International cooperation between politics and practice: how Dutch Indonesian cooperation changed remarkably little after a diplomatic rupture

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Citation for published version (APA):
Vos, M. L. (2001). International cooperation between politics and practice: how Dutch Indonesian cooperation changed remarkably little after a diplomatic rupture
CHAPTER 8
Cross case analysis and conclusions

... I mean the increased interaction and cooperation we are witnessing between Dutch society and Indonesian society. I have deliberately not said 'between our countries'. I'm not talking about diplomacy or about relations between states. I'm talking about the people of our two countries and about their organisations. I'm talking about the kind of relations that give genuine depth to the work of ministers and diplomats (Drs W. Deetman for the Netherlands Education Center seminar, 1 April 1999).

A chain of events led to an unexpected end of Dutch foreign aid to Indonesia in 1992. The Indonesian government decided that Dutch aid was detrimental to bilateral relations. This study represents the story of what happened following the decision, seen in the light of previous events and within the socio-economic context. By describing and analysing thirteen projects in which bilateral cooperation was developed, further light is shed on the nature of the cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The first section recapitulates the central direction of the study, how it has been conducted, and what variables have been used as landmarks in the empirical search. A cross-case analysis is then presented. The significance of the variables (factors) is elucidated: in what sense did they contribute to the outcome of projects? Once the variables have been defined, offering explanatory factors for (dis)continuation of the projects, their inter-relationship is analysed. Patterns in the set of variables are identified, leading to the outcomes of the thirteen projects. In this analysis it will become clear what role each of the games has played in the policy processes of bilateral cooperation. The cross-case analysis thus performed answers the questions raised in Chapter Two. In the last section I assess whether the events in 1992 did indeed lead to relations based on mutual benefit and equality. The following chapter reflects on the academic merits of this study and suggests some practical lessons.

Recapitulation of the questions and approach

This study began with wondering why some projects of the cancelled Dutch development assistance were continued and some not. Information about the fate of the projects was scant and did not result in a clear understanding of how the Indonesian government had executed the decision to stop receiving Dutch aid. Various people involved in relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, including civil servants,
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journalists and scholars, offered a number of explanations. The first assessment, presented in Chapter One, neither validated nor disputed either explanation.

In Chapter Two an explanation of what made the riddle so puzzling was offered: an orthodox view of the policy process, underlining the idea that the presidential decision would have been unambiguously implemented. This view assumes that the rational pursuit of interests leads to clear criteria for decision-making. It is also based on a hierarchy of powers, predicting that when political decisions are taken, they will become practice by the efforts of civil servants and implementers who are guided from above. This orthodox view has of course been refined and contested by many authors in political and policy sciences. What is rational manifests itself in different ways, depending on the actor, the environment and institutions. Criteria for rational action may thus be multifaceted, even conflicting, depending on whose point of view is taken. The literature on implementation and comparative public administration aptly demonstrated that at many levels in the policy process decisions are made which influence the outcome of a policy process. The network approach proposes another way of looking at policy processes: government and non-government actors – who are mutually dependent – steer the course of policy processes.

Based on the criticism and refinements, an open model was proposed to help solve the riddle. The metaphor of three games presents another view of the policy process: it assumes that the practice of each game in principle refers to a different stake (problem-solution-combination) based on a different rationality. Each game has in theory another task: the political game should decide the course of government action; the policy management game should translate political decisions into policy programmes; the implementation game should put policy programmes into practice. The model furthermore takes into account that influence is exerted in different ways: the vectors of influence (direction and magnitude thereof) may start at the level of implementation, as well as at the levels of policy management and politics. Changing the basic assumptions of the orthodox model, the three games approach offers another method to analyse complex policy processes. The elements of the games constitute a different set of independent variables that can help explain continuation or discontinuation.

In the letter of 25 March 1992 of the Indonesian to the Dutch government it was announced that some projects could be continued, with or without Dutch involvement. Focusing on the aftermath of projects, rather than policy documents, has led to a somewhat different list of continued and discontinued projects than that provided by the Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs. The discrepancy can be accounted for with varying explanations, depending upon the direction of the analysis (top-down vs. bottom-up) and how ‘continuation’ is defined. Those personally involved in cooperation had a different perception of continuation than did the administrators at the department level.

Insight into the beliefs and actions of the players, who define, translate and deliver policy, was the first factor investigated. In line with the constructivist tenet of this research, I have looked at how they defined problems and solutions (stakes), how they interacted, how they acted upon the rules relevant to them and how they perceived the
environment. Furthermore, focus was dedicated to the political leverage they wielded and their capabilities relative to their ambitions.

The second factor is found in the element referred to as stakes. Viewing the bilateral policy process as a means to solve problems, I have investigated the problems and policy objectives as defined by several of those directly involved. The political stakes of the Dutch and Indonesian governments, the policy management stakes of the respective civil services and the stake of the projects at the level of implementation have been addressed.

Interaction between the games is another important element to understand policy processes. Interaction is defined as communicative action and mutual influence. The actual form of interaction was manifested in oral communication, evaluations, personal relations, site visits and reports in the media: all means through which information about a project was disseminated – within a particular game and between games. Following Scharpf's conceptualisation, three modes of interaction were expected: unilateral action, negotiated agreement and hierarchical direction. Each of these modes is likely to occur in a particular constellation of actors. Unilateral action is associated with independent actors that have no fixed roles, nor authority relations amongst them. Negotiated agreement is likely to occur in mutually dependent relations, in which actors assume a specific role, but have no authority relations amongst themselves: the classical example of networks. Hierarchical direction occurs amongst actors who have a relationship of interdependence, have clearly defined 'fixed' roles with clear authority relations. The three games metaphor assumes that decisions in policy processes are formulated within the context of interaction amongst the three games. The question is, then, what kind of interaction occurred and which roles each of the games had in formulating the policy process.

Fourth, it has been assessed to what extent 'rules': policy instruments, written regulations and implicit understandings on behaviour, have influenced outcomes in the implementation games. The question here is: to what extent rules defined the boundaries of the games; but more importantly, how the players interpreted rules and acted upon them? The question of whose rules prevailed, those of the Indonesians or the Dutch, has received particular attention as the rules of both countries often contradict each other.

The last factor examined concerned the properties of the context outside the realm of the policy process, namely: the policy environment. Not only are the dynamics within a policy process influential; indiscriminate effects of political, economic and socio-cultural parameters must be taken into consideration as well. In Chapter Four, a perspective of both countries was offered to provide a background for the cases. While initially this environment facilitated projects, or did not impede them, in the course of time this context may have changed, (making projects either obsolete or more desired than before). Examples of such change in the policy environment are departmental reorganisations, changes in the market, changes in public opinion and elections – leading to different government coalitions. Such changes in the environment have been considered as factors influencing the outcome of projects.
In the following cross-case analysis a distinction is made between the events that occurred immediately after the decision and what had happened before. This distinction is made because, according to some explanations, some projects were different in 1992 than at their inception. In matrix 8.1 on the next two pages a summary is given of the most salient findings of the three games approach. The reference to which games were significantly influential is designated as 'p' for political game, 'm' for policy management game and 'i' for the implementation game. The summary in the matrix enables the reader to join in making the cross-case analysis. The analysis is done by first reading the columns – comparing the factors over the projects. A deeper understanding is given by recapitulating how developments before 1992 have shaped these factors. Then the most distinctive aspects of the factors — how they worked — are highlighted at the end of each sections which address the factors. How the factors worked is then summarised in a simplified matrix in the seventh section of this chapter. This matrix is used to assess the relative weights of the factors. By focusing on patterns and anomalies the outcomes of the projects after 1992 are then explained.

Players: bold, skilled & motivated

Despite the intentions in the letter of the Indonesian government of 25 March 1992, players from the political game were hardly involved in 'reviewing development projects whose activities are financially assisted by the Netherlands to determine their status for continuation'. Only for two projects, APERT and the Laminated Wooden Boats project, were politicians directly involved in the decision to continue the projects. With a simple order, ministers Habibie and Hartarto ruled that these two projects were to continue with Indonesian funds.

For none of the projects did the policy management game clearly lead to an initiative to continue or discontinue a project. In fact, administrators both in the Netherlands and Indonesia were notably absent or 'non-initiating'. People affected by the decision complained about the aloofness of embassy personnel, who advised to do nothing — for fear that things might get worse. In this bilateral conflict the bureaucracy apparently did not assume its powerful role that many a student in politics and public administration ascribes to it. Evidently, civil servants in the Netherlands and Indonesia had something to lose by initiating actions that contradicted the directive.

