the publications, spelling errors occurred frequently, which is not exactly what one expects to encounter in linguistic literature. This was the consequence of the 'pemerataan' (levelling out): in Indonesia funds and tasks are divided according to rules which do not make sense to people whose wages are not enough to make a living. When for example a book was edited in order to be published, another employee retyped it, because with adding this extra task, some extra money can be earned by the typist. But retyping without an extra check does more often than not result in extra errors, especially when the text concerns a foreign language or a regional dialect. The 'pemerataan' principle was also applied to the decision of research assignments. When for instance a participant had been enabled to study until the S2 degree and according to western standards should be enabled to continue, the Indonesians consider it more fair to assign the funds and time to someone else, who hasn't had the opportunity. For Indonesians, the meaning of research is, next to a vocation, a way of earning money, especially if extra
funds are available. Nonetheless, the implementation of Ildep II resulted in a large pool of highly trained linguists, capable to carry out the tasks of the language development policy of the Indonesian government.

Unlike the research project of PRIS, Dutch Ildep staff has not been involved with the research, which was carried out by the Indonesians themselves. The fact that only Indonesians carried out the research on the sensitive topic of language cultivation made Dutch involvement acceptable to the Indonesian authorities. The Dutch staff was only involved as co-promoters in individual dissertations. The project gained more recognition in the Netherlands as well. The educational component fit into minister Pronk's new vision on Human Resource development. He had come into office again in 1989 with a renewed vision on development, and the role of international education in development policy. His new conviction was that students from developing countries should be educated as much as possible in their own countries. If they are trained under completely different circumstances, they will have difficulties in applying what they learnt in their own environment (Van der Horst 1991). Training of the Ildep II fellows took place mainly in Indonesia.

As a side effect, involvement with and support from others (foreign organisations, institutions) meant an 'uplift' for the organisation. The Pusat Bahasa was in the early 1970s considered a stepchild of the department of P&K: it did not really fit in and the standing of the centre was low, due to the low number of trained staff. In the course of implementation of Ildep, the Pusat Bahasa gained more recognition for its work. Figure 5.5 depicts the heydays of Ildep: still a stepchild of DGIS, but strong in implementation. Ildep was one of the rare instances of a development project that did reach its objectives and aided well to solve the problems perceived by the recipient counterpart.

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**Figure 5.5**  Ildep II: part and parcel of the Indonesian counterpart

- Smooth implementation
- policy management at implementation level
- P&K at distance
The project was not continued as a Dutch-Indonesian enterprise: the organisation was envisioned to continue after Ildep would end. Two weeks after the formal decision was made, thanks to the mediation of professor Harsja Bachtiar, the *Pusat Bahasa* was ensured that some of the activities, previously supported with Dutch funds, could be continued with Indonesian funds. Bappenas voted funds for the salaries of Dr Steinhauer en Dr Tol until the end of their contract was reached in 1993. The Dutch salaries were compared to the Indonesian salaries very high and this led to some unease among the Indonesian staff at the *Pusat Bahasa* and the two Dutch staff-members. Book publications were also continued. Furthermore, the network of linguists kept contact and meets regularly in conferences and seminars. In the months after March 1992 all attempts to continue the project in its old form were directed to the ministry of Education and Sciences; after all, this ministry had partly financed the project. The renewed Cultural Agreement seemed to be the logical environment for an Ildep III. But the Dutch minister had his own agenda: he thought that international educational activities were a contamination on his budget, especially when unilaterally directed to developing countries. Ildep had precisely done that, unilaterally benefited the Indonesian counterpart and had become renowned for doing so. In 1993, Wim Stokhof initiated a Peer Review. In his Peer Review noted academics from the United States, Australia, France, Indonesia and the director of the KNAW were asked to review the merits of three RUL projects (see next sections). This Peer Review did not result in a positive decision for Ildep. It could not be denied that Ildep had been a training- and infrastructure project; all that had been undertaken had benefited the Indonesian counterpart.

