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The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens in Western Europe

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Same interests, different values?

The electorates of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties compared¹

Introduction

Across Western Europe political parties with critical positions towards the EU are on the rise at both ends of the political left-right spectrum. Euroscepticism is the common denominator of electorally successful parties as diverse as the radical left Syriza in Greece (36% of the vote in the 2015 national elections) and the radical right Front National in France (with 25% the largest French party in the 2014 European elections). These successes raise the question to what extent these parties are profiting from a similar electoral potential, created by European integration and the pressures of globalisation more broadly. To answer this question, the present chapter directly compares the support bases of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties.

Euroscepticism has been described as (part of) a new political conflict line in Western Europe which challenges the dominant left-right dimension. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004: 33) call European integration a “sleeping giant” that has the potential, if awakened, to impel voters to political behaviour that [because of its degree of orthogonality with left/right orientations] undercuts the bases for contemporary party mobilisation in many, if not most, European polities’. For Kriesi and colleagues (2012: 3), European integration is part of a more profound process of ‘transformation of territorial boundaries’ which forms ‘a new “critical juncture” which results in the formation of a new structural conflict between “winners” and “losers” of globalization or “denationalization”’. This conflict revolves around economic competition, cultural diversity and political integration, creating a potential electorate of predominantly lower educated citizens who feel threatened in their social position as well as their national identity. As this new social divide does not fit familiar left-right politics (Lefkofridi et al., 2014; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009), it provides opportunities for parties mobilising on the basis of these ‘new’ issues. Eurosceptic parties at the far left and the

¹ A single-authored article on the basis of this chapter has received an invitation to revise and resubmit to a peer-reviewed journal. The revised version is currently in preparation.

far right appear the most likely candidates to appeal to this yet unexploited electoral potential. But to what extent does this mean that left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties draw (increasingly) similar voters? The common ground for these parties lies in defending the socio-economic *interests* of socially vulnerable groups. Maintaining and expanding the welfare state is at the ideological core of the far left, yet parties of the radical right have more recently also shifted to protectionist positions, be it on welfare chauvinist rather than genuinely egalitarian grounds. Yet, as these different underpinnings already suggest, a large difference exists between the left and right when it comes to the *values* on which their Euroscepticism is premised. In Western European public opinion, Euroscepticism is strongly associated with questions of national identity and cosmopolitan and tolerant dispositions (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). While nationalist Euroscepticism relates closely to the nativism that is a core characteristic of the radical right (Mudde, 2007), left-wing ideology is traditionally associated with a more international and solidary outlook, and left-wing Euroscepticism is generally not linked to nativist concerns (Hooghe et al, 2002). The difference is exemplified by the position-taking of the Dutch radical left and radical right during the Greek bailout crisis of July 2015. Where the radical right Freedom Party scapegoated the Greeks as yet another reason to exit the EU, the radical left Socialist Party opposed the EU bailout regime mainly because in the end it would harm the Greek people, meanwhile stressing the need for international solidarity. Hence, though both the far left and far right take Eurosceptic positions, these are based on fundamentally distinct values on a nationalism-cosmopolitanism dimension.

The central expectation guiding this chapter is that due to these value differences, the Eurosceptic right is better equipped to mobilise the ‘globalisation losers’ than the Eurosceptic left. Kriesi et al. (2012: 20) have suggested that electoral competition on globalisation is driven much more by a cultural logic than by an economic logic, and this is supported by many recent studies which suggest that globalisation-related attitudes are more strongly related to values than to utilitarian considerations (Bechtel et al., 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; 2007). The dominance of cultural considerations is underlined by the ease with which radical right parties have adopted welfare chauvinism to respond to the economic fears of the globalisation losers (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2004; Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014). The left, in contrast, has not demonstrated similar agility in taking up the losers’ cultural fears. As Grande and Kriesi (2012: 19) put it, ‘The predicament for the left in trying to mobilise ‘losers’ is [their] (...) legacy of support for multiculturalism’.

As of yet there is little empirical research comparing the supporters of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties (but see Hobolt and De Vries, 2016; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). The present chapter fills this void by systematically examining to what extent support for these parties is driven by a new divide defined by education and Euroscepticism. First, education is the core social characteristic structuring attitudes towards European integration (Hakhverdian et al., 2013), as it relates to both the social positions and to the

values that underlie the globalisation divide. As I expect the value-based mobilisation by the Eurosceptic right to be most successful, I expect the lower educated to be overrepresented among Eurosceptic right – but less so among Eurosceptic left – supporters. Second, I focus on Eurosceptic attitudes as the most evident common ground for supporting left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties. Building on the findings in Chapter 3 with regard to the two EU attitude dimensions, I hypothesise that supporters of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties are all dissatisfied with the current EU, yet they have diverging preferences when it comes to the furthering of the process of European integration, which is opposed by those on the right, but not necessarily by those on the left. Again, and as is supported by the findings of Chapter 3, these differences are expected to arise because left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic voters crucially diverge in terms of cosmopolitan versus nationalist values, to which particularly opposition to further EU strengthening is closely related.

This chapter first tests its expectations in cross-sectional analyses based upon the European Election Study (EES) data of 2009 and 2014. These analyses are combined with a longitudinal analysis spanning 25 years based on the five-yearly EES waves from 1989 to 2014. This longitudinal perspective is important as divisions over European integration are becoming increasingly salient over time (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), and could thus have led the similarities between the supporters of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties to have increased over the past decades.

The findings show that left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties draw highly distinct electorates. While right-wing Eurosceptic parties draw lower educated voters, the Eurosceptic left instead draws voters with a mixed – or in some countries even higher – educational profile, and this difference is somewhat more marked in recent years. The EU attitudes of the supporters of both party families also diverge. While the supporters of right-wing Eurosceptic parties categorically reject Europe both in its current and potential future forms, supporters of the Eurosceptic left, on the other hand, are critical of the EU as it currently functions, but generally not opposed to furthering the European project. Again, these differences have increased rather than diminished over the past decades.