The implementation game was in the majority of cases the predominant centre of action from which the other games were targeted. For the Seksi Belanda, Ildep, INIS, IRIS, the Coffee, the Inter-University and the Judges Project a lobby was initiated. People working in projects in Indonesia or involved in the organisation in the Netherlands called, faxed, wrote proposals and frequented departments and the embassy. Less intense, and without participation of Indonesian counterparts were the activities of the new Dutch chairman of PRIS and the Dutch counterparts in the APERT project. Some projects were not supported by any game: the Pompengan, Sandwich and Legal Drafting projects, for example. After March 25, it remained awkwardly silent regard-
### Matrix 8.1  Salient details found with three games approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Players</th>
<th>Stakes</th>
<th>Interaction between games</th>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>Policy environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Seksi Belanda</em></td>
<td>Indonesian staff seize the opportunity to take control over their department (m, i)</td>
<td>Redefinition of tasks and responsibilities makes department’s objectives fit into new policy environment (m, i)</td>
<td>Negotiated Agreement. Small close network of dean and staff, dean is a key node in Dutch Indonesian circles (formerly director of PB in Leiden project)</td>
<td>Changing ‘colonial’ rules from before 1992 180 degrees enables department to become Indonesian, yet secure support with curriculum. (m, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>PRIS</em></td>
<td>Motivation and support for project among participants lacks, one attempt of new Dutch chairman stands alone (i)</td>
<td>Stakes of Dutch and Indonesian participants differed (i), project did not fit into Dutch and Indonesian policies either (m)</td>
<td>Unilateral Action. Once strong network withered when the key nodes of network (with double functions) withdrew from project</td>
<td>Through constantly adapting the interpretation of rules before 1992, project had become educational program that did not fit and could not be made fit in new rules after 1992. (m, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lidep</em></td>
<td>Dutch participants set up Peer Review for third phase, new Indonesian director doesn’t see the need (i)</td>
<td>Indonesian director not convinced of added benefit of continuing project (i); too much assistance in view of Dutch political game (p)</td>
<td>Negotiated Agreement. But replacement of Indonesian director results in gap in otherwise strong network</td>
<td>Project had observed Indonesian rules, but scope could not be adapted to fit into new rules. New director more prone to rule of no foreign interference. (p, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>INIS</em></td>
<td>Like minded academics and managers secure support of ministers (m, i)</td>
<td>Emphasising multiculturality and modern view on Islam of the project fits well in Dutch and Indonesian policies (p, i)</td>
<td>Negotiated Agreement. Influential network of academics and policy managers maintains short and fast information channels</td>
<td>Creatively dealing with rules of 50-50 financing and education as ‘forbidden’ assistance. (m, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>IRIS</em></td>
<td>Strongly motivated professor / policy manager convinces Bappenas of necessity of project (m, i)</td>
<td>Formal priority of Irian Jaya as a development target is successfully changed from words to deeds (i)</td>
<td>Negotiated Agreement. Double function of main Indonesian participant ensures vital information and influence channels, Dutch network supported by Leiden University</td>
<td>By keeping project out of bilateral cooperation the two participating universities safeguard continuation. (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Players</td>
<td>Stakes</td>
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<td>Rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>APERT</td>
<td>Minister Habibie (p) decides to continue, but implementing parties are divided on feasibility (i)</td>
<td>National stake not the same as stake at implementation game, no congruency between political aspirations (p) and practical needs (i)</td>
<td>Hierarchical Direction. Top down command and information chains in network that factually lost its apex</td>
<td>Before 1992 rules of the engineer community enable cooperation. Sticking to the rules after 1992 leads to factual standstill (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden Boats</td>
<td>Minister Hartarto decides on continuation, (p) but Ministry hampers implementation (m)</td>
<td>Stake of Ministry of Industry (m) contradicts minister’s aspirations (p) and stake of implementers (i)</td>
<td>Unilateral Action/Hierarchical direction. Missing link in communication and action because MoI does not provide required support</td>
<td>Dutch rules were observed, but informal rule of ‘sharing’ leads to conflict of conscious by implementers, stifles implementation. (m, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pompengan</td>
<td>Motivation and support for project lacks among all players, the end is gladly welcomed (m, i)</td>
<td>Integrated objectives did not serve stakes of any of participants because individual stakes too conflicting (i)</td>
<td>No interaction. Hampered and slow communication between participating parties; project far away from political and administrative centre</td>
<td>New rule (no aid) welcomed by many participants; enables them to withdraw from project without losing face. Before 1992 many unresolved conflicts over rules. (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTA 77 (Coffee project)</td>
<td>Dutch team and targetgroups believe in project (i), other players less personally involved and supportive (p, m)</td>
<td>Differing stakes for each party involved. Conflicting stakes as well: benefits of project go either to farmers, or to elite (m, i)</td>
<td>Unilateral Action. Distance between project and political and administrative centre hampers communication</td>
<td>Informal rule of personal gain and self interest destructive, rule that poor men stay poor once again confirmed (m, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandwich</td>
<td>Potential benefactors not organised (i, m)</td>
<td>Stakes too long term and indirect, other opportunities less costly (i)</td>
<td>No interaction. Interaction between participants is not institutionalised</td>
<td>No aid i.e. no support in education is without much ado applied. Dutch rules had prevailed before 1992 (m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Players</td>
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<td>Rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-university</td>
<td>Legal experts with double functions convince Bappenas to support project (i)</td>
<td>Post academic education for legal experts successfully advocated as national stake (i)</td>
<td>Negotiated Agreement. Double functions of main players makes strong network in Indonesia, key nodes of network influential</td>
<td>Rules are set by KIH, as a department within department of Education and Culture and KIH is ruled by academics themselves. Project kept out of bilateral cooperation. (m, i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>Strongly motivated judges continue project within Supreme court (i)</td>
<td>Post academic education for judges packaged in such a way that it does not seem harmful to regime (i)</td>
<td>Negotiated agreement. Small group of judges limits flow of information and secures silent support of policy management and political games in Indonesia</td>
<td>By trespassing and ignoring rules from above implementers do as they deem fit. Implementing players had learnt from political conflicts earlier. (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Drafting</td>
<td>Different perceptions on principles and objectives of project, players divided. Ind. manager turns to other countries (i, m)</td>
<td>Different stakes for each party involved. Project's formal objective is politically sensitive (p, i)</td>
<td>No interaction. The already troubled interaction comes to a halt after decision of 1992</td>
<td>No more aid provides easy way out for difficult and politically sensitive project. Conflicts about principles and scope were still unresolved in March 1992. (m, i)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ing these projects. If there had been no political intervention and no one from within the projects had undertaken action, projects simply awaited the final cut by some administrative measure.

**Bold players in the implementation game**

Unlike the civil servants, the people fighting for the upkeep of their projects had *everything* to lose with the demise of their projects. Initiatives from the policy management game or the political game were not to be expected, so doing nothing would certainly result in the end of the project. Precisely because the implementing parties depended on the success of projects, in many cases they dared to be bold and use their resources and skills to try to secure their projects. The boldness of Professor Masinambow, who simply went to Bappenas and reminded the civil servants there of the announcement that projects could continue on Indonesian funds, and the boldness of the Judges who circumvented a presidential decree, are examples of the 'nothing to lose' attitude. INIS was safeguarded because a small group of people used the influence and leverage they had in the Dutch and Indonesian policy and political circles. The same applied for the Inter-university project, which had improved the standing of the KIH and added to the influence and respect that the Indonesian counterparts earned. Contrary to their former Indonesian counterparts, the Dutch Council did not have that leverage nor the capability to convince other Dutch departments than DGIS that the project should be continued with other funds.

For Ildep and APERT some attempts had been made to convince other parties to continue the projects, but these lobbies were not 'complete'. The new director of Ildep did not participate, leaving the Dutch implementing parties as the sole lobbyists for Ildep. The Dutch counterparts in APERT did not have a sparring partner in Indonesia, when they presented their plans to the Dutch department of Education & Sciences. The Indonesian counterparts in APERT quietly waited for orders from Habibie, and did not confront Minister Habibie with the unfeasibility of his orders. The team leader of the Coffee project decided to stay and fight for the factory and its beneficiaries, but he stood virtually alone. The silent support he had from the farmers meant little in the social ladder of the New Order.

**The origins of motivation**

The degree of motivation of players in the implementation game, or indeed their disappointment in a project, explains the initiation of a lobby or a lack thereof. To understand how motivation or disappointment developed, we have to go back and examine the history of projects, their inception and development prior to 1992. Looking at the start of virtually all projects, we saw that non-government actors from both countries agreed that something must and could be done about a particular problem in their direct environment. The eventual implementing parties initiated most projects. For these actors, the solution for *their* problems was cooperation in a
project. Policy areas and funds were then found for their plans. Their plans were written and presented in such a way that they fit into Indonesia's development policy and the appropriate General Agreement for cooperation.

The projects for which implementing parties lobbied for maintenance had gained significance for them by 1992. Such was the case for the Inter-university and Judges Projects: through their success, the relative standing and leverage of the Indonesian counterparts had improved. By presenting credentials and some impressive results of previous endeavours, the players from the implementation game were able to be persuasive. They got what they wanted: approvals and funds. INIS and IRIS were of high importance for the implementing parties as well. They had recently been involved in getting their projects on the list of bilateral cooperation and were highly motivated to maintain the cooperation. Using their experience in bilateral cooperation, referring to policy objectives and gathering support from outsiders, the professors convinced the spending departments that the project was worth continuing.

The Seksi Belanda had a somewhat different position with regard to cooperation with the Dutch. It was evident that the department had to continue providing education and that input from the Netherlands (or Flanders) was essential. The question for the staff of the Seksi Belanda was how to maintain relations with Dutch academia, yet manage their own affairs. The activities after March 1992 were thus concentrated on finding a modus operandi in which Dutch involvement was acceptable but not dominant. The new dean of the department, who had learnt from previous cooperation with the Dutch in Ildep, found in the cooperation with the Dutch Language Union (a non-government organisation) the proper way to secure support from outside, yet remain an Indonesian department at an Indonesian university.

Not all projects that had been initiated by the eventual implementers were still meaningful for them, the PRIS being a prime example. While in the beginning the counterparts stood jointly at the opening sessions and agreed on different meanings, in following years, the PRIS had evolved into an educational program, rather than a joint research program (see also the section on rules in this chapter). The research activities did not serve the stakes of the majority of the participants, as could be read in Chapter Five's section on divergent needs and views on science. The program had evolved into one concerned predominantly with education, and the research that was being done was carried out by Dutch PhD students. The spirit of cooperation and mutual benefit had gradually drifted away. The once motivated and inspired scholars had each gone their own ways, disappointed in the project's results, and found other activities that better served their purposes. The Legal Drafting project had witnessed a similar process of diverging meanings. At the onset, implementers believed that assistance with the drafting process and training would be a good solution to the problems. What they had not realised was the political opposition in Indonesia to Dutch involvement and that the project managers would constantly argue on the sense and approach of the training. Considering all the unresolved conflicts, it was not surprising that the Indonesian project manager went to Germany and France after March 25 to assess the possibilities of cooperation with other (continental law) countries.
APERT is a case apart: under the new conditions of the Cultural Agreement, joint research was to be the official objective, pushed by the political games. However, people involved in implementation knew that joint research was not feasible. The impossibility of joint research could have been known by reflecting on what cooperation actually entailed in TTA-79. The JOT I and JOT II projects within TTA-79 had been so successful because experienced Dutch engineers guided the Indonesian engineers. In JOT III and IV, the education and library projects, much more input was assumed from the Indonesian counterparts, input which could not be delivered. These projects never really took off. Similarly, APERT was undertaken with the false assumption that Indonesia would provide a sufficient number of experienced engineers. Experienced Indonesian engineers did not work at ITPN, as they had all gone to the private companies. However, due to a lack of communication between levels of games, this simple fact was not communicated from the implementation game to the political game. The ideas of minister Habibie were already in the air and nobody at the time dared to confront him with the problems of ITPN on the ground. The comments at the end of the case on APERT summarise the disillusionment: ‘We got help from everybody … They knew that we could not compete anyway. They said you can do it and so we did it. Habibie thought that we had a critical mass of professional people to build up an industry … But it was absurd, far from the Indonesian reality. We did not know at the time. We thought we had the money, everybody said we had to do it ... We forgot the time factor and culture factor. It needs time, we cannot do it in ten years’.