A proposal for an Ildep III was submitted to the KNAW-committee in 1993, but was not endorsed either. The argument was that the project entailed too much education and training. Perhaps another reason was that two of the four Indonesian-Dutch projects under the auspices of professor Stokhof were already endorsed (see the next sections on INIS and IRIS) and that a ‘pemerataan’ consideration in Dutch ‘Indonesia-circles’ might have counted as well. Another factor that contributed to the discontinuation of Ildep was that the new director of the *Pusat Bahasa*, Hasan Alwi was less motivated to lobby for cooperation with the Dutch counterpart than his predecessor Anton Moeliono. The latter continued his professorship at the UI and has been successful there in ensuring Dutch involvement in the Seksi Belanda, the department of Dutch Studies at the Language Faculty of the Universitas Indonesia. Hasan Alwi saw Ildep in the light of the task of the *Pusat Bahasa*. He had inherited a core of well-trained linguists, a well-equipped library and national standing. Bappenas had agreed to pay the salaries of the Dutch lecturers, so that they could finish their jobs. He was less inclined to have foreigners involved in Indonesia’s language policy; he was of the opinion that Indonesians themselves should handle such potentially sensitive issues. A continuation with the Dutch was clearly not in his interest, nor did he need more
assistance: ILdep I and II had been perfect aides and another aide in the form of ILdep III was not needed, nor permitted.

Cooperation in Islamic Studies

The Indonesian Netherlands cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) is a project that continued after the turbulent times of 1992. Unlike the Seksi Belanda, which also continued, this project did not undergo major changes in its way of organisation, nor its objectives. How such was possible in the new era of Dutch-Indonesian cooperation must be seen as the art of articulating interests and meanings. The artisans of that discursive process had learnt how to do so in previous experiences in development- and cultural cooperation.

INIS is a program of cooperation between the Islamic State University of Indonesia (IAIN) and the Department of Languages and Cultures of Southeast Asia and Oceania (DSALCUL) of the state University of Leiden (RUL) in the Netherlands. The aim of the INIS is the training and upgrading of staff of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Islamic State Universities in the field of Islamic studies. Another aim is the development of adequate library and research facilities of the IAIN's. From 1989 till 1992 the project was financed by DGIS. Its aims fit well in the comprehensive definition of development cooperation prevalent in the late 1980s. Assistance in higher education, i.e. the elite was not a political issue anymore.

The government of Indonesia has a special interest in cooperating with academic institutes from the non-Islamic world. In the first section of this chapter the politics of religious containment have briefly been discussed. The unity of the Indonesian state can be endangered if the calls for establishing an Islamic state become more vocal or perceived by the majority of the Indonesian Muslims as a good alternative. The alternative of the government is to actively pursue the Indonesian alternative for religious harmony, based on the Panca Sila. A comprehensive education for the new religious leaders is seen as the best way to avert possible religious conflict. In the past decades the Ministers of Religious Affairs have sent many staff-members of the Ministry and students from the IAIN's to western universities, for three reasons. First, the comparative approach in the study of religious affairs of Western Universities is highly appreciated. Secondly, a stay abroad would broaden the horizons of the students. Thirdly, the quality of education and research of the IAIN's was not that well. A survey of the IAIN concluded that of the 5013 teachers, only 18 held a PhD degree. The Indonesian government also recognised that large differences in the quality of education existed between the IAIN's. The Jakarta IAIN for example has a far better educational record than for example the IAIN in Aceh.

The INIS project indirectly served Dutch interests as well. Similar to the PRIS, INIS would include research by Dutch academics on Islam. The Islam studies in the Netherlands had since Indonesia's independence lost momentum. In the 1970s however, the many immigrants from Muslim countries have altered the religious make up
of the Netherlands. Knowledge on Islam and creating religious harmony has thus gained new relevance (Shahid & Van Koningsveld 1997). The Indonesian experience in how to create such harmony is in that respect of interest. Furthermore, as a spin-off of the project, Leiden is re-establishing and developing itself as a centre of expertise on Islamic Studies. It is also claimed that through INIS, new professorial chairs at Dutch universities have been established. Dr Beck became professor of the Phenomenology of Religion in Tilburg University. Two new chairs (Islam in Western Europe and Culture of South East Asia) at the RUL were established. The aims identified in 1988 have up until 1999 not been changed. After 1992 the articulation of the Dutch benefits turned out to be decisive for continuation of the project.

The making of a cooperation: building networks and spreading the good news

Since 1969 students and professors in Islamic studies had regularly visited both Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesian fellows and teachers, from the IAINs or the ministry had for a shorter of longer period stayed in the Netherlands for upgrading courses or to do part of their research. Dutch lecturers visited IAINs to give guest lectures and regular courses. In 1987, 10 IAIN lecturers and two researchers from the ministry of Religious Affairs received a fellowship from the RUL. Professor Stokhof directed the program they received in Leiden; Dr Beck acted as coordinator of the students. It was recognised by Dutch and Indonesian officials that the incidental activities that up till then had been set up, could be institutionalised as a regular development cooperation project. Jan Paul Dirkse, the head of the Bureau Indonesia at DGIS, gave the green light for the RUL staff to assess the possibilities to turning the initiative into a Dutch-Indonesian project of development cooperation. He and Wim Stokhof had got to know each other well in previous years.

