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THE EU AND CIVILIAN MISSIONS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Dimitris Bouris and Madalina Dobrescu

Introduction

One of the main objectives of the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 was to work towards a secure neighbourhood, because ‘neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe’ (European Council 2003). The development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) added momentum to the EU’s role in conflict management and resolution by promoting stability and prosperity through the EU’s export of governance models and norms (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2010). Inherent in the ENP, is the EU’s support for ‘democratic institution-building as a conflict prevention/resolution instrument’ (Youngs 2004: 531). Although conflict management and resolution gradually gained prominence within the ENP framework and the policy’s revisions (2011 and 2015), the ENP was not designed to address these domains. The revision of the policy in 2011, allocated a more ambitious conflict resolution role to the EU, by making explicit the assumption that many of the instruments used to promote economic integration and sectoral cooperation in the neighbourhood could also be mobilised to support confidence-building and conflict resolution objectives between conflicting parties (Schumacher and Bouris 2017: 19). The most recent revision of the ENP, in November 2015, made clear reference to the need for coordination between the ENP (which has largely focused on instruments related to the Commission’s competencies) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP).

The aim of this chapter is to focus on the civilian missions that the EU has deployed in its neighbourhood as instruments of conflict resolution. The civilian missions operating in the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods reflect the Union’s efforts at addressing complex and pervasive security challenges stemming from long-simmering conflicts, significant levels of organised crime, trafficking and illegal migration. Through its CSDP operations, the EU has tried to address these issues by contributing directly to confidence-building between conflict parties, as well as by exporting EU and international regulatory frameworks and institutional templates meant to reform domestic institutions. The remainder of the chapter provides a cross-regional account of the EU’s engagement in conflict resolution, through civilian missions deployed at its southern and eastern neighbourhoods.

The EU and civilian missions in the southern neighbourhood

The first EU civilian missions, deployed in its southern neighbourhood, were in Palestine and they were directly linked to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Following the military intervention in Libya, and the subsequent migration crisis in the Mediterranean, the EU deployed a civilian and two military missions in Libya (one of them only on paper). While the first missions in Palestine generated mixed results, the EU's inability to act decisively in Libya has exposed the lack of an integrated civil–military approach on behalf of the EU.

EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)

The European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) was deployed after Israel's unilateral decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. In November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) signed an 'Agreement on Movement and Access' (AMA) which called for a third-party presence at the border crossing point of Rafah, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Agreement on Movement and Access 2015). Although Israel was initially reluctant to accept an active EU role, after the United States' unwillingness to do so, it agreed to the establishment of EUBAM Rafah. The mission had significance regarding EU–Israel relations, as it was the first time that Israel accepted an EU mission on the ground.

EUBAM Rafah started operating at the end of November 2005, and it sought to 'reconcile Israel's security concerns with both the Palestinian demands for an autonomous border management and the requirements of Gaza's economic recovery – which presupposes open borders' (Del Sarto 2007: 70). The mission was of great importance, as it dealt specifically with border control, which is one of the 'final status issues' in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and it was hoped that its example could be used at other border crossings as well. Its main aims were to: a) assist the PA to build capacity–training on border management and customs; b) evaluate and assess the PA's application of these procedures; c) contribute to confidence–building between the parties; d) contribute to building institutional capacity in the PA; e) ensure effective border control; and f) contribute to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities in all aspects of border management at Rafah (Council of the European Union 2005a).

The mission initially had a one-year mandate, which has been extended to date (Council of the European Union 2015a). EUBAM Rafah had some success until Hamas' takeover of Gaza in June 2007, and it was considered the 'Rolls-Royce of EU CSDP Missions', as it was deployed rapidly and managed to make a quick difference on the ground (EUPOL COPPS official, interview 22 April 2013). The mission has not been operational since 2007, but the EU decided to keep it 'alive' and not close it down formally. The initial argument behind this decision has been that the EU considers the situation in Gaza temporary and, despite ten years having passed since then, this rationale has not changed. There has also been the fear that if the mission was terminated, then Israel would not allow it to be redeployed, should there be a change in its policy towards Gaza. This was confirmed by former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman, who argued that 'we cannot allow a return to the ineffective EUBAM mission' (Lieberman 2011). EUBAM Rafah is coming to the fore every time a major incident takes place in Gaza, such as the 2008–2009 war on Gaza, the 2010 flotilla incident, and the 2012 and 2014 wars (Bouris 2015a: 34; 2015b), but until now, the EU has failed to persuade Israel to open the Gaza crossing points, which would enable the mission to be reactivated. Although the mission could potentially run some projects and training, the fact that it does not have an executive mandate and that its mandate is restricted to its presence at Rafah crossing point have limited its room for manoeuvre. To 'resurrect' EUBAM Rafah, the EU recently proposed the expansion