Only in the case of Pompengan was the project the result of government initiation. The project’s design was a blue-print sketched at desks in offices to carry out the idea of Integrated Development. Technical and social engineers were to carry out the project. But the blueprint never quite fitted with the ideas of the people carrying out the project: their problems were different than those envisioned in policy documents, similar to the ill-fitting political desires that confronted APERT. In 1992 there was no one in either of the games that felt the need to advocate continuation. Politicians had lost touch with the project, civil servants and those at the top of the Dutch consultancy agency had lost face. The project had been disappointing to the implementing parties.

But what about the other projects – that did solve problems of the participants and the people they represented? For the Coffee Project attempts to advocate continuation had been set up. However, the lobby was not effective for a host of reasons (see also the next sections). The team leader Bram Heijboer stood alone; his friends in higher places did not share his motivation to really help the farmers, which was proven by the sell-out of the factory later on. The farmers who supported him did not have a voice in the social and political structure of the New Order regime. The Sandwich Project represented future interests of PhD candidates, who did not operate collectively, but were individually involved in the project. There was no organisational structure to defend the common interest of the PhD candidates.
Skilled players

Between the lines of this section – and certainly in the next sections – the skills and resources (or lack thereof) of the players can be read. In the continued projects we find examples of players who had the right skills: to use the ‘politically correct’ words, to make projects fit into policy, and to use their connections and information sources. The professors/professionals in the Inter-university Project, the Judges Project, IRIS, IRIS and the Seksi Belanda knew precisely who to go to, what to say and had the right sources of influence at their disposal. They used their experience, in particular to convince players from other games that their projects should be continued. Before 1992 these players knew how to play the game of the bilateral policy process – when they skilfully put their plans on the policy agenda. In contrast, the Dutch Council for the legal cooperation projects and the team leader in Aceh did not have the resources and skills required for playing that game. Their limited access to policy circles in Jakarta or The Hague, or lack of oratory in the new discourse of cooperation hampered their attempts to have their projects continued. In the next sections the skills of the players are illustrated further by showing how they moulded stakes, organised interaction channels and dealt with the rules and the policy environment.

In summary, if a project was still meaningful to players in the implementation game they lobbied for the upkeep of the project. If a project lost its significance, or had come to mean different things to different people, no such lobby was set up. It did not matter much if players from the political game and policy management game were motivated to support the continuation of a project. In fact, players from the political game only intervened in two cases after March 1992. Players from the political and policy management games, contrary to what the orthodox model assumes, have had neither an initiating nor a decisive role. What matters first is what people at the level of the shopfloor believe is worth striving for. In particular, the skills and resources of the individual players provided significant impetus for both initiating and later terminating projects.

Political stakes versus the stakes of the shopfloor

‘Stakes’ were defined as problem-solution combinations. For each case, the stakes as they appeared in the games have been investigated. The actions of players from the political and implementation games addressed in the former section are seen as attempts to safeguard the respective stakes. It is important to realise that the general terms, under which bilateral cooperation was conducted, differed. While in the Netherlands such cooperation was part of foreign policy, in Indonesia the cooperation was inherent to sector policy. Agreements on the projects were made between ministers from sectoral departments in Indonesia and the minister of foreign aid (DGIS) in the Netherlands. Bappenas, the agency responsible for national development in Indone-
sia, must be seen as an intermediary between the sectoral ministries, rather than an independently operating ministry with its own policy-functions. That difference explains the direction of the advocacy for projects after 1992. Players wanting to continue a project did not turn to Bappenas, but sought support first in the sectoral policy area of which a project was part. It is in the sectoral policy areas where the decision-making on the projects eventually took place. Here a comparison of the cases is made to assess whose stakes prevailed in the end and whether congruency of stakes was a positive influence for continuation. By beginning with two contrasting projects we will address this question.

Whose stakes mattered

APERT and the Judges Project had a completely different beginning. Cooperation in aerospace technology clearly served a strategic-economic stake of both governments and it was likely that such a strong political stake would guarantee the continuation of APERT. Cooperation for the upgrading of Indonesian judges turned out to be problematic for both governments. Dutch critics objected to the fact that cooperation was sought of judges who were purportedly corrupt. Furthermore, the educational value of the training courses associated with the project was doubted. In Indonesia, judges whose aspirations were to establish a rechtsstaat (state of law) were perceived as a danger to the New Order regime. The aftermath of both projects demonstrated divergence: APERT lingered on without many activities, while the courses for judges throughout the archipelago had become an institutionalised initiative – even having its own education centre and later on, an official ‘Bappenas’ budget.

The crucial link bridging inception and outcome was the stake of the people on the ‘shopfloor’ of cooperation. The workshops for judges throughout the archipelago had been a solution to the problems they perceived: it would improve the consistency in verdicts, advance the knowledge of the judges and bring isolated judges in contact with colleagues. The judges responsible for the courses were so convinced of the advantages of the former Dutch-Indonesian project that they did not even wait for a presidential decree to continue the courses. In APERT, the engineers struggled with the stakes that were heavily promoted by the respective ministers. The ministers wanted joint research, which fit in nicely with the new Cultural Agreement because research, rather than education, implied equality and mutual benefit. The KNAW, as the representative of the policy management game, stood between the political and implementation games: agreeing with the implementers that this project could not live up to the expectations of the Cultural Agreement. But both the KNAW and the implementing counterparts had to succumb to the wishes of the ministers. Stakes in the sense of political wants and practical needs differed over the games in the case of APERT, leaving the project in a idle state where the allocated research funds remained unused. Contrary to the judges, the engineers in APERT had a mission impossible. When in 1999 the implementing parties proposed a different project, geared to the educational needs in Indonesia, their plans were turned down. They had assumed that with the restora-
tion of the development cooperation relation educational projects would be allowed. What they did not realise was that the political discourse in the Netherlands had changed as well. Assistance to Indonesia should consist of debt restructuring and good governance, not of hi tech projects geared to a distant future. Once again the stake of the political game was different than the stake of the implementation game.

The aftermath of the Wooden Boats project shows a similar course as APERT. This particular kind of small and medium scale industry development was strongly supported by Minister Hartarto and part of the nation-wide emphasis on building the industrial base. The support from the minister could not guarantee a successful and prolonged continuation. The department of Industry (policy management) had a stake that was contrary to that of the minister and the Dutch counterparts. The Dutch counterparts left disappointed: a project that served the needs of the small-scale fishermen was not possible in a climate of greed and petty corruption. When they left the project was formally terminated.

Finally, the continuation of Inter-university courses for the law faculties can be explained in a similar way as the Judges Project. The deans and professors who had been responsible immediately continued the courses as 'cooperation-formerly-known-as-Dutch.' At the shopfloor of cooperation it had become evident that the activities of the project had become a valuable practice that had to be continued by all means. The KIH had gained more leverage and the courses brought together experts from different fields. The Indonesian project managers thus had a personal stake as members of the KIH and a professional stake in continuing the project. Their arguments for funding the project as an Indonesian initiative were convincing for Bappenas.

In conclusion, these four cases demonstrate serving the political will of the Indonesian side was itself not sufficient enough to warrant continuation of a project. It is noteworthy that some projects withered away if they did not serve stakes at the shopfloor level. Indeed, as discussed in the former section, the activities initiated from the level of the shopfloor are crucial to understand a project’s aftermath.

Loosing interest in projects

Projects that were not continued must not only be explained by the events in 1992. The decision of 1992 simply ended a long process of stakes becoming more and more incompatible and undesirable. In the former section it was described how for the PRIS, Pompengan and Legal Drafting project motivations of the players had diminished. For PRIS, it was not only the decision of minister Ritzen that meant the end: not many participants still had a stake in PRIS. The differences in what the project meant to the different counterparts had in the course of years diverged so much that, especially on the Indonesian side, other offers for co-operation were much better solutions to their problems than PRIS could be. Something similar happened with the Pompengan and Legal Drafting project. The integrated project that Pompengan was meant to become, turned out to be so complex and resulted in so many conflicts, that
eventually nobody felt the need to continue the project. Conflicts, unfeasible objectives and reluctant implementers had been the reality of the Legal Drafting Project as well. When a reorganisation in the legal drafting process was implemented, the need for a project geared to the BPHN was minimised. Thus, for these projects the decision of 1992 meant the final straw for cooperation. The sudden end of these projects in 1992 was preceded by a loss of stakes at the level of implementation.

Stakes were not initially attached to a policy or project: it is people who pursue stakes. When those who have been at the centre of a project's development depart, the stake of a project may change. During its implementation Ildep had been 'a perfect aide' to the staff and director of the Pusat Bahasa. The new director however had no interest in keeping Dutch involved in his institute. His predecessor, on the other hand, as the new dean at the Language Faculty of the Universitas Indonesia, took his chance in reorganising the department in such a way that Dutch was taught as a source language. Having more people capable of using the Dutch language for research purposes had been a stake on his agenda when he was director of the Pusat Bahasa.

