

## **Online Appendix**

In the following, we present some additional information regarding our data (list of parties included, conversion table for CIG and MARPOR policy fields, correlation matrix), before we conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we explore whether the inclusion of our *Swedish* observations, due to the use of a slightly different measurement instrument, could drive our results. Secondly, we rely in this paper on a dichotomous measure of populism and we explore whether results could differ if we include a *continuous* measure of populism or populist tendencies of parties instead (e.g. Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017, 193). Finally, we explore expectations regarding contact between populist parties and the *frequency* of interaction. In all cases our results are confirmed which indicates the robustness of our findings (see Appendix 3-8 for the results and an extensive discussion of the theoretical embedding of the robustness checks).

### **Appendix 1. Additional information**

CIG Survey (<http://www.cigsurvey.eu>) questions used (see main text for explanation on calculation):

Variable		
Contact (DV)	QID32 During the last 12 months, how often has your group actively sought access to members, MPs or officials affiliated with the following parties in the parliament? Please tick one box in every row.	[No Contact, At least once, At least once every three months, At least once a month, At least once a week]
Issue overlap	QID16 Looking at the list below: Which areas is your organization involved in?	[see list of policy areas below]
Economic dimension	QID54 Interest organizations and civil society associations have different views on the role of government in economic matters. Some want government to play an active role in the economy, e.g. through taxation, regulation, government spending or a strong welfare state. Others prefer a reduced economic role for government, e.g. through privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, or a leaner welfare state. Next, we would like you to think about the goals of your organization in relation to the role of government in economic matters. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that government should play a much reduced role in the economy and '10' means that government should play a very active role in the economy, where would you position your organization on this scale? [q54]	0-10
Cultural dimension	QID56 Interest organizations and civil society associations have different views on personal freedoms and rights. Some support greater personal freedom, e.g., access to abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation (libertarian views). Others reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and	0-10

	<p>stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues (traditional views). Next, we would like you to think about the goals of your organization in relation to social, moral and cultural issues of this kind. On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means "libertarian" and '10' means "traditional", where would you position your organization on this scale?</p>	
Resources	<p>QID21 How many paid staff (full time equivalent) work for your organization? Please note the number below.</p>	#

**Table A1. Parties included in CIG survey**

<b>Country Name</b>	<b>English Party Name (acronym)</b>	<b>Populist?</b>
Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) Christian Social Party (CDH) Ecologists (Ecolo) Flemish Interest (VB) Francophone Socialist Party (PS) Green! New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (O-VLD) Reform Movement (MR) Socialist Party Different (SPa)	Yes
Netherlands	50Plus Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) Christian Union (CU) Democrats'66 (D66) Green Left (GL) Labour Party (PvdA) Party for the Animals (PvdD) Party of Freedom (PVV) People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) Reformed Political Party (SGP) Socialist Party (SP)	Yes
Lithuania	Election Action of Lithuania's Poles (LLRA) Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) Labour Party (DP) Liberal Movement (LRLS) Lithuanian Peasant and Green Union (LVLS) Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) Order and Justice (TT) The Way of Courage (DK)	Yes     Yes
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) New Slovenian Christian People's Party (NSI) Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) Slovenian People's Party (SLS) Social Democratic Party (SD)	
Sweden	Parties from the left Parties from the right Sweden Democrats	Yes

**Table A2. Conversion and calculation table for CIG policy fields  
and MARPOR programmatic dimensions.**

<b>CIG Survey Policy Field</b>	<b>MARPOR programmatic dimension</b>
Migration policy	per607 + per608
Economic and monetary policy	per401 + per402 + per404 + per406 + per407 + per409 + per410 + per411 + per412 + per413 + per414
Health policy	per504 + per505
Fight against crime	per605
Energy policy	per501 + per411
Education	per506 + per507
Gender policy	per503
Social policy	per503 + per504 + per505
Environmental policy	per501
Consumer protection	per403
Agriculture policy	per703
Fundamental rights of EU citizens	per201 + per202
International development policy	per107 + per109
Foreign policy	per101 + per102 + per107 + per109 + per105
Defense policy	per104 + per105
European integration and cooperation	per108 + per110
Scientific research policy	per411
Regional or cohesion policy	per301 + per302
Human Rights	per201
Transport policy	per411
Cultural policy	per502
Employment	per701 + per702