In January 1988 a small committee from Leiden — the chairman of the board of Governors of the RUL and professor Stokhof — paid a visit to Jakarta, to make an assessment of the needs and possibilities in both countries. The visit was well prepared by the permanent representative of the RUL, Dr Jacob Vredenbregt, who knew many officials in government and the military. The committee could be sure that there would be no impediments for the cooperation in Islam studies. The 25th of January 1988, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Tarmizi Taher and Mr. Cath of the RUL Board of Governors. Three months later, 25 April, the Dutch minister of development cooperation Piet Bukman and the Indonesian minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, signed a Memorandum of Understanding. It was agreed that Indonesia would contribute 1,000,000 Dutch guilders and the Netherlands 7,960,152 guilders for the total duration of the project.

Soon after the MoU was signed, the project started. The administrative organisation of INIS was based at the University of Leiden. Professor Stokhof became the director, Dr. Vredenbregt the coordinator in Jakarta. The bureau was situated at the
DSALCUL building, consisting of one and a half academic and two administrative staff-members. Two Dutch scholars lectured at the IAIN in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Because the project included study by Indonesian students in the Netherlands, a significant share of the activities took place in Leiden. In terms of the game metaphor, the set up of the program was more intergovernmental. There were strong political stakes involved and the Indonesian ministry closely monitored the proceedings of the implementation.

The permanent Dutch lecturer in Jakarta, Dr. Johan Meuleman, said that he had the impression that INIS had ‘descended upon the IAIN’ in Jakarta. Harul Nasution, the director of the Jakarta IAIN was not prepared for his arrival and made it clear that Meuleman’s services were not asked for by the IAIN. To Harul Nasution, the entire INIS project was something of minister Munawir and that Dutch University. Nonetheless, in the course of time Meuleman’s work became more appreciated: Nasution preferred him to supervise the PhD students, because he delivered quality. Meuleman became a well-known and highly appreciated lecturer: he was asked to give guest lectures in many IAIN’s in Indonesia. The Canadian McGill University has a similar program, but unlike INIS, the Canadian project does not provide in permanent teachers in Indonesia. The Dutch teachers were permanently available, while the Canadians only stayed for a three months period and could not provide assistance in guiding students.

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The outline of the education program had already been specified in detail in the proposal of March 1988. The training activities included, amongst others, 1. lectures in the Western approach to the study of Islam and methodology; 2. language courses in Arabic, English and Dutch; 3. Post-graduate counselling, for the preparation of Masters thesis or PhD thesis; 4. work-visits to libraries, archives, other universities, Cairo and other relevant institutions for the study of Islam. In Indonesia Johan Meuleman taught in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Padang, supervised between 15 and 20 PhD students and a number of Masters thesis from IAIN students as well.

Until 1994 the courses in the Netherlands were ‘non-degree’, but that was an unsatisfactory situation for the Indonesian government, that wanted people to finish their studies with an internationally recognised degree. In 1994 the courses were given in the form of a two-year program, leading to an MA degree. These Masters courses were given in the English language, so that students from the Netherlands and other countries could participate as well. INIS participants were selected on the base of a proposal for a Masters thesis, the outcome of the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). examination in the English language and if they held a BA degree. However, in a status report by DGIS of 1991, it was noted under the heading ‘constraints’ that ‘[t]he scientific quality of the participants is not always as expected’.

The infrastructure activities included training for one or two participants in library work, the supporting of collection expansions, publication of relevant material, for example translations of standard works. An important element in the publication activities was the publication of the INIS newsletter that appeared directly at the start of the project. It aimed at maintaining contact with and between (former) partici-
participants of the project and to improve professional communication between scholars and universities. The first section of the newsletter is devoted to INIS activities: who arrived at Leiden, which dissertations were written, and obituaries. The second part of the newsletter gives updates from the participating IAINS all over Indonesia. The third part contains a chronicle of the Indonesian Muslim world in the past months. The merit of this newsletter is of significance, although not measurable in quantitative terms. It is seen as a means for maintaining and strengthening a network of Islamologists in Indonesia and the Netherlands. A similar newsletter for the PRIS only started in 1991, 16 years after its start, to be ended a year after in 1992.