Table 23.1 EU CSDP missions in the neighbourhood 2003–2016

Name	Mandate	Date mission was agreed and current status	Staff (as of 2016)	Budget in (EUR million)	Country
EUBAM Rafah	Provide a third-party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute to its opening and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority	14 December 2005 (ongoing)	4 international staff 7 local staff	€1.54 (until 30 June 2017)	Palestine
EUPOL COPPS	Contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform	14 November 2005 (ongoing)	114 (69 international staff 45 national staff)	€10.32 (July 2016–June 2017)	Palestine
EUBAM Libya	Support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader IBM strategy in the longer term	22 May 2013 (ongoing)	17	€17 (22 August 2016–21 August 2017)	Libya (but located in Tunis)
EUJUST Themis	Assistance to the Georgian government in reforming the criminal justice sector: guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy, support for judicial reform and anti-corruption, support for the planning of new legislation, support for international and regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice	28 June 2004 (completed)	12 international staff 16 national staff	€2.05	Georgia
EUBAM Moldova–Ukraine	Develop appropriate operational and institutional capacity in Moldova and Ukraine, contribute to the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and improve transnational cooperation on border management	7 November 2005 (ongoing)	80 international staff 116 national staff from Moldova and Ukraine	€14.81 (December 2015–November 2017)	Moldova Ukraine
EUMM Georgia	Contribute to stabilisation, normalisation, confidence-building and informing European policy through civilian monitoring of the parties' actions, including full compliance with the six-point Agreement	15 September 2008 (ongoing)	200 EU monitors	€18.30	Georgia
EUAM Ukraine	Mentor and advise relevant Ukrainian bodies in the elaboration of renewed security strategies and in the consequent implementation of relevant comprehensive and cohesive reform efforts	22 July 2014 (ongoing)	>200 Ukrainian and international staff	€17.67 (1 December 2015–30 November 2016)	Ukraine

of its mandate to include a maritime link which ‘could open Gaza to Europe and allow the people of Gaza to unlock their socio-economic potential’ (European External Action Service 2014). Since this request has not come from any signatory parties of the AMA, the EU has downsized the mission to three people, based at the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv and has also reduced its budget (see Table 23.1).

The European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS)

EUPOL COPPS was the second mission the EU deployed in Palestine, and was closely linked to another ‘final status’ issue of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict – that is, security – and to the objectives of the ‘Roadmap’, which requested that the PA reform its security apparatus and improve its ability to take responsibility for law and order (Bulut 2009: 289). EUPOL COPPS was established in 2006, building on a previous bilateral British initiative, initiated in mid-January 2005 by the Department for International Development (DfID).

While the mission had a three-year mandate, this has been extended ever since. EUPOL COPPS has two main operational pillars – a Police Advisory and a Rule of Law section since 2008 – and it also consists of five sections: police advisory; programme coordination; rule of law; administration; and gender. The mission was deployed in January 2006, and its main tasks are: a) to mentor and advise the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP); b) to coordinate and facilitate EU Member State financial assistance to the PCP; and c) to give advice on politically related criminal justice elements (Council of the European Union 2005b). EUPOL COPPS faced several operational challenges, as its deployment coincided with Hamas’ electoral victory in the Palestinian elections on 25 January 2006, and the subsequent non-engagement policy of the international community and the EU with the Hamas-led government (Bouris 2014: 54–56). ‘From our first days here we were hostages of the political situation without being able to do our job’, argues an official from the mission (EUPOL COPPS official, interview 20 May 2010). The mission resumed its operations after the government of Salam Fayyad was established in 2007, but has limited its operations to the West Bank. Since, similarly to EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS does not have an executive mandate either, the mission can only be present where the PCP can operate, which is mainly in Area A of the West Bank.¹

Initially, the mission focused on providing training to the PCP and tackling basic equipment, infrastructure and assessment needs. EUPOL COPPS was instrumental in the building of the Jericho Police Training School which has permitted the PA to have the necessary infrastructure to train its own civil police force. Gradually, the mission started focusing more actively on the strategic level of reforms, and more specifically on the criminal justice sector, by targeting the most important actors in the ‘criminal chain’ – including prosecution services, courts, the High Judicial Council, penitentiary, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Palestinian bar association, civil society and the scientific legal community.