**Table A3. Correlation Matrix**

	Cont.	GAL-TAN Dist.	Left- right Dist.	Seat Share	Issue overlap	Pop. Party	Party Age	Gov. Party	IG Staff	GAL-TAN extrem.	Left- Right extrem.
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.09***	1.00									
Left-right Distance	0.01	0.06**	1.00								
Seat Share	0.12***	-	-0.02*	1.00							
		0.17**									
Issue overlap	0.17***	-0.01	-0.00	0.06**	1.00						
Populist Party	-0.17***	0.19**	0.10**	-0.01	-0.06***	1.00					
Party Age	0.23***	-	-0.01	0.26**	0.09***	-	1.00				
		0.07**				0.23*					
Government Party	0.08***	-	0.03**	0.52**	0.00	-	0.03**	1.00			
		0.14**				0.25*					
IG Staff	0.21***	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.14***	-0.01	0.11**	-0.01	1.00		
GAL-TAN extremity	-0.14***	0.38**	0.05**	-	-0.04***	0.34*	-	-0.39***	0.01	1.00	
				0.43**			0.07**				
Left-Right extremity	0.06***	0.00	0.04**	0.30**	0.05***	0.10*	0.46**	0.11***	0.06**	0.02**	1.00
IG breadth	0.19***	0.00	0.02**	0.04**	0.65***	-0.00	0.11**	-0.01	0.20**	-0.00	0.05***
<i>N</i>	13455										

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## **Appendix 2. Is Sweden driving our results?**

In the Swedish interest group survey, the question regarding interest groups' contacts with political parties was implemented slightly differently. Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency of their meetings with three categories: parties from the left (Social Democrats, Left Party, Greens), parties from the right (Centre Party, Liberal People's Party, Christian Democrats, Moderate Coalition Party), and the populist Sweden Democrats. We merged information for the respective individual parties belonging to these categories to these observations. *Contact* for the Swedish dyads does thus not vary for parties belonging to the same category (left, right, Sweden Democrats), but party and group-level variables do. While we think that this is an appropriate way of making use of the information available to us, there are two potential risks to this procedure. Firstly, there is a slight risk that by relying on the party-group mean to measure contact with individual parties we over- or underestimate actual contacts. This might lead to attenuation bias and jeopardize the reliability and validity of our results. However, we think it unlikely that this potential over- or underestimation is large so that this should not pose a major problem for our analyses. Secondly, the fact that the Sweden Democrats are the most relevant populist party in Sweden, and were offered as a category of their own, might lead to a lower propensity on the side of respondents to indicate any contacts with them. The just discussed 'lumping' of multiple parties into categories makes it statistically more likely that we will measure contact between any of these parties and an interest group. This might intensify the contrast between populist and non-populist parties and affect the validity of our estimates. To make sure that these two caveats do not in fact drive our results we reran all our models while excluding all Swedish observations.

The results are displayed in tables A4 and A5. While the effect of populism indeed is smaller if we exclude Sweden from our analysis, it remains nonetheless in the expected direction and stays significant. Importantly, except for this slight change, the models substantially replicate and support our previous findings: interest groups interact less with

populist-, ideologically extreme-, and ideologically distant parties, and more with parties that they share more policy interests with, that are more experienced, and in government. Interest group resources and the breadth of their policy engagement exert positive effects on the likelihood of contact with any party as well.



**Table A4: Explaining contact between interest groups and parties (Logistic regression with random intercept at the group level) – Excluding Sweden**

	(1)
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.062*** (0.019)
Left-Right Distance	-0.13*** (0.039)
Seat Share (%)	0.066*** (0.0058)
Populist Party	-0.49*** (0.14)
Left-Right Extremity	-0.54*** (0.052)
GAL-TAN Extremity	-0.027*** (0.0068)
Issue overlap	0.62*** (0.21)
Group Breadth	0.15*** (0.032)
Party Age (log)	1.04*** (0.067)
<i>Group Types (ref: Business Associations)</i>	
Professional	-0.53* (0.30)
Union	1.53*** (0.53)
Identity	-0.15 (0.31)
Public Interest	-0.27 (0.32)
Leisure	-1.88*** (0.41)
Institutional/Public	0.25 (0.46)
Rest	0.080 (0.55)
IG Staff (log)	0.42*** (0.074)
Government Party	-0.075 (0.090)
<i>Country Fixed Effects (ref: BEL)</i>	
NLD	1.23*** (0.25)
LTU	-0.45 (0.29)
SVN	-2.06*** (0.31)
Intercept	-4.77*** (0.36)

Group intercept variance	10.7*** (0.90)
<i>N Dyads</i>	10,193
<i>N Groups</i>	1,137
<i>AIC</i>	8803.0
<i>BIC</i>	8969.3