The INIS project also accounts for the revival of an Indonesian scientific magazine. The IAINS had a magazine, but it did not appear regularly, nor were the contents of good quality. With the assistance of the INIS-staff, the magazine gained international prestige in the Islam Community. It has oddly enough a Latin name, Studia Islamika, and the articles are written in English, Indonesian and Arabic. It is one of the few Indonesian magazines that meets international academic levels. The Indonesian Ministries of Religious and Foreign Affairs proudly promote this magazine; the minister of Foreign affairs has copies of the magazine sent to every embassy. For the Indonesian government, Studia Islamika is one of the means to export Indonesian tolerant Islam. The board of editors consists of Indonesians, it is presented as an Indonesian magazine, but in small letters, on the second page, it is stated that it is printed by INIS, requirement for the Dutch Ministry of Education and Culture, since it finances INIS.

Organising conferences for bringing together scholars in the field is another important element of the project. Academic conferences are in general the place to build networks, establish contacts, and initiate new activities. Unlike the PRIS conferences, the INIS conferences were set up for more people than the project participants so as to reach a wider public. The facilities of the IIAS, (the INIS bureau is in the same building and headed by the same director) are of benefit to set up larger scale conferences. In May 1996 a conference was organised on Islam in the 21st century by the INIS staff. 150 Scholars were invited from about 25 countries, of which 20 participants from Indonesia. The new Indonesian minister of Religious Affairs, Tarmizi Taher was one of the keynote speakers.

Articulating interests and playing with the rules after 1992

The INIS project was continued as Dutch-Indonesian cooperation after 1992, even though its contents and budgetary burden sharing could be defined as aid. Several factors can be listed for this apparent ‘anomaly’ in the official policies and political relations at that time. Compared to the PRIS, a strong network that could lobby was at the disposal of the INIS (and Ildep and IRIS). However, this is not the main reason why this project was continued.

Saleh Affif, the chairman of Bappenas in 1992, remembered the request of minister Munawir for continuation of the INIS project. ‘I told him that if he really wanted to
continue, he had my blessing, but not my (Bappenas) money. Since INIS was an expensive project, minister Munawir had to find funds elsewhere. In an evaluation of INIS from 1998, a clear insight is given on how INIS was financed, and with that, how the meanings that INIS had for the counterparts coalesced and accounted for continuation.

The Ministry of Education and Sciences took over the financing of INIS from DGIS until December 1993. The ministry set the condition that the project would be revised and made fit into the new priorities of the Cultural Agreement, i.e. more research benefits for the Netherlands and more financial and manpower input from Indonesia. In October 1993 the project division of DSALCUL submitted a proposal for INIS and the other two projects, Ildep and IRIS (see below). The proposal was rejected by the KNAW committee, because it did not contain research projects and was too costly – 11.2 million Dutch guilders for a period of 5 years. The KNAW Committee was requested by Education and Sciences to endorse the INIS project and not apply its scientific criteria in this case: the ministry was of the opinion that in the case of INIS, the political-strategic interests should be decisive. For 1994 and 1995, via the Cultural Agreement 3.1 million guilders was allotted to INIS. In 1996, another proposal was submitted to the KNAW. The KNAW judged the proposal on its scientific merits and concluded again that it contained too much education for Indonesians. Once more, the department of Education and Sciences ruled in favour of INIS. Up until 1999 the department of Education and Sciences funds INIS for the greater part. The Indonesian contribution to the project remained considerably less than the Dutch contribution. The agreement was that Indonesia would pay for the Dutch students in Indonesia, but compared to the number of Indonesian students who went to the Netherlands, their number was very low. In 1995 it was estimated by professor Stokhof that the Indonesian contribution was 0.3 million Dutch guilders, of which half was spent on the travel and stay expenses of the Indonesian MA students.

In the same evaluation report, it becomes clear that the contents of the project did not change either. The Dutch staff conducted not much research; they devoted most of their time to the education and supervision of the students. Also, approximately one third of the budget each year (1994-1997) was spent on publication costs and INIS staff was responsible for the translations as well. These publications, translations, books and the newsletter essentially benefited Indonesia. INIS-students participate in the course Islamology, which is joint education program of the faculties of Religious Studies and Languages and Cultures of the Middle East. According to an earlier study by the departments themselves, INIS contributes little to the course in Islamology, yet the Indonesian MA students do not have to pay tuition fees. Thus, much of the costs for education in INIS are born by the Leiden University itself. The Board of Leiden University has no objections to this extra financial burden. INIS is a good way to regain its position in the study of Islam, brings in students from abroad and improves the international standing of the University. In fact, plans to establish a centre for study of Islam in the modern world at the University of Leiden were investigated in 1996. After troublesome negotiations with Dutch University boards, Islamologists
and ocw a new institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World was founded in Leiden in January 1998 (Van Delft 1997). Next to the IAS the centre for Islam Studies meant an important step on the road to Leiden as a centre of excellence in contemporary Asian studies.

