Opposing a different Europe

The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens in Western Europe

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Chapter 3

United against a common foe?
The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens

Introduction

From party-level research we know that Euroscepticism and left-right ideology are related in a curvilinear way, with most Euroscepticism concentrated among parties at the left and right extremes. The previous chapter has shown that at the level of public opinion a similar horseshoe-shaped relationship has developed or is developing in several Western European countries. While the strength of the previous chapter is its broad scope in terms of time frame and country coverage, this comes at a trade-off of being restricted to very general measures of left-right placement and Euroscepticism. Hence, even if the asynchronous development of Euroscepticism at the left and the right suggests that left-wing and right-wing citizens base their Euroscepticism on different motivations, I was not able to put this to a strict empirical test. Therefore, it is yet unclear whether the Euroscepticism found at both extremes is of a different kind, or whether it creates common ground between left-wing and right-wing citizens.

The present chapter goes beyond the general relationship between left-right and Euroscepticism to assess to what extent left- and right-wing citizens are united against a common foe. At the party level, there is accumulating evidence that the apparent alliances between left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic actors are actually rather superficial. First, Euroscepticism among radical left and radical right parties relies on diverging motivations (Aspinwall, 2002; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2002). The Euroscepticism of radical left parties stems from their defence of welfare state arrangements and from their opposition against ongoing market liberalisation. Radical right Eurosceptic parties on the other hand mainly take issue with the threat that European integration poses to

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2 As noted in the results section of Chapter 2, the there presented analysis of the different ‘EU fears’ among left-wing and right-wing citizens provides only tentative evidence of their distinct motivations.
national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity, and though some have become increasingly concerned with protecting the welfare state, these concerns are generally intertwined with exclusivist, anti-immigrant sentiments. A second distinction, which is less often made, is that these ideological opposites direct their criticism towards different aspects of European integration. A recent study shows that ‘moving from broad Eurosceptical stances to more specific preferences on the integration process, extreme left and extreme right parties express rather distinctive views’ (Conti and Memoli, 2012: 93). Most parties of the radical right categorically reject any type of integration that goes beyond the most basic economic cooperation. For most radical left Eurosceptic parties, Euroscepticism constitutes a rejection of the EU’s current composition and practice, rather than a principled rejection of European integration in and of itself (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012).

While quite some research exists on how party positions on European integration are structured, surprisingly little is known about how these attitudes are structured in public opinion. The previous chapter has demonstrated that citizens at the extremes tend to be most Eurosceptic, particularly in recent decades (see also Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Van Elsas and Van der Brug, 2015). What remains understudied, however, are similarities and differences in the nature and origins of Euroscepticism of citizens with a left-wing or a right-wing ideology. The main reason for why I expect similar structures at the level of parties and citizens is that citizens and parties at similar positions on the left–right scale can be expected to share similar values and principles. To the extent that positions of citizens and parties on matters of European integration are driven by these values and principles, a similar structure would materialise. However, citizens’ attitudes are expected to be less constrained by ideology than are party positions. This raises the question whether the differences between left- and right-wing Euroscepticism found at the party level are mirrored among citizens.

I focus on two possible forms of heterogeneity. First, public Euroscepticism is a multidimensional concept (Boomgaarden et al., 2011), and can be directed at different aspects of European integration. As was explained in the introductory chapter, throughout this dissertation I distinguish between the more diffuse attitude of opposition to further European integration and specific dissatisfaction with the EU as it currently exists and operates (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). Citizens on the far left as well as those on the far

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3 Evidently, the radical left and radical right are not polar opposites. Right-wing Eurosceptic parties are increasingly concerned with welfare issues, albeit through an exclusivist lens. Likewise, the economic protectionism of the left can also be seen as a specific form of nationalism (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). Though economic and cultural concerns are thus sometimes blended, the relative emphasis on either fundamentally differs between Eurosceptic actors of left-wing and right-wing lineage.

4 The terms left and right have multiple meanings to citizens, as the left–right dimension functions as a ‘super issue’ that absorbs attitudes towards various issues. Certain attitudes are considered left-wing (e.g. support for redistribution, multiculturalism) whereas others are associated with the right (e.g. economic liberalism, monoculturalism). In case of conflicting issue positions in terms of left-right, left-right identification can be adapted based on the issues most salient to the voter (Weber and Saris, 2015). Left-right is thus meaningful even if there is a pluralisation of issues it is associated with.
right are expected to be more critical towards the EU than those at the political centre, yet I
expect that this criticism takes different forms depending on their ideological background.
Citizens on the far right are expected to be particularly opposed to further strengthening
of the EU as they outright reject the ideal of an ‘ever closer union’. Far left-wing citizens,
on the other hand, should not so much oppose the idea of European integration as such,
but rather the current functioning of the EU. Second, in line with Chapter 2, I expect
that different motivations anchor Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens.
Yet in the present chapter I relate these different motivations to the two dimensions of
Euroscepticism. Left-wing citizens, particularly those at the far left, are expected to be
most concerned with the economic consequences of the current set-up of the EU, but
these economic concerns do not necessarily imply opposition to the idea of European
integration. Further strengthening of the EU – particularly in terms of social provisions
– might actually be seen as a partial solution to overcome some of the EU’s perceived socio-
economic downsides. Right-wing citizens, and especially those on the far right, are expected
to put nationalist objections to the EU front and centre. Almost by definition, transnational
solutions are unacceptable for citizens with mainly nationalist concerns. For citizens with
monoculturalist and related attitudes further European integration is seen in an even more
negative light than the EU as it currently functions.