We realised that we needed a holistic approach that would help us bridge and merge security and justice because there was a fear that the justice system would be left behind and would not be able to catch up with the security system

argues a Department for International Development (DfID) official (interview 16 April 2013). But the engagement of the mission in the strategic planning by Ministries, and in the preparation of draft laws regarding the civil police and justice system, might potentially have some unintended consequences. This is because there is no parliamentary oversight, since there has

been a paralysis after the 2006 elections, and all the laws are being passed by presidential decrees. As a result, while the mission is trying to promote rule of law and good governance, ironically it operates in an environment where there is a clear democratic deficit.

EUPOL COPPS has been ‘handicapped’ because of the realities of the Israeli occupation on the ground. First, since the mission does not have an executive mandate, it can be present only in Area A of the West Bank where the Palestinian civil police are also allowed to operate. This limits the space, but also the projects that the mission could potentially run and, consequently, also its operational effectiveness. The fact that the mission operates in an environment where everything it does has to be approved by Israel first also poses specific limitations. Henrik Malmquist, a former head of the mission, argued that ‘any equipment we bring in has to be approved by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories’ (Hass 2011).

European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)

On 1 April 2011, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision for the deployment of a military operation in Libya which would contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced persons and support (with specific capabilities) the humanitarian agencies in their activities. EUFOR Libya’s activation was made conditional on the receipt of a request from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The decision envisaged an Italian commander with operational headquarters in Rome, a budget of EUR7.9 million and an initial duration of four months (Council of the European Union 2011). The planning had included four different scenarios for action in case of its deployment: 1) escorting humanitarian convoys; 2) evacuating humanitarian aid workers; 3) securing the port of Misrata; and 4) ensuring the security of humanitarian aid provisions in the long-term perspectives (Koenig 2011: 16). Since OCHA never requested its deployment, EUFOR Libya remained a ‘ghost CSDP operation’ (Hatzigeorgopoulos and Fara-Andrianarijaona 2013: 3), which formally terminated its non-operation in November 2011. The failure regarding the deployment of the mission made Members of the European Parliament characterise it as an ‘April fool’s mission’ (2011), and some other diplomats to argue that ‘The CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it’ (Atlantic Council 2011). The failure exposed once more the lack of an integrated civil-military approach on behalf of the EU. At the same time, it represented the first foreign and security policy test for the Lisbon Treaty, as it was ‘the most serious international crisis the EU had to deal with after the approval of the Treaty’ (Fabbrini 2014: 177). The non-deployment also exposed deeper EU divisions, the EU’s inability to speak with ‘one voice’, and the prioritisation of individual Member States’ policies. An EU official, for example, admits that

Germany was behind the OCHA stipulation and they wanted it, because they knew that such request would not come and as such the mission would never be deployed. It was part of their policy towards Libya and their unwillingness to support any kind of military intervention.

(EEAS official, interview 23 August 2016)

Following this, the EU decided to deploy a civilian mission in Libya in May 2013. EUBAM Libya aimed to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. The mission had an annual budget of EUR30 million and its initial mandate was for two years (until May 2015). Contrary to EUBAM Rafah, EUBAM Libya is supposed to be actively involved in land, sea and air borders, offering a more ‘inclusive’ approach. The mission

did not have an executive mandate and its tasks were to: a) support Libyan authorities, through training and mentoring, in strengthening the border services; b) advise the Libyan authorities on the development of a Libyan national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy; and c) support the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational capabilities.

Due to the continuation of violence between rival militias on the ground, the mission initially relocated to Tunis in July 2014, and since then it was downsized to a minimum of three international and three local staff on hold capacity (Council of the European Union 2015b). The ‘on hold’ mandate of the mission has been extended to August 2017, as the EU has considered that closing the mission would ‘send a negative political signal to Libya, the region, and international community partners’ (ibid.). Drawing parallels with EUBAM Rafah, which has been in the same ‘on hold’ since 2007 – based on the same arguments of ‘sending a wrong signal’ – it seems that EUBAM Libya is on the same path.