The Indonesian department of Religious affairs was content with INIS for other reasons. INIS is for the ministers an education program, and produces a satisfactory number of qualified students. The many translations are appreciated greatly, in particular the works of Snouck Hurgronje. From the financial report of the evaluation it is clear that the Indonesian government does not pay for these publications, or for the tuition fees of the students.

The only party that does not seem too happy with INIS is the KNAW committee. It was assigned to manage future Indonesian-Dutch cooperation and in particular look at the scientific merits of proposals. Such would ensure the mutual benefit of further cooperation. Apparently the definition and weight of 'political strategic' interests were defined elsewhere. In this case, actors in the political games and the implementation game, who each for their own reasons favoured the project, overruled policy management. The congruency between these meanings and the casual application of the objectives of the renewed Cultural Agreement account for the continuation of INIS.

Although it is clear to all involved in management, implementation and political decisions making that this program is still the same as it was when it was a DGIS funded project, no objections have been made thus far. The middle way was found between Soeharto’s rule of 'no acceptance of Dutch foreign aid money' and the new rules of Dutch-Indonesian cultural cooperation. The continuation of INIS is a perfect example of how deal in an unorthodox way with the rules. The next figure summarises the situation of INIS in the period 1992-1999.

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**Figure 5.6** All but one in favour of INIS
The Irian Jaya Studies project

This section is about a short-lived Dutch-Indonesian development project: three months after it had started the decision of Soeharto made an end to the status of development cooperation. The project was continued as an Indonesian project, but never gained the momentum the initiators had hoped for at its inception. Instead, a research project of Dutch universities emerged, facilitated by the contacts and goodwill created in this former development project.

The objective of the Irian Jaya Studies project (IRIS) was to train a core of Irianese students who would be able to actively participate in the development of Irian Jaya. The project was also aimed at the building up of the Irian Jaya Studies centre in Cenderawasih (IJSC). IRIS has its origins in the East Indonesia projects of the PRIS. The Indonesian counterpart for the IRIS project, Professor Dr Edy Masinambow, had been involved in the PRIS-Halmahera project. The lessons learnt from the PRIS explain much of the different set-up and organisation of the IRIS project.

The interests in Irian Jaya

Irian Jaya is the easternmost province of Indonesia. For the Indonesian government it is of economic and political interest to develop and exploit this province. There have been discoveries of oil, minerals, gas and the large forests form a rich source of tropical hard wood. Up until recently there were not much Irianese people who were able to participate in the development efforts; the number of Irianese who have had higher education is very small. Since the inclusion of New Guinea as a province of Indonesia there has been a guerrilla war against the government. The spectrum of the critical groups run from nationalist groups wanting a free West Papua New Guinea, to moderate group who want to stay a province of Indonesia, but with more self determination (Lagerberg 1979; Osborne 1985). A considerable source of unrest is the envy toward the large group of immigrants from other Indonesian provinces and foreign investors. The Indonesian immigrants have taken up administrative tasks in the civil service and have benefited from the transmigration subsidies. US based copper and gold mining company Freeport has set up a joint venture with the Indonesian government to exploit the natural resources. The profits from the mines do not benefit the Irianese, they feel exploited by the foreign companies and the Indonesian governments (Loveard 1996).

The Indonesian government has since the mid-1980s made strong efforts to integrate Irian into the rest of Indonesia. It is believed that the use and efforts of indigenous experts will serve both ends: political integration and economic development. Too many examples in the past have proven that development top-down, without the consent or participation of the indigenous people is highly problematic (Barlow & Hardjono 1995).