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A5: Logistic regression models explaining contact between interest groups and parties: conditional hypotheses – Excluding Sweden**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.019)	-0.058*** (0.020)
Left-Right Distance	-0.13*** (0.039)	-0.10** (0.040)	-0.12*** (0.041)	-0.13*** (0.039)
Populist Party	-0.51*** (0.17)	-1.16*** (0.24)	-0.28 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.22)
Issue overlap	0.61*** (0.22)	0.55*** (0.21)	0.61*** (0.21)	0.62*** (0.21)
Seat Share (%)	0.066*** (0.0058)	0.064*** (0.0058)	0.066*** (0.0058)	0.066*** (0.0058)
Populist Party*Issue overlap	0.10 (0.44)			
Populist Party*Seat Share		0.063*** (0.018)		
Populist Party*Left-Right Distance			-0.079 (0.070)	
Populist Party*GAL-TAN Distance				-0.038 (0.054)
Intercept	-4.77*** (0.36)	-4.75*** (0.36)	-4.78*** (0.36)	-4.78*** (0.36)
Group intercept variance	10.7*** (0.90)	10.7*** (0.90)	10.7*** (0.90)	10.7*** (0.90)
<i>N Dyads</i>	10,193	10,193	10,193	10,193
<i>N Groups</i>	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137
<i>AIC</i>	8805.0	8793.4	8803.8	8804.5
<i>BIC</i>	8978.5	8967.0	8977.3	8978.0

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; Models were calculated including the following control variables: Left-Right and GAL-TAN Extremity, Group Type, Group Breadth, Party Age, Group Staff, Government Party, Country Fixed Effects.

### **Appendix 3. Salience of anti-elite rhetoric as alternative measure of populism**

We operationalize party populism as a dichotomous variable because of limited data availability regarding the precise ‘level’ of populism of parties in the countries studied. There is some debate about the question whether populism is indeed a dichotomous concept, or should rather be understood a continuous phenomenon (e.g. Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017, 193). In the robustness check presented below, we use the salience of anti-elite rhetoric (Polk et al. 2017) as an alternative – if partial – indicator of populism. The results of our analysis with this continuous measure of populism support all our findings.

As we have elaborated above, one of the two defining features of the populist thin ideology is the prevalence of anti-elite sentiment. As such, the salience of anti-elite rhetoric at least partially indicates the populist nature of a given party: the more salient anti-elite rhetoric is for a given party, the more we can expect it to be populist in general (the correlation with our binary measure of populism is strong at  $r=.7$ ;  $p.<.001$ ); and by extension, to interact less with interest groups.

This alternative measure of populism is based on information from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017), where the salience of anti-elite rhetoric is reported. In our dataset, *anti-elite rhetoric* takes values between 1.2 and 9.4 (mean=3.8; sd=2.5), with higher values indicating a higher salience of anti-elite rhetoric. In tables A6 and A7 we replicate all models from our main analysis and find additional support for our previous findings.

Interaction between interest groups and parties gets significantly less likely the more salient anti-elite rhetoric is for a given party. Furthermore, anti-elite rhetoric interacts with issue overlap, party size, and ideological distance very similar to the way our binary measure of populism interacts (Table A7). This finding greatly increases our confidence in the robustness of our findings.

**Table A6: Explaining contact between interest groups and parties (logistic regression with random intercept at the group level): anti-elite rhetoric as measure of populism**

	(1)
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.095*** (0.018)
Left-Right Distance	-0.16*** (0.035)
Seat Share (%)	0.012** (0.0050)
Anti-elite rhetoric	-0.30*** (0.017)
Left-Right Extremity	-0.11*** (0.028)
GAL-TAN Extremity	-0.053*** (0.0063)
Issue overlap	0.41** (0.20)
Group Breadth	0.18*** (0.030)
Party Age (log)	0.65*** (0.070)
<i>Group Types (ref: Business Associations)</i>	
Professional	-0.92*** (0.29)
Union	0.45 (0.51)
Identity	-0.58* (0.31)
Public Interest	-0.13 (0.28)
Leisure	-2.27*** (0.36)
Institutional/Public	0.25 (0.47)
Rest	-0.41 (0.53)
IG Staff (log)	0.47*** (0.069)
Government Party	0.50*** (0.076)
<i>Country Fixed Effects (ref: BEL)</i>	
NLD	1.69*** (0.28)
LTU	-0.031 (0.31)
SVN	-1.16***

SWE	(0.32)
	1.40***
	(0.26)
Intercept	-2.34***
	(0.39)
Group intercept variance	13.6***
	(1.00)
<i>N Dyads</i>	13,455
<i>N Groups</i>	1,603
<i>AIC</i>	10905.9
<i>BIC</i>	11086.0