These findings are relevant in several ways. First, we know much more about the supporters of Eurosceptic right-wing parties (which mostly belong to the radical right) than of Eurosceptic left-wing parties (but see Ramiro, 2016), though the latter have also attained considerable electoral successes across Western Europe (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012). We know particularly little about the differences between the two electorates, and how these differences have developed in times of increasing politicisation of globalisation and European integration. This chapter's findings largely contradict the image of voters of Eurosceptic left-wing parties as typical 'losers of globalisation'. Second, the findings show that to the extent that realignment is taking place, it is not along a fully-fledged cross-cutting dimension that might reposition former foes to friends. Euroscepticism creates divides among voters, but no new lasting alliance. This implies that in contexts where Euroscepticism becomes a salient issue, it potentially contributes to party system fragmentation.

Theory

Many studies have now shown that divides over globalisation-related issues such as European integration are strongly rooted in an opposition between lower and higher educated citizens (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2012; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Margalit, 2012). Different mechanisms have been proposed to explain this education gap, the principal ones related to diverging interests or values of the different educational groups. In the following section, I will first discuss these two approaches to the globalisation divide. Then I will explain how right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic parties mobilise different aspects of the conflict in the light of their ideological positions, resulting in different hypotheses on the educational background of their supporters. Finally, I will formulate theoretical expectations on how the two dimensions of Euroscepticism affect right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic party support differently.

The new conflict: interests or values?

Central to the ‘losers of globalisation’ thesis is that processes of globalisation and European integration create new lines of division between social groups on the basis of diverging *interests*. In knowledge-based, post-industrial societies, these social groups are increasingly defined by human capital in the form of educational levels and occupational skills (Bonoli, 2006). Utilitarian explanations of public Euroscepticism point to such human capital as ‘a strong indicator of a citizen’s ability to adapt to the occupational competition introduced by a liberalised EU labor market’ (Gabel, 1998: 337). The lower educated not only have less ‘convertible’ resources (Kriesi et al., 2008), but also lack ‘transnational competences’ (Koehn and Rosenau, 2002), which makes them more vulnerable to market forces, and less able to reap the benefits of globalisation. In combination with decreasing welfare state protection, the lower educated strata experience mainly negative impacts of open borders (Azmanova, 2011; Kriesi et al., 2008). As the impact of globalisation and European integration becomes more pervasive over time, the gap between higher educated ‘winners’ and lower educated ‘losers’ is widening (Hakhverdian et al., 2013).

However, accumulating evidence shows that the divide is not only about winning and losing in terms of their economic interests, but that it has a strong link to underlying values of cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and questions of inclusive or exclusive identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2012; Teney et al., 2013). These cultural values and dispositions are strongly related to levels of education. Education improves cognitive abilities, including the ability to look at societal issues from different angles (Bobo and Licari, 1989), but it primarily has a socializing effect, as educational environments stimulate the development of core values such as tolerance and openness (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 2004; Stubager, 2008); Kriesi et al. (2012: 14) call this the ‘liberalizing effect’ of education. Various studies that look at the relation between education and globalisation-related attitudes emphasise the role of values. In their most recent work, Kriesi and colleagues argue that the globalisation divide is driven

much more by a cultural logic than by economic concerns (2012). Concrete evidence for this argument is provided by several studies. Margalit (2012) finds in a survey experiment that lower educated citizens particularly disapprove of international economic integration when they are primed on cultural (as opposed to economic) issues. Bechtel et al. (2014) find that the higher support for the Eurozone bailouts among higher educated in Germany rests on cosmopolitan and altruist values rather than on economic self-interest, which has little effect. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) show that the anti-immigrant attitudes found among the lower educated are dictated to a large extent by cultural values rather than by labor-market competition.

Parties of the Eurosceptic right strongly appeal to the values of the 'losers of globalisation'. The principal Eurosceptic actors on the right belong to the radical right party family, which is primarily defined by its nativism, 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state' (Mudde, 2007: 19). This nativism translates into a rejection of European integration as one concrete form of denationalisation. Right-wing Eurosceptic parties however also increasingly appeal to the interests of the lower educated. In the last two decades many radical right parties have adopted a 'new winning formula' combining their exclusionary, nationalist discourse with welfare state protectionism (Kitschelt, 2004; De Lange, 2007). In doing so, they appeal to lower educated citizens in less skilled occupations, who tend to experience more negative consequences of globalisation than the higher educated (Kriesi et al., 2012). So, according to both interest and value logics, lower levels of education makes a voter more likely to support the Eurosceptic right. Extant research (focusing on the radical right) supports this (for an overview, see Ivarsson and Stubb, 2013).

H1a: Level of education has a negative effect on the electoral support for right-wing Eurosceptic parties.

Left-wing Eurosceptic parties share with right-wing Eurosceptic parties the economic protectionism and defence of welfare state provisions. Added to this, the Eurosceptic left opposes the integration and liberalisation of markets, as well as, more recently, the austerity measures implemented in the Southern European member states. Thus, the Eurosceptic left – like the Eurosceptic right – can be expected to appeal to the social groups vulnerable to the process of globalisation. At the same time, the nativist values that characterise right-wing Euroscepticism are not commonly associated with the left. Quite to the contrary, parties of the radical left are traditionally characterised by their internationalist outlook, which translates into a belief in European cooperation and solidarity (March and Mudde, 2005). Many radical left parties, including the Dutch Socialist Party, the German Die Linke, and the Spanish Podemos, proclaimed solidarity with Syriza and the Greeks during the 2015 bailout crisis. Syriza-leader Tsipras, in turn, interpreted the Greek 'no' in the July 2015 bailout referendum

on implementing EU austerity measures as a preference ‘not (...) for a break with Europe, but for a return to the founding principles of European integration’.² Thus, Eurosceptic parties of the radical left are ambivalent with regard to the new conflict line. In line with their socialist tradition, they aim to defend the interests of those social groups that feel threatened or harmed by European integration and are thus critical of the EU as it currently functions. Yet, at the same time left-wing ideology is associated with a universalist worldview, and the left generally values the idea of international solidarity and cooperation between European countries in itself.