Irian Jaya is from a scientific point of view of high interest as well; the island is called 'the last unknown'. Because of the rich variety in languages and cultures, this
area offers great opportunities for descriptive and comparative research in anthropology and linguistics. Irian Jaya has been characterised as a ‘socio-linguistic laboratory’. Also for history, botany and archaeology the area offers many opportunities for research.\textsuperscript{107} Compared to the research in Papua New Guinea, mainly conducted by Australian universities, the research on Irian Jaya lags far behind. This has first of all its origins in the lack of interest displayed by the Dutch until the Second World War. The area was not considered to be of importance, except as a buffer against other powers. Only after the discovery of the Baliem Valley, oil and other natural resources the Dutch exhibited some interest in the area. Only after the 1949, when the rest of Indonesian became independent and New Guinea was excluded from the transfer, Dutch New Guinea became the focus of attention. The Dutch wanted it to be a ‘model colony’ and displayed a great many developmental, educational and scientific activities. Before that time, a small number of researches had been publicised. After 1962, when the Dutch left New Guinea and until the 1970s, no research whatsoever was carried out, because of the politically tense situation and the limited accessibility of the area. However, a lot of archival material on Irian, from the pre-colonial times until the handing over of the sovereignty is available in the national archives in Indonesia and the Netherlands, but as yet not investigated in detail. Irian Jaya is grist to the mill for scientists interested in studying an unspoilt laboratory of the past.\textsuperscript{108}

DGIS started to focus its development efforts towards eastern Indonesia since the late 1980s under minister Eegje Schoo from the liberal party. It was recognised both in Indonesia and internationally that the first 25-year plan of development has been mainly focused on the western parts of Indonesia. A seminar in Jayapura with amongst others the World Bank, the UNDP and the Asia Foundation in 1987 stressed the importance of developing the area economically and socially. Institution building and human resource policy form since the late 1980s important themes in Dutch foreign aid (DGIS 1991: 156-220). Despite the fact that Irian is a politically sensitive area the project was agreed upon by Bappenas and DGIS in 1990 and included in the Blue Book as project TTA-192. How that was achieved depended on the people who advocated the project and how it was set up.

The making of a cooperation no. 2

Professor Edy Masinambow had been involved in the East-Indonesia projects of PRIS and had learnt his lessons on designing a project.\textsuperscript{109} He had learnt from previous attempts in PRIS that joint research between Dutch and Indonesian academics was not possible as yet. In the seminar to mark the end of the Halmahera project from PRIS he stated that education of significant group of indigenous scholars was and should be the first priority of Indonesia. In the late 1980s the Birds Head project was initiated within the PRIS project, but towards the end of the PRIS program, no progress had been made in this research area.\textsuperscript{110} The project had nevertheless drawn the attention to Irian Jaya.
In the mid-1980s, Edy Masinambow had come into contact with Wim Stokhof of DSALCUL and Dr. Vredenbregt, the permanent representative of the University of Leiden (RUL). In the informal meetings with these men, representing the Leiden university rather than the Dutch government (as had Teeuw for the PRIS, via his chairmanship of the NAC) the first plans for cooperation were made. Stokhof had the full support of Dr. Oomen, the chairman of the University board of the RUL to initiate another project with Indonesia and was almost sure that the cooperation could become part of Dutch-Indonesian development cooperation. In 1989 under the supervision of Wim Stokhof, a proposal for the IRIS project was written. Masinambow said that the design of the proposal was entirely made by the Dutch, but because of the extensive talks he had had with the DSALCUL group, the project proposal completely reflected his ideas on a beneficial project geared to Irian Jaya's needs. The proposal was then submitted to Bappenas and the Dutch government DGIS.

Although DGIS has lengthier procedures and more stringent requirements, the initiators choose to submit the proposal under the Technical Cooperation agreement and not the Cultural Agreement. The reason for this was that under the TA-agreement more funds are available. The IRIS set-up was rather costly, especially when compared to other programs under the Cultural Agreement. Furthermore, it had to be distinct from the PRIS. The project was obviously geared to the needs of the Indonesian counterpart and matched DGIS objectives: educating Irianese anthropologists and enable them to participate in the development of their own region. When asked why professor Stokhof, as a scientist initiated so much projects under the Technical Cooperation agreement, he said: ‘Development cooperation basically is creating influence. If this is done in a good way, this will be of benefit for both parties.’ He added with regard to cooperation in science and education: ‘... the western vision on science is rather arrogant. The spoiled Westerner only thinks in terms of fundamental science, thinking it boosts our development, while on the other hand one can learn so much from applied science. People who are less allergic to applied science are better able to co-operate with the Indonesians’.