Congruency, real or rhetoric

Continued projects had the approval of the policy management and political games involved. However that does not mean that a project in practice served the same stakes as outlined by the political and policy-management games. 'Rhetorical' congruency was in some cases acceptable. Congruency was in some cases attained by wording a proposal in such a way that it was palatable for the political or financial decision-makers. Or, by redefining the scope of a project so that it fit into a new policy environment. The term 'rhetorical congruency' refers in this case to similar words and ideas confessed, but not necessarily to similar practices. For example, the INIS project was marketed as something beneficial for the Netherlands (which it was in many respects). However, in practice INIS entailed the same support in education as it had been under the terms of development cooperation, a point that was not emphasised. That the Dutch side bore most of the costs was not emphasised either. The judges had been rhetorically creative as well in presenting their plans to their superiors. The Council on the Dutch side was less apt in creating such congruency in words. As we recall from section the last section of Chapter Seven, Pieter Evers advised the Council to make more use of the words 'mutual benefit' and 'equality'. However, more was needed to convince the potential Dutch funding agencies that the goals of a project would really serve the new policy terms. Therefore the Dutch departments of Justice and Education & Sciences vetoed most of the proposals. Ministers Habibie and Ritzen believed in strategic benefits of the continuation of APERT, but the political rhetoric could not prevent the practice of the project from becoming dormant.

Thus, we have found that it has been primarily the stakes of the shopfloor that were important to understand the policy process that led to continuation or discontinuation. While one is tempted to think that projects serving clear political interests,
industrial development for example, the cases proved the contrary. Some projects that emphatically did not serve the economic interests of the New Order government continued, while projects that had earlier been singled out as ‘advantageous’ withered away. Similarly, a political stake does not guarantee implementation of a project; such is only realised when actors at the level of implementation are convinced of the use and feasibility of a policy objective. It would be inaccurate to state that the discontinued projects were ended because they did not fit into the new political objectives of cooperation. The fact that in these cases projects had lost significance for the implementing parties is equally important to understand the aftermath of the ended projects. The reverse pattern (project serves stake of the implementation game and continued) suggests that if there had been a stake at the level of implementation, these projects did have a chance to be continued. Matching stakes of the implementation game with political stakes has in some cases been more a matter of words, than a matter of changing practices.

Interaction: networks connecting the games

Former sections pointed to the dominance of the implementation game. In this section that dominance is further explained by analysing the interaction between the games. Reading the column on interaction vertically (matrix 8.1), negotiated agreement as a mode of interaction occurs most often in the continued projects. Players in the five continued projects on the matrix were organised in networks: people, who were mutually dependent, had clearly defined roles but who knew no hierarchy. Many of those involved shared interpersonal relationships: they had studied together, came from the same region or were part of an extended family. Actors in these networks communicated directly, via telephone or in meetings, rather than via written correspondence. Negotiated agreement is the ‘default’ mode of interaction is such personal networks.

Strong and weak networks

A strong network was at the disposal of the three ‘Leiden’ projects Ildep, INIS and IRIS. This network consisted of Dutch and Indonesian academics with easy access to the other games. The representative of the Leiden University in Indonesia maintained contact with powerful people in the military, government and cultural sector. In this way he was informed and able to present new ideas to people at different levels of government and society. In the Netherlands, the main manager of the projects, professor Stokhof, had in the course of time become the director of the International Institute of Asian Studies. In this capacity he had easy access to the board of the RUL and the department of Education and Sciences. The support of the responsible ministers in the Netherlands and Indonesia had been secured. In the policy management and implementation games activities were undertaken to bind experts together. The INIS
and Ildep newsletters and the scientific magazines kept people from all layers and professions informed and made them feel members of a professional community. Also ex-participants, who were promoted to policy-management posts remained part of the professional community. To quote professor Stokhof: ‘A newsletter keeps these people together; you inform them about scientific events, but also about births, obituaries and other personal things. A network is a building and you can’t let that rest on one person’. This anchorman of the Dutch-Asian scientific cooperation sees network-building and maintaining as one of the core businesses of bilateral cooperation.

In 1992 the ‘peer review’ of colleagues/friends was set up for the three projects, although with mixed results. INIS was continued with government funds, IRIS as a joint activity between the University of Leiden and the Universitas Indonesia, and Ildep ended one year later in 1993. The reason for the unsuccessful lobby of the network for Ildep was that the new director of the Pusat Bahasa could not be considered a node in the network: unlike his predecessor and his Dutch colleagues, he did not feel the need for an ILDEP III.

APERT seemed to have a strong network, but the mode of interaction was ‘hierarchical direction’. These top-down communication patterns were a heritage of the former phase of the project, TTA-79, in which a military-like organisation was successfully used to build the windtunnel. Despite its formal continuation, this mode of interaction blurred the dissemination of information. The Project Control officers complained that the ministers responsible for the project’s continuation were not familiar with the realities of the shopfloor. Joint research was not a feasible option. Some form of assistance with education at the Technical University of Bandung promised better results, according to the implementers. Also with the promotion of Habibie to several top functions the pyramid of interactions had lost its apex.

Isolated islands and hampering communications

For some projects, networks that cut across games did not exist at all, or had ceased to exist. The Coffee Project had mainly focused on the targetgroups in Aceh and in 1992 did not have supporters from the policy management or the political games personally involved in either Jakarta or The Hague. The parliamentary delegations and Indonesian ministers had shown an interest in the Coffee Project and had paid visits to Aceh, but contrary to INIS and IRIS, none of these officials were personally involved. Interaction after 1992 consisted of unilateral action from the team leader to Jakarta or The Hague, but the fate of no one in these places rested upon the continuation of that project. There is a simple technical explanation for this, which also applies to the Pompengan project: proximity to Jakarta and easy access to responsible departments does make a big difference. Team members in the Pompengan project said it was a hassle for embassy employees to really get informed, and they themselves had to take at least three days off to go to a meeting in Jakarta. Information about the Pompengan and LTA-77 project was, in contrast to other projects, mainly communicated through written text (progress-reports, letters, evaluations). This was partly due to the distance
between the project location and the centres of administration. The way to communicate across games was 'formal', that is communication on paper, such as evaluation reports and progress reports. Such formal communication was not a strong means of interaction between the games. The many and well-written progress reports on Pompengan and Aceh disappeared in the drawers of departments and the embassy. The letters the governor of Aceh wrote asking for support were not effective. Both in Indonesia and in the Netherlands the quality of information dissemination was better when it is spoken in personal encounters. This does not refer to so called 'oral traditions' in a country. The strength of interaction via networks lies in the fact that it is based on personal bonds and thus implies the personal involvement of the people communicating on a project.

Double functions and key nodes

In many cases examined herein a critical factor which determined the relative strength of the network was the dual function that many Indonesian actors filled. It was and remains quite normal for Indonesian professionals to have two jobs or more at totally different organisations. Many professors have, for example, a post at a ministry as well. This has to do with a shortage in higher educated personnel and the low salaries paid in the Indonesian civil service. In effect, people who had a double function formed the key nodes in a network. Such a duality made these actors walking sources of information and conduits for communication; they knew of the problems in their respective professional environments and they had the possibility to address them in their respective capacities, as advisor or top civil servant. These connections proved to be tremendously helpful in both initiating projects as well as lobbying for them in 1992; that is, if these people were convinced that they had a stake in a project.

Examples of such dual-functions/key nodes are, for example, found in the legal cooperation projects. Professors in law, who at the same time held positions at the Department of Education and Culture (and had a legal firm on the side) formed the key nodes in a network. To a lesser extent, the judges in the Judges Project also had these double functions, being both professors and judges and responsible for policy management of the project. When they decided to start their own educational centre at the Supreme Court, nobody contested their capacities. The silent support they had in the beginning turned into a Bappenas-funded project with the appropriate approvals. A professor who also held a position as director at the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI) managed IRIS. Wearing these two hats, he had much more leverage and formed a natural connection between the implementation and policy management game. When he approached Bappenas after March 1992, he knew that his advice could not be ignored and that he could call upon the Indonesian government to adhere to their promises concerning continuation of the priority projects.

Being too dependent on key-nodes can also break a network. Interviewees mentioned that the network of PRIS only rested on two pillars: when the two founding fathers of PRIS retired from the project, the network fell apart. When Habibie lost
touch with the daily business of APERT, the former strong infrastructure of communication dissolved. The Coffee Project had lost its crucial nodes in the network after the chairman of Bappeda had become governor, and the former governor (who had initiated the project) became a minister in Jakarta. Moving up higher on the ladder, they had lost touch with the orang kecil (poor folks) in their homeland.

**Negotiated agreement and bottom-up interaction**

While the default mode of interaction was negotiated agreement, to the extent that there was a dominant direction, this has not generally been in a top-down direction (from the political game ‘down’ to the implementation game). In most cases examined interaction was targeted from the implementation game to the policy management and political games. Influencing and presentation of ideas usually started at the level of implementation. The presence and strength of a network proved to be important for the beginning of projects and with that – new policy. PRIS came about because a group of professors, an ‘old boys’ (and girls) network, had used their expertise and connections in administration and sciences to formulate and execute the inclusive project that PRIS was. PRIS thus had a strong network before the 1990’s. Professor Teeuw and Bachtiar held many positions as advisers at universities and in government, and were key nodes in a small yet influential network. This network depended strongly on the two founding fathers, while other possible members of the network were haphazardly included and excluded. The network was in fact highly hierarchical. When the founding fathers withdrew from the project, no one of the former participants felt responsible to keep up the network.

Similarly, when Ildep begun in the late 1970s as an offspring of PRIS most DGIS employees found it a strange project. But, through learning from earlier experiences in cooperation in the humanities, a proposal was formulated that was desired by the Indonesian stakeholders. The Indonesian and Dutch future counterparts even succeeded in getting Ildep on the list of bilateral cooperation, even though the mainstream of development cooperation was literally technical aid. INIS and IRIS had a similar start. Having learned from experience and knowing how to formulate proposals, members of the network adjusted their plans to accommodate bilateral policy. The projects in Legal Cooperation started in a similar manner. Jurists, who knew each other from conferences or from their university studies, had developed an idea and presented a ready-to-go plan to the funding agencies. The agencies were inclined to listen to them, because the judgements and opinions of these jurists were well respected. With the proposals for legal cooperation they put a new topic on the list of development cooperation.