This has implications for my expectations regarding the educational profile of the supporters of the Eurosceptic left. Following the interest logic, the Eurosceptic left should draw lower educated voters (with their more vulnerable social positions). Yet, according to the value logic, their fundamentally international outlook appeals more to higher educated voters (who tend to have more cosmopolitanist values). The findings of (scarce) extant research on radical left support point in this latter direction. Three cross-national studies find a positive effect of education on the radical left vote (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Ramiro, 2016) and on supporting radical left ideology (Visser et al., 2014). The study by Ramiro (2016) at the same time finds some evidence suggesting that the radical left also appeals to the lowest educational group (in a non-linear relationship). Given these findings as well as the existing research suggesting that values play an important role in the divide over European integration, I expect the Eurosceptic left’s appeal to the lower educated to be at least weaker than that of the Eurosceptic right, where this ambiguity is absent.

H1b: In comparison to right-wing Eurosceptic parties, level of education has a weaker negative or even a positive effect on the electoral support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties.

Two dimensions of Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is the most obvious common feature of the electorates of Eurosceptic parties of both the left and right, and indeed, both party types have been shown to draw Eurosceptic voters (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). Yet, recent studies have shown that Euroscepticism among voters is clearly multidimensional (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). As Chapter 3 has shown, a basic distinction between dissatisfaction with the current functioning of the EU and opposition to EU strengthening is crucial to understand the relationship between EU attitudes and left-right ideology. Hence, it is likely that support for left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties is driven by different dimensions of Euroscepticism as well. A distinction between different dimensions of Euroscepticism is rarely made in the literature on EU issue voting. In most cases, Eurosceptic attitudes are conceptualised as a single pro/anti-EU dimension

² Tsipras, A. (2015, July 8). Speech to the European Parliament. <http://www.primeminister.gov.gr/english/2015/07/08/>, accessed on July 4, 2016.

(Evans, 1998; De Vries, 2010).³ Using such a conceptualisation, the finding that Eurosceptic parties from the left and right draw equally Eurosceptic voters could obscure the fact that the Euroscepticism among voters at both ends of the spectrum may be of a different nature, directed at very different objects.

At the party level, such differences in the kind of Euroscepticism exist between left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties, as was discussed extensively in the previous chapter. Right-wing Eurosceptic parties are rather unambiguous in their Euroscepticism. These parties tend to oppose both the furthering of European integration as well as the current functioning of the EU. They criticise the concrete consequences of the EU, ranging from increasing (migrant) competition on the labour market to an all too intrusive and bureaucratic 'Brussels' interfering in national affairs. But they also oppose the supranational aims of the European project more fundamentally, as these aims are incompatible with their preference for maintaining national sovereignty in the long run. Many left-wing Eurosceptic parties, in contrast, are mainly critical of the 'really existing EU' (March and Rommerskirchen, 2012). Their critique follows an interest logic, which means they are not necessarily against a European project in principle, as long as it would be designed to cater to the interests of their constituency. The majority of left-wing Eurosceptic parties has adopted a softer Eurosceptic profile over time, or what is referred to as a 'contingent opposition to European integration framed in fundamentally pro-integrationist terms' (Almeida, 2012: 95).

Still, even if many left-wing Eurosceptic parties tend to be 'fundamentally pro-integrationist', expecting their voters to support the strengthening of EU integration might be a stretch too far, for two reasons. First, positions among voters are known to be more diffuse than among political parties. Even though left-wing Eurosceptic parties may appeal to voters who are critical of the practice but positive about the furthering of European integration, among their voters the distinction between the two dimensions might not be that strict. Second, there exists variation and ambiguity among far left parties on the EU strengthening dimension: although many are (implicitly) favourable, some more orthodox-communist exceptions exist, most notably the Communist Party of Greece (ΚΚΕ) and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), that fundamentally reject European integration in both its principle and practice (Charalambous, 2011). Therefore, the expectation is that, compared to the Eurosceptic right, the effect of opposition to EU strengthening on supporting left-wing Eurosceptic parties is at least weaker, and possibly inverted (to a negative effect).

Research at the voter level regarding these propositions is scarce. Hobolt and De Vries (2016) find that supporters of Eurosceptic left-wing parties are on average slightly more supportive of liberal immigration policies than all other voters – which underlines their universalist, solidary worldview – but these authors do not look at the effect of different dimensions of Euroscepticism. There is one previous study that includes different indicators

³ Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) provide a notable exception. Their study unpacks the effect of different dimensions of Euroscepticism on voting for Eurosceptic parties, but they do not distinguish between different party types.

of Euroscepticism to explain support for radical left and radical right parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007), but no allusion is made to the conceptually distinct nature of these indicators. The study finds that distrust in the European Parliament contributes to support for the radical left *and* the radical right, while sovereignty-based Euroscepticism only leads to support for the radical right (but not for the radical left). This appears to be in line with the theoretical argument outlined above, which leads to the following hypotheses.

- H2: Dissatisfaction with the current EU has a positive effect on the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties (both left-wing and right-wing)
- H3a: Opposition to EU strengthening has a positive effect on the electoral support for right-wing Eurosceptic parties.
- H3b: In comparison to right-wing Eurosceptic parties, opposition to EU strengthening has a weaker positive or even a negative effect on the electoral support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties.