This chapter thus aims to answer two related questions, namely to what extent the
Euroscepticism of left-wing and right-wing citizens is directed at different objects, and to
what extent it is motivated by different concerns. I present a twofold analysis of the structure
of citizen attitudes on the basis of data from the 2009 and 2014 waves of the European
Election Study (EES) and the 2008 and 2012 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS),
focusing on fifteen Western European countries (and Appendix F provides additional analyses
of the 2004 EES and ESS). First, I distinguish between two dimensions of Euroscepticism:
dissatisfaction with the current EU and opposition to further EU strengthening. My findings show
that this distinction is important, as these dimensions relate differently to left–right ideology.
Left-wing citizens are more critical of the current state of the EU than right-wing citizens,
whereas the right is more opposed to EU strengthening than the left. In the second part of
the chapter, I analyse whether the motivations undergirding Euroscepticism are conditional
on citizen ideology. The results indicate that dissatisfaction with the current functioning of
the EU is traceable to egalitarian attitudes, but only for left-wing citizens, while opposition to
further European integration is related equally strongly to nationalist attitudes for all citizens.
Strong monoculturalism leads to an outright rejection of the European project per se among
all citizens regardless of their ideology, while a strong preference for national redistribution is
translated in dissatisfaction with the current EU, but only among left-wing citizens.

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5 My research question does not apply to Eastern European countries, since in these countries Euroscepticism is not
related to left–right ideology in a horseshoe pattern, but rather concentrated at the left end of the spectrum (Marks et
al., 2006).
The findings of this chapter contribute to the ongoing debate on whether or not, and how, the issue of European integration continues to transform the existing political space. Do EU attitudes constitute a new dimension uniting Eurosceptics of different ideological backgrounds against a common foe? Or can we actually distinguish different types of Eurosceptics whose similarities at the surface mask fundamentally diverging views on the European project? The results of this chapter support the latter conclusion. Left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the issue base of their Euroscepticism, but also direct their objections towards different aspects of European integration.

**Left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism**

Scholars are increasingly emphasising the multidimensional nature of Euroscepticism (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Being Eurosceptic could entail that one distrusts the institutions that together form the European Union, that one opposes specific EU policies, or that one fundamentally rejects the very idea of regional integration. By no means do these different critiques of European integration need to go together (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). Yet, as has been justly pointed out, ‘a systematic engagement with potential differences in the explanatory power of different antecedents for different dimensions of EU attitudes is still lacking’ (Boomgaarden et al., 2011: 243). This is particularly relevant when studying the ideological embedding of Euroscepticism.

Most of the literature on Euroscepticism and its ideological underpinnings focuses on political parties. Studies relying on expert survey data (Hooghe et al., 2002) and manifesto data (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012) consistently show that parties located at the left and right extremes in Western Europe stand out as most Eurosceptic. The image of the horseshoe or ‘inverted U’ (Hooghe et al., 2002) has become a forceful image to illustrate this relationship between Euroscepticism and left–right ideology, suggesting that parties at the left and right extremes are united in their Euroscepticism. However, this simple image obscures the fact that radical left and radical right parties diverge in the motivations as well as the objects of their Euroscepticism. Two dimensions of Euroscepticism – directed at different objects – should be distinguished when studying how ideology relates to Euroscepticism: 1) evaluations of the EU as it currently exists and functions, and 2) a more diffuse attitude towards continuing the European integration process towards a supranational polity, reflected in preferences regarding the further strengthening of the EU. This distinction is particularly important for parties of the radical left, which primarily oppose the EU for its expected negative consequences for national welfare states, and the subsequent social harm that might befall vulnerable groups in society. This does not necessarily imply opposition to the project of European integration as such. Otherwise Eurosceptic left-wing parties can even support further EU integration, because they expect socio-economic grievances to be best remedied at the European level, but also because fundamentally internationalist values
form part of socialist ideology (March and Mudde, 2005). Indeed, in the programmes and campaigns of radical left parties across Western Europe, we find statements such as ‘Change Europe’ (French Communist Party, 1999),6 ‘100% Social: No against this EU’ (Dutch Socialist Party, 2014),7 and ‘Another Europe is possible’ (European party group European United Left/Nordic Green Left).8 The radical left thus tends to be skeptical of the EU in its current form, while not opposing the idea of European integration as such (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012). Exceptions are a few orthodox communist parties, most notably the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which more fundamentally reject European integration in both its principle and practice (Charalambous, 2011).

Parties of the radical right oppose the European project primarily for socio-cultural and political reasons which are embedded in their nationalist and exclusivist values (Hooghe et al., 2002). They fear that European integration will have harmful consequences for national interests, traditions, and identities. The economic implications of the EU trigger diverse reactions among the radical right. Some parties on the far right recognise the merits of market integration and trade liberalisation (e.g. the Austrian FPÖ and Swiss SVP). At the same time, many radical right parties, particularly in the recent period, have put themselves forward as defenders of national welfare provisions, albeit on exclusionary grounds (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014) and thereby appeal to the ‘losers of globalisation’ (Kriesi et al., 2012). This economic protectionism is blended into their nationalist discourse centred on countering immigration and maintaining national sovereignty. By definition, this discourse of nationalism is antithetical to furthering integration, and thus primarily results in a principled rejection of the European project. However, since the focus of the EU in the early 1990s shifted away from market liberalisation to political unification, the current set-up of the EU infringes on the national sovereignty of its member states. Many far right parties therefore not only condemn the furthering of European integration in itself, but also negatively evaluate the current functioning of the EU, where ‘Brussels’ often serves as an umbrella term for the all too meddlesome European institutions. Euroscepticism of radical right parties is thus in the first place a principled opposition directed against further integration towards (ideally) a federal union. Yet, sovereignty-based objections also lead to dissatisfaction with the current EU.