Thus, with regard to interaction, networks that cut across games and connected by key nodes, are effective means to communicate and influence actors from other games. A mode of interaction that goes with an influential network is negotiated agreement. Through negotiated agreement players in a network found support –
silent or overt – from other network-members for the ideas and desires they communicated between the games. When the traffic direction in the three games is observed, the route in most cases starts at the implementation game. In almost all cases examined, the start of a project (and in some cases a completely new policy issue), was put on the agenda of bilateral cooperation by actors from the implementation game. Members of networks may be characterised as interdependent and equal, but initiation and inspiration for crucial decisions originates in the implementation game. Furthermore, the links between the games are closer in Indonesia than in the Netherlands because actors having dual functions is more common in Indonesia. In the Netherlands functions and responsibilities are more separated, and thus the distance between the games is larger.

Rules: Anticipation, interpretation and doing as the Romans do

While recognising the importance of institutions, the game metaphor does not assume that the steering of the policy process via rules always proceeds from the political game to the policy management game to the implementation game. Typically, one of the main tasks of the policy management game is to translate assignments from the political game into rules for the implementation game, but it cannot be assumed that this process of translation is unambiguous. Rules for the implementation of policy may come from four different games: the Dutch and Indonesian political and policy management games. Furthermore, the implementation game has its own intrinsic rules. For example, how tasks should be divided and who is responsible for what, with norms of behaviour, the cultural rules also considered. A list concerning a variety of rules was provided in table 2.4. By focusing on changes and conflicts in projects the relative significance of rules was investigated – which were important and why. Which countries’ rules (Dutch or Indonesian) prevailed in these cases of bilateral cooperation was another question addressed. Often rules from two countries are conflicting or difficult to observe simultaneously and it is important to know what choices have been made to facilitate bilateral cooperation.

Policy management: rules and chaos

Immediately after the decision of March 1992 there was much confusion in Dutch and Indonesian policy management circles as to what was and was not allowed. The reaction of the Dutch and Indonesian bureaucracies varied from doing nothing to being overtly strict. Different interpretations concerning duration of projects, available budgets and an upcoming exodus of all Dutch employees circulated. In this confusion, some implementers found ways to interpret and mould the unclear rules to their benefit. Some tried to play with the rules but were unsuccessful, in contrast to their earlier experiences with the host of rules that regulated bilateral cooperation before March 1992. The only clear rule was that DGIS should be completely erased from the
bilateral relations. That resulted in a scramble for funds at other departments that suddenly had to think about the interpretation of the rules and how bilateral cooperation should be given shape.

Two explanations for the aftermath of projects discussed in Chapter One concerned budgets and the phase of a project. These rules from the Indonesian and Dutch policy management games were suggested to have been decisive for the aftermath of projects. In all of the continued cases budgets were surprisingly made available, and whether a project had reached the end of its cycles was not a main issue. If the lobby for the upkeep of a project convincingly argued that a project should continue the respective spending departments were willing to support it (Judges project, Inter-university project and IRIS). Budget limitations were this not a decisive factor; in fact, if there was sufficient support for a project, money was always found.

Whether a project was in its latter phases had little effect on the decision-making process. It depended on whether the people involved found a project finished or not. The Coffee Project had officially ended its first phase and was about to go in its aftercare phase, where responsibilities were to be transferred to the Indonesian counterparts. According to the team of advisors this was a crucial phase because the coffee factory was not yet ready to become a commercial enterprise. In the case of the Judges and the Inter-university Project, the same divergence of opinion between progress reports and the reality of the shopfloor existed. Formally these projects were being reviewed because a phase of DGIS funding had ended. The professors involved however, were of the opinion that the courses had to continue. 'Phase' is a bureaucratic construct referring to the budget rather than a reflection of the actual process.

Interpreting political correctness

Much room for interpretation was generated in the new political rules of ‘equality and mutual benefit’. The translation of the rule of mutual benefit was joint research in the cultural or educational projects. Some players were more creative and capable of making adjustments than others. Equality was often translated into 50-50 financing, but as soon became apparent, that was impossible and not a necessary division. Examples of creative interpretation of the new rules for bilateral cooperation after 1992 are found in the stories of the Seksi Belanda and INIS. Clearly, the Seksi Belanda could still use some additional support in education materials and curriculum development, but what they did not need anymore was Dutch expatriates defining the curriculum and organising the department. By seeking cooperation via the Dutch Language Union, a non-government organisation that promotes the Dutch language and culture, the necessary input from native Dutch speakers and teachers was secured without the cooperation being labelled as aid. In the organisation a U-turn was made from a ‘colonial’ organisation to an independent Indonesian one. It seemed simply a matter of reverting everything 180 degrees. The implementing partners in INIS secured the non-aid status of the project in another way. By emphasising that the MA courses in Islamology were of benefit for the Netherlands as well, and by opening the program
for students from other countries, IRIS could not be labelled as aid to Indonesia. The fact that (joint) research did not really take off and that Dutch government paid for the larger part of the project was not problematic in the light of the strategic interests of the Netherlands. After all, it was of great importance that the Netherlands, as a multicultural and multi-religious country had its own study centre for Modern Islam. The other continued projects were actually taken out of the bilateral context. The two legal projects (Inter-university and Judges) were brought into the Indonesian development policy, funded by Bappenas; and IRIS became a project between two institutes: the Universitas Indonesia and the Leiden University.

Adhering to the new rules became a hindrance for the implementation of APERT after 1992. The new Dutch Project Control Officers came to the conclusion that joint research, as the manifestation of mutual benefit was not possible as yet and that equal funding had never been the reality. Turning the project into an educational project was not allowed before 1998. After 1998, deep into the Indonesian financial and political crisis, the Dutch government was of the opinion that support to the Engineering Department of the Technical University of Bandung was not a priority.

Observing Indonesian rules

Trying to uphold the Dutch rules of accountability and independence, the team of the Wooden Boats Project soon found out that the Indonesian counterpart obstructed rather than facilitated the project. Refusing to do as the Indonesians do, they left after one year. That brings us to the working of the factor rules before 1992. The projects in which Indonesian rather than Dutch rules prevailed in the implementation game appear to have been more continued than projects in which Dutch rules were more closely observed. Conflicts in implementation before 1992 served as a signpost: clashes on rules reveal more about whose rules prevailed and how these rules actually worked. Such conflicts could be over the boundaries of authority or money, but most often they concerned political principles. The focal point of the conflict was often whether Indonesian or Dutch rules should prevail. We revisit the history of some projects to provide illustration.

The Dutch team of the Coffee Project had always been very clear about the rules of the implementation game. The tone was set after the construction incident; they persisted in their desire to have the people of the small village carrying out construction works. Daringly the threats of the established construction companies were ignored. From then on it was clear to the people in Aceh that no bribes or extra costs would be paid for this project. Dutch rules of accountability prevailed. It is hard to establish a direct link to the little support the project received in 1992, but it is likely that since none could make a personal profit out of the project, the eagerness to have this project funded with Indonesian funds was not great.

The Dutch project control officer wrote the rules of implementation for the Windtunnel Project (see Chapter Six on ‘engineers bridging cultural pitfalls’). They worked extremely well and resulted in a neat task division and timely completion of
the project. But, when after 1992 the Indonesian party was supposed to organise and fund their part of the project, implementation did not follow. Contrary to the Judges and Inter-university project, no learning had taken place in how to organise a project. In fact, with the Judges Project, the Indonesian judges team (Tim P.) had always organised the workshops themselves. The rules of implementation were set by the Indonesian counterparts.

In the section on the dilemma of dependency the kind of problems that could be encountered when ‘elite’ parties attempt to work together in an aid project was highlighted. There had been discontent by the Indonesian counterparts (Inter-university and Legal Drafting projects) about the choices of topics, complaints that the Dutch organised too much and questions about the division of funds. While these problems were settled in the case of the Inter-university Project (the KIH strengthened itself) conflicts still hampered the Legal Drafting Project. The Dutch program manager objected in principal and on practical grounds and the Indonesian program manager remained dissatisfied with the scope of the project. When in 1992 the final blow to the Legal Drafting Project came, the Dutch program manager regretted that it had to end this way, with a solution still not having been found. Thus, while in the course of time, the KIH set the rules for cooperation in implementation for the Inter-university project, in the Legal Drafting project conflicts over rules remained. The settlement on Dutch terms of the conflict about lawyer Nasution made the Indonesian government reluctant to support the Sandwich project. If paying for Indonesian PhD students to study in the Netherlands meant that studies critical of the New Order government were produced, why put government money in it?

Unresolved or badly solved conflicts

The case of PRIS demonstrated how in the course of years - through frequently changing the rules – a project can become problematic. Because the education project did not achieve results as expected, standards and norms for students were adapted. The result was that PRIS had become an inefficient educational project, rather than a project that stimulated joint research. The research that was being done did not satisfy the demands of the Indonesian counterparts: their standards of applicable research were not met. In the end the project managers had compromised on so many rules that none of the counterparts really believed in a future of the project. The position of the Bureau of the Indonesian Studies (BIS) remained unclear to the Dutch Ministry of Education: there had never been a clear settlement on the legal environment, nor the tasks of the employees. The failure to present a clear picture of the position of the BIS was another iron in the fire for the Dutch ministry to end support to the project.

Similarly, the unresolved conflicts concerning task divisions, money, benefits and organisation of the implementation in Pompengan attributed to the negative connotations that were eventually ascribed to the project. More so, while one Dutch counterpart tried desperately to stick to the rational planning scheme, the other counterparts had already given up. The constant conflicts and the adherence of all
counterparts to their own rules of organisation led to a compartmentalisation that made the project fall apart like 'goats faeces.'

Ildep seems to be an anomaly: while during implementation both counterparts were satisfied with the way the organisation was set up, and Indonesian rules were observed, the project was not continued. The reason for the unwillingness of the new director to have the Dutch involved had its origin in a politically sensitive issue. It had always been problematic to have foreigners involved in the delicate issue of the study of regional languages. During implementation, the project had been solely focused on having Indonesian PhD students obtain their degree, but information about the Indonesian regional policies was naturally easily accessible to foreigners. The new director was more nationalist than was his predecessor and reasoned that the former Ildep graduates could carry out the regional language policies. In other words, an underlying conflict on political principles that had been avoided by the former staff was brought back after a change in staff.