Even though I have no *a priori* reasons to expect differences between left- and right-wing parties for dissatisfaction with the current EU (H2), the analyses will test for such differences for both EU dimensions.

The conflict over time

Voter realignment is by definition a process, and is therefore best assessed over a longer time span. As globalisation-related issues have become more salient over the past decades (Kriesi et al., 2012), determining the direction of developments (towards more similarities or more differences between left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic electorates) is a crucial test. If globalisation and European integration create common ground for left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties, we would expect both to increasingly draw support from lower educated, Eurosceptic voters. Yet, the above discussion makes clear that this is a valid expectation only insofar the divide is related to the interests of lower educated, socio-economically vulnerable 'losers' versus the higher educated 'winners'. Given that I expect the value logic to be dominant, however, an increasing overlap between the right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic electorates is unlikely.

If we more closely inspect the actual Euroscepticism articulated by parties at the left and the right, it appears that they are not moving closer together. Radical right parties began to voice more fundamental EU opposition in the early 1990s, as 'national debates over the ratification of Maastricht provided the incentive structure for positional realignment of the radical right' (Almeida, 2012: 138; see also Mudde, 2007). It has been argued that many left-wing Eurosceptic parties, on the other hand, have moderated their positions with time. Since their main critique of the EU is directed at its socio-economic consequences, the left had its

most unequivocal case against European integration when it was primarily a market making project (up until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, see Hooghe and Marks, 2009). As the EU's potential as a supranational regulatory institution became apparent, many radical left parties have attenuated their principled opposition to the project of European integration, or even taken up pro-integrationist positions (Almeida, 2012: 95).

There is thus no indication that the character of EU opposition among far left and far right parties is converging over time. Particularly when it comes to their opposition to the strengthening of the EU, therefore, we might find that their supporters are becoming more different rather than more similar.

Data

The European Election Studies, conducted every five years at the European elections from 1989 to 2014, offer a rich source of attitudinal data across all Western EU member states.⁴ For testing hypotheses H1 to H3 I use the 2009 and 2014 waves. As was explained in the previous chapter, the 2009 wave offers the most complete data to operationalise key concepts, whereas the 2014 wave allows me to look beyond the Eurozone crisis that struck Europe from 2009 onwards. For the longitudinal picture, I analyse the 1989 to 2014 waves, which stretch from before the Maastricht Treaty (1992) to after the economic crisis of the late 2000s (see Table 4.1). The countries included in the analyses are all Western European countries that are EU members and have left- or right-wing Eurosceptic parties, namely Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden.

Table 4.1 Overview of sample size, number of countries and number of parties per EES wave

	N (respondents)	N (countries)	N (RR parties)	N (RL parties)
Wave 1: 1989	7,073	11	7	14
Wave 2: 1994	8,927	12	10	9
Wave 3: 1999	9,311	14	12	18
Wave 4: 2004	9,643	10	9	13
Wave 5: 2009	14,380	13	13	17
Wave 6: 2014	16,327	14	13	15
Total	65,661	14	23	33

Note: Germany stands for West-Germany in 1989. East-Germany is included from 1994 onwards. Sweden and Austria joined the EU in 1995, and are included from 1999 onwards.

Source: European Election Study 1989-2014.

⁴ All waves of the European Election Study (as well as documentation) were obtained through www.eeshomepage.net (Van der Eijk et al., 1993; Schmitt et al., 1997; Van der Eijk et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2004; Van Egmond et al., 2009; Schmitt et al., 2015).

Selection of parties

The focus of this chapter is on electoral support for parties that have a clearly left-wing or right-wing profile *and* take a Eurosceptic position. Appendix J gives an overview of all parties that can be classified as such and that appear in the EES in any of the years under study. To classify parties in terms of their Eurosceptic and left-right positions, I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) and its predecessor by Leonard Ray (1999). Parties are considered Eurosceptic when they take a position lower than 4 (the centre) on the 1 to 7 European integration scale, and they are considered left-wing or right-wing when holding positions between respectively 0 to 3 or 7 to 10 on the general left-right scale. Table A1 shows the parties per country and wave that can be classified as left and right Eurosceptic parties. In practice, virtually all parties belong to the radical left and radical right party families, though there are a few exceptions (the British Conservatives⁵, the Irish Greens until 2004 and the Dutch Reformed Party). At the same time, not all radical (left or right) parties are Eurosceptic. The Spanish radical left IU is included only until 1999, after which it no longer classifies as Eurosceptic. Finally, Finland is excluded from the analyses because it has no party with a clear left- or right-wing and Eurosceptic profile.⁶

Variables

The dependent variable, support for Eurosceptic parties, is measured by the *propensity to vote* (PTV) question. Respondents are presented a list of their country's national political parties with the request to indicate on a 0 to 10 scale from 'not at all probable' to 'very probable' how likely it is that they will ever vote for that party.⁷ Such electoral utility measures are a solution precisely in the case of smaller parties, when survey samples often include too few respondents reporting to have voted for these parties. PTVs have been validated to reflect actual party choice very closely (Van der Eijk et al., 2006). All PTV items for left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties are included as dependent variables. In case of multiple parties that classify as Eurosceptic at either the left or the right in the same wave in one country, observations were stacked so that both parties are included (with the same respondent included twice in the data set).

Education is measured in three categories, representing the age at which respondents completed their education. Respondents that left school at 15 or earlier are seen as lower educated, 16 to 19 years is the middle category, and respondents who studied until age 20

⁵ Although the only mainstream party in the selection, the British Conservative Party has been referred to as the functional equivalent of a radical right party, mainly due to its Eurosceptic position (Kriesi et al., 2012).

⁶ The Finnish radical left VAS is not Eurosceptic according to the CHES. The True Finns, on the other hand, are Eurosceptic but not take a rather centrist left-right position (between 5.4 and 6.8 over the years).