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A7: Logistic regression models explaining contact between interest groups and parties: conditional hypotheses – anti-elite rhetoric as measure of populism**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.095*** (0.018)	-0.099*** (0.018)	-0.094*** (0.018)	0.065** (0.032)
Left-Right Distance	-0.16*** (0.035)	-0.16*** (0.035)	-0.20*** (0.048)	-0.16*** (0.035)
Anti-elite rhetoric	-0.26*** (0.020)	-0.42*** (0.028)	-0.33*** (0.027)	-0.17*** (0.027)
Issue overlap	1.01*** (0.28)	0.41** (0.20)	0.41** (0.20)	0.41** (0.20)
Seat Share (%)	0.012** (0.0050)	-0.031*** (0.0094)	0.012** (0.0050)	0.016*** (0.0050)
Anti-elite rhetoric *Issue overlap	-0.17*** (0.054)			
Anti-elite rhetoric *Seat Share		0.012*** (0.0022)		
Anti-elite rhetoric *Left-Right Distance			0.011 (0.0084)	
Anti-elite rhetoric *GAL-TAN Distance				-0.040*** (0.0067)
Intercept	-2.48*** (0.39)	-2.09*** (0.39)	-2.26*** (0.39)	-2.86*** (0.40)
Group intercept variance	13.6*** (1.00)	13.7*** (1.01)	13.6*** (1.00)	14.0*** (1.04)
<i>N Dyads</i>	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455
<i>N Groups</i>	1,603	1,603	1,603	1,603
<i>AIC</i>	10898.5	10879.5	10906.1	10871.1
<i>BIC</i>	11086.1	11067.2	11093.7	11058.8

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; Models were calculated including the following control variables: Left-Right and GAL-TAN Extremity, Group Type, Group Breadth, Party Age, Group Staff, Government Party, Country Fixed Effects.

#### **Appendix 4. Ordinal measure of contact**

Despite the fact that our interest in this paper is to understand why interest groups and (populist) parties interact in general, all our arguments can be extended to include expectations regarding the frequency of interaction. Most notably, we do not only expect that interaction is generally less likely if it involves a populist party, but also that even if the threshold of interaction is crossed, it should be less frequent. If we find evidence for the expectation that even when interest groups interact with populist parties, they do so less frequently than with other parties, this would further support our argument that interest groups and populist parties behave awkwardly when it comes to approaching one another. This is what we test in tables A8 and A9. In our original question we asked interest group representatives to indicate not only whether they have had contact with given parties, but also the frequency of their interaction during the previous 12 months. Respondents could indicate their contacts with a given political party on an ordinal 5-point scale (1='never'; 2='at least once'; 3='at least once every three months'; 4='at least once a month'; 5='at least once a week'). In tables A8 and A9 we replicate the models of our main analysis, but use this ordinal measure of contact as our dependent variable. We calculate ordered logistic regression models with random intercepts at the group level.

As becomes clear, these models provide robust evidence for our argument: across all different model specifications, interaction is less likely to happen more frequently, if it involves a populist party. While the likelihood of *never* having had contact for a given dyad is significantly higher if a populist party is involved ( $p < .001$ ), it is significantly lower for all other categories of contact (e.g. Figure A1 based on model A8.4). Additionally, also in these ordinal models, populism interacts with issue overlap, party size, and ideological distance very similar to the way it did in the binary models.