Nationalism as a political rule of behaviour is not universal. It can also be seen as an argument that is used when it is convenient to do so, even though for many people nationalism is a very relevant concept. A fine example of nationalism as a convenience rule is found in the Judges project. The conflict with Judge Intan rose to such a height that the nationalist state secretary threatened to end the project. The incident was solved in 'the Indonesian way' though, with only Judge Intan losing face and his position in Jakarta. The Janus face of nationalism is nicely explained by the following comments. When in 1997 I asked the judges responsible for the Judges Project why there was no longer cooperation with a Dutch party, they responded 'nationalistically correct' that they did not want anybody telling them what to do. But, in 1999 the chief judge confided that when the Dutch government sponsored the project, they had had much more freedom to do what they deemed important. Nationalism as a political rule was used when convenient, but was not necessarily a rule for behaviour for people at the level of the shopfloor.

The meaning of the factor 'rules', as those institutions that regulate actions of the players can be understood as the following: rules of the political and policy management game for the implementation game do matter, but not in the strict hierarchic sense. Rules have been anticipated and interpreted by players in the implementation game: taking care that no rules were broken, yet making them work for the purpose of the project. Interpretation of rules was a consequence of the diversity in rationalities of each of the games. Such was also suggested in the explanations by observers and those directly involved. This observation on rules adds to the findings on players: it is the capability of players to play the game of bilateral cooperation that explains continuation or discontinuation.

The source of many conflicts was the issue of which rules should prevail, Dutch or Indonesian. In a number of projects, such conflicts provided a learning experience; in those cases the rules of the host country, Indonesia, were adopted. In fact, observing Indonesian rules during implementation is a very strong explanatory aspect of rules.
Projects in which the Indonesian counterparts set the rules, or general Indonesian rules were observed, were more likely to be continued. Those projects accrued a more positive meaning to the counterparts, who in turn were more likely to lobby for the continuation of their project. Projects in which no solution could be found for conflicting rules, or compromises were made, were less likely to receive the warm support of the implementing parties. After all, the projects were geared towards Indonesian needs and were implemented in Indonesia. The question is whether adherence to the rules of a donor country in development projects always leads to conflicts, or hampered implementation. The literature on Development Administration points indeed in that direction: what works (and doesn’t!) in industrialised countries will not necessarily work in developing countries. All in all, Paul’s advice to the Romans with regard to the proper behaviour amongst people of different convictions seems to have been of positive influence for continuation.

Policy environment: a bit of structure and a lot of agency

Whether events or changes outside the realm of projects and their respective policy areas have affected their outcome has been assessed under the header ‘policy environment’. In Chapter Four the properties of these parameters for Indonesia and the Netherlands were described. In the case chapters aspects of the environment relevant to the projects were described. The question is whether the environment described in chapter four had changed in 1992.

Both in Indonesia and in the Netherlands changes in the political climate and the public opinion have been observed. The popularity of the ‘purple’ idea to politics (a socialist-liberal balance approach to economics and principles with principles coming second in line) created a different political environment and public opinion in the Netherlands. The effects of this change in political climate were most visible in the actions of Minister Jo Ritzen. He was an early adapter of the ‘purple’ idea in the Christian-Socialist government of 1989-1994, and judged the projects that were proposed under the new Cultural Agreement according to new principles. A good example was found with regard to INIS. The changed attitude of the Soeharto government towards the Muslim community in Indonesia provided a favourable environment for INIS. The belief that higher education for future religious leaders is good for the stability of the country made INIS a desirable project for Indonesia. In the Netherlands the realisation that the country had become multi-cultural and multi-religious turned out to be favourable for INIS as well.

PRIS and Ildep did not fit into the new policy guidelines that prioritised strategic interests and mutual benefits. In fact, PRIS had become the epitome of an old fashioned, colonial program: while the times had changed, the program’s research objectives were alleged to delve too much on the archives and not fit to address contemporary issues. It is quite ironic that a large part of PRIS research had been devoted to the Moluccas, a province that in 1998 witnessed severe cultural and religious clashes,
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which now pose acute and highly relevant social scientific questions. The question is whether the PRIS counterparts could have anticipated the changes in the political and social environment and adapted the project accordingly.

In matrix 8.1 it could be read that the policy environment for Pompengan, the Coffee- Sandwich- and Legal Drafting project was not very conducive. The conditions were however not different from how they were before; the other factors discussed made the decision of 1992 into the final blow. The political strife in South Sulawesi had always been tense; the ending of the project meant that there were a little less issues to fight against. Extraction, neglect and corruption had always ruled in Aceh, but with less leverage in the form of a Dutch funded project, these forces reigned freely again. Sandwich candidates were sent out to the Netherlands not only because the legal systems were closely connected, but also because scholarships were offered. When other scholarships became available, doctoral candidates went elsewhere. The Legal Drafting project had become obsolete earlier, since after a change in procedures departments drafted laws themselves. Thus, in these cases the context had not changed, it was the capacity of the implementers to deal with it that had dwindled.

The financial situation of the Indonesian government was in general conducive in the period 1992-1997, for many projects there appeared to be a great flexibility in the budget. The stiff competition in the aerospace industry after 1994 had its implications for APERT though. While in the first years of APERT's continuation Indonesian budgets were in theory available, after 1994 most of the financial support from other countries stopped. The research budget earmarked for APERT dwindled consequently.

Another question is whether the policy environment influenced the emergence of projects and policies. There are a few examples of before 1992 in which despite the political discourse of the time, projects were endorsed. Professors Teeuw and Anceaux proposed Ildep as a cultural development project, in a time where development was defined as technical. In the course of years, a growing interest in the cultural aspects of development emerged. The legal cooperation projects were endorsed in a time in which 'good governance' as development was not a political priority. There as in fact a hostile climate for the project: direct cooperation with the Indonesian government was not politically correct. In Indonesia furthermore, the New Order regime was not known for its willingness to foster legal and political reform. The costly TTA-79 project was implemented in the 1980s, when an economic recession forced the Dutch government to take stringent economising measures in all policy areas. Thus, a causal link between the political system and the emergence of the projects could in many of the cases not be found.

Differences in socio-cultural values had hardly affected cooperation before 1992. This discrepancy in values was frequently referred to in interviews, but actors from both countries knew exactly what these differences were and how to deal with them. The most obvious difference was the extent of directness in communication. Many Indonesian participants came from Java, where it is considered polite to say 'yes' or
‘maybe’ when actually ‘no’ is meant. But even Indonesians themselves recognised that at times they had to step over such politeness, if action was desired. Professor Haryati Soebadio, a participant in the PRIS, gave the most lucid example of knowing and dealing with the differences. She told about a meeting she had had with scholars from Cambridge and Oxford. She noticed that the English resemble the Javanese to a high degree: in the meetings everybody was so polite and indirect that in the end nobody knew what was agreed. When she proposed that everybody had been sufficiently polite and it was time to speak out, a research plan could finally be made. The Dutch consider being direct and honest a virtue and had sooner than the Indonesians their plans on the table. Although they had to wait on a final judgement of their Indonesian counterparts, in no case the politeness of the Indonesians has led to insurmountable problems in implementation.

Another example of how cultural differences had been accommodated for is found in the aerospace case, in which engineers worked together on a windtunnel. Dutch engineers had received a short crash course on how to communicate with their Indonesian colleagues. What made the cooperation run so smoothly however was the fact that they had all studied in the same field and shared the same technical jargon (‘a screw is a screw and has the same function in any culture’). More important in the case of TTA 79 was that a military structure of organisation was adopted by both counterparts. Command, obedience and timeliness are principles were strictly adhered to, facilitating the master-trainee relationship in building the windtunnel.

Also in the cases in legal cooperation, shared professional backgrounds proved stronger than cultural differences. Legal experts enjoyed working together in the same fields and differences in values and norms were considered academically challenging. The platitude that the Indonesian and Dutch people know each other so well is once again affirmed in this research on bilateral cooperation. Socio-cultural differences did not seem to have influenced the projects. How people dealt with them and whether they choose to adjust to the rules of the host country did matter, as was demonstrated in the former section.

A topic that was frequently mentioned by the Dutch interviewees was the ‘leveling out’ of finances and in some cases, petty corruption. Some considered that a part of Indonesian culture, but looking closely, it is not. The ‘sharing’ of funds is a direct result of the low wages of civil servants and the recent indignation of the Indonesian people toward the corrupt practices of the New Order regime is another proof that corruption itself is not a cultural trait. In Indonesian cultures corruption itself is a vice, while sharing (of burdens and wealth, Gotong Royong) is a virtue. Indonesians themselves know exactly when the concept Gotong Royong is abused or when sharing is acceptable. The disappointment of the Wooden Boats project team in the employees of the Ministry of Industry is therefore not a matter of cultures clashing. Rather it is disappointment in the fact that the ‘sharing’ was not acceptable: the Ministry of Industry did not deliver any services in return. The popularity of the abbreviation KKN (Korrupsi, Kolusi and Nepotisme) demonstrates that not only Dutch people resent abuse of public funds by civil servants and politicians.
The extent to which the context influenced the projects differed over the projects, but was in most cases not decisive. For most cases nothing had changed in the policy environment, and the fate of the projects must be explained by how the other factors worked. How players dealt with their environment is perhaps the best way to understand how ‘policy environment’ influenced the outcome of the projects. Perhaps if the main players in PRIS had been willing to redefine their project completely, it would have stood a chance to get a place in the purple environment of the Netherlands and give an answer to the demand for applied research in Indonesia. The Indonesian players in the Legal Drafting project were more willing than capable to advocate continuation of the courses. The players in the INIS project on the other hand aptly made use of the growing demand in knowledge on Islam and political attitude towards multicultural societies. The ‘structure’ remained mostly what it was before 1992, save for some changes, which were made into assets or impediments by ‘agents’. Like power, the environment is in the eyes of the beholder. Policy environment will therefore not be included in the next matrix, since it is not an independent variable.