⁷ Until 2004, the response scale ran from 1 to 10; the variables from these waves were rescaled to 0 to 10 scales.

or older are considered higher educated.⁸ I use this rather rough indicator because the EES does not measure substantive educational levels. However, these age categories have been used in many earlier studies and reflect the differences between compulsory, secondary and higher education (Hakhverdian et al., 2013). Next to education, I include a set of socio-structural controls. Social class is measured by respondents' self-identification. In the 1989 to 2009 waves, four categories are included (working class, lower middle class, middle class, upper middle class or upper class; the latter two categories are merged, as 'upper class' contains only few (<2%) respondents).⁹ In 2014, social class is measured on a 1 to 10 scale (from 'the lowest level in society' to 'the highest level in society'). The class measures are standardised in order to make them comparable between waves. Additionally, age and gender are included as control variables.

In the 2009 and 2014 analyses, the two EU attitude dimensions are measured by the same sets of items as in Chapter 3. Table 4.2 gives an overview of these scales along with the tests for reliability and validity by means of Cronbach's alpha and Mokken scale analysis. Again, the analyses based on 2014 by necessity include fewer-item scales. Additionally, in both waves I control for other political orientations that are central to the platforms of the respective parties, which are support for redistribution, anti-immigrant sentiments and political trust. As not all items of 2009 reappear in 2014, the operationalisations of these attitudes are different between 2009 and 2014. Finally, subjective left-right distance is included, measured as the absolute difference between the left-right self-placement of the respondent and the placement by this same respondent of the party in question (on 0 to 10 scales). All attitudinal items are standardised to enable comparison of the effect sizes.

In the longitudinal analyses from 1989 to 2014 the two EU dimensions are measured by single items. Dissatisfaction with the current EU is measured by 'satisfaction with democracy in the EU'. Opposition to EU strengthening is measured by the statement that 'European unification has gone too far or should be pushed further' (0-10) from 1999 to 2014. In 1989 and 1994, the item used reads: 'In general, are you for or against efforts made to unify Western Europe? (1-4)'. The wording is different, but both items are related to the process of unification rather than probing an evaluation of how the EU currently functions. The items are standardised within waves in order to enhance comparability of the coefficients between waves.

⁸ For the group of respondents that is still in education, those of 20 years and older are assigned to the 20+ category, whereas respondents under 20 are left out of the analyses (as it is unknown when they will finish).

⁹ Unfortunately the EES does not offer a more objective measure of social class. In interpreting the results, we have to bear in mind the possibility of endogeneity, as one's party preference might influence the social position one identifies with. I think this is acceptable given its function as control variable.

Table 4.2 Overview of attitudinal items used in analyses of 2009 and 2014 EES waves

	2009	2014
Dissatisfaction current EU	'How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU?' (1-4)	'Agree/Disagree: You trust the institutions of the EU?' (1-4)
	'Agree/Disagree: You trust the institutions of the EU?' (1-5)	'Agree/Disagree: The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens' (1-4)
	'Agree/Disagree: The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens' (1-5)	
	'How much confidence do you have that the decisions made by the EU are in the interest of your country?' (1-4)	
	Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$ / Loevinger H = .40	Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$ / Loevinger H = .58
Opposition to EU strengthening	'European unification has gone too far or should be pushed further' (0-10)	'European unification has gone too far or should be pushed further' (0-10)
	'EU enlargement is good or bad' (1-3)	
	Cronbach's $\alpha = .64$ / Loevinger H = .47	
Support redistribution	'Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people' (1-5)	You are fully in favour of/ opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in [country] (0-10)
Anti-immigrant sentiments	'Immigration to [country] should be decreased significantly' (1-5)	You are fully in favour of/ opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration (0-10)
Political trust	'How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?' (1-4)	You trust the [national parliament] (1-4)

Note: Mokken scale analysis indicates medium ($H > .4$) to good ($H > .5$) fit. Cronbach's alpha values point to reliable scales ($\alpha > .6$).

Method

The data have a hierarchical structure, as respondents are nested in parties, and – in the longitudinal analyses – in survey waves. To account for this structure, in 2009 and 2014 I run pooled regression models including party-level fixed effects. The longitudinal models have a more complex structure: here I run hierarchical regression models including a random intercept at the party-wave level. In addition, fixed effects are then included for wave and party separately.¹⁰

¹⁰ Alternatively, I estimated the models with country fixed effects (instead of party fixed effects). The results are highly similar.

The presented results are based on separate models for left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties, but a fully stacked model (combining the vote propensity scores of both left and right in one model) will be used to check if the differences between the left and the right are statistically significant.

The results for each individual party are presented in Appendix K and Appendix L to assess to what extent the pooled results accurately reflect tendencies in the individual countries, and are discussed in the section ‘Robustness checks’. Some between-country variation is to be expected, as previous research has shown that the effect of Euroscepticism on voting behaviour is stronger in some countries than in others depending specifically on the salience and polarisation of EU-related issues (De Vries, 2010).

Results

4

Cross-sectional analyses

I start by comparing the support bases of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties cross-sectionally, in 2009 and 2014. The analysis unfolds in three steps. Model 1 includes only level of education (next to age and gender), in order to test the full effect of education both as an indicator of social position (interest logic) and as a socialising or cultural factor (value logic) (hypotheses H1a and H1b). Model 2 adds subjective social class in order to assess how the effects change upon its inclusion. This allows me to disentangle the interest and value mechanisms: If the education effect changes when I include social class, this suggests that the overall education effect runs at least partially through social positions (in line with the interest logic).