I expect the fundamental ideological premises that structure parties’ EU positions to be mirrored at the level of citizens for two reasons. First, left–right ideology is related to

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certain values and principles, which are shared by parties and citizens at similar ideological positions. To the extent that EU attitudes are also driven by these underlying values, I would expect parties and citizens at similar left–right positions to partially share these attitudes as well. Second, various studies have shown that elites shape public opinion with regard to European integration (Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007), while there is also evidence for bottom-up influences where citizens’ preferences steer party positioning (Carrubba, 2001). Even though patterns in public attitudes are less tightly structured than the positions of parties (Converse, 1964), this mutual influence can be expected to reinforce the similarities between parties and citizens.

Only few empirical studies examine whether Euroscepticism forms a different attitude for left-wing as opposed to right-wing citizens. Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) distinguish three types of attitudes towards Europe. While their study does not theorise on the relationships between different kinds of Euro-scepticism and left–right orientations, and while they employ a different typology than I do, their results suggest that distrust towards the current EU is stronger among left-wing citizens, whereas citizens on the right are more fundamentally opposed to the European integration (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). In a Dutch case study, Boomgaarden et al. (2011) distinguish as many as five dimensions of EU support. Of these five, only one appears to be related to left-right in a curvilinear way. All in all, the research on this topic remains scarce and the results are quite inconclusive.

My general expectation concerning the relationship between citizen ideology and attitudes towards the EU is as follows:

H1a: The relationship between left-right ideology and dissatisfaction with the current EU is curvilinear, with citizens at the far right and far left being least satisfied.

H1b: The relationship between left-right ideology and opposition to EU strengthening is linear, with opposition being strongest among far right-wing citizens, and decreasing as citizens are positioned more to the left.

In addition to the object of citizens’ opposition, there is also good reason to distinguish between the motivations of left-wing and right-wing citizens for being Eurosceptic. In the previous chapter I have shown that left-wing and right-wing citizens in Western Europe are sensitive to different drawbacks of European integration, with the left being more fearful of losing social benefits than the right, and the right more afraid of eroding national identity than the left. Yet, the survey items ask people directly how fearful they are that European integration will have consequences such as a ‘loss of social security’ and a ‘loss of national identity’. Someone could state that she is not afraid that the EU will lead to a loss of national identity, because she thinks national identities will stay intact, or because she simply does not care about these identities. Moreover, the questions pertain to the EU in general, rather than to more specific forms of Euroscepticism. For a more definitive test of the origins of different
EU attitudes among left and right leaning citizens, we should look at correlations between independent measures of Euroscepticism and economic and cultural attitudes respectively, and assess to what extent these correlations differ between left-wing and right-wing citizens. To my knowledge only one study directly examines this matter. In a French case study, Jocelyn Evans (2000) compares voters of the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Front National (FN) in how their Euroscepticism relates to economic and cultural attitudes. He finds that for PCF voters Euroscepticism is more closely related to economic attitudes than for FN voters (and vice versa for cultural attitudes). This indicates that Euroscepticism has different roots for radical left and radical right voters, but as of yet we do not know to what extent this finding can be generalised to other countries, to larger groups of citizens and to the more recent time period.

In general, I expect that for left-wing citizens economic concerns (i.e. regarding redistribution and the role of the government in the economy) are a relatively more important reason for being Eurosceptic than for right-wing citizens, whereas for right-wing citizens cultural concerns (i.e. regarding immigration and national identity) are a more important predictor of their views towards the EU. However, the attitudinal roots of Euroscepticism also depend on the specific dimension of Euroscepticism under consideration. Previous research on the relation between Euroscepticism and economic and cultural issue dimensions has shown that EU attitudes are consistently and strongly related to cultural positions (Kriesi et al., 2008; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009), and less so to economic attitudes (Costello et al., 2012; Garry and Tilley, 2014). No study has however distinguished between different dimensions of EU attitudes. It is likely that their relationship to economic attitudes only exists for specific dimensions of Euroscepticism. As argued, economic objections against the EU are mainly directed at how the EU currently functions, but not at the principle of European integration in and of itself. On the other hand, cultural objections against the EU are directed at both the current EU and its possible future strengthening. Therefore, I formulate different sets of hypotheses for the two dimensions of Euroscepticism and how they are motivated by economic concerns (here conceptualised as attitudes regarding national income redistribution) and cultural concerns (conceptualised as anti-immigrant sentiments). Dissatisfaction with the current EU is expected to be related to both economic and cultural concerns, but to different degrees depending on ideological positions, as is formalised in the following hypotheses:

H2a: Support for redistribution has a positive effect on dissatisfaction with the current EU, but this effect is strongest among far left-wing citizens, and decreases as citizens are positioned more to the right.

H2b: Anti-immigrant sentiments have a positive effect on dissatisfaction with the current EU, but this effect is strongest among far right-wing citizens, and decreases as citizens are positioned more to the left.
With regard to opposition towards further EU strengthening, I expect cultural concerns to be dominant for all citizens, for three reasons. First, the most obvious consequence of the deepening and particularly the widening of the EU is increasing diversity. The opening of borders facilitates labour migration within the EU, and the enlargement of the EU to member states in Central and Eastern Europe has particularly facilitated such migration from the new to the old member states. In addition, in this context member states have less control on the influx of asylum seekers which is of particular concern to citizens with strong monoculturalist attitudes. Second, opposition to further European integration is a more principled EU attitude, and is therefore likely to be related to one’s value system or worldview. Citizens with an internationalist, cosmopolitan worldview hold values of openness and cooperation beyond national borders. They view the national level as but one level to solve collective action problems, and are open to politics at a higher – European – level. On the other hand, citizens with a communitarian, nationalist worldview consider the nation to be the only political unit that protects their interests (Evans, 2000; Teney et al., 2013). These opposed worldviews drive positions on the cultural dimension as well as support for the idea of further European integration, thus reinforcing the relationship between the two attitudes. Third, I expect opposition to EU strengthening not to be related to economic attitudes, precisely because with regard to redistributive concerns, strengthening can be seen as both a threat and a solution. As we have seen, many radical left parties aim at a different Europe rather than no Europe at all. Typical left-wing objections to the EU are thus not necessarily extended to the European project as such.