Patterns and anomalies

With the method of the game metaphor, including the five elements of which a game consists, each case presented a story, with a different content but the same outline. By recounting those stories, the factors ‘players, stakes, interaction rules and policy environment’ were given depth and meaning. Now that it has been concluded how each of the factors must be understood, a cross-case comparison of the most significant factors can be made. With a simplified matrix, the relation between and significance of the factors is illustrated, which gives an answer to the first partial question. That question addressed the extent and the way the elements that constitute the policy process contributed to the (dis)continuation of the bilateral projects in 1992. The simplification in the next matrix is twofold: first the factors have been stripped down to their main contribution (meaning) and secondly, plusses and minuses are placed in the cells. In this section the first partial question is addressed: how the factors that constitute the policy process contributed to the (dis)continuation of the bilateral projects in 1992.

How the factors worked is written in the top row: these are the conclusions drawn in the former five sections. In the first cell the actions and beliefs of players from the implementation game have been singled out as most important. Whether a project was in the interest of the shopfloor is the next variable taken into account. The next factor is political stakes. Any study into a policy process must include the policy objectives set out by politics, even though only in two cases direct intervention from the political game was observed. Interaction could not be understood without the concept of games crossing networks, of which key nodes/double functions are an important element. The implicit or explicit support that these networks could generate is a significant part of how interaction as a factor must be understood. With regard to rules, the observance of Indonesian rules appeared to be most important. Also the absence or re-
solution of conflicts about rules has been a crucial aspect of the working of the factor rules. Policy environment has been left out in this matrix: in these cases it was not an independent variable.

With pluses and minuses the values for a factor for a project are indicated. A match between the value and the outcome is printed in the middle, a mismatch to the left. In the last row the matches are counted: values of the factors corresponding to the outcomes. The continued projects are placed first and printed in bold; the discontinued projects follow in standard print. To assess the relative importance of the factors and the relation between them I pay particular attention to the anomalies: the 'mismatches' that are put on the left hand side of the cells.

Matrix 8.2  Simplified matrix of the relation between and significance of the factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How the factors worked</th>
<th>Lobby from players in implementation game</th>
<th>Project serves stake of the implementation game</th>
<th>Project serves stake of political games (Ind. or NL)</th>
<th>Interaction by negotiated agreement in games crossing network</th>
<th>Indonesian rules observed; no unresolved conflicts in implementation</th>
<th>Continued?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seksi Belanda</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INIS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APERT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden Boats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ildep</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pompengan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTA 77 (Coffee)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandwich</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Drafting</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCH</td>
<td>13 out of 13</td>
<td>11 out of 13</td>
<td>8 out of 13</td>
<td>11 out of 13</td>
<td>11 out of 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- In the first row the relevant factors and how they worked are placed
- In the first column the projects, ordered to continuation and discontinuation. In italics the two projects that were formally continued, but practically discontinued
- Matches of the factors with the outcome are printed in the middle
- Mismatches are printed on the left-hand side of the cells
When factors have been transformed to how they work it is evident that the more plusses are found, the more a project is likely to be continued, and vice versa. Nevertheless, this analysis is not to underline what is already known from the former five sections. By focusing on patterns and anomalies it is assessed which factors are indispensable and how they relate to one another.

At first horizontal glance four factors work in concert to continuation of a project: these are lobby from the players, stake of the implementation game, interaction by negotiated agreement in a games-crossing network and observance of Indonesian rules in implementation. Without exception all five continued projects without had a positive value on each of these four factors. Recounting the stories of the continued projects, in these cases implementing parties took the initiative to advocate their projects, because they deemed continuation essential for their organisations. These parties 'owned' the projects, because the Indonesian counterparts had set the rules and no conflicts were simmering under the surface. Using their networks they communicated to other games and generated the necessary support. Still looking horizontally, PRIS, Pompengan, Sandwich and Legal Drafting have minuses on all factors, matching the outcome, so we will focus instead on those projects that have mismatches. These are APERT, Wooden Boats, Ildep, and the Coffee Project.

Turning vertically, the factor political stakes reveals something strange: of the five continued projects, only two could be said to serve a political stake, or had direct support from the political game (Seksi Belanda and INIS). This leads to the conclusion that whether a project served a political stake is not an indispensable factor for continuation. In fact, two projects that were directly supported by political intervention (APERT and Wooden Boats) were formally continued, but practically discontinued, according to the implementing parties interviewed. Since APERT and the Wooden Boats project did not score positively on lobby of the implementation game and interaction, these two seem to be necessary ingredients for continuation. Let us first look to the factors lobby and stake of the implementation game.

The match count tells that a lobby from the implementation game gives a prefect match. That means that in all cases a lobby did lead to continuation, and the absence of a lobby did not result in continuation. When we remember the bold actions of the players for IRIS, the Judges and the reasons why they were motivated to see the link to continuation. Similarly, the absence of a lobby from the players of PRIS, Pompengan and the Legal Drafting project, caused by a loss of interest in the projects resulted in the end of the projects. And indeed, the second factor, a stake of the implementation game, goes in 11 of the 13 cases hand in hand with a lobby.

Only in the cases of the Wooden Boats and Coffee Project there is a mismatch on the second factor. The projects definitely served the stakes of the implementation game. For Wooden Boats that stake was recognised by the minister of Industry, who intervened and declared that the project fitted well into his small- and medium scale
industry policy. A lobby from the implementation game was not necessary, but not feasible either. The implementing team knew that no support was to be expected from the policy management game, the Ministry of Industry, which was also the formal counterpart. What they did not know when the project was continued by minister Hartarto was that their counterpart would not cooperate and even obstruct the project. The jealousy on the independent status of the project and the forced petty corruption made the implementers eventually lose faith in the project. Political support did in this case not prevent obstruction from the policy management game, nor could it take away the frustrations of the implementers. In the Coffee project, the stakes for the participating farmers was evident, but there was only one person who attempted to save the project. One could not speak of a lobby for that project, because the large group of farmers did not and could not make their voices heard. These observations actually strengthen the conclusion that a lobby from the implementation game is crucial: what it suggests is that people coming into action to save their projects and gain support from all levels is necessary. A bit of work seems to pay off.

Apparently the factors ‘lobby’ and ‘stake of the ‘implementation game’ only work in concert with other factors, ‘interaction’ and ‘rules’. We will first focus on interaction. Remembering the story of the Coffee project, it is evident that the single rescue attempt form the team leader from Aceh to Jakarta and The Hague was not successful because there was no network for the project in these capitals of administration and politics. A games-crossing network is a tremendous asset to successfully conduct a lobby, because it can generate the necessary support of other games. Such was convincingly demonstrated in the case of INIS and the Inter-university project. Without their networks with key nodes, the lobby from the implementers would not have been as successful. APERT’s network was not a strong network in the sense that it had negotiated agreement as the mode of interaction. The top-down communication lines resembled a pyramid, information about the feasibility of the objectives was not communicated adequately and the actual stakes of the implementation game were not negotiable. A lobby from the implementing parties appeared not necessary, since the project had received the official green light. When in 1999 the implementing parties finally undertook action to have their stakes considered, the policy environment had changed so much that it was too late to have their actions succeed. A network with negotiated agreement as the mode of interaction is thus the infrastructure that connects the different levels in which policy is made. Without such a network, the policy process is open-ended and may lead to nowhere. Nevertheless, we still have one anomaly on the factor ‘interaction’: Ildep. Having a good network did in the case of Ildep not mean that it had to be used. The new director of the Pusat Bahasa did not have a stake in continuing the project, since it had already done so in the past. A network is an effective network when all members share a similar stake.

The apparent anomalies on the column on ‘rules’ add to the argument that the factors mentioned above are most crucial. In the case of Ildep it did not really matter much
that the project had always observed Indonesian rules and had never witnessed any serious conflicts. The director did not want to continue the cooperation with the Dutch and the network that could carry the project through the essential political and bureaucratic allies was not used. In APERT a fitting mixture was found between the local practices and Dutch rules of conduct in the intrinsic rules of the engineering community. But, similar to the Ildep project: if one or more of the other three essential factors are missing, a positive value on rules does not put in enough weight. Unresolved conflicts do influence the factor ‘stakes’: in the case of PRIS, Pompengan and the Legal Drafting project conflicts hampered the attempts to come to an agreement over objectives/stakes of the projects. It is probably also true that the Dutch rules of accountability and prevalence for the poorest of the poor had made powerful people in Aceh lose interest in continuing the project as it was. Unsympathetic as it may sound, the governor and the chairman of Bappeda had no personal stake in the project. Only when the Dutch company took over the production the new governor, who had previously been the chairman of Bappeda became involved again. However, this time he was involved on the other side, that was less concerned with accountability and the interests of the farmers.

An answer to the first partial question is thus the following. Essential factors for continuation were first a lobby from the implementation game targeted to other games, motivated by a stake of the implementation game, carried through a network that had its links between the games. Adapting to Indonesian rules and resolving conflicts about which rules to observe, contributed favourably to the other factors. The observation that the skills and ingenuity of players from the implementation game have been crucial to put a project on the political agenda and to keep it there after 1992, was an important finding, made visible by using the game metaphor. Precisely with those characteristics some players knew how to adequately respond to the multiple rules of bilateral cooperation. With those characteristics some players were able to anticipate changes in the policy environment as well, preparing the projects to continue in a different environment. A project that either lacked a lobby, or did not serve the stakes of the implementation game, or did not have a games-crossing network, but most of all, skilled and experienced players in a bilateral game, missed all the assets for continuation.

The conclusions about the factors at work may not be new for people who have actually been involved in the process, nor will they be surprising for policy scientists. What I have simply done is to study the effects of a rupture between the governments of two countries by extending the level of analysis to the level of implementation. By doing so, I have pointed to another level of analysis in foreign policy-making. Next to politicians and civil servants one must be aware that target-groups and practitioners at the non-government level put in their expertise, experience and wants through interacting purposefully with government.
The importance of the shopfloor

The second partial question asked what the role of each the games had in the bilateral policy process. Investigating how the decision of the Indonesian political game affected a selection of projects of bilateral cooperation, each of the games had distinct roles. More so the roles were different than the traditional model of the policy process assumes, but also different than Laurence Lynn devised the roles of the games.