**Table A8: Explaining contact between interest groups and parties (ordered logistic regression with random intercept at the group level)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.15*** (0.012)	-0.11*** (0.013)	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.075*** (0.014)
Left-Right Distance	-0.25*** (0.025)	-0.16*** (0.026)	-0.16*** (0.026)	-0.16*** (0.026)
Seat Share (%)	-0.0013 (0.0031)	0.0076** (0.0031)	0.0036 (0.0036)	0.0036 (0.0036)
Populist Party		-2.05*** (0.095)	-1.79*** (0.10)	-1.78*** (0.10)
Left-Right Extremity			-0.13*** (0.017)	-0.13*** (0.017)
GAL-TAN Extremity			-0.032*** (0.0049)	-0.031*** (0.0049)
Issue overlap				0.25 (0.16)
Group Breadth	0.20*** (0.022)	0.20*** (0.023)	0.20*** (0.023)	0.19*** (0.024)
Party Age (log)	0.80*** (0.042)	0.53*** (0.044)	0.68*** (0.046)	0.68*** (0.046)
<i>Group Types (ref: Business Associations)</i>				
Professional	-0.79*** (0.24)	-0.82*** (0.24)	-0.82*** (0.24)	-0.81*** (0.24)
Union	0.44 (0.41)	0.35 (0.42)	0.36 (0.42)	0.36 (0.42)
Identity	-0.49** (0.25)	-0.53** (0.25)	-0.54** (0.25)	-0.54** (0.25)
Public Interest	-0.21 (0.22)	-0.26 (0.22)	-0.26 (0.23)	-0.25 (0.23)
Leisure	-1.73*** (0.30)	-1.78*** (0.30)	-1.78*** (0.30)	-1.76*** (0.30)
Institutional/Public	0.12 (0.37)	0.070 (0.38)	0.071 (0.38)	0.071 (0.38)
Rest	-0.97** (0.42)	-1.00** (0.43)	-1.01** (0.43)	-0.99** (0.43)
IG Staff (log)	0.54*** (0.054)	0.56*** (0.055)	0.56*** (0.055)	0.56*** (0.055)
Government Party	0.75*** (0.054)	0.63*** (0.055)	0.69*** (0.056)	0.69*** (0.056)
<i>Country Fixed Effects (ref: BEL)</i>				
NDL	0.87*** (0.22)	0.84*** (0.22)	0.86*** (0.22)	0.85*** (0.22)
LTU	0.26 (0.25)	0.35 (0.25)	0.40 (0.25)	0.41 (0.25)
SVN	-1.88*** (0.29)	-2.04*** (0.29)	-2.14*** (0.30)	-2.12*** (0.30)
SWE	0.62*** (0.20)	0.87*** (0.20)	0.93*** (0.21)	0.93*** (0.21)

cut1	3.95*** (0.27)	3.23*** (0.27)	3.56*** (0.28)	3.58*** (0.28)
cut2	6.46*** (0.27)	5.86*** (0.28)	6.21*** (0.29)	6.24*** (0.29)
cut3	8.73*** (0.28)	8.19*** (0.29)	8.55*** (0.29)	8.57*** (0.29)
cut4	11.9*** (0.32)	11.4*** (0.32)	11.8*** (0.33)	11.8*** (0.33)
Group intercept variance	7.21*** (0.41)	7.54*** (0.43)	7.62*** (0.43)	7.62*** (0.43)
<i>N Dyads</i>	12,677	12,677	12,677	12,677
<i>N Groups</i>	1,560	1,560	1,560	1,560
<i>AIC</i>	21120.8	20575.5	20454.2	20453.8
<i>BIC</i>	21292.1	20754.3	20647.8	20654.9

Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure A1: marginal average predicted probabilities of contacts with (non-)populist parties.**





**Table A9: Ordered logistic regression models explaining contact between interest groups and parties: conditional hypotheses**

	(1)	(2)	(4)	(5)
GAL-TAN Distance	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.015)
Left-Right Distance	-0.16*** (0.026)	-0.14*** (0.026)	-0.16*** (0.026)	-0.16*** (0.026)
Populist Party	-1.61*** (0.13)	-2.76*** (0.23)	-1.71*** (0.16)	-0.66*** (0.17)
Issue overlap	0.30* (0.16)	0.20 (0.16)	0.25 (0.16)	0.25 (0.16)
Seat Share (%)	0.0040 (0.0036)	0.0012 (0.0036)	0.0035 (0.0036)	0.0068* (0.0036)
Populist Party*Issue overlap	-0.76** (0.36)			
Populist Party*Seat Share		0.082*** (0.017)		
Populist Party*Left-Right Distance			-0.028 (0.054)	
Populist Party*GAL-TAN Distance				-0.33*** (0.044)
cut1	3.60*** (0.28)	3.62*** (0.28)	3.59*** (0.28)	3.65*** (0.28)
cut2	6.25*** (0.29)	6.28*** (0.29)	6.24*** (0.29)	6.32*** (0.29)
cut3	8.59*** (0.29)	8.62*** (0.29)	8.58*** (0.29)	8.67*** (0.29)
cut4	11.8*** (0.33)	11.8*** (0.33)	11.8*** (0.33)	11.9*** (0.33)
Group Intercept variance	7.62*** (0.43)	7.59*** (0.43)	7.61*** (0.43)	7.65*** (0.43)
<i>N Dyads</i>	12,677	12,677	12,677	12,677
<i>N Groups</i>	1,560	1,560	1,560	1,560
<i>AIC</i>	20451.3	20430.7	20455.5	20396.4
<i>BIC</i>	20659.8	20639.3	20664.0	20604.9

*Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01; Models were calculated including the following control variables: Left-Right and GAL-TAN Extremity, Group Type, Group Breadth, Party Age, Group Staff, Government Party, Country Fixed Effects.*

## References

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