H3: Anti-immigrant sentiments have a positive effect on opposition to EU strengthening, and this effect is equally strong for all citizens irrespective of their left–right positions.

Data

To test the hypotheses I draw on data from two waves of the European Election Study (EES 2009 and 2014) and two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS 2008 and 2012).\footnote{The EES data of 2009 (Van Egmond et al., 2009) and 2014 (Schmitt et al., 2015) can be accessed online via the EES homepage (http://eeshomepage.net/). The ESS data of 2008 and 2012 are accessible at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/} I combine different data sources for two reasons. First, the EES and ESS have different assets in terms of the included items. The EES 2009 allows me to distinguish between two dimensions of Euroscepticism based on various survey items. These data are suitable to map the two EU dimensions and study their relationship to left–right self-placement (H1a and H1b). However, in these surveys the measures of attitudes towards immigration and
redistribution have very skewed distributions. This makes them ill-suited for testing how their relationship with Euroscepticism differs between left-wing and right-wing citizens (H2a, H2b and H3). For this purpose I use the ess 2008, which enables me to construct more refined and balanced scales to measure attitudes towards redistribution and immigration, and thus to assess how the relationship between these attitudes and Euro scepticism differs between left- and right-wing citizens. By necessity, in the ess analyses I use single-item measures of the two dimensions of Euroscepticism identified in the ees 2009.

Second, recent years have been particularly turbulent for the eu and its member states. The Eurozone crisis has left an imprint on a wide range of citizens’ attitudes (e.g. Bermeo and Bartels, 2013). Although the ees 2009 and ess 2008 were conducted during the global financial crisis (from 2007 onwards), the subsequent debt crisis in the Eurozone (from December 2009 onwards) has been found to have the largest impact on eu attitudes (Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014). Therefore, I present replications of all analyses on the basis of the ees 2014 and the ess 2012 in order to assess to what extent the findings hold during the Eurozone crisis. By necessity, these analyses are based on fewer items to measure core concepts. Finally, I assessed whether the results hold outside times of crisis by replicating the analyses for two pre-crisis waves (ees 2004 and ess 2004, again by necessity relying on fewer items). The results strongly resemble the main findings, particularly those of 2008/2009. For reasons of conciseness, I refer the reader to Appendix F for these results.

The hypotheses are developed on the basis of the structure of Western European party systems, so the analyses are limited to fifteen Western eu member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. The ess analyses are conducted using twelve countries, since Austria and Luxembourg were not included in either of the ess waves, and Greece is included in 2008 but replaced by Italy in 2012.

Variables

Measuring Euroscepticism

Different operationalisations of Euroscepticism appear in the literature. In many instances, the choice of indicators depends to a large extent on the practical availability of survey items. Many studies have used the eu membership evaluation question, the principal advantage of which is its wide availability (Anderson, 1998; Gabel, 1998; Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Steenbergen et al., 2007). Other studies use support for further integration (Evans, 1999; Kriesi et al., 2008) or the desired speed of integration (De Vries and Edwards, 2009), while still others use some form of eu institutional trust (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014). Given my theoretical argument, I expect the outcomes of these studies to be in part a function of the specific sub-dimension of Euroscepticism tapped by the item. Constructing an index of multiple items does not by definition solve this. If one combines items on confidence in
the current functioning of the EU with items on further integration (e.g. Garry and Tilley, 2014), this is likely to introduce noise into the relationships with covariates such as ideology. Combining items that load on the same theoretical sub-dimension, however, will improve the reliability and validity of the findings, and this is what I aim for in my operationalisation.

**European Election Study 2009**

On the basis of the EU-related questions included in the EES 2009, I discern two dimensions of Euroscepticism. I tested the scales for reliability by using Cronbach’s alpha (α), and for validity by using Mokken scale analysis (Loevinger H-value). First, dissatisfaction with the current functioning of the EU is measured by the following four items (α = .77, H = .40): 'How satisfied are you, on the whole, with the way democracy works in the European Union?' (1–4), ‘Agree/Disagree: You trust the institutions of the European Union?’ (1–5), ‘Agree/Disagree: The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens’ (1–5), and ‘How much confidence do you have that the decisions made by the EU are in the interest of your country?’ (1–4). Second, opposition to further European integration is measured by two items (α = .64, H = .58): ‘European unification has gone too far or should be pushed further’ (0–10) and ‘In general, do you think that enlargement of the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? (1–3). All items were recoded in such a way that high scores reflect negative attitudes towards the EU. Subsequently, they were standardised and then added up to form scales. The resulting scales were again standardised, in order to obtain fully comparable scales representing the two EU dimensions.

Left–right ideology is measured by using the familiar left–right self-placement scale, which ranges from 0 to 10. I standardise the left–right scale and include it in the analysis in combination with its quadratic term.

**European Election Study 2014**

Not all items of the EES 2009 reappear in the 2014 EES wave. Dissatisfaction with the current EU is in 2014 measured by two items: ‘You trust the institutions of the EU’ (1–4), and ‘The European parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens’ (1–4) (α = .77, H = .47). These items have the same question wording, yet a slightly different response scale. Opposition to EU strengthening is measured by a single item: ‘European unification has gone too far or should be pushed further’ (0–10). Left–right ideology is measured on the same 0 to 10 scale as in the EES 2009.

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10 Cronbach’s alpha values are inflated by the number of items. Given the small set of items, α >.6 is taken as the cut-off value for sufficient reliability. Mokken scale analysis tests to what extent items measure the same latent construct. The fit of the scale is expressed in the Loevinger H coefficient, which is considered sufficient at >.3, medium at >.4, and good at >.5.