The EU and civilian missions in the eastern neighbourhood

The EU’s use of CSDP instruments in its eastern neighbourhood should be understood in the context of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), but also against the background of momentous political developments in the region. The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine, and EUJUST Themis in Georgia, were launched in 2005 and 2004, in the aftermath of the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe, which brought to power pro-European, reform-minded governments. The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia was the result of an equally ground-breaking, though far from positive, event in the region: the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Finally, the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Ukraine is one of the actions undertaken by the EU in response to the crisis in Ukraine.

EUJUST Themis in Georgia

EUJUST Themis represented a novelty in the EU’s ESDP repertoire from several points of view: it was the first rule of law mission deployed by the EU under the ESDP, and the first ever ESDP operation in the post-Soviet space (Kurowska 2009: 202). While not contributing directly to conflict resolution, the mission was meant to show the Union’s support for Georgia’s efforts towards democratisation in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, as well as contribute to embedding stability in the region (Council of the European Union 2004). As the first operation in the former Soviet Union, Themis was also thought to be a good test for the EU’s relations with Russia (Helly 2006: 91).

According to the mission’s mandate, a total of eight European rule of law experts were co-located with Georgian authorities and were given one year to assist their local counterparts in evaluating the justice system, drafting a criminal justice reform strategy and elaborating an implementation plan. The European experts were co-located in a variety of rule of law institutions, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Court of Georgia, the High Council of Justice, the Public Defender’s Office, the Court of Appeal Tbilisi and the City Prosecutor’s Office Tbilisi (EUJUST Themis 2004). The mission’s operative plan envisioned three consecutive phases which focused on specific objectives: 1. the assessment of the Georgian criminal justice system; 2. the drafting of a reform strategy; 3. the formulation of a plan for the implementation of the reform strategy (Kurowska 2009: 206).

The drafting of the criminal justice strategy – Themis’ main objective – was plagued by delays in setting up the working groups and their constantly changing membership (EUJUST Themis experts, interviews February–October 2013). The routine replacement of the mission’s counterparts resulted in infrequent meetings of the working groups and a general lack of commitment on the Georgian side to engage in the drafting process. This led to large parts of the final document being drafted by the mission experts, with no involvement from Georgian stakeholders (EUJUST Themis expert, interview 10 July 2013). The strategy was eventually adopted by presidential decree, without being formally discussed and adopted by the Georgian Parliament (Helly 2006: 100). The volatile political environment, which characterised the early stages of Saakashvili’s post-Rose Revolution rule, posed significant challenges to the mission’s effective operation. Under the banner of anti-corruption measures, Saakashvili’s regime engaged in a thorough purge of the public administration – targeting ministry personnel, judges and prosecutors associated with the Shevardnadze regime (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2009: 22) – and effectively blocking any meaningful reforms which could have strengthened the independence of the judiciary in Georgia. As for the mission’s role in embedding regional stability, it is questionable whether such a small-scale and short-lived operation made a difference on the ground.

EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova–Ukraine (EUBAM)

As the second EU mission deployed in the post-Soviet space, EUBAM is to be regarded as expanding the diversity of the EU’s civilian crisis management toolbox. At the time of its deployment in November 2005, the mission not only had an innovative mandate merging border assistance and capacity-building, but represented a unique case of a hybrid mission, which was neither a distinct CSDP operation nor an exclusively Commission-managed project (Dura 2009: 282). EUBAM was deployed due to a joint request by the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine for assistance with the establishment of an ‘international customs control arrangement and an effective border monitoring mechanism on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan–Ukrainian State border’ (EUBAM 2011: 5). Its contribution to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict was envisaged as the indirect result of enhanced border control, which was expected to curb illegal cross-border activities and lead to a subsequent improvement in the regional security situation.