The implementation game had predominantly an *initiating* role: players within that game put a stake they had on the agendas of the policy management and political games. The fierce nationalism in the letter rejecting Dutch aid was mollified into pragmatism from the professionals at the level of implementation. What was real to them was not the alleged neo-colonialism of Dutch-Indonesian cooperation, but whether cooperation could solve the problems inherited from the colonial times. Often like-minded professionals, sharing the same beliefs on what was the problem and how it should be solved, have made efforts to get their proposals on the political agenda. It did not matter whether that was a powerful person like B.J. Habibie with like-minded engineers in Indonesia and the Netherlands, or highly motivated judges, frustrated by the faltering legal system and the corruption of the New Order. It is at the level of implementation where political concepts are tested and at times, rejected. Players at that level, who know the policy area from within and how to translate ideas into practice, or practice into politically acceptable goals, have been the backbone of the bilateral cooperation.

In 1992, when all projects had to be reconsidered, the implementation game once again had an initiating role. The outcome of the five continued projects could not have been explained without regarding the actions of the implementing parties. No actions from the implementation game meant in effect that no other games could or would safeguard a project. Through interaction via games crossing networks, the necessary support from the policy management and political games was gained.

Unlike some models assume, the policy management game was not the strong fourth power that it is often perceived to be. The role of the policy management game in these cases has been that of the mediator, but not an initiator. Perhaps a mediating role is only assumed in sensitive, diplomatic issues such as the one studied here. However, and definitely compared to the implementation game, the policy management game had not been a source of much action. Rather, this game translated and functioned as an intermediary channel through which desires from the level of the shopfloor of cooperation found their way to political consent. The only power the policy management game in these cases demonstrated was the power of obstruction, and even that power was hardly used. Some individuals in the policy management game, whom also played a role in the implementation game did demonstrate some of the alleged fourth power. Using two positions, they were able to put their ideas on several agendas. These people formed the crucial nodes in the interaction between the games that was an indispensable factor in the policy process.
The political game has had a less initiating role than traditional models of the (foreign) policy process assume. Rather than initiating, the political game reacted on policy-proposals from 'below', both before 1992 and in the period after the Indonesian decision of March 25 in 1992. Evidently, the decision of 1992 was a political decision, and so were the interventions of the two Indonesian ministers. But the carrying through of these three decisions depended on what was decided and desired at the level of implementation.

None of the games can operate independently: without support and funds of the other two games, the implementation game cannot do much. But equally so, without the support and willingness of the implementation game, political objectives are likely to fail. The case of APERT is the most lucid example of the latter. Not surprisingly, the games are interdependent, but the role each of the games displayed was surprising. The implementation game has been the initiating game, from which new ideas emerged and political objectives were put to the test. The policy management game has been the mediator, translating and communicating ideas from mainly the implementation game to the political games. The political game was instead of the initiating, the reacting game. Even the ‘big decision’ to end Dutch foreign aid depended in the end on how players from the implementation game dealt with the decision. The analysis done here demonstrated that in order to understand the effects of a political decision such as the one in 1992 was, we must look at all levels in which that decision is carried out. The distinction in games, with stakes, actors and specific expertise could elucidate the different processes and how they relate to each other and what their contributions to the entire policy process.

To conclude this section Figure 8.1 is drawn of how the games related and worked in practice, during the cooperation, but also in the turbulent times of 1992.
A déja-vu

An explanation by the Dutch correspondent in Jakarta Dirk Vlasblom, referred to in chapter one, now makes sense. He said: 'There were no criteria. What was allowed to continue was not the result of well-considered policy but the result of negotiation and networks. People made use of the situation to get what they want if they were in a position to do so.' Vlasblom's impressionistic observation hit the mark, and now we know in more detail why and how. In the course of the search we have learnt even more about the policy process and what the role of each of the games has been for bilateral cooperation. Bilateral policy and its implementation in cooperation cannot be understood without a focus on non-government players: academics, businessmen, development workers and people with an emotional or historical bond with one another's country and people. The capacity of these non-governmental actors to deal with the rules, make policy structures work for them and build the right connections to policy management and politics determines for a larger part than expected the contents and proceedings of bilateral policy. What happened before 1992, in the cooperation between these non-government actors, what they learnt but most of all, what they perceived as solutions to problems in Indonesia or the Netherlands determined for a large part how the political decision of March 25, 1992 carried through.

Change of the window-dressing

The last partial question addressed the desire of the Indonesian government for bilateral cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit. The central stake of the political decision in 1992 was to change the cooperation towards equality and mutual benefit and a more businesslike relation. In other words, the Netherlands and Indonesia should resemble relations between for example the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, or Indonesia and India: without colonial hang-ups, but as fully sovereign states that do not conduct sentimental politics. If both countries decided to cooperate in matters, then the donor-recipient relation, that according to the Indonesian government had troubled the relation, should be banned completely. Cooperation has been defined in a broad term: including both the level of politics, administration and implementation of 'working together' towards objectives, shared or not. The answers are sought in changes in attitudes, actions and words.

At the political and administrative level, some changes could be observed. On the Dutch side politicians were notably aloof on Indonesian matters in parliament, the entire development cooperation apparatus for Indonesia was dismantled. The words 'equality' and 'mutual benefit' developed wings: in all official meetings, writings and agreements they were emphasised. Terms like human rights, the 'Soeharto regime' and aid were carefully avoided. In fact, more than political change, one could speak of a change in policy talk.
Politicians in the Netherlands and Indonesia pointed repeatedly to the private sector as the bearer of the redefined relation after 1992. Governmental interference should be limited, which was believed to prevent diplomatic conflict. After 1992 new private initiatives have been developed for new cooperation and to continue old cooperation, making use of the knowledge and ties that have been established in the past 50 or more years. The Forum Netherlands Indonesia (FNI) is a private organisation which aspires to be an umbrella organisation in which representatives form both countries from business, education and individuals annually come together to strengthen the ties and propose new initiatives. FNI annually organises meetings in either Indonesia or the Netherlands. The private sector was invited to take up a greater role in the bilateral ties after 1992, but before 1992 it had done so already. Most of the private organisations existed long before 1992 and were in fact the bases of the personal ties spoken of in the above. Amindo for example is an organisation that promoted economic, cultural and scientific cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The bilateral chambers of Commerce (INA) have for long provided services for companies wanting to do business in both countries. Indonet, a publisher and database gathers information about all cultural, business and private ties that exist between both countries (Indonet 1997). All Dutch universities have continued old or established new forms of scientific cooperation, without extra government support. Many Dutch companies have remained in Indonesia, even during the Asian financial crisis of 1998. The reason why these companies stayed was that it would be a loss in capital investment and a waste of knowledge and networks if they would leave Indonesia.

The new administrative structure for Dutch-Indonesian cultural cooperation organised by the KNAW was established to give shape to the new intentions of the Cultural Agreement. For Bappenas, the central agency concerned with the administration and management of all foreign donors, the decisions meant a short period of intensive administrative procedures. The decision did however not result in significant changes in the management of Indonesian development policy: the Dutch contribution had been small. Perhaps the major observable change was less money for new initiatives for Dutch-Indonesian cooperation, while the socio-economic context stayed the same. Indonesia remains a developing country in Southeast Asia and the Netherlands a fully industrialised country in northern Europe.

The stories of the projects showed that equality and mutual benefit in 'measurable quantities' could not be achieved. The projects that were continued, for example INIS and IRIS did not change objectives after 1992, they were geared towards educational assistance to Indonesian institutes and they remained so. For APERT, which was to be the prime example of the new era, it was extremely hard to meet the demands of equal inputs and mutual benefits. The projects that were discontinued not ended solely because of the decisions. Internal changes had already made the objectives obsolete. The decision of 1992 was more a catalyst for internal processes leading to their end than a U-turn in the process. These projects were not discontinued because they were politically sensitive or reflected neo-colonialism or inequality. The basis upon which people have started to work together and in the same way, ended it, was precisely
equality in wants and the same ideas on problems and solutions. The litmus test in 1992 was whether Indonesian counterparts were still convinced of the use of the project.

If we define equality in such a way, namely, an equal and shared say on what cooperation should be about, and then look at the level of implementation, then not much has changed after 1992. In fact, at the level of the shopfloor equality among the counterparts was the standard, despite all other differences: culture, salaries and expertise. The reasons why people from both countries have worked together in many areas, be it technological, cultural or industry development have been the same before 1992 and after 1992: because individually they had a stake in cooperation, hence there was mutual benefit at the level of implementation. The decision of 1992 was a sieve through which projects went, not shaken by politicians, but by actors at the level of implementation. Personal networks of Indonesian and Dutch, often professionals who have either lived or studied in their respective countries have stood at the beginning of many forms of cooperation. Practitioners came together, put ideas on the political agenda and worked together towards a common goal. That these goals diverged in the course of time was not so much the result of political differences, but professional differences of opinion and interests.

Joop de Jong, who in his capacity as historian and senior civil servant at the Department of Foreign Affairs, has written extensively on Dutch Indonesian relations, concludes that both countries have left an indelible impression on each other (De Jong 1986; 1988; 1995). The ties among people have not been extinguished by the several diplomatic crises both governments have had in the course of four centuries (De Jong 1998). The political decision of 1992 did thus not change the essence of cooperation between both societies. The contribution of bilateral politicking was that it enabled such cooperation and at times, learnt from people in the field and put it on the political agenda. Perceiving the policy process as the interaction between three sorts of games elucidated much on how bilateral policy was made and what defined its contents. It was also illustrated how societal actors interact with political actors and how political decisions carry through in an unexpected way into society. It does not matter how much divine power a ruler is believed to have, or how democratically a government has been chosen, ultimately the course of a decision is decided at the societal level. The knowledge gained in this research confirms the new thinking on state society relations; can add to theorising on the relation to domestic and international politics and; can generate lessons for the practice of international cooperation. These three topics are considered in the next chapter.