11 The main difference is that the 2014 items have no neutral category. For my main purpose of analysing the relationship with left–right placement, this is not problematic. It does however make a comparison of the absolute levels more difficult.
European Social Survey 2008/2012

The ESS 2008 and 2012 both include two items that measure EU attitudes, which can be matched to the two EU dimensions. As a proxy for dissatisfaction with the current EU, I use the item ‘distrust in the European Parliament’, measured on a scale from 0 (complete trust) to 10 (no trust at all). Conceptually, trust – like dissatisfaction – is based in large part on current evaluations (Hardin, 1999). Though the European Parliament constitutes a *pars pro toto*, the item overlaps in content with the two EES items that are included in the ‘dissatisfaction with the current EU’ scale in 2009 and 2014 (on institutional (dis)trust and on the European Parliament). For opposition to EU strengthening, I use the item ‘European integration has gone too far, or should go further’ (0–10), which is very similar to one of the two items I used in the EES 2009.

Left–right ideology is again measured by the self-placement scale, running from 0 (left) to 10 (right). For measuring support for redistribution and anti-immigrant attitudes, the ESS 2008 enables me to use three-item scales. In 2012, the immigration scale consists of the same three items, but attitudes towards redistribution are measured by a single item (see Table 3.1). Items were standardised before combining them into a scale, which is constructed by adding up the items and dividing the resulting scale by three (the number of items). Higher scores on these scales represent supportive attitudes regarding redistribution and negative attitudes regarding immigration. Again, to enable the comparison of effect sizes of indicators within and across models, both the independent and dependent variables are standardised.

| Table 3.1 Items used in scales for support for redistribution and anti-immigrant sentiments |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| **Support for redistribution**                               | ESS 2008 | ESS 2012 |
| Government should reduce differences in income levels (1-5)  | X        | X        |
| For a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small (1-5) | X    |          |
| Differences in income are acceptable if to reward talent and effort (1-5) | X        |          |
| α=.57                                                         |         |          |
| **Anti-immigrant sentiments**                                 | X        | X        |
| Immigrants make country a better or a worse place to live (0-10) | X        | X        |
| Country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (0-10) | X      | X        |
| Immigration is good or bad for the economy (0-10)             | X        | X        |
| α=.86                                                         | α=.85    |          |

Source: European Social Survey 2008/2012.
Control variables

Hypotheses H1a and H1b are concerned with the functional form of the relationship between left-right ideology and EU opposition, not with establishing a causal relationship between variables. I therefore do not include any control variables in the first part of the analyses based on the EES 2009/2014 (but see Appendix G for a replication of these analyses including demographic controls, which shows that the results are highly robust). Hypotheses H2a, H2b and H3, on the other hand, make predictions about the motivations leading to Eurosceptic attitudes. Here I do include a set of demographic controls, consisting of age, gender, level of education (measured in five categories), and social class (measured in nine categories).12

Method

The relationship between Euroscepticism, ideology and issue attitudes is studied by means of several linear regressions. Though H1a and H1b focus on relationships rather than causal effects, I model Euroscepticism as the dependent variable as this enables me to gauge the curvilinear nature of the horseshoe model, and ensures consistency with the analyses for H2a, H2b, and H3. The data sets include respondents from twelve to fifteen countries. I present pooled models including country fixed effects to control for the nested structure of the data, a strategy that fits my interest in relationships at the individual level.13

Yet, I am aware that the ideological underpinnings of Euroscepticism may differ between countries due to macro-economic factors (Garry and Tilley, 2014), the presence of left-wing or right-wing Eurosceptic parties (De Vries and Edwards, 2009), or possibly also due to a general Eurosceptic ‘mood’ in a country. This chapter focuses on common patterns within countries rather than between countries, but I do present country-specific analyses to assess to what extent the pooled results hold for individual countries.14

12 Education is measured as the highest level completed (five levels based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), combining levels 5 and 6). Class is measured in nine categories based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO08).

13 Hausman tests comparing fixed to random effects models are significant for five of the eight main models (based on both the EES 2009/2014 and ESS 2008/2012), indicating that fixed effects are in most cases preferable. To account for the nested structure, fixed effects are also preferable over clustered standard errors given that the latter method has been shown to produce over-conservative results (see Huang, 2016 for a simulation study), particularly inflating the level-1 standard errors, and particularly when within-cluster sample sizes are large. Appendix E shows that despite considerable inflating of standard errors, most findings are robust to the estimation of clustered standard errors (in fixed effects models).

14 Though all countries included are EU member states, they are not all Eurozone members. Since particularly in times of crisis we might expect different opinion dynamics in Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, I assessed whether the results hold equally in both categories of countries (see Appendix I for the results and a discussion). The results are highly robust for the Eurozone countries, and moderately robust for the non-Eurozone countries (though deviations can be explained by the particularity of these countries, which are Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain).
Results

Left-right and the two dimensions of Euroscepticism

Table 3.2 displays the results of a pooled regression of the two dimensions of Euroscepticism on left-right self-placement for 2009 and 2014. In 2009 left-right ideology is negatively and significantly related to dissatisfaction with the current EU ($b = -0.06$), indicating that citizens who identify as left-wing are less satisfied with the current EU than right-wing citizens. The curvilinear term is significant and positive ($b = 0.03$), indicating that dissatisfaction is stronger among citizens at the ideological extremes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dissatisfaction with current EU</th>
<th>Opposition to EU strengthening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right (z)</td>
<td>-0.06 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right (z)$^2$</td>
<td>0.03 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.02 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.04 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.08 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (respondents)</td>
<td>12,042</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Relation of two dimensions of Euroscepticism to left-right self-placement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dissatisfaction with current EU</th>
<th>Opposition to EU strengthening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right (z)</td>
<td>-0.06 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right (z)$^2$</td>
<td>0.03 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.02 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.04 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.08 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (respondents)</td>
<td>12,042</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fixed effects model of 15 countries. Left-right self-placement is standardized before squaring.