Being a purely advisory mission that lacks executive powers, EUBAM is not involved in the political negotiation process under the 5+2 format,² but its confidence-building work is coordinated with the overall political effort to settle the conflict. Assisting with the implementation of the Joint Declaration (JD), which introduced a new customs regime at the Moldovan–Ukrainian border in 2006,³ and contributing to the resumption of railway traffic across Transnistria represent two of EUBAM’s most prominent efforts towards conflict resolution. The observance of the JD not only provides a legal framework for Transnistrian businesses to operate under, thus curbing smuggling, but also contributes to a degree to economic integration between Moldova and Transnistria, as well as to improved cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine. At the same time, EUBAM was able to contribute – through its technical proposals and the facilitation of contacts between Moldovan and Transnistrian customs and railway experts – to the breakthrough normalisation of railway transport after a six-year interruption.⁴

While EUBAM played a crucial role in helping to improve border control, reduce illegal trade and facilitate contacts between Moldova and Transnistria, its effectiveness as a conflict resolution instrument remains doubtful. The two conflict parties – although engaged in limited technical and economic cooperation – are not even remotely close to a political agreement and there is very little political will on both sides to reach a negotiated settlement.

EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM)

EUMM operates in a highly challenging political environment, having been deployed within less than eight weeks after the outbreak of the August 2008 war, to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire between Georgia and Russia. The mission was given a broad technical mandate 'to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence-building, while also contributing to informing European policy' (Council of the European Union 2008). Although EUMM is mandated to cover the whole territory of Georgia, within the country's internationally recognised borders, Russia, and the *de facto* authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have so far denied access of the mission to the breakaway territories (International Crisis Group 2011: 5). Therefore, EUMM's patrols are mainly restricted to the areas adjacent to the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs), which separate the unrecognised entities from unoccupied Georgian territory.

The mission has deployed a variety of confidence-building measures, ranging from monitoring the compliance of the conflict parties with the ceasefire agreement to encouraging parties to exchange information and give notification of military manoeuvres, as well as establishing information and observation routines between them in the form of regular communication platforms.

As the only on-the-ground mechanism that brings together conflict parties, and facilitates information exchange on local incidents, detentions and human rights violations, the Incident and Prevention Response Mechanism (IPRM) has significant potential as a confidence-building tool. Nonetheless, in practice, the functioning of the IPRM has been hampered by the volatility and obstructiveness of the separatist regimes and Russia. The IPRM for the South Ossetian theatre was suspended for over a year because the *de facto* authorities in Tskhinvali conditioned participation on receiving information on missing or detained South Ossetian residents (Human Rights Watch 2011: 13), while IPRM Gali was boycotted for more than four years over a conflict between Abkhazian authorities and the Head of the Mission, dating back to April 2012.

Although the Geneva negotiations⁵ – where EUMM contributes with monitoring reports and analyses – have been unable to move forwards – primarily because of the difficult 'recognition' discussions surrounding the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – an important accomplishment with regard to the non-use of force, which can be credited to EUMM, is the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding with the Georgian Ministries of Defence and Interior, which limit Tbilisi's military movements (EUMM 2009). Despite its inability to fully oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement – given Moscow's refusal to withdraw from the two breakaway regions – the EUMM has been a critical actor in stabilising the situation in the region, using its monitoring and reporting resources to expose destabilising acts, which in turn acted as a deterrent to the renewal of hostilities. However, the mission's ability to maintain relative calm and stability around the ABLs does not easily translate into a long-term role facilitating confidence-building between conflict parties, and might indicate that the EUMM will find it difficult to transition from a crisis management actor to a conflict resolution instrument.

EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Ukraine

As the November 2013 crisis in Ukraine escalated from domestic discontent to an international conflict, triggered by Russia's occupation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU began contemplating the deployment of a CSDP mission to Ukraine. The operation was crucial in supporting the Ukrainian authorities 'on the critical path of civilian security sector reform' (Council of the European Union 2014a), an area of particular concern in light of the abusive crackdown of protests by Ukraine's civilian security services and the specific demands of the Maidan movement for anti-corruption reforms.

EUAM was deployed on 1 December 2014, with an initial two-year mandate to work with law enforcement agencies, such as the police and border guards, as well as rule of law institutions – including the Prosecutor’s Office – across a number of good governance areas: anti-corruption, human rights, public administration reform and strategic communication.⁶ While not conceived with an explicit conflict resolution mandate in mind, EUAM’s presence on the ground aimed at sending a signal of political support to Kiev, as well as acting as a strategy to soft balance Russia (Nováky 2015: 246). By addressing pervasive issues of inefficiency, corruption and a lack of effective command and control of law enforcement agencies – all of which had led to inappropriate responses to the crisis and an inability of the state to use force in an exclusive and legitimate manner (Council of the European Union 2014b) – it was hoped EUAM would contribute to enhancing the resilience of the Ukrainian state, which would minimise the scope for Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs.