Table 4.3a displays the models explaining the probability to vote for a right-wing Eurosceptic party. The results in Model 1 show that, in line with H1a, *education* has the expected negative effect on supporting these parties. With the middle level as the reference category, the differences are stronger between the higher and middle educated ($b = -.82$ in 2009, $b = -.79$ in 2014) than between the middle and lower categories ($b = .21$ in 2009, $b = .08$ (*n/s*) in 2014). Of the control variables, male and younger voters are relatively more supportive of the Eurosceptic right, which is consistent with previous findings (Werts et al., 2012). Adding the subjective social class variable (Model 2) barely alters the coefficients of education, which suggests that the causal mechanism of the education effect does not run through social positions, but possibly rather through cultural capital or socialisation. This could also explain why the effect of education is driven mainly by the higher educated: It is not so much those in precarious positions that are more supportive of the Eurosceptic right (interest logic), but rather those who are extensively socialised in an educational environment (value logic). This is further supported by the finding that subjective social class itself plays no important role in explaining Eurosceptic right-wing support, as it has a small negative effect which is only significant in 2014.

Table 4.3a Regression models explaining the probability to vote for Eurosceptic right-wing party

	2009			2014		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Male	0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.34*** (0.06)	0.35*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)
Education (ref=middle)						
Low education	0.21** (0.08)	0.18* (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)
High education	-0.82*** (0.07)	-0.79*** (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.07)	-0.79*** (0.07)	-0.76*** (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.07)
Subjective class (z)		-0.06 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)		-0.08** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Left-right distance (z)			-1.00*** (0.03)			-0.86*** (0.03)
Opposition to EU strengthening (z)			0.19*** (0.03)			0.31*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with current EU (z)			0.22*** (0.03)			0.26*** (0.04)
Support for redistribution (z)			-0.03 (0.03)			-0.18*** (0.03)
Opposition to immigration (z)			0.54*** (0.03)			0.46*** (0.03)
Political satisfaction (z)			-0.03 (0.03)			-0.14*** (0.04)
Constant	2.76*** (0.11)	2.75*** (0.11)	2.74*** (0.10)	3.03*** (0.30)	3.01*** (0.32)	2.88*** (0.46)
N (respondents)	9,328	9,328	9,328	10,010	10,010	10,010
N (parties)	13	13	13	13	13	13

Note: OLS regression models with party-level fixed effects. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (standard errors in parentheses).
Source: European Election Studies 2009 and 2014.

Table 4.3b Regression models explaining the probability to vote for Eurosceptic left-wing party

	2009			2014		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Male	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Education (ref=middle)						
Low education	0.06 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.26*** (0.09)
High education	0.03 (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)
Subjective class (z)		-0.49*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)		-0.31*** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)
Left-right distance (z)			-1.15*** (0.03)			-1.18*** (0.03)
Opposition to EU strengthening (z)			-0.03 (0.03)			0.13*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with current EU (z)			0.24*** (0.03)			0.17*** (0.04)
Support for redistribution (z)			0.30*** (0.03)			0.48*** (0.03)
Opposition to immigration (z)			-0.16*** (0.03)			-0.30*** (0.03)
Political satisfaction (z)			-0.08** (0.03)			-0.21*** (0.04)
Constant	3.82*** (0.10)	3.77*** (0.10)	3.22*** (0.09)	4.47*** (0.25)	4.35*** (0.26)	3.89*** (0.22)
N (respondents)	11,468	11,468	11,468	10,183	10,183	10,183
N (parties)	17	17	17	15	15	15

Note: OLS regression models with party-level fixed effects. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 (standard errors in parentheses).
Source: European Election Studies 2009 and 2014.

Model 3 shows, in line with H2 and H3a, that both dimensions of Euroscepticism have positive effects on supporting the Eurosceptic right. Both for *dissatisfaction with the current EU* ($b=.22$ in 2009, $b=.26$ in 2014) and *opposition to EU strengthening* ($b=.19$ in 2009, $b=.31$ in 2014) the effects are stronger in 2014 than in 2009. Of the remaining explanatory variables, by far the largest effect is that of left-right distance to the party ($b=-1.00$ in 2009, $b=-.86$ in 2014). Second largest is the effect of opposition to immigration ($b=.54$ in 2009, $b=.46$ in 2014), which is the core issue of radical right parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Furthermore, in 2014 supporters of the Eurosceptic right are less supportive of redistribution ($b=-.18$), which suggests that their support is not based upon the economic interests of the lower strata. The effect of political trust is rather small and inconsistent ($b=-.03$ (*n/s*) in 2009, $b=-.14$ in 2014), which can be due to the use of different indicators across waves.

Table 4.3b displays the same models for left-wing Eurosceptic parties. *Education*, when not controlled for social class (Model 1) has no effect on supporting the Eurosceptic left. This supports H1b that the effect of education is weaker for Eurosceptic left than for Eurosceptic right support. This difference is significant in a stacked model including both left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties (for higher education $p<.001$ in both years, for lower education $p<.01$ in 2009, *n/s* in 2014). Furthermore, when subjective social class is added to the equation (Model 2), the effect of education turns positive. Controlled for social class, in both years the Eurosceptic left parties draw higher educated voters ($b=.26$ in 2009, $b=.12$ (*n/s*) in 2014), while receiving relatively less support from the lower educated ($b=-.13$ (*n/s*) in 2009, $b=-.14$ (*n/s*) in 2014), in comparison to the middle group (in 2014 the differences between the lower and higher educated are significant). The education effect disappears when I include political attitudes (Model 3), indicating that these attitudes function as mediating variables. The results indicate that the effect of education on support for Eurosceptic left-wing parties is simultaneously negative (through social class) and positive (through cultural capital). This latter, value-based effect makes that the Eurosceptic left speaks (at least partially) to a different voter group than the Eurosceptic right: the higher educated.