Figure 3.1a gives insight in the substantive strength of the relationships. The predicted value of a far left-wing citizen (0) on the EU dissatisfaction scale is .21, whereas this is -.06 for a citizen of the far right (10). This gives partial support to H1a. Left-wing citizens are, as expected, more dissatisfied than the political centre. For citizens of the far right, however, there is no significant difference – but at least the far right is certainly not more satisfied than citizens in the centre. In 2014 there is stronger support for H1a. The linear relationship of dissatisfaction with the current EU to left–right is again negative, but no longer significant ($b = -.01$), while the curvilinear term remains significantly positive ($b = .02$). As Figure 3.2a shows, this results in the familiar U-shaped relationship. Left-wing citizens are still the most dissatisfied, yet the differences between the far left and the far right have become less pronounced. My analyses cannot tell whether this is because the left has become more satisfied or the centre and right less so, as I cannot compare absolute levels between 2009 and 2014 due to measurement differences (see footnote 31). However, recent studies have documented a strong rise in Euroscepticism during the Eurozone crisis (Armin-
This suggests that the shape of the relationship changed mainly because of rising dissatisfaction among the right and centre.

**Figure 3.1** Predicted values of two dimensions of Euroscepticism across left-right scale in 2009

3.1a. Dissatisfaction with current EU  
3.1b. Opposition to EU strengthening

*Source: Based on fixed effects model of 15 countries (EES 2009)*

**Figure 3.2** Predicted values of two dimensions of Euroscepticism across left-right scale in 2014

3.2a. Dissatisfaction with current EU  
3.2b. Opposition to EU strengthening

*Source: Based on fixed effects model of 15 countries (EES 2014)*
The results for opposition to EU strengthening show a very different pattern. On this dimension, right-wing citizens are significantly more Eurosceptic in both 2009 ($b = .06$) and 2014 ($b = .05$) than left-wing citizens. In 2009 the coefficient of the curvilinear term is not significant. Thus, as Figure 3.1b shows, the relationship is linear, with the predicted values running from -.13 for the far left to .11 for the far right. In 2014 the curvilinear term is significant and positive ($b = .03$). Yet, as Figure 3.2b shows, opposition to EU strengthening is still clearly stronger for the right. The predicted value of support for EU strengthening runs from -.04 for the far left to .19 for the far right. I thus find strong support for H1 in both years: opposition to strengthening of the EU is predominantly a right-wing attitude. Yet, it is important to note the tendency towards increased left-wing opposition in 2014. After the Eurozone crisis, we see glimpses of a horseshoe pattern for both EU dimensions, while Euroscepticism among the left and right was clearly more distinct before the Eurozone crisis broke out. I will return to this finding in the discussion.

These pooled results mask some cross-national heterogeneity. Country-specific graphs for 2009 (Appendix D1/D2) show that in Great Britain and to some extent in Austria, the right is the most Eurosceptic on both dimensions. Both countries have witnessed a drastic shift of Euroscepticism from the left to the right in recent decades (Evans, 1998; Pelinka, 2004). In Portugal and Sweden, I find that the left is most negative on both dimensions. Nevertheless, the majority of countries conform to the patterns found in the pooled results. The country-specific results of 2014 (Appendix D3/D4) show less pronounced differences between the two EU dimensions. In Finland, Greece and again Portugal and Sweden, both dimensions spark mainly opposition from the left. In Italy we now see that, similar to Great Britain and Austria, the right is the most negative on both dimensions.

What motivates left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism?

The second set of analyses assesses to what extent the motivations for Euroscepticism are different for left- and right-wing citizens. These analyses are conducted by means of pooled fixed effects regression models, employing the ESS 2008 and 2012, and include a set of demographic control variables. The crucial tests of my second set of hypotheses rely on the interaction effects between left–right ideology and two (economic and cultural) attitude scales on the two dimensions of Euroscepticism. These interactions are presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Interactions between left-right and support for redistribution and anti-immigrant sentiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Distrust in EP</th>
<th></th>
<th>Opposition to EU strengthening</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)***</td>
<td>-0.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male=1)</td>
<td>0.08 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.08 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.06 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.04 (.01) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1-5 ISCED scale)</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (Ref.=Clerks)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>0.01 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.00 (.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators</td>
<td>0.05 (.03)</td>
<td>0.14 (.03)***</td>
<td>0.13 (.03)***</td>
<td>0.11 (.03)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and trade workers</td>
<td>0.04 (.03)</td>
<td>0.08 (.03)**</td>
<td>0.09 (.03)**</td>
<td>0.07 (.03)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural</td>
<td>0.04 (.04)</td>
<td>0.08 (.05)</td>
<td>0.00 (.04)</td>
<td>0.08 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/shop/sales</td>
<td>-0.01 (.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>-0.01 (.03)</td>
<td>0.03 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.00 (.03)</td>
<td>0.04 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>-0.09 (.03)***</td>
<td>-0.04 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.03)***</td>
<td>-0.04 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/managerial</td>
<td>-0.02 (.03)</td>
<td>0.03 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.05 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>-0.09 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.08 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.04 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.04 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for redistribution</td>
<td>0.04 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.03 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.02 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right*Redistribution</td>
<td>-0.05 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.04 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.02 (.01)***</td>
<td>-0.02 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant sentiments</td>
<td>0.28 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.30 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.36 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.37 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right*anti-immigrant sentiments</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
<td>0.03 (.01)***</td>
<td>0.00 (.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.30 (.04)***</td>
<td>-0.24 (.04)***</td>
<td>-0.07 (.04)*</td>
<td>0.09 (.04)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (respondents)</td>
<td>17,887</td>
<td>17,785</td>
<td>17,887</td>
<td>17,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fixed effects model of 12 countries. Left-right self-placement, support for redistribution and anti-immigrant sentiments are measured by standardised scales. One-tailed significance indicated by asterisks: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (standard errors in parentheses).