The projects division of DSALCUL in Leiden performed the administrative tasks and was the direct counterpart for DGIS. Unlike the BIS, the projects division is entirely devoted to the management of international projects. Its employees do not have academic tasks, nor are they involved in the setting or adjusting of objectives. More importantly: this division does not have policy management tasks. Wim Stokhof, with the aid of his informants and permanent representative Jacob Vredenbregt in Indonesia is the central point of reference for DGIS. He knows more than anyone how to define projects' objectives in such a way that they are both appealing to the donor and the recipient. LIPI and the Dutch project managers directly administered all funds. When comparing the effectiveness of PRIS to IRIS, Masinambow mentioned two other factors for the success of the organisation: ‘Things go a lot faster with DSALCUL. The IRIS was inter-institutional, not intergovernmental.’ PRIS was the result of an agreement between the two ministries of Education, rep-
resented by professors Teeuw and Bachtiani, while IRIS was an agreement between the Leiden University and LIPI. The implementing parties did policy management, so that the lines of interaction remained short. The second factor for the potential success of the PRIS was the presence of Jacob Vredenbregt, as the permanent representative of the RUL projects in Jakarta. He has close contacts with many of the government circles in Jakarta and has thorough knowledge of the constraints and possibilities with regards to politics and science in both Indonesian and the Netherlands. The representative formulates advice, is able to present new ideas and finds solutions for obstacles in the designing phase of projects. Implementation took place in at the Department of Anthropology from the Universitas Indonesia where Masinambow taught as a professor. Thus, the crucial conditions for a successful start had been secured, all games were content with the project and a strong network facilitated interaction.

Parting ways in 1992

Similar to most of the former projects, IRIS’ objectives were geared to education, development of the infrastructure and research. But, unlike the other projects, IRIS would prioritise education. Irianese anthropology students were enabled to obtain their S2 degrees at the University of Jakarta; the University of Cenderawasih only offered courses leading to St. The students would after finishing their education go back to Irian Jaya and become advisors and researchers in the Irian Jaya Studies Centre. The total contribution of the Dutch government was some 5 million guilders and the project was planned to last until 1997. Two Dutch lecturers, Dr Haenen and Dr Miedema organised and gave S2 courses at the UI in Jakarta for a selection of Irianese students. The publication of source materials started soon thereafter and for the short time span the IRIS was a joint endeavour, the efforts resulted in a relatively large list of publications. Publication of the Irian Jaya source materials was done at the projects division of the DSALCUL. In Jakarta a book series about Irian Jaya was supported by LIPI and edited by E. Masinambow and P. Haenen. The projects aims also envisaged that within the near future of the project, research by Indonesian (Irianese) and Dutch researchers on Irian Jaya would be carried out. In the first few months, the IRIS activities mainly concentrated on the aim of training and the aim of infrastructure development.

Alas, approximately three months after the project started the decision of the Indonesian government to refuse all development aid from the Netherlands put a brake to the projects activities. The first students had just arrived in Jakarta, the lodgings had just been organised, courses had started and suddenly the flow of money stopped, because the Dutch government paid the Dutch co-ordinator and two Dutch lecturers. The project was continued however, with Indonesian funds from Bappenas. Professor Masinambow said: 'I took care that the project was continued. They [the central government, ML] had said that all projects could in principle be continued? Well, I held them to their statement, that sentence was exploited by me. I convinced Bappenas that funds for this project simply had to be made available.' At first it was planned that also the Dutch staff would be paid by Indonesia, but when seeing the
salaries, it soon became clear that that was not possible. Paul Haenen said: ‘At first there was euphoria on the Indonesian side, they had accomplished that this project could be continued with Indonesian funds, ‘we take it over and we will even pay for the Dutch experts. We will show them how we deal with such problems.’ When we [the three Dutch staff-members, MLV] showed them our pay slips however, this turned out to be too much. Nothing was said after that, and silently everything was taken care of. I could stay, paid by the Leiden University.’"  

The Leiden University had a special interest in having a Dutch teacher involved in IRIS, because one year earlier, an interdisciplinary research programme on Irian Jaya had been formulated. In 1990 a conference with Dutch scholars from various disciplines – linguistics, cultural anthropology, botany, archaeology, geology, history and development administration – had prepared the way for the Irian Jaya Studies: A programme for Interdisciplinary Research (ISIR). The objective of the ISIR programme is to increase and integrate knowledge of the languages, cultures, history and soil conditions and ecology of the Birds Head area of Irian Jaya." A programme of this kind had up till then been difficult to set up, since it was hard to obtain research visa for Irian Jaya. Through the contacts established with IRIS, in particular the Indonesian Scientific Institute LIPI, access to Irian Jaya had become easier: ‘The last unknown’ could now be explored.  