Of the political attitudes, *dissatisfaction with the current EU* has a positive effect on support for Eurosceptic left parties independent of other issue positions ($b=.24$ in 2009, $b=.17$ in 2014), as expected under H2 (in a fully stacked model, in 2009 there is no significant difference between left and right, but in 2014 the effect is significantly lower on the left, with $p<.001$). *Opposition to EU strengthening* has very small effects, which differ in direction between the two waves. In 2009, those who oppose EU strengthening are slightly *less* likely to support a Eurosceptic left-wing party ($b=-.03$ (*n/s*)). In 2014, they are slightly *more* likely to do so ($b=.13$). In both years, the effects are significantly different from those found on the right ($p<.001$ in both years). These results lend support to hypothesis H3b as they show that opposition to the strengthening of the European Union has an inverted (in 2009) or at least weaker (in 2014) effect on support for the Eurosceptic left

than for the right. The remaining attitudes have effects in the expected directions. Again, left-right distance is by far the strongest predictor of support for Eurosceptic left-wing parties ($b = -1.15$ in 2009, $b = -1.18$ in 2014). Supporters of the Eurosceptic left are in favour of national redistribution ($b = .30/b = .48$), are favourable towards immigration ($b = -.16/b = -.30$), and have lower political trust ($b = -.08/b = -.21$). Political trust is the only attitude of which the effect is not significantly different between left and right (stacked model). Furthermore, it is important to note that supporters of the Eurosceptic left have significantly more *positive* attitudes towards immigration, which contradicts the idea that they appeal primarily to the ‘losers of globalisation’.

Longitudinal analyses (1989-2014)

We now take a longitudinal look at the relationships between education, Eurosceptic attitudes and supporting Eurosceptic parties of the left and the right. First, the effect of education is analysed over time (controlling for age, gender and class, as in Model 2). Second, the effects of the two EU dimensions are assessed over time, additionally controlling for left-right distance (mimicking Model 3 as closely as possible with the longitudinal data).

Figure 4.1 Marginal effect of education on support for right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic party, 1989-2014




Source: European Election Studies 1989-2014

Figure 4.1 displays the marginal effect of education on support for Eurosceptic parties from 1989 to 2014. For electoral support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties, across the whole period (except 1994) the effect of being higher educated is positive and significant, whereas

the lower educated until 2004 do not differ from the middle group. In 2009 and 2014, the education gap increases, as the Eurosceptic left continues to draw higher educated supporters, but loses ground among those with lower education. For right-wing Eurosceptic parties, there is an education gap across all waves, which decreases in 1994 but from there increases somewhat until 2014. Again, it are particularly the higher educated who diverge as they are significantly less supportive of right-wing Eurosceptic parties. All in all, the education gap is much larger for the Eurosceptic right, but to the extent that it exists for the left, it is in the opposite direction. This supports the expectation in H1 that education has a much weaker, and even inverted effect on Eurosceptic left-wing electoral support as compared to Eurosceptic right-wing support. Rather than moving more closely together, the differences between the electorates persist, and, if anything, increase somewhat with time.

More similarities exists between the Eurosceptic left and right support base when it comes to dissatisfaction with the current EU (Figure 4.2). The indicator used is only available from 1994 to 2009. Over this 15-year period there is no clear trend. Overall, the effect of dissatisfaction with the current EU is positive for both the Eurosceptic left and right, which is in line with hypothesis H2. The effect decreases for both the left and the right in 2004, but returns to similar levels (around $b=.20$) in 2009.¹¹

Figure 4.2 Marginal effect of dissatisfaction with current EU on support for right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic party, 1994-2009




Source: European Election Studies 1994-2009

¹¹ These coefficients are similar, though not identical to those presented in Tables 3a and 3b, due to differences in model specification.

Turning to opposition to further EU strengthening, the results show clear-cut differences between left and right. Figure 4.3 displays how the relationship of opposition to EU strengthening to supporting right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic parties follows a highly different trajectory over time. On the left, opposition to EU strengthening and Eurosceptic left support are positively related in the earlier waves (1989 to 1999), but the relationship becomes insignificant (and even slightly negative) in the 2000s, indicating that this more principled EU opposition is no longer an important factor in voting for the Eurosceptic left. The effect turns (weakly) positive and significant again in 2014, but, as noted above, this effect is inconsistent across countries. On the right, the relationship in 1989 is twice as strong as on the left, and increases in 2014. Whereas from 1989 to 1999 opposition to EU strengthening was related to both left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic support, from the 2000s onwards it has become more of an exclusively right-wing attitude. There is thus a long-term development towards the pattern suggested by hypotheses H3a and H3b, that opposition to further EU strengthening is more relevant for right-wing than for left-wing Eurosceptic party support.

4

Figure 4.3 Marginal effect of opposition to EU strengthening on support for right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic party, 1989-2014



Source: European Election Studies 1989-2014

Robustness checks

The results were tested for robustness in several ways. First, the analyses were run on a subset of only those Eurosceptic parties that belong to the radical left and radical right party families (leaving out the Dutch Christian orthodox *SGP*, the British Conservatives, and the Irish Greens). The results are highly similar. If anything, for the Eurosceptic right the effect of education becomes more pronounced upon the exclusion of these parties. Second, I checked to what extent the results are consistent across individual parties in 2009 and 2014. In general, the effects on the right are much more robust than the effects on the left. Appendix K displays model 1 for each right-wing party separately (Tables K1a and K1b). Education has a negative effect on supporting a right-wing Eurosceptic party for 12 out of 13 parties in 2009, and in 9 out of 12 parties in 2014 (the British Conservatives being an exception in both years, as education has a positive effect instead). Turning to model 3, the effects of the two EU dimensions are also rather consistent across parties of the Eurosceptic right (see Tables K2a and K2b). In both waves, the effects are positive for almost all parties, and significantly so in about two-third of the cases.