Source: ESS 2008/2012.

I find support for H2a in both 2008 and 2012. Distrust in the European Parliament – as a proxy for current EU dissatisfaction – is positively affected by support for redistribution in both years ($b = .04$ and $.03$, effect for centrist citizens), and this effect is stronger for left-wing than for right-wing citizens as is shown by the negative interaction term ($b = -.05$ and -.04). To facilitate interpretation, Figures 3.3a and 3.4a show these results graphically. In both waves I find that for left-wing citizens, support for redistribution has a positive effect on distrust in the EP. This effect decreases as citizens are more right-wing, supporting the expectation in H2a that economic concerns are more important predictors of current EU dissatisfaction among left-wing than among right-wing citizens. Interestingly, among far right-wing citizens I find an inverse (negative) effect. Support for redistribution makes them more satisfied with the current EU. This unexpected negative effect suggests opposition to the increased regulatory role of the EU that exists among right-wing citizens with strong
neoliberal preferences. Additional inspection of the marginal effects by country (displayed in Appendix E) shows this effect is particularly marked in Great Britain (indeed a country where this critique is salient), though in 2012 it is significant in none of the countries. The positive effect of support for redistribution on current EU dissatisfaction on the left is consistent across countries. In 2008 it is positive in all twelve countries, and significantly so in seven of them (Table E1a). In 2012 (Table E1b) the results across countries are slightly less consistent, but I still find a positive and significant effect in six out of twelve countries. These findings thus generally support H2a, as they show that concerns about redistribution mainly play a role for left-wing (and to a lesser extent for centrist) citizens.

Unexpectedly, for opposition to EU strengthening I find a similar – yet much less pronounced – pattern, indicating that for left-wing citizens this dimension is affected by redistributive attitudes too, albeit to a much lesser degree. Figures 3.3b and 3.4b display the marginal effect of support for redistribution on opposition to EU strengthening alongside citizen ideology. The graphs look very similar between the two years. For left-wing citizens, there is a weak positive effect of support for redistribution on opposition to EU strengthening. Country-specific results show that in 2008 this effect is mostly driven by Sweden, Finland, Denmark and France, where it exists among left-wing (and centrist) citizens (Appendix E, Table E2a). In 2012, the effect again appears among left-wing citizens in Sweden and Finland, and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland (Table E2b). Redistributive concerns are thus somewhat related to opposition to EU strengthening, but much less strongly and consistently than to dissatisfaction with the current EU. In most countries, there is no effect of support for redistribution on opposition to EU strengthening, neither for left-wing nor for right-wing citizens. This lends credibility to the expectation under hypothesis H3 that opposition to EU strengthening as a more principled attitude is not so much related to economic concerns but rather to cultural attitudes (such as anti-immigrant sentiments) for all citizens regardless of their ideology.

I find mixed support for H2b. Anti-immigrant sentiments have a strong and positive effect on distrust in the European Parliament in both years (b = .28 and b = .30, effect for centrist citizens). However, the expectation in H2b that this relationship is stronger for right-wing citizens is only corroborated in 2012, and not in 2008 (b = .01 (n/s) in 2008, b = .03 in 2012). Turning to the marginal effects plots, Figure 3.5a and 3.6a show graphically how the patterns differ between 2008 and 2012. In 2008 (Figure 3.5a) the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on distrust in the EP is equally strong for left-wing and right-wing citizens. In 2012, however, the effect clearly becomes more strongly positive towards the right of the left–right scale (Figure 3.6a). Comparing the 2008 and 2012 graphs shows that this change is due to an increase in the effect on the right.16 During the Eurozone crisis, the EU opposition of right-wing citizens has become even more firmly anchored in cultural positions.

16 Strictly, we cannot draw this conclusion from these graphs as they are standardised within years. Additional analyses (not shown here) standardising the dependent variables across the two waves combined show a very similar pattern.
Figure 3.3 Marginal effect of support for redistribution on two EU dimensions by left-right in 2008

3.3a. Distrust in European Parliament

3.3b. Opposition to EU strengthening

Source: Based on fixed effects model of 12 countries (ESS 2008)

Figure 3.4 Marginal effect of support for redistribution on two EU dimensions by left-right in 2012

3.4a. Distrust in European Parliament

3.4b. Opposition to EU strengthening

Source: Based on fixed effects model of 12 countries (ESS 2012)
Figure 3.5 Marginal effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on two EU dimensions by left-right in 2008

3.5a. Distrust in European Parliament  
3.5b. Opposition to EU strengthening

Source: Based on fixed effects model of 12 countries (ESS 2008)

Figure 3.6 Marginal effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on two EU dimensions by left-right in 2012

3.6a. Distrust in European Parliament  
3.6b. Opposition to EU strengthening

Source: Based on fixed effects model of 12 countries (ESS 2012)
Similar differences between 2008 and 2012 can be observed for opposition to EU strengthening and anti-immigrant sentiments (Figures 3.5b and 3.6b). The 2008 result is in line with H3 that anti-immigrant sentiments have an equally strong effect on EU strengthening attitudes for the left, centre and right, while in 2012 the effect is somewhat stronger on the right. Another important finding is that in both years the effect of immigration attitudes is much stronger with regard to opposition to EU strengthening than with regard to current EU dissatisfaction. This underlines the particular importance of cultural attitudes as a predictor for support or opposition to the furthering of European integration. Tables E3a/E3b and E4a/E4b in the Appendix show the effect of immigration attitudes on the two dimensions of Euroscepticism for left- and right-wing citizens per country (in 2008 and 2012). These results demonstrate the remarkable consistency of the effects across the two EU dimensions, across left-right ideology, and across countries.