EUAM’s record so far suggests that the mission has established itself as a well-regarded partner for the Ukrainian law enforcement authorities. EUAM has been consulted on the reform of Ukraine’s security services (Rieker and Batora 2015: 26): it developed, together with international partners, a concept for a new structure designed to assist with the reform of Ukraine’s National Police (Emerson and Movchan 2016: 23); and set up a Border Management Assistance Group, as a forum to address border management issues by engaging all stakeholders (EUAM 2015). Significantly, the mission has extended its regional outreach beyond Kiev and now also operates in the Lviv region, where it has personnel based on a full-time basis, and is increasing its activities in the Kharkiv region. Nonetheless, the limitations imposed by EUAM’s size and budget – also due to Ukraine’s sheer size and on its potential for further geographical expansion – should not be underestimated. An additional challenge for the mission’s overall success is, unsurprisingly, ‘ministerial resistance’ to comprehensive reforms – a common obstacle when it comes to anti-corruption measures, but which will have to be overcome if Ukraine is to ‘de-sovietise’ its civilian security sector (Chromiec and Koenig 2015: 13).

Conclusions

This brief overview of the CSDP missions deployed by the EU in its southern and eastern neighbourhoods reveals the difficulty of addressing complex security challenges with small-scale, non-executive civilian crisis management instruments. Given their strictly advisory and monitoring roles, the success of CSDP civilian operations hinges on the willingness of local actors to cooperate with EU actors among themselves, and on the EU’s broader approach towards the country in question. While each of the missions discussed in this chapter can be commended for a range of achievements, none of them can be said to have successfully fulfilled a conflict resolution role.

The one challenge that keeps emerging across both the eastern and the southern dimensions of the EU’s neighbourhood is that civilian missions invariably undertake technical approaches in order to achieve political goals. Although CSDP operations are part of the EU’s foreign policy toolkit, and considered to be political instruments, their non-executive and technical mandates afford few opportunities to influence conflict resolution processes. But whereas the political impact of EU missions is minimal, their performance on the ground is inevitably affected by broader political and geopolitical dynamics, to the extent that sometimes they are not able to fully implement their mandates (EUMM Georgia, EUPOL COPPS), or are effectively prevented from operating (EUBAM Rafah, EUBAM Libya). An additional complication associated with the politically sensitive contexts within which missions operate – but which they themselves are unable to influence – is that often they become prisoners of rhetorical commitments, with the EU being reluctant to terminate CSDP missions for fear that this might convey a message of disengagement.

So far, the EU has been inconsistent in providing CSDP civilian missions with adequate political support in Brussels, as well as ensuring that the operations enjoy a high political profile on the ground and are well-received by host countries. This process could potentially be facilitated by a more effective implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, the importance of which was reaffirmed by the 2015 ENP Review. In practice, this implies drawing on all the instruments at the EU's disposal to address existing challenges and promote stability, creating synergies between the CSDP and the ENP, and greater involvement of and consensus between Member States.

Notes

- 1 Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into three areas: A, B and C. It was only in Area A that the PA was given full responsibility for civilian and security affairs. In Area B, the PA is responsible for civilian affairs, while Israel is responsible for security control. In Area C, Israel retains full responsibility and control in all aspects.
- 2 The multilateral 5+2 format includes Moldova and Transnistria as parties to the conflict, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as intermediaries, and the United States and the European Union as observers. Negotiations were suspended in March 2006, but resumed in February 2011.
- 3 At the end of 2005, one month after the deployment of EUBAM, the Prime Ministers of Moldova and Ukraine signed a Joint Declaration on the effective implementation of the customs regime on their common border, in a renewed push to curb illegal trade activities from Transnistria.
- 4 The Transnistrian authorities suspended railway transport through the separatist region in 2006 in reaction to the enforcement of the new customs regime between Moldova and Ukraine, monitored by EUBAM.
- 5 The Geneva International Discussions address the consequences of the 2008 conflict in Georgia by bringing together the co-chairs – OSCE, EU and UN, representatives of the conflict parties – Georgia, Russia, and Georgia's breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the United States.
- 6 www.euam-ukraine.eu.

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