For left-wing Eurosceptic parties, there is much more between-party variation. In the pooled models, education had no effect when not controlled for social class. Additional analyses show that this null result is the average of an equal share of positive, negative, and insignificant effects among the individual parties (Appendix L1). Still, hypothesis H1b that the effect of education is weaker or inverse for supporting the Eurosceptic left as compared to the Eurosceptic right holds in most countries. With regard to H2, in 2009 the effect of dissatisfaction with the current EU is consistent across individual parties (Appendix L2a), while the party-specific results in 2014 are somewhat less consistent (Appendix L2b). With regard to H3b, the analyses reveal that for most Eurosceptic left-wing parties there is no effect of opposition to EU strengthening; Again, in 2014 the results become more inconsistent, with the effect turning positive in a few cases (Appendix L2b). Paradoxically, the crisis seems to have increased ambivalence towards Europe among the supporters of Eurosceptic left-wing parties.¹²

Conclusion

The recent successes of both left-wing and right-wing parties with a clear Eurosceptic profile raise the question to what extent Euroscepticism as well as broader anti-globalisation sentiments offer common electoral potential for parties with otherwise very different ideologies. In this chapter I have argued that although left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic

¹² It could also (partially) be a methodological artefact because I have fewer indicators in 2014 than in 2009 to measure current EU dissatisfaction (2 instead of 4 items).

parties can be expected to appeal to similar interests – those of the socio-economic groups most vulnerable to globalisation pressures – there is a fundamental distinction when it comes to the values underpinning their Euroscepticism – in terms of cosmopolitanism and tolerance versus nationalism and exclusivism. Given the repeated finding by recent studies that values are crucial in explaining Eurosceptic (and other globalisation-related) attitudes, I hypothesised that there are important differences between supporters of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties.

The findings show that, rather than drawing on a common ‘loser’ potential, both party families indeed draw highly distinct supporters in terms of social positions as well as attitudes. The findings suggest in several ways that these differences are understandable by these supporters’ values with regard to nationalism versus cosmopolitanism. First, while the effect of education is negative for right-wing Eurosceptic parties, for left-wing Eurosceptic parties education has no effect at all, but the effect turns positive once controlled for social positions. So when differences in social positions are kept constant, it are actually the higher educated who are more likely to support the Eurosceptic left. Given that education is strongly related to cosmopolitan, universalist values, it is likely that this appeal is based upon a shared cosmopolitan worldview. Second, the education effect for the Eurosceptic right mainly separates the higher educated from the middle and lower categories. The education effect thus does not seem to tap the interests of the lower educated ‘losers of globalisation’, but rather reflects a characteristic that distinguishes the higher educated from the rest. This characteristic likely is the set of values or worldview socialised in higher education, which can explain why the higher educated refrain from supporting right-wing Eurosceptic parties. Third, supporters of left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties share a dissatisfaction with the functioning of the *current* EU. Yet, they stand very differently towards the *furthering* of European integration. On the right there is consistent opposition towards further European integration, whereas on the left the effects are weak, inconsistent and in some cases even inverted – again, this indicates that supporters of the Eurosceptic left and right differ when it comes to more cultural, value-based EU attitudes. Finally, the differences between the supporters of the Eurosceptic left and Eurosceptic right in terms of education and Euroscepticism have continually existed over the past decades. While the Eurosceptic right is tightening its grip on the fundamentally Eurosceptic voters, the Eurosceptic appeal on the left is weakening, as the effect of opposition to EU strengthening decreases with time.

These findings refine the common horseshoe understanding of Euroscepticism and the political space (Hooghe et al., 2002). Although all (left- and right-wing) parties in this chapter were selected on the basis of their generally Eurosceptic position, studying their electorates in more detail reveals that these parties appeal to different kinds of Euroscepticism. This has implications for the kind of voter realignment we can expect on the basis of a pro-/anti-EU dimension (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004) or in the form of a new globalisation cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012). Rather than creating common

ground for left- and right-wing radicals, the EU dimension – and attitudes towards EU strengthening in particular – underlines important differences between the supporters of Eurosceptic parties of the left and right. To the extent that voters base their vote choice on European issues, this is thus not likely to create new alliances that cross-cut left-right politics (between left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties). Rather, it would serve to reinforce the divisions *within* the left-wing and right-wing ideological blocks (between pro- and anti-EU parties), and would thereby contribute to the fragmentation of the political landscape.

The findings also emphasise the ambivalent position in which left-wing Eurosceptic parties find themselves, in line with the conclusions of Chapter 3. The radical left is traditionally associated with the interests of those on the losing side of globalisation. Yet, the international and solidary outlook which forms part of their ideological core implies a fundamentally supportive position on European integration. The more these fundamental values come to dominate the debate on Europe, the harder it becomes for the Eurosceptic left to formulate an unequivocal message. Right-wing Eurosceptic parties, in contrast, are more likely to profit from the new divide. A central defining characteristic of the radical right party family, to which most right-wing Eurosceptic parties belong, is its nativism (Mudde, 2007). This ideology dovetails directly with the values driving the globalisation divide. This is in line with the conclusions of Kriesi and colleagues (2012), who state that ‘the successful mobilisation of the globalization losers, which is driving the restructuring of the political space in West European countries, is mainly done by appealing to the cultural and political anxieties of these losers’ (Grande and Kriesi, 2012: 15-6). For the Eurosceptic left, the mixed message of supporting the EU in principle but objecting to its practices might prove more difficult to sell to their (potential) supporters.

Finally, the finding that left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptic parties draw support on the basis of different kinds of Euroscepticism raises the question whether such differences exist among mainstream parties as well. The horseshoe model posits radical anti-EU parties versus a pro-EU mainstream, thus suggesting that mainstream parties are alike in their EU support. While we know that the ideological motivations for mainstream parties’ EU positions are diverse (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2002), we do not know whether this is reflected in a diversity in the type of EU support they mobilise. Given the findings of this chapter, such diversity is to be expected, particularly for attitudes towards EU strengthening. This question is the main focus of the following chapter.