### Conclusion

The issue of European integration is often regarded as a potential new line of conflict in Western European societies, cross-cutting the existing conflict dimensions and possibly forging new alliances between Eurosceptic actors. Indeed, when looking at very general measures of EU support and opposition, ideological extremes seem to agree in their Euroscepticism, as is commonly illustrated by the well-known horseshoe shaped relationship between left–right positions and Euroscepticism. However, party-level research has shown that the similarities between left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties are rather superficial in nature. Even though these parties can sometimes be united in their opposition to the EU, the nature of their Euroscepticism differs tremendously. This chapter has shown that the same applies to citizens. While at first glance citizens on the ideological extremes appear united in their opposition to the EU, substantial differences exist between left-wing and right-wing citizens in the objects of their Euroscepticism, as well as in the motivations that underpin their Euroscepticism.

The first source of variation concerns the nature of Euroscepticism itself. Previous studies have shown that Euroscepticism is a multidimensional attitude: Citizens can oppose the EU in some regards but not in others. I have shown that when unpacking general Euroscepticism into two sub dimensions – dissatisfaction with the current EU and opposition to EU strengthening – the horseshoe falls apart. Left-wing citizens are relatively more dissatisfied with the current EU than right-wing citizens, whereas right-wing citizens oppose future strengthening the EU more than their left-wing counterparts.

Second, left-wing and right-wing citizens also differ in their motivations for being Eurosceptic. Again, the results depend on the specific EU dimension under study. For left-wing citizens, support for redistribution increases dissatisfaction with the current functioning of the EU, whereas their socio-economic attitudes have no effect on rejecting further EU
integration in principle. Rather, the opposition to EU strengthening of both left-wing and right-wing citizens is driven mainly by their cultural attitudes, and this directly explains why they take such different positions particularly on this principled EU dimension: In terms of cultural attitudes, left-wing ideology is associated with multiculturalism and international solidarity rather than nationalism – and in this respect left-wing citizens fundamentally differ from right-wing citizens. For right-wing citizens, both EU dimensions are anchored solely in cultural attitudes. As a consequence, their EU attitudes demonstrate less ambivalence.

These findings have implications for our understanding of the origins and nature of Euroscepticism, and carry recommendations for future empirical research on Euroscepticism. To start with the latter, I have shown that when studying the correlates of EU attitudes, it is crucial to distinguish between different dimensions of Euroscepticism. Extant research relies mostly on available indicators of Euroscepticism, and to the extent that these indicators represent different dimensions of Euroscepticism, they can produce fundamentally different results. For instance, previous research has produced inconsistent findings on whether EU attitudes are best interpreted as part of a cultural dimension of conflict, or whether they relate to both the cultural and the economic dimensions of the political space. Though there is evidence that citizens’ positions on a socio-economic dimension matter for their Euroscepticism (e.g. Costello et al., 2012; Garry and Tilley, 2014), this relationship does not come out as strongly in other studies (Kriesi et al., 2008; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). My findings imply that studies using indicators reflecting more principled EU attitudes (such as attitudes towards EU strengthening) are likely to find weaker relationships to economic attitudes (and stronger relationships to cultural attitudes) than studies that operationalise Euroscepticism as evaluations of the current EU.

As noted, the results of this chapter give insight into how ‘Europe’ produces ambivalence among the political left. Generally, the Western European left combines economically left-wing and culturally progressive positions. The present findings indicate that at the level of citizens, these attitudes are in conflict with regard to Europe: Egalitarians are sceptical towards the current functioning of the EU, while their culturally more cosmopolitan and universalist attitudes lead to a positive evaluation of European integration as an ideal. Left-wing citizens might therefore reject the current EU, but can at the same time find themselves supporting a different and ‘better’ (i.e. more social and solidary) Europe. These findings at the citizen level have implications for parties as well. Radical left Eurosceptic parties will have to pursue a rather complex and nuanced combination of critical positions on European issues, particularly when compared to the more categorical opposition to Europe voiced by the radical right.

In addition, my findings tentatively indicate that the economic crisis might cause shifts in how Euroscepticism is ideologically embedded. The type of EU criticism held by left-wing and right-wing citizens appears to have become more similar in 2014 as compared to 2009 (and 2004, see Appendix F), as right-wing citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with the current EU, and left-wing citizens in some countries seem to have picked up some
more opposition to EU strengthening. At the same time, the motivations for left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism remain distinct. Economic concerns remain relevant only to those on the left, whereas cultural concerns have become more important for the right than for the left. In the near future, it is certainly possible that shared foes provide a basis for temporary Eurosceptic coalitions. Yet, due to the differences in the underlying reasoning, the formation of a stable Eurosceptic front cross-cutting the left–right dimension seems unlikely.

Finally, this chapter’s findings bear implications for electoral behaviour. Studies on ‘EU issue voting’ have identified an effect of Euroscepticism on voting for pro- or anti-EU parties (De Vries, 2007a; 2010; Tillman, 2004). Also, Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) have argued that Euroscepticism, as part of a more general globalisation cleavage, is becoming increasingly important for voting for radical right and radical left parties in particular. Most studies to date on the effect of EU attitudes on voting however concentrate on the effect of general Euroscepticism on party choice in general. Hence, we do not know to what extent ideologically different anti-EU parties (or pro-EU parties) mobilise a similar type of Eurosceptic sentiment. The finding that left-right ideology is an important structuring factor of the motivations and manifestations of public Euroscepticism raises the suspicion that the Euroscepticism (or EU support) mobilised by parties with a left-wing and a right-wing ideology might actually be rather different. In Part II of this dissertation, I turn to this question by studying the effect of the two EU dimensions identified in this chapter on electoral support for radical and mainstream parties. The following chapter starts by comparing the support base of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties across Western Europe.