In 1992 the proposal for ISIR was endorsed by NWO, the Netherlands organisation for Scientific Research. ISIR is administered at the projects division of DSALCUL. A budget of 6,5 million Dutch guilders was granted for the period 1993-2000. One full time senior research, six part-time researchers, ten PhD students and three post-doctoral researchers conduct the researches. By the year 2000 the ISIR programme is to have produced a wealth of information of the Birds Head in Irian Jaya and helped the Netherlands to maintain its expertise on this area. It was hoped that the students from IRIS would in a few years be able to participate in the research conducted in ISIR. However, up till 1999, no Irianese are involved in the research. According to Dr. Jelle Miedema, this has again to do with the structural constraints Indonesian scholars face with the actual process of doing research, a problem apparent in all projects of (joint) research."  

IRIS continued on Indonesian funds, albeit downscaled. The first two of the three batches of MA students finished their studies. The project formally ended in January 1997. It was envisaged in the beginning that IRIS would have a follow up, but due to lack of funds and the retirement of Professor Masinambow as head of the Social Science Department at LIPI, a second phase of the project was not initiated. Most alumni of the IRIS project now work as civil servants, some of them work in other provinces. Professor Masinambow admits that he has lost track of most of the students after they obtained their degree." The objective to create a group of Irianese scholars that can continue research has not been reached as yet. Publication of the source materials continued under the auspices of DSALCUL and with Dutch funds. The figure below shows the situation after 1992, IRIS is downscaled, there is a spin-off for the Dutch scientific community in the form of ISIR and all is administered by the projects division of DSALCUL.
Cultural Cooperation as a guinea pig

In the course of 1992-1994 a new policy management structure for the Cultural Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands was established to give shape to the new principles of mutual benefit, equality and shared responsibilities. Cultural Cooperation would mainly exist in the form of joint research projects, in which counterparts from both countries would have an equal share in the formulation, implementation and financing. It was hoped that joint research would be the epitome of the renewed relations. Projects formulated in the new fashion found fertile ground in the political game, which was now occupied by another generation of policy makers. The, until then implicit, economic and strategic stakes in the political game of Dutch foreign policy became explicit and this in its turn was appreciated by players in the political games in Indonesia.

However, the renewed Cultural Agreement and the new administrative structure do not function as expected. Dutch interviewees say that the new networks consist of administrators, with no knowledge and attachment to Indonesia. The secretary of the Dutch steering committee said the organisation structures were not clear, as well as the source of the Indonesian finances. Edy Masinambow said that the Dutch members of the KNAW failed to realise that they were engaged in discussion with private persons, rather than representatives of the institutes of higher education. That explains according to him the promises that are never met. The problem on the Indonesian side is that funds are still scarce and cooperation with other donor countries is easier. The director of research at P&K thinks the renewed cooperation with the Netherlands is an opportunity to learn to co-operate in an equal way: up till now, such projects of cooperation have always implied aid to Indonesia. She regards the new
situation with the Netherlands as a guinea pig, a learning experience for a time when Indonesia is so developed that it cannot depend anymore on other countries input and finances. The fact of the matter is that the cooperation is rather disappointing. Both countries are obviously not used to this fifty-fifty financial arrangement. According to others much of the failures of the renewed CA lies in the fact that the new carriers of the cooperation are administrators with no special ties or knowledge with Indonesia.

Giving scholarships to Indonesian students was prohibited after 1992, and thus a means to invest in the Dutch economic future. It is believed that in their future positions, alumni will sooner turn to the country in which they have spent part of their student life. That link was now lost in the Cultural Agreement as a joint research programme. In 1997 Minister Ritzen established a special scholarship programme for talented Indonesian students and offered support for Dutch institutes of Higher education to attract (paying) Indonesian students. To that end the NUFFIC set up a liaison bureau in Jakarta in 1997. The Netherlands Education Centre is established to interest and advice Indonesian students in studying in the Netherlands. It could also compete with other foreign countries on the large Indonesian education market. In that same year, 1997, the financial crisis in Asia hit Indonesia hard, causing school attendance figures to drop. Studying abroad, even without tuition fees was not possible for many Indonesian students. In 1998 Ritzen's successor Louk Hermans ended the program (OCW 1998). His explanation was that the recent political and economic situation in Indonesia made him reconsider the objectives. But more importantly, as the new minister, Louk Hermans wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of this programme. That was similar to what minister Ritzen did when he entered into office. Similarly, new minister Hermans found a wealth of projects with Indonesia that did not necessarily fit in his policy plans. And that reminds of a constant in the Indonesian-Dutch cultural cooperation: the agreement remains, while ministers and presidents come, evaluate, change and go.